Administrative Circulars in relation to B.P. Blg.

22
ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR 12-2000
RE: PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF B.P. BLG. 22
Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 (An Act Penalizing the Making or Drawing and Issuance
of a Check Without Sufficient Funds for Credit and for Other Purposes) imposes the
penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one (1) year
or a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check, which fine
shall in no case exceed P200,000, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion
of the court.
In its decision in Eduardo Vaca, v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 131714, 16
November 1998; 298 SCRA 656, 664) the Supreme Court (Second Division) per Mr.
Justice V. Mendoza, modified the sentence imposed for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 by
deleting the penalty of imprisonment and imposing only the penalty of fine in an amount
double

the

amount

of

the

check.

In

justification

thereof,

the

Court

said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioners are first-time offenders. They are Filipino entrepreneurs who
presumably contribute to the national economy. Apparently, they brought this appeal,
believing in all good faith, although mistakenly that they had not committed a violation
of B.P. Blg. 22. Otherwise, they could simply have accepted the judgment of the trial
court and applied for probation to evade a prison term. It would best serve the ends of
criminal justice if in fixing the penalty within the range of discretion allowed by Section 1,
par. 1, the same philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is observed,
namely, that of redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary
deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the
protection of the social order. In this case, we believe that a fine in an amount equal to
double the amount of the check involved is an appropriate penalty to impose on each of
the petitioners
In the recent case of Rosa Lim v. People of the Philippines (G. R. No. 130038, 18
September 2000), the Supreme Court en banc, applying Vaca also deleted the penalty

of imprisonment and sentenced the drawer of the bounced check to the maximum of the
fine allowed by B.P. Blg. 22, i.e., P200,000, and concluded that such would best serve
the ends of criminal justice.
All courts and judges concerned should henceforth take note of the foregoing
policy of the Supreme Court on the matter of the imposition of penalties for violations
of B.P. Blg. 22.
ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 13-2001 February 14, 2001
SUBJECT : CLARIFICATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 12-2000
ON THE PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE BOUNCING CHECK LAW.
Clarification has been sought by concerned Judges and other parties regarding
the operation of Administrative Circular 12-2000 issued on 21 November 2000. In
particular, queries have been made regarding the authority of Judges to:
1. Impose the penalty of imprisonment for violations of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22; and
2. Impose subsidiary imprisonment in the event that the accused who is
found guilty of violating the provisions of B.P. Blg. 22, is unable to pay the fine
which he is sentenced to pay considering that Administrative Circular No. 122000 adopted the rulings in Eduardo Vaca v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 131714,
16 November 1998, 298 SCRA 656) and Rosa Lim v. People of the Philippines
(G.R. No. 130038, 18 September 2000) as a policy of the Supreme Court on the
matter of the imposition of penalties for violations of B.P. Blg. 22, without
mentioning whether subsidiary imprisonment could be resorted to in case of the
accused's inability to pay the fine.
The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to
remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in
the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22.

The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the possibility of
imprisonment for violations of B.P. Blg. 22. Neither does it defeat the legislative intent
behind the law.
Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the
application of the penal provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 such that where the circumstances of
both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact
without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the
more appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether the
circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge.
Should

the

Judge

decide

that

imprisonment

is

the

more

appropriate

penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not be deemed a hindrance.

It is, therefore, understood that:
1. Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not remove imprisonment as an
alternative penalty for violations of B.P. Blg. 22;
2. The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and
taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, determine
whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests of justice or
whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of
the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the
imperatives of justice;
3. Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the
fine, there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal
Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment.
Does Administrative Circular 13-2001 decriminalize violations of B.P. Blg 22?
No. Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, as clarified by
Administrative Circular No. 13-2001, established a rule of preference in imposing

penalties in B.P. 22 cases. Section 1 of B.P. 22 imposes the following alternative

penalties for its violation, to wit: (a) imprisonment of not less than 30 days but not more
than one year; or (b) a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the
check which fine shall in no case exceed P200,000; or (c) both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court. 1
The rationale of Adm. Circular No. 12-2000 is found in our rulings in Eduardo
Vaca vs. Court of Appeals2and Rosa Lim vs. People of the Philippines.3 The Supreme
Court held in those cases that it would best serve the ends of criminal justice if, in fixing
the penalty to be imposed for violation of B.P. 22, the same philosophy underlying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law is observed, i.e. that of redeeming valuable human
material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic
usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social order.4
To be sure, it is not the intention of the Court to decriminalize violation of B.P.
22. Neither is it the Courts intention to delete the alternative penalty of
imprisonment. The propriety and wisdom of decriminalizing violation of B.P. 22 is best
left to the legislature and not this Court. As clarified by Administrative Circular 13-2001,
the clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove
imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the
application of the penalties provided for in B.P. 22. Where the circumstances of the
case, for instance, clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of
negligence, the imposition of a fine alone may be considered as the more appropriate
penalty. This rule of preference does not foreclose the possibility of imprisonment for
violators of B.P. 22. Neither does it defeat the legislative intent behind the
1 Tan v Mendez [G.R. No. 138669. June 6, 2002
2 G.R. No. 131714, 298 SCRA 656, 664 (1998).
3 G.R. No. 130038, 340 SCRA 497, 504 (2000).
4 Tan v Mendez [G.R. No. 138669. June 6, 2002

law. Needless to say, the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the
imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the judge. Should the judge decide that
imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000
ought not to be deemed a hindrance.5
The Court is not unaware of the importance of checks in commercial
transactions. In commercial parlance, they have been widely and fittingly known as the
substitute of money and have effectively facilitated the smooth flow of commercial
transactions. Thus, the pernicious effects and repercussions of circulating worthless
checks are simply unimaginable. It is for this reason that B.P. 22 was enacted by the
legislature, to penalize individuals who would place worthless checks in circulation and
degrade the value and importance of checks in commercial transactions. Nevertheless,
while the Court recognizes the noble objective of B.P.22, it deems it proper to apply the
philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law in imposing penalties for its
violation. The gist of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is to consider the underlying
circumstances of the case such that if the situation calls for the imposition of the
alternative penalty of fine rather than imprisonment, the courts should not hesitate to do
so.6

5 Tan v Mendez [G.R. No. 138669. June 6, 2002

6 Tan v Mendez [G.R. No. 138669. June 6, 2002