G.R. No.

126696 January 21, 1999

SECURITY BANK & TRUST COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
TRIUMPH LUMBER AND CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court the petitioner asks this
Court to reverse the decision 1 of 28 December 1995 and the resolution 2 of 17 September 1996 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No, 33513. The former set aside the decision 3 of 14 November 1990
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati in Civil Case No. 16882 and ordered the petitioner to
reimburse the private respondent the value of the alleged forged checks drawn against private
respondent's account, plus interest and attorney's fees. The latter denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner and private respondent were the defendant and plaintiff respectively, in Civil Case No. 16882.
The factual antecedents of this case were summarized by the trial court in its decision in Civil Case No.
16882; thus:
Based on plaintiffs evidence, it appears that plaintiff is a depositor in good standing of defendant bank's
branch at Sucat, Paraaque, under current checking account no. 210-0053-60. Plaintiff claims that on
March 23 and 24, 1987, three (3) checks all payable to cash and all drawn against plaintiffs
aforementioned current account were presented for encashment at defendant's Sucat Paraaque branch,
to wit: Security Bank check nos. 466779 and 466777, both dated March 23, 1987 in the amount of
P150,000.00 and P130,000.00, respectively; and Security Bank Check no. 466780 dated March 24,
1987 in the amount of P20,000.00. (Exhs. A, A-1 to A-3, B, B-1 to B-3, C, C-1 to C-3) Plaintiff also
claims that due to defendant bank's gross negligence and inexcusable negligence in exercising ordinary
diligence in verifying from plaintiff the encashment of plaintiff's checks whose amount exceed
P10,000.00 and in determining the forgery of drawer's signatures, the aforesaid three (3) checks were
encashed by unauthorized persons to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff corporation. (Exhs, D, Dl, D-2) Plaintiff then requested the defendant to credit back and restore to its account the value of the
checks which were wrongfully encashed in the amount of P300,000.00 but despite due demand the
defendant failed to pay its liability. (Exhs. F, F-l, F-2) Finally, plaintiff claims that per findings of the PC
Crime Laboratory, the signatures of Co Yok Teng and Yu Chun Kit, the authorized [signatories] of
plaintiff were forged. (Exhs.E, E-1, to E-4, G, G-1, G-2, H, I, I-1, I-2)
Upon the other hand, the defendant bank claims that on June 19, 1985 the plaintiff corporation opened
savings account no. 3220-0529-79 and current account no. 3210-0053-60 with defendant bank's branch
in Sucat, Paraaque, Metro Manila. In order to make the said current and savings account operational,
the plaintiff herein provided the defendant with the requisite specimen signature cards which in effect
authorized defendant bank to honor withdrawals on the basis of any two of three signatures affixed
thereon, specifically those of Mr. Dee Kong, Mr. Co Yok Teng and Mr. Chun Yun Kit, the president,
treasurer and general manager, respectively, of plaintiff corporation. (Exhs. 3, 4) Subsequently, plaintiff
executed an automatic transfer agreement authorizing defendant bank to transfer cleared funds from
plaintiff's savings account to its current account at any time whenever funds in the current account are
insufficient to meet withdrawals therefrom or are below the stipulated minimum balance. (Exhs. 5, 6, 6A) Defendant also claims that the savings account pass book and the check booklets were kept by the

plaintiff in its filing cabinet but on March 23, 1987 the plaintiff herein discovered that the door of his
office was forced open including that of the filing cabinet where the check booklets and other bank
documents were being kept by the plaintiff. (pp. 32-33, TSN of August 15, 1988) Defendant further
claims that the incident was not reported to the police authorities by the plaintiff nor was there any
advise given to defendant bank and that on the same day of the discovery by plaintiff of the burglary,
said plaintiff nevertheless made three separate deposits in a total amount of P374,554.10. (Exhs. 1, 1-A,
1-B, 2-A, 2-B) Defendant also claims that immediately after the said deposit of P374,554.10 has been
made by the plaintiff, three checks namely: check no. 466779 dated March 23, 1987 in the amount of
P130,000.00; check no. 466779 dated March 23, 1987 of P150,000.00 and check no. 466780 dated
March 24, 1987 in the amount of P20,000.00 which [were] all payable to cash were successively
presented to defendant bank for encashment which was given due course by the latter after said checks
have passed through the standard bank procedure for verification the check signatures and the regularity
of the material particular of said checks. (pp. 6, 19, 20, 39, TSN of February 1, 1989, p. 21, TSN of
August 15, 1988) 4
On the basis of such factual environment, the trial court found no preponderance of evidence to support
private respondent's complaint. The private respondent failed to show that the signatures on the subject
checks were forged. It did not even present in court the originals of the checks. Neither did it bother to
explain its failure to do so. Thus, it could be presumed that the original checks were willfully
suppressed and would be adverse to private respondent's case if produced. Moreover, the signatures on
the checks were not compared with the specimen signatures appearing on the specimen signatures cards
provided by the private respondent upon opening its current account with petitioner. Thus, the opinion
of the expert witness is not worthy of credit. Besides, the private respondent failed to present Mr. Co
Yok Teng, one of the signatories of the checks in question, to deny the genuineness of the signatures.
The trial court was convinced that the petitioner bank had exercised due care and diligence in
determining the authenticity of the checks in question before they were encashed. It was rather the
private respondent that had been negligent in the care and custody of the corporate checks. After the
incident in question occurred, the private respondent should have reported the matter to the police
authorities or to the bank in order that the latter could "undertake stringent measure to counteract any
attempt to forge the corporate checks." But private respondent did not. Hence, private respondent should
be the one to bear the loss.
In view of such findings, the trial court is missed the complaint for lack of merit.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and ordered the petitioner to
reimburse the private respondent the sum of P300,000, plus interest at the rate of 21/2 % per month
from 24 March 1987 until full payment thereof, as well as attorney's fees equivalent to 25% of the
principal obligation.
The Court of appeals held that it was not necessary for the private respondent to prove that the
signatures on the three checks in question were forged of the following admissions set forth in
petitioner's answer:
14. Plaintiff was guilty of negligence substantially contributing to the unauthorized signatures or for
forgery of the signatures on the checks mentioned in the complaint.
xxx xxx xxx

15. The alleged forged signatures on the checks were sufficiently adroit as to escape detection even
under the officer's scrutiny.
xxx xxx xxx
20.3 Anna P. Naval and Roberto N. Gabutao verbally admitted that the checks were forged.
xxx xxx xxx
21. Anna Naval and Roberto Gabutao are now facing charges for estafa thru Falsification of
Commercial Documents under Criminal Case No. 30004 pending with the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, sitting at Makati, Metro Manila.
According to the Court of Appeals, the expert witness, contrary to the trial court's finding, was able to
examine the signatures on the original checks and compared them with the standard signatures of the
signatories. The photographic enlargements of the questioned checks, which she identified in court,
were in fact taken from the original checks. With the bank's admission in its answer, as well as the
unrebutted testimony of the expert witness and of Chun Yun Kit, there could be no doubt that the
signatures on the questioned checks were forged.
The Court of Appeals likewise held that the petitioner must be the one to bear the consequences of its
failure to detect the fogery. Besides, petitioner was "less than prudent" in the treatment of private
respondent's account. It did not observe its arrangement with the private respondent that it would inform
the latter whenever a check of more than P10,000 would be presented for encashment. Neither did it ask
the payee to present an identification card or to bring someone who could attest to identity of the payee.
After its motion for reconsideration was denied 5 by the Court of Appeals, petitioner filed this petition
contending that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that
I
. . . THE SIGNATURES ON THE CHECKS IN QUESTION WERE FORGED.
II
. . . WHETHER THE SIGNATURES WERE FORGED IS NO LONGER AN ISSUE IN THE CASE
CONSIDERING THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES SET FORT IN PETITIONER'S ANSWER.
III
. . . THE PETITIONER ITSELF WAS NEGLIGENT AND THAT RESPONDENT EXERCISED DUE
CARE IN THE CUSTODY OF ITS CHECKS AND OTHER RELATED DOCUMENTS.
IV
. . . RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT OF P300,000.00 PLUS INTEREST
THEREOF AS WELL AS ATTORNEY'S FEES.

In the first assigned error, the petitioner alleges that the best evidence of the forgery were the original
checks bearing the alleged forged signatures of private respondent's officers. In spite of the timely
objection made by the petitioner, the private respondent introduced in evidence mere photocopies of the
questioned checks. The failure to produce the originals of the checks was a fatal omission inasmuch as
there would be no evidentiary basis for the court to declare that the instruments were forgeries.
Likewise such failure amounted to a willful suppression of evidence, which created a presumption that
its production would be unfavorable to respondent's case. 6 It could also be presumed that "the checks in
question [were] genuine checks regularly issued by the respondent in the course of its business, bearing
the genuine signatures of the officers whom it authorized to sign in its behalf." Also, an unfavorable
inference could be drawn from the unexplained failure of private respondent to call as its witness Mr.
Co Yok Teng, whose signature was among those allegedly forged.
Petitioner further contends that the opinion of private respondent's expert witness, Crispina V. Tabo,
Senior Document Examiner of the PC Crime Laboratory, has no weight and deserves no consideration.
Tabo did not use as basis of her analytical study the standard signatures of Chun Yun Kit and Co Yok
Teng on the specimen signature cards provided by the private respondent upon opening Current Account
No. 3210-0523-60 with the petitioner. It was to be against these standard signatures appearing on the
specimen cards that petitioner was to honor checks drawn against private respondent's account. What
Tabo utilized for comparisons were signatures that were not even authenticated by Chun Yun Kit and Co
Yok Teng. Neither was it proved that the supposed standard signatures had been written "closely
proximate" to the date of the questioned checks. Moreover, the "requested signatures" on the long bond
paper written post litem motam could not be accepted as standards of comparison "because of the ease
with which they [could] be disguised to intentionally differentiate them from those being challenged." 8
As to the second assigned error, petitioner maintains that its Answer contained a specific denial of
private respondent's allegation of forgery. It could set in its answer affirmative and negative defenses
alternatively even if they were inconsistent with each other. 9
With respect to its third assigned error, petitioner asserts that it exercised due care and diligence in the
payment of private respondent's checks by first verifying in accordance with standard bank practices
and procedures the genuineness of the signatures and endorsements. Upon the other hand, the private
respondent, in the management of its business affairs, fell short of the diligence and the ordinary
prudence required under the circumstances. It should have advised petitioner of the alleged burglary that
petitioner could have applied stricter rules in the processing of checks drawn against private
respondent's account, but it did not bother to do so. Neither did it reconcile its account balances with the
petitioner in order to forestall the happening of the forgery.
In the last assigned error, the petitioner alleges that in view of the reasons it stated in the first and third
assigned errors the petitioner cannot be obliged to pay the amount of P300,000 plus interest. On the
contrary, petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney's fees because private respondent's complaint was
"insincere, baseless, and intended to harass, annoy and defame [it]." 10
Upon the other hand, the respondent claims that petitioner should have filed "a petition for review
by certiorari and not merely a petition for review." The determination of negligence by the Court of
Appeals is a question of fact that cannot be disturbed on appeal. Even assuming that the instant case is
an exeption to the rule limiting the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to reviewing errors of
law nonetheless, the issue of forgery was adequately proved by preponderance of evidence.
This appeal is meritorious.

Well settled is the rule that in the exercise of our power of review the findings of facts of the Court of
Appeals are conclusive and binding on this Court. However, there are recognized exceptions, among
which is when the factual findings of the trial court and the appellate court are conflicting. 11 The
disagreement between the trial court and the Court of Appeals in the factual conclusion, especially with
regard to the alleged forgery of the signatures on the questioned checks and the negligence of the
parties, has constrained us to examine the evidence submitted by the parties.
On the issue of forgery, we are unable to agree with the finding of the Court of Appeals that the
petitioner admitted in its Answer 12 to the complaint the forgery of the signatures. Far from admitting the
forgery, petitioner categorically denied that the signatures on the questioned checks were forgeries.
However, by way of an alternative affirmative defense, petitioner contended that it had exercised
reasonable degree of diligence in detecting whether there was forgery Even assuming that the signatures
on the checks were forged, still petitioner could not be held liable for the value of the checks because all
the checks were complete and regular on their face. The alleged forged signatures were "sufficiently
adroit as to escape detection even under the officer's scrutiny."
The Court of Appeals also erred in holding that forgery was duly established. First, Section 3, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court was not complied with by private respondent. The Section explicitly provides that
when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself. This is what is known as the "best evidence" rule. The exceptions are as
follows:
1. When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the
part of the offeror;
2. When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
3. When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in
court without great loss of time, and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general
result of the whole; and
4. When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
In this case, the originals of the alleged forged check has to be produced since it was shown that any of
these exceptions was present. What the private respondent offered were mere photocopies of the checks
in question marked as Exhibits "A," "B," and "C," 13 It never explained the reason why it could not
produce the originals of the checks. Its expert witness Crispina Tabo admitted though that the original
checks were taken back by the investigating policeman, Glen Ticson; thus:
ATTY. NARAG:
Q Do you have a copy, Madam Witness of the checks which were submitted to you under question?
A It was only a xerox copy, because the original was withdrawn by the investigating policeman, which
is in (sic) the name of Glenn Ticzon, sir.
Q Do you want to impress the court that the originals of these checks were submitted to you?

A Yes, sir.
Q Do you have a copy of the originals of the checks under (sic) standards?
A Xerox copies only, because it was also withdrawn by the investigating policeman, who is Mr. Glenn
Ticzon. 14
Yet, the said policeman was not presented to produce the original checks.
It is true that the photocopies of the questioned checks were all identified by private respondent's
witness Yu Chun Kit during his direct testimony 15 without objection on the part of petitioner's counsel.
The latter even cross-examined Yu Chun Kit, 16 and, at the formal offer of said exhibits, he objected to
their admission solely on the grounds that they were "irrelevant, immaterial and self-serving." 17 The
photocopies of the checks may therefore be admitted for failure of petitioner to tender an appropriate
objection 18 to their admission. Nevertheless, their probative value is nil. 19
Then, too, .the proper procedure in the investigation of a disputed handwriting was not observed. The
initial step in such investigation is the introduction of the genuine handwriting of the party sought to be
charged with the disputed writing, which is to serve as a standard of comparison. 20 The standard or the
exemplar must therefore be proved to be genuine. 21 For the purpose of proving the genuineness of a
handwriting Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 22. How the genuineness of handwriting is proved. The handwriting of a person may be proved
by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person
write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and
has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting
may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated
as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction
of the judge.
In BA Finance v. Court of Appeals, 22 we had the occasion to rule that the genuineness of a standard
writing may be established by any of the following: (1) by the admission of the person sought to be
charged with the disputed writing made at or for the purposes of the trial, or by his testimony; (2) by
witnesses who saw the standards written or to whom or in whose hearing the person sought to be
charged acknowledged the writing thereof; (3) by evidence showing that the reputed writer of the
standard has acquiesced in or recognized the same, or that it has been adopted and acted upon by him in
his business transactions or other concerns.
We find in the records only photocopies, not the originals, of the "long bond papers" containing the
alleged specimen signatures. 23 Nobody was presented to prove that the specimen signatures were in fact
signatures affixed by Yu Chun Kit and Co Yok Teng. Although the former took the witness stand, he
was never called to identify or authenticate his signatures on the said photocopy. Clearly then, Section
22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the guidelines set forth in BA Finance v. Court of
Appeals 24 were not complied with.
Moreover, the so-called specimen signatures on the bond paper were not directly turned over to Tabo by
those who purportedly wrote them. They, together with the questioned checks, were first submitted to
the Administration Branch of the PC Crime Laboratory, then endorsed to the Questioned Document

Branch. The chief of the latter branch thereafter referred them to Tabo. Tabo never saw the parties write
the specimen signatures. She just presumed the specimen signatures to be genuine signatures of the
parties concerned. These facts were disclosed by Tabo during her cross-examination; thus:

A It was the Administrative Branch who [sic] endorsed this document to the Documentation Branch. I
do not know the person who brought that.
Q You do not know the person who brought this document to the Administrative branch?

Q These question [sic] signatures and the specimen or signatures or standard were just given to you by
the police of Paraaque?
A It was submitted to the Administrative Branch and the Administrative Branch endorsed that to the
Question the Document Branch and the Chief of the Document Branch assigned that case to me, sir
That is why I received it and examined it.
COURT:
Q How do you know that, that is the genuine signatures?

A Yes, sir I do not know.

Q When you started making comparison and analysis of` this question [sic] signatures and standard
signatures, you did not anymore require the person, Mr. CO Yok Teng to appear personally to you?
A I did not, sir. 25
ATIY. REVILLA

A'ITY. REVILLA

Q Mrs. Tabo, like the question [sic] signature of Mr. Co Yok Teng, you also did not personally see or
observe how Mr. Co Yok Teng write this standard signature?

Yes, how do you know that, that is the genuine signatures when you were not able to see him personally
write his signature?

A. Yes, sir

A Because I examined the genuine signatures of Co Yok Teng which was submitted to the office by the
investigator and it said to be genuine, and I compared the signature whether genuine or not. And upon
comparing, all the specimen signatures were written by one, and also comparing all the question [sic]
signatures, this one (pointing to the chart) are written by one so, they were written, the question [sic]
and specimen were written by two different persons.
Q You did not ask the person to personally give his signature in order that there will be basis of
comparison between standard signature and the question [sic] signature?
A Your Honor, if the specimen signature is not sufficient enough to arrive at a conclusion, we will tell
the investigator to let the person involved to come to our office to write and sign his signature, if it is
not sufficient to arrive at a conclusion we let him sign.
Q So, you do not normally demand his income tax for example, the residence certificate or other
documents which contained this undisputed signature?

Q And this [sic] standard signatures were just submitted to you?

A Yes, it was submitted to the office, sir.
Q And when you made the examination and analysis of these documents the standard and the question
[sic] signature you did not require any other signature from these two personalities except those which
were delivered to you?
A. Yes, sir.
COURT
Q When this standard signature were submitted to you, you were just told that this is the genuine
signature of the person involved, you were just told?
A Yes, your Honor. As stated in the request it is the genuine signature.

A. We did not ask anymore additional specimen because the submitted document is sufficient enough to
arrive at the conclusion.

Q So that was your basis in claiming that this is the genuine signature of the persons involved?

ATTY. REVILLA:

A I examined first the specimen, all the specimen whether it was written by....

Q So, you just relied on what were given to you by the investigator as they informed you that these were
genuine and standard signature?

Q What are those specimen submitted to you.

A The same checks, your Honor, and the written standard.

A Yes, sir.
Q Did you confront Co Yok Teng?
Q And who was that person who gave you this document?

ATTY. REVILLA
A She said no, your Honor.
COURT
Q Did you confront Yu Chun Kit whether those were actually his genuine signature?
A No, your Honor.
Q So you just relied on the claim of the person who submitted to you that these are the genuine
signatures?

and the second. She tried to be under the third. But under the third, it is essential that (a) certain
specimens of handwriting were seen and considered by her and (b) they were genuinely written by the
person
in
question. 29 Now, as stated above, Tabo had no adequate basis for concluding that the alleged specimen
signatures in the long bond paper were indeed the signatures of the parties whose signatures in the
checks were claimed to have been forged. Moreover, we do not think that the alleged specimens before
her were sufficient in number. 30
Given the fact that Mrs. Tabo's testimony cannot inspire a conclusion that she was an expert, it was error
to rely on her representation. It is settled that the relative weight of the opinions of experts by and large
depends on the value of assistance and guidance they furnish the court in the determination of the issue
involved. 31
On the issue of negligence, the Court of Appeals held:

A Yes, your Honor.

Q And on the basis that you compare the characteristic handwriting between the alleged genuine and
question [sic] signature?
A Yes, your Honor. 26 (Underscoring ours for emphasis).
Our review of the testimony of private respondent's expert witness, Crispina V. Tabo, fails to convince
us that she was a credible document examiner, despite petitioner's admission that she was. She was
candid enough to admit to the court that although she had testified more or less three hundred times as
an expert, her findings were sustained by the courts in more or less ten cases only. Thus:
Court:
Q How many times have you testified in Court?
A More or less three hundred (300) times, your Honor.
Q How many were sustained by the Court?
A More or less ten (10), sir.
Q Out of 300?
A. Yes, your Honor. 27
Besides, under the circumstances obtaining in this case, Tabo could by no yardstick be considered to
have adequate knowledge of the genuine signatures of the parties whose signatures on the questioned
checks were claimed to be forged. That knowledge could be obtained either by (a) seeing the person
write some other documents or signatures (ex visu scriptionis); (b) seeing documents otherwise known
to him to have been written by the person in question (ex scriptis olim visis); or (c) examining, in or out
of court, for the express purpose of obtaining such knowledge, the documents said to have been written
by the person in question (ex comparatione scriptorum). 28 Tabo could not be a witness under the first

[T]here is overwhelming evidence to show that appellee (petitioner herein) was less than prudent in the
treatment of appellant's (private respondents') account. According to Chun Yun Kit, they had an
agreement with Appellee's Assistant branch manager, Felicidad, Dimaano, that appellant should be
informed whenever a check for than P10,000.00 is presented for encashment. Dimaano did not
controvert Chun Kit's testimony on this point. Such an arrangement was not observed by appellee with
respect to the payment of the checks in question.(Emphasis supplied).
We do not agree. During the hearing on 1 February 1989, Felicidad Dimaano denied having such
agreement with the private respondent. Rather, the agreement was that "all encashments over the
counter of P10,000.00 and above should be accompanied by one of the signatories" of private
respondent. But this agreement was made only on 31 March 1987, or a few days after the encashment of
the checks in question, 32
At any rate, since the questioned checks, which were payable to "cash," appeared regular on their face
and the bank found nothing unusual in the transaction, as the respondent usually issued checks in big
amounts 33 made payable to cash or to a particular person or to a company, 34 the petitioner cannot be
faulted in paying the value of the disputed checks.
Contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, the private respondent is the one which stands to be
blamed for its predicament. Chun Yun Kit testified that in the morning of 23 March 1987, he and some
employees found the doors of their office and the filing cabinets containing the company's check
booklet to have been forcibly opened. They also found the documents in disarray. Under these
circumstances, a prudent and reasonable man would simply have to go over the check booklet to find
out whether a check was missing. But, apparently, private respondent's officers and employees did not
bother to do so. If they did examine the booklet they could have readily discovered whether a check was
taken. The following testimony of Chun Yun Kit is apropos:
Q You said also during the last hearing that on the morning of March 23, 1987 you found out in the
morning that the doors of the office were forced opened?
A Yes, sir.

Q And you also testified during the last hearing that the locked [sic] of the filing cabinet were also
forced opened?

An errant husband stands charged with the crime of parricide. He was convicted on the basis of
circumstantial evidence and meted the supreme penalty of death.

A Yes, sir.
Q And you found out on that same time and date on March 23, 1987 that the documents in the filing
cabinet were not in their proper position ?

After a careful study, the Court finds all the elements of circumstantial evidence necessary for
conviction present here. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not really mean the degree of proof
excluding the possibility of error and producing absolute certainty. Only moral certainty or "that degree
of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind" is required. 1

A Yes, sir.

Chronology of events:

Q What did you do when you found out this [sic] circumstances on March 23, 1987?

Appellant Rodolfo Operaa, Jr. and the deceased Alicia Operaa were lawfully married. Their union
was blessed with five (5) children. Complainant Rufina Maminta is the mother of the deceased.

A We did not do anything because nothing was lost.

Q Did it not occur to you Mr. witness, that considering that burglary was committed in your office, the
doors of your office were forced opened, the locks of the filing cabinet were forced opened, the
documents placed in the filing cabinet were not in their proper position, it did not occur to you to check
the checks of the company as being placed in the filing cabinet?
A When we examined the check booklet, we did not discover anything lost.
Q You did not at all bother Mr. witness or your treasurer to check something might have lost in the
check [sic], considering that the burglery [sic] and the filing cabinet were forced opened?

Appellant was charged before Branch 41 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City with the crime of
parricide allegedly perpetrated as follows: 2
"That on or about the 11th day of May, 1994, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, RODOLFO OPERAA, JR., with
intent to kill his wife, ALICIA M. OPERAA, with whom he has united in lawful wedlock, with
evident premeditation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, attack, assault and use
personal violence upon his said wife, ALICIA M. OPERAA, resulting in her eventual death due to
Cardio Respiratory Arrest, Asphyxia, Hanging as per Autopsy Report and Exhumation Report issued
by the City Health Office and the National Bureau of Investigation, to the damage and prejudice of the
legal heirs of said deceased, ALICIA M. OPERAA, in the amount of not less than FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), Philippine Currency, and other consequential damages.

A No, sir.
Contrary to Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code."
Q Did you notice anything lost?
Arraigned thereunder on September 6, 1994, appellant entered a negative plea.
A No, Sir. 35
The Strangulation Theory of the Prosecution:3
Neither did any of private respondents officers or employees report the incident to the police
authorities, 36 nor did anyone advise the petitioner of such incident so that the latter could adopt
necessary measures to prevent unauthorized encashments of private respondent's checks. Hence, as
correctly held by the trial court, it is the private respondent, not the petitioner, which must bear the loss.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 33513 is hereby REVERSED, and the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
in Civil Case No. 6882 is hereby REINSTATED.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 120546

October 13, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RODOLFO OPERAA, JR., accused-appellant.

The prosecution sought to show through circumstantial evidence that appellant Rodolfo Operaa, Jr.
killed his wife Alicia by strangulation, on May 11, 1994.
Both the mother of the deceased, the herein complainant, and Joselito Paragas insisted that Alicia
Operaa was still alive when they first saw her lying on the floor of the kitchen of their house. Rufina
Maminta, an anguished mother and out of love for her daughter, begged the appellant, again and again,
that her dying daughter be brought to the hospital but seemingly without any concern, appellant
staunchly refused to rush Alicia to the nearest hospital; reasoning that she could not reach the hospital
alive.
An external examination of the body of the deceased was conducted on May 14, 1994 by Dr. Tomas
Cornel, upon the request of Mrs. Maminta. On May 18, 1994, an exhumation followed by an autopsy of
the remains of the deceased was conducted by Dr. Ronald Bandonill of the NBI, again upon the request
of the herein complainant. According to Dr. Bandonills report, the presence of multiple injuries all over
the body and the suspicious presence of multiple abrasions on the area of the neck not related to the
hanging gives the suicidal aspect a big question mark. 4 With respect to the said "suspicious" multiple

abrasions on the neck, the same were clarified by the same doctor as "[a]brasions, multiple, with signs
of strangulation, encircling the neck, at an area of 32.0 cms. x 4.5 cms., just below the thyroid
cartilage."5

4.) self-infliction, such as scratching.

Aside from the said abrasions, there were twelve (12) abrasions and one (1) contusion found on the
body of the deceased.6

As recited by the trial court:

Contrary to the claim of appellant that the deceased was found hanging from a wooden truss in their
kitchen, SPO1 Daniel Coronel of the Dagupan City Police Station testified that per his investigation, he
found no markings on the roof truss from where the victim was supposed to have hanged herself. He
also measured the distance of the 2" x 3" by 1 yard wooden truss from the floor of the kitchen and found
it to be six (6) feet. The deceased was 56" in height.
On the basis of the foregoing facts and circumstances, Rufina Maminta instituted the case of parricide at
bar against the appellant.
The "Suicide by Hanging" Theory of the Defense:
Appellant asseverates that at about 6 oclock in the morning of May 11, 1994, his wife Alicia Operaa
was discovered hanging from a kitchen truss by their daughter Jonaliz, who then woke him up and
informed him of what happened.7 Thereafter, appellant told his brother Gary to inform Alicias mother,
the complainant herein, who was residing in Brgy. Canaoalan, Binmaley, Pangasinan. Gary took a
motorcycle to fetch the complainant. Meanwhile, several neighbors saw the deceased and some even
touched her pulse and all of them concluded that she was already dead. 8
A certain SPO1 Ginder Arzadon investigated the incident. According to appellant, the said police officer
took with him the "suicide note" and the electric cord allegedly used by Alicia in hanging herself. 9
Appellant recounted that shortly thereafter,10 Mrs. Maminta, the herein complainant, arrived,
approached Alicia and opined that the latter was still alive. According to her, Alicia was still breathing
and tears were flowing from her eyes. She then went to her barangay and returned on a tricycle driven
by Joselito Paragas. Like the complainant, the latter also claimed that he saw tears in Alicias eyes and
her Adams apple was moving. Complainant then suggested that Alicia be brought to the hospital.
However, the appellant said that "theres no more hope as shes already dead."
Appellant theorized that the deceased committed suicide by hanging and placed heavy reliance on
medical evidence. According to him, both autopsy reports reveal a ligature mark above the thyroid
cartilage, consistent with hanging.
As regards the multiple abrasions on the body of the deceased, appellant tried to explain their probable
cause thus:11
1.) due to improper handling when embalmed;
2.) while being dressed;
3.) use of stone when bathing; or

Ruling of the Lower Court:

"Evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimonies of the following: SPO1 Daniel Coronel, NBI
Dr. Ronald Bandonill, Dr. Tomas Cornel, Joselito Paragas, and Rufina Maminta.
SPO1 Daniel Coronel, PNP member of Dagupan City Police Station testified that since April, 1991, he
has been an investigator and on May 11, 1994, his tour of duty was from 7:00 oclock in the morning up
to 7:00 oclock of the following morning, May 12, 1994. At around 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of
May 11, 1994, Rufina Maminta came to the police station to report an alleged suicide case that
transpired in Carael District, Dagupan City, wherein her daughter Alicia Operaa allegedly committed
suicide. He proceeded to the scene of the incident, together with three (3) other members of the PNP,
Dagupan City. At the scene of the incident at Carael District, Dagupan City, he found out that Alicia
Operaa was already lying flat on the floor of the kitchen. Alicia was wearing a duster, barefooted, no
traces of blood but there were markings appearing on her neck which must have been caused an (sic) an
electric cord. Operaas mother, Rufina Maminta, her husband Rodolfo Operaa, Orlan Maminta,
Joselito Paragas and some residents of Canaoalan, Binmaley, Pang. were present. The accused was
sitting beside the body of the deceased.
SPO1 Coronel authorized Mr. Lorie Abrejal to take pictures of the deceased (Exhs. A, A-1, A-2 &
A-3). Aside from authorizing the taking of pictures, as investigator, he measured the distance form the
roof truss to the cemented floor where the alleged suicide was committed which is six (6) feet. In
connection with his investigation, he executed an affidavit (Exh. B) attesting to the fact that during the
investigation, there were no signs of markings which appeared on the roof truss where the victim
allegedly tied the electric cord. He also identified the electric cord (Exh. C) as the one which the
deceased allegedly used in hanging herself which was recovered on top of the dining table, about 3 to 4
meters away from the body of the deceased. Also found was an alleged suicide note. (Exh. 2).
Dr. Ronald Bandonill, a physician and presently NBI Medico-Legal Officer testified that he received a
request from the Municipal Mayor of Binmaley, Pangasinan, Atty. Jose Fabia, for the exhumation of the
cadaver of Alicia Operaa. On May 18, 1994 at around 10:00 oclock in the morning he conducted the
exhumation in the presence of the deceaseds mother, Mrs. Rufina Maminta, Anselmo Doria, his
assistant, Ernesto Labayog, an agent of the NBI Dagupan City Sub-Office, Mr. Tomas Aoanan, the
Manager of the Eternal Gardens and other persons whom he believed are helpers of the Memorial Park.
In connection with the exhumation, he made an Exhumation Report consisting of two pages (Exhs. G
& G-1).
He also stated in his findings that the cause of death is asphyxia by hanging and remarked that the
presence of multiple injuries all over the body and the suspicious presence of multiple abrasions on the
neck area not related to the hanging gives the suicidal aspect a big question mark.
Dr. Tomas Cornel, physician and Asst. City Health Officer of Dagupan City testified that on May 14,
1994, a member of the PNP Dagupan City requested him to perform a post-mortem examination on the
body of deceased Alicia Operaa. He conducted the post-mortem examination at the deceaseds house at
Carael Dist., Dagupan City, three (3) days after her death. He ordered that the cadaver be removed from

the coffin and placed on a flat wooden bed. The deceaseds clothes were removed. When he conducted
the examination, the mother of the deceased, Rufina Maminta and two members of the PNP, Dagupan
City were present; while the husband, accused Rodolfo Operaa, Jr. was not around. The result of the
examination was all reflected in his report (Exh. I), with the following findings:

downward. It is highly improbable that these 13 wounds were inflicted by the deceased if she hanged
herself.
When he conducted the post-mortem examination, photographs were taken and he identified those
photographs.

External Findings
1. Ligature mark around the neck from the mastoid left and right and anterior portion of the neck above
the thyroid cartilage.
2. Abrasion, parietal and frontal area, left.
3. Abrasion, shoulder, posterior aspect, left.
4. Abrasion, midscapular line, level of the 3rd thoracic vertebra, left
5. Abrasion, lumbar region, along the vertebral column.
6. Contusion, hematoma, medial aspect, middle 3rd, thigh, left.
7. Abrasion, anterior trunk, left.
8. Abrasion, popleteal area, left.
9. Abrasion buttock, medial aspect, right.
10. Abrasion, posterior aspect, distal 3rd, leg left.
11. Abrasion, lateral aspect, distal 3rd, leg, left.

Joselito Paragas testified that he had known Rufina Maminta for a long time already. On May 11, 1994
at around 6:20 oclock in the morning, he was asked by Rufina Maminta to go with her to Carael
District, Dagupan City, to help her bring her daughter, Alicia, to a hospital for treatment. He and Rufina
Maminta proceeded to the house of Alicia Maminta Operaa at Carael Dist., Dagupan City. Upon
arriving at the house of Alicia Operaa, he saw the latter lying on the floor of the kitchen with (her) face
upward. He noticed that there was a contusion asireg below the Adams apple of Alicia and tears were
flowing from her eyes and (he noticed) also the palpitation below her Adams apple. The floor where
whe(sic) was lying was covered by floor mat. Accused Rodolfo Operaa told them that Alicia
committed suicide but he did not show them anything used by Alicia in committing suicide. Rufina
Maminta asked the accused to bring her daughter to the hospital but he answered her by saying Nanay
do not bring her anymore to the hospital because she will die just the same. Mrs. Maminta was very
insistent to (sic) bring (sic) her daughter to the hospital, and she asked the accused many times to allow
her to bring her daughter (to the hospital) but he refused. Even his brother, Max Operaa told him not to
interfere because it is still the jurisdiction of Dagupan City. After a while, Rodolfo and Max Operaa
insisted that they will bring Alicia to a funeral parlor for the purpose of embalming her but (s)he told
them not to do so because they would like the case to be investigated by the NBI. Max Operaa did not
talk anymore. At that time, there were only four of them.
The kitchen where Alicia was lying measured around 5 to 6 meters in width and the height of the roof
from the ground floor is 6 ft.
After staying at Alicias house for about 20 to 30 minutes, he and Rufina Maminta proceeded to the NBI
office in Dagupan City, which office advised them to prepare a written request. After that they went to
the police station of Dagupan City and requested the PNP Dagupan City to investigate the case. SPO1
Daniel Coronel, together with other policeman (sic) went to the house of the deceased to investigate. In
the course of the investigation, pictures were taken. (Exhs. A and series).

12. Abrasion, postero lateral aspect, middle 3rd leg, right.

13. Abrasion, postero medial aspect, proximal 3rd, thigh, right.
In his finding no. 1, the injury might have been caused by hanging or by excessive force of
strangulation. The abrasions are superficial injuries caused by rough instrument and it depends upon the
one who inflicted the injury because the abrasions are(sic) only slight or it is also possible that they are
(sic) deliberately inflicted. Contusions & hematoma are (sic) most probably caused by the impact with a
blunt instrument or by fist blows or by striking with a piece of wood. All the injuries in his findings
might have been inflicted most probably before the death of Alicia Operaa. The death might have been
caused by asphyxia or the obstruction of air passage due to hanging because of the ligature mark from
the mastoid left portion, just after the left cartilage. As he conducted the post-mortem 3 days after the
body was embalmed, he could not determine anymore whether the tongue was protruding or not. The
kind of injuries sustained by the deceased were (sic) not possibly self-inflicted especially so that she is a
woman and the injuries were located on the different parts of the body, scattered especially on the back
part of the medial aspect which might be possibly caused by pulling the victim within (sic) upward or

Rufina Maminta, Alicias mother testified that accused Rodolfo Operaa is her son-in-law, he being the
husband of her daughter Alicia. At around 6:00 oclock in the morning of May 11, 1994, she was at
home when Gary Operaa, accuseds brother told her to go with him as something happened to her
daughter. When asked what was it all about, he said that he will tell it at home. So she boarded Garys
motorcycle and proceeded to the house of Alicia Operaa. Her son-in-law embraced her and told her
Mother, I did nothing to your daughter. She said, why worry if you have not done anything to my
daughter?. Her daughter was lying on the kitchen floor. She embraced her daughter and said What
happened to you my daughter?. At that time she was already crying. She tried to bring her to the
hospital but the accused refused to let her bring her daughter to the hospital saying that she will not
anymore reach the hospital. She asked the accused several times to allow her to take her daughter to the
hospital but he refused. She returned to her house at Canaoalan, Binmaley, Pangasinan and asked
Joselito Paragas, a resident also of Canaoalan to help her bring her daughter to the hospital. She
returned to Carael, together with Joselito Paragas and again asked the accused to let her bring her
daughter to a hospital but the accused refused saying no more mother because she will not survive
anyway. She asked him several times but he refused. Max Operaa, accuseds brother also told them
not to touch the body of Alicia because it is still the jurisdiction of Dagupan City and that they should

not interfere. Accused also told her, she is my wife and dont lift her up. After that, they proceeded to
the NBI and requested that the case be investigated and then proceeded to the police station in Dagupan
City. SPO1 Coronel, together with other policeman (sic) went with them to Carael Dist., Dagupan City.
SPO1 Coronel conducted the investigation, pictures of Alicia Operaa were taken. She also asked the
City Health Officer, Dr. Coronel (sic) to conduct the post-mortem examination on her daughter. She did
not see the electric cord (Exh. C) in the kitchen which her daughter allegedly used in committing
suicide.
In connection with the death of her daughter, she executed an affidavit (Exhs. D and D-1).
Servillano de Vera, a resident of Carael Dist., Dagupan City, around 100 meters away from the
accuseds house, testified that in the early morning of May 11, 1994, he was in front of the house of one
Primitivo Operaa at Carael Dist., Dagupan City. He was there to buy cigarette in the store of Gary
Operaa. He was not able to buy cigarette because the store of Gary was still closed. He saw Cesar
Operaa seated at a bench in front of the house of Primitivo Operaa and they talked about the past
barangay elections. Primitivo Operaas house is around 30 to 40 meters away from the house of the
accused. While talking with Cesar Operaa, he heard Leny Operaa shouting and crying while telling
her cousin Cesar that Alicia Operaa committed suicide. Cesar Operaa went to the house of Alicia and
he followed. He saw the latter lying dead already but accused was upstairs bottle-feeding his small baby.
He felt the pulse beat at the left hand of Alicia but it already stopped beating. He stayed there for about
3 to 4 minutes after which he went home already.
Gary Operaa, brother of the accused testified that on the night of May 10, 1994, he slept in his store
located at about 1 1/2 meter away from the house of the accused. He woke up before 6:00 oclock in the
morning of May 11, 1994 because he was awakened by the shouts of his brother saying "father, mother,
please come to me". Upon hearing the shouting, he opened the door and entered the kitchen of the house
of his brother and there saw his sister-in-law, Alicia Operaa hanging; while his brother was untying the
wire. His brother, Rodolfo told him to go to Canaoalan and tell Alicias mother that Alicia committed
suicide. While his brother was untying the wire; he got his motorcycle and went to Canaoalan,
Binmely(sic), Pangasinan, which is 2 kilometers away from Carael District, Dagupan City. He saw
Rufina Maminta seated at the terrace of their house. He told her to come with him because his brother
needed her; but he did not immediately tell her that Alicia committed suicide because he didnt want her
to be shocked. Rufina Maminta rode in his tricycle (sic). They arrived in Carael after 10 minutes
although he travelled (sic) from Carael to Canaoalan for 8 minutes. Upon reaching Carael, Rufina
Maminta immediately went to the house of Alicia, while he returned the motorcycle in their house.
After that, he got the youngest daughter of his brother and took the child for a walk.
He further testified that on the night of May 10, 1994, he never heard any quarrel between the spouses
Alicia and Rodolfo Operaa. He likewise did not hear any exchange of words between the spouses
immediately before he woke up. When he went to the kitchen of the house of his brother, he saw his
brother Rodolfo attending to his wife and before he proceeded to Canaoalan, people started coming to
the house of the accused, among them, his brother Serving and Cesar and people whom he could no
longer remember because of his shock. Now that he is no longer shock (sic), he could recall that they
are (sic) Rosie, his sister Leny and some of their neighbors. These people whom he met on the way did
not ask him about anything. When he saw his brother untying the knot of the wire, his brother was not
standing on anything to increase his height as he could easily reach the place where the wire was tied.
Rodolfo Operaa testified that on the night before May 11, 1994, he slept at around 11:00 oclock in the
evening in the room of their house together with his daughter (sic) namely: Mary Gracem Junaliza and

Rudaliza; while his wife slept outside the room, with their daughters Mary Ann and Michelle. Before
going to bed, he watched TV with his wife beside him. While watching T.V. he observed that his wife
was thinking very deeply and sometimes she would glance at him. He was awakened when one of his
daughters Junalice (sic) Operaa said to him "Mama, Mama tied herself". Upon hearing those words, he
readily woke up, called his father and mother and at the same time came near the body of Alicia. His
brother Gary came over; and (he) told him to fetch his mother-in-law (while) at the same time untying
the electric wire with his right hand while his left hand held his wifes body and brought her down, to
the cemented floor of their kitchen. The cord was tied to the truss in their kitchen. After he untied the
cord, he laid Alicias body on the floor of the kitchen. Aside from his brother Gary, Servillano de Vera,
Cesar Operaa, Rostia Dalmacio, Creck de Vera, Rodolfo de Vera, and Ising de Vera also arrived.
Servillano de Vera, Cesar Operaa and Rodolfo de Vera felt the pulse of Alicia and they all said she is
already dead. He was then crying while feeling the pulse which was already not beating. He observed
that his wife is (sic) no longer breathing and already cold. Rosita Dalmacio also came to their house
(and) found a suicide note (Exh. 2) which she first read before handing the same to accused. After he
read it, he kept it in an aparador at(sic) their kitchen 1 1/2 meter (sic) away from Alicias body. His
mother-in-law arrived in their house and upon seeing her daughter dead, she cried and said what did
you do to yourself, you made true what you said before that you wanted to rest already. While Rufina
Maminta was uttering those words, he was in front of his wife. Then Rufina Maminta went home. At
around 6:30 in the morning of the same day, she came back together with Joselito Paragas; and scolded
him and telling (sic) him many things. She wanted to bring her daughter to the hospital for treatment but
he told his mother-in-law that Alicia is already dead as she is no longer breathing and was already cold.
He informed the Local Civil Registrar of Dagupan City about his wifes death and it was one of the
clerks therein who placed cardio-respiratory arrest as one of the causes of death because he informed
the clerk that his wife committed suicide. The incident was also reported to the police by Max Operaa,
his brother.
On cross-examination, accused testified that he did not see any tear rolling on the cheek of his wife but
he noticed the watery portion on the flooring just below her body and that her underwear was wet. He
also noticed some bubbles in her mouth and her tongue slightly protruded. He also noticed that his
wifes feet hanging was about 2 1/2 inches from the flooring and her head was touching the truss of
their kitchen.
He further testified that his mother-in-law disliked him as son-in-law from the very beginning and now
she accused him of killing his wife. During their marriage, there was no problem between them but
there was one time that his wife complained of her ligation because she cant (sic) eat, sleep and she
was thinking very deeply. One day she asked his permission to have a vacation at Canaoalan. He gave
permission to take a vacation. She even took a vacation in Manila and c(o)me back to Carael only on
May 1, 1994. He was not happy about his wifes stay in Manila but he did not make any quarrel with
her. On the third week of her stay in Manila, she called him over the phone but they had no heated
argument. The day following her arrival from Manila, they made love with each other as husband and
wife and she was happy about it. After that, she was again back to thinking deeply. He told her to go out
of the house and enjoy life, mingle with their neighbors but she did not do it. On May 5, 1994, he
brought her to a quack doctor who told them that somebody was watching her and advised him to have
the guava tree in front of their house cut and so he cut the guava tree. He also asked her (sic) wife to see
a doctor of medicine but she refused. Since his wife arrived from Manila on May 1, 1994 up to the night
of May 10, 1994, they have (sic) no misunderstanding and they never quarreled. Although there was one
time when somebody complained to the police that he kissed a young woman. His wife did not get
angry with him instead she helped him settle the case. On the night of May 10, 1994, he also saw eleven
(11) capsules of Ativan drug. His wife told him what is her purpose in taking that kind of medicine but

he told her not to take all the capsules at one time because they will cause drug poisoning. Of those 11
capsules, he saw only one (1) capsule left so he narrated before the Local Civil Registrar that one (sic)
his wife died of drug poisoning but he did not tell the police about the drug, he told them only about the
bubbles he saw on his wifes mouth. He was not able to mention about the Ativan capsule(s) and the
bubbles in her mouth when Dr. Coronel (sic) arrived in their house because he was not around that time.
Rufina Maminta testified on rebuttal that it is not true that she dislikes her son-in-law. After their
wedding, Rodolfo and Alicia lived in their house until she became pregnant with their first child. During
those times, she never had any misunderstanding with her son-in-(l)aw. Sometimes (sic) in March 1994,
her daughter came to her and told her about their quarrel but she told her to return to their house because
that is their life as husband and wife. She was able to persuade her daughter to return to their house.
Sometime in April, 1994, Alicia asked permission from the accused to let her go to Manila to attend a
wedding party. She also asked her son-in-law to let Alicia go with them but she received no reaction
from him. During their stay in Manila, her daughter had a talk with her husband over the telephone and
she saw Alicia crying although she can not hear their conversation. She asked Alicia why she was
crying and Alicia told her that her husband will kill her if she returns to Dagupan City. She told her
daughter that its just normal between husband and wife. When they returned from Manila, one of her
daughters, Marjorie accompanied Alicia to their house. On May 8, 1994, Alicia came to her again
telling her about their quarrel because her husband kissed a woman at the Interbank where accused was
a security guard. To settle the case, she and Alicia accompanied by the Brgy. Captain of Carael talked to
the girl kissed by the accused. They paid the girl P10,000.00 in settling the case.
It is not likewise true that it was on her second return to the accuseds house that she asked the accused
to let her bring her daughter to a hospital because after she was fetched by Gary Operaa. She asked her
son-in-law to bring her daughter to a hospital but accused refused.
She testified further that there was no instance during the lifetime of Alicia that the latter told her that
she was going to put an end to her life.
From the evidence, the Court finds that on May 11, 1994, at about 6:00 oclock in the morning, Mrs.
Rufina Maminta, mother of Alicia Operaa (victim), was called by Gary Operaa, brother of the
accused, to go with him to Carael, Dagupan City, saying that something happened to your daughter,
and that he will tell it at home. When she arrived in (sic) the house of Rodolfo and Alicia Operaa, she
found her daughter (Alicia) lying on the cemented floor. When asked what happened, the accused said,
I did nothing to your daughter.' She told him why worry when you have not done anything to my
daughter. She embraced her daughter and asked her, what happened to you my daughter, (t)ears rolled
from her eyes but was speechless. She wanted to take Alicia, to the hospital, but the accused refused
saying, anyway, she will not reach the hospital anymore.
She returned to Canaoalan, Binmaley, and asked Joselito Paragas to help her take Alicia to the hospital
but again the accused refused saying no more mother because she will not survive anyway. Then Max
Operaa, brother of the accused told them, not to touch the body because this is still the jurisdiction of
Dagupan City and you should not interfere. Again, the accused intervened, saying she is my wife and
dont lift her up.
Rufina Maminta asked the NBI to conduct an autopsy on the cadaver of Alicia. She reported the fact of
death to the Police station and the report was entered in the police blotter (Exhibit F) and requested
that the case be investigated.

SPO1 Coronel conducted an on the spot investigation and caused the taking of pictures of the deceased
and the place where she was lying. She also requested Dr. Tomas Coronel (sic) of the City Health Office
in Dagupan City, to conduct a Post-Mortem Examination of the deceased (Exhibit I).
Joselito Paragas corroborated the testimony of Rufina Maminta that she asked him to help her bring
Alicia to a hospital. He noticed contusion (asireg) below her Adams apple. He, likewise, testified that
he saw tears flowing from Alicias eyes, and he observed the palpitation below her Adams apple.
The claim of the accused that when Rufina Maminta arrived, her daughter Alicia, was already dead is
negated by the remarks of the accused, when he said, No more mother because she will not survive
anyway and Nanay, do not bring her anymore to the hospital because she will die just the same.
The suicide theory of the defense is negated by the remarks of Dr. Ronald Bandonill, Medico-Legal
Officer III of the NBI, Baguio City, who conducted the exhumation of the cadaver of Alicia Operaa
and his autopsy at the Eternal Garden Memorial Park, in Dagupan City on May 18, 1994 (Exhibit G-1C) which reads: the presence of multiple injuries all over the body of (sic) the suspicious presence of
multiple abrasions on the neck area not related to hanging gives the suicidal aspect a big question mark.
It is hard to believe that the victim maltreated herself before consummating her desire.
Dr. Bandonill, Jr. further found: abrasions, multiple, with signs of strangulations encircling the neck, at
an area of 32.0 cms. x 4.5 cms. just below the thyroid cartilage.
This finding strangely indicate that the victim was strangulated; thus, negated the contention of the
defense, that the victim committed suicide by hanging herself.
Dr. Tomas Cornel, Assistant City Health Officer of Dagupan City testified that the cause of death may
be excessive force of strangulation/(sic)
Dr. Cornel further declared that he did not find any ligature of a knot which would show that the victim
hanged herself with the use of the electric cord (Exhibit C). It is highly improbable for the victim to
sustain all the thirteen (13) wounds all over the body if she hanged herself.
The accused declared that the victim who is 56" in height hanged herself in (sic) a roof wooden truss at
the kitchen which is six (6) feet from the floor. It is very hard to believe how she could hang herself in
such a situation.
According to SPO1 Daniel Coronel (sic), the wooden truss measured 2" x 3" by one yard. If indeed, the
victim hanged herself from the wooden truss, said wooden truss would have been broken, considering
the size and weight of the victim as shown in (Exhibits A, A-1, A-2 and A-3).
Likewise, the accused contradicted himself when he reported the fact of death of his wife to the Local
Civil Registrar of Dagupan City. The death certificate (Exhibit L) shows that the accused is the
reportee; and that the causes of death are: Cardio respiratory arrest, Drug overdose (poisoning),
Mental Depression ("Exhibit L-1). If it were true that his wife committed suicide and hanged herself,
why did he omit the same when he reported the fact of death of his wife?

It is significant to note that the defense failed to present proof of drug overdose and mental depression.
It is possible that cardio-respiratory arrest as the cause of death, could have been produced by
strangulation or choking.
The motive of the killing could be the frequent quarrels between the accused and his wife, aggravated
by the laying of hands on his wife.
This is clear in his counter-affidavit to the complaint that the usual cause of quarrels was the inability of
the accused to provide some needs of the wife, and so the accused, got angry at her, and at times laid
hands on her.
In April, 1994, the accused and his wife quarreled when the latter went to Manila with her mother to
attend a wedding. When she failed to return home immediately, they talked over the telephone by long
distance and the accused told his wife that he will kill her if she returns to Dagupan City.
On May 8, 1994, the victim reported to her mother that she and her husband quarreled, when she
learned that her husband kissed a girl inside the Interbank in Dagupan City where he is working as a
security guard. This incident was settled, through the intercession of complainant Rufina Maminta and
her daughter, Alicia, where the complainant paid the girl the sum of P10,000.00.
The trip of the wife to Manila and the kissing incident involving the accused brought about violent
quarrels between them that prompted the accused to kill his wife.

When the accused sent his brother Gary to Canaoalan to call for his mother-in-law, without first asking
Gary to help him revive his wife; or take her to the hospital for treatment; and
When Max Operaa, brother of the accused, intervened and told Rufina Maminta and Joselito Paragas,
not to touch the body because this is still the jurisdiction of Dagupan City and that you should not
interfere; all these constitute circumstantial evidence to convict.
While the evidence adduced by the prosecution is indeed circumstantial, it appears that the witnesses
who testified for the prosecution are credible witnesses and the circumstances testified to by them are
consistent with truth and human nature and the natural course of things which, taken together, point
unerringly to the accused as the guilty party.
A witness who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and remains
consistent on cross-examination is a credible witness. (Peo. vs. Clores, 184 SCRA 638).
The web of circumstantial evidence points to no other conclusion than that the accused was guilty of
strangulating and choking his wife.
This court is convinced that the circumstantial evidence presented are sufficient to establish beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused of the crime of parricide.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for CONVICTION if:
(1). There is more than one circumstance;

In the case at bar, the following elements of the crime of Parricide (Art. 246, Revised Penal Code) are
present;
1. That a person is killed;

(2). The facts from which the inference(s) are derived are proven; and
(3). The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. (Peo. v. Bicog, 187 SCRA 556).

2. That the deceased is killed; (sic) and

3. The deceased is the legitimate spouse of the accused.

Circumstantial evidence may be characterized as that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts
from which the facts in issue may be established by inference (Peo. v. Songcuan, 176 SCRA 354).

The outright rejection of the accused that his wife be brought to the hospital for treatment is a clear case
of cover up which will not be complete if Alicia is alive.

In view of the foregoing, the presumption of innocence of the accused has been successfully
overwhelmed by evidence of guilt beyond moral certainty." 12

To the mind of the accused, this scenario to prevent the survival of his wife is his life-saving device. But
he is wrong. He cannot get away with it; because as the saying goes, crime does not pay.

On March 28, 1995, the lower court rendered judgment finding appellant Rodolfo Operaa, Jr. guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide and sentencing him thus: 13

When the accused told his mother, I did nothing to your daughter;

"WHEREFORE, the accused Rodolfo Operaa, Jr. is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of PARRICIDE defined and punished under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code; and hereby impose
upon him the maximum penalty of DEATH; to indemnify the offended party the amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND (P50,000.00) and to pay the costs.

She is my wife and dont lift her up; Anyway she will not reach the hospital anymore;
No more mother because she will not survive anyway;
Nanay, do not bring her anymore to the hospital because she will die just the same;

SO ORDERED."
The Errors Assigned:

Assailing his conviction, appellant assigns as errors, that:

I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON THE BASIS
OF CIRCUMSTANCES THAT HAVE NOT BEEN PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING JONALIZ M. OPERAA AND ROSITA
DALMACIO TO TESTIFY FOR THE DEFENSE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT PROPERLY APPRECIATING THE AUTOPSY AND
EXHUMATION REPORTS THAT TEND TO SUPPORT THE SUICIDE THEORY.
The Brief for Appellant was received by the Clerk of Court (En Banc) on October 11, 1996. In the Brief
for Appellee filed on March 17, 1997, the Solicitor General recommended the imposition of reclusion
perpetua in lieu of the death penalty.
As far back as People vs. Modesto,14 the doctrine on circumstantial evidence has been recognized as part
of the legal tradition when it was declared that "[a] rule of ancient respectability now molded into
tradition is that circumstantial evidence suffices to convict only if the following requisites concur: (a)
there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt." For the guidance of bar and bench, the standard postulated in appreciating circumstantial
evidence is well set out in the following passage fromPeople vs. Ludday:15 "No general rule can be laid
down as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which in any case will suffice. All the circumstances
proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and
at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational
hypothesis except that of guilty."
In short, it is the quality of the circumstances, rather than the quantity, that will draw the line on whether
the circumstances presented, consist of an unbroken chain that will inevitably lead to the conclusion that
the appellant is guilty without an iota of doubt. In assessing the circumstances with the end in view of a
conviction, it is, however, important to note that to preclude the possibility of any error is unattainable.
Moral certainty is sufficient or that certainty which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
Anent the first assigned error, the Court is not convinced that the trial court erred in convicting appellant
on the basis of the circumstantial evidence on record.1wphi1 The fifteen-page decision below is not
only exhaustive. It is both factually and legally sound and sustainable.
It is well settled that the factual findings by the lower court will not be generally disturbed on appeal,
such court having had the singular opportunity to hear the witnesses testify and to observe their
demeanor.

The suicide theory of appellant is full of holes and could not successfully account for the following: the
six feet distance of the wooden truss from the kitchen floor vis--vis the 56" height of Alicia Operaa;
weight of the deceased vis--vis the 2 x 3 x 1 yard measurement of the wooden truss; absence of any
marking on the wooden truss (Exh. "B-4"); absence of any marking on the electric cord; absence of the
original of the alleged unsigned suicide note; the multiple abrasions and contusions sustained by the
deceased; absence of any manifestation (except the ligature mark) of hanging e.g. protruding tongue,
elongation of neck, clenched hands, injury of the hyoid bone, ligature of a knot located at the apex of
the inverted V-shape mark, vertebral injury.
Anent the second error assigned, suffice it to rule that after reviewing all the fine distinctions between
asphyxia by hanging and asphyxia by strangulation, the court is of the irresistible conclusion, and so
finds, that the medical literature, upon which the pivot of inquiry as to the cause of death hinges, has
only established the fact that the deceased died (whether by hanging or by strangulation) involuntarily.
The Court fully agrees with the trial court that the deceased could not have inflicted all the wounds on
herself if she committed suicide.
Appellant claims that the lower court erred in not allowing the testimonies of his daughter, Jonaliz, and
that of Juana Misola. The Court disagrees. The question as to the competence of a child to testify is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. This is so because the trial judge "xxx sees the
proposed witness, notices [her] manner, [her] apparent possession or lack of intelligence, as well as
[her] understanding of the obligation of an oath." 16 The Court respects this finding below on this matter.
Besides, since the appellants brother, Gary, also testified that he allegedly saw the appellant removing
the deceased from being hanged from their kitchen, the testimony of Jonaliz, a child of tender years, to
the effect that she saw her mother hanging, is not indispensable to the appellants defense.
As regards Juana Misola, whose testimony will revolve around the alleged suicide note which was
unsigned, the records reveal that the original of said note could not be produced in open court. The
alleged suicide note presented was questioned in open court for being a mere carbon copy of the
original, and could not thus be admitted in evidence. Hence, there was no more need for Juana Misolas
testimony.
Having disposed of that, the Court will now move on to other relevant matters.
It has always been said that criminal cases are primarily about human nature. Here is a case of a
husband refusing to rush his dying wife to the hospital for possible resuscitation, in the face of
anguished pleas of her mother. Such cold and heartless inaction, as against the pitiful supplications of
his aging mother-in-law, is contrary to human nature. Even strangers are expected to give immediate aid
to the dying. How the appellant could not feel pity for his weeping mother-in-law who was welladvanced in her years and who earnestly begged for his help, and less so for his dying wife, is beyond
comprehension.
Another instance which indicated the weakness of the suicide theory is the stance that the deceased
suffered mental depression which eventually led to her suicide. This is belied by the fact that on May 8,
1994, or just three days before her death, she even went to their barangay hall - accompanied by her
mother, the complainant herein - in order to amicably settle a case against the appellant. The said case
arose from a kissing incident which took place in the bank where the appellant worked as a security
guard. The Court believes that such was not an act of a mentally depressed person, who had given up all
hopes on her married life.

The Court also agrees with the lower court that the claim of appellant that "he was extremely overcome
by shock so that he forgot to rush her to the hospital" 17 is contradicted by the gamut of collated material
evidence. It is undisputed, nay, admitted by the appellant himself, that he called his mother and father
when he saw his wife hanging, that he was bottle-feeding their baby when the neighbors entered the
house to look at his wife, and he asked his brother Gary to fetch his mother-in-law. The aforementioned
acts and circumstances were those of a calm and organized mind, not at all reflective of a husband who
was under great strain due to the unexpected loss of a loved one. What is more significant against
appellants assertion is that from the time he called his parents up to the time he called for his motherin-law - he never exerted earnest efforts to revive his dying wife.
Appellant contends that his wife committed suicide, and the suicide note and electric cord, or the suicide
paraphernalia, as it were, were all taken by SPO1 Ginder Arzadon. Based on the records of the case, it
would have been before the arrival of the complainant at around six oclock in the morning. However,
from the same records, it can be gleaned that the appellants brother reported the incident to the police
only at around seven o clock in the morning. 18 How then could SPO1 Arzadon have investigated the
incident? This reinforces the allegation that the suicide theory and concomitant suicide materials were
mere fabrications of appellant to cover up the malicious and felonious acts sued upon.
Appellant imputes malice and bad motive against the complainant. This Court has consistently ruled
that the trial courts findings on the credibility of witnesses deserve utmost respect and generally are not
to be disturbed on appeal unless the lower court overlooked certain facts of substance and value which
if considered would affect the result of the case. 19 Absent here is the exception to the rule on the
conclusiveness of findings by the trial court that "the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible and that the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts." 20
The lower court observed that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses particularly of the
complainant were full of sincerity and consistent with truth. The Court notes that one of the most
important aspects of the testimonies of Rufina Maminta and Joselito Paragas is not only that they have
proved that Alicia Operaa was still alive when they arrived at the scene of the unfortunate happening,
but that the said testimonies recounted with clarity the reluctance of appellant and his kin to rush the
dying Alicia to the hospital for treatment, however remote her chances of survival were. It cannot be
said that the reluctance of appellant was due to lack of money. The evidence has shown that he was not
suffering from shock at the time of the complainants arrival. Indeed, he had no cogent reason to refuse
aid to his dying wife. The following excerpt of the testimony of Rufina Maminta is in point:
"q How many times did you tell him (accused) that you and Joselito Paragas will bring your daughter to
the hospital?
a I pleaded to (sic) him several times even I have to shoulder the expenses but he refused sir.
q (At this juncture, witness started to cry.)" 21
All things studiedly considered and viewed in correct perspective, the lower court did not err in
concluding that the presumption of innocence of appellant has been overwhelmingly overcome by the
totality of the physical and testimonial evidence against him. The aforesaid circumstances, as presented,
constitute an unbroken chain leading to no other conclusion than that the appellant is guilty of the crime
charged. The blood of his lamented wife Alicia is on his hands.

With respect to the imposable penalty, after a careful study the Court finds merit in and adopts the
following submission of the Solicitor General:
"Section 5 of R.A. No. 7659 (An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes)
provides:
SEC. 5. The penalty of death for parricide under Article 246 of the same Code is hereby restored, so
that it shall read as follows:
Article 246. Parricide. - Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate, or
any of his ascendants, descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
Thus, depending on the existence of circumstances modifying the offense committed, the trial court may
impose the penalty of either reclusion perpetua or death for the crime of parricide.
In this case, the trial court imposed the maximum penalty of death on appellant without reference to any
proven aggravating circumstance which would justify such imposition. Accordingly, it is respectfully
submitted that appellant should be made to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua."
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction under review is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that, as recommended by the Solicitor General, appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-35366

August 5, 1931

THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF PAMPANGA, petitioner,

vs.
HERMOGENES REYES, Judge of First Instance of Pampanga, and ANDRES
GUEVARRA, respondents.
Provincial
Fiscal
Daza
Monico
R.
Mercado
Francisco Lazatin for respondent Guevarra.

in

his
for

own
respondent

behalf.
judge.

VILLAMOR, J.:
The petitioner prays for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent judge to admit Exhibits A, B, C,
and D (attached to the petition), as evidence for the prosecution in criminal cases Nos. 4501 and 4502 of
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga.
The provincial fiscal of Pampanga filed two informations for libel against Andres Guevarra. The
informations alleged that the defendant, with malicious intent, published on page 9 of the weekly
paper Ing Magumasid in its issue of July 13, 1930, a squib in verse, of which a translation into Spanish

was included therein, intended to impeach the honesty, integrity, and reputation of Clemente Dayrit
(information in criminal cause No. 4501) and of Mariano Nepomuceno (information in criminal cause
No. 4502).
The defendant demurred on the ground of duplicity of informations, he having published only one
libelous article in the Ing Magumasid for July 13, 1930. The court overruled the demurrer.
A joint trial was held of criminal cases Nos. 4501 and 4502. The fiscal attempted to present as evidence
for the prosecution, the aforementioned Exhibits A, B, C, and D, which are copies of the Ing
Magumasid containing the libelous article with the innuendo, another article in the vernacular published
in the same weekly, and its translation into Spanish. Counsel for the defendant objected to this evidence,
which objection was sustained by the court.
The respondents answered the petition for mandamus, praying for its dismissal with costs against the
petitioner.
At the hearing of this case, both parties appeared and moved that they be allowed to present memoranda
in lieu of an oral argument, which memoranda are in the record.
The petitioner contends that the exhibits in question are the best evidence of the libel, the subject matter
of the information, and should therefore be admitted; while the respondents maintain that, inasmuch as
the libelous articles were not quoted in the information, said evidence cannot be admitted without
amending the information. The prosecution asked for an amendment to the information, but the court
denied the petition on the ground that it would impair the rights of the defendant, holding that the
omission of the libelous article in the original was fatal to the prosecution.

not hearsay. (37 C.J., 151, sec. 688.) This being so, the rule of procedure which requires the production
of the best evidence, is applicable to the present case. And certainly the copies of the weekly where the
libelous article was published, and its translation, constitute the best evidence of the libel charged. The
newspaper itself is the best evidence of an article published in it. (Bond vs. Central Bank of Georgia, 2
Ga., 92.).
The respondent judge undoubtedly has discretion to admit or reject the evidence offered by the fiscal;
but in the instant case his refusal to admit such evidence amounts to an abuse of that discretion, which
may be controlled by this court by means of mandamus proceedings. In so far as the jurisdiction of this
court is concerned, we believe the doctrine is applicable which was held in Orient Insurance
Co. vs. Revilla and Teal Motor Co. (54 Phil., 919), namely, that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to
entertain an application for a writ of mandamus to compel a Court of First Instance to permit the
attorney of a litigant to examine the entire written communication, when part of the same has been
introduced in evidence by the other party.
Wherefore, the writ prayed for against the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
should be issued, requiring him to admit Exhibits A, B, C, and D, in question in criminal cases Nos.
4501 and 4502 of that court, and it is so ordered, without special pronouncement of costs.
G.R. No. L-17970

June 30, 1966

MARIA MAHILUM, SALVADOR MAHILUM, ANGEL MAHILUM, EMILIO OGDIMAN,

VICTORIO SALAZAR and TOMAS SALAZAR, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and GORGONIA FLORA DE SOTES, respondents.

The first question raised here is whether an information charging a libel published in an unofficial
language, without including a copy of the libelous article, but only a translation into Spanish, is valid or
not. It is true that in United States vs. Eguia and Lozano (38 Phil., 857), it was stated: "The general rule
is that the complaint or information for libel must set out the particular defamatory words as published,
and a statement of their substance and effect is usually considered insufficient." But this general rule
does not exclude certain exceptions, such as, cases where the libel is published in a non-official
language. "When the defamation has been published in a foreign tongue, it is proper, and in general,
necessary, to set out the communication as it was originally made, with an exact translation into
English; and if from the translation no cause of action appears, it is immaterial that the foreign words
were actionable. In some jurisdictions, however, under the influence of the liberality of laws on practice,
it is held unnecessary to set out the communication in the foreign language in which it is alleged to have
been published, so long as the foreign publication is alleged, with an English translation attached." (37
C. J., 27, sec. 336.)

This is an action for partition and damages filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental,
where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 3822. Present respondent Gorgonia Flora de Sotes was
plaintiff, and present petitioners were defendants. The latter's answer to the complaint contained a
counterclaim, also for damages. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing both the complaint and
the counterclaim; but upon appeal by plaintiff the Court of Appeals reversed as follows:

If the libelous article had been published in one of our official languages, English or Spanish, it would
have been necessary to follow the general rule; but since the article in question was published in the
Pampango dialect, it is sufficient to insert a Spanish translation in the information. The justice of this
exception to the general rule becomes more evident if we consider a libelous article published, for
instance, in Moro or Chinese, who use characters different from our own.

The findings and conclusions of the appellate court are as follows:

The second question refers to the admissibility of the aforesaid exhibits. The general rules regarding the
admissibility of evidence are applicable to cases of libel or slander. The evidence must be relevant, and

For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby set aside and another entered,
ordering the partition of Lot No. 2195 of the Cadastral Survey of San Carlos, Negros Occidental in
accordance with the deed of sale (Exh. "D") and ordering the receiver to deliver the funds in his
possession to plaintiff who is hereby declared as the rightful owner of a portion of 150,333 square
meters of said Cadastral Lot No. 2195, without special pronouncement as to costs in this instance.
The case is now before us on petition for review filed by defendants.

It appears that one Pedro Mahilum was the registered owner of a parcel of land, known as Lot No. 2195
of the Cadastral Survey of San Carlos, Negros Occidental, with an area of 150,333 square meters, as
evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. RO-6024 (22893) (Exh. "1"). Upon the death of Pedro
Mahilum in 1934, he was succeeded by his six children, namely, Tomas, Juan, Clemente, Antonia,
Juliana and Tomasa who on May 13, 1935, executed a "deed of definite sale" in favor of Gorgonia

Flora, married to Basilio Sotes, whereby in consideration of P2,000.00, receipt of which was
acknowledged by them, they had ceded and conveyed unto her
"A parcel of land (Lot No. 2195 Part of the Cadastral Survey of San Carlos (with improvements
thereon situated in sitio Calimbasan Bo. Lipat-on, Calatrava, bounded on the North by Lots Nos. 2324,
2320, & 2862; on the East by Lots Nos. 2852, 2334, & 2197; on the South by Lots Nos. 2193, 2559,
2198 & 2197; and on the West by Lots Nos. 2194 & 2196 Part of Maximina Antero, containing an
area of 15 hectares, 03 ares and 33 centares, more or less (150,333 square meters) including 500
coconut trees within said lot".
The vendors had acknowledged the deed of sale before Notary Public Nicolas D. Destua.
It further appears that Gorgonia Flora, the herein plaintiff, had declared the contested portion for
taxation purposes and began paying the taxes therefor in 1936.1wph1.t
The Mahilums, however, claimed that they never sold any portion of the aforesaid Lot No. 2195 of the
San Carlos Cadastre. As a matter of fact, according to them, Original Certificate of Title No. RO-6024
(22893) is free from any encumbrance whatsoever. They further claimed that if plaintiff had been in
possession of a portion of said lot, it was a mere toleration on their part, but not an acknowledgment of
her right if ownership over the property. It may be mentioned in this connection that most of the six
children of the late Tomas Mahilum, only two were living at the trial of this case, namely, Tomasa and
Juan. According to Tomasa, neither she nor her brothers and sisters appeared before notary public
Nicolas Destua on May 18, 1935, much less thumbmarked and/or signed the deed of sale (Exh. "D").
But could the lone testimony of Tomasa overcome the probative value of a public instrument? The rule
is well settled that clear and positive evidence is necessary to destroy the credence of a public
instrument, especially so where, like in the instant case, the notary public who ratified the deed of sale
(Exh. "D") took the witness stand and categorically declared that

referred to in the aforequoted portion (Par. 5) of the complaint (Exh. "Y"). For this reason, the lower
court incurred an error when it stated that the deed of sale (Exh. "D") came into existence only 1941.
The trial court likewise erred when it declared that no tax declaration was available when the deed of
sale (Exh. "D") was executed on May 13, 1935, for the first tax declaration Exhibit "A", was issued only
in 1941. In the first place, tax declaration No. 4995 (Exh. "A") was subscribed and sworn to on Sept.
19, 1940, but the tax thereunder was to begin in 1941. Note that tax declaration No. 4995 (Exh.
"A") cancelled tax declaration No. 4232 in the name of Gorgonia Flora (herein plaintiff) who paid the
corresponding taxes in 1936 for the land thereindescribed and declared, identified as "Cadastral Lot
No. 2195, part", the very land of the deceased Pedro Mahilum. Similarly, in 1938, 1939, plaintiff had
paid realty tax under tax declaration No. 4232 (Pls. see Exhs. "C-1" & "C-2").
True enough that the deed of sale (Exh. "D") was not registered for twenty years, but such fact does not
destroy its efficacy and the party in whose favor it was executed is not either barred from registering it
now. For these reasons as well as those that have been pointed out above, we hold and declare that the
document (Exh. "D") is not fictitious and fraudulent.
We are not, however, inclined to condemn defendants to pay any damages to plaintiff in their attempt to
assert their right of ownership over the portion of land in question that stemmed from the clean title of
their predecessor in interest, Pedro Mahilum.
Three errors are assigned by petitioners, namely:
(1) The Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the deed of sale (Exh. "D") is inadmissible in
evidence because it lacks the necessary documentary stamps.
(2) The Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the deed of sale (Exh. "D") could not validly convey
registered land because it is not signed by two disinterested witnesses.

"Those are the genuine thumbmarks of Tomas, Antonia, Juan, Juliana and Tomasa and this signature is
the signature of Clemente Mahilum. (t.s.n., p. 31, Estadillo)."

(3) The Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the Original Title No. RO-6024 of the herein
Petitioners over Lot No. 2195 of San Carlos Cadastre is conclusive evidence of ownership.

And according to the plaintiff, only Clemente Mahilum affixed his signature on the document, and they
simply thumbmarked the same (t.s.n., p. 9 Estadillo). For these reasons, the lone testimony of Tomasa
Mahilum is insufficient to destroy the probative value of the public document (Exh. "D") which,
according to the trial court, came into existence only in 1941, a conclusion that is not correct. For Juan
Mahilum (three surviving children of the late Pedro Mahilum) alleged in their complaint for
"Annulment of Contract of Definite Sale," dated March 11, 1955 filed in the Court of First Instance of
Occidental against Gorgonia Flora Vda. de Sotes (herein plaintiff)

The first assignment of error is without merit. Exhibit D is a duplicate copy of the original, signed
and/or thumbmarked by the parties and acknowledged before notary public Nicolas D. Destua. The
stamps referred to by petitioners (and required by Section 238 of the Internal Revenue Code so that a
public document may be admitted as evidence) are supposed to be, and as a matter of practice actually
are, affixed to the original or first copy of the document and not to any of the duplicates or carbon
copies thereof. There is no evidence whatsoever that such practice was not observed in regard to the
deed of sale involved in this case, and consequently the presumptions that official duty has been
regularly performed, that private transactions have been fair and regular, and that the regular course of
business has been followed, must be applied (Sec. 69[q], Rule 123; now Sec. 5, Rule 131). The burden
is upon those who seek to destroy this presumption to do so by convincing proof.

"That the defendant (Gorgonia Flora Vda. de Sotes) on May 13, 1955, fraudulently taking advantage of
the illiteracy or incapacity of the plaintiff and their brothers and sisters, Tomas, Clemente and Antonia
who were then living, induced them to sign a certain writing, which writing the defendant, in conspiracy
with Notary Public, Nicolas D. Destua ..., falsely and fraudulently represented to be an acknowledgment
of debt of plaintiffs father, Pedro Mahilum, but which is in fact a Definite Contract of Sale disposing of
Lot No. 2195 as aforesaid."
As the document (Exh. "D") which according to the court below came into existence only 1941, is dated
May 13, 1935, and entitled 'Deed of Definite Sale,' we can safely say that it is the very document

With respect to the contention that Exhibit D should not have been admitted as evidence because it is
only a copy and the non-production of the original has not been explained, it should be pointed out that
said exhibit is itself a signed carbon copy or duplicate executed at the same time as the original. This is
what is known as duplicate original, and it may be introduced in evidence without accounting for the
non-production of the other copies.

The second assignment of error is likewise without merit. The requirement of two witnesses to the
execution of an instrument, as provided for in Section 127 of Act 496, was complied with in Exhibit D.
The notary public himself, Nicolas D. Destua, signed the instrument as such witness, together with his
wife, and there is nothing in the law which prohibits a notary public from acting in that capacity.
Under the third assignment of error petitioners claim that Original Certificate of Title No. RO-6024 is
conclusive evidence of ownership. This is of course not disputed as the registered owner of the land was
the deceased Pedro Mahilum, who was succeeded by his children and heirs upon his death in 1934.
These are the persons who sold the land in question to herein respondent in 1935. The fact that the deed
of sale has not been registered since then does not destroy its efficacy insofar as they and their own
privies are concerned. They delivered possession to said respondent, as found by the Court of Appeals;
and no superior rights of third persons have intervened.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, with costs against petitioners-appellants.

Classification Map No. 871 of the Bureau of Forestry, the above parcel of land was considered part of
the public forest and released for disposition only on 31 December 1930. 7
In 1925, the spouses Ribaya applied for registration and confirmation of title of the lot covered by Plan
II-13961 before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Albay. The case was docketed as LRC Case
No. 52, G.L.R.O. Record No. 26050. Notice of the application and hearing thereof were published in
the 17 March 1925 issue of the Official Gazette, 8 and in its decision of 18 September 1925, 9 the CFI
granted the said application.
Sometime later, or on 18-21 November and 23-30 November 1925, a resurvey of the parcel of land
covered by Plan II-13961 was conducted at the instance of the spouses Ribaya. This gave rise to Plan II13961-Amd., which embraced, inter alia, four different parcels of land with an aggregate area of only
10,975,022 square meters, instead of the original 25,542,603 square meters. Plan II-13961-Amd.
appeared to have been approved by the Director of Lands on 26 February 1926. 10 The application was
not amended to reflect the resurvey and the amended plan was not published.

G.R. No. 113549 July 5, 1996

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (Represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS), petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF LUIS RIBAYA, namely, ANDREA RIBAYA BUENVIAJE,
LUIS RIBAYA, ANTONIA RIBAYA-CONDE, and JOHN DOE RIBAYA, all represented by
ANDREA RIBAYA BUENVIAJE as Administratrix of the Estate of Luis Ribaya, respondents.
Petitioner seeks the reversal of the Resolution 1 of 24 January 1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 17351, which set aside its earlier decision 2 of 9 January 1991. The latter affirmed the
decision 3 of 11 November 1987 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7, Legazpi City, in Civil
Case No. 6198 which declared null and void an original certificate of title issued pursuant to a decree
and a decision in a land registration case decided on 18 September 1925.
After the private respondents filed their Comment and the petitioner their Reply, we gave due course to
the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
The Court of Appeals' reversal was primarily due to its disagreement with the trial court's findings of
fact. Hence, such removes this case from the general rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals
bind us in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 4 We are thus compelled to review
the factual antecedents.
From the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals and the pleadings of the parties, the
following were established:
On the basis of the private respondents' exhibits, 5 on 9, 10, 12-16, 23, 24, 26, and 27 July 1920, a parcel
of land located in the barrio of Magragondong, Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay, was survived
for the spouses Luis Ribaya and Agustina Revatoris (hereinafter the spouses Ribaya) by Telesforo
Untalan, a Bureau of Lands surveyor. The parcel of land was found to comprise an area of 25,542,603
square meters. The survey plan was denominated as Plan II-13961 and allegedly approved by the Acting
Director of Lands on 3 January 1922. However, as noted by the Court of Appeals in its 9 January 1991 1
decision, 6 these exhibits do not at all show the surveyor's signature. Moreover, its per Land

On 31 July 1926, the corresponding decree of registration was issued, 11 while on 19 August 1926,
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 3947 covering the four lots embraced by Plan II-13961-Amd.
was issued in the names of the spouses Ribaya. 12
On 11 September 1958, OCT No. 3947 was administratively reconstituted from the owner's duplicate
copy thereof and the reconstituted title was denominated as OCT No. P0-10848 (3947). 13
In 1964, the heirs of Luis Ribaya (herein private respondents) received compensation from the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission of the United States for damages sustained by the land during the war. 14
In 1968, pursuant to a deed of partition executed by the private respondents herein, the land covered by
OCT No. RO-10848 (3947) was subdivided per Subdivision Plan LRC Psd-96075, approved on 16
December 1968. 15Then, OCT No. RO-10848 (3947) was cancelled and separate Transfer Certificates of
Title (TCT) were issued to the private respondents. 16
In a letter dated 6 January 1977, sixty-two (62) farmers occupying the land 17 and claiming ownership
thereof, requested the Director of Lands to institute an action to annul OCT No. RO-10848
(3947). 18 Finding merit in the request, herein petitioner filed a verified complaint, dated 17 August
1978, with the CFI (now Regional Trial Court) of Albay, Branch V, for the declaration of nullity of OCT
No. 3947, OCT No. RO-10848 (3947), and all subsequent titles emanating from the original title, viz.,
TCT Nos. T-31333 to T-31358, inclusive. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 6198.
The petitioner claimed therein that OCT No. 3947 was obtained through fraud and that the land
registration court did not acquire jurisdiction over the land for lack of republication of the amended
plan, neither did the spouses-applicants comply with Section 45 (],) of Act No. 2874. 19 The petitioner
further alleged that at the time the petition for registration was filed, the land covered therein was forest
land, and therefore, inalienable.
On 27 October 1979, the aforementioned 62 farmers filed a complaint-in-intervention and prayed that
the land revert to the petitioner and their titles over the portions respectively occupied by them
confirmed.

In its decision of 11 November 1987, 20 the Regional Trial Court (RTC) held for the petitioner as
follows:

It is well-settled that lands of the public domain classified as forest or timber lands, are incapable of
registration in the names of private persons and their inclusion in a title nullifies the title (Director of
Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177 and cases cited therein.) 25

WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 3947 and administratively reconstituted Original
Certificate of Title No. RO-10848 (3947) as null and void ab initio and without force and effect;
2. Declaring separate Transfer Certificates of Title, to wit: T-31333, T-31334, T-31335, T-31336, T31337, T-31338, T-31339, T-31340, T-31341, T-31342, T-31343, T-31344, T-31345, T-31346, T-31347,
T-31348, T-31349, T-31350, T-31351, T-31352, T-31353, T-31354, T-31355, T-31356, T-31357 and T31358, emanating from OCT No. 3947 and OCT No. RO-10848 (3947), all issued to the heirs of Luis
Ribaya and Agustina Revatoris, as likewise null and void and without force and effect.
3. Ordering [respondents] Heirs of Luis Ribaya and Agustina Revatoris to surrender their copy of OCT
No. RO-10848 (3947) as well as their separate transfer certificates of title to the Register of Deeds of
Albay, who (sic) is thereafter directed or ordered to cancel the same.

In refuting the claim of the private respondents that publication of the amended survey plan was
unnecessary in light of the decision of this Court in Benin vs. Tuazon, 26 the Court of Appeals held that
the facts in Benin were different. In Benin, an approved survey plan was submitted before the property
was decreed for registration, while in the present case:
[T]he land was decreed for registration on September 18, 1925 while its survey was performed
sometime in November and December 1925. The amended survey plan (plan II-13961-Amd.) thereof
was approved by the Director of Lands on February 26, 1926. In other words, the survey plan (plan II13961-Amd.) of the land in the instant case was approved when the land was already decreed for
registration. . . . 27
There was then, the Court of Appeals concluded, a violation of Sections 23 and 26 of Act No. 496. 28
The private respondents seasonably moved for a reconsideration of this decision.

4. Ordering the reversion of the land to [petitioner] Republic of the Philippines, as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.
5. And ordering the dismissal of the counterclaim.
The trial court found that at the time the spouses Ribaya filed their petition for registration, the land was
already classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land; however, the then CFI, as a land
registration court, did not acquire jurisdiction over the said lot due to lack of publication or
republication in the Official Gazette of Plan II-13961-Amd., which was the basis of the decree of
registration and OCT No. 3947. Consequently, said OCT No. 3947 and its derivative titles were
void. 21 In so finding, it relied on Fewkes vs. Vasquez, 22 where it was held that any amendment or
alteration in the description of the land after its publication and decree of registration was not
permissible unless coupled with republication.
The trial court likewise ruled that there was no evidence that the possession of the spouses Ribaya and
their predecessors-in-interests was open, continuous, and adverse under a bona fide claim of ownership
for the required number of years; moreover, they failed to present any tax declarations. It then
concluded that the said spouses may have occupied portions of the land at a later time, but not in the
concept of bona fide owners, for mere casual cultivation and raising of cattle on the land did not
constitute "possession" as contemplated by law. 23
The private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 17351), which, in its
decision 24 of 9 January 1991, affirmed in toto the appealed decision of the trial court. The appellate
court further pointed out another reason why the registration in favor of the applicants was invalid, thus:
[W]hen [the] spouses [Luis Ribaya and Agustina Revatoris] applied for registration thereof in their
names said land was still part of the public forest. The land was released for public disposition only
onDecember 31, 1930 as shown by the Land Classification Map No. 871 of the Bureau of Forestry
(Exhs. K, K-5). Consequently, OCT No. 3947 as reconstituted by OCT No. RO-10848 is void ab initio.

In its resolution 29 of 24 January 1994, the Court of Appeals granted the motion for reconsideration and
set aside its decision of 9 January 1991, reversed that of the trial court of 11 November 1987, and
dismissed the complaint and the complaint-in-intervention in Civil Case No. 6198 of Branch 7 of the
RTC of Legazpi City. In overturning its previous decision, the Court of Appeals ruled that OCT No.
3947 "is conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Government and all its branches (Sec.
38, Act No. 496) as to all matters contained therein (Sec. 47, Act No. 496). One (1) year after its
transcription which is the date of its effectivity (Sec. 42, Act No. 496), said certificate of title became
incontrovertible (Sec. 38, Act No. 496)." 30
It further applied the presumption of regularity in the grant of the land applied for by the spouses
Ribaya, and even extended said presumption to their compliance with all conditions required by law, in
particular, their "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land under
a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894." It thus burdened the Republic "to prove
otherwise." 31
It likewise ruled that the failure of the spouses Ribaya to present tax receipts was not fatal, and that
although they actually lived in Gas, Albay, such did not negate the character of their possession for
"[p]ossession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a men has to have his feet on every square meter
of ground before he can be said that he is in possession." 32
The Court of Appeals also rejected the application of the Fewkes case and applied, instead, the decision
in Benin, where this Court held that republication could be dispensed with in an amendment in the
application or in the survey plan, where such amendment consisted of the exclusion of a portion covered
by the original application and the original survey plan as published. Accordingly, the land registration
court retained its jurisdiction.
Finally, the Court of Appeals withdrew its earlier finding that the land in question still formed part of
the public forest at the time of the application for registration. It asserted, instead, that there was
insufficient basis to conclude that a parcel of land only became open to disposition on the basis of the

date of approval of the land classification map, because such approval may have been made later by
authority of a prior executive declaration.33
Unsatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition and asserts that: (1) the indefeasibility of title does
not lie against the State in an action for reversion of land; (2) the spouses-applicants failed to prove
possession of the land for the period required by law, and the evidence shows that their possession was
not open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious under a bona fide claim of ownership; (3) the amended
survey plan was not published; (4) the land covered by OCT No. 3947 was then part of the forest land,
hence, inalienable; and (5) the accuracy of the land survey was doubtful. 34

Finally, prescription never lies against the State for the reversion of property which is part of the public
forest or of a forest reservation which was registered in favor of any party. Then too, public land
registered under the Land Registration Act may be recovered by the State at any time. In Republic
vs. Animas, 40 we ruled:
Public land fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be recovered or reverted to the
state in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act. Prescription does not lie against the state in
such cases for the Statute of Limitations does not run against the state. The right of reversion or
reconveyance to the state is not barred by prescription.

In their Comment, the private respondents allege that the petition merely raises factual matters and
argue that OCT No. 3947 is absolutely incontestable, considering that the land was no longer part of the
public forest when it was decreed in favor of their parents. They further contend, invoking Benin, that
the issue of republication is inapplicable since the publication of the original survey plan was already
had in compliance with law. Moreover, possession of the land by their parents, the spouses-applicants,
was duly proven, i.e., donations of portions thereof in favor of the government and the compensation
they received from the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States for damages
sustained by the land during the war sufficiently proved that they were the legitimate owners of the
land. Finally, the original survey plan could no longer be questioned by the petitioner. 35

We therefore hold that since the land applied for by the spouses Ribaya was part of the public forest and
released only on 31 December 1930, 41 the land registration court acquired no jurisdiction over the land,
which was not yet alienable and disposable. Hence, the State's action to annul the certificates of title
issued thereunder and for the reversion of the land is not barred by prescription.

As the Court sees it, only two relevant issues need be resolved, to wit:

As found by both the trial court in Civil Case No. 6198 and the Court of Appeals, the notice of the
hearing of application of the spouses Ribaya for the registration of the land covered by the original plan
was published in the 17 March 1925 issue of the Official Gazette. In short, there was only
one publication thereof. Section 31 of Act No. 496, the governing law then, required two publications.
Hence, the decision of 18 September 1925 of the land registration court was void for want of the
required publications. The requirement of dual publication is one of the essential bases of the
jurisdiction of the registration court; 42 it is a jurisdictional requisite. 43 Land registration is a
proceeding in rem and jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the
land through publication and service of notice. 44

1. Whether the Republic of the Philippines is barred by prescription to bring the action for annulment of
OCT No. 3947 and all its derivative certificates of title; and
2. Whether the land registration court acquired jurisdiction over the four parcels of land subject of the
amended survey plan (Plan II-13961-Amd.) and covered by the decree issued on 31 July 1926 by the
General Land Registration Office pursuant to the decision of the said court of 18 September 1925.
As to the first issue, we find that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that OCT No. 3947 was, to
repeat:
[C]onclusive upon and against all persons, including the Government and all its branches (Sec. 38, Act
No. 496) as to all matters contained therein (Sec. 47, Act No. 496). One (1) year after its transcription
which is the date of its effectivity (Sec. 42, Act No. 496), said certificate of title became incontrovertible
(Sec. 38, Act No. 496). 36
First, the one-year period provided for in Section 38 of Act No. 496 merely refers to a petition for
review and is reckoned from the entry of the decree. In the second place, there are other remedies
available to an aggrieved party after the said one-year period, e.g., reconveyance, covered by Section 65
of Act No. 496 which, inter alia, provides that "in all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner
may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud, without prejudice,
however, to the rights of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title." 37 Likewise, an action for
damages is sanctioned in cases where the property has been transferred to an innocent purchaser for
value, which may be filed within four years from discovery of the fraud. 38 Recourse may also be had
against the Assurance Fund. 39

Anent the second issue, we hold that the land registration court in LRC Case No. 52, G.L.R.O. Record
No. 26050 never acquired jurisdiction over the land covered by either the original plan (Plan II-13961)
or the amended plan (Plan II-13961-Amd.) for lack of sufficient publication of the first and total want of
publication of the second.

Worse, the decision of 18 September 1925 was entirely based on an alleged original survey plan. The
fact remains, however, that in November of that year that original plan was amended (Plan II-13961Amd.) and the amended plan was not published at all. There is no evidence that the court amended its
decision to conform to the amended plan, neither is there a showing that the parties even attempted
publication thereof. However, the decree that was subsequently issued was based on the amended plan
insofar as the four lots were concerned.
A decree of registration is required to recite the description of the land. 45 On the basis of the decree,
OCT No. 3947 was issued. It follows then that the land registration court may have attended its decision
to conform to the amended plan for the four lots which ultimately found their way into the decree issued
by the General Land Registration Office, and finally, into OCT No. 3947. Whether it did so or not and
the General Land Registration Office merely adjusted the decree to conform to the amended plan, such
aims were fatally flawed due to the absence of publication of the amended plan. As such, the land
registration court acquired no jurisdiction over the land embraced by the amended plan.
The Court of Appeals in its challenged resolution of 24 January 1994 and the private respondents,
however, maintain that the publication of the amended plan was unnecessary under our pronouncements
in Benin
vs.Tuazon. 46 This
case
reiterates
our
rulings
in Philippine
Manufacturing
Co. vs. Imperial, 47 Juan and Chuongco vs. Ortiz, 48Bank of the Philippine Islands vs.

Acuna, 49 Lichauco vs. Herederos de Corpus, 50 and Director of Lands vs. Benitez, 51that only where the
original survey plan is amended during the registration proceedings, by the addition of land not
previously included in the original plan, should publication be made in order to confer jurisdiction on
the court to order the registration of the area added after the publication of the original plan. Conversely,
if the amendment does not involve an addition, but on the contrary, a reduction of the original area that
was published, no new publication is required.
Reliance on Benin and its predecessors is misplaced. In the first place, the amendment of the original
survey plan for the land applied for by the spouses Ribaya was made after the land registration court
rendered its decision. It follows then that a re-opening of the case was indispensable; however, no such
re-opening appears to have been done therein. Second, as earlier shown, the land registration court
acquired no jurisdiction over the land covered by the original plan because of insufficient publication in
the Official Gazette. Third, it has not been sufficiently shown that the four parcels of land covered by
OCT No. 3947, which are based on the amended plan, are but a small part of the same land covered by
the original survey plan. This conclusion is thoroughly discussed below.
In the 24 January 1994 resolution of the Court of Appeals, it found the original areas covered by Plan II13961 to be 25,542,603 square meters and the four parcels of land embraced in the amended plan, Plan
II-13961-Amd., to be in the aggregate of 10,975,022 square meters. Thus:
In the case at bar, in 1925, the spouses Ribaya sought for a judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title of the land described as follows:
Parcel of Land (plan II-13961) containing an area of 25,542,603 square meters, with the buildings and
improvements thereon, situated in the Barrio Magragondong, Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay,
P.I. . . . (Emphasis supplied).
Said 25,542,603 square meter land was surveyed on July 9, 10, 12-16, 23, 24, 26 and 27, 1920 by
Telesforo Untalan, a surveyor of the Bureau of Lands which survey was approved by the Acting
Director of Lands on January 3, 1922. (Exh. 6).
The notice of application and hearing of the land as aforedescribed, was published in the March 17,
1925 issue of the Official Gazette (Exhs. J and J-1).
The land registration court issued a decision in favor of the spouses Ribaya on September 18, 1925 but
for a smaller parcel of land than the 25,542,603 square meters are applied for. On November 23 and 30,
1925, said smaller parcel of land was surveyed by Land Surveyor Wenceslao Manuel, and was approved
by the Director of Lands on February 26, 1926 as Plan II-13961-Amd. (Exh. H and series).
Plan II-13961-Amd. embraced 4 parcels of land in the aggregate area of 10,975,022 square meters
separately described as follows:
1. A parcel of land (Lot No. 1 Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 3,318,454 square meters,
more or less;
2. A parcel of land (Lot No. 2 Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 1,575,195 square meters,
more or less;

3. A parcel of land (Lot No. 3 Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 4,844,205 square meters,
more or less;
4. A parcel of land (Lot No. 4 Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 1,237,368 square meters,
more or less. 52
This was also its finding in its earlier decision of 9 January 1991. 53
In their Comment of 30 May 1994, the private respondents do not, for obvious reasons, dispute such
finding and so they not only quoted it therein, 54 they also explicitly assert that:
The undisputed facts are that the original plan of the land applied for which was published in the
Official Gazette contained an area of 25,542,603 square meters. The land actually embraced in the
decree of registration contained only 10,975,022 square meters. 55 (emphasis supplied).
In hectares, the 25,542,603 square meters means Two Thousand Five Hundred and Fifty Four Hectares,
two ares, and six hundred and three centares (2,554 has., 2 ares, and 603 centares); and the 10,975,022
square meters means one thousand and ninety seven hectares, five ares, and twenty-two centares (1,097
has., 5 ares, and 22 centares).
However, the trial court is somewhat confused as to the area of the land covered by Plan II-13961, as
well as that covered by the amended plan (Plan II-13961-Amd.). Thus:
[A]nd on March 7, 1978 Land Investigator Selecio San Felipe wrote the Director of Lands that the
report of the ocular inspection and investigation conducted on May 14, 15 and 16, 1977 was true and
correct, . . . that Plan II-13961-Amd., Sheet no. 1, surveyed for Luis Ribaya, with an area of 489.3649
hectares, located at Magragondong, Ligao, Albay, was surveyed on November 18-21, December 8-9,
1925 by Private Land Surveyor Wenceslao Manuel, and was approved by the Director of Lands on
February 26, 1926 (Exhibits G, G-1 and G-2 for plaintiff and Exhibits GG, GG-1 and GG-2 for
Intervenors); that Plan II-13961-Amd., Sheet no. 2, surveyed for Luis Ribaya, with an area of 608.1373
hectares, located at Magragondong, Ligao, Albay, was surveyed on November 23-30, 1925 by Private
Land Surveyor Wenceslao Manuel, and was approved by the Director of Lands on February 26, 1926
(Exhibits H, H-1 and H-2 for plaintiff and Exhibits HH, HH-1 and HH-2 for intervenors); . . . that
Original Certificate of Title No. RO-10848 (3947) covers 4 parcels of land, to wit: Lot No. 1, plan II13961-Amd.), containing an area of 3,318.454 square meters more or less, Lot No. 2, plan II-13961Amd.), containing an area of 1,575.195 square meters more or less, Lot No. 3, plan II-13961-Amd.),
containing an area of 4,844.005 square meters more or less, and Lot No. 4, plan II-13961-Amd.),
containing an area of 1,237.368 square meters more or less, with a total of 10,975.022 square
meters more or less; . . . that plan II-13961 of property as surveyed for Luis Ribaya, situated in the
barrio of Magragondong, Municipality of Ligao, province of Albay, containing an area
of25,542.603 square meters, was surveyed on July 9, 10, 12-16, 23, 24, 26 and 27, 1920 in accordance
with Section 45 of Act 2874 by Telesforo Untalan, a surveyor of the Bureau of Lands, and the said plan
was approved by the Acting Director of Lands on January 3, 1922 (Exhibits 6 and 6-A). . . . 56 (emphasis
supplied)
Note that instead of a comma (,) before the last three digits in the areas of the four lots covered by the
amended plan, as well as the areas embraced in the original plan, the trial court placed a period (.). The
change from a comma to a period is of vital significance. For, translated into hectares, the 25,542.603

square meters would be only Two (2) hectares, five (5) ares, and five hundred and forty-two (542)
centares; and the aggregate of 10,975.022 square meters for the four lots embraced in Plan II-13961Amd. would beone (1) hectare and nine hundred seventy-five (975) centares.

Costs against the private respondents.

Indeed, the disagreement between the Court of Appeals and the trial court as to the land area of the
original survey plan (Plan II-13961), i.e., whether it was 25,542,603 square meters, (twenty-five million,
five hundred and forty-two thousand and six hundred three square meters) as found by the former,
or 25,542.603 square meters (twenty-five thousand, five hundred forty-two point six hundred and three
square meters) as found by the latter, only shows the unreliability of the original plan sought to be
established through Exhibits "6" and "6-A." The Court of Appeals itself so found it to be in its decision
of 9 January 1991 because these exhibits did not show that the survey plan was signed by the surveyor.
Thus:

G.R. No. 108630 April 2, 1996

Although the trial court said so (decision, p. 4) its basis, which is (original) plan II-13961 (Exhs. 6, 6A), did not indubitably establish the same. In the first place, said original plan (plan II-13961) does not
bear the signature of the surveyor thereof, thereof casting doubt on its genuiness and due
execution. . . . 57 (emphasis supplied).

ROMERO, J.:p

Such doubt gains strength if we consider that if indeed the area embraced therein was that found by the
Court of Appeals, i.e., 25,542,603 square meters - with a comma before the last three digits - it would
have been physically impossible to finish the survey thereof in only eleven days (9, 10, 12-16, 23, 24,
26, and 27 July 1920). Plainly, the present-day sophisticated survey instruments were not then available.
Furthermore, the trial court indicated in its findings of fact that in addition to the four lots covered by
OCT No. 3947, there were other large tracts covered by the amended survey plan (Plan II-13961Amd.), viz.:
[T]hat Plan II-13961-Amd., Sheet no. 1, surveyed for Luis Ribaya, with an area
of 489.3649 hectares,located at Magragondong, Ligao, Albay, . . . (Exhibits G, G-1 and G-2 for
plaintiff and Exhibits GG, GG-1 and GG-2 for Intervenors); that Plan II-13961 Amd., Sheet no. 2,
surveyed for Luis Ribaya, with an area of 608.1373 hectares, located at Magragondong, Ligao,
Albay, . . . (Exhibits H, H-1 and H-2 for plaintiff and Exhibits HH, HH-1 and HH-2 for
intervenors); 58 (emphasis supplied)
The disagreement between the trial court and the Court of Appeals cannot be definitely resolved
because no reliable copy of the original Plan II-13961 was presented. Exhibits "6" and "6-A" are a
machine copy of the blueprint of the said Plan, which is not the best evidence under Section 3, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court. They are, at most, secondary evidence, which are inadmissible for failure of the
offeror to prove any of the exceptions provided therein and to establish the conditions for their
admissibility. Even if they are admitted, they have no probative value.
Clearly then, there is absence of factual basis to conclude that the four parcels of land included in OCT
No. 3947 are but a part of the land covered by the original plan (Plan II-13961).
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged resolution of 24 January 1994 of the
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 17351 is SET ASIDE, while its decision therein of 9
January 1991 affirming in totothat of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City of 11
November 1987 in Civil Case No. 6198 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LORETO TAN, respondents.

Petitioner Philippine National Bank (PNB) questions the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals partially
affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Bacolod City. The dispositive portion of
the trial court's decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendants as follows:
1) Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P32,480.00, with legal rate of
interest to be computed from May 2, 1979, date of filing of this complaint until fully paid;
2) Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P5,000.00 as exemplary
damages;
3) Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
4) To pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED. 2
The facts are the following:
Private respondent Loreto Tan (Tan) is the owner of a parcel of land abutting the national highway in
Mandalagan, Bacolod City. Expropriation proceedings were instituted by the government against
private respondent Tan and other property owners before the then Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, Branch IV, docketed as Civil Case No. 12924.
Tan filed a motion dated May 10, 1978 requesting issuance of an order for the release to him of the
expropriation price of P32,480.00.
On May 22, 1978, petitioner PNB (Bacolod Branch) was required by the trial court to release to Tan the
amount of P32,480.00 deposited with it by the government.

On May 24, 1978, petitioner, through its Assistant Branch Manager Juan Tagamolila, issued a manager's
check for P32,480.00 and delivered the same to one Sonia Gonzaga without Tan's knowledge, consent
or authority. Sonia Gonzaga deposited it in her account with Far East Bank and Trust Co. (FEBTC) and
later on withdrew the said amount.

On June 7, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment ordering petitioner and Tagamolila to pay private
respondent jointly and severally the amount of P32,480.00 with legal interest, damages and attorney's
fees.
Both petitioner and Tagamolila appealed the case to the Court of Appeals.

Private respondent Tan subsequently demanded payment in the amount of P32,480.00 from petitioner,
but the same was refused on the ground that petitioner had already paid and delivered the amount to
Sonia Gonzaga on the strength of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) allegedly executed in her favor by
Tan.

In a resolution dated April 8, 1991, the appellate court dismissed Tagamolila's appeal for failure to pay
the docket fee within the reglementary period.

On June 8, 1978, Tan executed an affidavit before petitioner's lawyer, Alejandro S. Some, stating that:

On August 31, 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court against petitioner, with
the modification that the award of P5,000.00 for exemplary damages and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees
by the trial court was deleted.

1) he had never executed any Special Power of Attorney in favor of Sonia S. Gonzaga;
Hence, this petition.
2) he had never authorized Sonia Gonzaga to receive the sum of P32,480.00 from petitioner;
3) he signed a motion for the court to issue an Order to release the said sum of money to him and gave
the same to Mr. Nilo Gonzaga (husband of Sonia) to be filed in court. However, after the Order was
subsequently issued by the court, a certain Engineer Decena of the Highway Engineer's Office issued
the authority to release the funds not to him but to Mr. Gonzaga.
When he failed to recover the amount from PNB, private respondent filed a motion with the court to
require PNB to pay the same to him.
Petitioner filed an opposition contending that Sonia Gonzaga presented to it a copy of the May 22, 1978
order and a special power of attorney by virtue of which petitioner delivered the check to her.
The matter was set for hearing on July 21, 1978 and petitioner was directed by the court to produce the
said special power of attorney thereat. However, petitioner failed to do so.
The court decided that there was need for the matter to be ventilated in a separate civil action and thus
private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City (Branch 44) against
petitioner and Juan Tagamolila, PNB's Assistant Branch Manager, to recover the said amount.
In its defense, petitioner contended that private respondent had duly authorized Sonia Gonzaga to act as
his agent.

Petitioner PNB states that the issue in this case is whether or not the SPA ever existed. It argues that the
existence of the SPA need not be proved by it under the "best evidence rule" because it already proved
the existence of the SPA from the testimonies of its witnesses and by the certification issued by the Far
East Bank and Trust Company that it allowed Sonia Gonzaga to encash Tan's check on the basis of the
SPA.
We find the petition unmeritorious.
There is no question that no payment had ever been made to private respondent as the check was never
delivered to him. When the court ordered petitioner to pay private respondent the amount of
P32,480.00, it had the obligation to deliver the same to him. Under Art. 1233 of the Civil Code, a debt
shall not be understood to have been paid unless the thing or service in which the obligation consists has
been completely delivered or rendered, as the case may be.
The burden of proof of such payment lies with the debtor. 3 In the instant case, neither the SPA nor the
check issued by petitioner was ever presented in court.
The testimonies of petitioner's own witnesses regarding the check were conflicting. Tagamolila testified
that the check was issued to the order of "Sonia Gonzaga as attorney-in-fact of Loreto Tan," 4 while
Elvira Tibon, assistant cashier of PNB (Bacolod Branch), stated that the check was issued to the order of
"Loreto Tan." 5

On September 28, 1979, petitioner filed a third-party complaint against the spouses Nilo and Sonia
Gonzaga praying that they be ordered to pay private respondent the amount of P32,480.00. However,
for failure of petitioner to have the summons served on the Gonzagas despite opportunities given to it,
the third-party complaint was dismissed.

Furthermore, contrary to petitioner's contention that all that is needed to be proved is the existence of
the SPA, it is also necessary for evidence to be presented regarding the nature and extent of the alleged
powers and authority granted to Sonia Gonzaga; more specifically, to determine whether the document
indeed authorized her to receive payment intended for private respondent. However, no such evidence
was ever presented.

Tagamolila, in his answer, stated that Sonia Gonzaga presented a Special Power of Attorney to him but
borrowed it later with the promise to return it, claiming that she needed it to encash the check.

Section 2, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that:

Sec. 2. Original writing must produced; exceptions. There can be no evidence of a writing the
contents of which is the subject of inquiry, other than the original writing itself, except in the following
cases:

1. they may be imposed by way of example in addition to compensatory damages, and only after the
claimant's right to them has been established;

(a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court;

2. they cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending upon the amount of
compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant;

(b) When the original is in the possession of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the
latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

3. the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent
manner. 9

(c) When the original is a record or other document in the custody of a public officer;

In the case at bench, while there is a clear breach of petitioner's obligation to pay private respondents,
there is no evidence that it acted in a fraudulent, wanton, reckless or oppressive manner. Furthermore,
there is no award of compensatory damages which is a prerequisite before exemplary damages may be
awarded. Therefore, the award by the trial court of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages is baseless.

(d) When the original has been recorded in an existing record a certified copy of which is made
evidence by law;
(e) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in
court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result
of the whole.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the modification that the
award by the Regional Trial Court of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

Section 4, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court allows the presentation of secondary evidence when the
original is lost or destroyed, thus:
Sec. 4. Secondary evidence when original is lost or destroyed. When the original writing has been
lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction, or
unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic
document, or by the recollection of witnesses.

G.R. No. 186571

August 11, 2010

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
DECISION

Considering that the contents of the SPA are also in issue here, the best evidence rule applies. Hence,
only the original document (which has not been presented at all) is the best evidence of the fact as to
whether or not private respondent indeed authorized Sonia Gonzaga to receive the check from
petitioner. In the absence of such document, petitioner's arguments regarding due payment must fail.
Regarding the award of attorney's fees, we hold that private respondent Tan is entitled to the same. Art.
2208 of the Civil Code allows attorney's fees to be awarded if the claimant is compelled to litigate with
third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act or omission of
the party from whom it is sought. 6
In Rasonable v. NLRC, et al., 7 we held that when a party is forced to litigate to protect his rights, he is
entitled to an award of attorney's fees.
As for the award of exemplary damages, we agree with the appellate court that the same should be
deleted.
Under Art. 2232 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be awarded if a party acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. However, they cannot be recovered as a matter
of right; the court has yet to decide whether or not they should be adjudicated. 8
Jurisprudence has set down the requirements for exemplary damages to be awarded:

BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City,
Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari 2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present
petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization on November 29, 2000. 3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T.
Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.4 Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for
Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise
Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and
disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice,
Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce
decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.5
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of
marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry
Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite
the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed
Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be

enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine
court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any
responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered
no opposition to Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was
prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a
party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts.
In its October 30, 2008 decision, 7 the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert
was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as
he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, 8 in order for him or her to be able to remarry
under Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido
III;10 the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." 11
THE PETITION
From the RTCs ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed
in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse.
He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file
the petition only to the Filipino spouse an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with
sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for
bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiance in the Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving
him, would be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn,
in their respective Comments,14 both support Gerberts position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign
divorce decree.

THE COURTS RULING

The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the
substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages void 15 and voidable16 marriages. In
both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists
before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the
lawful union for cause arising after the marriage. 17 Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce
between Filipino citizens.18
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien,
President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom
Constitution,19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its
present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into
the law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the
Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of marital rights after a foreign courts
divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce
had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo
that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to [the
alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should
not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien
spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.
She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 22
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where
the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse." 23 The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by
clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to
have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the
foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related

issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not
recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond; 25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that
the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign
country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct
exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the
Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to
the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien
spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract
another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien
spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally
governed by his national law.26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit
of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to
petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not
sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal
interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree
itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven
according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert,
pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign
judgments. This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of a judgment or final order of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive
upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a
party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign
judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad

may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national
law.27
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a
rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of
another country."28 This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts
under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens applicable national law to show the effect of the
judgment on the alien himself or herself. 29 The recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral
aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his
or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications
or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official
records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the
required certificates proving its authenticity,30 but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on
divorce.31 Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of
supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine
whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will
be served and the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the
same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a
petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to
ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once
recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata 32 between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39
of the Rules of Court.33
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of
foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as
the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its
terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the
substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already
recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate based on the mere
presentation of the decree.34We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw
attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.

Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status
of persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil registry of
judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a persons legal capacity and status, i.e.,
those affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily
terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not." 35
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a persons legal capacity
and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status
specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in which
shall be entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;

But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the
submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decrees registration. The law
should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before
it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists
recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of
turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and
Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as it
cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, 36 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of
198237 both of which required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign
judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the
registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree
without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.1avvphi1
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the
Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A
petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the
Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected,
without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically
providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially
cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural
requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction,
may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be
filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located; 38 that the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the proceedings; 39 and
that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation. 40As these
basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition
Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

(i) naturalization; and

(j) changes of name.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the
following books, in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of
persons:
(1) Birth and death register;

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate
proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry one for recognition of
the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as
the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can
serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding 41 by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can
be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact.

(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but also divorces and
dissolved marriages.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order.
We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our
ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.

(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register.

SO ORDERED.

WILD VALLEY SHIPPING v. CA

342 SCRA 213 Conflict of Laws Private International Law Proof of Foreign Law
In the Orinoco River in Venezuela, it is a rule that ships passing through it must be piloted by pilots

THE COURT OF APPEALS, OSCAR INOCENTES AND ASUNCION LLANES

INOCENTES, respondents.
On September 30, 1982, private respondents sold to petitioner two (2) parcels of registered land in
Quezon City for a consideration of P35,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively. The first deed of absolute
sale covering Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 258628 provides in part:

familiar to the river. Hence, in 1988 Captain Nicandro Colon, master of Philippine Roxas, a ship owned
by Philippine President Lines, Inc. (PPL), obtained the services of Ezzar Vasquez, a duly accredited
pilot in Venezuela to pilot the ship in the Orinoco River. Unfortunately, Philippine Roxas ran aground in
the Orinoco River while being piloted by Vasquez. As a result, the stranded ship blocked other vessels.
One such vessel was owned Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. (WSC). The blockade caused $400k worth
of losses to WSC as its ship was not able to make its delivery. Subsequently, WSC sued PPL in the RTC

That for and in consideration of the sum of THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND (P35,000.00) PESOS, receipt
of which in full is hereby acknowledged, we have sold, transferred and conveyed, as we hereby sell,
transfer and convey, that subdivided portion of the property covered by TCT No. 258628 known as Lot
No. 684-G-1-B-2 in favor of RAFAEL S. ORTAEZ, of legal age, Filipino, whose marriage is under a
regime of complete separation of property, and a resident of 942 Aurora Blvd., Quezon City, his heirs or
assigns. 1

of Manila. It averred that PPL is liable for the losses it incurred under the laws of Venezuela, to
wit: Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje and Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje N o 1 del

while the second deed of absolute sale covering TCT. No. 243273 provides:

Orinoco. These two laws provide that the master and owner of the ship is liable for the negligence of
the pilot of the ship. Vasquez was proven to be negligent when he failed to check on certain vibrations
that the ship was experiencing while traversing the river.
ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine President Lines, Inc. is liable under the said Venezuelan laws.
HELD: No. The two Venezuelan Laws were not duly proven as fact before the court. Only mere
photocopies of the laws were presented as evidence. For a copy of a foreign public document to be
admissible, the following requisites are mandatory:

That for and in consideration of the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS receipt of
which in full is hereby acknowledged, we have sold, transferred and conveyed, as we hereby sell,
transfer and convey, that consolidated-subdivided portion of the property covered by TCT No. 243273
known as Lot No. 5 in favor of RAFAEL S. ORTANEZ, of legal age, Filipino, whose marriage is under
a regime of complete separation of property, and a resident of 942 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City
his heirs or assigns. 2
Private respondents received the payments for the above-mentioned lots, but failed to deliver the titles
to petitioner. On April 9, 1990 the latter demanded from the former the delivery of said titles. 3 Private
respondents, however, refused on the ground that the title of the first lot is in the possession of another
person, 4 and petitioner's acquisition of the title of the other lot is subject to certain conditions.

(1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy; and
(2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general,
consul, vice consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal of his office.
And in case of unwritten foreign laws, the oral testimony of expert witnesses is admissible, as are

Offshoot, petitioner sued private respondents for specific performance before the RTC. In their answer
with counterclaim private respondents merely alleged the existence of the following oral
conditions 5 which were never reflected in the deeds of sale: 6
3.3.2 Title to the other property (TCT No. 243273) remains with the defendants (private respondents)
until plaintiff (petitioner) shows proof that all the following requirements have been met:

printed and published books of reports of decisions of the courts of the country concerned if proved to
be commonly admitted in such courts.

(i) Plaintiff will cause the segregation of his right of way amounting to 398 sq. m.;

Failure to prove the foreign laws gives rise to processual presumption where the foreign law is deemed

(ii) Plaintiff will submit to the defendants the approved plan for the segregation;

to be the same as Philippine laws. Under Philippine laws, PPL nor Captain Colon cannot be held liable
for the negligence of Vasquez. PPL and Colon had shown due diligence in selecting Vasquez to pilot the
vessel. Vasquez is competent and was a duly accredited pilot in Venezuela in good standing when he
was engaged.
G.R. No. 107372 January 23, 1997
RAFAEL S. ORTAES, petitioner,
vs.

(iii) Plaintiff will put up a strong wall between his property and that of defendants' lot to segregate his
right of way;
(iv) Plaintiff will pay the capital gains tax and all other expenses that may be incurred by reason of
sale. . .
During trial, private respondent Oscar Inocentes, a former judge, orally testified that the sale was
subject to the above conditions, 7 although such conditions were not incorporated in the deeds of sale.

Despite petitioner's timely objections on the ground that the introduction of said oral conditions was
barred by the parol evidence rule, the lower court nonetheless, admitted them and eventually dismissed
the complaint as well as the counterclaim. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the court a
quo. Hence, this petition.
We are tasked to resolve the issue on the admissibility of parol evidence to establish the alleged oral
conditions-precedent to a contract of sale, when the deeds of sale are silent on such conditions.
The parol evidence herein introduced is inadmissible. First, private respondents' oral testimony on the
alleged conditions, coming from a party who has an interest in the outcome of the case, depending
exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence. 8 Spoken words
could be notoriously unreliable unlike a written contract which speaks of a uniform language. 9 Thus,
under the general rule in Section 9 of Rule 130 10 of the Rules of Court, when the terms of an agreement
were reduced to writing, as in this case, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no
evidence of such terms can be admitted other than the contents thereof. 11 Considering that the written
deeds of sale were the only repository of the truth, whatever is not found in said instruments must have
been waived and abandoned by the parties. 12 Examining the deeds of sale, we cannot even make an
inference that the sale was subject to any condition. As a contract, it is the law between the parties. 13
Secondly, to buttress their argument, private respondents rely on the case of Land Settlement
Development, Co.vs. Garcia Plantation 14 where the Court ruled that a condition precedent to a contract
may be established by parol evidence. However, the material facts of that case are different from this
case. In the former, the contract sought to be enforced 15 expressly stated that it is subject to an
agreement containing the conditions-precedent which were proven through parol evidence. Whereas,
the deeds of sale in this case, made no reference to any pre-conditions or other agreement. In fact, the
sale is denominated as absolute in its own terms.
Third, the parol evidence herein sought to be introduced would vary, contradict or defeat the operation
of a valid instrument, 16 hence, contrary to the rule that:
The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to . . . the terms of a written instrument by testimony
purporting to show that, at or before the signing of the document, other or different terms were orally
agreed upon by the parties. 17
Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract, "it cannot serve the purpose
of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all
in the writing unless there has been fraud or mistake." 18 No such fraud or mistake exists in this case.
Fourth, we disagree with private respondents' argument that their parol evidence is admissible under the
exceptions provided by the Rules, specifically, the alleged failure of the agreement to express the true
intent of the parties. Such exception obtains only in the following instance:
[W]here the written contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms that the contractual intention of the
parties cannot be understood from a mere reading of the instrument. In such a case, extrinsic evidence
of the subject matter of the contract, of the relations of the parties to each other, and of the facts and
circumstances surrounding them when they entered into the contract may be received to enable the court
to make a proper, interpretation of the instrument. 19

In this case, the deeds of sale are clear, without any ambiguity, mistake or imperfection, much less
obscurity or doubt in the terms thereof.
Fifth, we are not persuaded by private respondents' contention that they "put in issue by the pleadings"
the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent of the parties. Record shows 20 that private
respondents did notexpressly plead that the deeds of sale were incomplete or that it did not reflect the
intention 21 of the buyer (petitioner) and the seller (private respondents). Such issue must be, "squarely
presented." 22Private respondents merely alleged that the sale was subject to four (4) conditions which
they tried to prove during trial by parol evidence. 23 Obviously, this cannot be done, because they did not
plead any of the exceptions mentioned in the parol evidence rule. 24 Their case is covered by the general
rule that the contents of the writing are the only repository of the terms of the agreement. Considering
that private respondent Oscar Inocentes is a lawyer (and former judge) he was "supposed to be steeped
in legal knowledge and practices" and was "expected to know the consequences" 25 of his signing a deed
of absolute sale. Had he given an iota's attention to scrutinize the deeds, he would have incorporated
important stipulations that the transfer of title to said lots were conditional. 26
One last thing, assuming arguendo that the parol evidence is admissible, it should nonetheless be
disbelieved as no other evidence appears from the record to sustain the existence of the alleged
conditions. Not even the other seller, Asuncion Inocentes, was presented to testify on such conditions.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision is REVERSED and the records of this case REMANDED to
the trial court for proper disposition in accordance with this ruling.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 111924 January 27, 1997
ADORACION LUSTAN, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, NICOLAS PARANGAN and SOLEDAD PARANGAN, PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK,respondents.
FRANCISCO, J.:
Petitioner Adoracion Lustan is the registered owner of a parcel of land otherwise known as Lot 8069 of
the Cadastral Survey of Calinog, Iloilo containing an area of 10.0057 hectares and covered by TCT No.
T-561. On February 25, 1969, petitioner leased the above described property to private respondent
Nicolas Parangan for a term of ten (10) years and an annual rent of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos.
During the period of lease, Parangan was regularly extending loans in small amounts to petitioner to
defray her daily expenses and to finance her daughter's education. On July 29, 1970, petitioner executed
a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Parangan to secure an agricultural loan from private respondent
Philippine National Bank (PNB) with the aforesaid lot as collateral. On February 18, 1972, a second
Special Power of Attorney was executed by petitioner, by virtue of which, Parangan was able to secure
four (4) additional loans, to wit: the sums of P24,000.00, P38,000.00, P38,600.00 and P25,000.00 on
December 15, 1975, September 6, 1976, July 2, 1979 and June 2, 1980, respectively. The last three
loans were without the knowledge of herein petitioner and all the proceeds therefrom were used by
Parangan for his own benefit. 1 These encumbrances were duly annotated on the certificate of title. On
April 16, 1973, petitioner signed a Deed of Pacto de Retro Sale 2 in favor of Parangan which was

superseded by the Deed of Definite Sale 3 dated May 4, 1979 which petitioner signed upon Parangan's
representation that the same merely evidences the loans extended by him unto the former.

IN CONCLUDING THAT PETITIONER SIGNED THE DEED OF SALE WITH KNOWLEDGE AS

TO THE CONTENTS THEREOF;

For fear that her property might be prejudiced by the continued borrowing of Parangan, petitioner
demanded the return of her certificate of title. Instead of complying with the request, Parangan asserted
his rights over the property which allegedly had become his by virtue of the aforementioned Deed of
Definite Sale. Under said document, petitioner conveyed the subject property and all the improvements
thereon unto Parangan absolutely for and in consideration of the sum of Seventy Five Thousand
(P75,000.00) Pesos.

IN ARRIVING AT THE CONCLUSION THAT THE TESTIMONY OF WITNESS DELIA CABIAL

DESERVES FULL FAITH AND CREDIT;

Aggrieved, petitioner filed an action for cancellation of liens, quieting of title, recovery of possession
and damages against Parangan and PNB in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City. After trial, the lower
court rendered judgment, disposing as follows:

IN FINDING THAT THE SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY AUTHORIZING MORTGAGE FOR

"UNLIMITED" LOANS AS RELEVANT.
Two main issues confront us in this case, to wit: whether or not the Deed of Definite Sale is in reality an
equitable mortgage and whether or not petitioner's property is liable to PNB for the loans contracted by
Parangan by virtue of the special power of attorney. The lower court and the CA arrived at different
factual findings thus necessitating a review of the evidence on record. 5 After a thorough examination,
we note some errors, both in fact and in law, committed by public respondent CA.

WHEREFORE and in view of the foregoing, a decision is rendered as follows:

1. Ordering cancellation by the Register of Deeds of the Province of Iloilo, of the unauthorized loans,
the liens and encumbrances appearing in the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-561, especially entries
nos. 286231; 338638; and 352794;
2. Declaring the Deed of Pacto de Retro Sale dated April 25, 1978 and the Deed of Definite Sale dated
May 6, 1979, both documents executed by Adoracion Lustan in favor of Nicolas Parangan over Lot
8069 in TCT No. T-561 of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo, as null and void, declaring the same to be
Deeds of Equitable Mortgage;
3. Ordering defendant Nicolas Parangan to pay all the loans he secured from defendant PNB using
thereto as security TCT No. T-561 of plaintiff and defendant PNB to return TCT No. T-561 to plaintiff;
4. Ordering defendant Nicolas Parangan to return possession of the land in question, Lot 8069 of the
Calinog Cadastre, described in TCT No. T-561 of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo, to plaintiff upon
payment of the sum of P75,000.00 by plaintiff to defendant Parangan which payment by plaintiff must
be made within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision; otherwise, sale of the land will be ordered
by the court to satisfy payment of the amount;

The court a quo ruled that the Deed of Definite Sale is in reality an equitable mortgage as it was shown
beyond doubt that the intention of the parties was one of a loan secured by petitioner's land. 6 We agree.
A contract is perfected by mere consent. 7 More particularly, a contract of sale is perfected at the
moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the
price. 8 This meeting of the minds speaks of the intent of the parties in entering into the contract
respecting the subject matter and the consideration thereof. If the words of the contract appear to be
contrary to the evident intention of the parties, the latter shall prevail over the former. 9 In the case at
bench, the evidence is sufficient to warrant a finding that petitioner and Parangan merely intended to
consolidate the former's indebtedness to the latter in a single instrument and to secure the same with the
subject property. Even when a document appears on its face to be a sale, the owner of the property may
prove that the contract is really a loan with mortgage by raising as an issue the fact that the document
does not express the true intent of the parties. In this case, parol evidence then becomes competent and
admissible to prove that the instrument was in truth and in fact given merely as a security for the
repayment of a loan. And upon proof of the truth of such allegations, the court will enforce the
agreement or understanding in consonance with the true intent of the parties at the time of the execution
of the contract. 10
Articles 1602 and 1604 of the Civil Code respectively provide:

5. Ordering defendant Nicolas Parangan to pay plaintiff attorney's fees in the sum of P15,000.00 and to
pay the costs of the suit.

The contract shall be presumed to be an equitable mortgage in any of the following cases:

SO ORDERED. 4

1) When the price of a sale with right to repurchase is unusually inadequate;

Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), respondent court reversed the trial court's decision. Hence
this petition contending that the CA committed the following errors:

2) When the vendor remains in possession as lessor or otherwise;

IN ARRIVING AT THE CONCLUSION THAT NONE OF THE CONDITIONS STATED IN ART.

1602 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE HAS BEEN PROVEN TO EXIST BY PREPONDERANCE OF
EVIDENCE;

3) When upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase, another instrument extending the period
of redemption or granting a new period is executed;
4) When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold;
5) When the purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase price;

6) In any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is that the
transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any other obligation.

execution of the document at the behest of Parangan himself who, at the outset, informed him that he
will witness a document consolidating petitioner's debts. He thus testified:

Art. 1604. The provisions of Article 1602 shall also apply to a contract purporting to be an absolute sale.

Q: In (sic) May 4, 1979, you remember having went (sic) to the Municipality of Calinog?

From a reading of the above-quoted provisions, for a presumption of an equitable mortgage to arise, we
must first satisfy two requisites namely: that the parties entered into a contract denominated as a
contract of sale and that their intention was to secure an existing debt by way of mortgage. Under Art.
1604 of the Civil Code, a contract purporting to be an absolute sale shall be presumed to be an equitable
mortgage should any of the conditions in Art. 1602 be present. The existence of any of the
circumstances therein, not a concurrence nor an overwhelming number of such circumstances, suffices
to give rise to the presumption that the contract is an equitable mortgage. 11

A: Yes, sir.

Art. 1602, (6), in relation to Art 1604 provides that a contract of sale is presumed to be an equitable
mortgage in any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is that the
transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any other obligation. That the case
clearly falls under this category can be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the transaction as
herein set forth:

Q: Who invited you to go there?

A: Parangan.
Q: You mean Nicolas Parangan?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did Nicolas tell you why he invited you to go there?
A: He told me that I will witness on the indebtedness of Adoracion to Parangan.

Petitioner had no knowledge that the contract 12 she signed is a deed of sale. The contents of the same
were not read nor explained to her so that she may intelligibly formulate in her mind the consequences
of her conduct and the nature of the rights she was ceding in favor of Parangan. Petitioner is illiterate
and her condition constrained her to merely rely on Parangan's assurance that the contract only
evidences her indebtedness to the latter. When one of the contracting parties is unable to read, or if the
contract is in a language not understood by him, and mistake or fraud is alleged, the person enforcing
the contract must show that the terms thereof have been fully explained to the former. 13 Settled is the
rule that where a party to a contract is illiterate or cannot read or cannot understand the language in
which the contract is written, the burden is on the party interested in enforcing the contract to prove that
the terms thereof are fully explained to the former in a language understood by him. 14 To our mind, this
burden has not been satisfactorily discharged.
We do not find the testimony of Parangan and Delia Cabial that the contract was duly read and
explained to petitioner worthy of credit. The assessment by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses
is entitled to great respect and weight for having had the opportunity of observing the conduct and
demeanor of the witnesses while testifying. 15 The lower court may not have categorically declared
Cabial's testimony as doubtful but this fact is readily apparent when it ruled on the basis of petitioner's
evidence in total disregard of the positive testimony on Parangan's side. We have subjected the records
to a thorough examination, and a reading of the transcript of stenographic notes would bear out that the
court a quo is correct in its assessment. The CA committed a reversible error when it relied on the
testimony of Cabial in upholding the validity of the Deed of Definite Sale. For one, there are noted
major contradictions between the testimonies of Cabial and Judge Lebaquin, who notarized the
purported Deed of Definite Sale. While the former testified that receipts were presented before Judge
Lebaquin, who in turn made an accounting to determine the price of the land 16, the latter categorically
denied the allegation. 17 This contradiction casts doubt on the credibility of Cabial as it is ostensible that
her version of the story is concocted.
On the other hand, petitioner's witness Celso Pamplona, testified that the contract was not read nor
explained to petitioner. We believe that this witness gave a more accurate account of the circumstances
surrounding the transaction. He has no motive to prevaricate or concoct a story as he witnessed the

Q: Before Adoracion Lustan signed her name in this Exh. "4", was this document read to her?
A: No, sir.
Q: Did Nicolas Parangan right in that very room tell Adoracion what she was signing?
A: No, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What did you have in mind when you were signing this document, Exh. "4"?
A:
To
Parangan. 18

show

that

Adoracion

Lustan

has

debts

with

Nicolas

Furthermore, we note the absence of any question propounded to Judge Lebaquin to establish that the
deed of sale was read and explained by him to petitioner. When asked if witness has any knowledge
whether petitioner knows how to read or write, he answered in the negative. 19 This latter admission
impresses upon us that the contract was not at all read or explained to petitioner for had he known that
petitioner is illiterate, his assistance would not have been necessary.
The foregoing squares with the sixth instance when a presumption of equitable mortgage prevails. The
contract of definite sale, where petitioner purportedly ceded all her rights to the subject lot in favor of
Parangan, did not embody the true intention of the parties. The evidence speaks clearly of the nature of
the agreement it was one executed to secure some loans.

Anent the issue of whether the outstanding mortgages on the subject property can be enforced against
petitioner, we rule in the affirmative.

4. ORDERING PRIVATE RESPONDENT PARANGAN TO PAY PETITIONER THE AMOUNT OF

P15,000.00 BY WAY OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND TO PAY THE COSTS OF THE SUIT.

Third persons who are not parties to a loan may secure the latter by pledging or mortgaging their own
property. 20So long as valid consent was given, the fact that the loans were solely for the benefit of
Parangan would not invalidate the mortgage with respect to petitioner's property. In consenting thereto,
even granting that petitioner may not be assuming personal liability for the debt, her property shall
nevertheless secure and respond for the performance of the principal obligation. 21 It is admitted that
petitioner is the owner of the parcel of land mortgaged to PNB on five (5) occasions by virtue of the
Special Powers of Attorney executed by petitioner in favor of Parangan. Petitioner argues that the last
three mortgages were void for lack of authority. She totally failed to consider that said Special Powers
of Attorney are a continuing one and absent a valid revocation duly furnished to the mortgagee, the
same continues to have force and effect as against third persons who had no knowledge of such lack of
authority. Article 1921 of the Civil Code provides:

SO ORDERED.

Art. 1921. If the agency has been entrusted for the purpose of contracting with specified persons, its
revocation shall not prejudice the latter if they were not given notice thereof.
The Special Power of Attorney executed by petitioner in favor of Parangan duly authorized the latter to
represent and act on behalf of the former. Having done so, petitioner clothed Parangan with authority to
deal with PNB on her behalf and in the absence of any proof that the bank had knowledge that the last
three loans were without the express authority of petitioner, it cannot be prejudiced thereby. As far as
third persons are concerned, an act is deemed to have been performed within the scope of the agent's
authority if such is within the terms of the power of attorney as written even if the agent has in fact
exceeded the limits of his authority according to the understanding between the principal and the
agent. 22 The Special Power of Attorney particularly provides that the same is good not only for the
principal loan but also for subsequent commercial, industrial, agricultural loan or credit accommodation
that the attorney-in-fact may obtain and until the power of attorney is revoked in a public instrument
and a copy of which is furnished to PNB. 23 Even when the agent has exceeded his authority, the
principal is solidarily liable with the agent if the former allowed the latter to act as though he had full
powers (Article 1911, Civil Code). 24 The mortgage directly and immediately subjects the property upon
which it is imposed. 25 The property of third persons which has been expressly mortgaged to guarantee
an obligation to which the said persons are foreign, is directly and jointly liable for the fulfillment
thereof; it is therefore subject to execution and sale for the purpose of paying the amount of the debt for
which it is liable. 26 However, petitioner has an unquestionable right to demand proportional
indemnification from Parangan with respect to the sum paid to PNB from the proceeds of the sale of her
property 27 in case the same is sold to satisfy the unpaid debts.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of the lower court is hereby REINSTATED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
1. DECLARING THE DEED OF DEFINITE SALE AS AN EQUITABLE MORTGAGE;
2. ORDERING PRIVATE RESPONDENT NICOLAS PARANGAN TO RETURN THE POSSESSION
OF THE SUBJECT LAND UNTO PETITIONER UPON THE LATTER'S PAYMENT OF THE SUM
OF P75,000.00 WITHIN NINETY (90) DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF THIS DECISION;
3. DECLARING THE MORTGAGES IN FAVOR OF PNB AS VALID AND SUBSISTING AND MAY
THEREFORE BE SUBJECTED TO EXECUTION SALE.

G.R. No. 111890 May 7, 1997

CKH INDUSTRIAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and RUBI SAW, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, (FORMER 13TH DIVISION), THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
METRO MANILA DISTRICT III (VALENZUELA), CENTURY-WELL PHIL.
CORPORATION, LOURDES CHONG, CHONG TAK KEI and UY CHI KIM, respondents.

TORRES, JR., J.:

The present petition springs from a civil action instituted by herein petitioners, to rescind and/or annul
the sale of two parcels of land, from petitioner CKH Industrial and Development Corporation (CKH, for
brevity) to private respondent Century-Well Phil. Corporation (Century-Well, for brevity), for failure to
pay the stipulated price of P800,000.00.
Petitioners specifically assail the Decision 1 of the respondent Court of Appeals, which denied the
annulment of the sale. The appellate court found that there was payment of the consideration by way of
compensation, and ordered petitioners to pay moral damages and attorney's fees to private respondents.
The dispositive portion of the questioned decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed Decision is REVERSED. The complaint is
DISMISSED with costs against the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs jointly and severally are required to pay
each of the defendants Lourdes Chong, Chong Tak Kei, and Uy Chi Kim moral damages of P20,000.00;
and further requiring the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, to pay to each of the defendants Century-Well
Phil. Corporation, Lourdes Chong, Chong Tak Kei and Uy Chi Kim attorney's fees of P20,000.00.
With costs in this instance against the plaintiffs-appellees.
SO ORDERED. 2
The said decision reversed the disposition of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 172 in
Civil Case No. 2845-V-88 entitled "CKH Industrial & Development Corporation vs. Century-Well
Philippine Corporation, Lourdes Chong, Chong Tak Kei, Uy Chi Kim, and the Register of Deeds of
Metro Manila, District III (Valenzuela)." The trial court's decision stated pertinently:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff:
1. Ordering the rescission/annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale of Reality.

2. Ordering defendants Lourdes Chong, Chong Tak Kei and Century-Well to pay plaintiffs moral
damages in the sum of P200,000.00;
3. Ordering defendants Lourdes Chong, Chong Tak Kei and Century Well to pay plaintiffs Attorney's
fees in the amount of 15% of the agreed price of P800,000.00 per appearance fees of P500.00 per
appearance;
4. Ordering defendants Lourdes Chong, Chong Tak Kei and Century Well to pay the costs of suit;
5. As the writ of preliminary injunction was denied, the defendant Register of Deeds of Valenzuela is
hereby ordered to cancel the certificates of title issued to Century-Well by virtue of the Deed of
Absolute Sale of Realty and to reissue a new title in the name of CKH.
The case is dismissed as far as defendant Uy Chi Kim is concerned. His counterclaim is likewise
dismissed considering that by his mediation he took it upon himself to assume the damages he allegedly
suffered.

in favor of
CENTURY-WELL PHIL. CORPORATION, a corporation duly organized and existing under and by
virtue of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines at least sixty 60%) percent of the subscribed capital
stock of which is owned by Filipino citizens, duly qualified to own and acquire lands in the Philippines,
with office and business address at 66 F Bautista St., Valenzuela, Metro Manila and represented in this
act by its Treasurer and authorized representative, Ms. Lourdes Chong, hereinafter referred to as
VENDEE,
W I T N E S S E T H:
That vendor is the registered owner of two adjacent parcels of residential land situated in the Bo. of
Karuhatan, Municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, covered by Transfer Certificates of Titles Nos.
B-8710 and B-8711 of the Registry of Deeds for Metro Manila District III, and more particularly
described as follows:
xxx xxx xxx

SO ORDERED. 3
The records disclosed that petitioner CKH is the owner of two parcels of land, consisting of 4,590 sq.
m. and 300 sq. m. respectively, located in Karuhatan, Valenzuela, and covered by Transfer Certificates
of Tittle Nos. 8710 and 8711, Register of Deeds of Caloocan City (now Register of Deeds District III
[Valenzuela]). 4 CKH is a corporation established under Philippine law by the late Cheng Kim Heng
(Cheng), an immigrant of Chinese descent. Upon Cheng's demise, control over the petitioner
corporation was transferred to Rubi Saw, also of Chinese descent, and Cheng's second wife.
It also appear that before coming to the Philippines, Cheng Kim Heng was married to Hung Yuk Wah
(Wah), who lived in Hongkong together with their children, Chong Tak Kei (Kie), Chong Tak Choi
(Choi), and Chong Tak Yam (Yam). After Cheng immigrated to the Philippines in 1976, and married
Rubi Saw in 1977, he brought his first wife, Heng, and their children to this country, and established
himself and his Chinese family as naturalized Filipino citizens. Heng died in 1984.
On May 8, 1988, Rubi Saw and Lourdes Chong, the wife of Cheng's son, Kei, met at the 1266 Soler St.,
Sta. Cruz, Manila, the residence of Cheng's friend, Uy Chi Kim, and executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale, 5 whereby Rubi Saw, representing CKH, agreed to sell the subject properties to Century-Well, a
corporation owned in part by Lourdes Chong, Kei and Choi. 6

That for and in consideration of the sum of EIGHT HUNDRED THOUSAND (P800,000.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currency, paid by VENDEE to VENDOR, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged by the
letter to its entire satisfaction, said VENDOR, by these presents, has SOLD, CEDED, TRANSFERRED,
and CONVEYED by way of absolute sale unto said VENDEE, its successors and assigns, the two
parcels of land above described and any and all improvements therein;
That the above-described parcels of land are free from liens and encumbrances of whatever kind and
nature.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto and their instrumental witnesses have hereunto set their
hand on _____at_____.
Rubi Saw signed on behalf of CKH, while Lourdes Chong signed for Century Well. 7 The document was
notarized the day after the parties signed the same, i.e., March 9, 1988. 8

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

Claiming that the consideration for the sale of the subject properties was not paid by the private
respondent-vendee despite several demands to do so, Petitioners CKH and Rubi Saw filed the instant
complaint 9 on May 23, 1988, with the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 172, against
Century-Well, Lourdes Chong, Chong Tak Kei and Uy Chi Kim. Petitioners prayed for the
annulment/rescission of the Deed of Absolute Sale, and in the meantime, for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction restraining the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela from registering the Certificates
of Title over the subject properties in the name of the private respondent Century-Well.

This Deed of Absolute Sale of Realty executed by and between:

The trial court synthesized the petitioners' submissions as follows:

CKH INDUSTRIAL & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a corporation duly organized and existing
under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, with business address at 553
Bermuda St.., Sta. Cruz, Manila, represented in this act by its authorized representative, Ms. RUBI
SAW, hereinafter referred to as VENDOR,

The complaint alleges the following:

The pertinent portions of the Deed of Sale are hereby reproduced:

Lourdes Chong and Rubi Saw agreed that the full payment of P800,000.00 as purchase price shall be in
the form of a Manager's Check, to be delivered to Rubi Saw upon the execution of the Deed of Sale, the

preparation of which, Lourdes Chong undertook. On May 8, 1988, the date agreed upon for the
execution of the Deed of Sale, plaintiff Rubi Saw, accompanied by her friend Aurora Chua Ng, went to
1266 Soler St., Sta. Cruz, Manila which is the residence and place of business of defendant Uy Chi
Kim, an elderly man of Chinese ancestry and the place suggested by Lourdes Chong as their meeting
place. During the meeting, Uy Chi Kim who was there presented to Rubi Saw a Deed of Absolute Sale
in favor of defendant Century Well for her signature. Before Rubi Saw signed the Deed of Absolute Sale
she inquired about the payment of the P800,000.00. Defendant Uy Chi Kim presented to her a personal
check but she refused the same because it was contrary to her arrangement with Lourdes Chong that the
payment would be in the form of Manager's Check. Uy Chi Kim then explained to Rubi Saw that since
it was a Sunday that day, they were unable to obtain the Manager's Check. He assured her that he had
sufficient cash money at the first floor of his residence which is a store owned by Uy Chi Kim. Before
Uy Chi Kim left on the pretext of getting the money, he persuaded plaintiff Rubi Saw to sign the Deed
of Absolute Sale and give the same to Lourdes Chong together with the two Certificates of Title. Since
Uy Chi Kim is an elderly Chinese whom Rubi Saw had no reason to mistrust, following Chinese
custom, plaintiff Rubi Saw acceded to the request of Uy Chi Kim, trusting that he had sufficient cash
amounting to P800,000.00 kept in the first floor of his residence. When Uy Chi Kim returned, he told
Rubi Saw that he had only P20,000 on hand. He assured plaintiff, however, that there was no cause for
her to worry (as) he was certain he would have the entire amount ready by the next day when the banks
would be open. Again, trusting the elderly defendant Uy Chi Kim, Rubi Saw did not object and did not
insist on the return of the Deed of Absolute Sale that she signed, together with the Certificate of Title
which she delivered to Lourdes Chong. The next day, May 9, 1988 Rubi Saw called Lourdes Chong and
Uy Chi Kim over the telephone but was told they were not around. She could not go to the residence of
Uy Chi Kim because she could not leave her office due to business concerns. On May 10, 1988 Rubi
Saw repeatedly called the two but was informed they were not around. On May 11, 1988 already
anxious, she personally went to the residences and offices of the two defendants but they were not
around. On May 12, 1988 Rubi Saw wrote defendant Century Well advising Lourdes Chong of the
rescission and cancellation of the Deed of Absolute Sale because of lack of consideration. Lourdes
Chong refused to receive the letter. Thereafter, several demand letters were sent to the defendants but
they refused to pay plaintiffs. Worried that defendants might surreptitiously transfer the certificates of
title to their names, Rubi Saw wrote the public defendant Register of Deeds on May 16, 1988, giving
information about the circumstances of the sale and requesting not to allow registration of the Deed of
Absolute Sale, together with an Affidavit of Adverse Claim. On May 20, 1988, plaintiffs representative
was informed by the Register of Deeds that defendants have made representations with defendant to
Register the Deed of Absolute Sale on May 23, 1988.
Plaintiff Rubi Saw filed this Complaint alleging that Lourdes Chong and Uy Chi Kim maliciously
misled her to believe that they would pay the P800,000 as consideration when in fact they had no
intention to pay plaintiffs, and prayed that they should be awarded moral damages; that defendants be
restrained from registering the Deed of Absolute Sale, and be ordered to return to them the 2 titles of the
properties together with the Deed of Absolute Sale. 10
On the other hand, private respondents Century-Well, Lourdes Chong, and Chong Tak Kei alleged that:
. . . the consideration for the two parcels of land was paid by means of off-setting or legal compensation
in the amount of P700,000 thru alleged promissory notes executed by Cheng Kim Heng in favor of his
sons Chong Tak Choi and Chong Tak Kei (Exh. 6, 7, & 8) and payment of P100,000.00 in cash.
The defendant Century Well filed its Answer stating that during the operation of plaintiff CKH, the
latter borrowed from Chong Tak Choi and Chong Tak Kei the total sum of P700,000.00 paying interest

on P300,000.00 while the remaining P400,000.00 was interest free, and upon the death of Cheng Kim
Heng, it stopped making said payments. Defendant tried to prove that the source of this P700,000 was
Hung Yuk Wah while she was still residing in Hongkong, sent via bank draft from Hongkong to Chong
Tak Choi and Chong Tak Kei on a bank to bank transfer. Defendant likewise tried to prove that after the
death of Cheng Kim Heng, Rubi Saw unilaterally arrogated to herself the executive positions in plaintiff
corporation such as President, Secretary, Treasurer and General Manager; thus effectively shunting
aside Hung Yuk Wah and her children in the management of plaintiff corporation. Family differences
(arose) between Rubi Saw on one hand, and Hung Yuk Wah and her children on the other hand which
turned to worst after the death of Cheng Kim Heng. This brought about the entry of Chinese mediators
between them, one of whom is defendant Uy Chi Kim, a reason why the execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale was to be done at the residence and business address of Uy Chi Kim. 11
Uy Chi Kim, on the other hand, answered on his behalf, that:
. . . his only participation in the transaction was as a mediator, he being one of the closest friends of
Cheng Kim Heng; that because the heirs of Cheng Kim Heng could not settle their problems he,
together with Machao Chan and Tomas Ching tried to mediate in accordance with Chinese traditions;
that after long and tedious meetings the parties finally agreed to meet at his residence at 1266 Solar St.,
Sta. Cruz, Manila for the purpose of pushing thru the sale of the properties in question as part of the
settlement of the estate. Defendant Uy Chi Kim corroborated the defense of his co-defendants that the
purchase price of the properties was P800,000.00 the payment of which consists in the form of
P100,000.00 in cash Philippine Currency; and the balance of P700,000.00 will be applied as a set-off to
the amount borrowed by plaintiff CKH from Chong Tak Choi and Chong Tak Kei. He advanced the
amount of P100,000.00 by way of his personal check to Rubi Saw but because Rubi Saw refused, he
gave Rubi Saw P100,000 in the form of P100 bills which Rubi Saw and Jacinto Say even counted. After
the P100,000.00 cash was given and the promissory notes, Rubi Saw signed the document of sale. It
was during the registration of the sale that a problem arose as to the payment of the capital gains (tax)
which Rubi Saw refused to pay. The buyer likewise refused to pay the same. The complaint against him
is baseless and which besmirched his reputation. Hence his counterclaim for damages. 12
The trial court denied the petitioners' prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction in its
Order dated August 4, 1988. 13
After trial, the lower court rendered its Decision on February 4, 1991, finding that the annulment of the
Deed of Absolute Sale was merited, as there was no payment of the stipulated consideration for the sale
of the real properties involved to Rubi Saw.
In the first place, said the court, the Deed of Sale itself, which is the best evidence of the agreement
between the parties, did not provide for payment by offsetting a portion of the purchase price with the
outstanding obligation of Cheng Kim Heng to his sons Chong Tak Choi and Chong Tak Kei. On the
contrary, it provided for payment in cash, in the amount of P800,000.00. The evidence presented,
however, did not disclose that payment of the said amount had ever been made by the private
respondent. Moreover, there cannot be any valid off-setting or compensation in this case, as Article
1278 of the Civil
Code 14 requires, as a prerequisite for compensation, that the parties be mutually bound principally as
creditors and debtors, which is not the case in this instance. The rescission of the contract is, therefore,
called for, ruled the court.

Upon appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals reversed the findings and pronouncements of the trial
court. In its Decision 15 dated April 21, 1993, the appellate court expressed its own findings, that the
execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale was in settlement of a dispute between Rubi Saw and the first
family of Cheng Kim Heng, which arose upon Cheng's death. The appellate court described the history
of their dispute as follows:
In 1977, Heng formed plaintiff-appellee CKH Industrial & Development Corporation (CKH), with his
first wife Wah, children Choi and Kei, and second wife Rubi as his co-incorporators/stockholders, along
with other individuals (Exhs. C and D; ibid., p. 9 and pp. 10-13, respectively). On April 15 and July 17
the following year, Heng, on behalf of CHK [sic], obtained loans of P400,000.00 and P100,000.00 from
Choi, for which Heng executed two promissory notes in Choi's favor (Exhs. 6 and 7; ibid., p. 40 and p.
41, respectively). On November 24, 1981, Heng obtained from his other son, Kei, another loan this time
in the sum of P200,000.00 on behalf of CKH for which he issued another promissory note. (Exh.
8, ibid., p. 42.)
After its incorporation, CKH acquired two parcels of land situated in Karuhatan, Valenzuela, Bulacan
(now Metro Manila) covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. B-8710 (Annex A-Complaint;
Record, p. 13) and B-8711 (Annex B-Complaint; ibid., p. 14), which are now the subject of litigation in
instant case.
On October 11, 1982, Kei was married to defendant-appellant Lourdes Chong nee Lourdes Gochico Hai
Huat (Lourdes). During their marriage, Kei and Lourdes resided in the house on Tetuan St., Sta. Cruz,
Manila, which CKH was then utilizing as its office. At about this time, Heng and Rubi had moved
residence from Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to Bermuda St., Sta. Cruz, Manila.
Two years later, or in late 1984, Heng died. Thenceforth, there appeared to be a falling out between
Heng's first wife Wah and their three children on the one hand, and his second wife Rubi, on the other,
which came to a head when, Rubi as president of CKH wrote a letter dated August 21, 1985 to the
mayor of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to prevent issuance of a business permit to American Metals
managed by Chong Tak Choi, stating that CKH has not allowed it to make use of the property, and on
November 7, 1985, when CKH, through counsel, demanded that Wah, Choi and Yam vacate the
residential and factory buildings and premises owned by CKH and located on one of the subject lots on
76 F. Bautista St., Valenzuela, which the three and the corporation (of which two of them were
stockholders), had been allegedly illegally occupying (Exhs. 10 and 10-A; Folio, pp. 44-45).
Respected mediators from the Chinese community in the persons of defendant-appellant Uy Chi Kim,
Ma Chao, Tomas Cheng and Johnny Saw, were called in to mediate. The mediation efforts which
resulted in the withdrawal by Rubi Saw of her letter about the withholding of a license to American
Metals, Inc. and much later, had culminated in the transaction now under litigation.
The formula for settlement in the dispute was for the Valenzuela properties of CKH to be sold to
Century Well for the amount of P800,000.00, P100,000.00 of which will be paid in cash and the balance
of P700,000.00 to be set-off by the three (3) promissory notes executed in behalf of CKH in favor of
Chong Tak Choi and Chong Tak Kei (Exhs. 6, 7 and 8) the accumulated interests thereon to be waived
as unstated consideration of the sale.
Having reached such agreement, on May 8, 1988, the parties met at the residence of Kim at Soler St.,
where the corresponding deed of absolute sale of realty was executed (Exhs. 11, 11-A to 11-C; ibid., pp.
46-49), with mediator Cheng and CKH stockholder and Rubi's secretary, Jacinto Say, signing as

instrumental witnesses. After having received the cash consideration of P100,000.00 and the promissory
notes amounting to P700,000.00 Rubi had signed the deed, and thereafter delivered to Lourdes the
document of sale and the owner's copies of the certificates of tittle for the two lots. The deed having
been executed on a Sunday, the parties agreed to have the same notarized the following day, May 9,
1988. The parties again met the next day, May 9, 1988, when they acknowledge the deed before a
notary public. 16
In sum, the appellate court found that there was indeed payment of the purchase price, partially in cash
for P100,000.00 and partially by compensation by off-setting the debt of Cheng Kim Heng to his sons
Choi and Kei for P500,000.00 and P200,000.00 respectively, against the remainder of the stipulated
price. Such mode of payment is recognized under Article 1249 17 of the Civil Code.
As observed by the appellate court:
We are of the considered view that the appellees have not established what they claim to be the
invalidity of the subject deed of sale. The appellees are therefore neither entitled to the rescission or
annulment of the document nor to the award made in their favor in the decision under question and
those other reliefs they are seeking. 18
The question the Court is now tasked to answer is whether or not there was payment of the
consideration for the sale of real property subject of this case. More specifically, was there a valid
compensation of the obligations of Cheng Kim Heng to his sons with the purchase price of the sale?
To resolve this issue, it is first required that we establish the true agreement of the parties.
Both parties take exception to the provisions of the Deed of Absolute Sale to bolster their respective
claims. Petitioners, while submitting that as worded, the Deed of Absolute Sale does not provide for
payment by compensation, thereby ruling out the intention of the parties to provide for such mode of
payment, submit on the other hand, that they had not received payment of the stipulated cash payment
of P800,000.00. The testimony of Rubi Saw during the hearings for preliminary injunction and during
trial was submitted to advance the submission that she was never paid the price of the subject lots, in
cash or in promissory notes.
On the other side of the fence, private respondents, who, ironically, were the parties, who drafted the
subject document, claim that the Deed of Sale does not express the true agreement of the parties,
specifically with regard to the mode of payment. Private respondents allege that the execution of the
deed of absolute sale was the culmination of mediation of the dispute of the first and second families of
Cheng Kim Heng, over the properties of the decedent; that the price of the real property subject of the
contract of sale was partly in cash, and the reminder to be compensated against Cheng's indebtedness to
his sons Choi and Kei, reflected in the promissory notes submitted as Exhibits 6, 7 and 8 during the
trial; that by virtue of such compensation, the sale has been consummated and the private respondent
Century-Well is entitled to the registration of the certificates of title over the subject properties in its
name.
These contrasting submissions of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the subject document
have led to this stalemate of sorts. Still, the best test to establish the true intent of the parties remains to
be the Deed of Absolute Sale, whose genuineness and due execution, are unchallenged. 19

Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that "when the terms of an agreement have been
reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between
the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the
written agreement."

Compensation may take place by operation of law (legal compensation), when two persons, in their own
right, are creditors and debtors of each other. 23 Article 1279 of the Civil Code provides for the
requisites of legal compensation:
Art. 1279. In order that compensation may be proper, it is necessary:

The so-called "parol evidence rule" forbids any addition to or contradiction of the terms of a written
instrument by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that, at or before the execution of the
parties' written agreement, other or different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport
of the written contract. When an agreement has been reduced to writing, the parties cannot be permitted
to adduce evidence to prove alleged practices which to all purposes would alter the terms of the written
agreement. Whatever is not found in the writing is understood to have been waived and abandoned. 20
The rule is not without exceptions, however, as it is likewise provided that a party to an action may
present evidence to modify, explain, or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in
his pleadings: (a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement; (b) The
failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto; (c) The
validity of the written agreement; or (d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their
successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement. 21

(1) That each one of the obligors be bound principally, and that he be at the same time a principal
creditor of the other;
(2) That both debts consist in a sum of money, or if the things due are consumable, they be of the same
kind, and also of the same quality if the latter has been stated;
(3) That the two debts be due;
(4) That they be liquidated and demandable;
(5) That over neither of them there be any retention or controversy, commenced by third persons and
communicated in due time to the debtor.

We reiterate the pertinent provisions of the deed:

That for and in consideration of the sum of EIGHT HUNDRED THOUSAND (P800,000.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currency, paid by VENDEE to VENDOR, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged by the
latter to its entire satisfaction, said VENDOR, by these presents, has SOLD, CEDED, TRANSFERRED,
and CONVEYED by way of absolute sale unto said VENDEE, its successors and assigns, the two
parcels of land above described and any and all improvements therein; 22
The foregoing stipulation is clear enough in manifesting the vendor's admission of receipt of the
purchase price, thereby lending sufficient, though reluctant, credence to the private respondents'
submission that payment had been made by off-setting P700,000.00 of the purchase price with the
obligation of Cheng Kim Heng to his sons Choi and Kei. By signing the Deed of Absolute Sale,
petitioner Rubi Saw has given her imprimatur to the provisions of the deed, and she cannot now
challenge its veracity.
However, the suitability of the said stipulations as benchmarks for the intention of the contracting
parties, does not come clothed with the cloak of validity. It must be remembered that agreements
affecting the civil relationship of the contracting parties must come under the scrutiny of the provisions
of law existing and effective at the time of the execution of the contract.
We refer particularly to the provisions of the law on compensation as a mode of extinguishment of
obligations. Under Article 1231 of the Civil Code, an obligation may be extinguished: (1) by payment
or performance; (2) by the loss of the thing due, (3) by the condonation or remission of the debt; (4) by
the confusion or merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, (5) by compensation; or (6) by novation.
Other causes of extinguishment of obligations include annulment, rescission, fulfillment of a resolutory
condition and prescription.

Compensation may also be voluntary or conventional, that is, when the parties, who are mutually
creditors and debtors agree to compensate their respective obligations, even though not all the requisites
for legal compensation are present. Without the confluence of the characters of mutual debtors and
creditors, contracting parties cannot stipulate to the compensation of their obligations, for then the legal
tie that binds contracting parties to their obligations would be absent. At least one party would be
binding himself under an authority he does not possess. As observed by a noted author, the requirements
of conventional compensation are (1) that each of the parties can dispose of the credit he seeks to
compensate, and (2) that they agree to the mutual extinguishment of their credits. 24
In the instant case, there can be no valid compensation of the purchase price with the obligations of
Cheng Kim Heng reflected in the promissory notes, for the reason that CKH and Century-Well the
principal contracting parties, are not mutually bound as creditors and debtors in their own name. A close
scrutiny of the promissory notes does not indicate the late Cheng, as then president of CKH,
acknowledging any indebtedness to Century-Well. As worded, the promissory notes reveal CKH's
indebtedness to Chong Tak Choi and Chong Tak Kei.
G.R. No. 103066 April 25, 1996
WILLEX PLASTIC INDUSTRIES, CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:p
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
19094, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region,
Branch XLV, Manila, which ordered petitioner Willex Plastic Industries Corporation and the Inter-Resin
Industrial Corporation, jointly and severally, to pay private respondent International Corporate Bank

certain sums of money, and the appellate court's resolution of October 17, 1989 denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.

(d) WLLLEX is only a guarantor of the principal obliger, and thus, its liability is only secondary to that
of the principal;

The facts are as follows:

(e) Plaintiff failed to exhaust the ultimate remedy in pursuing its claim against the principal obliger;

Sometime in 1978, Inter-Resin Industrial Corporation opened a letter of credit with the Manila Banking
Corporation. To secure payment of the credit accomodation, Inter-Resin Industrial and the Investment
and Underwriting Corporation of the Philippines (IUCP) executed two documents, both entitled
"Continuing Surety Agreement" and dated December 1, 1978, whereby they bound themselves
solidarily to pay Manilabank "obligations of every kind, on which the [Inter-Resin Industrial] may now
be indebted or hereafter become indebted to the [Manilabank]." The two agreements (Exhs. J and K) are
the same in all respects, except as to the limit of liability of the surety, the first surety agreement being
limited to US$333,830.00, while the second one is limited to US$334,087.00.

(f) Plaintiff has no personality to sue.

On April 2, 1979, Inter-Resin Industrial, together with Willex Plastic Industries Corp., executed a
"Continuing Guaranty" in favor of IUCP whereby "For and in consideration of the sum or sums
obtained and/or to be obtained by Inter-Resin Industrial Corporation" from IUCP, Inter-Resin Industrial
and Willex Plastic jointly and severally guaranteed "the prompt and punctual payment at maturity of the
NOTE/S issued by the DEBTOR/S . . . to the extent of the aggregate principal sum of FIVE MILLION
PESOS (P5,000,000.00) Philippine Currency and such interests, charges and penalties as hereafter may
be specified."
On January 7, 1981, following demand upon it, IUCP paid to Manilabank the sum of P4,334,280.61
representing Inter-Resin Industrial's outstanding obligation. (Exh. M-1) On February 23 and 24, 1981,
Atrium Capital Corp., which in the meantime had succeeded IUCP, demanded from Inter-Resin
Industrial and Willex Plastic the payment of what it (IUCP) had paid to Manilabank. As neither one of
the sureties paid, Atrium filed this case in the court below against Inter-Resin Industrial and Willex
Plastic.
On August 11, 1982, Inter-Resin Industrial paid Interbank, which had in turn succeeded Atrium, the sum
of P687,600.00 representing the proceeds of its fire insurance policy for the destruction of its properties.

On April 29, 1986, Interbank was substituted as plaintiff in the action. The case then proceeded to trial.
On March 4, 1988, the trial court declared Inter-Resin Industrial to have waived the right to present
evidence for its failure to appear at the hearing despite due notice. On the other hand, Willex Plastic
rested its case without presenting any evidence. Thereafter Interbank and Willex Plastic submitted their
respective memoranda.
On April 5, 1988, the trial court rendered judgment, ordering Inter-Resin Industrial and Willex Plastic
jointly and severally to pay to Interbank the following amounts:
(a) P3, 646,780.61, representing their indebtedness to the plaintiff, with interest of 17% per annumfrom
August 11, 1982, when Inter-Resin Industrial paid P687,500.00 to the plaintiff, until full payment of the
said amount;
(b) Liquidated damages equivalent to 178 of the amount due; and
(c) Attorney's fees and expenses of litigation equivalent to 208 of the total amount due.
Inter-Resin Industrial and Willex Plastic appealed to the Court of Appeals. Willex Plastic filed its brief,
while Inter-Resin Industrial presented a "Motion to Conduct Hearing and to Receive Evidence to
Resolve Factual Issues and to Defer Filing of the Appellant's Brief." After its motion was denied, InterResin Industrial did not file its brief anymore.
On February 22, 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the ruling of the trial court.

In its answer, Inter-Resin Industrial admitted that the "Continuing Guaranty" was intended to secure
payment to Atrium of the amount of P4,334,280.61 which the latter had paid to Manilabank. It claimed,
however, that it had already fully paid its obligation to Atrium Capital.
On the other hand, Willex Plastic denied the material allegations of the complaint and interposed the
following Special Affirmative Defenses:
(a) Assuming arguendo that main defendant is indebted to plaintiff, the former's liability is extinguished
due to the accidental fire that destroyed its premises, which liability is covered by sufficient insurance
assigned to plaintiff;
(b) Again, assuming arguendo, that the main defendant is indebted to plaintiff, its account is now very
much lesser than those stated in the complaint because of some payments made by the former;
(c) The complaint states no cause of action against WILLEX;

Willex Plastic filed a motion for reconsideration praying that it be allowed to present evidence to show
that Inter-Resin Industrial had already paid its obligation to Interbank, but its motion was denied on
December 6, 1991:
The motion is denied for lack of merit. We denied defendant-appellant Inter-Resin Industrial's motion
for reception of evidence because the situation or situations in which we could exercise the power under
BP 129 did not exist. Movant here has not presented any argument which would show otherwise.
Hence, this petition by Willex Plastic for the review of the decision of February 22, 1991 and the
resolution of December 6, 1991 of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner raises a number of issues.

[1] The main issue raised is whether under the "Continuing Guaranty" signed on April 2, 1979 petitioner
Willex Plastic may be held jointly and severally liable with Inter-Resin Industrial for the amount paid by
Interbank to Manilabank.
As already stated, the amount had been paid by Interbank's predecessor-in-interest, Atrium Capital, to
Manilabank pursuant to the "Continuing Surety Agreements" made on December 1, 1978. In denying
liability to Interbank for the amount, Willex Plastic argues that under the "Continuing Guaranty," its
liability is for sums obtained by Inter-Resin Industrial from Interbank, not for sums paid by the latter to
Manilabank for the account of Inter-Resin Industrial. In support of this contention Willex Plastic cites
the following portion of the "Continuing Guaranty":
For and in consideration of the sums obtained and/or to be obtained by INTER-RESIN INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATION, hereinafter referred to as the DEBTOR/S, from you and/or your principal/s as may be
evidenced by promissory note/s, checks, bills receivable/s and/or other evidence/s of indebtedness
(hereinafter referred to as the NOTE/S), I/We hereby jointly and severally and unconditionally
guarantee unto you and/or your principal/s, successor/s and assigns the prompt and punctual payment at
maturity of the NOTE/S issued by the DEBTOR/S in your and/or your principal/s, successor/s and
assigns favor to the extent of the aggregate principal sum of FIVE MILLION PESOS (P5,000,000.00),
Philippine Currency, and such interests, charges and penalties as may hereinafter be specified.
The contention is untenable. What Willex Plastic has overlooked is the fact that evidence aliunde was
introduced in the trial court to explain that it was actually to secure payment to Interbank (formerly
IUCP) of amounts paid by the latter to Manilabank that the "Continuing Guaranty" was executed. In its
complaint below, Interbank's predecessor-in-interest, Atrium Capital, alleged:
5. to secure the guarantee made by plaintiff of the credit accommodation granted to defendant IRIC
[Inter-Resin Industrial] by Manilabank, the plaintiff required defendant IRIC [Inter-Resin Industrial] to
execute a chattel mortgage in its favor and a Continuing Guaranty which was signed by the other
defendant WPIC [Willex Plastic].
In its answer, Inter-Resin Industrial admitted this allegation although it claimed that it had already paid
its obligation in its entirety. On the other hand, Willex Plastic, while denying the allegation in question,
merely did so "for lack of knowledge or information of the same." But, at the hearing of the case on
September 16, 1986, when asked by the trial judge whether Willex Plastic had not filed a crossclaim
against Inter-Resin Industrial, Willex Plastic's counsel replied in the negative and manifested that "the
plaintiff in this case [Interbank] is the guarantor and my client [Willex Plastic] only signed as a
guarantor to the guarantee." 2
For its part Interbank adduced evidence to show that the "Continuing Guaranty" had been made to
guarantee payment of amounts made by it to Manilabank and not of any sums given by it as loan to
Inter-Resin Industrial. Interbank's witness testified under cross examination by counsel for Willex
Plastic that Willex "guaranteed the exposure/of whatever exposure of ACP [Atrium Capital] will later be
made because of the guarantee to Manila Banking Corporation." 3
It has been held that explanatory evidence may be received to show the circumstances under which a
document has been made and to what debt it relates. 4 At all events, Willex Plastic cannot now claim that
its liability is limited to any amount which Interbank, as creditor, might give directly to Inter-Resin
Industrial as debtor because, by failing to object to the parol evidence presented, Willex Plastic waived
the protection of the parol evidence rule. 5

Accordingly, the trial court found that it was "to secure the guarantee made by plaintiff of the credit
accommodation granted to defendant IRIC [Inter-Resin Industrial] by Manilabank, [that] the plaintiff
required defendant IRIC to execute a chattel mortgage in its favor and a Continuing Guaranty which
was signed by the defendant Willex Plastic Industries Corporation." 6
Similarly, the Court of Appeals found it to be an undisputed fact that "to secure the guarantee
undertaken by plaintiff-appellee [Interbank] of the credit accommodation granted to Inter-Resin
Industrial by Manilabank, plaintiff-appellee required defendant-appellants to sign a Continuing
Guaranty." These factual findings of the trial court and of the Court of Appeals are binding on us not
only because of the rule that on appeal to the Supreme Court such findings are entitled to great weight
and respect but also because our own examination of the record of the trial court confirms these findings
of the two courts. 7
Nor does the record show any other transaction under which Inter-Resin Industrial may have obtained
sums of money from Interbank. It can reasonably be assumed that Inter-Resin Industrial and Willex
Plastic intended to indemnify Interbank for amounts which it may have paid Manilabank on behalf of
Inter-Resin Industrial.
Indeed, in its Petition for Review in this Court, Willex Plastic admitted that it was "to secure the
aforesaid guarantee, that INTERBANK required principal debtor IRIC [Inter-Resin Industrial] to
execute a chattel mortgage in its favor, and so a "Continuing Guaranty" was executed on April 2, 1979
by WILLEX PLASTIC INDUSTRIES CORPORATION (WILLEX for brevity) in favor of
INTERBANK for and in consideration of the loan obtained by IRIC [Inter-Resin Industrial]."
[2] Willex Plastic argues that the "Continuing Guaranty," being an accessory contract, cannot legally
exist because of the absence of a valid principal obligation. 8 Its contention is based on the fact that it is
not a party either to the "Continuing Surety Agreement" or to the loan agreement between Manilabank
and Interbank Industrial.
Put in another way the consideration necessary to support a surety obligation need not pass directly to
the surety, a consideration moving to the principal alone being sufficient. For a "guarantor or surety is
bound by the same consideration that makes the contract effective between the principal parties thereto.
It is never necessary that a guarantor or surety should receive any part or benefit, if such there be,
accruing to his principal." 9 In an analogous case, 10 this Court held:
At the time the loan of P100,000.00 was obtained from petitioner by Daicor, for the purpose of having
an additional capital for buying and selling coco-shell charcoal and importation of activated carbon, the
comprehensive surety agreement was admittedly in full force and effect. The loan was, therefore,
covered by the said agreement, and private respondent, even if he did not sign the promissory note, is
liable by virtue of the surety agreement. The only condition that would make him liable thereunder is
that the Borrower "is or may become liable as maker, endorser, acceptor or otherwise." There is no
doubt that Daicor is liable on the promissory note evidencing the indebtedness.
The surety agreement which was earlier signed by Enrique Go, Sr. and private respondent, is an
accessory obligation, it being dependent upon a principal one which, in this case is the loan obtained by
Daicor as evidenced by a promissory note.

[3] Willex Plastic contends that the "Continuing Guaranty" cannot be retroactivelt applied so as to
secure payments made by Interbank under the two "Continuing Surety Agreements." Willex Plastic
invokes the ruling in El Vencedor v. Canlas 11 and Dio v. Court of Appeals 12 in support of its
contention that a contract of suretyship or guaranty should be applied prospectively.
The cases cited are, however, distinguishable from the present case. In El Vencedor v. Canlas we held
that a contract of suretyship "is not retrospective and no liability attaches for defaults occurring before it
is entered into unless an intent to be so liable is indicated." There we found nothing in the contract to
show that the paries intended the surety bonds to answer for the debts contracted previous to the
execution of the bonds. In contrast, in this case, the parties to the "Continuing Guaranty" clearly
provided that the guaranty would cover "sumsobtained and/or to be obtained" by Inter-Resin Industrial
from Interbank.
On the other hand, in Dio v. Court of Appeals the issue was whether the sureties could be held liable
for an obligation contracted after the execution of the continuing surety agreement. It was held that by
its very nature a continuing suretyship contemplates a future course of dealing. "It is prospective in its
operation and is generallyintended to provide security with respect to future transactions." By no means,
however, was it meant in that case that in all instances a contrast of guaranty or suretyship should be
prospective in application.
Indeed, as we also held in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Foerster, 13 although a contract of suretyship
is ordinarily not to be construed as retrospective, in the end the intention of the parties as revealed by
the evidence is controlling. What was said there 14 applies mutatis mutandis to the case at bar:
In our opinion, the appealed judgment is erroneous. It is very true that bonds or other contracts of
suretyship are ordinarily not to be construed as retrospective, but that rule must yield to the intention of
the contracting parties as revealed by the evidence, and does not interfere with the use of the ordinary
tests and canons of interpretation which apply in regard to other contracts.
In the present case the circumstances so clearly indicate that the bond given by Echevarria was intended
to cover all of the indebtedness of the Arrocera upon its current account with the plaintiff Bank that we
cannot possibly adopt the view of the court below in regard to the effect of the bond.
[4] Willex Plastic says that in any event it cannot be proceeded against without first exhausting all
property of Inter-Resin Industrial. Willex Plastic thus claims the benefit of excussion. The Civil Code
provides, however:
Art. 2059. This excussion shall not take place:
(1) If the guarantor has expressly renounced it;
(2) If he has bound himself solidarily with the debtor;
The pertinent portion of the "Continuing Guaranty" executed by Willex Plastic and Inter-Resin
Industrial in favor of IUCP (now Interbank) reads:
If default be made in the payment of the NOTE/s herein guaranteed you and/or your principal/s may
directly proceed against Me/Us without first proceeding against and exhausting DEBTOR/s propertiesin

the same manner as if all such liabilities constituted My/Our direct and primary obligations. (emphasis
supplied)
This stipulation embodies an express renunciation of the right of excussion. In addition, Willex Plastic
bound itself solidarily liable with Inter-Resin Industrial under the same agreement:
For and in consideration of the sums obtained and/or to be obtained by INTER-RESIN INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATION, hereinafter referred to as the DEBTOR/S, from you and/or your principal/s as may be
evidenced by promissory note/s, checks, bills receivable/s and/or other evidence/s of indebtedness
(hereinafter referred to as the NOTE/S), I/We hereby jointly and severally and unconditionally
guarantee unto you and/or your principal/s, successor/s and assigns the prompt and punctual payment at
maturity of the NOTE/S issued by the DEBTOR/S in your and/or your principal/s, successor/s and
assigns favor to the extent of the aggregate principal sum of FIVE MILLION PESOS (P5,000,000.00),
Philippine Currency, and such interests, charges and penalties as may hereinafter he specified.
[5] Finally it is contended that Inter-Resin Industrial had already paid its indebtedness to Interbank and
that Willex Plastic should have been allowed by the Court of Appeals to adduce evidence to prove this.
Suffice it to say that Inter-Resin Industrial had been given generous opportunity to present its evidence
but it failed to make use of the same. On the otherhand, Willex Plastic rested its case without presenting
evidence.
The reception of evidence of Inter-Resin Industrial was set on January 29, 1987, but because of its
failure to appear on that date, the hearing was reset on March 12, 26 and April 2, 1987.
On March 12, 1987 Inter-Resin Industrial again failed to appear. Upon motion of Willex Plastic, the
hearings on March 12 and 26, 1987 were cancelled and "reset for the last time" on April 2 and 30, 1987.
On April 2, 1987, Inter-Resin Industrial again failed to appear. Accordingly the trial court issued the
following order:
Considering that, as shown by the records, the Court had exerted every earnest effort to cause the
service of notice or subpoena on the defendant Inter-Resin Industrial but to no avail, even with the
assistance of the defendant Willex the defendant Inter-Resin Industrial is hereby deemed to have waived
the right to present its evidence.
On the other hand, Willex Plastic announced it was resting its case without presenting any evidence.
Upon motion of Inter-Resin Industrial, however, the trial court reconsidered its order and set the hearing
anew on July 23, 1987. But Inter-Resin Industrial again moved for the postponement of the hearing be
postponed to August 11, 1987. The hearing was, therefore, reset on September 8 and 22, 1987 but the
hearings were reset on October 13, 1987, this time upon motion of Interbank. To give Interbank time to
comment on a motion filed by Inter-Resin Industrial, the reception of evidence for Inter-Resin Industrial
was again reset on November 17, 26 and December 11, 1987. However, Inter-Resin Industrial again
moved for the postponement of the hearing. Accordingly the hearing was reset on November 26 and
December 11, 1987, with warning that the hearings were intransferrable.

Again, the reception of evidence for Inter-Resin Industrial was reset on January 22, 1988 and February
5, 1988 upon motion of its counsel. As Inter-Resin Industrial still failed to present its evidence, it was
declared to have waived its evidence.
To give Inter-Resin Industrial a last opportunity to present its evidence, however, the hearing was
postponed to March 4, 1988. Again Inter-Resin Industrial's counsel did not appear. The trial court,
therefore, finally declared Inter-Resin Industrial to have waived the right to present its evidence. On the
other hand, Willex Plastic, as before, manifested that it was not presenting evidence and requested
instead for time to file a memorandum.
There is therefore no basis for the plea made by Willex Plastic that it be given the opportunity of
showing that Inter-Resin Industrial has already paid its obligation to Interbank.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 140904

October 9, 2000

RENE S. ONG, MAGDALENO B. ALBARRACIN, JR., PETRONIO C. AALIWIN and J. O.

NERIT, petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION

witness complainant Zeny Alfonso. The prosecution then formally offered its documentary evidence and
rested its case. The admissibility of these documents was questioned by petitioners.
The disputed documents are alleged photo copies of (1) the approval of the sale of the paper bagmaking machine supposedly signed by petitioners; (2) an official receipt of Solid Cement Corporation
evidencing payment of P362,000.00; (3) a plant gate pass from one J.P. Valencia dated February 16,
1993 for entry into the Antipolo compound and pull-out of the machine; (4) a letter from one Atty.
Maximino Robles demanding delivery of the machine to the complainant; (5) a letter of Solid Cement's
Rene S. Ong offering to return P362,000.00 plus interest; (6) a letter from Atty. Robles informing Solid
Cement of complainant's refusal to accept the refund of the P362,000.00; (7) a memorandum from five
officers or employees of Solid Cement Corporation recommending the sale of the paper bag-makingmachine; (8) another gate-pass dated December 3, 1992 from one Ramon Enriquez allowing the pull out
of the machine; (9) a letter from one Lorenzo P. Ligot thanking Solid Cement, through one Peter
Aaliwin, for the former's grant of a right of first refusal; and (10) a copy of the resolution dated July 26,
1993 of the Provincial Prosecutor's Office of Rizal. The defense objected to the admission of these
pieces of evidence, claiming that the same were only unauthenticated photocopies of the originals.
On July 12, 1996, petitioners filed a motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence, attaching thereto
their demurrer. In their pleading, petitioners stressed that all the above-mentioned documents being
uncertified photocopies bearing unidentified or unauthenticated signatures are inadmissible in evidence.
Without ruling on the motion for leave to file demurrer, the MeTC, on August 19, 1996, held:
WHEREFORE, the instant demurrer is hereby denied and the motion to hold departure order of all
accused Granted. Let a copy of this Order be sent to the Commissioner of Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation for proper disposition and implementation against the accused RENE ONG,
MAGDALENO ALBARRACIN, JR., PETRONIO C. AALIWIN and J.O. NERIT of Solid Cement
Corporation, No. 168 Salcedo Street, 3rd Floor, Golden Rock Building, Makati City.

MELO, J.:
(pp. 113-114, Rollo.)
Before us is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, wherein petitioners, accused before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City,
charge said court with having committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied their demurrer to
evidence.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On February 8, 1993, Zeny Alfonso purchased a paper bag-making machine for P362,000.00 from the
Solid Cement Corporation. When she went to the corporation's Antipolo plant, however, no machine
could be given to her, it appearing that the machine sold had been earlier mortgaged to a creditor, who,
unfortunately, refused to release the mortgage. Herein petitioners offered to return the money paid by
Mrs. Alfonso but she refused and instead filed a criminal complaint with the City Prosecutor of Makati.
The City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint on the ground that liability, if any, would be civil and not
criminal in nature. This dismissal was, however, reversed by the Department of Justice.
On October 18, 1994, an Information for estafa and other deceit based on Article 318 of the Revised
Penal Code was filed with the MeTC of Makati City. After pre-trial, the prosecution presented as its sole

In its Order denying the demurrer to evidence, MeTC Judge Felicidad Y. Navarro-Quiambao
summarized private complainant's testimony as follows:
The prosecutor presented the private complainant Zeny Alfonso who testified that on February 8, 1993,
she was awarded by the accused the sale of a Paper Bag Making Machine including its spare parts. On
February 16, 1993, she paid in full the purchase price of the machine including the charges for its
freight to Cebu in the amount of P362,000.00 and as a consequence of said payment she was issued a
Plant Gate Pass for the pull out of shipment of the machine to Cebu; that the following day, she
proceeded to the plant site of the Solid Cement Corporation in Antipolo where she was told that accused
Rene S. Ong has ordered to stop and discontinue with the shipment of the machine; that on the same
day, she rushed to see Mr. Ong in Makati and she was told to wait for a week; that on March 1, 1993,
she went again to Mr. Ong who informed her to go back to the plant site for final arrangement regarding
the shipment of the paper bag machine so she proceeded to the plant only to be told that the machine
cannot be released on order of Mr. Ong; that upon the demand of her lawyer to the Solid Corporation
for its compliance with their obligation under the transaction, Mr. Ong offered a compromise which was
turned down by her.
(pp. 112-113, Rollo.)

The MeTC, in fact, found that there was a prima facie case against petitioners on the basis of the
documents submitted by the prosecution, stating:
The Court noted from the documentary evidence on record that the machine subject of the transaction
between the complainant and the accused is mortgaged to another creditor, who, incidentally, refused to
release the mortgage on said subject machine. Indeed, this strongly suggest (sic) the existence of
a prima facie case that would warrant a trial on the merits. Accordingly, the motion for hold departure
order is hereby Granted.
(p. 113, Rollo.)
Acting on a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the accused, the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, per Judge Teofilo Guadiz, Jr., reversed the above ruling in its order dated May 19, 1997,
disposing:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby granted. The Order dated August 19,
1996 denying the Demurrer to Evidence and the Order dated September 18, 1996, insofar as it declares
the existence of cause to hold the petitioners for further trial, are hereby set aside and declared null and
void. The respondent judge is hereby ordered to dismiss Criminal Case No. 157290 entitled People of
the Philippines v. Rene Ong, et al.
(p. 159, Rollo.)
The Guadiz resolution was raised to the Court of Appeals by the People. On April 8, 1999, the 13th
Division thereof (Mabutas [P], Aquino, and Rivera, JJ.) rendered a reversal decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED - and the assailed resolution
(dated May 19, 1997) and order (dated October 16, 1997) of the respondent judge SET ASIDE. The writ
of preliminary injunction issued by this Court on June 5, 1998 is made permanent. The private
respondents herein are given the option to either present their evidence (in Criminal Case No. 157290
which is reinstated) before the trial court below (Metropolitan Trial Court) or to submit the case for
decision based solely on the prosecutor's evidence.
(p. 71, Rollo.)
Petitioners submit that the Court of Appeals acted contrary to law and jurisprudence and committed
grave abuse of discretion in:
1) finding that appeal and not certiorari was the remedy that should have been availed of by petitioners;
2) finding that RTC Judge Teofilo Guadiz, Jr. erred in evaluating the prosecution's evidence for
sufficiency and inadmissibility;
3) not finding that the RTC resolution dated May 19, 1997 was an acquittal and not applying double
jeopardy in their favor;

The petition is meritorious.

In setting aside the regional trial court's decision which ordered the MeTC to dismiss the criminal case
filed against petitioners, the Court of Appeals held that petitioners, after the denial by the MeTC of their
demurrer to evidence, should not have filed a petition for certiorari with the regional trial court. In its
words:
As pointed out, the Supreme Court, in the case of Joseph v. Villaluz (89 SCRA 324), held that it would
not annul an interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss in a criminal case. Appeal is the proper
remedy of the petitioners in order to have the findings of fact reviewed by a superior court (Manalo v.
Mariano, 69 SCRA 80). Such ruling was a reiteration of an earlier one in People v. Romero (22 Phil.
565) wherein the Highest Tribunal stressed that the question of whether or not the evidence by the
prosecution is sufficient to convince the court that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged, rests entirely within the sound judgment of the trial court. The error, if any is committed
by the denial of the demurrer to evidence, can only be corrected by appeal (Cruz v. People, 144 SCRA
677).
Similarly, the Supreme Court held in People v. Court of Appeals (119 SCRA 162) that it has been the
long settled rule that certiorari does not lie to challenge the trial court's interlocutory order denying the
accused's motion to dismiss. "The appellate courts will not review in such special civil action the
prosecution's evidence and decide in advance that such evidence has or has not yet established the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The orderly procedure prescribed by the Rules of Court is for
the accused to present his evidence after which the trial court, on its own assessment of the evidence
submitted by both the prosecution and defense, will then properly render its judgment of acquittal or
conviction. If the verdict is one of acquittal, the case ends there. But if it is one of conviction, then
appeal is the proper recourse (Cruz v. People, supra).
(pp. 64-65, Rollo.)
In other words, the position of the Court of Appeals is to the effect that after the denial of their demurrer
to evidence, petitioners instead of filing a petition for certiorari with the regional trial court, should
have presented their evidence and in case of an adverse decision, appealed the same to the regional trial
court.
Likewise, the Court of Appeals brushed aside petitioners' invocation of their right against double
jeopardy, stating that the order of the regional trial court dismissing the criminal case filed against
petitioners did not amount to their acquittal. Held thus the appellate court:
As aptly posited by the petitioner (The People) the requisites that must concur for legal jeopardy to
attach are: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a court of competent jurisdiction; (c) the accused
has pleaded to the charge; and (d) the accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case dismissed or
terminated without the express consent of the accused (People v. Gines, 197 SCRA 481, De la Rosa v.
Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 499). The fourth requisite is lacking, because respondent court's resolution
of May 19, 1997 is a "fruit" emerging from a grave abuse of discretion - thus it cannot ripen to an
acquittal of the private respondents, whose demurrer to evidence had been denied by the trial court
below. It is true that an accused is presumed innocent until his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt.
However, after the prosecution has adduced evidence, the constitutional presumption of innocence must
yield to what has been so amply and persuasively demonstrated (People v. Andal, 70 SCRA 30). The
respondent judge could not decide in the special civil action before him whether or not the evidence

adduced by the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioners (private
respondents herein), because factual matters are not proper for consideration in proceedings brought
either as an original action for certiorari or as an appeal by certiorari (Insular Bank of Asia and
America v. Court of Appeals, 228 SCRA 420; Navarro v. Commission on Elections, 228 SCRA 596). It
is, therefore, incumbent on the part of the accused (private respondents herein) to neutralize the
evidence of the State in order to maintain the presumption of their innocence of the crime of which they
were charged. If convicted, appeal will be their (private respondents') proper remedy to have the
findings of fact by the trial judge reviewed by a superior court (Manalo v. Mariano, et al., 69 SCRA 80).
Indeed, the rule generally prevailing is that "certiorari does not lie to review a trial court's interlocutory
order denying a motion to dismiss (or to acquit), which is equivalent to a demurrer to evidence, filed
after the prosecution had presented its evidence and rested its case. An order denying a demurrer to
evidence is interlocutory. It is not appealable. Neither can it be the subject of a petition
for certiorari (Tadeo v. People, 300 SCRA 744 [1998])."
However, Tadeo itself states that "[f]rom such denial (of the demurrer to evidence), appeal in due time is
the proper remedy, not certiorari, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction,
or an oppressive exercise of judicial authority."
Consequently, if the denial of the demurrer to evidence is attended by grave abuse of discretion, the
denial may be assailed through a petition for certiorari. This exception was explicitly recognized by the
Court in Cruz v. People (303 SCRA 533 [1999]), where we stated that:
The general rule that the extraordinary writ of certiorari is not available to challenge (the denial of the
demurrer to evidence) may be subject to exceptions. When the assailed interlocutory orders are patently
erroneous or issued with grave abuse of discretion, the remedy of certiorari lies.
Likewise, in Gutib v. Court of Appeals (312 SCRA 365 [1999]), we declared that "the rule is not
absolute and admits of an exception. Thus where, as in the instant case, the denial of the motion to
dismiss by the trial court was tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the aggrieved party may assail the order of denial on certiorari."
The present case presents one such exception warranting the resort to the remedy of certiorari, the trial
court judge having committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
denying petitioners' demurrer to evidence. A demurrer to evidence is an objection by one of the parties
in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law,
whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the
sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the
evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether there
is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt (Gutib v.
CA, supra).
In the instant case, there is no competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support
a verdict of guilt against petitioners. As pointed out by petitioners, all documentary evidence submitted
by the private complainant were uncertified photocopies of certain documents, the signatures on which
were either unidentified or unauthenticated.

Section 20, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that "before any private document offered
as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) by anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Thus, prior to the admission in evidence of a private writing, the identity and authenticity of the
document sought to be presented must first be reasonably established. Where there is no proof as to the
authenticity of the executor's signature appearing in a private document, such private document should
be excluded (Paz v. Santiago, 47 Phil 334 [1925]).
The documentary evidence submitted by the complaining witness are private instruments, being
instruments executed by private persons without the intervention of a public notary or of other persons
legally authorized, by which document some disposition or agreement is proved, evidenced, or set forth
(U.S. v. Orera, 11 Phil. 596 [1907]).
Being private instruments, their due and valid execution and their genuineness and authenticity must
first be established, either by the testimony of any one who saw the writing executed or by evidence of
the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker hereof.
A painstaking perusal of the testimony of the prosecution's sole witness reveals, however, that the due
execution and authenticity of these documents were never proved. In fact, the prosecution took no effort
to prove the due execution and authenticity of these documents during the presentation of their sole
witness. Absent such proof, these documents are incompetent as evidence. It is elementary that this
Court cannot rightly appreciate firsthand the genuineness of an unverified and unidentified document;
much less, accord it evidentiary value (People v. Sumalpong, 284 SCRA 464 [1998]). In People v.
Gamiao (240 SCRA 254 [1995]), we declared, "[p]arenthetically, appellant failed to present in evidence
the originals or the xerox copies of the documents hereinbefore discussed. The requirements for the
admission of such secondary evidence in court were not satisfied. The Rules of Court provide that
private documents require proof of their due execution and authentication before they can be received in
evidence. When there is no such proof, the substitutionary documents may be excluded."
Moreover, the documents submitted are mere photocopies of the originals. Thus, they are secondary
evidence and as such are not admissible unless there is ample proof of the loss of the originals (Section
3, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court). However, the loss of the originals have not been proved by the
prosecution, neither have they shown that the original is a public record in the custody of a public office
or is recorded in a public office, nor that the same is in the custody or under the control of petitioners.
The due execution and authenticity of the documentary evidence presented not having been proved, and
since these are mere photocopies, the loss of the originals of which was not previously established, the
same are clearly inadmissible in evidence. Being incompetent evidence, the only evidence the
prosecution could rely on to prove petitioners' guilt would be the sole testimony of the private
complainant. Unsupported by any other evidence, said testimony is insufficient to sustain a finding of
culpability.
Sufficient evidence for purposes of frustrating a demurrer thereto is such evidence in character, weight
or amount as will legally justify the judicial or official action demanded according to the circumstances.

To be considered sufficient, therefore, the evidence must prove: (a) the commission of the crime, and (b)
the precise degree of participation therein by the accused. In the instant case, the prosecution miserably
failed to establish by sufficient evidence the existence of the crime of estafa and other deceit.
Aside from complainant's testimony, the only evidence of petitioners' supposed complicity in the
alleged offense is the photocopy of the approval of the sale of the paper bag-making machine, said
document containing the names of petitioners Ong, Nerit, Aaliwin, and Albarracin. As stated earlier,
however, said document is inadmissible in evidence. Thus, there is no evidence as to their participation
in the crime.1wphi1 In fact, among the petitioners, private complainant had personal contact only with
Ong, whom she met only after the alleged approval of the sale of the machine. Having met Ong after
the sale, Ong could not have misrepresented anything to complainant to induce her to part with her
money. As to the others, not having had personal dealings with private complainant, it boggles one's
mind to even entertain the speculation that they could have misrepresented anything to the latter.
With our ruling that the documentary evidence submitted by the prosecution is inadmissible in evidence,
the prosecution's evidence against petitioners is grossly and patently insufficient to support a finding of
guilt. Withal, it was grave abuse of discretion for the MeTC to consider that there was a prima
facie case against petitioners warranting a trial on the merits given the paucity of evidence against
petitioners.
Had said court been more punctilious and thorough in its study and preparation of the case, it could
have fully appreciated the weakness of the state evidence against petitioners, and that it was useless, not
to say a waste of time and money, but most of all unfair to the accused, to proceed with the tedious
process of trial and direct petitioners to adduce evidence in their defense, since it was obvious from the
beginning that petitioners could not be convicted of the crime charged.
In ruling against petitioners, the appellate court also held that petitioners could not avail of their
constitutional right against double jeopardy, allegedly because the regional trial court's reversal of the
MeTC denial of their demurrer to evidence is a "fruit" emerging from grave abuse of discretion. It
declared that Judge Guadiz could not decide in the special civil action filed before him whether or not
the evidence adduced by the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of
petitioners, factual matters not being proper for consideration in certiorariproceedings.
It is true that the prerogative writ of certiorari does not lie to correct every controversial interlocutory
order but is confined merely to questions of jurisdiction. Its function is to keep an inferior court within
its jurisdiction and to relieve persons from arbitrary acts, meaning acts which courts or judges have no
power or authority in law to perform. It is not designed to correct procedural errors or the court's
erroneous findings and conclusions (De Vera v. Pineda, 213 SCRA 434 [1992]).
However, certiorari can be properly resorted to where the factual findings complained of are not
supported by the evidence on record (Congregation of the Religious of the Virgin Mary v. CA, 291
SCRA 385 [1998]). As earlier observed, with the inadmissibility of the prosecution's documentary
evidence, the trial court's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners is glaringly unsupported by
the sole testimony of private complainant, hence the RTC resolution reversing the MeTC's denial of the
demurrer to evidence cannot be said to be the "fruit" of grave abuse of discretion. Since the factual
findings of the MeTC are devoid of support in the evidence on record, it was proper for the RTC to
review said findings. Moreover, in order to determine whether or not there was grave abuse of
discretion in denying the demurrer to evidence, the RTC had to inquire into the admissibility and
sufficiency of the documentary and testimonial evidence submitted by the prosecution.

With the grant by the RTC of the demurrer to evidence, the same constituted a valid acquittal and any
further prosecution of petitioners on the same charge would expose them to being put twice in jeopardy
for the same offense. A dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of a demurrer to evidence is not
appealable as the accused would thereby be placed in double jeopardy (See Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium, p. 441).
Lastly, it has been said that a wide breadth of discretion is granted a court of justice
in certiorari proceedings. The cases in which certiorari will issue cannot be defined, because to do so
would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide is the discretion of the court that
authority is not wanting to show that certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition
or mandamus. In the exercise of our superintending control over other courts, we are to be guided by all
the circumstances of each particular case "as the ends of justice may require." So it is that the writ will
be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice (Gutib v.
CA, supra).
The case at bar presents one such instance calling for this appropriate remedy. As discussed elsewhere,
petitioners have satisfactorily demonstrated in their demurrer that the prosecution failed to prove the
crime charged against them, hence, there remains no reason to hold them for trial. Indeed, an accused is
always presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. Parenthetically, petitioners have the right to be
protected against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecution; to be secure from an open and public
accusation of a crime; and, from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial. Similarly situated is
the State, which must be shielded at all times from useless and expensive litigations that only contribute
to the clogging of court dockets and take a heavy toll on its limited time and meager resources.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
dated April 8, 1999 setting aside the Regional Trial Court's resolution dated May 19, 1997, as well as
respondent appellate court's Resolution dated November 16, 1999 denying reconsideration of its
decision, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The dismissal of Criminal Case No. 157290 entitled
"People of the Philippines v. Rene S. Ong, et al. is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to the filing of an
appropriate civil action.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 118828 & 119371

February 29, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
HENRY LUGARTO Y PETILLA and ERNESTO CORDERO y MARISTELA @
"Booster," accused-appellants.
(supra)
________________________________________________________________________________
G.R. No. 116294 August 21, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO CHAVEZ y ESTAMANTE alias "TONY", accused-appellant.

KAPUNAN, J.:
This is an appeal from the February 24, 1994 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City,
Branch 32,1 in Criminal Case No. 10499 finding herein appellant Antonio Chavez y
Estamante alias "Tony" guilty of the crime of murder committed against the person of one Bernabe Jaos
and imposing on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the payment of civil indemnity in the
amount of P50,000.00, interment expenses of P10,000.00, moral damages of P16,000.00 and the costs
of suit.
The information 2 for murder was filed against appellant on November 26, 1992. Appellant pleaded not
guilty to the murder charge. 3 As the accused was then on probation for the crime of robbery, 4 his
probation was revoked by the trial court. 5
The prosecution, through its principal witness Agripina Ablejina, sought to establish the following facts:
The victim, Bernabe Jaos, 23 years old, 6 lived with his common-law wife, Agripina Ablejina, in Sitio
Tampaga, Barrio Mantiquel, Siaton, Negros Oriental. Their nearest neighbor was Efraim Navarez whose
wife was the sister of Jaos. The house of Jaos was about two (2) meters away from that of Navarez so
that from there, one could look down on the front door of Navarez who sold goods to his neighbors.
At around 8:00 o'clock in the evening of October 18, 1992, Agripina was standing by the window of her
home, where she could observe the Navarez household. Her husband Jaos was buying cigarettes at the
house cum store of Navarez. Agripina saw that Efraim Navarez was with his wife and younger brother.
Navarez and Jaos were smoking and conversing with each other when appellant, first cousin of
Navarez, arrived and stabbed Jaos with a knife. Jaos was stabbed above his umbilical cord, causing his
blood to spurt and his intestines to come out. The victim was then squatting near the door inside the
house of Navarez. Chavez pushed Jaos, who fell to the ground. Chavez then ran to the house of his
mother.
Agripina went to Jaos and removed the knife which was left sticking out of his body. She delivered the
knife to the PNP station in Mantiquel. When she was investigated at the police station, Agripina could
not finish her statement 7 because her child was crying. She then requested Navarez to "finish" her
statement. 8 His body was brought to the Siaton morgue. 9
Dr. Mitylene B. Tan, municipal health officer, was also presented as a witness. Dr. Tan testified that she
conducted a postmortem examination on the body of Jaos at the morgue of the Siaton District Hospital
at 8:00 p.m. of October 19, 1992. She found the body rigid and had been dead for approximately fifteen
(15) hours. Her examination revealed that the victim had sustained a perforating 2 1/2 inches long stab
wound with intestinal herniation at the mid-upper abdominal region. 10
PO3 Marcial Dingal in his testimony stated that he reflected the stabbing incident on the police
blotter 11 in the afternoon of October 19, 1992. He identified the weapon used, a 10-inch long
bolo, 12 which was surrendered by CAA 13Atanacio Caminade who was also a member of the CAFGU. 14
The defense interposed denial.
Appellant testified on his behalf, and his version of the events that transpired on October 18, 1992 is a
follows:

At around 6:30 in the evening of October 18, 1992, he went to Navarez's place to buy bread. With
Navarez then were Melvin and Henry Jaos, a first cousin of the victim. Navarez invited appellant to take
a meal. While appellant was eating, Jaos arrived and, addressing Navarez said, "It's good that you are
here, let us finish each other."
Having heard Jaos' utterance, Navarez pulled out a weapon and stabbed Jaos' stomach. As Jaos fell
downstairs, appellant stood up and at this juncture, Navarez faced him and stabbed him in the right arm.
Appellant leaned on the wall, parried the blows and kicked Navarez, hitting his chest. Then appellant
jumped downstairs and ran to the house of his elder brother, Sebastian Chavez, Jr., who was at home
with their sister, mother and appellant's wife. Appellant told his brother, "Nong, please help me because
Bernabe was killed." However, appellant did not report the incident to the police "because it is very far."
That same evening, PNP members came for appellant. They told him that he was responsible for the
death of Jaos. Appellant informed the police that it was Navarez who killed Jaos but the police replied,
"Just go with us and relay the incident to our higher up." 15
Appellant's story was corroborated by Melvin Quimada. Quimada, who was from Sitio Saksak,
Malabuhan, claimed that he had gone to Mantiquel to help out in the harvest of crops and was staying
with his uncle, Agapito Quimada. In the evening of October 18, 1992, Melvin was in the house of
Navarez when he heard Jaos shout at Navarez, "You have eluded before and raw away but now I will
kill you." Jaos made one step and shouted, "I will kill you." Navarez got a knife, went to the front door
and stabbed Jaos. As Jaos fell to the ground, appellant and Melvin both tried to jump from the house.
However, appellant was stabbed by Navarez so that Melvin stepped back to hide behind the door. When
he noticed that he had a way out, Melvin jumped out of the door and ran to the house of his uncle. He
learned the following day that Jaos was dead. Melvin did not report the incident to the police because he
knew that they would not believe him. 16
Appellant's brother, Sebastian Chavez, Jr., testified that he let appellant into his house and applied
herbal medicine to his right arm. Later, CAFGU members fetched appellant because Navarez had
reported that appellant was responsible for the stabbing of Jaos. Sebastian protested that his brother was
even wounded during the incident but the CAFGUs did not listen to him. Instead, they took appellant to
the CAFGU headquarters. Sebastian, who accompanied his brother, saw Navarez at the
headquarters, 17 sitting with Agapito Quimada.
Agapito investigated Navarez and then, after the investigation, informed everyone that since appellant
had run away from the crime scene, the matter should be investigated by the police. Sebastian reiterated
that it was Navarez who stabbed the victim but Agapito repeated the "standing order" that both appellant
and Navarez should be brought to the police station. He did not accompany appellant to the police
station because he had fever then.18
On rebuttal, the prosecution presented Agapito Quimada, father-in-law of Sebastian Chavez, Jr., Agapito
testified that it was Antonio Merlo and Navarez who had requested for appellant's arrest at around 10:00
o'clock in the evening, as they had presented to him the letter 19 of Serafin Sibol, a barangay councilman,
requesting such arrest. Agapito arrested appellant at the house of his brother and later conducted an
investigation at the crime scene. He saw the body of the deceased near the house of Navarez which was
around one (1) meter away from the house of the victim. Agapito even made a sketch of the two
houses. 20
Agapito likewise denied that his nephew, Melvin Quimada, went to his place in Mantiquel.

When Agapito went to the crime scene, the victim's wife and Serafin Sibol were around. A doublebladed knife, the weapon used in the crime, was surrendered to him by Agripina but it was Tating
(Atanacio Caminade) who gave it up to the police. According to Agapito, the bolo marked as Exhibit E
was not the murder weapon.
On his own volition, Agapito drew the sketch 21 of the crime scene showing the victim lying between
the houses of Jaos and Navarez. At the house of Sebastian Chavez, Jr., Agapito asked appellant why he
stabbed Jaos. Appellant answered that he was "ganged up." It was in the house of Sebastian that he
arrested appellant.
On the trial court's initiative, Agripina was recalled to the witness stand. The court verified from her as
to whom she surrendered the knife she had pulled out of the victim's body. Agripina told the court that
she gave the knife to Agapito Quimada and that the bolo labelled as Exhibit E was not the murder
weapon. 22
Atanacio Caminade, a member of the CAFGU, surrendered the weapon to the police. Another CAFGU
member, Antonio Fabillar, had given it to him. The weapon that he surrendered was not a bolo but a
hunting knife. Upon learning that a bolo was brought to the court and identified as the murder weapon,
he confronted policeman Marcial Dingal. According to Caminade, the weapon wrongly brought to the
court by Dingal was the bolo used in the killing of a certain Sayson in Mantiquel. Caminade saw how
the killer in the case himself surrendered the bolo but it was he (Caminade) who surrendered the hunting
knife used in killing Jaos. 23
Once again recalled to the witness stand, Agripina testified that she pulled the knife out of Jaos' body in
the presence of the barangay councilman, Serafin Sibol and Elsa Quitay. She gave the knife to Agapito
Quimada, a CAFGU, who was then in the company of Nelson Apostol, Benedicto Trumata and Antonio
Sombilon. 24
As a surrebuttal witness, Sebastian Chavez, Jr. claimed that while it was true that he and his father-inlaw, Agapito Quimada, used to be in good terms with each other, their relationship turned sour when
Agapito sided with his son, Toribio, with whom Sebastian had an altercation when Toribio's horse
nibbled Sebastian's rice and corn plants.
When he himself returned to the witness stand, Melvin Quimada insisted that he was in Mantiquel in the
month of October, 1992, harvesting rice. He had gone there to harvest several times already. When he
returned to Cama after the incident which resulted in the death of Jaos, Agapito went to his house.
Agapito "murmured" to him, asking why he (Melvin) had become a witness in this case. Melvin
answered that he only wanted to tell the truth. 25
Not satisfied with the trial court's decision, appellant appealed to this Court assigning the following
errors:

II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ANTONIO
CHAVEZ Y ESTAMANTE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF
MURDER. 26
Considering that the parties presented contradictory facts, the issue in this appeal boils down to
credibility. As this Court has time and again said, the trial court's evaluation on the credibility of
witnesses is viewed as correct and entitled to the highest respect by appellate courts. The trial court is
more competent to so conclude, having had the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor and
deportment on the stand, and the manner in which they gave their testimonies. 27 Its findings on the
issue of credibility of witnesses and its consequent findings of fact must be given great weight and
respect on appeal, unless certain facts of substance and value have been overlooked which, if considered
might affect the result of the case. 28
After a careful scrutiny of the records and evidence of the case, we find no persuasive reason to depart
from this well entrenched rule on credibility as to warrant a reversal of the decision of the trial court.
Nevertheless, the issues raised by the appellant should be faced squarely.
Appellant bewails the fact that the trial court accorded great weight to the testimony of the common-law
wife of the victim. Appellant posits that she could hardly be considered as an eyewitness as she was in
her house at the time of the killing, while there were other persons at the scene of the crime, who were
not even presented as witnesses.29
This is argument has no basis in fact and in law. In the first place, it is the prosecution which determines
who among the witnesses to a crime should testify in court. The prosecutor handling the case is given a
wide discretion on this matter. It is definitely not for the courts, much more the defense, to dictate what
evidence to present or who should take the witness stand at the trial of a
case. 30
Secondly, the trial court did not err in finding that Agripina was a credible witness whose testimony
should be deemed as nothing but the truth. The appellant himself admitted that there was no reason why
she should testify against him. 31 Well-settled is the rule that when there is no evidence to indicate that
the principal witness for the prosecution was moved by improper motive, the presumption is that such
witness was not so moved and that his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. 32
Thirdly, simply because Agripina was a common-law wife of the victim, it does not necessarily follow
that her testimony is biased, incredible or self-serving. This Court has held that there is no legal
provision that disqualifies relatives of the victim of a crime from testifying, being otherwise competent,
regarding the facts and circumstances of the crime. Mere relationship of witnesses to the victim of a
crime, whether by consanguinity or affinity, does not necessarily impair their credibility as witnesses.
This is specially so when the witnesses were present at the scene of the crime. 33

I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE
TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND IN TOTALLY DISREGARDING THAT
OF THE DEFENSE.

Lastly, the defense further attacks Agripina's credibility on the ground that her affidavit before the
police, does not even mention the stabbing incident itself. 34 This omission was, however, explained by
Agripina when she testified that she could not finish her statement because she had to attend to her
crying child. 35 Affidavits, being taken ex-parte, are almost always incomplete and inaccurate. 36

Appellant points out that Agripina's testimony is not credible because her claim that her house was
elevated and therefore higher than that of Navarez, was contradicted by prosecution witness Agapito
Quimada. However, both the testimony of Agripina and Agapito's sketch show that the window of the
victim's house faced the front door of the Navarez residence. In other words, Agripina had an
unobstructed view of the incident. This is the material aspect of the prosecution's case which the defense
failed to disprove satisfactorily.
Another matter which appellant stresses as indicative of Agripina's incredulous testimony is the fact that
while she claimed that the murder weapon was a knife, the police presented a bolo. The mistake on the
part of witness Dingal in presenting the wrong murder weapon was satisfactory explained by the
prosecution. That it was not Dingal himself who rectified the error on the
stand 37 is of no moment. It would not be amiss to point out that the production of the murder weapon is
not even essential for a conviction. This, the Court emphasized in People v. Bello, 38 when it said:
For the purposes of conviction, it is enough that the prosecution establishes by proof beyond reasonable
doubt that a crime was committed and the accused is the author thereof. The production of the weapon
used in the commission of the crime is not a condition sine qua non for the discharge of such burden,
for the same may not have been recovered at all from the assailant (People v. Florida, 214 SCRA 227
[1992]).
Appellant attempts to support his denial of guilt by asserting that he informed the police that it was
Navarez who killed Jaos but the police appeared to have been bent on pinning him down as the
culprit. 39 This bare assertion, unsupported as it is by other evidence, is simply self-serving and deserves
scant consideration. Moreover, appellant's claim that Navarez has a motive for harming Jaos because the
latter allegedly "disallowed (Navarez) to use the carabao in plowing the fields" 40 cannot be appreciated
in the absence of independent proof thereon duly presented at the trial. Furthermore, the positive
identification of appellant as the perpetrator of the crime may not be overturned by his denial. It is wellsettled that between the positive assertions of the prosecution witnesses and the negative averments of
the accused-appellant, the former indisputably deserve more credence and are, therefore, entitled to
greater evidentiary weight. 41
Appellant's last-ditch effort towards exoneration is his allegation that the trial court was biased against
him because it was the same court which convicted him of robbery in Criminal Case No. 9958 and,
hence, there "existed in the mind of the court that the accused-appellant who is under probation would
be prone to commit the act imputed against him. 42 The Court finds this assertion misplaced. If indeed
there was reason for the appellant to doubt the court's impartiality, his counsel could have sought the
inhibition of the presiding judge from hearing the case.
The trial court correctly qualified the killing to the crime of murder as treachery was duly established by
the prosecution. The testimony of the prosecution eyewitness is significant on this matter:

A Yes, I really saw it.

Q And when you saw the act of stabbing, what weapon was used by Tony Chavez in stabbing Bernabe
Jaos?
A A knife.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, when Tony Chavez stabbed your common-law husband, was your common-law husband hit?
A Yes, he was hit.
Q Where was your common-law husband hit?
A He was hit above the umbilical cord.
Q And when your husband was hit above the umbilical cord, did you see blood spurting?
A Yes.
Q What else have you seen aside from blood spurting?
A His intestine.
Q And since you saw the act of stabbing, did you not warn your husband that there was an impending
assault on his person?
A No because the stabbing of Tony Chavez was so sudden.
Q When your husband was hit, blood spurting, the intestine came out, what happened to your husband?
A He died right away.
Q When Tony Chavez stabbed your husband, what was the position of your husband, was he sitting or
he was standing?
A He was sitting.

xxx xxx xxx

Q On what was he sitting?
Q And when Tony Chavez arrived at the store of Ephraim (sic) Navarez, what happened next?
A He was squatting.
A He then stabbed Bernabe Jaos.
Q Was he talking with a friend Ephraim (sic) Navarez at that time?
Q Have you seen the act of stabbing?

A Yes, they were talking.

A Towards their house.

Q Was Ephraim (sic) Navarez also squatting?

xxx xxx xxx. 43

A Yes, he was also squatting.

Treachery clearly characterized the commission of the crime. In this case, the assault was undoubtedly
made not only suddenly but also while the victim was defenseless. The fact that the victim was attacked
frontally does not negate the existence of treachery. The situation in this case is similar to that obtaining
in People v. Saliling 44where the victim was conversing with another person when the accused emerged
from behind them, stabbed the victim twice and quickly ran away. In holding that there was treachery,
the Court brushed aside the appellant's contention that by the location of the wounds inflicted upon the
victim, the attack was frontal and, therefore, not treacherous. It held that even a frontal attack can be
treacherous when it is sudden and unexpected and the victim was unarmed. 45

Q And when Tony Chavez delivered that stabbing blow on your common-law husband, where
particularly in the store of Ephraim (sic) Navarez was your husband situated?
A Near the door.
Q When you said near the door, was he inside the store of Navarez or outside the store of Navarez?
A He was inside the store.
Q When your husband was sitting and he was on a squatting position, what happened to your husband,
did he remain squatting or did he attempt to rise?

In the absence of proof of other circumstances attending the commission of the crime, whether
mitigating or aggravating, the penalty that should be imposed upon the appellant for the crime of
murder is reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the herein decision of the trial court finding Antonio Chavez
guilty of murder is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

A He fell down because he was pushed by Tony Chavez.

SO ORDERED.
Q Will you clarify that, he fell to the ground or he fell to the floor?
G.R. Nos. 70168-69 July 24, 1996
A He fell to the ground.
Q You mean to say the store at the house of Ephraim (sic) Navarez is elevated from the ground?
A Yes, about two (2) feet.

RAFAEL T. MOLINA and REYNALDO SONEJA, petitioners,

vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and the HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLANT
COURT, respondents.

Q You have seen also how Tony Chavez pushed your common-law husband?
A Yes.

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:p

Q And when your husband fell to the ground, what happened?

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court whereby petitioners Rafael
Molina and Reynaldo Soneja seek the review of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 affirming their
conviction3 for the crimes of Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents 4 and Violation of
Section 3 (h) of Republic Act. No. 3019, as amended, 5 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.

A He was lying on the ground.

xxx xxx xxx
Q After Tony Chavez pushed your husband and your husband fell to the ground, what did Tony Chavez
do next?

Petitioners, together with Rudy Concepcion and Aristeo Arcilla, Jr. were charged before the then Court
of First Instance of Catanduanes under Criminal Case No. 659 for Estafa thru Falsification of Public
Document under Article 315 in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code allegedly committed in
this wise:

A He ran.
Q Towards where did he ran?

That on or about and during the period from August 1, 1977 to November 11, 1977, the above-named
accused Rudy T. Concepcion, Chief of the JMA Memorial Hospital, San Andres, Catanduanes, a
government owned and operated institution; Reynaldo C. Sonejo, Administrative Officer and Cashier of

the same hospital; Aristeo T. Arcilla Jr., Bookeeper of the same hospital and Rafael T. Molina, in his
capacity as Assistant Provincial Auditor of Catanduanes, conspiring and confederating with one another,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain, simulated and falsified
public documents consisting of requisition and issue vouchers, canvass papers, bidders (sic) tenders,
contract of sale, invoices and general vouchers, thereby making it appear that the D'Vinta Marketing
Center owned and operated by Homer R. Tabuzo, sold and delivered to the JMA Memorial Hospital
supplies consisting of 50 pieces of bed sheets, 25 pieces of patients ( sic) gowns, 10 gallons of
merthiolate, 10 gallons of lysol disinfectant and 10 gallons of muriatic acid, worth P7,610.00, thereby
facilitating and making possible the issuance of Treasury Cheque Nos. SN 3-9982421 and SN 39982422 in the total amount of P7,610.00 payable to the order of the D'Vinta Marketing Center and
cashed the aforesaid treasury cheques at the PNB Virac Branch by forging the signature of Homer
Tabuzo making it the cheques to the accused Rafael Molina who also signed said cheques indorsing the
same to the accused Aristeo Arcilla, Jr. thereby enabling the said accused after cashing the cheques to
appropriate or divide among themselves the amount of P7,610.00 to the damage and prejudice of the
government who was defrauded in the aforesaid amount, and to the damage and prejudice of Homer
Tabuzo who suffered a besmirched reputation thereby entitling the latter to moral damages in the
amount of P50,000.00. 6
Petitioners, together with said Rudy Concepcion and Aristeo Arcilla and one Oliver Vargas were
charged before the same trial court under Criminal Case No. 658 for Violation of Section 3 (h) of R.A.
3019, as amended, purportedly committed in this fashion:
That on or about and during the period from August 1, 1977 to November 11, 1977, the above-named
accused Rudy T. Concepcion, Chief of the JMA Memorial Hospital, San Andres, Catanduanes, a
government owned and operated institution; Reynaldo C. Soneja, Administrative Officer and Cashier of
the same hospital; Aristeo T. Arcilla, Jr., Bookeeper of the same hospital; Rafael Molina, in his capacity
as Asst. Provincial Auditor of Catanduanes and Oliver F. Vargas, Checker-Inspector of the Provincial
Auditor's Office, same province, conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously simulated a contract or transaction making it appear the D'Vinta
Marketing Center, owned and operated by Homer Tabuzo , sold and delivered to the JMA Memorial
Hospital supplies consisting of 50 pieces bed sheets, 25 pieces patients (sic) gowns, 10 gallons of
merthiolate, 10 gallons of muriatic acid and 10 gallons of lysol disinfectant worth P7,610.00 by
simulating and falsifying requisition and issue vouchers, canvass papers, bidders ( sic) tenders, contract
of sale, invoices and general vouchers, thereby making possible the issuance of Treasury Cheques Nos.
SN 3-9982421 and SN 3-9982422 in the total amount of P7,610.00, as supposed payment for the abovedescribed undelivered medical and/or hospital supplies which up to the present have never been
delivered for the simple reason that the proprietor and manager of the D'Vinta Marketing Center had no
knowledge whatsoever of the aforesaid illegal transaction defrauding the government in the amount of
P7,610.00 thereby directly having financial or pecuniary interest in the aforesaid transaction in
connection with which the above-named accused took part in their respective official capacities in
which they are prohibited by law from having any such interests; said accused having appropriated
and/or divided among themselves the aforesaid amount. 7
These two cases were jointly tried upon agreement of the parties.
The facts as adduced by the Solicitor General without objection from the accused in any of their
subsequent pleadings are as follows:
THE FACTS

xxx xxx xxx

8. On August 23, 1977, petitioner Reynaldo C. Soneja was the Administrative Officer, Cashier (sic)
Supply and Disbursing Officer of Juan M. Alberto Memorial Hospital (JMA) of Virac, Catanduanes, a
government-owned institution (p. 4, tsn., April 19, 1977). Accused Aristeo T. Arcilla, Jr., was the
bookeeper. On the other hand, accused Oliver Vargas was the checker-inspector of the Provincial
Auditor's Office and petitioner Rafael T. Molina was the Assistant Provincial Auditor of Catanduanes
(pp. 27-28, tsn., January 18, 1979; Exh. "D", Envelope of Exhibits, unnumbered).
9. On November 11, 1977 at about 8:30 o'clock in the morning, Asuncion Tabuzo was in their house at
Salvacion, Virac, Catanduanes. Her husband Homer Tabuso left that morning for Manila (Exh. "J", p. 56
tsn., March 21, 1979). Molina arrived and asked her to give him an invoice of their business
establishment, the D'vinta Marketing Center (p. 101, tsn, march 21, 1979; p. 179, record). She refused
as she was not authorized by her husband Homer to give her that he will use the invoice to facilitate the
processing of a check from JMA Memorial Hospital in favor of D'Vinta Marketing Center (p. 180,
record). Molina left as she stood pat on her decision not to give him any invoices (p. 102, tsn., March
21, 1977; p. 180, record).
10. In the afternoon of the same day, Molina returned to the Tabuzo residence with Arcilla, Jr. With
them were two Treasury Warrants (Nos. 9982421 and 9982422) payable to the order of D'Vinta
Marketing Center (p. 180, rec.). Molina asked her to indorse the Treasury Warrants in his favor (pp.
102-013, tsn, ibid; p. 180, ibid). Again, she refused because her husband had no transaction with JMA
Memorial Hospital (ibid). They left when they could not convince her (p. 104. tsn, ibid).
11. Later, Asuncion's son, Ronald Tabuzo, went to their house (p. 104, tsn, ibid; p. 108, rec.). He came
from PNB Virac Branch to withdraw from their savings deposit. He said that in the PNB Branch he saw
Arcilla, Jr. cash two checks which are payable to the order of the D'Vinta Marketing Center (p. 180,
rec.). Immediately, Asuncion went to the PNB Virac Branch and asked Manuel Romero, the teller, how
the Treasury Warrant (check) Nos. 9982421 and 9982422 were encashed despite their non-indorsement
by her and her husband (ibid). Romero explained to her that he thought the signatures on the two checks
were signatures of Homer Tabuzo; that the second indorsement contains what appears to be the genuine
signature of Molina and the third indorsement thereat appears to be by Arcilla, Jr. (ibid). In view
thereof, Manuel Romero claimed that he paid the amount of P7,610.00 to Arcilla, Jr. (pp. 27-31, tsn,
March 21, 1979).
12. On November 12, 1977, Asuncion received a long distance call from Homer. She asked him if he
had made deliveries of hospital and medical supplies to the JMA Hospital which would entitle him to
the issuance of Check Nos. 9982421 and 9982422 in the total sum of P7,610.00 He said he had not.
When informed that the aforesaid checks were already encashed by Molina and Arcilla, Jr. he instructed
her (Asuncion) to file a formal complaint with the Fiscal's Office and to request the bank authorities to
allow her to obtain xerox copies of the said checks (pp. 180-181, record). She went to the Fiscal's Office
to file her complaint but due to the absence of the stenographer thereat, she had to proceed to the
Headquarters, Catanduanes Constabulary Command, at Camp Francisco Camacho, Virac, Catanduanes,
where she executed a sworn statement about the incident (pp. 179-181, rec.). She was also to get xerox
copies of the two checks the ActinMg Cashier of PNB Virac Branch Estelito Bagadiong (ibid).
13. On November 16, 1977, Homer Tabuzo arrived from Manila (pp. 56-60, tsn, March 21, 1979). On
the following day, he went to the Headquarters of the Catanduanes Constabulary Command at Virac,
where he also filed a formal complaint regarding the falsification of his signature in the invoice of his

establishment as well as in the two checks encashed by Molina and Arcilla, Jr. In his sworn statement,
he stated that the accused conspired with one another in simulating bidder's tender, canvass, contract,
voucher and invoices to make it appear that he sold to the HMA (sic) Memorial Hospital supplies while
in truth he had not. Furthermore, he stated that he did not deliver any hospital supplies because he did
not enter into any contract with the said hospital (p. 182, rec.; pp. 46-51, tsn, March 21, 1979.
14. On November 18, 1977, Sergeant Monico B. Peyra of the Catanduanes Constabulary Command
conducted an investigation regarding the complaint of Homer Tabuzo and Concepcion Tabuzo; and,
thereafter, or on November 21, 1977, he filed criminal complaint against the accused for violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents with the
Provincial Fiscal of Catanduanes (pp. 175-177, rec.). A preliminary investigation was conducted by
Fiscal Edgardo S. Surtida (pp. 189-245, rec.).
15. On January 18, 1978, Salvador Echavez (sic), Officer-In-Charge of the Office of the Provincial
Auditor of Virac, Catanduanes, appeared before Fiscal Surtida in compliance with the latter's subpoena
duces tecum. He (Salvador Echano) brought with him several documents concerning the alleged
purchased of (sic) D'Vinta Marketing Center (p. 31, tsn, January 18, 1979; pp. 209-213, rec.). The
aforesaid documents were retrieved by Echano from the possession of accused Oliver Vargas (p. 31,
tsn, ibid; p. 209, rec.).
From these documents, Fiscal Surtida found an undated voucher of JMA Memorial Hospital evidencing
payment to D'Vinta Marketing Center in the sum of P2,110.00 for ten gallons of merthiolate, ten (10)
gallons of Lysol and ten (10) gallons of muriatic acid (Exh. "F"). The documents supporting aforesaid
voucher (Exh. "G") are the following:
(a) Requisition and Issue Voucher dated August 23, 1977, for ten (10) gallons of merthiolate, ten (10)
gallons of Lysol and ten (10) gallons of muriatic acid. In this voucher Soneja certified that the supplies
requisitioned were necessary and will be used solely for the purpose stated. He further acknowledged
receipt of the supplies requisitioned. Vargas wrote thereat the word "Inspected" (Exhs. "D", "4-A").
There was no certification made by Arcilla, Jr. as bookeeper, that there are available funds (ibid).
(b) Canvass paper dated August 23, 1977 allegedly addressed to Virac Pharmacy of Catanduanes, for
ten (10) gallons of merthiolate, ten (10) gallons of lysol and ten (10) gallons of muriatic acid. Said
establishment allegedly gave the unit price of P99.00 for merthiolate, P69.00 for lysol and P52.00 of
(sic) muriatic acid. This canvass was initialed by Soneja (exh. "A").
(c) Canvass paper dated August 23, 1977 allegedly addressed to Catanduanes Pharmacy, for ten (10)
gallons of merthiolate with a unit price of P98.00, ten (10) gallons of lysol with unit price of P68.00 and
ten (10) gallons of muriatic acid with a unit price of P55.00. A certain "B Reyes" signing for the dealer
gave the aforestated price. This canvass was also initialed by Soneja (Exh. "B");
(d) Canvass paper dated August 23, 1977 allegedly addressed to D'Vinta Marketing Center of Virac,
Catanduanes, for ten (10) gallons of lysol and ten (10) gallons of muriatic acid, no unit cost stated, and
initialed by Soneja (Exh. "C"). An illegible signature appears on the position "signature of dealer"
(ibid));
(e) An abstract of price quotations or Bid dated August 23, 1977, signed by Soneja as Administrative
Officer and approved by Concepcion. This document reflected the requisition of JMA Memorial

Hospital (Exh. "D") and canvass (Exhs. "A, "B" and "C") for ten (10) gallons of merthiolate, ten, (10)
gallons of lysol and ten (10) gallons of muriatic acid, and awarded to D'Vinta Marketing Center. Virac
and Catanduanes Pharmacies appeared to have made higher bids than that of D'Vinta Marketing Center
(Exh. "E");
(f) A Sales Invoice No. 0516 of D'Vinta Marketing Center, dated August 25, 1977. This document stated
the delivery to JMA Memorial Hospital of ten (10) gallons of merthiolate for P95.00, ten (10) gallons of
lysol for P680.00 and ten (10) gallons of muriatic acid for P480.00. Soneja affixed his signature below
the statement printed on the lower right portion of the document "Received above merchandise in good
order and condition" (Exh. "5-A").
(g) Treasury Check No. 9982421 was issued pursuant to the aforestated voucher in favor of the D'Vinta
Marketing Center (p. 40, tsn. Jan. 18, 1979; Exh. "G-6"). It was prepared and signed by Soneja (Exh.
"H"). The voucher (Exh. "G-5") was not signed by the creditor. It does not beard a number
corresponding to the hospital; it has no number in the Auditor's Office, no date, no journal entry, no
initial of the pre-auditing clerk; and no indication as to when it was pre-audited. Neither was the official
receipt acknowledging payment attached to the voucher (pp. 34-39, tsn., Jan. 18, 1979). Finally, above
the typewritten name of provincial auditor Salvador although he had not been authorized to do so (pp.
33-34, tsn, ibid).
In that voucher (Exh. "G") Arcilla, Jr. certified that there are adequate available funds; the purchase was
supported by documents, and the account codes are proper (Exh. "G-2"). Likewise, Soneja certified that
the expenses are necessary, lawful and incurred under his direct supervision. He further certified that the
prices are just, reasonable and not in excess of the current rates in the locality (pp. 4-5, April 19, 1979;
Exh. "G-3"). In the said document, Dr. Rudy T. Concepcion affixed his signature approving the said
transaction as Chief of the Hospital (Exh. "G"; pp. 45- 46, tsn, April 18, 1979).
17. Another undated voucher of the JMA Memorial Hospital indicates a payment of the sum of
P5,500.00 to D'Vinta Marketing Center for hospital supplies allegedly delivered to it. (Exh. "P", p. 52,
tsn, April 18, 1979). It contains the same certification made by Soneja in the first other voucher that the
expenses are necessary, lawful and incurred his direct supervision and that the price is just and
reasonable and not in excess of the current rated in the locality. Arcilla, Jr. also certified that there are
adequate available funds; that the purchase was supported by documents and the account codes are
proper (Exhs. "P", "P-3" and "P-4"). The signature of Concepcion appeared thereat approving the said
transaction (Exh. "P-2"). Molina signed above the typewritten name of provincial auditor Salvador F.
Echano although he had not been authorized to do so by the latter official (Exh. "P-1", p. 47, tsn.,
January 18, 1979). Treasury Check No. 9982422 was issued therefore in favor of D'Vinta Marketing
Center (Exhs. "P-6" and "P-5"). This check was prepared and signed by Soneja (Exh. "Q").
Supporting the aforesaid hospital voucher (Exh. "P") are the following documents:
(a) Hospital Requisition and Issue Voucher dated September 12, 1977 for fifty (50) pieces of bed sheet
and twenty five (25) pieces of patient gown. Accused Soneja certified thereat that the supplies
requisitioned are necessary and will be used solely for the purpose stated. He further acknowledged
receipt of the supplies requisitioned. Concepcion approved the said requisition voucher (Exhs. "I" and
"7-B"), while Vargas wrote "Inspected " and signed therein (Exhs. "7-A"). But Arcilla, Jr. did not certify
thereto as to the availability of funds (ibid).

(b) Invitation to bid dated September 12, 1977 addressed to D'Vinta Marketing Center of Virac,
Catanduanes, for fifty (50) pieces of bed sheet with a unit price of P85.00 and twenty ( sic) (25) pieces
of patient gown with unit price of P74.00 allegedly specified by the said establishment. This document
was allegedly signed by Homer Tabuzo, the owner of the store (Exhs. "J" and "J-1"). There is no
signature of Concepcion above his typewritten name (ibid);
(c) Invitation to bid dated September 12, 1977 addressed to G'Ser Enterprise of Sta. Cruz, manila, for
fifty (50) pieces of bed sheet and twenty five (25) pieces of patient gown with the unit price of P85.00
and P74.00 respectively, allegedly specified by "G. Serafica", the owner of the said establishment
(Exhs. "K" and K-1"). Likewise above the typewritten name of Concepcion there is not (sic) signature
thereon (ibid);
(d) Invitation to bid dated September 12, 1977 addressed to Jomel Trading of Naga City, for fifty (50)
pieces of bed sheet and twenty five (25) pieces of patient gown. The said establishment allegedly
specified the unit price for bed sheet at P80.00 and for the patient gown, P75.00. No signature of
Concepcion appears above his typewritten name (Exhs. "L" and "L-1");
(e) An abstract of price quotation or bid dated Sept. 16, 1977, signed by accused Sonejo as
Administrative Officer of the hospital and approved by Concepcion as Chief of hospital. Reflected
thereat are the alleged bids of Jomel Trading, G'Ser Enterprise, and D'Vinta Marketing Center for fifty
(50) pieces of bed sheet and twenty five (250 pieces of patient gown, and the award of the contract to
D'Vinta Marketing Center being the lowest bidder (Exhs. "M" and "N");
(f) A mimeographed from contract dated September 17, 1977 between Juan M. Alberto Memorial
Hospital and D'Vinta Marketing Center, wherein the latter would furnish the hospital fifty (50) pieces of
bed sheet and twenty five (25) pieces of patient gown within fifteen days from receipt of a copy of the
approved contract by D'Vinta Marketing Center. This document was signed only by Concepcion as
representative of the hospital, while D'Vinta Marketing Center did not (Exh. "N").
(g) A Sales Invoice No. 0515 of D'Vinta Marketing Center, dated September 21, 1977. This document
stated the delivery to JMA Memorial Hospital of fifty (50) pieces of bed sheet of P3,750.00 and twenty
five (25) pieces of patient gown for P1,750.00. Soneja affixed his signature below the statement:
"Received above merchandise in good order and condition" (Exh. "D", p. 56, tsn, April 18, 1979).
18. In the investigation of the transaction by Fiscal Surtida on January 18, 1978, Benita T. Reyes, the
owner of Catanduanes Pharmacy, denied having signed her name in the canvass paper (Exh. "B") dated
August 23, 1977 of JMA Memorial Hospital; that she did not receive the said canvass paper of JMA
Memorial Hospital; that she did not make a price quotation in the canvass paper (Exh. "B") concerning
ten (10) gallons of merthiolate, lysol and muriatic acid; that she did not participate in any transaction
with the JMA Memorial Hospital (p. 214, record; pp. 5, 17-23, tsn, January 18, 1979).
Likewise, Deogena S. Garcia, proprietor of Virac Pharmacy denied in the aforestated investigation that
she signed her name on the canvass paper (Exh. "A") dated August 23, 1977 of JMA Memorial
Hospital; that she never received the said canvass paper from JMA Memorial Hospital; that she saw it
for the first time when it was shown to her by Fiscal Surtida in connection with the investigation of the
transaction; that she did not quote price quotations for ten (10) gallons of Merthiolate, lysol and
muriatic acid; that her signature in the aforesaid canvass paper is forgery and that nobody from JMA
Memorial Hospital went to her drug store in the month of August 1977 to get her price quotation for
certain medicines (p. 215, record; pp. 3-5, tsn, January 18, 1979).

19. On October 25, 1978, Bienvenido C. Albacea, Document Examiner of the National Beureau of
Investigation rendered his report on the result of his examination of the questioned signatures and the
standard signatures "HOMER TABUZO" appearing on the Treasury Warrant SN 3-9982422 (Exh. "Q1") and Treasury Warrant SN 3-9982421 (Exh. "Q-2"). According to him, the questioned signature and
the standard signature "HOMER TABUZO" were not written by one and the same person (Exhs. "R"
and "R-7"; pp. 5-14, tsn, March 21, 1979). 8
In the appeal of petitioners to the respondent court, they faulted the court a quo for holding (1) that all
the accused conspired with one another; and (2) that they were guilty of the crimes charged. 9
In resolving these assigned errors, the respondent Appellate Court was least persuaded by the arguments
of petitioners. Respondent court declared:
All the appellants ascribe error to the trial Court in finding conspiracy among them in the commission
of estafa thru falsification of public documents.
We find no merit in this pretense.
Numerous circumstances appear in the record showing that Molina, Soneja, Vargas and Arcilla had
conspired with one another in simulating the transaction between the D'Vinta Marketing Center with
(sic) the JMA Memorial Hospital. Soneja acknowledged in the requisition and issue vouchers (Exhs.
"D", "4-B", "I" and "7-B") that he received the materials allegedly delivered by D'Vinta while Vargas
stated that he inspected them (Exhs. "14-A" and "7-A"). These statements are patently false because
D'Vinta did not deliver any materials to the hospital. Molina, on his part, signed the vouchers for
Provincial Auditor Echano (Exhs. "G-4" and "P-1"), although he had no authority from the latter to do
so. Moreover, Echano testified that Vargas kept the supporting documents of the vouchers in his
personal file and not in Echsno's office file. Soneja, in turn, gave all cheks (Exhs. "H" and "Q") payable
to the D'Vinta not to Homer Tabuzo but to Arcilla, Jr. who, with Molina, brought said checks to
Asuncion Tabuzo. Molina tried to persuade Asuncion to indorse the cheks in his favor but Asuncion
refused. Furthermore, Molina represented to PNB Cashier Bagadiong that the cheks had already been
indorsed in his favor by Homer Tabuzo which false because Tabuzo at the time was in Manila. Worse,
Molina, indorsed the checks by affixing his signatures thereon and later gave the cash value thereof to
Arcilla.
Evidently, the appellants would not have resorted to these falsities and irregular transactions if they had
not colluded with each other. The totality of the evidence clearly establishes that Soneja requisitioned
for 10 gallons of merthiolate, 10 gallons of lysol, 10 gallons of muriatic acid, 50 pieces of bed sheets
and 25 pieces of patient's gowns; the hospital voucher for P5,000.00 was not pre-audited by the
Provincial Auditor as required; no canvass was made from the supposed bidders namely, canvass was
made from the supposed bidders namely, Virac Pharmacy, Catanduanes Pharmacy and D'Vinta
Marketing Center; all of the Bidders' Tenders submitted by the three firms were fabricated; no
invitations to bid were sent to other alleged bidders and, despite the lack of basis in the Bidders'
Tenders, the transactions were awarded to D'Vinta; the sale of 50 pieces of bed sheets and 25 pieces of
patient's gowns was not signed by Homer Tabuzo, proprietor of D'Vinta; Soneja and Vargas
acknowledged the receipt and inspections of these meterials and the delivery to the JMA Memorial
Hospital by D'Vinta although no such delivery was made; Vargas did not submit supporting documents
of the vouchers to the Provincial Auditor and, instead concealed said documents in his private files;
Arcilla certified to the availability of funds in the voucher; Molina and Arcilla got the checks from

Soneja ans encashed the same with the PNB, Virac Branch, and appropriated the amounts for
themselves.
All these circumstances point to no other conclusion than that the appellants conspired with one another
and falsified public documents for monetary gain, which circumstances are patently inconsistent with
their innocence.
xxx xxx xxx
The appellants also maintain that the Court a quo erred in holding them guilty of transgressing R.A. No.
3019 despite the fact the Government did not suffer any damage because the goods were actually
delivered by D'Vinta Marketing Center to JMA Memorial Hospital.
We find no merit in this claim. The record clearly shows that no delivery of the materials in question
was made by D'Vinta Marketing Center to JMA. Homer Tabuzo, himself, positively testified that his
firm D'Vinta Marketing Center did not deliver anything to the hospital because he had no contract
therewith.
We are satisfied that the evidence on record amply substantiates the trial Courts's findings of guilt. 10
Respondent Appellate Court was not persuaded, and neither are we.
What gains unquestionable prominence amidst the nexus of the aforecited circumstances and the
avalanche of documentary evidence therein established is that petitioners did conspire to defraud the
government of a definite amount of money corresponding to the pecuniary worth of medical supplies
which, through falsification of various government requisition, contract and purchase forms, were made
to appear by petitioners to have been ordered and purchased by JMA Memorial Hospital from the
D'Vinta Marketing Center of Homer Tabuzo. Petitioners, before respondent Appellate Court, insisted
that the element of damage essential in the crimes of Estafa and Violation of Section 3 (h) of R.A. 3019,
as amended, are lacking in the case at bench, but, like respondent court, we pay no heed to those claims
because of their sheer lack of merit.

This assertion by petitioners is misleading, What was testified to by Rolando Teves is that he merely
examined the stock cards of the hospital; never did he claim that he conducted physical examination of
the medical supplies allegedly delivered to the JMA Memorial Hospital. This fact was even admitted by
the petitioners in their brief found on page 16 thereof that witness Rolando Teves qualified his
testimony by stating thereat that what he actually examined were merely the stock cards the
hospital . . . 11
What inevitably and necessarily impresses us, as in the case of respondent Appellate Court, is that there
is categorical and unequivocal evidence that the government paid taxpayers' money for ghost medical
supplies the alleged delivery of which is an integral part of the conspiratorial plot leaving the plotters no
choice but to persist and insist on their claim of delivery. Although petitioner Soneja stands by his
certification in the invoices that he received tha medical supplies in good condition, such claim,
however, is of a dubious nature since it is precisely a necessary premise in the theory of the defense.
There should have been definitive evidence independent of petitioner Soneja's own aforecited
certification. There is none. The asseveration of petitioners that the said medical supplies had been
delivered, is mere lip service, and no clear evidence thereof has been proferred, which evidence is
necessitated to shake the formidable case which the prosecution has made againts the petitioner.
In the light of the foregoing, we may not ascribes to respondent Appellate Court the errors which it
allegedly committed as claimed by petitioners. Having stated thus, however, we nonetheless take note of
the
Manifestation
and
Motion 12 filed by petitioners subsequent to the filing by the Solicitor General of their
Comment. 13 Petitioners in the said Manifestation and Motion, alleged that their counsel:
. . . received a true copy of an affidavit executed by the complaining witness Homer Tabuzo, and
subscribed and sworn to before the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Catanduanes on July 19, 1985. . .
In his affidavit, complainant Homer Tabuzo affirmed that he had actually delivered the hospital supplies
to the JA Memorial Hospital and that the payment therefor was borrowed by Rafael Molina Tabuzo
explained the reason why he testified in the manner he did at the trial by saying that at the time of trial
the amount taken by Molina had not been paid by the latter and that he was now recanting his testimony
because he had already been paid in full and was no longer interested.

The records show that treasury warrants were issued in payment of medical supplies allegedly
purchased by JMA Memorial Hospital. These were honored and paid to petitioner Molina by the PNB
when they were presented for encashment. But, wonder of wonders, how could warrants be issued when
the owner of D'Vinta Marketing Center, Homer Tabuzo, testifying in the court a quo, categorically
denied having delivered the medical supplies alleged to have been purchased from him. It is significant
to note that accused Oliver Vargas, the checker-inspector whose signature appears on the invoices, in
guarantee of his compliance with the required routinary inspection of the medical supplies allegedly
delivered by D'Vinta Marketing Center, did not interpose any appeal from his conviction but instead
applied for probation.

. . . the affidavit of Tabuzo enhances the innocence of the Petitioner at the same time that it renders the
already very doubtful evidence of the prosecution the more incredible. . . 14

We find to be correct the assertion of the Solicitor General that:

I HOMER TABUZO, of legal age, Filipino, married and a resident of Salvacion, Virac, Catanduanes,
after being duly sworn to in accordance with law, depose and say:

Petitioners, in their reply to the Comment filed by the respondents in the instant case, averred tha the
testimony of Homer Tabuzo . . . was contradicted by the prosecution's own witness, Rolando Teves,
checker-inspector of the Office of the Provincial Auditor, who purportedly testified during the trial that
he inspected or inventoried the hospital supplies supposedly delivered by Homer Tabuzo.

Attached to the said Manifestation and Motion is a xerox copy of the aforecited affidavit of Homer
Tabuzo, owner of D'Vinta Marketing Center and complainant in the instant case. Said affidavit is
reproduced herein below in full:
AFFIDAVIT

1. That I am the owner of the D'Vinta Marketing;

2. That on the month of November 1977, I was expecting a payment from the Juan M. Alberto
Memorial Hospital for supplies delivered by me and received by said Hospital and covered by the
necessary vouchers;

6. That after some years, the amount thus borrowed was paid back by Mr. Rafael Molina to me and
therefore I am no longer interested in prosecuting this case.

Tabuzo, the owner of D'Vinta Marketing Center, the payee of the two checques (Exh. "H" and "Q")
were forged or falsified as shown in the Questioned Document Report of the NBI dated September 7,
1978 (Exh. "R") testified by NBI Document Examiner Bienvenido Albacea. There being no contract
entered into by and between the JMA Memorial Hospital and the D'Vinta Marketing received by the
hospital, and nothing was inspected as nothing was delivered and received, contrary to the certifications
of the accused Reynaldo Soneja that he received the "merchandise in good order and condition" as
indicated in the two invoices (Exh. "F" and "O"), and the signature of accused Oliver Vargas indicating
that he inspected the hospital supplies. The invoice dated August 25, 1977 (Exh. "F") indicating that ten
(10) gallons of muriatic acid, ten (10) gallons of merthiolate and ten (10) gallons of merthiolate and ten
(10) gallons of lysol sold to the JMA Memorial Hospital were "received in good order and condition" by
accused Reynaldo Soneja bears invoice number "0516", while the invoice dated Sept. 21, 1977 (Exh.
"C") indicating that fifty (50) pieces of bed sheets and twenty-five (25) pieces of patients ( sic) gowns
sold to JMA Memorial Hospital were "received in good order and condition" by accused Reynaldo
Soneja bears invoice number "0515". In the ordinary course of business, the invoice (Exh. "O"), which
bears the number "0516" should have been issued much earlier than the invoice which bears the number
"0516" was issued much earlier on August 25, 1977, while the invoice (Exh. "F") bearing the lower
number (0515) was issued later on Sept. 21, 1977. (Decision, rec.; emphasis supplied) 16

AFFIANT FURTHER SAYETH NONE.

We are in full accord with the aforegoing legal posture of the Solicitor General.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 15th day of July, 1985, at Virac,
Catanduanes.

Affidavits of recantation made by a witness after the conviction of the accused in unreliable deserves
scant consideration. 17

s/Homer
t/HOMER TABUZO 15

. . . Merely because a witness says that what he had declared is false and that what he now says is true,
is not sufficient ground for concluding that the previous testimony is false. No such reasoning has ever
crystallized into a rule of credibility. The rule is that a witness may be impeached by a previous
contradictory statement . . . not that a previous statement is presumed to be false merely because a
witness now says that the same is not true. The jurisprudence of this Court has always been
otherwise, i.e., that contradictory testimony given subsequently does not necessarily discredit the
previous testimony if the contradictions are satisfactorily explained. (U.S. vs. Magtibay, 17 Phil. 417;
U.S. vs. Briones, 28 Phil. 362; U.S. vs. Dasiip, 26 Phil. 503; U.S. vs. Lazaro, 34 Phil.
871). 18

3. That on the November 17, 1977, due to some circumstances, I had to go to Manila so I requested Mr.
Rafael Molina to claim the payment from the Juan M. Alberto Memorial Hospital as he usually do (sic)
for me and I authorized him to encash it for me and sign the Check in my behalf and give the amount to
my wife;
4. That when I came back from Manila my wife informed me that the money was not turned over to her
by Mr. Rafael Molina because he said he wanted to borrow first the amount because he needed it badly;
5. That it is for this reason that I filed a case against Mr. Molina and denied the whole transaction;

Tabuzo

The Solicitor General strongly discounts the aforequoted affidavit as inconsequential and hardly
credible. He laments such a last ditch, desperate attempt by petitioners to be liberated from criminal
proceedings instituted on account of their illegal and malicious acts which have been proven beyond
reasonable doubt by the prosecution; petitioners, the Solicitor General submits, simply wish to escape
criminal responsibility at all costs.
This last minute attempt by the petitioners to obtain exculpation based on the subsequent retraction by a
witness should not be granted. Otherwise, it would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken
before the court of justice simply because the witness who had given it later on changed his mind for
one reason or another for such rule will make a solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation of
truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. For, it is not highly improbable or impossible that such a
retraction was made for a consideration, usually monetary (People vs. Morales, 113 SCRA 683). Hence,
complainant's alleged affidavit of desistance executed during the pendency of the appeal is of no
consequence.
. . . Additionally, there are other evidence on the records that would establish the culpability of
petitioners that indeed they defrauded the JMA Memorial Hospital when the said hospital supplies that
it did not receive. In elucidating this point, the lower court aptly stated that:
. . . the prosecution was able to prove clearly, satisfactory and convincingly, that the signatures of
persons who allegedly participated in the price quotation canvass (Exhs. "A", "B" & "C") were all
forged or falsified; that the abstract of the price quotation is indicated in the price canvass addressed to
the D'Vinta Marketing Center (Exh. "C"); that the signatures purport to be the signatures of Homer

Indeed, it is a dangerous rule to set aside a testimony which has been solemnly taken before a court of
justice in an open and free trial and under conditions precisely sought to discourage and forestall
falsehood simply because one of the witnesses who had given the testimony later on changed his
mind. 19 Such a rule will make solemn trials a mockery and place the investigation of the truth at the
mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. 20 Unless there be special circumstances which, coupled with the
retraction of the witness, really raise doubt as to the truth of the testimony given by him at the trial and
accepted by the trial judge, and only if such testimony is essential to the judgment of conviction, or its
elimination would lead the trial judge to a different conclusion, an acquittal of the accused based on
such as retraction would not be justified. 21
This Court has always looked with disfavor upon retraction of testimonies previously given in
court. 22 The asserted motives for the repudiation are commonly held suspect, and the veracity of the
statements made in the affidavit of repudiation are frequently and deserved subject to serious doubt. 23
Such being the experience of this court, we should proceed with extreme caution and judicial prudence
in according any probative value to affidavits of recantation in the light of the sad reality that the same

can be easily secured from poor and ignorant witnesses for some financial consideration 24 or through
intimidation. 25 Especially when the affidavit of retraction is executed by a prosecution witness after the
judgment of conviction has already been rendered, "it is too late in the day for his recantation without
portraying
himself
as
a
liar." 26 At most, the retraction is an afterthought which should not be given probative value. 27

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
NARCISO BARERA, alias "Narsing," accused-appellant.

Mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate the original testimony if
credible. 28 The rule is settled that in cases where previous testimony is retracted and a subsequent
different, if not contrary, testimony is made by the same witness, the test to decide which testimony is
made by the same witness, the test to decide which testimony to believe is one of comparison coupled
with the application of the general rules of evidence. 29 A testimony solemnly given in court should not
be set aside and disregarded lightly, and before this can be done, both the previous testimony and the
subsequent one should be carefully compared and juxtaposed, the circumstances under which each was
made, carefully and keenly scrutinized, and the reasons or motives for the change, discriminatingly
analyzed. 30 The unreliable character of the affidavit of recantation executed by a complaining witness is
also shown by the incredulity of the fact that after going through the burdensome process of reporting to
and/or having the accused arrested by the law enforcers, executing a criminal complaint-affidavit
against the accused, attending trial and testifying against the accused, the said complaining witness
would later on declare that all the foregoing is actually a farce and the truth is now that he says it to be
in his affidavit of recantation. 31 And in situations, like the instant case, where testimony is recanted by
an affidavit subsequently executed by the recanting witness, we are properly guided by the well-settled
rules that an affidavit is hearsay unless the affiant is presented on the witness stand 32 and that affidavits
taken ex-parte are generally considered inferior to the testimony given in open court. 33

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Applying the aforegoing principles, we are hardly perturbed in our affirmance of petitioners' conviction.
Furthermore, the following antecedent facts and circumstances render the recantation out of context: (1)
complaining witness Homer Tabuzo went through all the trouble of instructing his wife, (while he was
in Manila in November, 1977 when told that the treasury warrants were encashed at the PNB), to file
the proper complaint and to get xerox copies of the treasury warrants from the PNB; (2) he proceeded to
the authorities the day after he arrived from Manila, around five (5) days after the treasury warrants
were encashed, to file a formal complaint regarding the falsification of his signature; and (3) he
participated in the various stages of the investigation and the trial whenever he was summoned by the
Fiscal of the Judge. That he executed the affidavit of recantation in July, 1985 or eight (8) years after the
cases were filed, bordered on incredulity. More importantly, the affidavit of recantation did not cover all
points raised and facts established during the trial. Neither did it refute testimonial and documentary
evidence of other witnesses, especially, for instance, the other pharmacy owners who were made to
appear to have filed bids and submitted price quotations, when the truth was that they did not. In short,
the said affidavit did not at all explain the other evidence considered by the court a quo in rendering the
judgment of conviction, which evidence unequivocally shows petitioners to be guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes charged against them.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court (now the Court of Appeals), dated April 30, 1984, in AC-G.R. Nos. 24729 and 24730CR, is HEREBY DISMISSED, with costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 99867 September 19, 1996

Accused of rape, the herein appellant, like many others before him, pinned his hopes on a weak alibi
while viciously attacking the moral character of the victim, to no avail.
Narciso Barera alias "Narsing" was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Bataan, Third Judicial
Region, Branch 4, 1 Balanga, Bataan, in an Information 2 dated February 14, 1990 which reads as
follows:
That on or about November 4, 1989 at Sitio Manila 2, Barangay Batangas 2, Mariveles, Bataan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then armed with
a kitchen knife, and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously lie and succeed to have sexual intercourse with the offended party, Girlie M. Flower, a 14
year old minor girl, against the will and consent of the latter, to her damage and prejudice.
Upon arraignment, appellant, duly assisted by counsel de oficio, Atty. Joe Frank Zuiga, entered a plea
of Not Guilty to the charge.
The Facts
The trial court summarized the facts and evidence as follows:
Complainant Girlie [Girlie 3] Flower was at the time material to this case 14 years old, single, and a high
school student. She claimed that she knew the accused, the son of Avelina Barera who she fondly called
as here grandmother or "lola" and with whom she has been living and who has taken care of her ever
since she was three (3) years of age.
And as regards the incident in question, she declared that on November 4, 1989 (a Saturday), at about
2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, she was inside a big house owned by a Mrs. Patel of which her "Lola"
Avelina Barera is the care-taker or overseer and located at sitio Manila-2, Barangay Batangas 2,
Mariveles, Bataan. It was in this house where she (complainant) resided together with her twin sister,
Grace Flower, and "Lola" Avelina Barera. At that date and time, she was all alone in the house, her
sister Grace having left earlier to watch a basketball game, while her "Lola" was then in the neighboring
town of Limay to wash clothes for someone. Thereupon, while she was asleep, having just finished
doing her laundry, the accused entered her room and pointed a knife at her breast telling her not to shout
or to tell her "Lola" about it, otherwise he would kill her. The accused forthwith raised her skirt and
remove her underwear. She tried to push him but to no avail as he was of strong and heavy built ( sic).
With her underwear already removed, the accused soon after took off his own shorts after which he
forced her to lie down and thereupon went on top of her and started the up and down movements.
Momentarily, she felt a hot substance emitting from the accused who thereafter left for the CAFGU
(Citizen's Armed Forces Geographical Unit) Camp of which unit he was a member. After he departed,
all that she could do was to cry. Three hours later, she went to the house of her Ate Soly, the sister of the

accused, where she saw her "lola". She did not divulge what the accused did to her as she was afraid
that he might carry out his threats to kill her. The following day (November 5), she told her teacher,
Celia Icasciano [should be "Icasiano"], about what the accused did to her and who then informed a
certain Fely Adriales, a religion teacher at a Catholic convent and who, in turn told Father George Piron,
the Parish priest of a (C)atholic church in Cabcaben, Mariveles, of what had happened to her. Father
Piron then went to fetch her from her house and had a talk with her. Subsequently, on November 6,
1989, she underwent physical examination at the Bataan Provincial Hospital in Balanga, Bataan. She
also reported the incident to the Mariveles Police Station and gave a written statement (Exh. "A") before
a police investigator wherein she narrated the details of her ravishment.
The other prosecution witness, Dr. Irma Ronquillo, testified that on November 6, 1989, she attended to a
rape case involving one Girlie Flower and in her examination of said victim, which was focused on the
hymen, she found hymenal ring with old laceration at 10, 11 and 12 o'clock positions and which she
reflected in her Medico-legal report (Exh. "B").
Refuting the prosecution's version, the accused presented his own testimony corroborated by three (3)
witnesses. He claimed that he is married to one Dolores dela Cruz, a resident of Naic, Cavite, with
whom he has three children. He declared that the complainant, Girlie Flower, since she was three (3)
years old, became the adopted child of (his) mother, Avelina Barera, though not through legal process.
Girlie has a twin sister, Grace Flower both of whom lived with his mother and he (accused) treated the
twins as his younger sisters.
He denied having raped the complainant, claiming that on November 4, 1989, he, being a CAFGU
member, was then on duty at their camp in Lamao, Limay, Bataan. Their headquarters is about three to
four kilometers away from the house where Girlie was allegedly ravished and either place can be
negotiated or reached in about five (5) minutes through motorized transportation. He did not leave their
camp where he stayed from Monday through Saturday. he does not know of any reason why Girlie
charged him with the crime of rape.
The accused after his examination in chief, was later recalled to the stand to give additional testimony as
to the motive for his implication which, over the vigorous objection of the public prosecutor, was
granted by the court for a more perfect attainment of justice. He declared that in the year 1989, there
was an incident whereby (he) saw Grace Flower, the complainant's twin sister, at about night time
boarding a passenger jitney together with a drunk woman and a man and all three proceeded to Lamao,
Limay, Grace did not come home for a week. He tried to look for her but to no avail. When Grace
finally returned home, he spanked her for her misdeeds and she promised to behave. Later, he again saw
Grace at the pier in Lamao, Limay talking with an American nigger and he again scolded her for such
misbehavior. Thereafter, on October 17, 1989, between 5:00 and 6:00 o'clock in the evening, he saw
Grace and Girlie boarding a cargo vessel, a conduct that was unbecoming of them and for which
misbehavior he berated and spanked them in the presence of his mother. He saw the two sisters again
the following day, October 18, at the same time, i.e., between 5:00 and 6:00 o'clock in the evening in
Lamao, Limay.
The second defense witness, Crispin Borja, declared that as a CAFGU member, he acts as a team leader
who prepared the attendance sheet of the members one of whom was the accused. He is very sure that
the accused reported for duty at their camp on November 4, 1989 starting at 6:00 o'clock in the morning
and did not leave the same the whole day as they were then on red alert, and this was reflected on the
attendance sheet (Exh. "1"). He belied the complainant's version of having been raped by the accused on

November 4, 1989, averring that it could not have been possible inasmuch as the accused was in their
camp at the time of the alleged commission of the offense.
The third witness, Solita Abelgas, a sister of the accused, declared that on February 17, 1990, in the
morning, while she was at home at Manila-2, Mariveles, tending to her small store, complainant Girlie
Flower arrived and wroted a letter (Exh. "1") [should be Exh. "2"] addressed to her (witness') mother,
Avelina Barera, and which letter was left to her (witness). She explained that her mother wanted very
much to see and talk to Girlie but both were unable to meet each other so that what Girlie did was to just
write a letter to her "Lola" and left. She later gave the letter to her mother upon seeing each other. She
learned that in said letter Girlie was asking for an apology [should be "pardon"] in charging the accused
which she (Girlie) says was not really of her liking.
The last defense witness Leonora Bustamante, a niece of the accused, averred that she knows Girlie
Flower who was the adopted daughter of her auntie Avelina Barera, the mother of accused. She claimed
that after her school classes, she sometimes sells banana cues at the port (pier) in Lamao, Limay where
several vessels are moored. On such occasions, she used to see Girlie going with two niggers inside a
merchant ship. There were several occasions when she (witness) was invited by Girlie and the niggers
to have lunch with them at the snackhouse in Lamao and also, to join them on board the vessels.
In the rebuttal, complainant Girlie Flower belied the testimonies of defense witness Leonora
Bustamante and the accused himself that she and her sister Grace Flower used to board with two niggers
the mechant vessels berthed at the pier in Lamao, Limay, and for which misconduct, as claimed by said
accused, he scolded and spanked the twin sisters who might have resented the same.
In the sur-rebuttal, Leonora Bustamante was recalled to the stand and insisted on the truth of her
testimony in chief of having seen Girlie with two niggers on board the merchant vessel.
On February 15, 1991, the trial court rendered its Decision, the decretal portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Narciso Barera y
Bustamante, alias"Narsing" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape as defined and
penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and without the attendance of any modifying
circumstances, hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory
penalties provided for by law, to indemnify the offended party Girlie Flower in the sum of P20,000.00
as moral damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
On March 18, 1991, the accused through counsel filed a Notice of Appeal 4 manifesting his intention to
have recourse to the Court of Appeals. Acting upon said notice, the trial court forthwith gave due course
to the appeal and forwarded the record of the case to said appellate court. 5 In turn, the Chief of the
Judicial Records Division of the Court of Appeals, "upon instruction of the Presiding Justice,"
transmitted to this Court the records "erroneously forwarded" to the Court of Appeals "considering that
the penalty imposed upon the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua. 6
Clearly, accused should have taken appeal to this Court directly. In People vs. Pagsanjan, 7 this Court,
through Mr. Chief Justice Narvasa, held:

As this Court has already stressed in other cases, the constitutional proscription on the imposition of the
death penalty, has eliminated the automatic review by the Supreme Court, there(to)fore existing, of
"cases where the death penalty is imposed." Hence, as the law now stands, in criminal cases, an appeal
may be taken to the Supreme Court from the Regional Trial Court in only one of two ways: (a) the filing
of a notice of appeal in those cases where the latter imposes the sentence of reclusion perpetua,
regardless of the questions to be raised on appeal, whether purely legal, or legal and factual; or (b) filing
of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 (Sec. 3[d], Rule 122, Rules of Court) where the
penalty imposed is not reclusion perpetua, but the appeal would involve only questions of law. It was
therefore
necessary
for
the
accused
. . . to file a notice of appeal within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment of conviction to
initiate an appeal. Since no such notice of appeal was filed, no appeal was ever perfected . . .
The blunder by accused's counsel in taking appeal to the Court of Appeals ordinarily would be binding
upon his client and would require an outright dismissal of this appeal, but in this instance, this Court
decided not to dismiss the same but instead give it due course, all in the interest of substantial justice.
Errors Assigned
In
seeking
exculpation,
appellant
claims
that
the
trial
court
erred
in:
(a) convicting him on the basis of the uncorroborated, improbable, contradictory and inconsistent
testimony of the complainant; (b) not giving weight to his defense of alibi, and (c) finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.

This Court has time and again that a few discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of
witnesses referring to minor details and not in actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime, do
not impair their credibility. 8 The inconsistencies being trivial and minor, they cannot blunt the impact of
complainant's testimony especially because at the time she testified, complainant was a mere 15-yearold
lass
who
was
unaccustomed
to
public
trial 9 In fact, she was expected to fall into minor lapses in her testimony considering that she was
recounting details of an experience so harrowing, humiliating and painful to recall. 10 Terrified and
agitated, yet helpless and at the mercy of her assailant, the offended party could not be expected to
observe and accurately note the exact details of the outrage being inflicted upon her
person. 11 A victim of rape does not relish remembering the ugly details of the traumatic experience, and
would prefer to forget it ever happened. Hence, instead of weakening complainant's testimony, such
inconsistencies tend to strengthen her credibility 12 and discount the possibility of a rehearsed
testimony. 13 They are actually badges of truth, indicating veracity rather than prevarication, especially
in this case where the offended party gave her testimony more than six months after the crime was
committed. 14
A review of the transcripts of stenographic notes shows that complainant's testimony was
straightforward, clear and without any equivocation or attempt at evasion. We quote from her direct
testimony:
Q On November 4, 1989, was that the first time you were raped by Narciso Barera?
A No, Sir.

The accused's assignment of errors boils down to simply questioning (i) the credibility of complainant
as main witness for the prosecution, and (ii) the trial court's assessment of his defense of alibi.

Q When was the first time?

This Court's Ruling

A I cannot remember but it was in 1988, sir.

First
Issue:
Inconsistencies
And Do Not Affect Complainant's Credibility

Are

Minor,

Q When you were raped by Narciso Barera in 1988, did you inform your grandmother about it?
A Yes, sir, I told her because Narciso Barera or kuya Narcing attempted to rape me, sir.

Appellant contends that complainant's testimony is replete with inconsistencies and contradictions
regarding the following matters: what the accused did with her skirt; the first time she felt a hot
substance coming out of appellant's sex organ (i.e., whether it was during the second or the fourth
sexual assault); complainant's residence at the time of the incident, (it allegedly not being clear whether
complainant, her twin sister and their Lola Belen used the Patel house as their dwelling or merely as a
resting place at noontime); whether or not the offended party was sleeping at the time of the incident
(i.e., complainant could not have seen appellant enter the room if, as she claimed, she was asleep); the
time appellant removed his shorts; and where appellant placed his knife after the rape.

Q What was the reply of your grandmother?

A She told me "we will admonish him", sir.
Q When was the second time?
A Also in 1988, sir.

Said alleged inconsistencies, however, refer to minor details only, and do not touch upon the very matter
in contention whether or not complainant was sexually abused against her will by appellant. Notably,
appellant failed to controvert complainant's testimony that the November 4, 1989 incident was
the fourth sexual assault upon her by the appellant. Neither did he attempt to refute the prosecution's
attribution to him of the three previous sexual attacks on the offended party. All he tried to downgrade
and erode, by means of the aforementioned "inconsistencies," was complainant's testimony regarding
the fourth and last rape incident.

Q Did he succeed in raping you for the second time?

A Yes, sir.
Q Did you inform grandmother about it?
A No, Sir.

Q Why not?

ATTY. ZUIGA:

A Because she let my kuya Narcing comeback in the house that is why I have an ill-feeling with her
since I told her about the attempt and yet she allowed him to comeback, sir. 15

Q Was it three months before November 4?

A I do not know, sir.

And on cross-examination, complainant elaborated as follows:

Q So, it was long time ago before November 4, 1989?
Q You have stated that he was able to insert his penis to your organ, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
COURT:
Q How did you know that?
Q How many intercourse did you have with him prior to November 4?
A I felt, sir.
A The November intercourse was the fourth time sir.
Q What actually did you feel?
A That something hot came out from him and I felt pain, sir.

Q And the time you had intercourse with your Kuya Narsing, you did not report the matter to the
police?

Q And where did you actually felt this hot substance, was it inside?

A No, sir.

A Yes, sir.

Q How about the second time?

Q So, your felt this hot substance inside your organ?

A Also no, sir.

A Yes sir.

Q The first time?

Q Was that the first time you felt hot substance?

A The first time, yes, your Honor, because it was not consummated because by twin sister arrived.

A No, sir.

ATTY. ZUIGA:

Q When for the first time did you feel hot substance coming out of the penis?

Q So, to whom did you report the matter the first time?

A The second time he touched me, sir.

A To my grandmother, sir.

Q And how long was that before November 4, 1989?

Q Was your Kuya Narsing the first man who had a sexual intercourse with you?

A I do not know, sir.

A Are you sure of that?

COURT:

A It was his brother, actually, who first had intercourse with me, sir. I also filed a complaint against him.

Q When you mentioned touch, do you mean to imply intercourse?

ATTY. ZUIGA:

A Yes, your Honor.

Q So, when for the first time did you feel hot substance emanating from the penis, was it the first
intercourse, the second intercourse, the third intercourse or the fourth intercourse you had with your
Kuya Narsing?
A On the fourth, sir.
Q So, the third time you had an intercourse with your Kuya Narsing, you did not feel that hot
substance?
A The third time he had an intercourse with me, sir, he was in a hurry and so told him to hurry up and I
even told him to take pity on me because I was not yet at the right age to do this thing.
Q Because your told him to hurry up, so he hurried up, is that correct?
A No, sir. It was him who told me that. He told me to give in to him so that he can finish at once.
Q And so, because of that you were not able to feel that hot substance, is that correct?
A No, sir.
Q So, when the inserted his penis to your organ, you did not offer any resistance to him anymore, it that
correct?
A No more sir, because I cannot do anything anymore.
Q By the way, Miss Witness, on the fourth time that you had sexual intercourse with your Kuya
Narsing, did you notice if your organ emanated any sticky substance?

A Yes, sir, because I was feeling tired and my body was already aching. 16
In this appeal, the defense primarily raises the issue of credibility of complainant's testimony. It is wellsettled that when the issue is one of credibility, appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of
the trial court, considering that the latter is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the
witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying at the trial. 17 We find no
cogent reason why the Court should deviate from this general rule. As a matter of fact, after reviewing
the record, we are in agreement with the trial court's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and
their testimonies.
We have held that in a rape case, the complainant's uncorroborated testimony, if credible and positive, is
sufficient to declare a conviction. 18 This is because while rape may possibly be committed in a public
place or in a house where there are other occupants, 19 in the normal course of things, a rapist would
naturally prefer to carry it out in a deserted or isolated place where there are no eyewitnesses, and no
bystanders or passersby to foil the consummation of his lust. And so that absence of corroborating
testimony is only to be expected. Thus, when a woman, especially a minor, says that she has been raped,
she says in effect all that is necessary to show that she has indeed been raped. 20 It is a natural instinct of
the Filipina to protect her honor. 21 No Filipina of tender age, like the complainant herein, would make
of public knowledge that she has been raped, abused and robbed of her virtue, nor permit the
examination of her private parts by a total stranger, and suffer the humiliation of a public trial (not to
mention the indignities of cross-examination at the hands of a hostile counsel bent on showing that she
is a liar or a woman of loose virtue), if in fact she had not actually been ravished. Her desire is simply to
obtain justice and seek redress for the bestial and foul deed forced upon her, to right the wrong done her.
The defense also tried putting complainant's moral character under a cloud by testimony to the effect
that at age fourteen, complainant allegedly sold her body to black American seamen on more than one
occasion. Expectedly, the offended party refuted these allegations, In any event, this obviously
misguided attempt at exculpation has no beneficial significance for the accused as far as the charge of
rape is concerned. Even prostitutes may be the victims of rape. 22 In People vs. Lomibao, 23 the Court,
quoting the unreported case of People vs. Garcia, 24 said:

A No, sir.
Q How long a time, Miss Witness, did he move his body up and down while his penis was inserted at
your organ?

It may be true that the offended person had theretofore had relations with other men, but that fact did
not justify the appellant in having illicit relations with her against her will and consent and by force and
violence. The law punishes those who have carnal knowledge of a woman by force or intimidation.
Virginity is not one of the elements of the crime of rape.

A I do not know sir.

Q Could it be five minutes?
A I do not know, sir.
Q And was his penis easily inserted at your organ?
A No, sir, it took time because I was moving.
Q So, you want to impress upon us that he was able to insert his penis to your organ because you finally
did not move, is that correct?

Thus, even assuming that the testimonies of Leonora Bustamante and the accused were true, it does not
meant that complainant could not have been raped by appellant. While the allegation that the herein
complainant had sex with foreigners for a fee might reflect on her lack of moral values, it does not at all
detract from the established fact of her repeated ravishment by the appellant.
Notably, the medico-legal findings that complainant's hymenal lacerations were old merely strengthened
her claim that she had been raped by appellant on three prior occasions.
Even the absence of spermatozoa, as noted in the medical examination, can be explained by the fact that
complainant was brought for medical examination only on November 6, 1989, or two days after the
rape, during which interregnum the complainant may have washed herself more than a few times. In
any case, a negative sperm-detection test is immaterial to the crime of rape, it being firmly settled that
the important consideration in rape is penetration and not emission.

Complainant's relationship with appellant whom she treated as an older brother may also have been a
contributory factor to lessening the vigor of her resistance during the sexual assault. Added to that is the
physical violence he admittedly inflicted upon her and her twin sister by way of spankings which he
administered. Far from evidencing motive for inculpating him in rape, as appellant argues, these
spankings which, appellant asserts, impelled her to pinpoint him as her ravisher, could account for her
repeated docility to his lustful acts. The fear engendered by appellant through physical violence inflicted
on the offended party could not but have been multiplied by the fear elicited by the knife that he
conspicuously displayed to her as he violated her body. This Court, speaking about force or intimidation
as an element of the crime of rape, said in People vs. Pamor. 25
. . . Nor is it reasonable to demand that a greater degree of intimidation be present so as to warrant
conviction. Intimidation in rape cases is not calibrated or governed by hard and fast rules. Since it is
addressed to the mind of the victim and is therefore subjective, it must be viewed in the light of the
victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime. It is enough that it
produces fear fear that if the victim does not yield to the bestial demands of the accused, something
would happen to her at that moment. It includes the moral kind such as the fear caused by threatening
the victim with a knife or pistol. Where such intimidation exists and the victim is cowed into submission
as a result thereof, thereby rendering resistance futile, it would be extremely unreasonable, to say the
least, to expect the victim to resist with all here might and strength. If resistance would nevertheless be
futile because of a continuing intimidation, then offering none at all would not mean consent to the
assault as to make the victim's participation in the sexual act voluntary.
Second Issue: Weak Alibi
Appellant's alibi deserves scant consideration. The rule is well-settled that in order for the defense of
alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that appellant was somewhere else when the offense was
committed but it must likewise be demonstrated that he was so far away that it was not possible for him
to have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission. 26
Alibi, the plea of having been elsewhere than at the scene of the crime at the time of the commission of
the felony, is a plausible excuse for the accused. Let there be no mistake about it. Contrary to the
common notion, alibi is in fact a good defense. But, to be valid for purposes of exoneration from a
criminal charge, the defense, of alibi must be such that it would have been physically impossible for the
person charged with the crime to be at the locus criminis at the time of its commission, the reason being
that no person can be in two places at the same time. The excuse must be so airtight that it would admit
of no exception. Where there is the least possibility of accused's presence at the crime scene, the alibi
will not hold water. (emphasis ours) 27
In this case, appellant claimed that he was, at the time of rape, in his CAFGU camp in Lamao, Limay,
Bataan, where he allegedly stayed the whole week due to a red alert. However, it was established that
the camp was barely four to five kilometers away from the scene of the assault and the distance could be
traversed in a matter of five minutes by motorized transportation. Moreover, he was definitely and
positively identified by the complainant as the perpetrator of the dastardly deed, and there was no
possibility of her having been mistaken in that regard. 28
It is sad to note that, in an effort to bolster his alibi, appellant cited People vs. Somera 29 and claimed
that this Court allegedly ruled therein that "(a)libi is not always false and without merit and when
coupled with the improbabilities and inconsistencies of the prosecution evidence, the defense of alibi

deserves merit. 30 We take umbrage at appellant's counsel's 31 temerity for this erroneous and misleading
citation. It should be stressed that the Court made no such ruling in the Somera case. In fact, this Court
rejected therein appellant's alibi notwithstanding his allegation of inconsistencies in the prosecution
witnesses' testimony which the Court found to be minor ones. Said counsel are accordingly warned to
exercise extra care in making citations and avoid attempting to mislead this Court.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides that whenever the crime of rape is committed with the
use of a deadly weapon, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. In the absence of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the penalty that appellant shall suffer is the lesser penalty
of reclusion perpetua 32 and, in accordance with jurisprudential law on civil indemnity in crimes of rape
against a minor whose life is forever marred by the crime, appellant must pay complainant the amount
of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00). 33
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the trial court convicting appellant Narciso
Babera y Bustamante of the crime of rape and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua is hereby
AFFIRMED, subject to the modification that the civil indemnity awarded to the offended party Girlie
M. Flower is hereby INCREASED to fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), consistent with prevailing
jurisprudence. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 123074 July 4, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FERNANDO FERNANDEZ y MAGNO, ALIAS "FERNAN" and JOEL SANTIAGO y
RUSTIA, accused.
FERNANDO FERNANDEZ y MAGNO, accused-appellant.

MELO, J.:
Accused-appellant Fernando Fernandez y Magno appeals the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
the Third Judicial Region, Branch 6 stationed at Malolos, Bulacan in its Criminal Case No. 753-M-91,
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide and physical injuries
and consequently sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the
victim P50,000 as civil indemnity, P400,000 as actual damages, and P100,000 as moral damages.
The Information filed against Fernandez and his co-accused Joel Santiago charged:
That on or about the 10th day of April, 1991, in the municipality of Baliuag, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, armed with
chisel and screw driver, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain and by means of force, violence,
intimidation, take, rob and carry away with them one (1) Sony Betamax worth P9,000.00, assorted
jewelries worth P300,000.00 and cash amounting to P100,000.00, belonging to Sps. Dr. Delfin

Tolentino and Eugenia Lindain-Tolentino, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the total amount
of P409,000.00; and on the occasion of the commission of the said robbery, the said accused, conspiring
and confederating together and mutually helping one another, and with intent to kill one Eugenia
Lindain-Tolentino, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation
and treachery, attack, assault and stab with the said chisel and screw driver the said Eugenia LindainTolentino, hitting the latter on her body thereby causing her serious physical injuries which directly
caused her death and also causing physical injuries to Dr. Delfin Tolentino which required medical
attendance for some period of time.
Contrary to law.
Malolos, Bulacan, April 30, 1991.
(pp. 5, 17, Rollo)
Initially, only Santiago was apprehended, and after trial was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged. A partial decision dated December 23, 1991 convicting him was promulgated on
February 3, 1992. Herein accused-appellant Fernandez remained at-large and was arrested by elements
of
the
Philippine
National
Police-Baliuag
only
on
January
28,
1993
(p. 18, Ibid.).
On February 3, 1993, Fernandez, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the charge. After
trial, the regional trial court rendered its now appealed decision.
Accused-appellant anchors his appeal on his lone and shot-gun type of argument that the trial court
erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide (p.
152, Ibid.).
The facts, as determined by the trial court and duly supported by evidence, show that on April 10, 1991,
at around 2 o'clock in the afternoon, a man pretending to be having difficulty breathing and wanting
treatment rang the door bell at the residence of Dr. Delfin Tolentino and his wife Eugenia LindainTolentino at Vergel de Dios St., Baliuag, Bulacan. Because of the man's persistence, the doctor let him
in. Once inside, the otherwise sickly man overpowered Dr. Tolentino, covered his eyes with masking
tape and gagged him. The doctor, however, got a good look at the man's face before his eyes were
covered. He would later positively identify the intruder as accused-appellant Fernando Fernandez (pp.
19-20, Ibid.).
Accused-appellant then forced Dr. Tolentino down on the floor, took his watch and tied both his hands
and feet. A second person entered the room. The doctor was told to keep quiet, otherwise he would be
killed. Both men entered the room where Dr. Tolentino's wife was staying. The doctor heard his wife
saying "Joel, ano ba?", but nothing was heard from her thereafter. After about twenty minutes, they
returned and carried the doctor upstairs. After the masking tape over his eyes was removed, Dr.
Tolentino was told to open the vault. Both men then ransacked its contents, taking jewelry, cash,
certificates of title, and stock certificates. Dr. Tolentino testified that as he was only about two feet away
from the safe, and with Fernandez in front of him and Santiago to his right, he could see them both very
clearly. When the door bell rang, both men hurriedly left. Dr. Tolentino locked the door and telephoned
his son, Dr. Nilo Tolentino. When his son and a helper arrived, Dr. Tolentino was brought down to the
clinic where he later learned that his wife was killed (p. 19, Ibid.).

Dr. Nilo Tolentino testified that when he came to their house after the call from his father, he saw the
latter upstairs. The cabinets were ransacked. He also noticed a pool of blood in front of the stereo and
television cabinets and drops of blood leading to the examination room. There, he saw the lifeless body
of his mother. He called the police immediately and his father related to him what had happened. In
court, he identified pictures showing his father's injuries and the lifeless body of his mother. He also
testified that they spent around P300,000 for the wake and burial of his mother (pp. 19-20, Ibid.).
PO3 Eladio San Pedro, the investigator assigned to the case, testified that Santiago admitted his
participation in the killing of Eugenia and that Fernandez was the one who stabbed her after she called
for help. PO3 San Pedro also testified that they were able to recover the Sony Betamax machine from
the house of a certain Rogelio Abesamis while a search of Santiago's house yielded the chisel used in
killing Eugenia and some bloodied clothes (p. 20, Ibid.).
Another witness, Rene Julian, stated that he was the owner of the tricycle which Fernandez used to
drive for a living. This witness testified that early on the morning of April 10, 1991, Fernandez took the
tricycle from its garage. Later that afternoon, between 1:30 and 2 o'clock, he saw the tricycle parked in
front of Dr. Tolentino's house. At around 7:05 o'clock that evening, accused-appellant returned the
tricycle and personally handed over P50 as "boundary" for the day (p. 20, Ibid.).
Dr. Benito Caballero testified that Eugenia Lindain-Tolentino sustained twenty-four stab wounds on
different parts of the body, which could have been inflicted by more than one person with the use of
sharp, pointed objects, probably two, due to the different sizes of the wounds (p. 21, Ibid.).
Accused-appellant Fernandez admitted that he took the tricycle from Rene Julian's garage early on the
morning of April 10, 1991. However, having had a quarrel with his wife, he was in no mood to drive it,
and so he instead asked his brother, Freddie, to drive it for him. Thus, his alibi is that at around 6 o'clock
on that same morning, he took a NELBUSCO bus bound for Isabela, and that he was already some
distance away from the scene of the crime when it happened. His wife, Amelia, and his mother, Emma,
tried to corroborate accused-appellant's testimony as to the fact of the quarrel and his stay in Isabela (p.
21, Ibid.).
In support of his lone assigned error, accused-appellant Fernandez contends that the trial court gave
undue weight to the statements of co-accused Joel Santiago and to the testimony of Dr. Delfin
Tolentino. Accused-appellant argues that Santiago's declarations as relayed to the trial court by PO3 San
Pedro, should not have been considered as Santiago was not called as a witness in the case and thus
could not have been cross-examined on such matter. Accused-appellant likewise faults the trial court for
lending credence to the positive identification given by Dr. Delfin Tolentino inasmuch as the doctor's
perceptions are not very clear since he was already eighty-two years old at the time of the incident.
Furthermore, it is said, Dr. Delfin Tolentino may have pointed to accused-appellant only because of the
prior statements of Santiago before the police authorities implicating the accused-appellant (pp. 152154, Ibid.).
The Court finds the appeal unmeritorious, although obviously accused-appellant's contention that the
trial court erred in considering PO3 San Pedro's testimony regarding Santiago's declarations implicating
Fernandez is correct. The implicatory statements of Santiago, it must be noted, were not given during
the trial of accused-appellant, who was thus deprived of the right of cross-examining and confronting
his accuser. Thus, Santiago's statements on this matter, as related to the trial court by PO3 San Pedro,
are mere hearsay, which even if not objected to, as in this case, nevertheless do not deserve credence
(People vs. Damaso, 212 SCRA 547, 554 [1992]). However, this is not sufficient to exonerate accused-

appellant. The Office of the Solicitor General, citingPeople vs. Barba (203 SCRA 436, 452 [1991]),
correctly points out that the positive identification of accused-appellant by Dr. Delfin Tolentino who is
untainted by any motive to falsely testify, sufficiently established the guilt of accused-appellant, for the
law does not require that positive identification be corroborated to obtain conviction (p. 82, Rollo). The
People submits that it does not matter that it was only after such declaration that the police were able to
get a lead on Fernandez. Indeed, and most helpfully, the police got valuable information from their
interview with Dr. Delfin Tolentino which led to the successful solution of the crime.
Likewise, there was no proof that Dr. Delfin Tolentino, at the time of the incident, did not possess the
proper mental and physical faculties as to make him a less than credible witness. The record shows Dr.
Delfin Tolentino saw who the malefactors were:
Q: How far or how near were you then from that person who wants to consult you as physician at that
time that you saw that person?
A: Probably 3-4 feet, Sir.
(p. 17, TSN, March 22, 1993)
Q: Before you were actually over-powered, your eyes were covered with masking tape, were you able to
recognize that person who according to you consulted you for medical treatment?
A: Yes, Sir. He was very near to me and I was able to see him very well.
Q: If that person is present in court, can you identify him, point to him?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Please look around before this courtroom and tell us if that person is present?
A: Yes, Sir.
Interpreter:
Witness pointed to a detention prisoner, in uniform and who when asked of his name, answered
Fernando Fernandez.
(pp. 18-19, Ibid.)
Q: At the time they were trying to open the safe, how far or how near were you from them?
A: They were just very near me, probably around 1 to 2 feet, Sir.
Q: Can you tell us who was the person who first attempted to open the safe?
A: At first, Fernando Fernandez, Sir (Witness pointing to accused Fernando Fernandez).

Q: And what was the other person doing then when this Fernando Fernandez was first trying open the
safe or vault?
A: He was just standing beside me, Sir.
(pp. 23-24, Ibid.)
Verily, Dr. Delfin Tolentino's categorical, clear, and consistent answers during the intensive crossexamination all the more indicated that he possessed all the faculties required of a qualified witness, that
he was telling the truth, and that his declarations and answers established, beyond reasonable doubt, the
identity of the perpetrators of the crime:
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, you testified a while ago that a person tried to enter your clinic posing as a
patient; now, where was the person whom you said tried to pose as a patient when you first saw him on
April 10, 1991?
A: He was just outside the clinic, Sir.
Q: And, you were inside the clinic, Mr. Witness?
A: And, he was outside the clinic.
Q: Was your clinic made of concrete materials?
A: Mixed materials, Sir.
Q: Was there any window at that time, Mr. Witness?
A: Yes, Sir. That is how I saw Fernando Fernandez, through the window.
Q: And, the window is made of glass, Mr. Witness?
A: Yes, Sir, but the window was opened.
Q: Was there any cover in that window to protect the occupant inside the clinic from sunlight?
A: There was none, Sir.
Q: And, you said that person who posed as a patient was how far from you, Mr. Witness?
A: Probably around 2 to 3 feet, Sir.
Q: And after you conversed with that person outside the clinic, Mr. Witness, you decided to open the
door of your clinic, is that correct?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q: And, after you opened the door of your clinic, you said your eyes were immediately covered by
masking tape?

A: It is only around two (2) feet, Sir.

Q: Was his face towards you or his back towards you?

A: Yes, Sir.
A: He was in front of me; he was facing me.
Q: And, from that time on until you said the vault was opened by you, your eyes were covered by
masking tape?

Q: Now, how about Joel Santiago, what was he doing at that time, Mr. Witness?

A: When I opened the safe, they removed the cover already and they put my eyeglasses.

Prosecutor:

Q: By the way, Mr. Witness, when you were conversing with that person whom you said posed as a
patient, you were not wearing your eyeglasses at that time, Mr. Witness?

The question is vague, Your Honor.

A: I was wearing my eyeglasses already.

Q: Now, Mr. Witness, can you still see me clearly?
A: Yes, Sir, very clear, I can see you. You have your eyeglasses, you are "gwapo".
Atty. Vargas:
Thank you.
Court:
Make it of record that the distance between the witness and the defense counsel is about 2 1/2 meters,
more or less, as stipulated by the parties.
(pp. 38-41, Ibid.).
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, when you said you were in your room, the masking tape that covers your eyes
were removed?
A: Removed, Sir and they put my eyeglasses on.
Q: And, at that time, where was Joel Santiago?
A: At my right side, Sir. Fernando was in front of me.
Q: But when the masking tape was removed, the first person you saw was Joel Santiago, is that correct,
Mr. Witness?
A: No, Sir, Fernando Fernandez.
Q: Now, how far was Fernando Fernandez from you Mr. Witness?

Atty. Vargas:
. . . at the time you were in front of your safe and the masking tape was removed?
A: They were ransacking the contents of the safe and they got what they wanted.
Q: So, you said they were ransacking the safe; you mean the 2 persons Mr. Witness?
A: Fernando Fernandez was the one who removed the tape of my eyes, Sir.
Q: So, Fernando Fernandez was at your back at that time?
A: No, Sir. He was in front; I was in front. He could remove it like that.
Q: And, after that, they went to your safe?
A: Yes, Sir. We were already in front of the safe.
Q: How far were you from the safe when the masking tape was removed?
A: Probably around 2 feet or more than one foot.
Q: And, Fernando Fernandez, how far was he from the safe?
A: Only around 2 feet, Sir.
Q: And, you said they were ransacking the safe how far were you from the safe?
A: Around 2 feet, Sir.
Q: When they were ransacking the safe?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q: The safe was in front of you Mr. Witness?

A: Yes, Sir almost.

WATEROUS DRUG CORPORATION and MS. EMMA CO, petitioners,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ANTONIA MELODIA
CATOLICO, respondents.

Q: So, when they were ransacking the safe, their backs were towards you?
A: No, Sir. Fernando was just in front of me and Joel was on my right side, very near, that is why I
could see both of them very clearly.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Q: How long were you able to see the accused Fernando Fernandez, Mr. Witness?

Nor is he a true Servant [who] buys dear to share in the Profit with the Seller. 1

Prosecutor:

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to declare private respondent
Antonia Melodia Catolico (hereafter Catolico) not a "true Servant," thereby assailing the 30 September
1993 decision 2 and December 1993 Resolution 3 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
in NLRC-NCR CA No. 005160-93, which sustained the reinstatement and monetary awards in favor of
private respondent 4 and denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. 5

On that particular moment, while they were ransacking the safe?

Court:
Specify.
Atty. Vargas:
. . . at the time the masking tape was removed from your eyes?
A: Probably around 15 minutes, Sir.
(pp. 45-48, Ibid.)
The Court thus sees no ground to reverse the trial court's judgment in regard to accused-appellant's guilt.
It is settled doctrine that in matters such as credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will generally not
disturb the findings of trial courts, unless material and substantial facts have gone unnoticed by the
latter, the reason being the trial court, having had the first-hand opportunity to observe the witnesses'
deportment and manner of testifying during the trial, is in a better position to assess their credibility
(People vs. Eduardo Ligotan v Fabella, G.R. No. 119219, September 30, 1996). However, the trial court
committed an error in convicting accused-appellant of the crime of robbery with homicide and physical
injuries. The appealed judgment should be modified in that the crime committed by accused-appellant
should simply be robbery with homicide, since the physical injuries committed during or on occasion of
the robbery are absorbed therein, regardless of the number of homicides and physical injuries
committed (People vs. Pamintuan, 222 SCRA 716, 722 [1993]).
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED, except with the modification that accusedappellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 113271 October 16, 1997

The facts are as follows:

Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by petitioner Waterous Drug Corporation (hereafter WATEROUS)
on 15 August 1988.
On 31 July 1989, Catolico received a memorandum 6 from WATEROUS Vice President-General
Manager Emma R. Co warning her not to dispense medicine to employees chargeable to the latter's
accounts because the same was a prohibited practice. On the same date, Co issued another
memorandum 7 to Catolico warning her not to negotiate with suppliers of medicine without consulting
the Purchasing Department, as this would impair the company's control of purchases and, besides she
was not authorized to deal directly with the suppliers.
As regards the first memorandum, Catolico did not deny her responsibility but explained that her act
was "due to negligence," since fellow employee Irene Soliven "obtained the medicines in bad faith and
through misrepresentation when she claimed that she was given a charge slip by the Admitting Dept."
Catolico then asked the company to look into the fraudulent activities of Soliven. 8
In a memorandum 9 dated 21 November 1989, WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda E. Bautro warned
Catolico against the "rush delivery of medicines without the proper documents."
On 29 January 1990, WATEROUS Control Clerk Eugenio Valdez informed Co that he noticed an
irregularity involving Catolico and Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (hereafter YSP), which he
described as follows:
. . . A case in point is medicine purchased under our Purchase Order (P.O.) No. 19045 with YSP Sales
Invoice No. 266 representing purchase of ten (10) bottles of Voren tablets at P384.00 per unit. Previews
P.O.s issued to YSP, Inc. showed that the price per bottle is P320.00 while P.O. No. 19045 is priced at
P384.00 or an over price of P64.00 per bottle (or total of P640.00). WDRC paid the amount of
P3,840.00 thru MBTC Check No. 222832 dated December 15, 1988. Verification was made to YSP, Inc.
to determine the discrepancy and it was found that the cost per bottle was indeed overpriced. YSP, Inc.
Accounting Department (Ms. Estelita Reyes) confirmed that the difference represents refund of jack-up

price of ten bottles of Voren tablets per sales invoice no. 266 as per their check voucher no. 629552
(shown to the undersigned), which was paid to Ms. Catolico through China Bank check no. 892068
dated November 9, 1989 . . . .

Accordingly, he awarded separation pay to Catolico computed at one-half month's pay for every year of
service; back wages for one year; and the additional sum of P2,000.00 for illegal suspension
"representing 30 days work." Arbiter Lopez computed the award in favor of Catolico as follows:

The undersigned talked to Ms. Catolico regarding the check but she denied having received it and that
she is unaware of the overprice. However, upon conversation with Ms. Saldana, EDRC Espana
Pharmacy Clerk, she confirmed that the check amounting to P640.00 was actually received by Ms.
Catolico. As a matter of fact, Ms. Catolico even asked Ms. Saldana if she opened the envelope
containing the check but Ms. Saldana answered her "talagang ganyan, bukas." It appears that the
amount in question (P640.00) had been pocketed by Ms. Catolico. 10

30
Backwages
1/12
Separation

TOTAL

Forthwith, in her memorandum 11 dated 37 January 1990, Co asked Catolico to explain, within twentyfour hours, her side of the reported irregularity. Catolico asked for additional time to give her
explanation, 12 and she was granted a 48-hour extension from 1 to 3 February 1990. However, on 2
February 1990, she was informed that effective 6 February 1990 to 7 March 1990, she would be placed
on preventive suspension to protect the interests of the company. 13
In a letter dated 2 February 1990, Catolico requested access to the file containing Sales Invoice No. 266
for her to be able to make a satisfactory explanation. In said letter she protested Saldaa's invasion of
her privacy when Saldaa opened an envelope addressed to Catolico. 14
In a letter 15 to Co dated 10 February 1990, Catolico, through her counsel, explained that the check she
received from YSP was a Christmas gift and not a "refund of overprice." She also averred that the
preventive suspension was ill-motivated, as it sprang from an earlier incident between her and Co's
secretary, Irene Soliven.
On 5 March 1990, WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda Bautro, issued a memorandum 16 notifying
Catolico of her termination; thus:
We received your letter of explanation and your lawyer's letter dated Feb. 2, 1990 and Feb. 10, 1990
respectively regarding our imposition of preventive suspension on you for acts of dishonesty. However,
said letters failed to rebut the evidences [sic] in our possession which clearly shows that as a Pharmacist
stationed at Espana Branch, you actually made Purchase Orders at YSP Phils., Inc. for 10 bottles of
Voren tablets at P384.00/bottle with previous price of P320.00/bottle only. A check which you received
in the amount of P640.00 actually represents the refund of over price of said medicines and this was
confirmed by Ms. Estelita Reyes, YSP Phils., Inc. Accounting Department.
Your actuation constitutes an act of dishonesty detrimental to the interest of the company. Accordingly,
you are hereby terminated effective March 8, 1990.
On 5 May 1990, Catolico filed before the Office of the Labor Arbiter a complaint for unfair labor
practice, illegal dismissal, and illegal suspension. 17
In his decision 18 of 10 May 1993, Labor Arbiter Alex Arcadio Lopez found no proof of unfair labor
practice against petitioners. Nevertheless, he decided in favor of Catolico because petitioners failed to
"prove what [they] alleged as complainant's dishonesty," and to show that any investigation was
conducted. Hence, the dismissal was without just cause and due process. He thus declared the dismissal
and suspension illegal but disallowed reinstatement, as it would not be to the best interest of the parties.

days

Preventive
of
pay

Suspension

P2,000.00
26,858.50
2,238.21
4,305.15

P26,858.50
(3

years)

AWARD

P35,401.86

Petitioners seasonably appealed from the decision and urged the NLRC to set it aside because the Labor
Arbiter erred in finding that Catolico was denied due process and that there was no just cause to
terminate her services.
In its decision 19 of 30 September 1993, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter on the
ground that petitioners were not able to prove a just cause for Catolico's dismissal from her
employment. It found that petitioner's evidence consisted only of the check of P640.00 drawn by YSP in
favor of complainant, which her co-employee saw when the latter opened the envelope. But, it declared
that the check was inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Sections 2 and 3(1 and 2) of Article III of the
Constitution. 20 It concluded:
With the smoking gun evidence of respondents being rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the
constitutional right invoked by complainants, respondents' case falls apart as it is bereft of evidence
which cannot be used as a legal basis for complainant's dismissal.
The NLRC then dismissed the appeal for lack of merit, but modified the dispositive portion of the
appealed decision by deleting the award for illegal suspension as the same was already included in the
computation of the aggregate of the awards in the amount of P35,401.86.
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed this special civil action
for certiorari, which is anchored on the following grounds:
I. Public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in its findings of facts.
II. Due process was duly accorded to private respondent.
III. Public respondent gravely erred in applying Section 3, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
As to the first and second grounds, petitioners insist that Catolico had been receiving "commissions"
from YSP, or probably from other suppliers, and that the check issued to her on 9 November 1989 was
not the first or the last. They also maintained that Catolico occupied a confidential position and that
Catolico's receipt of YSP's check, aggravated by her "propensity to violate company rules," constituted
breach of confidence. And contrary to the findings of NLRC, Catolico was given ample opportunity to
explain her side of the controversy.

Anent the third ground, petitioners submit that, in light of the decision in the People v. Marti, 21 the
constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one's
person from interference by government and cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
In its Manifestation in Lieu of Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disagreed with the
NLRC's decision, as it was of the persuasion that (a) the conclusions reached by public respondent are
inconsistent with its findings of fact; and (b) the incident involving the opening of envelope addressed
to private respondent does not warrant the application of the constitutional provisions. It observed that
Catolico was given "several opportunities" to explain her side of the check controversy, and concluded
that the opportunities granted her and her subsequent explanation "satisfy the requirements of just cause
and due process." The OSG was also convinced that Catolico's dismissal was based on just cause and
that Catolico's admission of the existence of the check, as well as her "lame excuse" that it was a
Christmas gift from YSP, constituted substantial evidence of dishonesty. Finally, the OSG echoed
petitioners' argument that there was no violation of the right of privacy of communication in this
case, 22 adding that petitioner WATEROUS was justified in opening an envelope from one of its regular
suppliers as it could assume that the letter was a business communication in which it had an interest.
In its Comment which we required to be filed in view of the adverse stand of the OSG, the NLRC
contends that petitioners miserably failed to prove their claim that it committed grave abuse of
discretion in its findings of fact. It then prays that we dismiss this petition.
In her Comment, Catolico asserts that petitioners' evidence is too "flimsy" to justify her dismissal. The
check in issue was given to her, and she had no duty to turn it over to her employer. Company rules do
not prohibit an employee from accepting gifts from clients, and there is no indication in the contentious
check that it was meant as a refund for overpriced medicines. Besides, the check was discovered in
violation of the constitutional provision on the right to privacy and communication; hence, as correctly
held by the NLRC, it was inadmissible in evidence.
Catolico likewise disputes petitioners' claim that the audit report and her initial response that she never
received a check were sufficient to justify her dismissal. When she denied having received a check from
YSP, she meant that she did not receive any refund of overprice, consistent with her position that what
she received was a token gift. All that can be gathered from the audit report is that there was apparently
an overcharge, with no basis to conclude that Catolico pocketed the amount in collusion with YSP. She
thus concluded that her dismissal was based on a mere suspicion.
Finally, Catolico insists that she could not have breached the trust and confidence of WATEROUS
because, being merely a pharmacist, she did not handle "confidential information or sensitive
properties." She was doing the task of a saleslady: selling drugs and making requisitions when supplies
were low.
A thorough review of the record leads us to no other conclusion than that, except as to the third ground,
the instant petition must fail.
Concededly, Catolico was denied due process. Procedural due process requires that an employee be
apprised of the charge against him, given reasonable time to answer the charge, allowed ample
opportunity to be heard and defend himself, and assisted by a representative if the employee so
desires. 23 Ample opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord the
employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense, including legal representation. 24

In the case at bar, although Catolico was given an opportunity to explain her side, she was dismissed
from the service in the memorandum of 5 March 1990 issued by her Supervisor after receipt of her
letter and that of her counsel. No hearing was ever conducted after the issues were joined through said
letters. The Supervisor's memorandum spoke of "evidences [sic] in [WATEROUS] possession," which
were not, however, submitted. What the "evidences" [sic] other than the sales invoice and the check
were, only the Supervisor knew.
Catolico was also unjustly dismissed. It is settled that the burden is on the employer to prove just and
valid cause for dismissing an employee, and its failure to discharge that burden would result in a finding
that the dismissal is unjustified. 25 Here, WATEROUS proved unequal to the task.
It is evident from the Supervisor's memorandum that Catolico was dismissed because of an alleged
anomalous transaction with YSP. Unfortunately for petitioners, their evidence does not establish that
there was an overcharge. Control Clerk Eugenio C. Valdez, who claims to have discovered Catolico's
inappropriate transaction, stated in his affidavit: 26
4. My findings revealed that on or before the month of July 31, 1989, Ms. Catolico in violation of the
[company] procedure, made an under the table deal with YSP Phils. to supply WDRC needed medicines
like Voren tablets at a jack-up price of P384.00 per bottle of 50 mg. which has a previous price of only
P320.00;
5. I verified the matter to YSP Phils. to determine the discrepancy and I found out that the cost per bottle
was indeed overpriced. The Accounting Department of YSP Phils. through Ms. Estelita Reyes
confirmed that there was really an overprice and she said that the difference was refunded through their
check voucher no. 629552 which was shown to me and the payee is Melodia Catolico, through a China
Bank Check No. 892068 dated November 9, 1989.
It clearly appears then that Catolico's dismissal was based on hearsay information. Estelita Reyes never
testified nor executed an affidavit relative to this case; thus, we have to reject the statements attributed
to her by Valdez. Hearsay evidence carries no probative value. 27
Besides, it was never shown that petitioners paid for the Voren tablets. While Valdez informed Co,
through the former's memorandum 28 of 29 January 1990, that WATEROUS paid YSP P3,840.00 "thru
MBTC Check No. 222832," the said check was never presented in evidence, nor was any receipt from
YSP offered by petitioners.
Moreover, the two purchase orders for Voren tablets presented by petitioners do not indicate an
overcharge. The purchase order dated 16 August 1989 29 stated that the Voren tablets cost P320.00 per
box, while the purchase order dated 5 October 1989 30 priced the Voren tablets at P384.00 per bottle. The
difference in price may then be attributed to the different packaging used in each purchase order.
Assuming that there was an overcharge, the two purchase orders for the Voren tablets were
recommended by Director-MMG Mario R. Panuncio, verified by AVP-MNG Noli M. Lopez and
approved by Vice President-General Manager Emma R. Co. The purchase orders were silent as to
Catolico's participation in the purchase. If the price increase was objectionable to petitioners, they or
their officers should have disapproved the transaction. Consequently, petitioners had no one to blame
for their predicament but themselves. This set of facts emphasizes the exceedingly incredible situation
proposed by petitioners. Despite the memorandum warning Catolico not to negotiate with suppliers of

medicine, there was no proof that she ever transacted, or that she had the opportunity to transact, with
the said suppliers. Again, as the purchase orders indicate, Catolico was not at all involved in the sale of
the Voren tablets. There was no occasion for Catolico to initiate, much less benefit from, what Valdez
called an "under the table deal" with YSP.
Catolico's dismissal then was obviously grounded on mere suspicion, which in no case can justify an
employee's dismissal. Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the
termination
of
employment; 31 and even the dismissal of an employee for loss of trust and confidence must rest on
substantial grounds and not on the employer's arbitrariness, whims, caprices, or suspicion. 32 Besides,
Catolico was not shown to be a managerial employee, to which class of employees the term "trust and
confidence" is restricted. 33
As regards the constitutional violation upon which the NLRC anchored its decision, we find no reason
to revise the doctrine laid down in People vs. Marti 34 that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens
from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for
Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said
counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities.
Finally, since it has been determined by the Labor Arbiter that Catolico's reinstatement would not be to
the best interest of the parties, he correctly awarded separation pay to Catolico. Separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement is computed at one month's salary for every year of service. 35 In this case, however, Labor
Arbiter Lopez computed the separation pay at one-half month's salary for every year of service.
Catolico did not oppose or raise an objection. As such, we will uphold the award of separation pay as
fixed by the Labor Arbiter.

G.R. No. 137944

April 6, 2000

FERNANDA MENDOZA CEQUEA and RUPERTA MENDOZA LIRIO, petitioners,

vs.
HONORATA MENDOZA BOLANTE, respondent.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
Tax receipts and declarations are prima facie proofs of ownership or possession of the property for
which such taxes have been paid. Coupled with proof of actual possession of the property, they may
become the basis of a claim for ownership. By acquisitive prescription, possession in the concept of
owner public, adverse, peaceful and uninterrupted may be converted to ownership. On the other
hand, mere possession and occupation of land cannot ripen into ownership.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the March 19, 1999 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals 2 (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 43423. The assailed Decision disposed as follows: 3
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the decision of the trial court appealed from is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, judgment is hereby rendered declaring . . . Honorata Mendoza Bolante the
rightful owner and possessor of the parcel of land which is the subject of this appeal.
The Facts

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the challenged decision and resolution
of the National Labor Relations Commission dated 30 September 1993 and 2 December 1993,
respectively, in NLRC-NCR CA No. 005160-93 are AFFIRMED, except as to its reason for upholding
the Labor Arbiter's decision, viz., that the evidence against private respondent was inadmissible for
having been obtained in violation of her constitutional rights of privacy of communication and against
unreasonable searches and seizures which is hereby set aside.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 114263-64 March 29, 1996

The Petition herein refers to a parcel of land situated in Barangay Bangad, Binangonan, Province of
Rizal, having an area of 1,728 square meters and covered by Tax Declaration No. 26-0027. The
undisputed antecedents of this case are narrated by the Court of Appeals as follows: 4
The facts not disputed revealed that prior to 1954, the land was originally declared for taxation purposes
in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza, father of [respondent] and married to Eduarda Apiado. Sinforoso
died in 1930. [Petitioners] were the daughters of Margarito Mendoza. On the basis of an affidavit, the
tax declaration in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza of the contested lot was cancelled and subsequently
declared in the name of Margarito Mendoza. Margarito and Sinforoso are brothers. [Respondent] is the
present occupant of the land. Earlier, on October 15, 1975, [respondent] and Miguel Mendoza, another
brother of [petitioners], during the cadastral survey had a dispute on [the] ownership of the
land.1wphi1.nt
During the pre-trial conference, parties stipulated the following facts:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOHN JENN PORRAS and SERGIO EMELO, accused-appellants.

1) The land subject of the case was formerly declared for taxation purposes in the name of Sinforoso
Mendoza prior to 1954 but is now declared in the name of Margarito Mendoza.

SUPRA

2) The parties agree[d] as to the identity of the land subject of instant case.

________________________________________________________________________________

3) [Petitioners] are the daughters of Margarito Mendoza while the [respondent] is the only daughter of
Sinforoso Mendoza.

4) Margarito Mendoza and Sinforoso Mendoza [were] brothers, now deceased.

5) During the cadastral survey of the property on October 15, 1979 there was already a dispute between
Honorata M. Bolante and Miguel Mendoza, brother of [petitioners].
6) [Respondent was] occupying the property in question.
The only issue involved [was] who [was] the lawful owner and possessor of the land subject of the case.
After trial, the court a quo rendered its judgment in favor of [petitioners], the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered for the [petitioners]
and against the [respondent]:

1. . . . [I]n not considering the affidavit as an exception to the general rule that an affidavit is classified
as hearsay evidence, unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand;
2. . . . [I]n holding that respondent has been in actual and physical possession, coupled with . . .
exclusive and continuous possession of the land since 1985, which are evidence of the best kind of
circumstance proving the claim of the title of ownership and enjoys the presumption of preferred
possessor.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
Admissibility of the Affidavit

1. Declaring that the parcel of land situated in Bangad, Binangonan, Rizal covered by tax declaration
no. 26-0027 in the name of Margarito Mendoza belong to his heirs, the [petitioners] herein;
2. Ordering [respondent] to vacate the property subject of the case and deliver possession thereof to the
heirs of Margarito Mendoza.
3. Ordering the [respondent] to indemnify the [petitioners] in the sum of P10,000.00, as actual damages.
4. Ordering the [respondent] to pay the costs.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court because the genuineness and the due execution of the
affidavit allegedly signed by the respondent and her mother had not been sufficiently established. The
notary public or anyone else who had witnessed the execution of the affidavit was not presented. No
expert testimony or competent witness ever attested to the genuineness of the questioned signatures.
The CA further ruled that the affidavit was insufficient to overcome the denial of respondent and her
mother. The former testified that the latter, never having attended school, could neither read nor write.
Respondent also said that she had never been called "Leonor," which was how she was referred to in the
affidavit.
Moreover, the appellate court held that the probative value of petitioners' tax receipts and declarations
paled in comparison with respondent's proof of ownership of the disputed parcel. Actual, physical,
exclusive and continuous possession by respondent since 1985 indeed gave her a better title under
Article 538 of the Civil Code.
Hence, this Petition. 5
Issues
Insisting that they are the rightful owners of the disputed land, the petitioners allege that the CA
committed these reversible errors: 6

Petitioners dispute the CA's ruling that the affidavit was not the best evidence of their father's ownership
of the disputed land, because the "affiant was not placed on the witness stand." They contend that it was
unnecessary to present a witness to establish the authenticity of the affidavit because it was a declaration
against respondent's interest and was an ancient document. As a declaration against interest, it was an
exception to the hearsay rule. As a necessary and trustworthy document, it was admissible in evidence.
And because it was executed on March 24, 1953, it was a self-authenticating ancient document.
We quote below the pertinent portion of the appellate court's ruling:

While it is true that the affidavit was signed and subscribed before a notary public, the general rule is
that affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence, unless affiants are placed on the witness stand
(People's Bank and Trust Company vs. Leonidas, 207 SCRA 164). Affidavits are not considered the best
evidence, if affiants are available as witnesses (Vallarta vs. Court of Appeals, 163 SCRA 587). The due
execution of the affidavit was not sufficiently established. The notary public or others who saw that the
document was signed or at least [could] confirm its recitals [were] not presented. There was no expert
testimony or competent witness who attested to the genuineness of the questioned signatures. Worse,
[respondent] denied the genuineness of her signature and that of her mother . . . [Respondent] testified
that her mother was an illiterate and as far as she knew her mother could not write because she had not
attended school (p. 7,ibid). Her testimony was corroborated by Ma. Sales Bolante Basa, who said the
[respondent's] mother was illiterate.
The petitioners allegations are untenable. Before a private document offered as authentic can be
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved first. 8 And before a document is
admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule under the Dead Man's Statute, the offeror must show (a)
that the declarant is dead, insane or unable to testify; (b) that the declaration concerns a fact cognizable
by the declarant; (c) that at the time the declaration was made, he was aware that the same was contrary
to his interest; and (d) that circumstances render improbable the existence of any motive to falsify. 9
In this case, one of the affiants happens to be the respondent, who is still alive and who testified that the
signature in the affidavit was not hers. A declaration against interest is not admissible if the declarant is
available to testify as a witness. 10 Such declarant should be confronted with the statement against
interest as a prior inconsistent statement.
The affidavit cannot be considered an ancient document either. An ancient document is one that is (1)
more than 30 years old, (2) found in the proper custody, and (3) unblemished by any alteration or by any
circumstance of suspicion. 11 It must on its face appear to be genuine. The petitioners herein failed,
however, to explain how the purported signature of Eduarda Apiado could have been affixed to the

subject affidavit if, according to the witness, she was an illiterate woman who never had any formal
schooling. This circumstance casts suspicion on its authenticity.
Not all notarized documents are exempted from the rule on authentication. Thus, an affidavit does not
automatically become a public document just because it contains a notarial jurat. Furthermore, the
affidavit in question does not state how the ownership of the subject land was transferred from
Sinforoso Mendoza to Margarito Mendoza. By itself, an affidavit is not a mode of acquiring ownership.

The respondent's contention is untenable. The presumption in Article 541 of the Civil Code is merely
disputable; it prevails until the contrary is proven. 20 That is, one who is disturbed in one's possession
shall, under this provision, be restored thereto by the means established by law. 21 Article 538 settles
only the question of possession, and possession is different from ownership. Ownership in this case
should be established in one of the ways provided by law.
To settle the issue of ownership, we need to determine who between the claimants has proven
acquisitive prescription. 22

Second Issue:
Preference of Possession
The CA ruled that the respondent was the preferred possessor under Article 538 of the Civil Code
because she was in notorious, actual, exclusive and continuous possession of the land since 1985.
Petitioners dispute this ruling. They contend that she came into possession through force and violence,
contrary to Article 536 of the Civil Code.
We concede that despite their dispossession in 1985, the petitioners did not lose legal possession
because possession cannot be acquired through force or violence. 12 To all intents and purposes, a
possessor, even if physically ousted, is still deemed the legal possessor. 13 Indeed, anyone who can prove
prior possession, regardless of its character, may recover such possession. 14
However, possession by the petitioners does not prevail over that of the respondent.1wphi1 Possession
by the former before 1985 was not exclusive, as the latter also acquired it before 1985. The records
show that the petitioners' father and brother, as well as the respondent and her mother were
simultaneously in adverse possession of the land.
Before 1985, the subject land was occupied and cultivated by the respondent's father (Sinforoso), who
was the brother of petitioners' father (Margarito), as evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 26425. 15 When
Sinforoso died in 1930, Margarito took possession of the land and cultivated it with his son Miguel. At
the same time, respondent and her mother continued residing on the lot.
When respondent came of age in 1948, she paid realty taxes for the years 1932-1948. 16 Margarito
declared the lot for taxation in his name in 1953 17 and paid its realty taxes beginning 1952. 18 When he
died, Miguel continued cultivating the land. As found by the CA, the respondent and her mother were
living on the land, which was being tilled by Miguel until 1985 when he was physically ousted by the
respondent. 19
Based on Article 538 of the Civil Code, the respondent is the preferred possessor because, benefiting
from her father's tax declaration of the subject lot since 1926, she has been in possession thereof for a
longer period. On the other hand, petitioners' father acquired joint possession only in 1952.
Third Issue:
Possession of Better Right
Finally, the petitioners challenge the CA ruling that "actual and physical coupled with the exclusive and
continuous possession [by respondent] of the land since 1985" proved her ownership of the disputed
land. The respondent argues that she was legally presumed to possess the subject land with a just title
since she possessed it in the concept of owner. Under Article 541 of the Code, she could not be obliged
to show or prove such title.

Ownership of immovable property is acquired by ordinary prescription through possession for ten
years.23 Being the sole heir of her father, respondent showed through his tax receipt that she had been in
possession of the land for more than ten years since 1932. When her father died in 1930, she continued
to reside there with her mother. When she got married, she and her husband engaged in kaingin inside
the disputed lot for their livelihood. 24
Respondent's possession was not disturbed until 1953 when the petitioners' father claimed the land. But
by then, her possession, which was in the concept of owner public, peaceful, and uninterrupted 25
had already ripened into ownership. Furthermore she herself, after her father's demise, declared and paid
realty taxes for the disputed land. Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation, when coupled
with proof of actual possession of the property, can be the basis of a claim for ownership through
prescription. 26
In contrast, the petitioners, despite thirty-two years of farming the subject land, did not acquire
ownership. It is settled that ownership cannot be acquired by mere occupation. 27 Unless coupled with
the element of hostility toward the true owner, 28 occupation and use, however long, will not confer title
by prescription or adverse possession. Moreover, the petitioners cannot claim that their possession was
public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Although their father and brother arguably acquired ownership
through extraordinary prescription because of their adverse possession for thirty-two years (19531985), 29 this supposed ownership cannot extend to the entire disputed lot, but must be limited to the
portion that they actually farmed.
We cannot sustain the petitioners' contention that their ownership of the disputed land was established
before the trial court through the series of tax declarations and receipts issued in the name of Margarito
Mendoza. Such documents prove that the holder has a claim of title over the property. Aside from
manifesting a sincere desire to obtain title thereto, they announce the holder's adverse claim against the
state and other interested parties. 30
However, tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership. 31 At most, they
constitute mereprima facie proof of ownership or possession of the property for which taxes have been
paid. 32 In the absence of actual public and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax
purposes does not prove ownership.33 In sum, the petitioners' claim of ownership of the whole parcel has
no legal basis.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 109279 January 18, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
OCTAVIO MENDOZA y LANDICHO, accused-appellant.

And to Charmaine Mendoza the accused is hereby ordered to pay her the following
MELO, J.:

1. P50,000.00 for causing the death of her mother Cecilia Eusebio Mendoza;

On the night of November 11, 1988, one Cecilia Eusebio Mendoza was shot to death. The trial court
found her husband, Octavio Mendoza, responsible for her death. However the real victim of this
unfortunate occurrence is the spouses' only minor child, Charmaine Mendoza, who is now left to the
care of her maternal grandparents.

2. P100,000.00 for and as moral damages;

For the death of his wife Cecilia Mendoza, accused-appellant Octavio Mendoza was separately charged
with parricide and illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under two Informations, to wit:
Criminal Case No. 636
That on or about the 11th day of November, 1988, in the Municipality of Las Pias, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
kill and without justifiable motive, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shot with a .38 caliber revolver one Cecilia Eusebio Mendoza, his wife, thereby inflicting
upon her serious and mortal gunshot wounds which directly caused her death.

3. P25,000.00 for and as attorney's fees.

Plus costs of the proceedings.
Accused Octavio Mendoza y Landicho is further deprived of his civil and parental rights over his child
Charmaine Mendoza and he cannot inherit from her.
2. In Criminal Case No. 637, and finding the accused Octavio Mendoza y Landicho guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunitions, used in the
Commission of Parricide, defined and penalized under Secton 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 as
amended by Presidential decree No. 1878-A said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua, with all the accessories of the law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The firearms and ammunitions used, a Colt Revolver Cal. 38, with a Serial Number 41001 is hereby
forfeited in favor of the government together with all the ammunitions.

Criminal Case No. 637

With costs against the accused.

That on or about the 11th day of November, 1988, in the municipality of Las Pias, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and direct custody a firearm
one .38 caliber revolver, Colt with Serial No. 41001 and four (4) live ammunitions use in the crime of
parricide, without first securing the necessary license or permit therefor.

Conformably with the Circular of the Honorable Supreme Court, the accused is hereby ordered
committed to the Bureau of Corrections.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
(pp. 38-39, Rollo.)
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges, whereupon a joint trial on the merits commenced,
following which, a judgment of conviction was rendered, disposing:
WHEREFORE, premises considered:
1. In Criminal Case No. 636, and finding accused Octavio Mendoza y Landicho guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of PARRICIDE, defined and penalized under Article 246 of the Revised
Penal Code, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, with all the accessory
penalties attendant thereto.
He is further ordered to pay to Alipio Eusebio the amount of P66,000.00 for the funeral, wake, burial
and incidental expenses that said Alipio Eusebio spent by reason of the death of his daughter Cecilia
Eusebio Mendoza.

The accused, if he appeals the decision entitled to Bail.

SO ORDERED
(pp. 76-77, Rollo.)
Dissatisfied, accused-appellant has interposed the instant appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in
I
. . . substantially and almost totally relying on illegally procured and/or inadmissible, unauthenticated,
questionable documents, in grave violation of accused's constitutional right to privacy of
communication and papers, and/or his right against unreasonable search and seizure.
II
. . . almost substantially and wholly relying in the incredibly coached and unreliable direct testimony of
the minor daughter of accused and victim, Charmaine Mendoza, despite the evident grave conflicts or

contradictions thereof to the facts clearly and decisively testified by and/or findings of the police
investigators.

down on the floor of their living room, bleeding profusely. Charmaine saw accused-appellant hiding a
gun under the bed in her parents' room (pp. 5-6, Ibid.).

III

Charmaine ran towards her gasping and bleeding mother and held her. Then, accused-appellant asked
Charmaine to call her Aunt Dolores Mendoza to inform her of the death of Cecilia. Dolores could not
believe Charmaine and talked to accused-appellant instead (Ibid.).

. . . not believing the decisively clear and straight forward testimony of the accused as corroborated by
his witness.

Meanwhile, the victim bled to death on the floor.

IV
. . . ultimately convicting accused for the separate offenses of parricide and Illegal Possession of
Firearms despite the police investigator's undisturbed findings of a shooting and stabbing incident, a
situation consistent with the decisively clear postulate of the defense.
V
. . . not considering, even assuming merely for the sake of argument, but without conceding, that the
crime of parricide was committed, the law and doctrine that if a firearm is used in the commission of a
killing (Homicide, parricide, etc.) the same, as now mandated by Republic Act No. 8294 (known as
Revilla Law) must only be considered an aggravating circumstance. This is consistent to the rule that
Penal laws favorable to the accused shall have retroactive effects.
The facts as established by the evidence for the prosecution are as follows.
On November 11, 1988, accused-appellant, his wife Cecilia Mendoza, and their then 10-year-old
daughter attended the birthday party of a relative of accused-appellant held at McDonald's in Harrison
Plaza. While the party was going on, accused-appellant letf and proceeded to Kentucky Fried Chicken
Restaurant where he had some beer. When it was time for Cecilia and Charmaine to go home, they
could not find accused-appellant, hence, they decided to just leave, proceeding directly to their
residence at No. 2 Tramo Street, Camella Homes, Phase III, Pamplona, Las Pias (p. 4, Appellee's
Brief).
Cecilia and Charmaine arrived home at around 7 o'clock in the evening but accused-appellant was not
yet there. After a while, mother and daughter left for the house of Cecilia's parents in Bacoor, Cavite to
bring some perfume for Cecilia's brother, Francisco (p. 5, Ibid. ).
At about 9 o'clock in the evening, Cecilia and Charmaine left Bacoor. They rode a jeepney and at the
gate of the subdivision where they live, they saw the car of Rowena Hernandez, Cecilia's god-daughter,
and they hitched a ride home. Finally home, they saw their car already parked in the garage of their
neighbor. All the lights in their house were on but the screen door was locked. They knocked at the
window but accused-appellant did not respond. A moment later, however, accused-appellant opened the
back door and mother and daughter went straight to the master's bedroom (Ibid.).
While inside the master's bedroom, accused-appellant who was drunk instructed Charmaine to get cold
water and to douse him. She willingly obliged, after which she was told to go to her room. She changed
her clothes and readied herself for bed. While in her room, Charmaine heard her parents quarrelling
over the issue of Cecilia and Charmaine having left accused-appellant at the party. Thereafter,
Charmaine suddenly heard three gunshots. Running out of her room, Charmaine saw her mother Cecilia

Accused-appellant subsequently called his brother-in-law, Sgt. Antonio Gabac, and told him that Cecilia
had been shot and is already dead. Gabac, on the other line, told accused-appellant not to touch anything
and that he would be arriving shortly. When Gabac finally arrived, he and accused-appellant carried the
lifeless body of Cecilia into accused-appellant's car and brought her to the Perpetual Help Hospital.
Cecilia Mendoza was pronounced dead on arrival. The autopsy report indicated the cause of death as
follows:
Hemorrhage, severe, secondary to gunshot wounds of the back and left shoulder.
Upon receiving information about the shooting incident, Chief Investigator Cpl. Leopoldo Africa,
together with investigators Cpl. Prudencio Parejas, Cpl. Gorgonio Nortales, and Pfc. Rolando Almario,
proceeded to the hospital to investigate the incident, but accused-appellant refused to give any statement
or comment. Thereafter, the policemen invited Antonio Gabac to accompany them to the crime scene at
No. 2 Tramo Street, Camella Homes, Phase III, Pamplona, Las Pias. While they were inspecting the
premises, Cpl. Africa noticed something tucked inside Gabac's waist. He promptly told Gabac "Pare,
pakisurrender mo nga iyang baril." Gabac immediately handed Cpl. Africa a .38 caliber revolver with
Serial No. 41001 and with two empty shells and two live rounds. Gabac informed Africa that the gun
was handed to him by accused-appellant when Gabac arrived at the crime scene to respond to the call of
accused-appellant for assistance (p. 7, Ibid.)
Cecilia's father, Alipio Eusebio, having been informed of his daughter's death, and that valuables were
being taken out of his daughter's house, decided to remove, together with his sons, the remaining pieces
of property therein, including accused-appellant's personal effects (p. 8, Ibid.)
From the aforestated personal effects of accused-appellant, Alipio found Mission Order No. 86-580-893
dated November 7, 1986 issued to accused-appellant by Col. Eladio Gonzales, PAF (GSC), Acting Wing
Commander, 580th Aircraft Central Warning Wing, Villamor Airbase, Pasay City, which authorized
accused-appellant to carry a Colt Revolver, 38 Caliber with Serial No. 41001 from November 15, 1986
to December 15, 1986. There was also a Memorandum Receipt for Equipment, dated November 10,
1986, approved by Captain Luis L. Salanguit of the Philippine Air Force and Lt. Col. Ramon Bandong
and issued to one Octavio L. Mendoza, Captain, PAF, Assistant Director for Personnel which described
the firearm as "One Colt Revolver SN 41001" (p. 52, Rollo).
Accused-appellant tested positive for the presence of nitrates (p. 50, Ibid.).
Accused-appellant's own account of the incident is to the effect that before the shooting incident on the
night of November 11, 1988, he and his wife Cecilia were arguing about the latter carrying an

unlicensed .38 caliber revolver, and that a few weeks earlier they likewise argued because he found out
that his wife was still supporting her parents as well as her brothers and sisters.

After going through the evidentiary record, we find no reasons to disagree with the trial court and are
convinced that the guilt of accused-appellant Octavio Mendoza has been duly established.

Further, accused-appellant claimed that he saw men roaming near their house and that he had received
death threats over the telephone because Cecilia owed $35,000.00 to some people, in relation to her
jewelry and perfumes business. She also allegedly owed people some cash which was coursed through
her by workers from Saudi Arabia to be sent to their relatives in the Philippines (tsn, November 16,
1992, pp. 14-19).

Although the judgment of conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, conviction is proper if the
circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which lead to one fair and reasonable conclusion
pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person (Pecho v. People, 262 SCRA
518 [1996]). Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court
may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt (People vs. Damao, 253 SCRA 146 [1996]).

Accused-appellant claimed that he went home alone at around 7 o'clock on the night of November 11,
1988, after his wife, Cecilia, and daughter, Charmaine, had left him at the party. When his wife and
Charmaine arrived, they proceeded to the master's bedroom, after which, her daughter kissed him
goodnight. He and his wife were then left alone in their room and at that moment, his wife showed him
some money and uttered "Dad, okey na". She also brought out the .38 caliber revolver from her bag
then changed her clothes, and went to the bathroom, and he fell asleep (tsn, November 16, 1992, pp. 2128).

During the trial of the case, it was duly established that the only persons residing at No. 2 Tramo Street,
Camella Homes, Phase III, Pamplona, Las Pias, were the Mendozas, namely, accused-appellant
Octavio, his daughter Charmaine, and his now deceased wife Cecilia. On the night Cecilia was shot to
death, no one was there except these three person. Accused-appellant struggled to persuade the trial
court of his innocence by denying that the killed his wife, insinuating that another person is the killer.
This stance of denial is negative self-serving evidence which deserves no evidentiary weight (People v.
Gondora, 265 SCRA 408 [1996]). The insinuation of accused-appellant that some convenient intruder
perpetrated the killing is absolutely without basis and unsubstantiated. It is plainly an afterthought, a
devised plot to escape just punishment. In fact, accused-appellant even refused to give any statement or
comment to the police investigators to enlighten them about the shooting incident. If indeed, Cecilia
was shot and killed by somebody else as claimed by accused-appellant, it would surely have been but
natural for him, as a husband to cooperate with police authorities for the speedy apprehension of the
gunman, by informing them immediately of the alleged intruder-killer. But he did not and instead, he
took the advice of his relative, Fiscal Castillo, to keep silent about the incident when the police
conducted the investigation, which is rather odd if he really were innocent. Verily it was only on
November 16, 1992, or 2 years after the incident that he came out with the story about the handy
intruder. He kept silent for two long years.

Thereafter, accused-appellant declared, he was suddenly awakened by an unusual sound or shot outside
their room. When he went out, he saw his wife wounded and bleeding, and he felt and heard somebody
run from the backdoor of their house which banged. Consequently, he ran outside and pursued the
intruder who ran from the backdoor, but accused-appellant claimed that he only went up to their gate
because of his concern over his wife's condition.
When he went back, he woke up Charmaine, and seeing the condition of Cecilia, both of them cried.
After a while, he called up his brother-in-law, policeman Antonio Gabac (tsn, November 16, 1992, p.
32, p. 34, p. 37) and the two of them then brought Cecilia to the hospital.
In the hospital, some police investigators from the Las Pias Police Station asked accused-appellant
about the incident, but he refused to comment. He was later invited to the police station for
investigation, but due to the advice of his relative, Fiscal Castillo, he never gave any statement to the
police about the incident.
Accused-appellant denied the charges against him. While he admitted having been married to Cecilia on
February 28, 1976, he claimed that his wife was killed by somebody else. Further, even as he denied
possession of a .38 caliber revolver, he admitted to have been authorized to carry a .45 caliber between
the years 1968 and 1969 (tsn, November 16, 1992, pp. 7 and 68).
Accused-appellant swore that he had no reason to kill his wife because he loved her. However, he
admitted to have sired children by another woman (tsn, November 16, 1992, p. 51).
The trial court did not give credence and weight to the defense's theory that the victim was engaged in
illegal activities which supposedly led to her death. Rather, the trial court found that accused-appellant
had the opportunity and the propensity to commit the crime (pp. 66-67, Rollo).
Accordingly, although the evidence was partly circumstantial, the trial court made a pronouncement that
all elements which were needed to arrive at a conclusion that accused-appellant killed his wife were
present and that no proof had been established by him to overturn its findings (p. 67, ibid.).

Accused-appellant strives to persuade us that the trial court erred in giving full credence to the
testimony of his father-in-law, Alipio Eusebio, and his own daughter, Charmaine Mendoza. But having
been in a better position to observe the witnesses, the trial court's appreciation of their testimony,
truthfulness, honesty, and candor, deserves the highest respect (People vs. Del Prado, 253 SCRA 731
[1996]).
As established by the prosecution, and this is admitted by accused-appellant, even before he and his
family went to the birthday party of his relative, he and the victim had already several occasions of
altercation. Such fact was shown when accused-appellant left his wife and daughter at the party without
informing them where he would be. The victim's father, Alipio Eusebio, attested to the fact that accusedappellant and his daughter, Cecilia, had been quarrelling. Accused-appellant suspected that Cecilia was
having an illicit relationship with another man. He contends that Alipio is not a credible witness for the
prosecution in view of his relationship with the victim and that Alipio resents him on account of his
having children with another woman.
It is basic precept that relationship per se of a witness with the victim does not necessarily mean he is
biased. The Court finds improbable and contrary to human experience accused-appellant's claim that
Alipio testified for no other purpose but revenge. It was not shown that Alipio was actuated by improper
motive, thus, his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.
The testimony of Charmaine that she saw accused-appellant, her father, hide a gun under his bed, leads
us to believe that accused-appellant killed his own wife. Accused-appellant cannot escape criminal

liability on his theory that when Charmaine testified for the prosecution, her testimony did not appear to
be a naturally spontaneous narration, but rather evidently a coached one. According to him, this theory
was bolstered when she cried and suddenly, embraced accused-appellant in public view.
On the contrary, the fact that Charmaine cried during her testimony is mute evidence of her credibility,
this, being in accord with human behavior and nature. It must have been a most traumatic and painful
experience for her, at a very tender age, to testify in court against her own father whom she loves and
respects as shown by the act of embracing him.
Accused-appellant virtually banks, for acquittal, on Charmaine's retraction. But the trial court correctly
disregarded the same. The first time Charmaine took the witness stand was in December, 1988, barely a
month after her mother's death. Her recantation was made two years later when she was already in the
custody of accused-appellant who was allowed to go out on bail. Charmaine's first testimony was to the
effect that she saw her father, accused-appellant, hiding a gun under the bed, and her subsequent
testimony was that she saw no such act. Such contradictory statements should not discredit Charmaine
as a witness. The present rule is that testimony of a witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in
part, depending upon the corroborative evidence and probabilities and improbabilities of the case
(People vs. Cura, 240 SCRA 234 [1995]). Moreover, mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not
necessarily vitiate the original testimony. Testimony solemnly given in court should not be set aside and
disregarded lightly, and before this can be done, both the previous testimony and the subsequent one
should be carefully compared and juxtaposed, the circumstances under which each was made carefully
and keenly scrutinized, and the reasons or motives for the change discriminalingly analyzed (Molina v.
People, 259 SCRA 138 [1996]).
The trial court believed that the testimony given by Charmaine for the defense did not alter her former
testimony for the prosecution. The second declaration was received with caution, and it did not
impressed the trial court. Neither are we persuaded to hold otherwise for it must be borne in mind that
Charmaine was living with and defendent upon her father, accused-appellant, at the time she gave her
second declaration.
Another fact which militates against accused-appellant's denial that he killed his wife is that the palaffin
test conducted on him yielded positive results. Notably, this test was conducted a day after the shooting
incident.
Accused-appellant also denied having and possessed the .38 colt revolver with Serial Number 41001,
the fatal weapon, and even implied that the, gun belongs to the victim. According to accused-appellant,
there had been a dispute between him and his wife over the unlicensed .38 caliber gun which his wife
carried wherever she went, and not about the fact that his wife was having an illicit relationship with
another man.
But this claim is belied by the overwhelming evidence pointing to accussed-appellant as the possessor
of the fatal weapon. Charmaine testified thal the fatal gun, when exhibited in court, was the gun she saw
on the night her mother was not shot. And weeks earlier, she said, it was the same gun which she saw
with his father. Defense witness, Antonio Gabac, when asked by the Las Pias police investigators to
surrender the gun, claimed that the same was surrendered to him by accused-appellant shortly after the
shooting incident. The possession of the fatal gun by accused-appellant is further established by the
memorandum receipt signed by accused-appellant himself and a mission order authorizing him to carry
the said weapon (p. 66, Rollo). But accused-appellant claims that these documents were illegally

procured in grave violation of his constitutional right to privacy of communication and papers, and/or
his right against unreasonable search and seizure (p. 154, ibid.).
The Solicitor General is correct in explaining that such rights applies as a restraint directed only against
the government and its agencies. The case in piont is People vs. Marti (193 SCRA 57 [1991]) where this
Court had the occasion to rule that the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures refers to the immunity of one's person from interference by government and it cannot be
extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful
intrusion.
In the instant case, the memorandum receipt and mission order were discovered by accused-appellant's
father-in-law Alipio Eusebio, a private citizen. Certainly, a search warrant is dispensable.
Finally, contrary to accused-appellant's claim that he was licensed and authorized to carry a .45 caliber
pistol, the certification of Captain Abraham Garcillano, Chief, Records, Legal and Research Branch of
the Firearm and Explosive Unit, dated December 29, 1989, shows that accused-appellant is not a
licensed fiream holder of any kind (p. 69, Rollo).
While admittedly there is no direct evidence presented by the prosecution on the killing of Cecilia by
accused-appellant, the establishment abovestated, however, constitute an unbroken chain, consistent
with each other and with the hypotheses that accused-appellant is guilty, to the exclusion of all other
hypotheses that he is not. And when circumstancial evidence constitutes an unbroken chain of natural
and rational circumstances corroborating each other, it cannot be overcome by inconcrete and doubtful
evidence submitted by the accused (People vs. Verano, 264 SCRA 546 [1996]). The unbelievable story
of accused-appellant that the killing was perpetrated by the "smuggling syndicate's man" is all too
plainly a mere concoction of accused-appellant designed to exculpate himself from criminal liability.
Although the prosecution duly established that the crime of illegal possession of firearm under
Presidential Decree No. 1866 was committed, fortunately for accussed-appellant, Republic Act No 8294
which took effect on July 7, 1997 amended the said decree and the law now merely considers the use of
an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, and not as a separate
offense (People vs. Molina, G.R. No. 115835-36, July 22, 1998 ).
Withal, accused-apppellant may be held liable only for parricide with the special aggravating
circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm. This notwitastanding, that is, despite the presence of such
aggravating circumstance, the penalty imposed for the crime of parricide which is reclusion perpetua,
may no longer be increased. The death penalty cannot be imposed upon accused-appellant since the
killing occurred in November, 1988, when the imposition of the capital penalty was still proscribed.
WHEREFORE, except as above modified, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, without special
pronouncement as to costs.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 119005 December 2, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SABAS RAQUEL, VALERIANO RAQUEL and AMADO PONCE, accused.

Amado Ponce revealed to P/Sgt. Andal S. Pangato that appellants Sabas and Valeriano Raquel were the
perpetrators of the crime and that they may be found in their residence. However, the police failed to
find them there since appellants fled immediately after the shooting incident. (pp. 12-14, ibid.)

SABAS RAQUEL and VALERIANO RAQUEL, accused-appellants.

Appellants were later on apprehended on different occasions. (pp. 5-6, TSN, April 2, 1991) 4
Upon the other hand, appellants relied on alibi as their defense, on the bases of facts which are
presented in their brief in this wise:

REGALADO, J.:p
The court a quo found herein accused-appellants Sabas Raquel and Valeriano Raquel, as well as accused
Amado Ponce, guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide and sentenced them to suffer the penalty
ofreclusion perpetua, to pay the heirs of Agapito Gambalan, Jr. the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for
his death, and the amount of P1,500.00 representing the value of the stolen revolver. 1 The Raquel
brothers now plead for their absolution in this appellate review.

Accused Valeriano Raquel testified that on July 2, 1986, with the permission of his parents he left
Paatan, Kabacan, Cotabato and went to Tunggol Pagalungan, Maguindanao. He stayed in the house of
his sister-in-law, the wife of his deceased brother. Together with Boy Madriaga and Corazon Corpuz, he
harvested palay on July 3 and 4. On July 5, while he was still asle(ep), police authorities accompanied
by his father arrested him and brought him to the municipal jail of Kabacan, Cotabato. He already heard
the name of accused Amado Ponce, to be an owner of a parcel of land in Paatan.

In an information dated August 27, 1986, the aforementioned accused were indicted for robbery with
homicide before the Regional Trial Court of Kabacan, Cotabato, Branch 16, 2 allegedly committed on
July 4, 1986 in Barangay Osias of the Municipality of Kabacan.

On cross-examination, he admitted that their house and that of Gambalan are located in the same
Barangay. Before July 4, he entertained no grudge against victim Agapito Gambalan. (TSN, April 2,
1991, pp. 2-20).

Upon arraignment thereafter, all the accused pleaded not guilty. While trial was in progress, however,
and before he could give his testimony, accused Amado Ponce escaped from jail. 3

Antonio Raquel, 64 years old, testified that on July 2, 1986 he was at home when his son Valeriano
Raquel told him that he was going to Tungol, Pagalungan, Maguindanao to harvest palay. On (the) same
date, his other son, Sabas Raquel, also asked his permission to leave since the latter, a soldier, was going
to his place of assignment at Pagadian. On July 5, 1986, several policemen came over to his house,
looking for his two (2) sons. He gave them pictures of his sons and even accompanied them to Tungol
where they arrested his son Valeriano. (TSN, April 3, 1991, pp. 3-26).

The factual antecedents of the case for the People, as borne out by the evidence of record and with page
references to the transcripts of the court hearings, are summarized by the Solicitor General in the
appellee's brief:
At midnight of July 4, 1986, tragedy visited the peaceful lives of spouses Juliet and Agapito Gambalan,
Jr. Thinking of a neighbor in need, Agapito attended to the person knocking at the backdoor of their
kitchen. Much to his surprise, heavily armed men emerged at the door, declared a hold-up and fired their
guns at him. (pp. 4-6, TSN, January 25, 1988)
Juliet went out of their room after hearing gunshots and saw her husband's lifeless (sic) while a man
took her husband's gun and left hurriedly. (p. 7, ibid.)
She shouted for help at their window and saw a man fall beside their water pump while two (2) other
men ran away. (p. 9, ibid.)
George Jovillano responded to Juliet's plea for help. He reported the incident to the police. The police
came and found one of the perpetrators of the crime wounded and lying at about 8 meters from the
victim's house. He was identified as Amado Ponce. (pp. 5-7, TSN, October 21, 1987; pp. 8-9, TSN,
March 21, 1988)
Amado Ponce was first treated at a clinic before he was brought to the police station. (p. 27, ibid.)

T/Sgt. Natalio Zafra, of the 102 Brigade, Aurora, Zamboanga, testified that on July 4, 1986, he was
assigned in the 2nd Infantry Battalion, First Infantry Division, Maria Cristina, Iligan City. Sabas Raquel
was under his division then, and was on duty on July 4, 1986. (TSN, Nov. 6, 1992, pp. 2-20). 5
On August 10, 1993, the trial court, as stated at the outset, rendered judgment finding all of the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentenced them accordingly. 6
Not satisfied therewith, herein appellants filed a notice of appeal wherein they manifested that they
were appealing the decision to the Court of Appeals. 7 The lower court ordered the transmittal of the
records of the case to the Court of Appeals. 8 In view of the penalty imposed, the Court of Appeals
properly forwarded the same to us. 9
Before us, the defense submits a lone assignment of error, i.e., that the trial court erred in convicting
accused Sabas Raquel and Valeriano Raquel of the crime charged, despite absence of evidence
positively implicating them as the perpetrators of the crime.
We find such submission to be meritorious. A careful review and objective appraisal of the evidence
convinces us that the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the real identities of the
perpetrators of, much less the participation of herein appellants in, the crime charged.

The lone eyewitness, Juliet Gambalan, was not able to identify the assailants of her husband. In her
testimony on direct examination in court she declared as follows:

Q: You only saw this Amado Ponce when (h)e was presented to you by the police, is that right?
A: Yes, sir. 11

Q: You said you shouted right after the incident and pip (sic) at the window, did you see any when you
pip (sic) at the window?
A; Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: You testified in direct testimony you pip (sic) in jalousie after you shouted for help and you saw two
(2) person(s) running, is that right?

Q: What did you see if you were able to see anything?

A: Yes, sir.
A: I saw a person who fel(l) down beside the water pump and I saw again two (2) persons who were
running away, sir.
Q: Were you able to identify this persons who fel(l) down near the jetmatic pump and two (2) persons
running away?
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Now, you said somebody fel(l) down near the jetmatic pump, who is this person?
A: I do not know sir. I have known that he was Amado Ponce when the Police arrived. 10(emphasis
ours.)
On cross-examination she further testified:
Q: For the first time when you shouted for help, where were you?
A: I was at the Veranda sir and I started shouting while going to our room.
Q: In fact you have no way (of) identifying that one person who was mask(ed) and got the gun of your
husband because he was mask(ed), is that not right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In fact, you saw only this one person got inside to your house and got this gun?

Q: Now, you saw these persons running on the road, is that not right?
A: I saw them running sir going around.
Q: These two (2) persons were running going around?
A: They were running towards the road.
ATTY. DIVINO:
Going to the road.
Q: And you cannot identify these two (2) persons running towards the road?
A: No, sir. 12 (Emphases supplied.)
Even the corroborating witness, George Jovillano, in his testimony made no mention of who shot
Agapito Gambalan. In fact, in his sworn statement executed in the Investigation Section of the Kabacan
Police Station on July 5, 1986, he declared that:
19Q: By the way, when you saw three persons passing about 5 meters away from where you were then
drinking, what have you noticed about them, if you ever noticed any?

Q: And this Amado Ponce cannot be the person who have got this gun inside?

A: I noticed that one of the men ha(d) long firearm which was partly covered by a maong jacket. The
other one wore a hat locally known as "kipis" meaning a hat made of cloth with leaves protruding above
the forehead and seemed to be holding something which I failed to recognize. The other one wore a
shortpant with a somewhat white T-shirt with markings and there was a white T-shirt covering his head
and a part of his face as he was head-down during that time.

FISCAL DIZON:

20Q: Did you recognized any of these men?

Already answered.

A: No. Because they walked fast. 13 (Emphasis supplied.)

She was not able to identify, your Honor.

A thorough review of the records of this case readily revealed that the identification of herein appellants
as the culprits was based chiefly on the extrajudicial statement of accused Amado Ponce pointing to

A: Yes, sir.

them as his co-perpetrators of the crime. As earlier stated, the said accused escaped from jail before he
could testify in court and he has been at large since then.

Q: Don't you know that under the case of PP vs. Galit; the accused should be (re)presented by counsel
that is the ruling of the Supreme Court?

The extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused may not be utilized against the
latter, unless these are repeated in open court. If the accused never had the opportunity to cross-examine
his co-accused on the latter's extrajudicial statements, it is elementary that the same are hearsay as
against said accused. 14 That is exactly the situation, and the disadvantaged plight of appellants, in the
case at bar.

A: I do not know if it is actually the same as this case.

Extreme caution should be exercised by the courts in dealing with the confession of an accused which
implicates his co-accused. A distinction, obviously, should be made between extrajudicial and judicial
confessions. The former deprives the other accused of the opportunity to cross-examine the confessant,
while in the latter his confession is thrown wide open for cross-examination and rebuttal. 15
The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another. An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not
admissible against his co-accused. The reason for the rule is that, on a principle of good faith and
mutual convenience, a man's own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are
his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust,
that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be
bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him. 16
Although the above-stated rule admits of certain jurisprudential exceptions, 17 those exceptions do not
however apply to the present case.
Firstly, except for that extrajudicial statement of accused Amado Ponce, there exists no evidence
whatsoever linking appellants to the crime. In fact, the testimony of police Sgt. Andal S. Pangato that
appellant Sabas Raquel was wounded and went to the clinic of Dr. Anulao for treatment using the name
Dante Clemente, 18 was negated by Dr. Anulao himself who testified that he treated no person by the
name of Danny Clemente. 19
Secondly, this extrajudicial statement, ironically relied upon as prosecution evidence, was made in
violation of the constitutional rights of accused Amado Ponce. This was unwittingly admitted in the
testimony of the same Sgt. Andal S. Pangato who was the chief of the intelligence and investigation
section of their police station:
Q: During the investigation did you inform him (of) his constitutional right while on the process of
investigation?

Q: But it is a fact that you did not even inform him (of) his right?
A: No sir.
Q: At the time when you asked him he has no counsel.
A: No counsel, Sir. 20
Extrajudicial statements made during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel are
inadmissible and cannot be considered in the adjudication of the case. While the right to counsel may be
waived, such waiver must be made with the assistance of counsel. 21 These rights, both constitutional
and statutory in source and foundation, were never observed.
A conviction in a criminal case must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of guilt. 22 Without the
positive identification of appellants, the evidence of the prosecution is not sufficient to overcome the
presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights to them. 23 While admittedly the alibi of
appellants may be assailable, the evidence of the prosecution is probatively low in substance and
evidentiarily barred in part. The prosecution cannot use the weakness of the defense to enhance its case;
it must rely on the strength of its own evidence. In fact, alibi need not be inquired into where the
prosecution's evidence is weak. 24
It would not even have been necessary to stress that every reasonable doubt in criminal cases must be
resolved in favor of the accused. The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt calls for moral
certainty of guilt. In the instant case, the test of moral certainty was neither met nor were the standards
therefor fulfilled.
WHEREFORE, on reasonable doubt, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and accused-appellants
Sabas Raquel and Valeriano Raquel are hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged, with costs de
oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 111285

A: No sir, because my purpose was only to get the information from him . . . And after that I checked
the information that he gave.
Q: Of course, you know very well that the accused should be assisted by counsel?
A: What I know is if when a person is under investigation you have in mind to investigate as to against
(sic) him, and you have to inform his constitutional right but if the purpose is to interrogate him to
acquire information which will lead to the identity of the other accused we do not need to inform him.

January 24, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
VICENTE VALLA1, accused-appellant.
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the decision dated March 29, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Gumaca, Quezon,
Branch 62, convicting appellant of the crime of rape with homicide, imposing upon him the penalty

of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as
indemnity and P30,000.00 as actual and moral damages.
Appellant was 28 years old, married, cousin of the victim, and resident of Barangay Tayuman, San
Francisco, Quezon, at the time of incident. The victim was an eight (8) year-old girl, Dyesebel "Gigi" de
la Cruz, who was reported missing and the following day found raped and strangled to death near the
riverbank of the Tayuman river in Quezon province.
The facts, as summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General, which we find to be supported by the
records, are as follows:
1. On April 14, 1991, at around nine o'clock in the morning, Myra Pines, a twelve-year old girl, was
passing by the ricefield near the road located at Barangay Ilayang Tayuman in the Municipality of San
Francisco, Quezon Province. She was carrying bananas on her way to the crossing in said municipality.
(pp. 3-6, Pines, February 5, 1991).
2. As she passed by the ricefield, she heard a voice coming from the direction of the forested area of the
place and it seemed to her that someone was being strangled. Listening closely, she recognized the voice
as belonging to her friend and playmate, Dyesebel de la Cruz, an eight-year old girl. Frightened at the
thought that Dyesebel was being strangled, Myra scampered and proceeded to the crossing where she
was originally headed for. After discharging her bananas at the crossing, she went home. (pp. 5-6, tsn,
Pines, February 5, 1991).
3. Later that day, at around four o'clock in the afternoon, Barangay Captain Aristeo Allarey of Barangay
Ilayang Tayuman was visited in his house by Mila de la Cruz, Dyesebel's mother, who reported that her
daughter was missing. Allarey sought the assistance of his constituents and organized a search party
composed of the members of the Sangguniang Barangay, a Barangay Tanod, Dyesebel's father Gonzalo
dela Cruz, and other residents of the barangay. Prosecution witnesses Bayani Samadan, a Kagawad of
the Sangguniang Barangay and Reynaldo Merle, a "barangay tanod," were among the searchers (pp. 1013, tsn, Allarey, February 5, 1991; p. 24, tsn, De la Cruz, February 5, 1991; pp. 6-7, tsn, Merle, July 18,
1991; pp. 4-7, tsn, Samadan, September 17, 1991).
4. Barangay Captain Allarey learned from Gonzalo de la Cruz that, earlier, Dyesebel was in the
company of accused-appellant Vicente Valla, and that both of them were tasked to watch the ricefield.
They went to the ricefield but appellant was not there. Allarey learned from a barangay tanod that
appellant was drinking liquor in the house of a friend within the same barangay. He summoned
appellant but the latter failed to immediately report to him. (pp. 14-15, and 20, tsn, Allarey, February 5,
1991).1wphi1.nt
5. That afternoon, Allarey and his party started their search but they had to stop at around 6:30 in the
evening since it was already dark. The following day, they continued their search for Dyesebel, (p. 12,
tsn, Allarey, February 5, 1991; pp. 7-8, tsn, Merle, July 18, 1991).
6. While Allarey, De la Cruz and the rest of their companions were searching for Dyesebel, they were
joined by appellant who trailed behind them. Earlier, appellant spoke to Allarey and told him that he
knew nothing about Dyesebel's whereabouts. (pp. 15-16, tsn, Allarey, February 5, 1991; p. 24, tsn, De la
Cruz, February 5, 1991; p. 13, tsn, Merle, July 18, 1991; pp. 8-9, tsn, Samadan, September 17, 1991).

7. At around 11:00 o'clock in the morning of that day, they finally found Dyesebel. Her body was found
near the river with her neck blackened and her vagina bloodied. She was still wearing her dress but her
panty had been pulled down to her mid-thigh. (pp. 13-14, tsn, Allarey, February 5, 1991; p. 23, tsn, De
la Cruz, February 5, 1991; pp. 8-9, tsn, Merle, July 18, 1991; pp. 7-8, tsn, Samadan, September 17,
1991).
8. Allarey and his companions immediately confronted appellant who, out of remorse, admitted that he
raped and killed Dyesebel. Thereafter, he addressed Dyesebel's father, in the presence of Allarey and
company, offering his own daughter in payment of Dyesebel's life which he took and begged for
forgiveness. De la Cruz told appellant that he cannot accept appellant's daughter and, thereafter, tried to
unsheath his bolo. But before De la Cruz could attack appellant, he was held back by the people around
him. Appellant was ordered arrested by Allarey. (pp. 16-17 and 21, tsn, Allarey, February 5, 1991; pp.
24-26 and 28, tsn, De la Cruz, February 5, 1991; pp. 11 and 18, tsn, Merle, July 18, 1991; pp. 9-11 and
13-14, tsn, Samadan, September 17, 1991).
9. That same day, at around one o'clock in the afternoon, Allarey, accompanied by Samadan, Merle, De
la Cruz, and one Abelardo Rego, brought appellant to the police headquarters in San Francisco, Quezon.
(pp. 5-6, tsn, Rosales, November 6, 1991; p. 17, tsn, Allarey, February 5, 1991).
10. Dyesebel's body was brought to the Bondoc Peninsula District Hospital in Catanauan, Quezon,
where an autopsy was performed. Dyesebel's skull bore a depression on the left temporal area which
resulted from being struck with a hard object. Her pubic area bore blisters brought about by a contact
with a lighted cigarette. Her hymen bore several lacerations indicative of repeated rape before and
possibly, after she was killed. (pp. 4-6, tsn, Madatu, January 14, 1992). 2
On August 14, 1990, appellant was charged with the crime of "rape with murder" under the following
Information:3
The undersigned upon complaint originally filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San
Francisco-San Andres, by Gonzalo de la Cruz, father of the offended party Dyesebel de la Cruz, accuses
Vicente Valla (prisoner, (sic) of the crime of rape with murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 14th day of April 1990, at Barangay Ilayang Tayuman, in the Municipality of San
Francisco, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused with lewd design, by means of force and violence, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one Dyesebel de la Cruz, a minor, 8 years of age,
against her will; that by reason, and on the occasion of said rape, the said accused with intent to kill and
with treachery and taking advantage of his superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and employ violence against said Dyesebel de la Cruz, thereby inflicting
upon the latter injuries on vital parts of her body, which directly caused her death.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment, appellant, duly assisted by counsel de oficio Atty. Ronaldo Salamillas, entered a plea
of not guilty to the crime charged.4 Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Myra Pines, the victim's 12 year-old playmate,
who heard the victim's cries as she was being strangled, but became afraid and went home instead; (2)

Aristeo Allarey, the Barangay Captain of Ilayang, Tayuman, San Francisco, Quezon, who organized a
search party upon report of the mother that her daughter was missing, and before whom, appellant
admitted that he raped and killed the victim, and even offered his (appellant's) daughter in return; (3)
Gonzalo de la Cruz, father of the victim, who took part in the search party, and who witnessed
appellant's confession to the commission of the crime; (4) Reynaldo Merle, Barangay Tanod of
Barangay Ilayang, Tayuman, San Francisco, Quezon, another member of the search party; (5) Bayani
Samadan, Kagawad of the Barangay, also a member of the search party; (6) Rodolfo Rosales, police
investigator of San Francisco, Quezon, Philippine National Police; (7) Dr. Araceli R. Madatu, Senior
Resident Physician of Bondoc Peninsula District Hospital, Catanauan, Quezon, who testified that when
the cadaver was brought for examination, it was in cadaveric rigidity, the legs were spread like a woman
about to give birth ("parang nanganganak"), the tongue sticking out ("nakalawit"), the skull crushed
("basag"), and the pubic area had blisters resulting from cigarette burns, ("pinagpapaso ng sigarilyo"),
and the vagina had a laceration up to the anus, evidencing that the child was raped. 5
In addition to the oral evidence, the prosecution offered as documentary evidence the sworn statements
of Barangay Captain Aristeo Allarey and Gonzalo de la Cruz, the Criminal Complaints filed with the
Municipal Trial Court of San Francisco, San Andres, Quezon, and the Medico-legal Certificate signed
by Dr. Madatu.
On the other hand, the defense presented as its witnesses (1) appellant himself who bluntly denied any
participation in the rape/killing of the victim, or that he made any confessions to the barangay captain;
he interposed the defense of alibi that at the time of the alleged rape/killing, he was at his house in
Barangay Ilayang Tayuman, San Francisco, Quezon together with his wife, their child and his brother,
caring for his sick child,6 and (2) his father Emilio Valla, who corroborated his story.7 The defense
offered no documentary evidence.
On March 29, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision 8 finding appellant guilty of the crime of "rape
with homicide," the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the fact that the government has proved beyond an iota of a doubt
that the accused is guilty, sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
Further the accused is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the late Dyesebel de la Cruz the sum of
P50,000.00 for her death and P30,000.00 for actual and moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the present appeal. Appellant assigns the following errors: 9
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE
CONFLICTING AND IMPROBABLE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT DESPITE INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
In his brief, appellant claims that the testimony of prosecution witness Allarey was inconsistent since on
direct examination, Allarey narrated that when he summoned appellant, the latter did not immediately

appear,10 but on cross-examination, he said that appellant immediately reported to him. 11 Appellant also
contends that Merle's testimony that appellant was "tulala" at the time he confessed to the commission
of the crime12 was inconsistent with appellant's alleged begging for forgiveness far the crime. 13 Further,
appellant adds that his statement offering to exchange his own daughter for the victim was made
because of compulsion from the crowd. Appellant further insists that his alibi should be given due
consideration since the prosecution failed to overturn his alibi which was duly corroborated by the
testimony of his father.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, recommends affirmance of the judgment in toto.
The OSG contends that the alleged inconsistencies, assuming them to be so, are too minor and
insignificant to destroy the credibility of said prosecution witnesses, particularly where the testimonies
of all the prosecution witnesses are consistent and compatible with each other on material points. Anent
the defense of alibi, the OSG points out that appellant's house is located within the same barangay
where the incident took place, therefore there is no physical impossibility regarding his commission of
the crime.
In sum, the crucial issue centers on the assessment of credibility of the witnesses. In this case, the trial
court gave full faith and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. We find no reason to
disturb this finding. As consistently held by the Court, the trial judge's evaluation of the testimony of a
witness is generally accorded not only the highest aspect, but also finality, unless some weighty
circumstance has been ignored or misunderstood but which could change the result. Having had the
direct opportunity to observe the witness on the stand, the trial judge was in a vantage position to assess
his
demeanor,
and
determine
if
he
was
telling
the
truth
or
not.14
The alleged inconsistency in the testimony of Allarey as to whether appellant immediately reported to
him after being summoned, and in the testimony of Merle that appellant was "tulala" at the time he
admitted responsibility for the crime, merely refer to minor details which do not in actuality touch upon
the "whys" and "wherefores" of the crime committed. 15 Inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses
when referring only to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of their
declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony. Although there may be inconsistencies on
minor details, the same do not impair the credibility of the witnesses where there is consistency in
relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailants. 16 In fact, some minor
inconsistencies could show that the witness was not previously coached so as to tailor his testimony, and
thus they serve as badges of credibility.
Further, the prosecution witnesses, particularly the barangay officials, had no motive to falsely testify
against appellant, who is their townmate, nor did they have any reason to impute such a heinous crime
against appellant if it were not true. Appellant's claim that he was implicated in the crime "because he
did not immediately accomplish the cutting of the grass in the ricefield" 17 is too preposterous to even
merit consideration.
More importantly, the declaration of appellant acknowledging his guilt of the offense may be given in
evidence against him under Section 33 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. Note that his
extrajudicial confession is corroborated by the corpus delicti as required by Section 3 of Rule 133. The
Rules do not require that all the elements of the crime must be clearly established by evidence
independent of the confession. Corpus delicti only means that there should be some concrete evidence
tending to show the commission of the crime apart from the confession. In this case, the fact of the
crime was sufficiently proven through the testimonies by witnesses such as Myra Pines, who heard the

cries of the victim, and the other members of the search party who found the body of the victim, and
witnessed the confession of the appellant, as well as documentary evidence presented during trial such
as the medico-legal certificate (Exhibit "D") attesting that the victim had been raped and killed.
The statement of the accused asking for forgiveness and even offering his own daughter in exchange for
his crime18 may also be regarded as part of the res gestae under Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. Res gestae means "things done".19 There are three requisites to admit evidence as part of the res
gestae: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence, in this case the discovery of
the body of the victim; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or
devise a falsehood, in this case, appellant had begged for forgiveness immediately after the body was
found; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending
circumstances, in this case, appellant had admitted to raping and killing the victim, and even "offered"
his daughter in exchange for the victim.20
Appellant's defense of denial and alibi is likewise riddled with glaring inconsistencies. During his
testimony, he claimed that on the night of the incident, he was at home with his wife and brother, taking
care of his sick child, and emphatically declared that nobody else was with them. 21 However, appellant's
father testified that he was also with appellant at the time of the incident, creating a doubt regarding his
alibi. Although appellant's father initially denied knowing the victim, he later admitted that he knew her
as the daughter of Gonzalo de la Cruz. 22 Evidently, appellant's defense was fabricated in a desperate
attempt to exculpate him.
As to the crime committed, the trial court correctly convicted appellant of the special complex crime of
"rape with homicide," and not "rape with murder" as designated in the Information, since "homicide" is
herein taken in its generic sense.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Gumaca, Quezon, Branch 62 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant VICENTE VALLA is hereby sentenced to reclusion
perpetua and ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs against
appellant.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 110290 January 25, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JAIME "JIMMY" AGUSTIN, WILFREDO "SONNY QUIAO, MANUEL "JUN" ABENOJA,
JR., and FREDDIE "BOY" CARTEL, accused. JAIME "JIMMY" AGUSTIN, accused-appellant.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In five separate informations filed on 22 May 1987 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3,
Baguio City, the accused were charged with murder in Criminal Cases Nos. 4647-R and 4648-R, with
frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 4649-R, and with attempted murder in Criminal Cases Nos.
4650-R and 4651-R. The crimes were allegedly committed on 6 September 1986 in Baguio City and
resulted in the deaths of Dr. Napoleon Bayquen and Anna Theresa Francisco and the wounding of
Anthony Bayquen, Dominic Bayquen, and Danny Ancheta.

The aggravating circumstance of ignominy under Article 14, No. 17 of the Revised Penal Code should
be appreciated considering that the medico-legal officer testified that the pubic area of the victim bore
blisters brought about by a contact with a lighted cigarette. This circumstance added disgrace and
obloquy to the material injury inflicted upon the victim of the crime. 23

The informations in the murder cases charged that the accused acted in conspiracy and alleged the
presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the ordinary aggravating circumstances of
evident premeditation and price. 1

At the time of the commission of the crime, Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code imposed the penalty of
death when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed. However, the 1987
Constitution suspended the imposition of death penalty, and therefore, the trial court correctly imposed
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Only the appellant and Wilfredo Quiao were arrested. However, before Quiao could be arraigned, he
escaped on 12 July 1987 while under the custody of the Philippine Constabulary/PNP Regional
Command I at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet. 2 The cases, which were consolidated and jointly
tried, proceeded only against the appellant.

As to the amount of damages, however, the trial court erred in awarding P50,000.00 only as indemnity
and P30,000.00 for actual and moral damages. Hence, correction is called for. This being a case of rape
with homicide, civil indemnity in the amount of P100,000.00 should be awarded, pursuant to current
jurisprudence.24Moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 should also be awarded to the heirs of the
victim, without need of further proof. 25 In view of the attendance of one aggravating circumstance,
exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00 should likewise be awarded, pursuant to Article 2230
of the New Civil Code. But the award of actual damages cannot be allowed for lack of supporting
evidence.

After the appellant pleaded not guilty at his arraignment on 4 September 1987, trial on the merits was
held on various dates from 11 May 1988 until 10 January 1990.
On 30 May 1990, the trial court promulgated its decision 3 in the consolidated cases acquitting the
appellant in Criminal Case No. 4649-R (frustrated murder) and Criminal Cases Nos. 4650-R and 4651R (attempted murder) for insufficiency of evidence but convicting him in the two murder cases,
Criminal Cases Nos. 4647-R and 4648-R, with treachery as the qualifying circumstance. 4 It also ruled
that the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and price had been duly established. It then
sentenced the appellant as follows:
Upon these premises, the accused Jaime Agustin is found GUILTY of two (2) counts of murder, the
prosecution having proven his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In each of the criminal cases aforesaid, he
should be sentenced to the maximum penalty of Death, there being two aggravating circumstances.

However, since the death penalty is not imposable at this time, the accused is sentenced to Reclusion
Perpetua. He is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victims; Anna Theresa Francisco the sum
of sixty Three Thousand Pesos (P63,000.00) as actual damages (Exhibits "F," "I" and "G"); and Dr.
Napoleon Bayquen, the sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00). With costs against the accused,
Jaime Agustin.
SO ORDERED. 5
The version of the prosecution is based on the testimonies of (1) Isidoro Magpantay, a member of the
Baguio City Police Force, who identified the initial report (Exhibit "A"); (2) Christie Napeas, a
stenographic reporter in the Office of the City Fiscal of Baguio City, who took down the stenographic
notes of City Fiscal Erdolfo Balajadia's investigations of accused Wilfredo Quiao (Exhibit "D") on 30
January 1987 and of the appellant on 10 February 1987, and who identified her stenographic notes
containing the statement of the appellant (Exhibit "B") and the transcript of said stenographic notes
(Exhibit "C"); (3) Dominic Bayquen, the victim in Criminal Case No. 4650-R, who testified on how
they were shot; (5) Eulogio Francisco, the father of Anna Theresa Francisco, who identified her death
certificate (Exhibit "I") and testified on the list of expenses (Exhibit "G"); (6) Rogelio Mumar, a
supervising ballistics expert, who declared that the fourteen shell recovered from the scene of the crime
were not fired from any of the three armalite rifles submitted to him; (7) Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom, who
testified that he was the lawyer who assisted the appellant and accused Wilfredo Quiao while they
were being investigated by City Fiscal Balajadia; and (8) Lilian San Luis Bayquen, wife of Dr.
Napoleon Bayquen and mother of Dominic Bayquen, who testified on what she did after Dominic
informed her by telephone about the shooting incident.
The evidence for the prosecution established the following facts. At past 7:30 p.m. of 6 September 1986
in Baguio City, Dr. Napoleon Bayquen, a dentist, together with his son, Anthony; Anthony's girlfriend,
Anna Theresa Francisco; his daughter, Dominic; and Danny Ancheta, a family friend, were on their way
aboard their Brasilia to the doctor's residence at Trancoville at 21-D Malvar Street, Baguio City, from
his driving the car. While they were cruising along Malvar Street and nearing the Baptist church, a man
came out from the right side of a car parked about two meters to the church. The man approached the
Brasilia, aimed his armalite rifle through its window, and fired at the passengers. The Brasilia swerved
and hit a fence. The gunman immediately returned to the parked car which then sped away.
All those in the car were hit and Dr. Bayquen and Anna Theresa died on the spot. Dr. Bayquen's head
was blown off. Dominic was bale to get out of the Brasilia to run to the Alabanza store where she
telephoned her mother and told her what had happened. Later, she and her mother brought her father
and Anthony to the hospital. 6 Danny Ancheta went home and was then brought to the Notre Dame
Hospital for treatment. 7 Anna Theresa Francisco was brought to the funeral parlor. 8 The police later
arrived at the crime scene and conducted an investigation. they recovered some empty shells of an
armalite rifle. 9
On 30 January 1987, accused Wilfredo "Sonny" Quiao, an alleged former military agent or "asset" who
had been picked up in La Union by the police authorities, confessed during the investigation conducted
by Baguio City Fiscal Erdolfo Balajadia in his office that he was the triggerman in the fatal shooting of
Dr. Bayquen and Anna Theresa Francisco. He implicated Manuel "Jun" Abenoja, Jr., allegedly a fellow
military agent and the "bagman" who engaged him to kill Dr. Bayquen for a fee, Freddie "Boy" Cartel,
who provided the armalite, and a certain "Jimmy." During the investigation, Wilfredo Quiao was
assisted by Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom, a representative of the Integrated bar of the Philippines (IBP). Ms.
Christie Napeas, a stenographic notes of the proceedings during the investigation. 10 Thereafter, she

transcribed the notes and the transcription became the sworn statement of Wilfredo Quiao which he
signed, with the assistance of Atty. Cajucom, and swore to before City Fiscal Balajadia. 11
In the morning of 10 February 1987, "Jimmy," who turned out to be appellant Jaime Agustin, was
picked up in Sto. Tomas, Pangasinan, by military personnel and brought to Baguio city. At 4:00 p.m. of
that date, he was taken to the office of City Fiscal Erdolfo Balajadia where he was investigated in
connection with the crime. Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom assisted the appellant during the investigation. Ms.
Christie Napeas took down stenographic notes of the proceedings during the investigation. The
stenographic notes consisted of 22 pages (Exhibit "B"), each of which was signed afterwards by the
appellant and Atty. Cajucom. Ms. Napeas subsequently transcribed these notes which the prosecution
marked as Exhibit "C." The appellant narrated therein his knowledge of the shooting of Dr. Bayquen
and revealed the identities of his cohorts in the crime. In a confrontation two days later, he identified
Quiao as "Sony," the triggerman.
The defense presented the appellant and his wife, Elizabeth Agustin. The appellant, who is a farmer and
whose highest educational attainment was grad four, impugned the validity of his extrajudicial
statement. he alleged that in the morning of 10 February 1987, he went to Carmen, Pangasinan, to buy
some fertilizer and upon his return he was met by two armed men who took him to their car where two
other companions, armed with armalites, were waiting. They then brought him out of Pangasinan. He
later learned that they were on their way to Baguio City.
Inside the car, he was asked if he knew Boy and Jun, and he answered that he did not. Along Kennon
Road, he was made to stoop down at the back seat whenever they would reach a toll booth, and then
brought out three times near the ravines and made to kneel at gunpoint in order to force him to admit his
involvement in the shooting, which he finally did out of fear. Then he was brought to the Office of the
City Fiscal of Baguio City.
While he was giving his statement at the fical's office, the armed men stayed with him and their
presence deterred him from telling the investigating fiscal that he was being threatened. He further
declared that although he was given a lawyer, Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom, to assist him, he, nevertheless,
asked for his uncle who is a lawyer, Atty. Oliver Tabin, and that Atty. Cajucom interviewed him from
only two minutes in English and Tagalog but not in Ilocano, the dialect he understands. Then later, at
Camp Dangwa to where he was taken, he told his wife to get in touch and talk with Atty. Tabin. Finally,
he asserted that he was promised by his captors that he would be discharged as a state witness if he
cooperates, but the plan did not push through because his co-accused, Quiao, escaped. 12
Elizabeth Agustin corroborated her husband's story that he went to Carmen in the morning of 10
February 1987 to buy some fertilizer and that he failed to return. Her efforts to locate him proved futile
until days later when she finally learned that he was detained at Camp Dangwa. 13
The trial court admitted the appellant's extrajudicial statement and gave scant consideration to his claim
of force, intimidation, and other irregularities because of the following reasons: (a) the presence of
material improbabilities in his tale of when and how he was allegedly taken at gunpoint from his
hometown in Pangasinan; (b) it was improbable that he was made to kneel thrice at gunpoint along
Kennon Road considering the vehicles which were passing along that road; (c) it was unbelievable that
when he was in the Fiscal's Office he asked for his uncle, Atty. Tabin if he could not go home for a
period of one month; (d) no less than the city Fiscal of Baguio City interrogated him and yet he did not
tell the fiscal that he was being forced to give a statement; (e) the fiscal even provided him with a
lawyer who conferred with him and apprised him of his rights; (f) he signed each and every page of the

stenographic notes of his statement and this was witnessed by no less than the City Fiscal of Baguio and
the lawyer who assisted him; and (g) he disclosed in his statement that he voluntarily gave it because of
his ill feeling against his co-accused who did not give him any money.
The trial court then concluded that "[t]here was conspiracy and the accused was a direct participant in
the crime," and that while he tried to minimize his culpability, his "extrajudicial confession" shows that
"he was in on the plan," and even "expected to be paid, to be rewarded monetarily"; and that he
"decided to give a statement only when he was not given the money." Since the proof of corpus
delicti required in Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court was established by the prosecution's
evidence, it found his conviction for murder inevitable.

A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt of the
crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to
the issue, and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, and
admission is something less than a confession, and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or
circumstance which in itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction, and which tends only to establish
the ultimate fact of guilt.

The appellant filed a notice of appeal. In this brief, he imputes upon the trial court the commission of
this lone error:

We have examined the assailed extrajudicial statement of the appellant, and we are satisfied that nothing
therein indicates that he expressly acknowledged his guilt; he merely admitted some facts or
circumstances which in themselves are insufficient to authorize a conviction and which can only tend to
establish the ultimate fact of guilt. Nevertheless, when what is involved is the issue of admissibly in
evidence under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, the distinction is irrelevant because Paragraph
3 thereof expressly refers to both confession and admission. Thus:

THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN CONSIDERING ACCUSEDAPPELLANT'S EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION AS ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM. 14

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible
in evidence against him.

The appellant insists that his extrajudicial confession was taken in violation of his rights under Section
11, Article III of the constitution. He argues that the lawyer who assisted him, Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom,
was not of his own choice but was foisted upon him by the city Fiscal. Worse, the said lawyer is a law
partner of the private prosecutor, Atty. Arthur Galace, and conferred with him in English and Tagalog
although he understood only Ilocano. Moreover, when Atty. Cajucom briefly conferred with him and
when the city Fiscal interrogated him, his military escorts were present.

The first two paragraphs of Section 12 read:

He stresses that the lawyer "who assists the suspect under custodial interrogation should be of the
latter's choice, not one foisted on him by the police investigator or other parties," 15 and that where there
are serious doubts on the voluntariness of the extrajudicial confession, the doubts must be resolved in
favor of the accused. 16 He then concludes that his extrajudicial confession is inadmissible and his
conviction cannot stand, there being no other evidence linking him to the crimes charged.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall
be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.

In its brief, 17 the appellee, reiterating the reasons of the trial court in upholding the validity of the
confession, prays for the affirmance of the appealed decision.
After a careful study of the records of Criminal Cases Nos. 4647-R and 4648-R and a painstaking
evaluation of the evidence, we find this appeal to be impressed with merit. Indeed, the extrajudicial
admission not extrajudicial confession of the appellant, which is the only evidence of the
prosecution linking him to the commission of the crime charged, is wholly inadmissible because it was
taken in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. We also see in these cases a blatant
disregard of the appellant's right under Section 2 of Article III when he was unlawfully arrested.
Before we go any further, it should be pointed out that, contrary to the pronouncement of the trial court
and the characterization given by the appellant himself, the assailed extrajudicial statement is not
extrajudicial confession. It is only an extrajudicial admission. We take this opportunity to once more
distinguish one from the other. Sections 26 and 33, rule 30 of the Rules of
Court 18 clearly show such a distinction.
In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt of the accused or of the criminal intent to commit
the offense with which he is charged. 19 Wharton 20 defines a confession as follows:

Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

These first and second paragraphs are taken from Section 20, Article IV (Bill of Rights) of the 1973
Constitution which read:
Sec. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation
for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed
of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will
shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in
evidence.
The first two paragraphs of Section 12, Article III of the present Constitution have broadened the
aforesaid Section 20 in these respects: (1) the right to counsel means not just any counsel, but a
"competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice"; (2) the right to remain silent and to
counsel can only be waived in writing and in the presence of counsel; and (3) the rule on inadmissibility
expressly includes admissions, not just confessions.
In Morales vs. Enrile, 21 this Court, applying Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, laid down
the duties of an investigator during custodial investigation and ruled that the waiver of the right to
counsel would not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel:

At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason
for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be
used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or
anyone he chooses by the most expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter or
messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No
custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person
arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee
himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid
unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein
laid down, whether exculpatory of inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
We reiterated the above ruling in People vs. Galit, 22 People vs. Lumayok, 23 People vs.
Albofera, 24 People vs. Marquez, 25 People vs. Penillos, 26 and People vs. Basay, 27 among other cases.
The right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates "the transmission of
meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract
constitutional principle." 28 It is not enough for the investigator to merely repeat to the person under
investigation the provisions of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution or Section 12, Article III
of the present Constitution; the former must also explain the effects of such provision in practical
terms, e.g., what the person under investigation may or may not do, and in language the subject fairly
understands. The right to be informed carries with it a correlative obligation on the part of the
investigator to explain, and contemplates effective communication which results in the subject
understanding what is conveyed. Since it is comprehension that is sought to be attained, the degree of
explanation required will necessarily vary and depend on the education, intelligence, and other relevant
personal circumstances of the person undergoing the investigation.
In further ensuring the right to counsel, it is not enough that the subject is informed of such right; he
should also be asked if he wants to avail of the same and should be told that he can ask for counsel if he
so desires or that one will be provided him at his request. If he decides not to retain counsel of his
choice or avail of one to be provided for him and, therefore, chooses to waive his right to counsel, such
waiver, to be valid and effective, must be made with the assistance of counsel. That counsel must be a
lawyer. 29
The waiver of the right to counsel must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. 30 Consequently, even if
the confession of an accused speaks the truth, if it was made without the assistance off counsel, it is
inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily
given. 31
The extrajudicial admission of the appellant, 32 contained in twenty-two pages of yellow pad, does,
indeed, appear to be signed by him and Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom. what we find in these yellow pads are
stenographic notes. these were transcribed by the stenographer who took down the stenographic notes,
but for reasons not explained in the records, the transcript of the notes (Exhibit "C"), which consists of
twelve pages, 33 was not signed by the appellant since it does not indicate any jurat. On the other hand,
the same stenographic reporter, who took down the stenographic notes when accused Wilfredo Quiao
was being investigated by City Fiscal Balajadia, transcribed the notes, and the transcription 34 was
subscribed and sworn to by the accused before City Fiscal Balajadia and also signed by Atty. Cajucom,
who represented the accused in the investigation.

Since we cannot even reads or decipher the stenographic notes in the yellow pads, we cannot expect the
appellant, who is a farmer and who reached only the fourth grade, to read or decipher its contents. We
have to rely solely on the transcript and presume its accuracy. A perusal of the transcript convinces us
that the appellant was not given a fair deal and was deprived of his rights under Section 12(1), Article
III of the Constitution. Firstly, he was not fully and properly informed of his rights. The transcript
(Exhibit "C") shows the following preliminary questions of the City Fiscal and the answers of the
appellant:
01. QUESTION Mr. Jaime Agustin, I am informing you that
you are under investigation in connection
with the death of Dr. Nap Bayquen of which
you are one of the principal suspects. I am
informing you of your constitutional rights
before you give any statement. First, you
have the right to remain silent meaning, you
may give a statement or you may not give
any statement. If you will not give a
statement, you will not be forced to do so,
do you understand this right?
ANSWER I understand, sir.
02. Q If you will give a statement, you have the
right to be assisted by a lawyer of your own
choice, if you cannot afford to secure the
services of a lawyer the government will
provide a lawyer for you, do you understand
this right?
A I understand, sir.
03. Q Now, do you want to be assisted by a
lawyer?
A Yes, sir.
04. Q I am now informing you that a lawyer in the
person of Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom is now
present in this investigation room, do you
wish to avail of his assistance in connection
with this investigation?
A I want, sir.
05. Q I am also informing you that whatever you
say in this investigation can be used as
evidence in your favor and it can also be

used as evidence against you in any criminal

or civil case, do you understand that?
A Yes, sir, I understand.
06. Q After informing you of your constitutional
rights, are you now willing to give a
statement?
A Yes, sir, I agree.
Investigator Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom, the witness or
respondent Jaime Agustin has chosen you to
give him assistance in this investigation, are
you willing to assist him?
Answer I am willing, fiscal, to assist the witness.
Investigator Have you appraised [sic] him of his
constitutional rights?
Answer Yes, fiscal.
Investigator Do you know after examining him whether
or not he is giving a free and voluntary
statement of his own volition without any
intimidation or force exerted on him?
A As stated by him, fiscal, he is willing to give
a free and voluntary statement in relation to
what really happened.
It is at once observed that the appellant was not explicitly told of his right to have
a competent and independentcounsel of his choice, specifically asked if he had in mind any such
counsel and, if so, whether he could afford to hire his services, and, if he could not, whether he would
agree to be assisted by one to be provided for him. He was not categorically informed that he could
waive his rights to remain silent and to counsel and that this waiver must be in writing and in the
presence of his counsel. He had, in fact, waived his right to remain silent by agreeing to be investigated.
Yet, no written waiver of such right appears in the transcript and no other independent evidence was
offered to prove its existence.
Secondly, Atty. Cajucom can hardly be said to have been voluntarily and intelligently "accepted" by the
appellant as his counsel to assist him in the investigation. Atty. Cajucom's presence in the Office of the
City fiscal at the time the appellant was brought there for investigation is unclear to us. At least two
possibilities may explain it: it was a mere coincidence in the sense that he happened to be attending to
some professional matter, or he was earlier called by the City Fiscal for the purpose of giving free legal
aid to the appellant. These possibilities are not remote but whether it was one or the other, it is clear to
us that Atty. Cajucom was in fact foisted upon the appellant, for as shown in the above-quoted portion

of Exhibit "C," the city fiscal immediately suggested the availability of Atty. Cajucom without first
distinctly asking the appellant if he had a counsel of his own choice and if he had one, whether he could
hire such counsel; and if he could not, whether he would simply exercise his right to remain silent and
to counsel. In short, after the appellant said that he wanted to be assisted by counsel, the City fiscal,
through suggestive language, immediately informed him that Atty. Cajucom was ready to assist him.
While it is true that in custodial investigations the party to be investigated has the final choice of
counsel and may reject the counsel chosen for him by the investigator and ask for another one, 35 the
circumstances obtaining in the custodial interrogation of the appellant left him no freedom to
intelligently and freely do so. For as earlier stated, he was not even asked if he had a lawyer of his own
choice and whether he could afford to hire such lawyer; on the other hand, the city Fiscal clearly
suggested the availability of Atty. Cajucom. then too, present at that time were Capt. Antonio Ayat and
Sgt. Roberto Rambac, military officers of RUC I, who brought him to the City Fiscal's Office for
investigation in the afternoon of the day when he was unlawfully arrested in Sto. Tomas, Pangasinan.
Along Kennon road, on the way to Baguio City, he was coerced and threatened with death if he would
not admit knowing "Jun" and "Sonny" and hi participation in the crime. This testimony was unrebutted
by the prosecution. The presence of the military officers and the continuing fear that if he did not
cooperate, something would happen to him, was like a Damocles sword which vitiated his free will.
Why it was the City Fiscal who had to conduct the custodial investigation is beyond us. Nothing in the
records shows that at that time the criminal cases against the culprits had already been filed with the
City Fiscal's Office for preliminary investigation and had, therefore, ceased to be a police matter. If they
had been so filed, then the City Fiscal should have followed the usual course of procedure in
preliminary investigations. It appears, however, from the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 4647-R
and 46648-R that it was Assistant City Fiscal Octavio M. Banta who conducted the preliminary
investigation and who prepared, signed, and certified the informations. city Fiscal Balajadia merely
approved them and administered the jurat in the certification. the conclusion then is inevitable that he
did not conduct the preliminary investigation.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the appellant voluntarily agreed to be assisted by Atty.
Cajucom, we doubt it very much if he was an independent counsel. While we wish to give him the
benefit of the doubt because he is an officer of the court upon whose shoulders lies the responsibility to
see to it that protection be accorded the appellant and that no injustice be committed to him, 36 and,
moreover, he generally has in his favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of his
duties, 37 there are special circumstances in these cases which convince us that he was unable to assist
the appellant in a satisfactory manner. For one, he admitted on cross-examination that at that time, and
even until the time he took the witness stand, he was an associate of the private prosecutor, Atty. Arthur
Galace, in these and the companion cases. Thus:
Q Mr. Witness, at the time you assisted the accused you belonged to the office of Atty. Galace, you were
an associate at the time when you assisted the accused?
A I was represented [sic] then as IBP Legal Aid.
Q The question is not answered, we are only requesting him if he was an associate of Atty. Galace up to
the present?
A Yes. 38

Then we have misgivings on whether Atty. Cajucom was in fact understood by the appellant when the
former informed the appellant of his constitutional rights in English and Tagalog considering that the
appellant, a fourth grader and a farmer, could only understand Ilocano. Thus:
ATTY. TABIN:

Q Why do you say that it was given voluntarily?

A Before presenting him to the investigation we were given
time to talk personally without any other people and that
was the time that I explained to him all his rights and
consequences pertaining to him as witness to this case. 42

So in other words when you appraised [sic] him of his constitutional rights using English Language and
Tagalog Dialect you did not have any Ilocano dialect Interpreter. . . .

On cross-examination, Atty. Cajucom also declared:

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. TABIN:

WITNESS:

That is why I am requesting him how he explained in that language, Your Honor.

As far as I can remember, I explained it in Tagalog and English. 39

WITNESS:

And when asked whether he was sure if the appellant understood him, Atty. Cajucom merely answered:

I told him that this is a grave case which he would be giving some narrations as a witnessand his
involvement would mean the most grievous offense and if found guilty will bring him for some years in
jail and I told him that I could help him if he will be presenting the truth and narrate is the truth. This is
in combination, English and Tagalog, and most of the time, I made it in Tagalog. 43

A At least I put everything as far as I could give to him to appraise [sic] him of his constitutional
rights. 40
Then too, even if he were fully understood by the appellant, we are not satisfied that his explanations
were adequate. On direct examination, he gave the following answers:
Q Did you explain the constitutional rights of the accused to
caution him of the consequences of his statement?
A I explained to him that he has the right to remain silent, to
confront in person the witnesses against him and that he has
the right to choose a counsel to assist him in the hearing of
the case which was being investigated then.
Q And what was his reply regarding the consequences of this
statement?
A He told me that he is willing to give a truthful statement and
in order to shed light. 41
It appears to us that Atty. Cajucom did not actually impress upon the appellant that he was one of the
accused; rather, Atty. Cajucom made the appellant believe that he was only a witness. Thus:
Q [by the prosecutor]
But, nevertheless, you gave the precautionary measure
entitled to any witness?
A Yes, sir.

Moreover, considering that the appellant is familiar only with Ilocano, the Court has serious doubts
about his ability to understand Atty. Cajucom's explanation of his constitutional rights since Atty.
Cajucom did so in English and Tagalog.
Finally, Atty. Cajucom knew, as admitted by him on cross-examination, that the appellant was picked up
on 10 February 1987 by military men in Pangasinan without a warrant for his arrest. 44 Since the crimes
with which the appellant was charged were allegedly committed on 6 September 1986 or more than five
months earlier, no arrest without a warrant could have been legally and validly effected. a warrantless
arrest should comply with the conditions prescribed in Section 5, rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Said
section provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
None of these exceptional circumstances were present at the time the appellant was arrested on 10
February 1987. The prosecution did not even insinuate that the crimes were committed in the presence
of the arresting officers (for otherwise they could have arrested the appellant on 6 September 1986 yet)

or that the appellant was a prisoner who had escaped from his place of detention; or that the crimes
had just been committed for they were in fact committed more than five months earlier. Atty. Cajucom
knew or ought to have known that the arrest was unlawful. If he were then truly moved by his duty to
fully assist the appellant, he should have forthwith taken the appropriate measures for the immediate
release of the appellant instead of allowing the City Fiscal to investigate him. Needless to say, the
conduct of Atty. Cajucom under the circumstances only strengthen our belief that the appellant had all
the cards stacked against him.
Thus, we do not hesitate to declare the appellant's extrajudicial statement inadmissible in evidence
because it was obtained in violation of Section 12 (1), Article III of the Constitution. since it is the only
evidence which links him to the crimes of which he was convicted, he must then be acquitted.

His acquittal must not write finis to these murder cases. These crimes must be solved and the triggerman
and the mastermind apprehended. We see in these cases the failure of the Government to exert the
necessary efforts to bring the guilty parties to the bar of justice. Until now, the accused, who were
implicated by the triggerman as having ordered for a price the murder of Dr. Bayquen, remain at large
and the records do not show any diligent effort to effect their arrest. The triggerman escaped while in
the custody of the PC/INP at Camp Dangwa. The City Prosecutor's Office of Baguio City should then
use all the resources at its command, in coordination with the law-enforcement agencies of the
Government, such as the National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine National Police, to
immediately arrest the other accused.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the challenged judgment of the Regional
Trial Court, branch 3, Baguio City, in Criminal Case No. 4647-R and Criminal Case No. 4648-R, and
ACQUITTING appellant JAIME "JIMMY" AGUSTIN. His immediate release from confinement is
hereby ORDERED unless for some other lawful cause his continued detention is warranted.