G.R. No.

L-24803 May 26, 1977

PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of
Agapito Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said
minor, defendants-appellees.
Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.
Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.

BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29,
1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing,
upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of
damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence,
and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting
subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito
Elcano(killed), of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted
on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled
with mistake."
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds: RTCs decision:
dismissed the case against Hill
1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule 107, which is
now Rule III, of the Revised Rules of Court;
2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in res-adjudicata;
3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill, because he was
relieved as guardian of the other defendant through emancipation by marriage.
(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])

was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of the
defendants of such denial, reiterating the above grounds that the following order was
issued:

Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on January 14, 1965
and after thoroughly examining the arguments therein contained, the Court finds the
same to be meritorious and well-founded.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby reconsidered by
ordering the dismissal of the above entitled case.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21, Record on Appeal.)

Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are presenting for
Our resolution the following assignment of errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY UPHOLDING THE
CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT I
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION OF
SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND
THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES OF COURT IS APPLICABLE;
II
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR RESADJUDICTA;
III
THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL
CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; and
IV
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT
MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER
DEFENDANT THROUGH EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.)

It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendantappellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court
of First Instance of Quezon City. After due trial, he (REGINALD HILL) was acquitted
on the ground that his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to kill,
coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the parties has favored Us with a copy
of the decision of acquittal, presumably because appellants do not dispute that such
indeed was the basis stated in the court's decision. And so, when appellants filed their

complaint against appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the
death of their son, the appellees filed the motion to dismiss above-referred to.
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues presented
for Our resolution are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the
criminal case wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied against Atty.
Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained
of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting subsistenee from his father, was
already legally married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and further
clarification of the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of
obligation which was firmly established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil.
607. In that case, this Court postulated, on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by
Justice Bocobo on the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito and
mere culpa or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain,
the works of recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our own, that the same
given act can result in civil liability not only under the Penal Code but also under
the Civil Code. Thus, the opinion holds:
The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act machinist. come under
both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent killeth
unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action.
And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the
Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the employee who was
being sued. (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.). 1
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a
criminal case because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by
the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence
being a proper subject matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil
liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action
for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this
jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under
the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a
negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted
in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued
for this civil liability arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2

It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902
of the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally
prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also made civilly
liable because of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in
an independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. (p.
618, 73 Phil.) 3
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to
dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little
understood, in the past, it might not he inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless but also
simple negligence. If

we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the

Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law,
accordingly to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the
legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and
application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to propertythrough any degree of negligence - even the slightest - would have to be Idemnified only
through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what
sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the
lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we,
in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the
spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render
almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as
culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to
1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is
sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of
criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be
proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should
be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code.
Otherwise. there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus
Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the
Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of
spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of
the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages
only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is
another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this
habitual method is allowed by, our laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless
and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or
culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual
course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harms done by such practice
and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et

seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict
or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be
diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the
better safeguarding or private rights because it realtor, an ancient and additional remedy,
and for the further reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues,
limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party
wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. (p.
621, 73 Phil.)

Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the foregoing
excerpts from the opinion in Garcia that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil
Code therein referred to contemplate only acts of negligence and not intentional
voluntary acts - deeper reflection would reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements
therein is not so limited, but that in fact it actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be
seen in the reference made therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of
February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent act.
Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia,
provided textually that obligations "which are derived from acts or omissions in which
fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II,
Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely the underline
qualification, "not punishable by law", that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an
ultimo construction or interpretation of the letter of the law that "killeth, rather than the
spirit that giveth lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the
law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such fullgrown development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved and made
enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." And so, because Justice
Bacobo was Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the original text of the new
Civil Code, it is to be noted that the said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia
doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11 not punishable by law," thereby making it clear that
the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in
violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the corresponding
provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code, which is Article 1162, simply says,
"Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter
2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a new
provision, Article 2177 of the new code provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.
But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.

According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at
first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of

criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter
is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own
foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction
between criminal negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been
sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound
and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the
proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on
reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil
liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa
aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.", (Report of the Code)
Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence,
the same argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that upholds "the spirit that
giveth lift- rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be
observed in applying the same. And considering that the preliminary chapter on human
relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and independence
of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the
civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate
also the same separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice,
and more in harmony with modern progress"- to borrow the felicitous relevant language
in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that
Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable
by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or
negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal
act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided
that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger
award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the
extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively
to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil
liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
estinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has
not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold,
in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which
may be punishable by law.4
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not
extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant
action against him.

Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation by
marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our considered
opinion that the conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility
cannot be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child
(Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the
marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399,
emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus
"(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental
authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as
though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real
property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be
sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company." In
the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with
his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question.
Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a
situation which is not unusual.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and
solidary liability of presuncion with their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the
obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from
causing damage to third persons. 5 On the other hand, the clear implication of Article
399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or
be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry
with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial
litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else
invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve
the parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give
answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real property
which cannot be done by their minor married child without their consent. (Art. 399;
Manresa, supra.)
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the
emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald

is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling,
subsidiary to that of his son.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to
proceed in accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs against appellees.
G.R. No. 110295 October 18, 1993
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC.,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Fifth Division) and MS. LYDIA GERONIMO,
respondents.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz Law Offices for petitioner.
Alejandro M. Villamil for private respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This case concerns the proprietress of a school canteen which had to close down as a
consequence of the big drop in its sales of soft drinks triggered by the discovery of foreign
substances in certain beverages sold by it. The interesting issue posed is whether the subsequent
action for damages by the proprietress against the soft drinks manufacturer should be treated as
one for breach of implied warranty against hidden defects or merchantability, as claimed by the
manufacturer, the petitioner herein which must therefore be filed within six months from the
delivery of the thing sold pursuant to Article 1571 of the Civil Code, or one for quasi-delict, as
held by the public respondent, which can be filed within four years pursuant to Article 1146 of
the same Code.
On 7 May 1990, Lydia L. Geronimo, the herein private respondent, filed a complaint for
damages against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City. 1 The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. D-9629. She alleges in her complaint that she was the proprietress of
Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen docketed as located in Dagupan City, an enterprise engaged in
the sale of soft drinks (including Coke and Sprite) and other goods to the students of
Kindergarten Wonderland and to the public; on or about 12 August 1989, some parents of the
students complained to her that the Coke and Sprite soft drinks sold by her contained fiber-like
matter and other foreign substances or particles; he then went over her stock of softdrinks and
discovered the presence of some fiber-like substances in the contents of some unopened Coke
bottles and a plastic matter in the contents of an unopened Sprite bottle; she brought the said
bottles to the Regional Health Office of the Department of Health at San Fernando, La Union, for

examination; subsequently, she received a letter from the Department of Health informing her
that the samples she submitted "are adulterated;" as a consequence of the discovery of the foreign
substances in the beverages, her sales of soft drinks severely plummeted from the usual 10 cases
per day to as low as 2 to 3 cases per day resulting in losses of from P200.00 to P300.00 per day,
and not long after that she had to lose shop on 12 December 1989; she became jobless and
destitute; she demanded from the petitioner the payment of damages but was rebuffed by it. She
prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her P5,000.00 as actual damages, P72,000.00
as compensatory damages, P500,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages,
the amount equal to 30% of the damages awarded as attorney's fees, and the costs. 2
The petitioner moved to dismiss 3 the complaint on the grounds of failure to exhaust
administrative remedies and prescription. Anent the latter ground, the petitioner argued that since
the complaint is for breach of warranty under Article 1561 of the said Code. In her Comment 4
thereto, private respondent alleged that the complaint is one for damages which does not involve
an administrative action and that her cause of action is based on an injury to plaintiff's right
which can be brought within four years pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code; hence, the
complaint was seasonably filed. Subsequent related pleadings were thereafter filed by the parties.
5

In its Order of 23 January 1991, 6 the trial court granted the motion to dismiss. It ruled that the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply as the existing administrative
remedy is not adequate. It also stated that the complaint is based on a contract, and not on quasidelict, as there exists pre-existing contractual relation between the parties; thus, on the basis of
Article 1571, in relation to Article 1562, the complaint should have been filed within six months
from the delivery of the thing sold.
Her motion for the reconsideration of the order having been denied by the trial court in its Order
of 17 April 1991, 7 the private respondent came to this Court via a petition for review on
certiorari which we referred to the public respondent "for proper determination and disposition. 8
The public respondent docketed the case as CA-G.R. SP No. 25391.
In a decision promulgated on 28 January 1992, 9 the public respondent annulled the questioned
orders of the RTC and directed it to conduct further proceedings in Civil Case No. D-9629. In
holding for the private respondent, it ruled that:
Petitioner's complaint being one for quasi-delict, and not for breach of warranty
as respondent contends, the applicable prescriptive period is four years.
It should be stressed that the allegations in the complaint plainly show that it is an
action or damages arising from respondent's act of "recklessly and negligently
manufacturing adulterated food items intended to be sold or public consumption"

(p. 25, rollo). It is truism in legal procedure that what determines the nature of an
action are the facts alleged in the complaint and those averred as a defense in the
defendant's answer (I Moran 126; Calo v. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445; Alger Electric,
Inc. v. CA, 135 SCRA 340).
Secondly, despite the literal wording of Article 2176 of the Civil code, the
existence of contractual relations between the parties does not absolutely preclude
an action by one against the other for quasi-delict arising from negligence in the
performance of a contract
In Singson v. Court of Appeals (23 SCRA 1117), the Supreme Court ruled:
It has been repeatedly held: that the existence of a contract
between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the
one against the other and the consequent recovery of damages
therefor
. . . . Thus in Air France vs. Carrascoso, . . . (it was held that)
although the relation between a passenger and a carrier is
"contractual both in origin and in nature the act that breaks the
contract may also be a tort.
Significantly, in American jurisprudence, from which Our law on Sales was taken,
the authorities are one in saying that he availability of an action or breach of
warranty does not bar an action for torts in a sale of defective goods. 10
Its motion for the reconsideration of the decision having been denied by the public respondent in
its Resolution of 14 May 1993, 11 the petitioner took his recourse under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court. It alleges in its petition that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT ARTICLE 2176, THE GENERAL
PROVISION ON QUASI-DELICTS, IS APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE WHEN
THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT CLEARLY SHOW THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S CAUSE OF ACTION IS BASEDON BREACH OF
A SELLER'S IMPLIED WARRANTIES UNDER OUR LAW ON SALES.
II.
CORROLARILY, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN OVERRULING PETITIONER'S

ARGUMENT THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S CAUSE OF ACTION HAD

PRESCRIBED UNDER ARTICLE 1571 OF THE CIVIL CODE. 12
The petitioner insists that a cursory reading of the complaint will reveal that the primary legal
basis for private respondent's cause of action is not Article 2176 of the Civil Code on quasidelict for the complaint does not ascribe any tortious or wrongful conduct on its part but
Articles 1561 and 1562 thereof on breach of a seller's implied warranties under the law on sales.
It contends the existence of a contractual relation between the parties (arising from the contract
of sale) bars the application of the law on quasi-delicts and that since private respondent's cause
of action arose from the breach of implied warranties, the complaint should have been filed
within six months room delivery of the soft drinks pursuant to Article 171 of the Civil Code.
In her Comment the private respondent argues that in case of breach of the seller's implied
warranties, the vendee may, under Article 1567 of the Civil Code, elect between withdrawing
from the contract or demanding a proportionate reduction of the price, with damages in either
case. She asserts that Civil Case No. D-9629 is neither an action for rescission nor for
proportionate reduction of the price, but for damages arising from a quasi-delict and that the
public respondent was correct in ruling that the existence of a contract did not preclude the action
for quasi-delict. As to the issue of prescription, the private respondent insists that since her cause
of action is based on quasi-delict, the prescriptive period therefore is four (4) years in accordance
with Article 1144 of the Civil Code and thus the filing of the complaint was well within the said
period.
We find no merit in the petition. The public respondent's conclusion that the cause of action in
Civil Case No. D-9629 is found on quasi-delict and that, therefore, pursuant to Article 1146 of
the Civil Code, it prescribes in four (4) years is supported by the allegations in the complaint,
more particularly paragraph 12 thereof, which makes reference to the reckless and negligent
manufacture of "adulterated food items intended to be sold for public consumption."
The vendee's remedies against a vendor with respect to the warranties against hidden defects of
or encumbrances upon the thing sold are not limited to those prescribed in Article 1567 of the
Civil Code which provides:
Art. 1567. In the case of Articles 1561, 1562, 1564, 1565 and 1566, the vendee
may elect between withdrawing from the contract and demanding a proportionate
reduction of the price, with damages either
case. 13
The vendee may also ask for the annulment of the contract upon proof of error or fraud, in which
case the ordinary rule on obligations shall be applicable. 14 Under the law on obligations,
responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all obligations and any waiver of an action for

future fraud is void. Responsibility arising from negligence is also demandable in any
obligation, but such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the
circumstances. 15 Those guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay in the performance of their
obligations and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof are liable for
damages. 16
The vendor could likewise be liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
and an action based thereon may be brought by the vendee. While it may be true that the
pre-existing contract between the parties may, as a general rule, bar the applicability of the
law on quasi-delict, the liability may itself be deemed to arise from quasi-delict, i.e., the acts
which breaks the contract may also be a quasi-delict. Thus, in Singson vs. Bank of the
Philippine Islands, 17 this Court stated:
We have repeatedly held, however, that the existence of a contract between the
parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one against the other and the
consequent recovery of damages therefor. 18 Indeed, this view has been, in effect,
reiterated in a comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air France vs. Carrascoso, 19
involving an airplane passenger who, despite hi first-class ticket, had been
illegally ousted from his first-class accommodation and compelled to take a seat
in the tourist compartment, was held entitled to recover damages from the aircarrier, upon the ground of tort on the latter's part, for, although the relation
between the passenger and a carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature . . .
the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort.
Otherwise put, liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence of contractual
relations. 20
Under American law, the liabilities of a manufacturer or seller of injury-causing
products may be based on negligence, 21 breach of warranty, 22 tort, 23 or other
grounds such as fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. 24 Quasi-delict, as defined in
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, (which is known in Spanish legal treaties as culpa
aquiliana, culpa extra-contractual or cuasi-delitos) 25 is homologous but not identical
to tort under the common law, 26 which includes not only negligence, but also
intentional criminal acts, such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit.
27

It must be made clear that our affirmance of the decision of the public respondent should by no
means be understood as suggesting that the private respondent's claims for moral damages have
sufficient factual and legal basis.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit,
with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

CHILD LEARNING CENTER, INC.

G.R. No. 150920

and SPOUSES EDGARDO L. LIMON

and SYLVIA S. LIMON,

Present:
Petitioners,
DAVIDE, JR., C.J. (Chairman),

- versus -

QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO, and
AZCUNA, JJ.

TIMOTHY TAGARIO, assisted by

his parents BASILIO TAGORIO and

Promulgated:

HERMINIA TAGORIO,
Respondents.

November 25, 2005

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DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

This petition started with a tort case filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Makati by Timothy Tagorio and his parents, Basilio R.
Tagorio and Herminia Tagorio, docketed as Civil Case No. 911389. The complaint[1] alleged that during the school year 19901991, Timothy was a Grade IV student at Marymount School, an
academic institution operated and maintained by Child Learning
Center, Inc. (CLC). In the afternoon of March 5, 1991, between 1
and 2 p.m., Timothy entered the boys comfort room at the third
floor of the Marymount building to answer the call of nature. He,
however, found himself locked inside and unable to get out.
Timothy started to panic and so he banged and kicked the door
and yelled several times for help.

When no help arrived he

decided to open the window to call for help. In the process of

opening the window, Timothy went right through and fell down
three stories.

Timothy was hospitalized and given medical

treatment for serious multiple physical injuries.

An action under Article 2176 of the Civil Code was filed by

respondents against the CLC, the members of its Board of
Directors, namely Spouses Edgardo and Sylvia Limon, Alfonso

Cruz,

Carmelo

Narciso

and

Luningning

Salvador,

and

the

Administrative Officer of Marymount School, Ricardo Pilao. In its

defense,[2] CLC maintained that there was nothing defective
about the locking mechanism of the door and that the fall of
Timothy was not due to its fault or negligence.

CLC further

maintained that it had exercised the due care and diligence of a

good father of a family to ensure the safety, well-being and
convenience of its students.

After trial, the court a quo found in favor of respondents

and

ordered

petitioners

CLC

and

Spouses

Limon

to

pay

respondents, jointly and severally, P200,253.12 as actual and

compensatory damages, P200,000 as moral damages, P50,000 as
exemplary damages, P100,000 as attorneys fees and the costs of
the suit. The trial court disregarded the corporate fiction of CLC
and held the Spouses Limon personally liable because they were
the ones who actually managed the affairs of the CLC.

Petitioners CLC and the Spouses Limon appealed the

decision to the Court of Appeals.

On September 28, 2001, the Court of Appeals[3] affirmed the

decision in toto. Petitioners elevated the case to this Court under

Rule

45

of

the

Rules

of

Court,

after

their

motion

for

reconsideration was denied by Resolution of November 23, 2001.

[4]

Petitioners question several factual findings of the trial

court, which were affirmed by the Court of Appeals, namely:[5]

1.
That respondent was allegedly trapped inside the
boys comfort room located at the third floor of the school
building on March 5, 1991;
2.
That respondent allegedly banged and kicked the
door of said comfort room several times to attract attention and
that he allegedly yelled thereat for help which never came;

3.
That respondent was allegedly forced to open the
window of said comfort room to seek help;
4.
That the lock set installed at the boys comfort room
located in the third floor of the school building on March 5, 1991
was allegedly defective and that the same lock set was involved
in previous incidents of alleged malfunctioning;

5.
That petitioner Child Learning Center, Inc. allegedly
failed to install iron grills in the window of the boys comfort
room at the third floor of the school building;
6.
That petitioner Child Learning Center, Inc. allegedly
failed to exercise the due care of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employees;
7.
That the proximate cause of respondents accident
was allegedly not due to his own contributory negligence;

8.
That there was an alleged basis to apply the legal
principle of piercing the veil of corporate entity in resolving the
issue of alleged liability of petitioners Edgardo L. Limon and
Sylvia S. Limon;

9.
That there was alleged basis for petitioners to pay
respondent actual, moral and exemplary damages, plus
attorneys fees;

10.
That there was an alleged basis in not awarding
petitioners prayer for moral and exemplary damages, including
attorneys fees.

Generally, factual findings of the trial court, affirmed by the

Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be
reviewed on appeal. The established exceptions are: (1) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2)
when there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the findings are
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4)
when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings,
went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (8) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the

parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different

conclusion; and (9) when the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by the evidence on record.[6]

On the basis of the records of this case, this Court finds no

justification to reverse the factual findings and consider this case
as an exception to the general rule.

In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the
damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of
the defendant or some other person for whose act he must
respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the
fault or negligence and the damages incurred.[7]

Fault, in general, signifies a voluntary act or omission which

causes damage to the right of another giving rise to an obligation
on the part of the actor to repair such damage. Negligence is the
failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another
person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand. Fault requires the execution of a
positive act which causes damage to another while negligence

consists of the omission to do acts which result in damage to

another.[8]

In this tort case, respondents contend that CLC failed to

provide precautionary measures to avoid harm and injury to its
students in two instances: (1) failure to fix a defective door knob
despite having been notified of the problem; and (2) failure to
install safety grills on the window where Timothy fell from.

The trial court found that the lock was defective on March 5,
1991:[9]

The door knob was defective. After the incident of March 5,

1991, said door knob was taken off the door of the toilet where
Timothy was in. The architect who testified during the trial
declared that although there were standard specifications for
door knobs for comfort room[s], and he designed them according
to that requirement, he did not investigate whether the door
knob specified in his plans during the construction [was] actually
put in place. This is so because he did not verify whether the
door knob he specified w[as] actually put in place at the
particular comfort room where Timothy was barred from getting
outside. (TSN, pp. 19-20, December 8, 1994).

The Court of Appeals held that there was no reason to

disturb the factual assessment:[10]

After having perused the records, We fail to see any

indication of whim or arbitrariness on the part of the trial
magistrate in his assessment of the facts of the case. That said,
We deem it not to be within Our business to recast the factual
conclusions reached by the court below.

Petitioners would make much of the point that no direct

evidence was presented to prove that the door knob was indeed
defective on the date in question.

The fact, however, that Timothy fell out through the window
shows that the door could not be opened from the inside. That
sufficiently points to the fact that something was wrong with the
door, if not the door knob, under the principle of res ipsa loquitor.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies where (1) the accident
was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not
have happened except for the defendants negligence; (2) the
accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality
within the exclusive management or control of the person
charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident
must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution
on the part of the person injured.[11] Petitioners are clearly
answerable for failure to see to it that the doors of their school
toilets are at all times in working condition.

The fact that a

student had to go through the window, instead of the door, shows

that something was wrong with the door.

As to the absence of grills on the window, petitioners

contend that there was no such requirement under the Building
Code. Nevertheless, the fact is that such window, as petitioners
themselves point out, was approximately 1.5 meters from the
floor, so that it was within reach of a student who finds the
regular exit, the door, not functioning. Petitioners, with the due
diligence of a good father of the family, should have anticipated
that a student, locked in the toilet by a non-working door, would
attempt to use the window to call for help or even to get out.
Considering all the circumstances, therefore, there is sufficient
basis to sustain a finding of liability on petitioners part.

Petitioners argument that CLC exercised the due diligence of

a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employees is not decisive. Due diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees is applicable where the employer is
being held responsible for the acts or omissions of others under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code.[12] In this case, CLCs liability is
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, premised on the fact of its
own negligence in not ensuring that all its doors are properly
maintained.

Our pronouncement that Timothy climbed out of the window

because he could not get out using the door, negates petitioners
other contention that the proximate cause of the accident was
Timothys own negligence. The injuries he sustained from the fall
were the product of a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any intervening cause, that originated from CLCs own
negligence.

We, however, agree with petitioners that there was no basis

to pierce CLCs separate corporate personality. To disregard the
corporate existence, the plaintiff must prove: (1) Control by the
individual

owners,

not

mere

majority

or

complete

stock

ownership, resulting in complete domination not only of finances

but of policy and business practice in respect to a transaction so
that the corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time no
separate mind, will or existence of its own; (2) such control must
have been used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to
perpetuate the violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty,
or a dishonest and unjust act in contravention of the plaintiffs
legal right; and (3) the control and breach of duty must
proximately cause the injury or unjust loss complained of. The
absence of these elements prevents piercing the corporate veil.
[13] The evidence on record fails to show that these elements are
present, especially given the fact that plaintiffs complaint had

pleaded that CLC is a corporation duly organized and existing

under the laws of the Philippines.

On 9th and 10th points raised concerning the award of

damages, the resolution would rest on factual determinations by
the trial court, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and no legal
issue warrants our intervention.

WHEREFORE, the petition is partly granted and the

Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
50961 dated September 28, 2001 and November 23, 2001,
respectively, are MODIFIED in that petitioners Spouses Edgardo
and Sylvia Limon are absolved from personal liability. The
Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED in all other respects. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-48006

July 8, 1942

FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner,

vs.
SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO, respondents.

Celedonio P. Gloria and Antonio Barredo for petitioner.

Jose G. Advincula for respondents.
BOCOBO, J.:
This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner herein, Fausto Barredo,
liable in damages for the death of Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of Pedro Fontanilla,
a taxi driver employed by said Fausto Barredo.
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and
Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab
driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was
overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from
which he died two days later. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, and he was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year
and one day to two years of prision correccional. The court in the criminal case granted the
petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case. Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario,
parents of the deceased on March 7, 1939, brought an action in the Court of First Instance of
Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of
Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the Court of First Instance of Manila awarded damages in
favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from the date of the complaint. This decision
was modified by the Court of Appeals by reducing the damages to P1,000 with legal interest
from the time the action was instituted. It is undisputed that Fontanilla 's negligence was the
cause of the mishap, as he was driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high speed. As to
Barredo's responsibility, the Court of Appeals found:
... It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There is proof that he exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (See p. 22, appellant's
brief.) In fact it is shown he was careless in employing Fontanilla who had been caught
several times for violation of the Automobile Law and speeding (Exhibit A) violation
which appeared in the records of the Bureau of Public Works available to be public and to
himself. Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs under the provisions of article 1903 of
the Civil Code.
The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is governed by the Revised
Penal Code; hence, his liability is only subsidiary, and as there has been no civil action against
Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally liable, Barredo cannot be held responsible in the case.
The petitioner's brief states on page 10:

... The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being sued for his failure to exercise
all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pedro
Fontanilla to prevent damages suffered by the respondents. In other words, The Court of
Appeals insists on applying in the case article 1903 of the Civil Code. Article 1903 of the
Civil Code is found in Chapter II, Title 16, Book IV of the Civil Code. This fact makes
said article to a civil liability arising from a crime as in the case at bar simply because
Chapter II of Title 16 of Book IV of the Civil Code, in the precise words of article 1903
of the Civil Code itself, is applicable only to "those (obligations) arising from wrongful
or negligent acts or commission not punishable by law.
The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed thus:
... We cannot agree to the defendant's contention. The liability sought to be imposed upon
him in this action is not a civil obligation arising from a felony or a misdemeanor (the
crime of Pedro Fontanilla,), but an obligation imposed in article 1903 of the Civil Code
by reason of his negligence in the selection or supervision of his servant or employee.
The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action
against Fausto Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly, responsible under article 1903
of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla. The defendant maintains that Fontanilla's
negligence being punishable by the Penal Code, his (defendant's) liability as an employer is only
subsidiary, according to said Penal code, but Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil action and his
property has not been exhausted. To decide the main issue, we must cut through the tangle that
has, in the minds of many confused and jumbled together delitos and cuasi delitos, or crimes
under the Penal Code and fault or negligence under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. This
should be done, because justice may be lost in a labyrinth, unless principles and remedies are
distinctly envisaged. Fortunately, we are aided in our inquiry by the luminous presentation of the
perplexing subject by renown jurists and we are likewise guided by the decisions of this Court in
previous cases as well as by the solemn clarity of the consideration in several sentences of the
Supreme Tribunal of Spain.
Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely
apart and independent from delict or crime. Upon this principle and on the wording and spirit
article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility of employers may be safely
anchored.
The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and Revised Penal Code are as follows:
CIVIL CODE

ART. 1089 Obligations arise from law, from contracts and quasi-contracts, and from acts
and omissions which are unlawful or in which any kind of fault or negligence intervenes.
xxx

xxx

xxx

ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or misdemeanors shall be governed by
the provisions of the Penal Code.
ART. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence,
not punishable by law, intervenes shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter II, Title
XVI of this book.
xxx

xxx

xxx

ART 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by his fault
or negligence shall be liable for the damage so done.
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is enforcible, not only
for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is
responsible.
The father and in, case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages
caused by the minor children who live with them.
Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or incapacitated persons subject to their
authority and living with them.
Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally liable for any damages
caused by their employees while engaged in the branch of the service in which employed,
or on occasion of the performance of their duties.
The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a special agent, but not if
the damage shall have been caused by the official upon whom properly devolved the duty
of doing the act performed, in which case the provisions of the next preceding article
shall be applicable.
Finally, teachers or directors of arts trades are liable for any damages caused by their
pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody.
The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons mentioned therein
prove that they are exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage.

ART. 1904. Any person who pays for damage caused by his employees may recover from
the latter what he may have paid.
REVISED PENAL CODE
ART. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. Every person criminally liable for
a felony is also civilly liable.
ART. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. The exemption from
criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12 and in
subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil liability,
which shall be enforced to the following rules:
First. In cases of subdivision, 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 the civil liability for acts committed
by any imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over
nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment shall devolve
upon those having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears
that there was no fault or negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority,
legal guardianship, or control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or
minor shall respond with their own property, excepting property exempt from execution,
in accordance with the civil law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the person for whose benefit
the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they
may have received.
The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each
one shall be liable.
When the respective shares can not be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the
liability also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in
all events, whenever the damage has been caused with the consent of the authorities or their
agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the persons using violence or
causing the fear shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those
doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part of their property exempt from
execution.

ART. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers and proprietors of
establishment. In default of persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern keepers, and
any other persons or corporation shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their
establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or
special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or
theft within their houses lodging therein, or the person, or for the payment of the value
thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or
the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall
furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may
have given them with respect to the care of and vigilance over such goods. No liability
shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation against or
intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's employees.
ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability
established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons,
and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their
servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
xxx

xxx

xxx

ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence,
shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall
suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the
penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed."
It will thus be seen that while the terms of articles 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad
enough to cover the driver's negligence in the instant case, nevertheless article 1093 limits cuasidelitos to acts or omissions "not punishable by law." But inasmuch as article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code punishes not only reckless but even simple imprudence or negligence, the fault or
negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code has apparently been crowded out. It is this
overlapping that makes the "confusion worse confounded." However, a closer study shows that
such a concurrence of scope in regard to negligent acts does not destroy the distinction between
the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-

contractual. The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a
crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa
extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms clear and unmistakable. This
legal institution is of ancient lineage, one of its early ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the
Roman Law. In fact, in Spanish legal terminology, this responsibility is often referred to as culpa
aquiliana. The Partidas also contributed to the genealogy of the present fault or negligence under
the Civil Code; for instance, Law 6, Title 15, of Partida 7, says: "Tenudo es de fazer emienda,
porque, como quier que el non fizo a sabiendas en dao al otro, pero acaescio por su culpa."
The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code. According to article 1089, one
of the five sources of obligations is this legal institution of cuasi-delito or culpa extracontractual: "los actos . . . en que intervenga cualquier genero de culpa o negligencia." Then
article 1093 provides that this kind of obligation shall be governed by Chapter II of Title XVI of
Book IV, meaning articles 1902-0910. This portion of the Civil Code is exclusively devoted to
the legal institution of culpa aquiliana.
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa aquiliana or cuasidelito under the Civil Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code,
by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if there is a
penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any
king of fault or negligence intervenes." However, it should be noted that not all violations of the
penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in contravention of ordinances, violation
of the game laws, infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt. (See Colin and Capitant,
"Curso Elemental de Derecho Civil," Vol. 3, p. 728.)
Let us now ascertain what some jurists say on the separate existence of quasi-delicts and the
employer's primary and direct liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
Dorado Montero in his essay on "Responsibilidad" in the "Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola" (Vol.
XXVII, p. 414) says:
El concepto juridico de la responsabilidad civil abarca diversos aspectos y comprende a
diferentes personas. Asi, existe una responsabilidad civil propiamente dicha, que en

ningun casl lleva aparejada responsabilidad criminal alguna, y otra que es consecuencia
indeclinable de la penal que nace de todo delito o falta."
The juridical concept of civil responsibility has various aspects and comprises different
persons. Thus, there is a civil responsibility, properly speaking, which in no case carries
with it any criminal responsibility, and another which is a necessary consequence of the
penal liability as a result of every felony or misdemeanor."
Maura, an outstanding authority, was consulted on the following case: There had been a collision
between two trains belonging respectively to the Ferrocarril Cantabrico and the Ferrocarril del
Norte. An employee of the latter had been prosecuted in a criminal case, in which the company
had been made a party as subsidiarily responsible in civil damages. The employee had been
acquitted in the criminal case, and the employer, the Ferrocarril del Norte, had also been
exonerated. The question asked was whether the Ferrocarril Cantabrico could still bring a civil
action for damages against the Ferrocarril del Norte. Maura's opinion was in the affirmative,
stating in part (Maura, Dictamenes, Vol. 6, pp. 511-513):
Quedando las cosas asi, a proposito de la realidad pura y neta de los hechos, todavia
menos parece sostenible que exista cosa juzgada acerca de la obligacion civil de
indemnizar los quebrantos y menoscabos inferidos por el choque de los trenes. El titulo
en que se funda la accion para demandar el resarcimiento, no puede confundirse con las
responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito, siquiera exista en este, sea el cual sea, una
culpa rodeada de notas agravatorias que motivan sanciones penales, mas o menos
severas. La lesion causada por delito o falta en los derechos civiles, requiere
restituciones, reparaciones o indemnizaciones, que cual la pena misma ataen al orden
publico; por tal motivo vienen encomendadas, de ordinario, al Ministerio Fiscal; y claro
es que si por esta via se enmiendan los quebrantos y menoscabos, el agraviado excusa
procurar el ya conseguido desagravio; pero esta eventual coincidencia de los efectos, no
borra la diversidad originaria de las acciones civiles para pedir indemnizacion.
Estas, para el caso actual (prescindiendo de culpas contractuales, que no vendrian a
cuento y que tiene otro regimen), dimanan, segun el articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, de
toda accion u omision, causante de daos o perjuicios, en que intervenga culpa o
negligencia. Es trivial que acciones semejantes son ejercitadas ante los Tribunales de lo
civil cotidianamente, sin que la Justicia punitiva tenga que mezclarse en los asuntos. Los
articulos 18 al 21 y 121 al 128 del Codigo Penal, atentos al espiritu y a los fines sociales
y politicos del mismo, desenvuelven y ordenan la materia de responsabilidades civiles
nacidas de delito, en terminos separados del regimen por ley comun de la culpa que se
denomina aquiliana, por alusion a precedentes legislativos del Corpus Juris. Seria
intempestivo un paralelo entre aquellas ordenaciones, y la de la obligacion de indemnizar

a titulo de culpa civil; pero viene al caso y es necesaria una de las diferenciaciones que en
el tal paralelo se notarian.
Los articulos 20 y 21 del Codigo Penal, despues de distribuir a su modo las
responsabilidades civiles, entre los que sean por diversos conceptos culpables del delito o
falta, las hacen extensivas a las empresas y los establecimientos al servicio de los cuales
estan los delincuentes; pero con caracter subsidiario, o sea, segun el texto literal, en
defecto de los que sean responsables criminalmente. No coincide en ello el Codigo Civil,
cuyo articulo 1903, dice; La obligacion que impone el articulo anterior es exigible, no
solo por los actos y omisiones propios, sino por los de aquellas personas de quienes se
debe responder; personas en la enumeracion de las cuales figuran los dependientes y
empleados de los establecimientos o empresas, sea por actos del servicio, sea con ocasion
de sus funciones. Por esto acontece, y se observa en la jurisprudencia, que las empresas,
despues de intervenir en las causas criminales con el caracter subsidiario de su
responsabilidad civil por razon del delito, son demandadas y condenadas directa y
aisladamente, cuando se trata de la obligacion, ante los tribunales civiles.
Siendo como se ve, diverso el titulo de esta obligacion, y formando verdadero postulado
de nuestro regimen judicial la separacion entre justicia punitiva y tribunales de lo civil, de
suerte que tienen unos y otros normas de fondo en distintos cuerpos legales, y diferentes
modos de proceder, habiendose, por aadidura, abstenido de asistir al juicio criminal la
Compaia del Ferrocarril Cantabrico, que se reservo ejercitar sus acciones, parece
innegable que la de indemnizacion por los daos y perjuicios que le irrogo el choque, no
estuvo sub judice ante el Tribunal del Jurado, ni fue sentenciada, sino que permanecio
intacta, al pronunciarse el fallo de 21 de marzo. Aun cuando el veredicto no hubiese sido
de inculpabilidad, mostrose mas arriba, que tal accion quedaba legitimamente reservada
para despues del proceso; pero al declararse que no existio delito, ni responsabilidad
dimanada de delito, materia unica sobre que tenian jurisdiccion aquellos juzgadores, se
redobla el motivo para la obligacion civil ex lege, y se patentiza mas y mas que la accion
para pedir su cumplimiento permanece incolume, extraa a la cosa juzgada.
As things are, apropos of the reality pure and simple of the facts, it seems less tenable
that there should be res judicata with regard to the civil obligation for damages on
account of the losses caused by the collision of the trains. The title upon which the action
for reparation is based cannot be confused with the civil responsibilities born of a crime,
because there exists in the latter, whatever each nature, a culpa surrounded with
aggravating aspects which give rise to penal measures that are more or less severe. The
injury caused by a felony or misdemeanor upon civil rights requires restitutions,
reparations, or indemnifications which, like the penalty itself, affect public order; for this
reason, they are ordinarily entrusted to the office of the prosecuting attorney; and it is
clear that if by this means the losses and damages are repaired, the injured party no

longer desires to seek another relief; but this coincidence of effects does not eliminate the
peculiar nature of civil actions to ask for indemnity.
Such civil actions in the present case (without referring to contractual faults which are not
pertinent and belong to another scope) are derived, according to article 1902 of the Civil
Code, from every act or omission causing losses and damages in which culpa or
negligence intervenes. It is unimportant that such actions are every day filed before the
civil courts without the criminal courts interfering therewith. Articles 18 to 21 and 121 to
128 of the Penal Code, bearing in mind the spirit and the social and political purposes of
that Code, develop and regulate the matter of civil responsibilities arising from a crime,
separately from the regime under common law, of culpa which is known as aquiliana, in
accordance with legislative precedent of the Corpus Juris. It would be unwarranted to
make a detailed comparison between the former provisions and that regarding the
obligation to indemnify on account of civil culpa; but it is pertinent and necessary to
point out to one of such differences.
Articles 20 and 21 of the Penal Code, after distriburing in their own way the civil
responsibilities among those who, for different reasons, are guilty of felony or
misdemeanor, make such civil responsibilities applicable to enterprises and
establishments for which the guilty parties render service, but with subsidiary character,
that is to say, according to the wording of the Penal Code, in default of those who are
criminally responsible. In this regard, the Civil Code does not coincide because article
1903 says: "The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is demandable, not only
for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is
responsible." Among the persons enumerated are the subordinates and employees of
establishments or enterprises, either for acts during their service or on the occasion of
their functions. It is for this reason that it happens, and it is so observed in judicial
decisions, that the companies or enterprises, after taking part in the criminal cases
because of their subsidiary civil responsibility by reason of the crime, are sued and
sentenced directly and separately with regard to the obligation, before the civil courts.
Seeing that the title of this obligation is different, and the separation between punitive
justice and the civil courts being a true postulate of our judicial system, so that they have
different fundamental norms in different codes, as well as different modes of procedure,
and inasmuch as the Compaa del Ferrocarril Cantabrico has abstained from taking part
in the criminal case and has reserved the right to exercise its actions, it seems undeniable
that the action for indemnification for the losses and damages caused to it by the collision
was not sub judice before the Tribunal del Jurado, nor was it the subject of a sentence,
but it remained intact when the decision of March 21 was rendered. Even if the verdict
had not been that of acquittal, it has already been shown that such action had been
legitimately reserved till after the criminal prosecution; but because of the declaration of

the non-existence of the felony and the non-existence of the responsibility arising from
the crime, which was the sole subject matter upon which the Tribunal del Jurado had
jurisdiction, there is greater reason for the civil obligation ex lege, and it becomes clearer
that the action for its enforcement remain intact and is not res judicata.
Laurent, a jurist who has written a monumental work on the French Civil Code, on which the
Spanish Civil Code is largely based and whose provisions on cuasi-delito or culpa extracontractual are similar to those of the Spanish Civil Code, says, referring to article 1384 of the
French Civil Code which corresponds to article 1903, Spanish Civil Code:
The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another), without
including the author of the act. The action against the principal is accessory in the sense
that it implies the existence of a prejudicial act committed by the employee, but it is not
subsidiary in the sense that it can not be instituted till after the judgment against the
author of the act or at least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action; the action for
responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a principal action. (Laurent, Principles of
French Civil Law, Spanish translation, Vol. 20, pp. 734-735.)
Amandi, in his "Cuestionario del Codigo Civil Reformado" (Vol. 4, pp. 429, 430), declares that
the responsibility of the employer is principal and not subsidiary. He writes:
Cuestion 1. La responsabilidad declarada en el articulo 1903 por las acciones u omisiones
de aquellas personas por las que se debe responder, es subsidiaria? es principal? Para
contestar a esta pregunta es necesario saber, en primer lugar, en que se funda el precepto
legal. Es que realmente se impone una responsabilidad por una falta ajena? Asi parece a
primera vista; pero semejante afirmacion seria contraria a la justicia y a la maxima
universal, segun la que las faltas son personales, y cada uno responde de aquellas que le
son imputables. La responsabilidad de que tratamos se impone con ocasion de un delito o
culpa, pero no por causa de ellos, sino por causa del causi delito, esto es, de la
imprudencia o de la negligencia del padre, del tutor, del dueo o director del
establecimiento, del maestro, etc. Cuando cualquiera de las personas que enumera el
articulo citado (menores de edad, incapacitados, dependientes, aprendices) causan un
dao, la ley presume que el padre, el tutor, el maestro, etc., han cometido una falta de
negligencia para prevenir o evitar el dao. Esta falta es la que la ley castiga. No hay,
pues, responsabilidad por un hecho ajeno, sino en la apariencia; en realidad la
responsabilidad se exige por un hecho propio. La idea de que esa responsabilidad sea
subsidiaria es, por lo tanto, completamente inadmisible.
Question No. 1. Is the responsibility declared in article 1903 for the acts or omissions of
those persons for who one is responsible, subsidiary or principal? In order to answer this
question it is necessary to know, in the first place, on what the legal provision is based. Is

it true that there is a responsibility for the fault of another person? It seems so at first
sight; but such assertion would be contrary to justice and to the universal maxim that all
faults are personal, and that everyone is liable for those faults that can be imputed to him.
The responsibility in question is imposed on the occasion of a crime or fault, but not
because of the same, but because of the cuasi-delito, that is to say, the imprudence or
negligence of the father, guardian, proprietor or manager of the establishment, of the
teacher, etc. Whenever anyone of the persons enumerated in the article referred to
(minors, incapacitated persons, employees, apprentices) causes any damage, the law
presumes that the father, guardian, teacher, etc. have committed an act of negligence in
not preventing or avoiding the damage. It is this fault that is condemned by the law. It is,
therefore, only apparent that there is a responsibility for the act of another; in reality the
responsibility exacted is for one's own act. The idea that such responsibility is subsidiary
is, therefore, completely inadmissible.
Oyuelos, in his "Digesto: Principios, Doctrina y Jurisprudencia, Referentes al Codigo Civil
Espaol," says in Vol. VII, p. 743:
Es decir, no responde de hechos ajenos, porque se responde solo de su propia culpa,
doctrina del articulo 1902; mas por excepcion, se responde de la ajena respecto de
aquellas personas con las que media algun nexo o vinculo, que motiva o razona la
responsabilidad. Esta responsabilidad, es directa o es subsidiaria? En el orden penal, el
Codigo de esta clase distingue entre menores e incapacitados y los demas, declarando
directa la primera (articulo 19) y subsidiaria la segunda (articulos 20 y 21); pero en el
orden civil, en el caso del articulo 1903, ha de entenderse directa, por el tenor del articulo
que impone la responsabilidad precisamente "por los actos de aquellas personas de
quienes se deba responder."
That is to say, one is not responsible for the acts of others, because one is liable only for
his own faults, this being the doctrine of article 1902; but, by exception, one is liable for
the acts of those persons with whom there is a bond or tie which gives rise to the
responsibility. Is this responsibility direct or subsidiary? In the order of the penal law, the
Penal Code distinguishes between minors and incapacitated persons on the one hand, and
other persons on the other, declaring that the responsibility for the former is direct (article
19), and for the latter, subsidiary (articles 20 and 21); but in the scheme of the civil law,
in the case of article 1903, the responsibility should be understood as direct, according to
the tenor of that articles, for precisely it imposes responsibility "for the acts of those
persons for whom one should be responsible."
Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, that court has upheld the
principles above set forth: that a quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual is a separate and distinct
legal institution, independent from the civil responsibility arising from criminal liability, and that

an employer is, under article 1903 of the Civil Code, primarily and directly responsible for the
negligent acts of his employee.
One of the most important of those Spanish decisions is that of October 21, 1910. In that case,
Ramon Lafuente died as the result of having been run over by a street car owned by the
"compaia Electric Madrilea de Traccion." The conductor was prosecuted in a criminal case but
he was acquitted. Thereupon, the widow filed a civil action against the street car company,
paying for damages in the amount of 15,000 pesetas. The lower court awarded damages; so the
company appealed to the Supreme Tribunal, alleging violation of articles 1902 and 1903 of the
Civil Code because by final judgment the non-existence of fault or negligence had been declared.
The Supreme Court of Spain dismissed the appeal, saying:
Considerando que el primer motivo del recurso se funda en el equivocado supuesto de
que el Tribunal a quo, al condonar a la compaia Electrica Madrilea al pago del dao
causado con la muerte de Ramon La fuente Izquierdo, desconoce el valor y efectos
juridicos de la sentencia absolutoria deictada en la causa criminal que se siguio por el
mismo hecho, cuando es lo cierto que de este han conocido las dos jurisdicciones bajo
diferentes as pectos, y como la de lo criminal declrao dentro de los limites de su
competencia que el hecho de que se trata no era constitutivo de delito por no haber
mediado descuido o negligencia graves, lo que no excluye, siendo este el unico
fundamento del fallo absolutorio, el concurso de la culpa o negligencia no califacadas,
fuente de obligaciones civiles segun el articulo 1902 del Codigo, y que alcanzan, segun el
1903, netre otras perosnas, a los Directores de establecimientos o empresas por los daos
causados por sus dependientes en determinadas condiciones, es manifesto que la de lo
civil, al conocer del mismo hehco baho este ultimo aspecto y al condenar a la compaia
recurrente a la indemnizacion del dao causado por uno de sus empleados, lejos de
infringer los mencionados textos, en relacion con el articulo 116 de la Ley de
Enjuciamiento Criminal, se ha atenido estrictamente a ellos, sin invadir atribuciones
ajenas a su jurisdiccion propia, ni contrariar en lo mas minimo el fallo recaido en la
causa.
Considering that the first ground of the appeal is based on the mistaken supposition that
the trial court, in sentencing the Compaia Madrilea to the payment of the damage
caused by the death of Ramon Lafuente Izquierdo, disregards the value and juridical
effects of the sentence of acquittal rendered in the criminal case instituted on account of
the same act, when it is a fact that the two jurisdictions had taken cognizance of the same
act in its different aspects, and as the criminal jurisdiction declared within the limits of its
authority that the act in question did not constitute a felony because there was no grave
carelessness or negligence, and this being the only basis of acquittal, it does no exclude
the co-existence of fault or negligence which is not qualified, and is a source of civil
obligations according to article 1902 of the Civil Code, affecting, in accordance with

article 1903, among other persons, the managers of establishments or enterprises by

reason of the damages caused by employees under certain conditions, it is manifest that
the civil jurisdiccion in taking cognizance of the same act in this latter aspect and in
ordering the company, appellant herein, to pay an indemnity for the damage caused by
one of its employees, far from violating said legal provisions, in relation with article 116
of the Law of Criminal Procedure, strictly followed the same, without invading attributes
which are beyond its own jurisdiction, and without in any way contradicting the decision
in that cause. (Emphasis supplied.)
It will be noted, as to the case just cited:
First. That the conductor was not sued in a civil case, either separately or with the street car
company. This is precisely what happens in the present case: the driver, Fontanilla, has not been
sued in a civil action, either alone or with his employer.
Second. That the conductor had been acquitted of grave criminal negligence, but the Supreme
Tribunal of Spain said that this did not exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence, which is
not qualified, on the part of the conductor, under article 1902 of the Civil Code. In the present
case, the taxi driver was found guilty of criminal negligence, so that if he had even sued for his
civil responsibility arising from the crime, he would have been held primarily liable for civil
damages, and Barredo would have been held subsidiarily liable for the same. But the plaintiffs
are directly suing Barredo, on his primary responsibility because of his own presumed
negligence which he did not overcome under article 1903. Thus, there were two
liabilities of Barredo: first, the subsidiary one because of the civil liability of the taxi driver
arising from the latter's criminal negligence; and, second, Barredo's primary liability as an
employer under article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to choose which course to take, and they
preferred the second remedy. In so doing, they were acting within their rights. It might be
observed in passing, that the plaintiff choose the more expeditious and effective method of relief,
because Fontanilla was either in prison, or had just been released, and besides, he was probably
without property which might be seized in enforcing any judgment against him for damages.
Third. That inasmuch as in the above sentence of October 21, 1910, the employer was held liable
civilly, notwithstanding the acquittal of the employee (the conductor) in a previous criminal case,
with greater reason should Barredo, the employer in the case at bar, be held liable for damages in
a civil suit filed against him because his taxi driver had been convicted. The degree of negligence
of the conductor in the Spanish case cited was less than that of the taxi driver, Fontanilla,
because the former was acquitted in the previous criminal case while the latter was found guilty
of criminal negligence and was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day
to two years of prision correccional.
(See also Sentence of February 19, 1902, which is similar to the one above quoted.)

In the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain, dated February 14, 1919, an action was brought
against a railroad company for damages because the station agent, employed by the company,
had unjustly and fraudulently, refused to deliver certain articles consigned to the plaintiff. The
Supreme Court of Spain held that this action was properly under article 1902 of the Civil Code,
the court saying:
Considerando que la sentencia discutida reconoce, en virtud de los hechos que consigna
con relacion a las pruebas del pleito: 1., que las expediciones facturadas por la compaia
ferroviaria a la consignacion del actor de las vasijas vacias que en su demanda relacionan
tenian como fin el que este las devolviera a sus remitentes con vinos y alcoholes; 2., que
llegadas a su destino tales mercanias no se quisieron entregar a dicho consignatario por el
jefe de la estacion sin motivo justificado y con intencion dolosa, y 3., que la falta de
entrega de estas expediciones al tiempo de reclamarlas el demandante le originaron daos
y perjuicios en cantidad de bastante importancia como expendedor al por mayor que era
de vinos y alcoholes por las ganancias que dejo de obtener al verse privado de servir los
pedidos que se le habian hecho por los remitentes en los envases:
Considerando que sobre esta base hay necesidad de estimar los cuatro motivos que
integran este recurso, porque la demanda inicial del pleito a que se contrae no contiene
accion que nazca del incumplimiento del contrato de transporte, toda vez que no se funda
en el retraso de la llegada de las mercancias ni de ningun otro vinculo contractual entre
las partes contendientes, careciendo, por tanto, de aplicacion el articulo 371 del Codigo
de Comercio, en que principalmente descansa el fallo recurrido, sino que se limita a pedir
la reparaction de los daos y perjuicios producidos en el patrimonio del actor por la
injustificada y dolosa negativa del porteador a la entrega de las mercancias a su nombre
consignadas, segun lo reconoce la sentencia, y cuya responsabilidad esta claramente
sancionada en el articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, que obliga por el siguiente a la
Compaia demandada como ligada con el causante de aquellos por relaciones de caracter
economico y de jurarquia administrativa.
Considering that the sentence, in question recognizes, in virtue of the facts which it
declares, in relation to the evidence in the case: (1) that the invoice issued by the railroad
company in favor of the plaintiff contemplated that the empty receptacles referred to in
the complaint should be returned to the consignors with wines and liquors; (2) that when
the said merchandise reached their destination, their delivery to the consignee was
refused by the station agent without justification and with fraudulent intent, and (3) that
the lack of delivery of these goods when they were demanded by the plaintiff caused him
losses and damages of considerable importance, as he was a wholesale vendor of wines
and liquors and he failed to realize the profits when he was unable to fill the orders sent
to him by the consignors of the receptacles:

Considering that upon this basis there is need of upholding the four assignments of error,
as the original complaint did not contain any cause of action arising from non-fulfillment
of a contract of transportation, because the action was not based on the delay of the goods
nor on any contractual relation between the parties litigant and, therefore, article 371 of
the Code of Commerce, on which the decision appealed from is based, is not applicable;
but it limits to asking for reparation for losses and damages produced on the patrimony of
the plaintiff on account of the unjustified and fraudulent refusal of the carrier to deliver
the goods consigned to the plaintiff as stated by the sentence, and the carrier's
responsibility is clearly laid down in article 1902 of the Civil Code which binds, in virtue
of the next article, the defendant company, because the latter is connected with the person
who caused the damage by relations of economic character and by administrative
hierarchy. (Emphasis supplied.)
The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come under both the Penal
Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent was unjustified and fraudulent and
therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a
proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it
was the employer and not the employee who was being sued.
Let us now examine the cases previously decided by this Court.
In the leading case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359, 362-365 [year 1907]),
the trial court awarded damages to the plaintiff, a laborer of the defendant, because the latter had
negligently failed to repair a tramway in consequence of which the rails slid off while iron was
being transported, and caught the plaintiff whose leg was broken. This Court held:
It is contended by the defendant, as its first defense to the action that the necessary
conclusion from these collated laws is that the remedy for injuries through negligence lies
only in a criminal action in which the official criminally responsible must be made
primarily liable and his employer held only subsidiarily to him. According to this theory
the plaintiff should have procured the arrest of the representative of the company
accountable for not repairing the track, and on his prosecution a suitable fine should have
been imposed, payable primarily by him and secondarily by his employer.
This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish codes upon this subject. Article
1093 of the Civil Code makes obligations arising from faults or negligence not punished
by the law, subject to the provisions of Chapter II of Title XVI. Section 1902 of that
chapter reads:
"A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault
or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.

"SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceeding article is demandable, not
only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom
they should be responsible.
"The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is liable for the damages
caused by the minors who live with them.
xxx

xxx

xxx

"Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the

damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the
latter may be employed or in the performance of their duties.
xxx

xxx

xxx

"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned
therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
avoid the damage."
As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it may be sufficient to point
out that nowhere in our general statutes is the employer penalized for failure to provide or
maintain safe appliances for his workmen. His obligation therefore is one 'not punished
by the laws' and falls under civil rather than criminal jurisprudence. But the answer may
be a broader one. We should be reluctant, under any conditions, to adopt a forced
construction of these scientific codes, such as is proposed by the defendant, that would
rob some of these articles of effect, would shut out litigants against their will from the
civil courts, would make the assertion of their rights dependent upon the selection for
prosecution of the proper criminal offender, and render recovery doubtful by reason of
the strict rules of proof prevailing in criminal actions. Even if these articles had always
stood alone, such a construction would be unnecessary, but clear light is thrown upon
their meaning by the provisions of the Law of Criminal Procedure of Spain (Ley de
Enjuiciamiento Criminal), which, though never in actual force in these Islands, was
formerly given a suppletory or explanatory effect. Under article 111 of this law, both
classes of action, civil and criminal, might be prosecuted jointly or separately, but while
the penal action was pending the civil was suspended. According to article 112, the penal
action once started, the civil remedy should be sought therewith, unless it had been
waived by the party injured or been expressly reserved by him for civil proceedings for
the future. If the civil action alone was prosecuted, arising out of a crime that could be
enforced only on private complaint, the penal action thereunder should be extinguished.
These provisions are in harmony with those of articles 23 and 133 of our Penal Code on
the same subject.

An examination of this topic might be carried much further, but the citation of these
articles suffices to show that the civil liability was not intended to be merged in the
criminal nor even to be suspended thereby, except as expressly provided in the law.
Where an individual is civilly liable for a negligent act or omission, it is not required that
the injured party should seek out a third person criminally liable whose prosecution must
be a condition precedent to the enforcement of the civil right.
Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an employer may be
regarded as subsidiary in respect of criminal actions against his employees only
while they are in process of prosecution, or in so far as they determine the existence
of the criminal act from which liability arises, and his obligation under the civil law
and its enforcement in the civil courts is not barred thereby unless by the election of
the injured person. Inasmuch as no criminal proceeding had been instituted, growing
our of the accident in question, the provisions of the Penal Code can not affect this action.
This construction renders it unnecessary to finally determine here whether this subsidiary
civil liability in penal actions has survived the laws that fully regulated it or has been
abrogated by the American civil and criminal procedure now in force in the Philippines.
The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited in this case appears from
the briefs before us to have arisen from the interpretation of the words of article 1093,
"fault or negligence not punished by law," as applied to the comprehensive definition of
offenses in articles 568 and 590 of the Penal Code. It has been shown that the liability of
an employer arising out of his relation to his employee who is the offender is not to be
regarded as derived from negligence punished by the law, within the meaning of articles
1902 and 1093. More than this, however, it cannot be said to fall within the class of acts
unpunished by the law, the consequence of which are regulated by articles 1902 and 1903
of the Civil Code. The acts to which these articles are applicable are understood to be
those not growing out of pre-existing duties of the parties to one another. But where
relations already formed give rise to duties, whether springing from contract or quasi
contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the
same code. A typical application of this distinction may be found in the consequences of a
railway accident due to defective machinery supplied by the employer. His liability to his
employee would arise out of the contract of employment, that to the passengers out of the
contract for passage, while that to the injured bystander would originate in the negligent
act itself.
In Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821 (year 1918), the mother of the 8 of 9-year-old child
Salvador Bona brought a civil action against Moreta to recover damages resulting from the death
of the child, who had been run over by an automobile driven and managed by the defendant. The
trial court rendered judgment requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,000 as
indemnity: This Court in affirming the judgment, said in part:

If it were true that the defendant, in coming from the southern part of Solana Street, had
to stop his auto before crossing Real Street, because he had met vehicles which were
going along the latter street or were coming from the opposite direction along Solana
Street, it is to be believed that, when he again started to run his auto across said Real
Street and to continue its way along Solana Street northward, he should have adjusted the
speed of the auto which he was operating until he had fully crossed Real Street and had
completely reached a clear way on Solana Street. But, as the child was run over by the
auto precisely at the entrance of Solana Street, this accident could not have occurred if
the auto had been running at a slow speed, aside from the fact that the defendant, at the
moment of crossing Real Street and entering Solana Street, in a northward direction,
could have seen the child in the act of crossing the latter street from the sidewalk on the
right to that on the left, and if the accident had occurred in such a way that after the
automobile had run over the body of the child, and the child's body had already been
stretched out on the ground, the automobile still moved along a distance of about 2
meters, this circumstance shows the fact that the automobile entered Solana Street from
Real Street, at a high speed without the defendant having blown the horn. If these
precautions had been taken by the defendant, the deplorable accident which caused the
death of the child would not have occurred.
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal
case because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code.
Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject-matter
either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely
separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individually of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the
Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which
the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after
such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.
Years later (in 1930) this Court had another occasion to apply the same doctrine. In Bernal and
Enverso vs. House and Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., 54 Phil., 327, the parents of the fiveyear-old child, Purificacion Bernal, brought a civil action to recover damages for the child's
death as a result of burns caused by the fault and negligence of the defendants. On the evening of
April 10, 1925, the Good Friday procession was held in Tacloban, Leyte. Fortunata Enverso with
her daughter Purificacion Bernal had come from another municipality to attend the same. After
the procession the mother and the daughter with two others were passing along Gran Capitan
Street in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., owned by defendants J. V.
House, when an automobile appeared from the opposite direction. The little girl, who was
slightly ahead of the rest, was so frightened by the automobile that she turned to run, but
unfortunately she fell into the street gutter where hot water from the electric plant was flowing.
The child died that same night from the burns. The trial courts dismissed the action because of

the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. But this Court held, on appeal, that there was no
contributory negligence, and allowed the parents P1,000 in damages from J. V. House who at the
time of the tragic occurrence was the holder of the franchise for the electric plant. This Court
said in part:
Although the trial judge made the findings of fact hereinbefore outlined, he nevertheless
was led to order the dismissal of the action because of the contributory negligence of the
plaintiffs. It is from this point that a majority of the court depart from the stand taken by
the trial judge. The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of
Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the religious procession was held. There was
nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother.
No one could foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened
child running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water. The doctrine announced in the
much debated case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907]), 7 Phil., 359), still
rule. Article 1902 of the Civil Code must again be enforced. The contributory negligence
of the child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest
sense could only result in reduction of the damages.
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902 of the
Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for
reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also made civilly liable because of his
criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil action for
fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes (30 Phil., 624 [year 1915), the action was for damages for the
death of the plaintiff's daughter alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the servant in
driving an automobile over the child. It appeared that the cause of the mishap was a defect in the
steering gear. The defendant Leynes had rented the automobile from the International Garage of
Manila, to be used by him in carrying passengers during the fiesta of Tuy, Batangas. Leynes was
ordered by the lower court to pay P1,000 as damages to the plaintiff. On appeal this Court
reversed the judgment as to Leynes on the ground that he had shown that the exercised the care
of a good father of a family, thus overcoming the presumption of negligence under article 1903.
This Court said:
As to selection, the defendant has clearly shown that he exercised the care and diligence
of a good father of a family. He obtained the machine from a reputable garage and it was,
so far as appeared, in good condition. The workmen were likewise selected from a
standard garage, were duly licensed by the Government in their particular calling, and
apparently thoroughly competent. The machine had been used but a few hours when the
accident occurred and it is clear from the evidence that the defendant had no notice, either
actual or constructive, of the defective condition of the steering gear.

The legal aspect of the case was discussed by this Court thus:
Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in cases of negligence, but
also provides when the liability shall cease. It says:
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned
therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
avoid the damage."
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the
negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there
was negligence on the part of the matter or employer either in the selection of the servant
or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that
presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It
follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in
selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a
family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieve from liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and
not on that of his servant.
The doctrine of the case just cited was followed by this Court in Cerf vs. Medel (33 Phil., 37
[year 1915]). In the latter case, the complaint alleged that the defendant's servant had so
negligently driven an automobile, which was operated by defendant as a public vehicle, that said
automobile struck and damaged the plaintiff's motorcycle. This Court, applying article 1903 and
following the rule in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, said in part (p. 41) that:
The master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant where he is the owner or director
of a business or enterprise and the negligent acts are committed while the servant is
engaged in his master's employment as such owner.
Another case which followed the decision in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes was Cuison vs.
Norton & Harrison Co., 55 Phil., 18 (year 1930). The latter case was an action for damages
brought by Cuison for the death of his seven-year-old son Moises. The little boy was on his way
to school with his sister Marciana. Some large pieces of lumber fell from a truck and pinned the
boy underneath, instantly killing him. Two youths, Telesforo Binoya and Francisco Bautista, who
were working for Ora, an employee of defendant Norton & Harrison Co., pleaded guilty to the
crime of homicide through reckless negligence and were sentenced accordingly. This Court,
applying articles 1902 and 1903, held:

The basis of civil law liability is not respondent superior but the relationship of pater
familias. This theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on his own negligence
and not on that of his servant. (Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes [1915], 30 Phil., 624;
Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co. [1918], 38 Phil., 768.)
In Walter A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55 Phil., 517 (year 1930) the
plaintiff brought an action for damages for the demolition of its wharf, which had been struck by
the steamer Helen C belonging to the defendant. This Court held (p. 526):
The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time the plaintiff's wharf collapsed was a
duly licensed captain, authorized to navigate and direct a vessel of any tonnage, and that
the appellee contracted his services because of his reputation as a captain, according to F.
C. Cadwallader. This being so, we are of the opinion that the presumption of liability
against the defendant has been overcome by the exercise of the care and diligence of a
good father of a family in selecting Captain Lasa, in accordance with the doctrines laid
down by this court in the cases cited above, and the defendant is therefore absolved from
all liability.
It is, therefore, seen that the defendant's theory about his secondary liability is negatived by the
six cases above set forth. He is, on the authority of these cases, primarily and directly responsible
in damages under article 1903, in relation to article 1902, of the Civil Code.
Let us now take up the Philippine decisions relied upon by the defendant. We study first, City of
Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., 52 Phil., 586 (year 1928). A collision between a truck of the City
of Manila and a street car of the Manila Electric Co. took place on June 8, 1925. The truck was
damaged in the amount of P1,788.27. Sixto Eustaquio, the motorman, was prosecuted for the
crime of damage to property and slight injuries through reckless imprudence. He was found
guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of P900, to indemnify the City of Manila for P1,788.27, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Unable to collect the indemnity from Eustaquio,
the City of Manila filed an action against the Manila Electric Company to obtain payment,
claiming that the defendant was subsidiarily liable. The main defense was that the defendant had
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. The lower court
rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. This Court held, in part, that this case was governed
by the Penal Code, saying:
With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no escaping the conclusion that the
provisions of the Penal Code govern. The Penal Code in easily understandable language
authorizes the determination of subsidiary liability. The Civil Code negatives its
application by providing that civil obligations arising from crimes or misdemeanors shall
be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code. The conviction of the motorman was a
misdemeanor falling under article 604 of the Penal Code. The act of the motorman was

not a wrongful or negligent act or omission not punishable by law. Accordingly, the civil
obligation connected up with the Penal Code and not with article 1903 of the Civil Code.
In other words, the Penal Code affirms its jurisdiction while the Civil Code negatives its
jurisdiction. This is a case of criminal negligence out of which civil liability arises and
not a case of civil negligence.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Our deduction, therefore, is that the case relates to the Penal Code and not to the Civil
Code. Indeed, as pointed out by the trial judge, any different ruling would permit the
master to escape scot-free by simply alleging and proving that the master had exercised
all diligence in the selection and training of its servants to prevent the damage. That
would be a good defense to a strictly civil action, but might or might not be to a civil
action either as a part of or predicated on conviction for a crime or misdemeanor. (By
way of parenthesis, it may be said further that the statements here made are offered to
meet the argument advanced during our deliberations to the effect that article 0902 of the
Civil Code should be disregarded and codal articles 1093 and 1903 applied.)
It is not clear how the above case could support the defendant's proposition, because the Court of
Appeals based its decision in the present case on the defendant's primary responsibility under
article 1903 of the Civil Code and not on his subsidiary liability arising from Fontanilla's
criminal negligence. In other words, the case of City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., supra, is
predicated on an entirely different theory, which is the subsidiary liability of an employer arising
from a criminal act of his employee, whereas the foundation of the decision of the Court of
Appeals in the present case is the employer's primary liability under article 1903 of the Civil
Code. We have already seen that this is a proper and independent remedy.
Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co. (55 Phil., 75), is another case invoked by the defendant. A
motorman in the employ of the Manila Electric Company had been convicted o homicide by
simple negligence and sentenced, among other things, to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of
P1,000. An action was then brought to enforce the subsidiary liability of the defendant as
employer under the Penal Code. The defendant attempted to show that it had exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in selecting the motorman, and therefore claimed
exemption from civil liability. But this Court held:
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold, (1) that

the
exemption from civil liability established in article 1903 of the
Civil Code for all who have acted with the diligence of a good

father of a family, is not applicable to the subsidiary civil

liability provided in article 20 of the Penal Code.
The above case is also extraneous to the theory of the defendant in the instant case, because the
action there had for its purpose the enforcement of the defendant's subsidiary liability under the
Penal Code, while in the case at bar, the plaintiff's cause of action is based on the defendant's
primary and direct responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code. In fact, the above case
destroys the defendant's contention because that decision illustrates the principle that the
employer's primary responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code is different in character
from his subsidiary liability under the Penal Code.
In trying to apply the two cases just referred to, counsel for the defendant has failed to recognize
the distinction between civil liability arising from a crime, which is governed by the Penal Code,
and the responsibility for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code, and has likewise
failed to give the importance to the latter type of civil action.
The defendant-petitioner also cites Francisco vs. Onrubia (46 Phil., 327). That case need not be
set forth. Suffice it to say that the question involved was also civil liability arising from a crime.
Hence, it is as inapplicable as the two cases above discussed.
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa
aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction between civil
liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for
fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act
may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate
responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more
concretely, the authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer in
this case the defendant-petitioner is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of the
Civil Code.
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to
dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little
understood in the past, it might not be inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple
negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or
negligence not punished by law, according to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code,
the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life.
Death or injury to persons and damage to property through any degree of negligence even the
slightest would have to be indemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising
from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa

aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so
absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter
that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to
smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown
development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is
required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay
in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown
beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases,
the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to
1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil
wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability effective, and that is, to
sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be tantamount to compelling the
plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining relief. True, there is such a
remedy under our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which is based on the primary
and direct responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of the
law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because the procedure indicated by the
defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of common knowledge that
professional drivers of taxis and similar public conveyance usually do not have sufficient means
with which to pay damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go through
this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless procedure? In construing the laws, courts
have endeavored to shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and justice.
At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of employers and
their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Workmen and employees
should be carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters
or employers who principally reap the profits resulting from the services of these servants
and employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the latter's careful conduct for the
personnel and patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said, "they should reproach
themselves, at least, some for their weakness, others for their poor selection and all for their
negligence." And according to Manresa, "It is much more equitable and just that such
responsibility should fall upon the principal or director who could have chosen a careful and
prudent employee, and not upon the injured person who could not exercise such selection and
who used such employee because of his confidence in the principal or director." (Vol. 12, p. 622,
2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this primary responsibility of the employer on the principle of
representation of the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work already cited (Vol. 7,
p. 747) that before third persons the employer and employee "vienen a ser como una sola

personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente en la de quien le emplea y utiliza." ("become

as one personality by the merging of the person of the employee in that of him who employs and
utilizes him.") All these observations acquire a peculiar force and significance when it comes to
motor accidents, and there is need of stressing and accentuating the responsibility of owners of
motor vehicles.
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil
Code on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already
discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa
aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil
responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking
articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by our laws, it
has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective
remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to
help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harm done
by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under
articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of
quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no
longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for
the better safeguarding of private rights because it re-establishes an ancient and additional
remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues,
limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or
his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be and is hereby affirmed,
with costs against the defendant-petitioner.
G.R. No. L-41423 February 23, 1989
LUIS JOSEPH, petitioner
vs.
HON. CRISPIN V. BAUTISTA, PATROCINIO PEREZ, ANTONIO SIOSON, JACINTO
PAGARIGAN, ALBERTO CARDENO and LAZARO VILLANUEVA, respondents.
Jose M. Castillo for petitioner.
Arturo Z. Sioson for private respondent, Patrocinio Perez.
Cipriano B. Farrales for private respondents except P. Perez.

REGALAD0, J.:
Petitioner prays in this appeal by certiorari for the annulment and setting aside of the
order, dated July 8, 1975, dismissing petitioner's complaint, as well as the order, dated
August 22, 1975, denying his motion for reconsideration of said dismissal, both issued
by respondent Judge Crispin V. Bautista of the former Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, Branch III.
Petitioner herein is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 50-V-73 entitled "Luis Joseph vs.
Patrocinio Perez, Domingo Villa y de Jesus, Rosario Vargas, Antonio Sioson, Lazaro
Villanueva and Jacinto Pagarigan", filed before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
Branch III, and presided over by respondent Judge Crispin V. Bautista; while private
respondents Patrocinio Perez, Antonio Sioson, Jacinto Pagarigan and Lazaro
Villanueva are four of the defendants in said case. Defendant Domingo Villa y de Jesus
did not answer either the original or the amended complaint, while defendant Rosario
Vargas could not be served with summons; and respondent Alberto Cardeno is included
herein as he was impleaded by defendant Patrocinio Perez, one of respondents herein,
in her cross-claim.
The generative facts of this case, as culled from the written submission of the parties,
are as follows:
Respondent Patrocinio Perez is the owner of a cargo truck with Plate No. 25-2 YT Phil.
'73 for conveying cargoes and passengers for a consideration from Dagupan City to
Manila. On January 12, 1973, said cargo truck driven by defendant Domingo Villa was
on its way to Valenzuela, Bulacan from Pangasinan. Petitioner, with a cargo of
livestock, boarded the cargo truck at Dagupan City after paying the sum of P 9.00
as one way fare to Valenzuela, Bulacan. While said cargo truck was negotiating the
National Highway proceeding towards Manila, defendant Domingo Villa tried to overtake
a tricycle likewise proceeding in the same direction. At about the same time, a pick-up
truck with Plate No. 45-95 B, supposedly owned by respondents Antonio Sioson and
Jacinto Pagarigan, then driven by respondent Lazaro Villanueva, tried to overtake the
cargo truck which was then in the process of overtaking the tricycle, thereby forcing the
cargo truck to veer towards the shoulder of the road and to ram a mango tree. As a
result, petitioner sustained a bone fracture in one of his legs. 1
The following proceedings thereafter took place:

Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against respondent Patrocinio Perez, as owner
of the cargo truck, based on a breach of contract of carriage and against respondents

Antonio Sioson and Lazaro Villanueva, as owner and driver, respectively, of the pick-up
truck, based on quasi-delict.
Respondent Sioson filed his answer alleging that he is not and never was an owner of
the pick-up truck and neither would he acquire ownership thereof in the future.
On September 24, 1973, petitioner, with prior leave of court, filed his amended
complaint impleading respondents Jacinto Pagarigan and a certain Rosario Vargas as
additional alternative defendants. Petitioner apparently could not ascertain who the real
owner of said cargo truck was, whether respondents Patrocinio Perez or Rosario
Vargas, and who was the real owner of said pick-up truck, whether respondents Antonio
Sioson or Jacinto Pagarigan.
Respondent Perez filed her amended answer with crossclaim against her co-defendants
for indemnity and subrogation in the event she is ordered to pay petitioner's claim, and
therein impleaded cross-defendant Alberto Cardeno as additional alternative defendant.
On September 27, 1974, respondents Lazaro Villanueva, Alberto Cardeno, Antonio
Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan, thru their insurer, Insurance Corporation of the
Philippines, paid petitioner's claim for injuries sustained in the amount of P 1,300.00. By
reason thereof, petitioner executed a release of claim releasing from liability the
following parties, viz: Insurance Corporation of the Philippines, Alberto Cardeno, Lazaro
Villanueva, Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan.
On December 2, 1974, respondents Lazaro Villanueva, Alberto Cardeno and their
insurer, the Insurance Corporation of the Philippines, paid respondent Patrocinio Perez'
claim for damages to her cargo truck in the amount of P 7,420.61.
Consequently, respondents Sioson, Pagarigan, Cardeno and Villanueva filed a "Motion
to Exonerate and Exclude Defs/ Cross defs. Alberto Cardeno, Lazaro Villanueva,
Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan on the Instant Case", alleging that respondents
Cardeno and Villanueva already paid P 7,420.61 by way of damages to respondent
Perez, and alleging further that respondents Cardeno, Villanueva, Sioson and
Pagarigan paid P 1,300.00 to petitioner by way of amicable settlement.
Thereafter, respondent Perez filed her "Opposition to Cross-defs.' motion dated Dec. 2,
1974 and Counter Motion" to dismiss. The so-called counter motion to dismiss was
premised on the fact that the release of claim executed by petitioner in favor of the other
respondents inured to the benefit of respondent Perez, considering that all the
respondents are solidarity liable to herein petitioner.

On July 8, 1975, respondent judge issued the questioned order dismissing the case,
and a motion for the reconsideration thereof was denied. Hence, this appeal, petitioner
contending that respondent judge erred in declaring that the release of claim executed
by petitioner in favor of respondents Sioson, Villanueva and Pagarigan inured to the
benefit of respondent Perez; ergo, it likewise erred in dismissing the case.
We find the present recourse devoid of merit.
The argument that there are two causes of action embodied in petitioner's complaint,
hence the judgment on the compromise agreement under the cause of action based on
quasi-delict is not a bar to the cause of action for breach of contract of carriage, is
untenable. (Petitioners argument: the claim under a compromise agreement
based on quasi delict is not a bar for a claim in an action for breach of contract)
A cause of action is understood to be the delict or wrongful act or omission committed
by the defendant in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff. 3 It is true that a single
act or omission can be violative of various rights at the same time, as when the
act constitutes juridically a violation of several separate and distinct legal
obligations. However where there is only one delict or wrong, there is but a single
cause of action regardless of the number of rights that may have been violated
belonging to one person. 4
The singleness of a cause of action lies in the singleness of the- delict or wrong
violating the rights of one person. Nevertheless, if only one injury resulted from
several wrongful acts, only one cause of action arises. 5 In the case at bar, there is
no question that the petitioner sustained a single injury on his person. That vested in
him a single cause of action, albeit with the correlative rights of action against the
different respondents through the appropriate remedies allowed by law.
The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that there was only one cause of action
involved although the bases of recovery invoked by petitioner against the defendants
therein were not necessarily Identical since the respondents were not identically
circumstanced. However, a recovery by the petitioner under one remedy
necessarily bars recovery under the other. This, in essence, is the rationale for the
proscription in our law against double recovery for the same act or omission which,
obviously, stems from the fundamental rule against unjust enrichment.
There is no question that the respondents herein are solidarily liable to petitioner. On
the evidence presented in the court below, the trial court found them to be so liable. It is
undisputed that petitioner, in his amended complaint, prayed that the trial court hold
respondents jointly and severally liable. Furthermore, the allegations in the amended

complaint clearly impleaded respondents as solidary debtors. We cannot accept the

vacuous contention of petitioner that said allegations are intended to apply only in the
event that execution be issued in his favor. There is nothing in law or jurisprudence
which would countenance such a procedure.
The respondents having been found to be solidarity liable to petitioner, the full payment
made by some of the solidary debtors and their subsequent release from any and all
liability to petitioner inevitably resulted in the extinguishment and release from liability of
the other solidary debtors, including herein respondent Patrocinio Perez.
The claim that there was an agreement entered into between the parties during the pretrial conference that, after such payment made by the other respondents, the case shall
proceed as against respondent Perez is both incredible and unsubstantiated. There is
nothing in the records to show, either by way of a pre-trial order, minutes or a transcript
of the notes of the alleged pre-trial hearing, that there was indeed such as agreement.
WHEREFORE, the challenged orders of the respondent judge are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 129029 April 3, 2000
RAFAEL REYES TRUCKING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ROSARIO P. DY (for herself and on behalf of the
minors Maria Luisa, Francis Edward, Francis Mark and Francis Rafael, all surnamed Dy),
respondents.
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the amended decision 1 of the Court of Appeals2
affirming the decision and supplemental decision of the trial court,3 as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the
appeals interposed by both accused and Reyes Trucking Corporation and
affirming the Decision and Supplemental Decision dated June 6, 1992 and
October 26, 1992 respectively.
SO ORDERED.4
The facts are as follows:

On October 10, 1989, Provincial Prosecutor Patricio T. Durian of Isabela filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Isabela, Branch 19, Cauayan an amended information charging Romeo Dunca y de
Tumol with reckless imprudence resulting in double homicide and damage to property, reading
as follows:
That on or about the 20th day of June, 1989, in the Municipality of Cauayan,
Province of Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused being the driver and person-in-charge of a Trailer Truck
Tractor bearing Plate No. N2A-867 registered in the name of Rafael Reyes
Trucking Corporation, with a load of 2,000 cases of empty bottles of beer grande,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drove and operated the same while along the
National Highway of Barangay Tagaran, in said Municipality, in a negligent,
careless and imprudent manner, without due regard to traffic laws, rules and
ordinances and without taking the necessary precautions to prevent injuries to
persons and damage to property, causing by such negligence, carelessness and
imprudence the said trailer truck to hit and bump a Nissan Pick-up bearing Plate
No. BBG-957 driven by Feliciano Balcita and Francisco Dy, Jr., @ Pacquing, due
to irreversible shock, internal and external hemorrhage and multiple injuries, open
wounds, abrasions, and further causing damages to the heirs of Feliciano Balcita
in the amount of P100,000.00 and to the death of Francisco Dy, Jr.; @ Pacquing
and damages to his Nissan Pick-Up bearing Plate No. BBG-957 in the total
amount of P2,000,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Cauayan, Isabela, October 10, 1989.
(Sgd.) FAUSTO C. CABANTAC
Third Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Upon arraignment on October 23, 1989, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. On the same
occasion, the offended parties (Rosario P. Dy and minor children and Angelina M. Balcita and
minor son Paolo) made a reservation to file a separate civil action against the accused arising
from the offense charged.5 On November 29, 1989, the offended parties actually filed with
the Regional Trial Court, Isabela, Branch 19, Cauayan a complaint against petitioner
Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as employer of driver Romeo Dunca y de Tumol,
based on quasi delict. The petitioner settled the claim of the heirs of Feliciano Balcita (the driver
of the other vehicle involved in the accident). The private respondents opted to pursue the
criminal action but did not withdraw the civil case quasi ex delicto they filed against petitioner.
On December 15, 1989, private respondents withdrew the reservation to file a separate civil

action against the accused and manifested that they would prosecute the civil aspect ex delicto in
the criminal action.6 However, they did not withdraw the separate civil action based on quasi
delict against petitioner as employer arising from the same act or omission of the accused driver.7
Upon agreement of the parties, the trial court consolidated both criminal and civil cases and
conducted a joint trial of the same.
The facts, as found by the trial court, which appear to be undisputed, are as follows:
The defendant Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation is a domestic corporation
engaged in the business of transporting beer products for the San Miguel
Corporation (SMC for Short) from the latter's San Fernando, Pampanga plant to
its various sales outlets in Luzon. Among its fleets of vehicles for hire is the white
truck trailer described above driven by Romeo Dunca y Tumol, a duly licensed
driver. Aside from the Corporation's memorandum to all its drivers and helpers to
physically inspect their vehicles before each trip (Exh. 15, pars. 4 & 5), the SMC's
Traffic Investigator-Inspector certified the roadworthiness of this White Truck
trailer prior to June 20, 1989 (Exh. 17). In addition to a professional driver's
license, it also conducts a rigid examination of all driver applicants before they
are hired.
In the early morning of June 20, 1989, the White Truck driven by Dunca left
Tuguegarao, Cagayan bound to San Fernando, Pampanga loaded with 2,000 cases
of empty beer "Grande" bottles. Seated at the front right seat beside him was
Ferdinand Domingo, his truck helper ("pahinante" in Pilipino). At around 4:00
o'clock that same morning while the truck was descending at a slight downgrade
along the national road at Tagaran, Cauayan, Isabela, it approached a damaged
portion of the road covering the full width of the truck's right lane going south and
about six meters in length. These made the surface of the road uneven because the
potholes were about five to six inches deep. The left lane parallel to this damaged
portion is smooth. As narrated by Ferdinand Domingo, before approaching the
potholes, he and Dunca saw the Nissan with its headlights on coming from the
opposite direction. They used to evade this damaged road by taking the left lance
but at that particular moment, because of the incoming vehicle, they had to run
over it. This caused the truck to bounce wildly. Dunca lost control of the wheels
and the truck swerved to the left invading the lane of the Nissan. As a result,
Dunca's vehicle rammed the incoming Nissan dragging it to the left shoulder of
the road and climbed a ridge above said shoulder where it finally stopped. (see
Exh. A-5, p. 8, record). The Nissan was severely damaged (Exhs. A-7, A-8, A-9
and A-14, pp. 9-11 record), and its two passengers, namely: Feliciano Balcita and

Francisco Dy, Jr. died instantly (Exh. A-19) from external and internal
hemorrhage and multiple fractures (pp. 15 and 16, record).
For the funeral expenses of Francisco Dy, Jr. her widow spent P651,360.00 (Exh.
I-3). At the time of his death he was 45 years old. He was the President and
Chairman of the Board of the Dynamic Wood Products and Development
Corporation (DWPC), a wood processing establishment, from which he was
receiving an income of P10,000.00 a month. (Exh. D). In the Articles of
Incorporation of the DWPC, the spouses Francisco Dy, Jr. and Rosario Perez Dy
appear to be stockholders of 10,000 shares each with par value of P100.00 per
share out of its outstanding and subscribed capital stock of 60,000 shares valued
at P6,000,000.00 (Exhs. K-1 & 10-B). Under its 1988 Income Tax Returns (Exh.
J) the DWPC had a taxable net income of P78,499.30 (Exh. J). Francisco Dy, Jr.
was a La Salle University graduate in Business Administration, past president of
the Pasay Jaycees, National Treasurer and President of the Philippine Jaycees in
1971 and 1976, respectively, and World Vice-President of Jaycees International in
1979. He was also the recipient of numerous awards as a civic leader (Exh. C).
His children were all studying in prestigious schools and spent about P180,000.00
for their education in 1988 alone (Exh. H-4).
As stated earlier, the plaintiffs' procurement of a writ of attachment of the
properties of the Corporation was declared illegal by the Court of Appeals. It was
shown that on December 26, 1989, Deputy Sheriff Edgardo Zabat of the RTC at
San Fernando, Pampanga, attached six units of Truck Tractors and trailers of the
Corporation at its garage at San Fernando, Pampanga. These vehicles were kept
under PC guard by the plaintiffs in said garage thus preventing the Corporation to
operate them. However, on December 28, 1989, the Court of Appeals dissolved
the writ (p. 30, record) and on December 29, 1989, said Sheriff reported to this
Court that the attached vehicles were taken by the defendant's representative,
Melita Manapil (Exh. O, p. 31, record). The defendant's general Manager declared
that it lost P21,000.00 per day for the non-operation of the six units during their
attachment (p. 31, t.s.n., Natividad C. Babaran, proceedings on December 10,
1990).8
On June 6, 1992, the trial court rendered a joint decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations judgment is hereby
rendered:

1. Finding the accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Double Homicide through Reckless Imprudence with violation of
the Motor Vehicle Law (Rep. Act No. 4136), and appreciating in his favor the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender without any aggravating
circumstance to offset the same, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer two (2)
indeterminate penalties of four months and one day of arresto mayor as minimum
to three years, six months and twenty days as maximum; to indemnify the Heirs
of Francisco Dy. Jr. in the amount of P3,000,000.00 as compensatory damages,
P1,000,000.00 as moral damages, and P1,030,000.00 as funeral expenses;
2. Ordering the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Br. 19-424 to pay the defendant therein
actual damages in the amount of P84,000.00; and
3. Ordering the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. Br. 19-424.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cauayan, Isabela, June 6, 1992.
(Sgd.) ARTEMIO R. ALIVIA
Regional Trial Judge9
On September 3, 1992, petitioner and the accused filed a notice of appeal from the joint decision.
10

On the other hand, private respondents moved for amendment of the dispositive portion of the
joint decision so as to hold petitioner subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded to the private
respondents in the event of insolvency of the accused. 11 ---granted
On October 26, 1992, the trial court rendered a supplemental decision amending the dispositive
portion by inserting an additional paragraph reading as follows:
2:A Ordering the defendant Reyes Trucking Corporation subsidiarily liable for
all the damages awarded to the heirs of Francisco Dy, Jr., in the event of
insolvency of the accused but deducting therefrom the damages of P84,000.00
awarded to said defendant in the next preceding paragraph; and . . . 12
On November 12, 1992, petitioner filed with the trial court a supplemental notice of appeal from
the supplemental decision. 13

During the pendency of the appeal, the accused jumped bail and fled to a foreign country. By
resolution dated December 29, 1994, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of the accused in
the criminal case. 14
On January 6, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered an amended decision affirming that of the
trial court, as set out in the opening paragraph of this decision. 15
On January 31, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the amended decision. 16
On April 21, 1997, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit 17
Hence, this petition for review. 18
On July 21, 1997, the Court required respondents to comment on the petition within ten (10)
days from notice. 19
On January 27, 1998, the Solicitor General filed his comment. 20 On April 13, 1998, the Court
granted leave to petitioner to file a reply and noted the reply it filed on March 11, 1998. 21
We now resolve to give due course to the petition and decide the case.
Petitioner raises three (3) grounds for allowance of the petition, which, however, boil down to
two (2) basic issues, namely:
1. May petitioner as owner of the truck involved in the accident be
held subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded to the offended
parties in the criminal action against the truck driver despite the
filing of a separate civil action by the offended parties against the
employer of the truck driver?
2. May the Court award damages to the offended parties in the
criminal case despite the filing of a civil action against the
employer of the truck driver; and in amounts exceeding that
alleged in the information for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide and damage to property? 22
We grant the petition, resolving under the circumstances pro hac vice to remand the cases to the
trial court for determination of the civil liability of petitioner as employer of the accused driver in
the civil action quasi ex delicto re-opened for the purpose.

In negligence cases, the aggrieved party has the choice between (1) an action
to enforce civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code; and (2) a separate action for quasi delict under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. Once the choice is made, the injured party can
not avail himself of any other remedy because he may not recover damages
twice for the same negligent act or omission of the accused. 23 This is the rule
against double recovery.1wphi1.nt
In other words, "the same act or omission can create two kinds of liability on the part of
the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto, and civil liability quasi delicto" either of which
"may be enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil
Code that the offended party can not recover damages under both types of liability." 24
In the instant case, the offended parties elected to file a separate civil action for damages against
petitioner as employer of the accused, based on quasi delict, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines. Private respondents sued petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as the
employer of the accused, to be vicariously liable for the fault or negligence of the latter. Under
the law, this vicarious liability of the employer is founded on at least two specific provisions
of law.
The first is expressed in Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which
would allow an action predicated on quasi-delict to be instituted by the injured party
against the employer for an act or omission of the employee and would necessitate only a
preponderance of evidence to prevail. Here, the liability of the employer for the

negligent conduct of the subordinate is direct and primary, subject to the

defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. The
enforcement of the judgment against the employer in an action based on
Article 2176 does not require the employee to be insolvent since the nature of
the liability of the employer with that of the employee, the two being
statutorily considered joint tortfeasors, is solidary. 25 The second, predicated on
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, provides that an employer may be held subsidiarily
civilly liable for a felony committed by his employee in the discharge of his duty. This liability
attaches when the employee is convicted of a crime done in the performance of his work and is
found to be insolvent that renders him unable to properly respond to the civil liability adjudged.
26

As regards the first issue, the answer is in the negative. Rafael Reyes Trucking
Corporation, as employer of the accused who has been adjudged guilty in the criminal case
for reckless imprudence, can not be held subsidiarily liable because of the filing of the

separate civil action based on quasi delict against it. In view of the reservation to file, and the
subsequent filing of the civil action for recovery of civil liability, the same was not instituted
with the criminal action. Such separate civil action was for recovery of damages under Article
2176 of the Civil Code, arising from the same act or omission of the accused. 27
Pursuant to the provision of Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, when private respondents, as

complainants in the criminal action,

reserved the right to file the separate civil action, they waived other
available civil actions predicated on the same act or omission of the
accused-driver. Such civil action includes the recovery of indemnity under the Revised
Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
arising from the same act or omission of the accused. 28
The intention of private respondents to proceed primarily and directly against petitioner as
employer of accused truck driver became clearer when they did not ask for the dismissal of the
civil action against the latter based on quasi delict.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals and the trial court erred in holding the accused civilly liable,
and petitioner-employer of the accused subsidiarily liable for damages arising from crime (ex
delicto) in the criminal action as the offended parties in fact filed a separate civil action against
the employer based on quasi delict resulting in the waiver of the civil action ex delicto.
It might be argued that private respondents as complainants in the criminal case withdrew the
reservation to file a civil action against the driver (accused) and manifested that they would
pursue the civil liability of the driver in the criminal action. However, the withdrawal is
ineffective to reverse the effect of the reservation earlier made because private respondents did
not withdraw the civil action against petitioner based on quasi delict. In such a case, the
provision of Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure is clear
that the reservation to file or the filing of a separate civil action results in a waiver of other
available civil actions arising from the same act or omission of the accused. Rule 111, Section 1,
paragraph 2 enumerated what are the civil actions deemed waived upon such reservation or
filing, and one of which is the civil indemnity under the Revised Penal Code. Rule 111, Section
1, paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure specifically provides:
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or
the reservation of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the
others.

The rationale behind this rule is the avoidance of multiple suits between the
same litigants arising out of the same act or omission of the offender. The

restrictive phraseology of the section under consideration is meant to cover all kinds of civil
actions, regardless of their source in law, provided that the action has for its basis the same act or
omission of the offender. 29
However, petitioner as defendant in the separate civil action for damages filed against it, based
on quasi delict, may be held liable thereon. Thus, the trial court grievously erred in dismissing
plaintiff's civil complaint. And the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's decision.
Unfortunately private respondents did not appeal from such dismissal and could not be granted
affirmative relief. 30
The Court, however, in exceptional cases has relaxed the rules "in order to promote their
objectives and assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action or proceeding" 31 or exempted "a particular case from the operation of the rules." 32
Invoking this principle, we rule that the trial court erred in awarding civil damages in the
criminal case and in dismissing the civil action. Apparently satisfied with such award, private
respondent did not appeal from the dismissal of the civil case. However, petitioner did appeal.
Hence, this case should be remanded to the trial court so that it may render decision in the
civil case awarding damages as may be warranted by the evidence. 33
With regard to the second issue, the award of damages in the criminal case was improper
because the civil action for the recovery of civil liability was waived in the criminal action
by the filing of a separate civil action against the employer. As enunciated in Ramos vs.
Gonong, 34 "civil indemnity is not part of the penalty for the crime committed." The only issue
brought before the trial court in the criminal action is whether accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol
is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property. The action for
recovery of civil liability is not included therein, but is covered by the separate civil action filed
against the petitioner as employer of the accused truck-driver.
In this case, accused-driver jumped bail pending his appeal from his conviction. Thus, the
judgment convicting the accused became final and executory, but only insofar as the penalty in
the criminal action is concerned. The damages awarded in the criminal action was invalid
because of its effective waiver. The pronouncement was void because the action for recovery of
the civil liability arising from the crime has been waived in said criminal action.
With respect to the issue that the award of damages in the criminal action exceeded the amount
of damages alleged in the amended information, the issue is de minimis. At any rate, the trial
court erred in awarding damages in the criminal case because by virtue of the reservation of the
right to bring a separate civil action or the filing thereof, "there would be no possibility that the
employer would be held liable because in such a case there would be no pronouncement as to the
civil liability of the accused. 35

As a final note, we reiterate that "the policy against double recovery requires that only one
action be maintained for the same act or omission whether the action is brought against the
employee or against his employer. 36 The injured party must choose which of the available
causes of action for damages he will bring. 37
Parenthetically, the trial court found the accused "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Double Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence with violation of the Motor Vehicle Law (Rep.
Act No. 4136)". There is no such nomenclature of an offense under the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, the trial court was misled to sentence the accused "to suffer two (2) indeterminate penalties
of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, six (6)
months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional, as maximum." This is erroneous because in
reckless imprudence cases, the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the
individual willfull crime or crimes committed, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series of
crimes. 38
Unfortunately, we can no longer correct this judgment even if erroneous, as it is, because it has
become final and executory.
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal negligence "is treated as a mere quasi
offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a question of classification or
terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what
is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous
recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. Much of the confusion has
arisen from the common use of such descriptive phrase as "homicide through reckless
imprudence", and the like; when the strict technical sense is, more accurately, "reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide"; or "simple imprudence causing damages to property"." 39
There is need, therefore, to rectify the designation of the offense without disturbing the imposed
penalty for the guidance of bench and bar in strict adherence to precedent.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and SETS ASIDE the amended decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14448, promulgated on January 6, 1997,
and the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court, Isabela, Branch 19, Cauayan, in Criminal Case
No. Br. 19-311 and Civil Case No. Br. 19-424, dated June 6, 1992.
IN LIEU THEREOF, the Court renders judgment as follows:
(1) In Criminal Case No. Br. 19-311, the Court declares the accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to
property, defined and penalized under Article 365, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, with
violation of the automobile law (R.A. No. 4136, as amended), and sentences him to suffer two

(2) indeterminate penalties of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional, as maximum, 40
without indemnity, and to pay the costs, and
(2) In Civil Case No. Br. 19-424, the Court orders the case re-opened to determine the liability of
the defendant Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation to plaintiffs and that of plaintiffs on
defendant's counterclaim.
No costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 151452. July 29, 2005
SPS. ANTONIO C. SANTOS and ESPERANZA C. SANTOS, NORA BARNALO,
BELINDA LUMACTAD, MARIENELA DY, NIKKA SANTOS and LEONARDO
FERRER, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. NORMANDIE B. PIZARDO, as Presiding Judge, RTC of Quezon City, Branch 101,
DIONISIO M SIBAYAN, and VIRON TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC.,
represented by VIRGILIO Q. RONDARIS, President/Chairman, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 dated March 1, 2002, petitioners assail the Resolutions
of the Court of Appeals dated September 10, 2001 and January 9, 2002, respectively dismissing
their petition for certiorari and denying their motion for reconsideration, arising from the
dismissal of their complaint to recover civil indemnity for the death and physical injuries of their
kin.
The following facts are matters of record.
In an Information dated April 25, 1994, Dionisio M. Sibayan (Sibayan) was charged with
Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries in
connection with a vehicle collision between a southbound Viron Transit bus driven by Sibayan
and a northbound Lite Ace Van, which claimed the lives of the vans driver and three (3) of its
passengers, including a two-month old baby, and caused physical injuries to five (5) of the vans
passengers. After trial, Sibayan was convicted and sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2)
months. However, as there was a reservation to file a separate civil action, no pronouncement of

civil liability was made by the municipal circuit trial court in its decision promulgated on
December 17, 1998.2
On October 20, 2000, petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit
and its President/Chairman, Virgilio Q. Rondaris, with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
pursuant to their reservation to file a separate civil action.3 They cited therein the judgment
convicting Sibayan.
Viron Transit moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of improper service of summons,
prescription and laches, and defective certification of non-forum shopping. It also sought the
dropping of Virgilio Q. Rondaris as defendant in view of the separate personality of Viron Transit
from its officers.4
Petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss contending, among others, that the right to file a
separate action in this case prescribes in ten (10) years reckoned from the finality of the
judgment in the criminal action. As there was no appeal of the decision convicting Sibayan, the
complaint which was filed barely two (2) years thence was clearly filed within the prescriptive
period.
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the principal ground that the cause of action had
already prescribed. According to the trial court, actions based on quasi delict, as it construed
petitioners cause of action to be, prescribe four (4) years from the accrual of the cause of
action. Hence, notwithstanding the fact that petitioners reserved the right to file a separate civil
action, the complaint ought to be dismissed on the ground of prescription.5
Improper service of summons was likewise cited as a ground for dismissal of the complaint as
summons was served through a certain Jessica Ubalde of the legal department without
mentioning her designation or position.
Petitioners argument: Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration pointing out yet again that
the complaint is not based on quasi delict but on the final judgment of conviction in the criminal
case which prescribes ten (10) years from the finality of the judgment.6 The trial court denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration reiterating that petitioners cause of action was based on
quasi delict and had prescribed under Article 1146 of the Civil Code because the complaint was
filed more than four (4) years after the vehicular accident.7 As regards the improper service of
summons, the trial court reconsidered its ruling that the complaint ought to be dismissed on this
ground.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which dismissed the same for
error in the choice or mode of appeal.8 The appellate court also denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration reasoning that even if the respondent trial court judge committed grave abuse of

discretion in issuing the order of dismissal, certiorari is still not the permissible remedy as
appeal was available to petitioners and they failed to allege that the petition was brought within
the recognized exceptions for the allowance of certiorari in lieu of appeal.9
In this petition, petitioners argue that a rigid application of the rule that certiorari cannot be a
substitute for appeal will result in a judicial rejection of an existing obligation arising from the
criminal liability of private respondents. Petitioners insist that the liability sought to be enforced
in the complaint arose ex delicto and is not based on quasi delict. The trial court allegedly
committed grave abuse of discretion when it insisted that the cause of action invoked by
petitioners is based on quasi delict and concluded that the action had prescribed. Since the action
is based on the criminal liability of private respondents, the cause of action accrued from the
finality of the judgment of conviction.
Assuming that their petition with the appellate court was procedurally flawed, petitioners
implore the Court to exempt this case from the rigid operation of the rules as they allegedly have
a legitimate grievance to vindicate, i.e., damages for the deaths and physical injuries caused by
private respondents for which no civil liability had been adjudged by reason of their reservation
of the right to file a separate civil action.
In their Comment10 dated June 13, 2002, private respondents insist that the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground of prescription was in order. They point out that the averments in the
complaint make out a cause of action for quasi delict under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the
Civil Code. As such, the prescriptive period of four (4) years should be reckoned from the
time the accident took place.
Viron Transit also alleges that its subsidiary liability cannot be enforced since Sibayan was
not ordered to pay damages in the criminal case. It is Viron Transits contention that the
subsidiary liability of the employer contemplated in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code
presupposes a situation where the civil aspect of the case was instituted in the criminal case and
no reservation to file a separate civil case was made.
Private respondents likewise allege that the recourse to the Court of Appeals via certiorari was
improper as petitioners should have appealed the adverse order of the trial court. Moreover, they
point out several other procedural lapses allegedly committed by petitioners, such as lack of
certification against forum-shopping; lack of duplicate original or certified true copy of the
assailed order of the trial court; and non-indication of the full names and addresses of petitioners
in the petition.
Petitioners filed a Reply11 dated September 14, 2002, while private respondents filed a
Rejoinder12 dated October 14, 2002, both in reiteration of their arguments.

We grant the petition.

Our Revised Penal Code provides that every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable.13 Such civil liability may consist of restitution, reparation of the damage
caused and indemnification of consequential damages.14 When a criminal action is instituted,
the civil liability arising from the offense is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, subject
to three notable exceptions: first, when the injured party expressly waives the right to recover
damages from the accused; second, when the offended party reserves his right to have the civil
damages determined in a separate action in order to take full control and direction of the
prosecution of his cause; and third, when the injured party actually exercises the right to
maintain a private suit against the offender by instituting a civil action prior to the filing of
the criminal case.
Notably, it was the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended in 1988, which governed the
institution of the criminal action, as well as the reservation of the right to file a separate civil
action. Section 1, Rule 111 thereof states:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act
or omission of the accused.
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the
reservation of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others.
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the
prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
accused.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral,
nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such action as provided in these
Rules shall constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an award for actual damages.

In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or
information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon filing thereof
in court for trial.
Petitioners expressly made a reservation of their right to file a separate civil action as a result of
the crime committed by Sibayan. On account of this reservation, the municipal circuit trial court,
in its decision convicting Sibayan, did not make any pronouncement as to the latters civil
liability.
Predicating their claim on the judgment of conviction and their reservation to file a separate civil
action made in the criminal case, petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan,
Viron Transit and its President/Chairman. Petitioners assert that by the institution of the
complaint, they seek to recover private respondents civil liability arising from crime.
Unfortunately, based on its misreading of the allegations in the complaint, the trial court
dismissed the same, declaring that petitioners cause of action was based on quasi delict and
should have been brought within four (4) years from the time the cause of action accrued, i.e.,
from the time of the accident.

A reading of the complaint reveals that the allegations therein are

consistent with petitioners claim that the action was brought to
recover civil liability arising from crime. Although there are
allegations of negligence on the part of Sibayan and Viron Transit,
such does not necessarily mean that petitioners were pursuing a
cause of action based on quasi delict, considering that at the time of
the filing of the complaint, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had
already prescribed. Besides, in cases of negligence, the offended
party has the choice between an action to enforce civil liability
arising from crime under the Revised Penal Code and an action for
quasi delict under the Civil Code.
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities
on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or
omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under
Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an
action independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code.15

Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article
2177 of the Civil Code that the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant and the similar proscription against double recovery under the Rules
above-quoted.
At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this case, the cause of action ex quasi
delicto had already prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue opened
for them by their reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is so because the

prescription of the action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar

to an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime especially
as the latter action had been expressly reserved.
The case of Mendoza v. La Mallorca Bus Company16 was decided upon a similar set of facts.
Therein, the driver of La Mallorca Bus Company was charged with reckless imprudence
resulting to damage to property. The plaintiff made an express reservation for the filing of a
separate civil action. The driver was convicted which conviction was affirmed by this Court.
Later, plaintiff filed a separate civil action for damages based on quasi delict which was ordered
dismissed by the trial court upon finding that the action was instituted more than six (6) years
from the date of the accident and thus, had already prescribed. Subsequently, plaintiff instituted
another action, this time based on the subsidiary liability of the bus company. The trial court
dismissed the action holding that the dismissal of the earlier civil case operated as a bar to the
filing of the action to enforce the bus companys subsidiary liability.
We held that the dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar to the enforcement
of the subsidiary liability of the employer. Once there is a conviction for a felony, final in
character, the employer becomes subsidiarily liable if the commission of the crime was in the
discharge of the duties of the employees. This is so because Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code operates with controlling force to obviate the possibility of the aggrieved party being
deprived of indemnity even after the rendition of a final judgment convicting the employee.
Seen in this light, the trial court should not have dismissed the complaint on the ground of
prescription, but instead allowed the complaint for damages ex delicto to be prosecuted on the
merits, considering petitioners allegations in their complaint, opposition to the motion to
dismiss17 and motion for reconsideration18 of the order of dismissal, insisting that the action was
to recover civil liability arising from crime.
This does not offend the policy that the reservation or institution of a separate civil action
waives the other civil actions. The rationale behind this rule is the avoidance of multiple
suits between the same litigants arising out of the same act or omission of the offender.19
However, since the stale action for damages based on quasi delict should be considered

waived, there is no more occasion for petitioners to file multiple suits against private
respondents as the only recourse available to them is to pursue damages ex delicto. This
interpretation is also consistent with the bar against double recovery for obvious reasons.
Now the procedural issue. Admittedly, petitioners should have appealed the order of dismissal of
the trial court instead of filing a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Such procedural
misstep, however, should be exempted from the strict application of the rules in order to promote
their fundamental objective of securing substantial justice.20 We are loathe to deprive petitioners
of the indemnity to which they are entitled by law and by a final judgment of conviction based
solely on a technicality. It is our duty to prevent such an injustice.21
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered SETTING ASIDE the resolutions of the Court of
Appeals dated September 10, 2001 and January 9, 2002, respectively dismissing the present
action and denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, as well as the orders of the lower
court dated February 26, 2001 and July 16, 2001. Let the case be REMANDED to the trial court
for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 150157

January 25, 2007

MAURICIO MANLICLIC and PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., Petitioners,

vs.
MODESTO CALAUNAN, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Assailed before Us is the decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 which
affirmed in toto the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 42, in
Civil Case No. D-10086, finding petitioners Mauricio Manliclic and Philippine Rabbit Bus
Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) solidarily liable to pay damages and attorneys fees to respondent Modesto
Calaunan.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
The vehicles involved in this case are: (1) Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 with plate number
CVD-478, owned by petitioner PRBLI and driven by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic; and (2)
owner-type jeep with plate number PER-290, owned by respondent Modesto Calaunan and
driven by Marcelo Mendoza.

At around 6:00 to 7:00 oclock in the morning of 12 July 1988, respondent Calaunan, together
with Marcelo Mendoza, was on his way to Manila from Pangasinan on board his owner-type
jeep. The Philippine Rabbit Bus was likewise bound for Manila from Concepcion, Tarlac. At
approximately Kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Expressway in Barangay Lalangan, Plaridel,
Bulacan, the two vehicles collided. The front right side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear
left side of the jeep causing the latter to move to the shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch
with water resulting to further extensive damage. The bus veered to the left and stopped 7 to 8
meters from point of collision.
Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt. He was first brought for
treatment to the Manila Central University Hospital in Kalookan City by Oscar Buan, the
conductor of the Philippine Rabbit Bus, and was later transferred to the Veterans Memorial
Medical Center.
By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan,
charging petitioner Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with
Physical Injuries, docketed as Crim. Case No. 684-M-89. Subsequently on 2 December 1991,
respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI before the
RTC of Dagupan City, docketed as Civil Case No. D-10086. The criminal case was tried ahead
of the civil case. Among those who testified in the criminal case were respondent Calaunan,
Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos.
In the civil case (now before this Court), the parties admitted the following:
1. The parties agreed on the capacity of the parties to sue and be sued as well as the venue
and the identities of the vehicles involved;
2. The identity of the drivers and the fact that they are duly licensed;
3. The date and place of the vehicular collision;
4. The extent of the injuries suffered by plaintiff Modesto Calaunan and the existence of
the medical certificate;
5. That both vehicles were going towards the south; the private jeep being ahead of the
bus;
6. That the weather was fair and the road was well paved and straight, although there was
a ditch on the right side where the jeep fell into.3
When the civil case was heard, counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts of stenographic
notes (TSNs)4 of the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando

Ramos in the criminal case be received in evidence in the civil case in as much as these
witnesses are not available to testify in the civil case.
Francisco Tuliao testified that his brother-in-law, respondent Calaunan, left for abroad sometime
in November, 1989 and has not returned since then. Rogelio Ramos took the stand and said that
his brother, Fernando Ramos, left for Amman, Jordan, to work. Rosalia Mendoza testified that
her husband, Marcelo Mendoza, left their residence to look for a job. She narrated that she
thought her husband went to his hometown in Panique, Tarlac, when he did not return after one
month. She went to her husbands hometown to look for him but she was informed that he did
not go there.1awphil.net
The trial court subpoenaed the Clerk of Court of Branch 8, RTC, Malolos, Bulacan, the court
where Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was tried, to bring the TSNs of the testimonies of
respondent Calaunan,5 Marcelo Mendoza6 and Fernando Ramos7 in said case, together with other
documentary evidence marked therein. Instead of the Branch Clerk of Court, it was Enrique
Santos Guevara, Court Interpreter, who appeared before the court and identified the TSNs of the
three afore-named witnesses and other pertinent documents he had brought.8 Counsel for
respondent wanted to mark other TSNs and documents from the said criminal case to be adopted
in the instant case, but since the same were not brought to the trial court, counsel for petitioners
compromised that said TSNs and documents could be offered by counsel for respondent as
rebuttal evidence.
For the defendants, petitioner Manliclic and bus conductor Oscar Buan testified. The TSN9 of the
testimony of Donato Ganiban, investigator of the PRBLI, in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was
marked and allowed to be adopted in the civil case on the ground that he was already dead.
Respondent further marked, among other documents, as rebuttal evidence, the TSNs10 of the
testimonies of Donato Ganiban, Oscar Buan and petitioner Manliclic in Criminal Case No. 684M-89.
The disagreement arises from the question: Who is to be held liable for the collision?
Respondent insists it was petitioner Manliclic who should be liable while the latter is resolute in
saying it was the former who caused the smash up.
The versions of the parties are summarized by the trial court as follows:
The parties differed only on the manner the collision between the two (2) vehicles took place.
According to the plaintiff and his driver, the jeep was cruising at the speed of 60 to 70 kilometers
per hour on the slow lane of the expressway when the Philippine Rabbit Bus overtook the jeep
and in the process of overtaking the jeep, the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear of the jeep on the

left side. At the time the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, it was about to overtake the jeep. In
other words, the Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at the back of the jeep when the jeep was hit.
Fernando Ramos corroborated the testimony of the plaintiff and Marcelo Mendoza. He said that
he was on another jeep following the Philippine Rabbit Bus and the jeep of plaintiff when the
incident took place. He said, the jeep of the plaintiff overtook them and the said jeep of the
plaintiff was followed by the Philippine Rabbit Bus which was running very fast. The bus also
overtook the jeep in which he was riding. After that, he heard a loud sound. He saw the jeep of
the plaintiff swerved to the right on a grassy portion of the road. The Philippine Rabbit Bus
stopped and they overtook the Philippine Rabbit Bus so that it could not moved (sic), meaning
they stopped in front of the Philippine Rabbit Bus. He testified that the jeep of plaintiff swerved
to the right because it was bumped by the Philippine Rabbit bus from behind.
Both Mauricio Manliclic and his driver, Oscar Buan admitted that the Philippine Rabbit Bus
bumped the jeep in question. However, they explained that when the Philippine Rabbit bus was
about to go to the left lane to overtake the jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the left because it was
to overtake another jeep in front of it. Such was their testimony before the RTC in Malolos in the
criminal case and before this Court in the instant case. [Thus, which of the two versions of the
manner how the collision took place was correct, would be determinative of who between the
two drivers was negligent in the operation of their respective vehicles.]11
Petitioner PRBLI maintained that it observed and exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of its employee, specifically petitioner Manliclic.
On 22 July 1996, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent Calaunan and
against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering
the said defendants to pay plaintiff jointly and solidarily the amount of P40,838.00 as actual
damages for the towing as well as the repair and the materials used for the repair of the jeep in
question; P100,000.00 as moral damages and another P100,000.00 as exemplary damages and
P15,000.00 as attorneys fees, including appearance fees of the lawyer. In addition, the
defendants are also to pay costs.12
Petitioners appealed the decision via Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals.13
In a decision dated 28 September 2001, the Court of Appeals, finding no reversible error in the
decision of the trial court, affirmed it in all respects.14
Petitioners are now before us by way of petition for review assailing the decision of the Court of
Appeals. They assign as errors the following:

I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE
TRIAL COURTS QUESTIONABLE ADMISSION IN EVIDENCE OF THE TSNs AND
OTHER DOCUMENTS PRESENTED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE
TRIAL COURTS RELIANCE ON THE VERSION OF THE RESPONDENT ON HOW THE
ACCIDENT SUPPOSEDLY OCCURRED.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE
TRIAL COURTS UNFAIR DISREGARD OF HEREIN PETITIONER PRBLs DEFENSE OF
EXERCISE OF DUE DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF ITS
EMPLOYEES.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE
TRIAL COURTS QUESTIONABLE AWARD OF DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEE.
With the passing away of respondent Calaunan during the pendency of this appeal with this
Court, we granted the Motion for the Substitution of Respondent filed by his wife, Mrs. Precila
Zarate Vda. De Calaunan, and children, Virgilio Calaunan, Carmelita Honeycomb, Evelyn
Calaunan, Marko Calaunan and Liwayway Calaunan.15
In their Reply to respondents Comment, petitioners informed this Court of a Decision16 of the
Court of Appeals acquitting petitioner Manliclic of the charge17 of Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries attaching thereto a photocopy thereof.
On the first assigned error, petitioners argue that the TSNs containing the testimonies of
respondent Calaunan,18 Marcelo Mendoza19 and Fernando Ramos20 should not be admitted in
evidence for failure of respondent to comply with the requisites of Section 47, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.
For Section 47, Rule 13021 to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is
dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a former case or
proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same parties or those representing the same
interests; (c) the former case involved the same subject as that in the present case, although on

different causes of action; (d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same
issue involved in the present case; and (e) the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine
the witness in the former case.22
Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence of all the requisites set forth by the Rules
for a testimony given in a former case or proceeding to be admissible as an exception to the
hearsay rule. Petitioner PRBLI, not being a party in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89, had no
opportunity to cross-examine the three witnesses in said case. The criminal case was filed
exclusively against petitioner Manliclic, petitioner PRBLIs employee. The cases dealing with
the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties
to the criminal cases instituted against their employees.23
Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said criminal case, the
testimonies of the three witnesses are still admissible on the ground that petitioner PRBLI failed
to object on their admissibility.
It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible
document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the
right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive. Thus, a failure to except to the
evidence because it does not conform to the statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law. Even
assuming ex gratia argumenti that these documents are inadmissible for being hearsay, but on
account of failure to object thereto, the same may be admitted and considered as sufficient to
prove the facts therein asserted.24 Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a fact
in a suit but, when no objection is made thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to be considered
and given the importance it deserves.25
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI did not object to the TSNs containing the testimonies of
respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case when the
same were offered in evidence in the trial court. In fact, the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan
and Mendoza were admitted by both petitioners.26 Moreover, petitioner PRBLI even offered in
evidence the TSN containing the testimony of Donato Ganiban in the criminal case. If petitioner
PRBLI argues that the TSNs of the testimonies of plaintiffs witnesses in the criminal case
should not be admitted in the instant case, why then did it offer the TSN of the testimony of
Ganiban which was given in the criminal case? It appears that petitioner PRBLI wants to have its
cake and eat it too. It cannot argue that the TSNs of the testimonies of the witnesses of the
adverse party in the criminal case should not be admitted and at the same time insist that the TSN
of the testimony of the witness for the accused be admitted in its favor. To disallow admission in
evidence of the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in
the criminal case and to admit the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban would be unfair.

We do not subscribe to petitioner PRBLIs argument that it will be denied due process when the
TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal
case are to be admitted in the civil case. It is too late for petitioner PRBLI to raise denial of due
process in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a ground for objecting to the
admissibility of the TSNs. For failure to object at the proper time, it waived its right to object
that the TSNs did not comply with Section 47.
In Mangio v. Court of Appeals,27 this Court, through Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno,28
admitted in evidence a TSN of the testimony of a witness in another case despite therein
petitioners assertion that he would be denied due process. In admitting the TSN, the Court ruled
that the raising of denial of due process in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
as a ground for objecting to the admissibility of the TSN was belatedly done. In so doing, therein
petitioner waived his right to object based on said ground.
Petitioners contend that the documents in the criminal case should not have been admitted in the
instant civil case because Section 47 of Rule 130 refers only to "testimony or deposition." We
find such contention to be untenable. Though said section speaks only of testimony and
deposition, it does not mean that documents from a former case or proceeding cannot be
admitted. Said documents can be admitted they being part of the testimonies of witnesses that
have been admitted. Accordingly, they shall be given the same weight as that to which the
testimony may be entitled.29
On the second assigned error, petitioners contend that the version of petitioner Manliclic as to
how the accident occurred is more credible than respondents version. They anchor their
contention on the fact that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted by the Court of Appeals of the
charge of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries.

To be resolved by the Court is the effect of petitioner Manliclics

acquittal in the civil case.
From the complaint, it can be gathered that the civil case for damages was one arising from, or
based on, quasi-delict.30 Petitioner Manliclic was sued for his negligence or reckless imprudence
in causing the collision, while petitioner PRBLI was sued for its failure to exercise the diligence
of a good father in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly petitioner
Manliclic. The allegations read:
"4. That sometime on July 12, 1988 at around 6:20 A.M. plaintiff was on board the
above-described motor vehicle travelling at a moderate speed along the North Luzon
Expressway heading South towards Manila together with MARCELO MENDOZA, who
was then driving the same;

"5. That approximately at kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Express Way, the abovedescribed motor vehicle was suddenly bumped from behind by a Philippine Rabbit Bus
with Body No. 353 and with plate No. CVD 478 then being driven by one Mauricio
Manliclic of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac, who was then travelling recklessly at a very
fast speed and had apparently lost control of his vehicle;
"6. That as a result of the impact of the collision the above-described motor vehicle was
forced off the North Luzon Express Way towards the rightside where it fell on its drivers
side on a ditch, and that as a consequence, the above-described motor vehicle which
maybe valued at EIGHTY THOUSAND PESOS (P80,000) was rendered a total wreck as
shown by pictures to be presented during the pre-trial and trial of this case;
"7. That also as a result of said incident, plaintiff sustained bodily injuries which
compounded plaintiffs frail physical condition and required his hospitalization from July
12, 1988 up to and until July 22, 1988, copy of the medical certificate is hereto attached
as Annex "A" and made an integral part hereof;
"8. That the vehicular collision resulting in the total wreckage of the above-described
motor vehicle as well as bodily (sic) sustained by plaintiff, was solely due to the reckless
imprudence of the defendant driver Mauricio Manliclic who drove his Philippine Rabbit
Bus No. 353 at a fast speed without due regard or observance of existing traffic rules and
regulations;
"9. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Line Corporation failed to exercise the
diligence of a good father of (sic) family in the selection and supervision of its drivers; x
x x"31
Can Manliclic still be held liable for the collision and be found negligent notwithstanding the
declaration of the Court of Appeals that there was an absence of negligence on his part?
In exonerating petitioner Manliclic in the criminal case, the Court of Appeals said:
To the following findings of the court a quo, to wit: that accused-appellant was negligent "when
the bus he was driving bumped the jeep from behind"; that "the proximate cause of the accident
was his having driven the bus at a great speed while closely following the jeep"; x x x
We do not agree.
The swerving of Calaunans jeep when it tried to overtake the vehicle in front of it was beyond
the control of accused-appellant.
xxxx

Absent evidence of negligence, therefore, accused-appellant cannot be held liable for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries as defined in Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code.32
From the foregoing declaration of the Court of Appeals, it appears that petitioner Manliclic
was acquitted not on reasonable doubt, but on the ground that he is not the author of the
act complained of which is based on Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure which reads:
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
might arise did not exist.
In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held liable for the mishap. The aforequoted section applies only to a civil action arising from crime or ex delicto and not to a
civil action arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. The extinction of civil liability
referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111 [now Section 2 (b) of Rule 111], refers exclusively
to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for
the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused.33
A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a
substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or
crime a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility
for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce
civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or
culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code.34 It is now settled that acquittal of the

accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it
the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict.35
In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil
liability arising from the crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
However, if an accused is acquitted on the basis that he was not the author of the act or
omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from
which the civil might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil liability
based on the crime or ex delicto. In this second instance, there being no crime or delict to
speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In this case, a civil action,
if any, may be instituted on grounds other than the delict complained of.

As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be
extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that accused
was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a
final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist). The
responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.36 An acquittal
or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case37 based on quasidelict or culpa aquiliana.
Petitioners ask us to give credence to their version of how the collision occurred and to disregard
that of respondents. Petitioners insist that while the PRBLI bus was in the process of overtaking
respondents jeep, the latter, without warning, suddenly swerved to the left (fast) lane in order to
overtake another jeep ahead of it, thus causing the collision.
As a general rule, questions of fact may not be raised in a petition for review. The factual
findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding and
conclusive on the Supreme Court.38 Not being a trier of facts, this Court will not allow a review
thereof unless:
(1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the
inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of
Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellees; (7) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those
of the trial court; (8) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record.39
After going over the evidence on record, we do not find any of the exceptions that would warrant
our departure from the general rule. We fully agree in the finding of the trial court, as affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, that it was petitioner Manliclic who was negligent in driving the PRBLI
bus which was the cause of the collision. In giving credence to the version of the respondent, the
trial court has this say:
x x x Thus, which of the two versions of the manner how the collision took place was correct,
would be determinative of who between the two drivers was negligent in the operation of their
respective vehicle.

In this regard, it should be noted that in the statement of Mauricio Manliclic (Exh. 15) given to
the Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading no mention was made by him about the fact that
the driver of the jeep was overtaking another jeep when the collision took place. The allegation
that another jeep was being overtaken by the jeep of Calaunan was testified to by him only in
Crim. Case No. 684-M-89 before the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan and before this
Court. Evidently, it was a product of an afterthought on the part of Mauricio Manliclic so that he
could explain why he should not be held responsible for the incident. His attempt to veer away
from the truth was also apparent when it would be considered that in his statement given to the
Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading (Exh. 15), he alleged that the Philippine Rabbit Bus
bumped the jeep of Calaunan while the Philippine Rabbit Bus was behind the said jeep. In his
testimony before the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan as well as in this Court, he
alleged that the Philippine Rabbit Bus was already on the left side of the jeep when the collision
took place. For this inconsistency between his statement and testimony, his explanation regarding
the manner of how the collision between the jeep and the bus took place should be taken with
caution. It might be true that in the statement of Oscar Buan given to the Philippine Rabbit
Investigator CV Cabading, it was mentioned by the former that the jeep of plaintiff was in the act
of overtaking another jeep when the collision between the latter jeep and the Philippine Rabbit
Bus took place. But the fact, however, that his statement was given on July 15, 1988, one day
after Mauricio Manliclic gave his statement should not escape attention. The one-day difference
between the giving of the two statements would be significant enough to entertain the possibility
of Oscar Buan having received legal advise before giving his statement. Apart from that, as
between his statement and the statement of Manliclic himself, the statement of the latter should
prevail. Besides, in his Affidavit of March 10, 1989, (Exh. 14), the unreliability of the statement
of Oscar Buan (Exh. 13) given to CV Cabading rear its "ugly head" when he did not mention in
said affidavit that the jeep of Calaunan was trying to overtake another jeep when the collision
between the jeep in question and the Philippine Rabbit bus took place.
xxxx
If one would believe the testimony of the defendant, Mauricio Manliclic, and his conductor,
Oscar Buan, that the Philippine Rabbit Bus was already somewhat parallel to the jeep when the
collision took place, the point of collision on the jeep should have been somewhat on the left side
thereof rather than on its rear. Furthermore, the jeep should have fallen on the road itself rather
than having been forced off the road. Useless, likewise to emphasize that the Philippine Rabbit
was running very fast as testified to by Ramos which was not controverted by the defendants.40

Having ruled that it was petitioner Manliclics negligence that caused the
smash up, there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is
negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a good
father of a family.41 Under Article 218042 of the New Civil Code, when an

injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a

presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or
employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision
over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer under Article
2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against
the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such
employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove
that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of their employee.43
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI maintains that it had shown that it exercised the required
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly petitioner Manliclic. In
the matter of selection, it showed the screening process that petitioner Manliclic underwent
before he became a regular driver. As to the exercise of due diligence in the supervision of its
employees, it argues that presence of ready investigators (Ganiban and Cabading) is sufficient
proof that it exercised the required due diligence in the supervision of its employees.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience and service records. In the supervision of employees, the employer
must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose
disciplinary measures for the breach thereof. To fend off vicarious liability, employers must
submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence, that they complied with everything that
was incumbent on them.44
In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,45 it was explained that:
Due diligence in the supervision of employees on the other hand, includes the formulation
of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper
instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer
has relations through his or its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary
measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the
performance of acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employer. To
this, we add that actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with said
rules should be the constant concern of the employer, acting through dependable
supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory functions.
In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees may be
deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence of said company
guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to
the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving

that it has been diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual supervision
of their work. The mere allegation of the existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies,
without anything more, is decidedly not sufficient to overcome such presumption.
We emphatically reiterate our holding, as a warning to all employers, that "the formulation of
various company policies on safety without showing that they were being complied with is not
sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability arising from negligence of its employees. It is
incumbent upon petitioner to show that in recruiting and employing the erring driver the
recruitment procedures and company policies on efficiency and safety were followed." x x x.
The trial court found that petitioner PRBLI exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection but not in the supervision of its employees. It expounded as follows:
From the evidence of the defendants, it seems that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines has a very
good procedure of recruiting its driver as well as in the maintenance of its vehicles. There is no
evidence though that it is as good in the supervision of its personnel. There has been no iota of
evidence introduced by it that there are rules promulgated by the bus company regarding the safe
operation of its vehicle and in the way its driver should manage and operate the vehicles assigned
to them. There is no showing that somebody in the bus company has been employed to oversee
how its driver should behave while operating their vehicles without courting incidents similar to
the herein case. In regard to supervision, it is not difficult to observe that the Philippine Rabbit
Bus Lines, Inc. has been negligent as an employer and it should be made responsible for the acts
of its employees, particularly the driver involved in this case.
We agree. The presence of ready investigators after the occurrence of the accident is not enough
to exempt petitioner PRBLI from liability arising from the negligence of petitioner Manliclic.
Same does not comply with the guidelines set forth in the cases above-mentioned. The presence
of the investigators after the accident is not enough supervision. Regular supervision of
employees, that is, prior to any accident, should have been shown and established. This,
petitioner failed to do. The lack of supervision can further be seen by the fact that there is only
one set of manual containing the rules and regulations for all the drivers of PRBLI. 46 How then
can all the drivers of petitioner PRBLI know and be continually informed of the rules and
regulations when only one manual is being lent to all the drivers?
For failure to adduce proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employees, petitioner PRBLI is held solidarily responsible for the
damages caused by petitioner Manliclics negligence.
We now go to the award of damages. The trial court correctly awarded the amount of P40,838.00
as actual damages representing the amount paid by respondent for the towing and repair of his
jeep.47 As regards the awards for moral and exemplary damages, same, under the circumstances,

must be modified. The P100,000.00 awarded by the trial court as moral damages must be
reduced to P50,000.00.48 Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for
the public good.49 The amount awarded by the trial court must, likewise, be lowered to
P50,000.00.50 The award of P15,000.00 for attorneys fees and expenses of litigation is in order
and authorized by law.51
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
(1) the award of moral damages shall be reduced to P50,000.00; and (2) the award of exemplary
damages shall be lowered to P50,000.00. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 34840

September 23, 1931

NARCISO GUTIERREZ, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BONIFACIO GUTIERREZ, MARIA V. DE GUTIERREZ, MANUEL GUTIERREZ,
ABELARDO VELASCO, and SATURNINO CORTEZ, defendants-appellants.
L.D. Lockwood for appellants Velasco and Cortez.
San Agustin and Roxas for other appellants.
Ramon Diokno for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
This is an action brought by the plaintiff in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the five
defendants, to recover damages in the amount of P10,000, for physical injuries suffered as a
result of an automobile accident. On judgment being rendered as prayed for by the plaintiff, both
sets of defendants appealed.
On February 2, 1930, a passenger truck and an automobile of private ownership collided while
attempting to pass each other on the Talon bridge on the Manila South Road in the municipality
of Las Pias, Province of Rizal. The truck was driven by the chauffeur Abelardo Velasco, and
was owned by Saturnino Cortez. The automobile was being operated by Bonifacio Gutierrez, a
lad 18 years of age, and was owned by Bonifacio's father and mother, Mr. and Mrs. Manuel
Gutierrez. At the time of the collision, the father was not in the car, but the mother, together will
several other members of the Gutierrez family, seven in all, were accommodated therein. A
passenger in the autobus, by the name of Narciso Gutierrez, was en route from San Pablo,
Laguna, to Manila. The collision between the bus and the automobile resulted in Narciso

Gutierrez suffering a fracture right leg which required medical attendance for a considerable
period of time, and which even at the date of the trial appears not to have healed properly.
It is conceded that the collision was caused by negligence pure and simple. The difference
between the parties is that, while the plaintiff blames both sets of defendants, the owner of the
passenger truck blames the automobile, and the owner of the automobile, in turn, blames the
truck. We have given close attention to these highly debatable points, and having done so, a
majority of the court are of the opinion that the findings of the trial judge on all controversial
questions of fact find sufficient support in the record, and so should be maintained. With this
general statement set down, we turn to consider the respective legal obligations of the
defendants.
In amplification of so much of the above pronouncement as concerns the Gutierrez family, it may
be explained that the youth Bonifacio was in incompetent chauffeur, that he was driving at an
excessive rate of speed, and that, on approaching the bridge and the truck, he lost his head and so
contributed by his negligence to the accident. The guaranty given by the father at the time the
son was granted a license to operate motor vehicles made the father responsible for the acts of
his son. Based on these facts, pursuant to the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code, the
father alone and not the minor or the mother, would be liable for the damages caused by
the minor.
We are dealing with the civil law liability of parties for obligations which arise from fault or
negligence. At the same time, we believe that, as has been done in other cases, we can take
cognizance of the common law rule on the same subject. In the United States, it is uniformly
held that the head of a house, the owner of an automobile, who maintains it for the general
use of his family is liable for its negligent operation by one of his children, whom he
designates or permits to run it, where the car is occupied and being used at the time of the injury
for the pleasure of other members of the owner's family than the child driving it. The theory of
the law is that the running of the machine by a child to carry other members of the family is
within the scope of the owner's business, so that he is liable for the negligence of the child
because of the relationship of master and servant. (Huddy On Automobiles, 6th ed., sec. 660;
Missell vs. Hayes [1914], 91 Atl., 322.) The liability of Saturnino Cortez, the owner of the
truck, and of his chauffeur Abelardo Velasco rests on a different basis, namely, that of
contract which, we think, has been sufficiently demonstrated by the allegations of the complaint,
not controverted, and the evidence. The reason for this conclusion reaches to the findings of the
trial court concerning the position of the truck on the bridge, the speed in operating the machine,
and the lack of care employed by the chauffeur. While these facts are not as clearly evidenced as
are those which convict the other defendant, we nevertheless hesitate to disregard the points
emphasized by the trial judge. In its broader aspects, the case is one of two drivers approaching a
narrow bridge from opposite directions, with neither being willing to slow up and give the right
of way to the other, with the inevitable result of a collision and an accident.

The defendants Velasco and Cortez further contend that there existed contributory negligence on
the part of the plaintiff, consisting principally of his keeping his foot outside the truck, which
occasioned his injury. In this connection, it is sufficient to state that, aside from the fact that the
defense of contributory negligence was not pleaded, the evidence bearing out this theory of the
case is contradictory in the extreme and leads us far afield into speculative matters.
The last subject for consideration relates to the amount of the award. The appellee suggests that
the amount could justly be raised to P16,517, but naturally is not serious in asking for this sum,
since no appeal was taken by him from the judgment. The other parties unite in challenging the
award of P10,000, as excessive. All facts considered, including actual expenditures and damages
for the injury to the leg of the plaintiff, which may cause him permanent lameness, in connection
with other adjudications of this court, lead us to conclude that a total sum for the plaintiff of
P5,000 would be fair and reasonable. The difficulty in approximating the damages by monetary
compensation is well elucidated by the divergence of opinion among the members of the court,
three of whom have inclined to the view that P3,000 would be amply sufficient, while a fourth
member has argued that P7,500 would be none too much.
In consonance with the foregoing rulings, the judgment appealed from will be modified, and the
plaintiff will have judgment in his favor against the defendants Manuel Gutierrez, Abelardo
Velasco, and Saturnino Cortez, jointly and severally, for the sum of P5,000, and the costs of both
instances.
Avancea, C.J., Johnson, Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez, and Imperial, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992
PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, JUAN D. LIM, BENJAMIN
P. PAULINO, ANTONIO M. MAGTALAS, COL. PEDRO SACRO and LT. M. SORIANO,
petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGINA ORDOEZ-BENITEZ, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court, Manila, SEGUNDA R.
BAUTISTA and ARSENIA D. BAUTISTA, respondents.
Balgos and Perez for petitioners.
Collantes, Ramirez & Associates for private respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista
while on the second-floor premises of the Philippine School of Business Administration
(PSBA) prompted the parents of the deceased to file suit in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila (Branch 47) presided over by Judge (now Court of Appeals justice) Regina
Ordoez-Benitez, for damages against the said PSBA and its corporate officers. At the
time of his death, Carlitos was enrolled in the third year commerce course at the PSBA.
It was established that his assailants were not members of the school's academic
community but were elements from outside the school.
Specifically, the suit impleaded the PSBA and the following school authorities: Juan D.
Lim (President), Benjamin P. Paulino (Vice-President), Antonio M. Magtalas
(Treasurer/Cashier), Col. Pedro Sacro (Chief of Security) and a Lt. M. Soriano
(Assistant Chief of Security). Substantially, the plaintiffs (now private respondents)
sought to adjudge them liable for the victim's untimely demise due to their alleged
negligence, recklessness and lack of security precautions, means and methods before,
during and after the attack on the victim. During the proceedings a quo, Lt. M. Soriano
terminated his relationship with the other petitioners by resigning from his position in the
school.
Defendants a quo (now petitioners) sought to have the suit dismissed, alleging that
since they are presumably sued under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint
states no cause of action against them, as jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect
that academic institutions, such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit of the rule in the
afore-stated article.
The respondent trial court, however, overruled petitioners' contention and thru an order
dated 8 December 1987, denied their motion to dismiss. A subsequent motion for
reconsideration was similarly dealt with by an order dated 25 January 1988. Petitioners
then assailed the trial court's disposition before the respondent appellate court which, in
a decision * promulgated on 10 June 1988, affirmed the trial court's orders. On 22
August 1988, the respondent appellate court resolved to deny the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
At the outset, it is to be observed that the respondent appellate court primarily anchored
its decision on the law of quasi-delicts, as enunciated in Articles 2176 and 2180 of the
Civil Code. 1 Pertinent portions of the appellate court's now assailed ruling state:
Article 2180 (formerly Article 1903) of the Civil Code is an adoption from the old Spanish
Civil Code. The comments of Manresa and learned authorities on its meaning should give
way to present day changes. The law is not fixed and flexible (sic); it must be dynamic. In
fact, the greatest value and significance of law as a rule of conduct in (sic) its flexibility to

adopt to changing social conditions and its capacity to meet the new challenges of
progress.
Construed in the light of modern day educational system, Article 2180 cannot be
construed in its narrow concept as held in the old case of Exconde vs. Capuno 2 and
Mercado vs. Court of Appeals; 3 hence, the ruling in the Palisoc 4 case that it should apply
to all kinds of educational institutions, academic or vocational.
At any rate, the law holds the teachers and heads of the school staff liable unless they
relieve themselves of such liability pursuant to the last paragraph of Article 2180 by
"proving that they observed all the diligence to prevent damage." This can only be done
at a trial on the merits of the case. 5

While we agree with the respondent appellate court that the motion to dismiss the
complaint was correctly denied and the complaint should be tried on the merits, we do
not however agree with the premises of the appellate court's ruling.
Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule of in
loco parentis. This Court discussed this doctrine in the afore-cited cases of Exconde,
Mendoza, Palisoc and, more recently, in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals. 6 In all such
cases, it had been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage
should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of he educational institution
sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody.
However, this material situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier
indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the
school could be made liable.
However, does the appellate court's failure to consider such material facts mean the
exculpation of the petitioners from liability? It does not necessarily follow.
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a
contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to
comply with. 7 For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an
education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills
to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to
abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.
Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation of providing
their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary
undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of
physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when
bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the
school premises a constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure

that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises
and to prevent the breakdown thereof.
Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between
the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. 8 A
perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also
known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound
by contract, whether express or implied. However, this impression has not prevented
this Court from determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract.
In Air France vs. Carrascoso (124 Phil. 722), the private respondent was awarded
damages for his unwarranted expulsion from a first-class seat aboard the petitioner
airline. It is noted, however, that the Court referred to the petitioner-airline's liability as
one arising from tort, not one arising from a contract of carriage. In effect, Air France is
authority for the view that liability from tort may exist even if there is a contract, for the
act that breaks the contract may be also a tort. (Austro-America S.S. Co. vs. Thomas,
248 Fed. 231).
This view was not all that revolutionary, for even as early as 1918, this Court was
already of a similar mind. In Cangco vs. Manila Railroad (38 Phil. 780), Mr. Justice
Fisher elucidated thus:
The field of non-contractual obligation is much broader than that of contractual obligation,
comprising, as it does, the whole extent of juridical human relations. These two fields,
figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to
another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person.
When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such
conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have
constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between
the parties.

Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations,
particularly Article 21, which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good custom or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
(emphasis supplied).

Air France penalized the racist policy of the airline which emboldened the petitioner's
employee to forcibly oust the private respondent to cater to the comfort of a white man
who allegedly "had a better right to the seat." In Austro-American, supra, the public
embarrassment caused to the passenger was the justification for the Circuit Court of
Appeals, (Second Circuit), to award damages to the latter. From the foregoing, it can be

concluded that should the act which breaches a contract be done in bad faith and be
violative of Article 21, then there is a cause to view the act as constituting a quasi-delict.
In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding
that the contract between the school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's
negligence in providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial court to
determine. And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise
generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, supra, the
negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that
negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA
and Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the
school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the
contract, unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of
the Civil Code.
This Court is not unmindful of the attendant difficulties posed by the obligation of
schools, above-mentioned, for conceptually a school, like a common carrier, cannot be
an insurer of its students against all risks. This is specially true in the populous student
communities of the so-called "university belt" in Manila where there have been reported
several incidents ranging from gang wars to other forms of hooliganism. It would not be
equitable to expect of schools to anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their
premises, for notwithstanding the security measures installed, the same may still fail
against an individual or group determined to carry out a nefarious deed inside school
premises and environs. Should this be the case, the school may still avoid liability by
proving that the breach of its contractual obligation to the students was not due to its
negligence, here statutorily defined to be the omission of that degree of diligence which
is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of
persons, time and place. 9
As the proceedings a quo have yet to commence on the substance of the private
respondents' complaint, the record is bereft of all the material facts. Obviously, at this
stage, only the trial court can make such a determination from the evidence still to
unfold.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The court of
origin (RTC, Manila, Br. 47) is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent with
this ruling of the Court. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-21438

September 28, 1966

AIR FRANCE, petitioner,

vs.
RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Lichauco, Picazo and Agcaoili for petitioner.
Bengzon Villegas and Zarraga for respondent R. Carrascoso.

SANCHEZ, J.:
The Court of First Instance of Manila 1 sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael
Carrascoso P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P393.20
representing the difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the portion of the trip
Bangkok-Rome, these various amounts with interest at the legal rate, from the date of the filing
of the complaint until paid; plus P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit.
On appeal,2 the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's
plane ticket from P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other
respects", with costs against petitioner.
The case is now before us for review on certiorari.
The facts declared by the Court of Appeals as " fully supported by the evidence of record",
are:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left
Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent,
Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from
Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at
Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class"
seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there
was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When
asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told
defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion
ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got
nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot
discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and
pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man" (Transcript, p. 12, Hearing of
May 26, 1959); and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.3

1. The trust of the relief petitioner now seeks is that we review "all the findings" 4 of
respondent Court of Appeals. Petitioner charges that respondent court failed to make complete
findings of fact on all the issues properly laid before it. We are asked to consider facts favorable
to petitioner, and then, to overturn the appellate court's decision.
Coming into focus is the constitutional mandate that "No decision shall be rendered by any
court of record without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it
is based". 5 This is echoed in the statutory demand that a judgment determining the merits of the
case shall state "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based"; 6 and that
"Every decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain complete findings of fact on all issues
properly raised before it". 7
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. It is open to direct attack. 8 The
law, however, solely insists that a decision state the "essential ultimate facts" upon which the
court's conclusion is drawn. 9 A court of justice is not hidebound to write in its decision every bit
and piece of evidence 10 presented by one party and the other upon the issues raised. Neither is it
to be burdened with the obligation "to specify in the sentence the facts" which a party
"considered as proved". 11 This is but a part of the mental process from which the Court draws
the essential ultimate facts. A decision is not to be so clogged with details such that prolixity, if
not confusion, may result. So long as the decision of the Court of Appeals contains the necessary
facts to warrant its conclusions, it is no error for said court to withhold therefrom "any specific
finding of facts with respect to the evidence for the defense". Because as this Court well
observed, "There is no law that so requires". 12 Indeed, "the mere failure to specify (in the
decision) the contentions of the appellant and the reasons for refusing to believe them is not
sufficient to hold the same contrary to the requirements of the provisions of law and the
Constitution". It is in this setting that in Manigque, it was held that the mere fact that the findings
"were based entirely on the evidence for the prosecution without taking into consideration or
even mentioning the appellant's side in the controversy as shown by his own testimony", would
not vitiate the judgment. 13 If the court did not recite in the decision the testimony of each witness
for, or each item of evidence presented by, the defeated party, it does not mean that the court has
overlooked such testimony or such item of evidence. 14 At any rate, the legal presumptions are
that official duty has been regularly performed, and that all the matters within an issue in a case
were laid before the court and passed upon by it. 15
Findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals is required to make, maybe defined as "the
written statement of the ultimate facts as found by the court ... and essential to support the
decision and judgment rendered thereon". 16 They consist of the court's "conclusions" with
respect to the determinative facts in issue". 17 A question of law, upon the other hand, has been
declared as "one which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the parties." 18

2. By statute, "only questions of law may be raised" in an appeal by certiorari from a

judgment of the Court of Appeals. 19 That judgment is conclusive as to the facts. It is not
appropriately the business of this Court to alter the facts or to review the questions of fact. 20
With these guideposts, we now face the problem of whether the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals support its judgment.
3. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims?
It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and received from
petitioner a first class ticket. But petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and
complete intent and agreement of the parties; that said respondent knew that he did not have
confirmed reservations for first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class
protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would
have a first class ride, but that such would depend upon the availability of first class seats.
These are matters which petitioner has thoroughly presented and discussed in its brief
before the Court of Appeals under its third assignment of error, which reads: "The trial court
erred in finding that plaintiff had confirmed reservations for, and a right to, first class seats on the
"definite" segments of his journey, particularly that from Saigon to Beirut". 21
And, the Court of Appeals disposed of this contention thus:
Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument that the issuance of a first-class
ticket was no guarantee that the passenger to whom the same had been issued, would be
accommodated in the first-class compartment, for as in the case of plaintiff he had yet to
make arrangements upon arrival at every station for the necessary first-class reservation.
We are not impressed by such a reasoning. We cannot understand how a reputable
firm like defendant airplane company could have the indiscretion to give out tickets
it never meant to honor at all. It received the corresponding amount in payment of
first-class tickets and yet it allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its
employees. It is more in keeping with the ordinary course of business that the company
should know whether or riot the tickets it issues are to be honored or not.22
Not that the Court of Appeals is alone. The trial court similarly disposed of petitioner's
contention, thus:
On the fact that plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "First class" ticket, there can be no
question. Apart from his testimony, see plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-1", "B", "B-1," "B-2", "C"
and "C-1", and defendant's own witness, Rafael Altonaga, confirmed plaintiff's testimony and
testified as follows:

Q. In these tickets there are marks "O.K." From what you know, what does this OK
mean?
A. That the space is confirmed.
Q. Confirmed for first class?
A. Yes, "first class". (Transcript, p. 169)
xxx

xxx

xxx

Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis Zaldariaga and Rafael
Altonaga that although plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "first class" airplane ticket, the ticket
was subject to confirmation in Hongkong. The court cannot give credit to the testimony of said
witnesses. Oral evidence cannot prevail over written evidence, and plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "Al", "B", "B-l", "C" and "C-1" belie the testimony of said witnesses, and clearly show that the
plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first class ticket without any reservation whatever.
Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, defendant's own witness Rafael Altonaga testified
that the reservation for a "first class" accommodation for the plaintiff was confirmed. The court
cannot believe that after such confirmation defendant had a verbal understanding with plaintiff
that the "first class" ticket issued to him by defendant would be subject to confirmation in
Hongkong. 23
We have heretofore adverted to the fact that except for a slight difference of a few pesos in
the amount refunded on Carrascoso's ticket, the decision of the Court of First Instance was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals in all other respects. We hold the view that such a judgment of
affirmance has merged the judgment of the lower court. 24 Implicit in that affirmance is a
determination by the Court of Appeals that the proceeding in the Court of First Instance was free
from prejudicial error and "all questions raised by the assignments of error and all questions that
might have been raised are to be regarded as finally adjudicated against the appellant". So also,
the judgment affirmed "must be regarded as free from all error". 25 We reached this policy
construction because nothing in the decision of the Court of Appeals on this point would suggest
that its findings of fact are in any way at war with those of the trial court. Nor was said
affirmance by the Court of Appeals upon a ground or grounds different from those which were
made the basis of the conclusions of the trial court. 26
SCs discussion: If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a
first class seat, notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein
confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline. What security
then can a passenger have? It will always be an easy matter for an airline aided by its employees,

to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket, and say that there was a verbal agreement to the
contrary. What if the passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that, as a rule, a
written document speaks a uniform language; that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable.
If only to achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the
ticket so issued is desirable. Such is the case here. The lower courts refused to believe the oral
evidence intended to defeat the covenants in the ticket.
The foregoing are the considerations which point to the conclusion that there are facts
upon which the Court of Appeals predicated the finding that respondent Carrascoso had a first
class ticket and was entitled to a first class seat at Bangkok, which is a stopover in the Saigon to
Beirut leg of the flight. 27 We perceive no "welter of distortions by the Court of Appeals of
petitioner's statement of its position", as charged by petitioner. 28 Nor do we subscribe to
petitioner's accusation that respondent Carrascoso "surreptitiously took a first class seat to
provoke an issue". 29 And this because, as petitioner states, Carrascoso went to see the Manager
at his office in Bangkok "to confirm my seat and because from Saigon I was told again to see the
Manager". 30 Why, then, was he allowed to take a first class seat in the plane at Bangkok, if he
had no seat? Or, if another had a better right to the seat?
4. Petitioner assails respondent court's award of moral damages. Petitioner's
trenchant claim is that Carrascoso's action is planted upon breach of contract; that to
authorize an award for moral damages there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith;31
and that the decision of the Court of Appeals fails to make a finding of bad faith. The
pivotal allegations in the complaint bearing on this issue are:
3. That ... plaintiff entered into a contract of air carriage with the Philippine Air Lines for
a valuable consideration, the latter acting as general agents for and in behalf of the
defendant, under which said contract, plaintiff was entitled to, as defendant agreed to
furnish plaintiff, First Class passage on defendant's plane during the entire duration of
plaintiff's tour of Europe with Hongkong as starting point up to and until plaintiff's return
trip to Manila, ... .
4. That, during the first two legs of the trip from Hongkong to Saigon and from Saigon to
Bangkok, defendant furnished to the plaintiff First Class accommodation but only after
protestations, arguments and/or insistence were made by the plaintiff with defendant's
employees.
5. That finally, defendant failed to provide First Class passage, but instead furnished
plaintiff only Tourist Class accommodations from Bangkok to Teheran and/or
Casablanca, ... the plaintiff has been compelled by defendant's employees to leave the
First Class accommodation berths at Bangkok after he was already seated.

6. That consequently, the plaintiff, desiring no repetition of the inconvenience and

embarrassments brought by defendant's breach of contract was forced to take a Pan
American World Airways plane on his return trip from Madrid to Manila.32
xxx

xxx

xxx

2. That likewise, as a result of defendant's failure to furnish First Class accommodations

aforesaid, plaintiff suffered inconveniences, embarrassments, and humiliations, thereby causing
plaintiff mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation, and the like
injury, resulting in moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00. 33
xxx

xxx

xxx

The foregoing, in our opinion, substantially aver: First, That there was a contract to
furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second,
That said contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at
Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso
to leave his first class accommodation berth "after he was already, seated" and to take a seat in
the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and
humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social
humiliation, resulting in moral damages. It is true that there is no specific mention of the term
bad faith in the complaint. But, the inference of bad faith is there, it may be drawn from the
facts and circumstances set forth therein. 34 The contract was averred to establish the relation
between the parties. But the stress of the action is put on wrongful expulsion.
Quite apart from the foregoing is that (a) right the start of the trial, respondent's counsel
placed petitioner on guard on what Carrascoso intended to prove: That while sitting in the plane
in Bangkok, Carrascoso was ousted by petitioner's manager who gave his seat to a white man; 35
and (b) evidence of bad faith in the fulfillment of the contract was presented without objection on
the part of the petitioner. It is, therefore, unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is
sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award for moral damages. Deficiency in the
complaint, if any, was cured by the evidence. An amendment thereof to conform to the
evidence is not even required. 36 On the question of bad faith, the Court of Appeals declared:
That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class compartment of the
plane belonging to the defendant Air France while at Bangkok, and was transferred to the
tourist class not only without his consent but against his will, has been sufficiently
established by plaintiff in his testimony before the court, corroborated by the
corresponding entry made by the purser of the plane in his notebook which notation reads
as follows:

"First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will,
and that the captain refused to intervene",
and by the testimony of an eye-witness, Ernesto G. Cuento, who was a copassenger. The captain of the plane who was asked by the manager of defendant company
at Bangkok to intervene even refused to do so. It is noteworthy that no one on behalf of
defendant ever contradicted or denied this evidence for the plaintiff. It could have been
easy for defendant to present its manager at Bangkok to testify at the trial of the case, or
yet to secure his disposition; but defendant did neither. 37
The Court of appeals further stated
Neither is there evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation was made by the
white man. Hence, if the employees of the defendant at Bangkok sold a first-class ticket
to him when all the seats had already been taken, surely the plaintiff should not have been
picked out as the one to suffer the consequences and to be subjected to the humiliation
and indignity of being ejected from his seat in the presence of others. Instead of
explaining to the white man the improvidence committed by defendant's employees, the
manager adopted the more drastic step of ousting the plaintiff who was then safely
ensconsced in his rightful seat. We are strengthened in our belief that this probably was
what happened there, by the testimony of defendant's witness Rafael Altonaga who, when
asked to explain the meaning of the letters "O.K." appearing on the tickets of plaintiff,
said "that the space is confirmed for first class. Likewise, Zenaida Faustino, another
witness for defendant, who was the chief of the Reservation Office of defendant, testified
as follows:
"Q How does the person in the ticket-issuing office know what reservation the
passenger has arranged with you?
A They call us up by phone and ask for the confirmation." (t.s.n., p. 247, June 19,
1959)
In this connection, we quote with approval what the trial Judge has said on this
point:
Why did the, using the words of witness Ernesto G. Cuento, "white man"
have a "better right" to the seat occupied by Mr. Carrascoso? The record is silent.
The defendant airline did not prove "any better", nay, any right on the part of the
"white man" to the "First class" seat that the plaintiff was occupying and for
which he paid and was issued a corresponding "first class" ticket.

If there was a justified reason for the action of the defendant's Manager in
Bangkok, the defendant could have easily proven it by having taken the testimony
of the said Manager by deposition, but defendant did not do so; the presumption is
that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced [Sec. 69, par (e),
Rules of Court]; and, under the circumstances, the Court is constrained to find, as
it does find, that the Manager of the defendant airline in Bangkok not merely
asked but threatened the plaintiff to throw him out of the plane if he did not give
up his "first class" seat because the said Manager wanted to accommodate, using
the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, the "white man".38
It is really correct to say that the Court of Appeals in the quoted portion first
transcribed did not use the term "bad faith". But can it be doubted that the recital of facts
therein points to bad faith? The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his
right to a first class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him
from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class
compartment - just to give way to another passenger whose right thereto has not been
established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a
meaning different from what is understood in law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a
"state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of
self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose." 39
And if the foregoing were not yet sufficient, there is the express finding of bad
faith in the judgment of the Court of First Instance, thus:
The evidence shows that the defendant violated its contract of
transportation with plaintiff in bad faith, with the aggravating circumstances that
defendant's Manager in Bangkok went to the extent of threatening the plaintiff in
the presence of many passengers to have him thrown out of the airplane to give
the "first class" seat that he was occupying to, again using the words of the
witness Ernesto G. Cuento, a "white man" whom he (defendant's Manager)
wished to accommodate, and the defendant has not proven that this "white man"
had any "better right" to occupy the "first class" seat that the plaintiff was
occupying, duly paid for, and for which the corresponding "first class" ticket was
issued by the defendant to him.40
5. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not be
essayed. It is well settled in law. 41 For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager,
petitioner, his employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:

ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that
is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held that upon
the provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable. 42
6. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any
other contractual relation. 43 And this, because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains
with the public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of
the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a
relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees,
naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the
carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to
be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such
employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a
passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. 44
Thus, "Where a steamship company 45 had accepted a passenger's check, it was a breach of
contract and a tort, giving a right of action for its agent in the presence of third persons to falsely
notify her that the check was worthless and demand payment under threat of ejection, though the
language used was not insulting and she was not ejected." 46 And

this, because,
although the relation of passenger and carrier is
"contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the
act that breaks the contract may be also a tort". And in another
47

case, "Where a passenger on a railroad train, when the conductor came to collect his fare
tendered him the cash fare to a point where the train was scheduled not to stop, and told him that
as soon as the train reached such point he would pay the cash fare from that point to destination,
there was nothing in the conduct of the passenger which justified the conductor in using insulting
language to him, as by calling him a lunatic," 48 and the Supreme Court of South Carolina there
held the carrier liable for the mental suffering of said passenger.1awphl.nt
Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of
Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a
violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier a case of quasi-delict. Damages are
proper.

7. Petitioner draws our attention to respondent Carrascoso's testimony, thus

Q You mentioned about an attendant. Who is that attendant and purser?
A When we left already that was already in the trip I could not help it. So one of
the flight attendants approached me and requested from me my ticket and I said, What
for? and she said, "We will note that you transferred to the tourist class". I said, "Nothing
of that kind. That is tantamount to accepting my transfer." And I also said, "You are not
going to note anything there because I am protesting to this transfer".
Q Was she able to note it?
A No, because I did not give my ticket.
Q About that purser?
A Well, the seats there are so close that you feel uncomfortable and you don't have
enough leg room, I stood up and I went to the pantry that was next to me and the purser
was there. He told me, "I have recorded the incident in my notebook." He read it and
translated it to me because it was recorded in French "First class passenger was
forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene."
Mr. VALTE
I move to strike out the last part of the testimony of the witness because the best evidence
would be the notes. Your Honor.
COURT
I will allow that as part of his testimony. 49
Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the purser made an entry in
his notebook reading "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will,
and that the captain refused to intervene" is predicated upon evidence [Carrascoso's testimony
above] which is incompetent. We do not think so. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the
ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within the proscription of the best
evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible. 49a
Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue happened, the
impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not
as yet died down. Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. 50
For, they grow "out of the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of the

declarant". 51 The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous,
and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. 52
It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.
At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an employee of
petitioner. It would have been an easy matter for petitioner to have contradicted Carrascoso's
testimony. If it were really true that no such entry was made, the deposition of the purser could
have cleared up the matter.
We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is admissible in evidence.
8. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the court ample power to
grant exemplary damages in contracts and quasi- contracts. The only condition is that
defendant should have "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner." 53 The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into
this legal precept. And this, in addition to moral damages.54
9. The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The grant of exemplary damages justifies
a similar judgment for attorneys' fees. The least that can be said is that the courts below felt that
it is but just and equitable that attorneys' fees be given. 55 We do not intend to break faith with the
tradition that discretion well exercised as it was here should not be disturbed.
10. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by both the trial court and the Court
of Appeals, thus: P25,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00, by way of exemplary damages, and
P3,000.00 as attorneys' fees. The task of fixing these amounts is primarily with the trial court. 56
The Court of Appeals did not interfere with the same. The dictates of good sense suggest that we
give our imprimatur thereto. Because, the facts and circumstances point to the reasonableness
thereof.57
On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from
reversible error. We accordingly vote to affirm the same. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar and Castro, JJ.,
concur.
Bengzon, J.P., J., took no part.
G.R. No. 156109

November 18, 2004

KHRISTINE REA M. REGINO, Assisted and Represented by ARMANDO REGINO,

petitioner,
vs.

PANGASINAN COLLEGES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, RACHELLE A.

GAMUROT and ELISSA BALADAD, respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:
Upon enrolment, students and their school enter upon a reciprocal contract. The students
agree to abide by the standards of academic performance and codes of conduct, issued usually in
the form of manuals that are distributed to the enrollees at the start of the school term. Further,
the school informs them of the itemized fees they are expected to pay. Consequently, it cannot,
after the enrolment of a student, vary the terms of the contract. It cannot require fees other
than those it specified upon enrolment.
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review under Rule 45,1 seeking to nullify the Jul y 12, 20022
and the November 22, 20023 Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta City,
Pangasinan (Branch 48) in Civil Case No. U-7541. The decretal portion of the first assailed
Order reads:
"WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the instant motion to dismiss for lack of cause of
action."4
The second challenged Order denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
Petitioner Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first year computer science student at Respondent
Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology (PCST). Reared in a poor family, Regino went
to college mainly through the financial support of her relatives. During the second semester of
school year 2001-2002, she enrolled in logic and statistics subjects under Respondents Rachelle
A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad, respectively, as teachers.
In February 2002, PCST held a fund raising campaign dubbed the "Rave Party and Dance
Revolution," the proceeds of which were to go to the construction of the school's tennis and
volleyball courts. Each student was required to pay for two tickets at the price of P100 each. The
project was allegedly implemented by recompensing students who purchased tickets with
additional points in their test scores; those who refused to pay were denied the opportunity to
take the final examinations.

Financially strapped and prohibited by her religion from attending dance parties and
celebrations, Regino refused to pay for the tickets. On March 14 and March 15, 2002, the
scheduled dates of the final examinations in logic and statistics, her teachers -- Respondents
Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad -- allegedly disallowed her from taking the tests.
According to petitioner, Gamurot made her sit out her logic class while her classmates were
taking their examinations. The next day, Baladad, after announcing to the entire class that she
was not permitting petitioner and another student to take their statistics examinations for failing
to pay for their tickets, allegedly ejected them from the classroom. Petitioner's pleas ostensibly
went unheeded by Gamurot and Baladad, who unrelentingly defended their positions as
compliance with PCST's policy.
On April 25, 2002, petitioner filed, as a pauper litigant, a Complaint5 for damages against PCST,
Gamurot and Baladad. In her Complaint, she prayed for P500,000 as nominal damages;
P500,000 as moral damages; at least P1,000,000 as exemplary damages; P250,000 as actual
damages; plus the costs of litigation and attorney's fees.
On May 30, 2002, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss6 on the ground of petitioner's failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. According to respondents, the question raised involved the
determination of the wisdom of an administrative policy of the PCST; hence, the case should
have been initiated before the proper administrative body, the Commission of Higher Education
(CHED).
In her Comment to respondents' Motion, petitioner argued that prior exhaustion of administrative
remedies was unnecessary, because her action was not administrative in nature, but one purely
for damages arising from respondents' breach of the laws on human relations. As such,
jurisdiction lay with the courts.
On July 12, 2002, the RTC dismissed the Complaint for lack of cause of action.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In granting respondents' Motion to Dismiss, the trial court noted that the instant controversy
involved a higher institution of learning, two of its faculty members and one of its students. It
added that Section 54 of the Education Act of 1982 vested in the Commission on Higher
Education (CHED) the supervision and regulation of tertiary schools. Thus, it ruled that the
CHED, not the courts, had jurisdiction over the controversy.7
In its dispositive portion, the assailed Order dismissed the Complaint for "lack of cause of
action" without, however, explaining this ground.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the present Petition on pure questions of law.8
Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:

"Whether or not the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies in a civil

action exclusively for damages based on violation of the human relation provisions of the
Civil Code, filed by a student against her former school.
"Whether or not there is a need for prior declaration of invalidity of a certain school
administrative policy by the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) before a former
student can successfully maintain an action exclusively for damages in regular courts.
"Whether or not the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) has exclusive original
jurisdiction over actions for damages based upon violation of the Civil Code provisions
on human relations filed by a student against the school."9
All of the foregoing point to one issue -- whether the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is applicable. The Court, however, sees a second issue which, though
not expressly raised by petitioner, was impliedly contained in her Petition: whether the
Complaint stated sufficient cause(s) of action.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Respondents anchored their Motion to Dismiss on petitioner's alleged failure to exhaust
administrative remedies before resorting to the RTC. According to them, the determination of the
controversy hinge on the validity, the wisdom and the propriety of PCST's academic policy.
Thus, the Complaint should have been lodged in the CHED, the administrative body tasked
under Republic Act No. 7722 to implement the state policy to "protect, foster and promote the
right of all citizens to affordable quality education at all levels and to take appropriate steps to
ensure that education is accessible to all."10
Petitioner counters that the doctrine finds no relevance to the present case since she is praying for
damages, a remedy beyond the domain of the CHED and well within the jurisdiction of the
courts.11
Petitioner is correct. First, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies has no bearing
on the present case. In Factoran Jr. v. CA,12 the Court had occasion to elucidate on the rationale
behind this doctrine:
"The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of
law, comity, and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available
administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been
given the appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed
in the administrative forum. x x x.13"

Petitioner is not asking for the reversal of the policies of PCST. Neither is she demanding it
to allow her to take her final examinations; she was already enrolled in another educational
institution. A reversal of the acts complained of would not adequately redress her
grievances; under the circumstances, the consequences of respondents' acts could no longer
be undone or rectified.
Second, exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when there is competence on the
part of the administrative body to act upon the matter complained of.14 Administrative agencies
are not courts; they are neither part of the judicial system, nor are they deemed judicial
tribunals.15 Specifically, the CHED does not have the power to award damages.16 Hence,
petitioner could not have commenced her case before the Commission.
Third, the exhaustion doctrine admits of exceptions, one of which arises when the issue is
purely legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial court.17 Petitioner's action for
damages inevitably calls for the application and the interpretation of the Civil Code, a
function that falls within the jurisdiction of the courts.18
Second Issue:
Cause of Action
Sufficient Causes of Action Stated in the Allegations in the Complaint
As a rule, every complaint must sufficiently allege a cause of action; failure to do so warrants its
dismissal.19 A complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what
appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed
for. Assuming the facts that are alleged to be true, the court should be able to render a valid
judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint.20
A motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the
alleged facts. In their Motion to Dismiss, respondents did not dispute any of petitioner's
allegations, and they admitted that "x x x the crux of plaintiff's cause of action is the
determination of whether or not the assessment of P100 per ticket is excessive or oppressive."21
They thereby premised their prayer for dismissal on the Complaint's alleged failure to state a
cause of action. Thus, a reexamination of the Complaint is in order.
The Complaint contains the following factual allegations:
"10. In the second week of February 2002, defendant Rachelle A. Gamurot, in
connivance with PCST, forced plaintiff and her classmates to buy or take two tickets
each, x x x;
"11. Plaintiff and many of her classmates objected to the forced distribution and selling of
tickets to them but the said defendant warned them that if they refused [to] take or pay
the price of the two tickets they would not be allowed at all to take the final
examinations;

"12. As if to add insult to injury, defendant Rachelle A. Gamurot bribed students with
additional fifty points or so in their test score in her subject just to unjustly influence and
compel them into taking the tickets;
"13. Despite the students' refusal, they were forced to take the tickets because [of]
defendant Rachelle A. Gamurot's coercion and act of intimidation, but still many of them
including the plaintiff did not attend the dance party imposed upon them by defendants
PCST and Rachelle A. Gamurot;
"14. Plaintiff was not able to pay the price of her own two tickets because aside form the
fact that she could not afford to pay them it is also against her religious practice as a
member of a certain religious congregation to be attending dance parties and celebrations;
"15. On March 14, 2002, before defendant Rachelle A. Gamurot gave her class its final
examination in the subject 'Logic' she warned that students who had not paid the tickets
would not be allowed to participate in the examination, for which threat and intimidation
many students were eventually forced to make payments:
"16. Because plaintiff could not afford to pay, defendant Rachelle A. Gamurot inhumanly
made plaintiff sit out the class but the defendant did not allow her to take her final
examination in 'Logic;'
"17. On March 15, 2002 just before the giving of the final examination in the subject
'Statistics,' defendant Elissa Baladad, in connivance with defendants Rachelle A. Gamurot
and PCST, announced in the classroom that she was not allowing plaintiff and another
student to take the examination for their failure and refusal to pay the price of the tickets,
and thenceforth she ejected plaintiff and the other student from the classroom;
"18. Plaintiff pleaded for a chance to take the examination but all defendants could say
was that the prohibition to give the examinations to non-paying students was an
administrative decision;
"19. Plaintiff has already paid her tuition fees and other obligations in the school;
"20. That the above-cited incident was not a first since PCST also did another forced
distribution of tickets to its students in the first semester of school year 2001-2002; x x x
" 22
The foregoing allegations show two causes of action; first, breach of contract; and second,
liability for tort.
Reciprocity of the
School-Student Contract
In Alcuaz v. PSBA,23 the Court characterized the relationship between the school and the student
as a contract, in which "a student, once admitted by the school is considered enrolled for one

semester."24 Two years later, in Non v. Dames II,25 the Court modified the "termination of
contract theory" in Alcuaz by holding that the contractual relationship between the school and
the student is not only semestral in duration, but for the entire period the latter are expected to
complete it."26 Except for the variance in the period during which the contractual relationship is
considered to subsist, both Alcuaz and Non were unanimous in characterizing the school-student
relationship as contractual in nature.
The school-student relationship is also reciprocal. Thus, it has consequences appurtenant to and
inherent in all contracts of such kind -- it gives rise to bilateral or reciprocal rights and
obligations. The school undertakes to provide students with education sufficient to enable them
to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the students agree to abide by the
academic requirements of the school and to observe its rules and regulations.27
The terms of the school-student contract are defined at the moment of its inception -- upon
enrolment of the student. Standards of academic performance and the code of behavior and
discipline are usually set forth in manuals distributed to new students at the start of every school
year. Further, schools inform prospective enrollees the amount of fees and the terms of payment.
In practice, students are normally required to make a down payment upon enrollment, with the
balance to be paid before every preliminary, midterm and final examination. Their failure to pay
their financial obligation is regarded as a valid ground for the school to deny them the
opportunity to take these examinations.
The foregoing practice does not merely ensure compliance with financial obligations; it also
underlines the importance of major examinations. Failure to take a major examination is usually
fatal to the students' promotion to the next grade or to graduation. Examination results form a
significant basis for their final grades. These tests are usually a primary and an indispensable
requisite to their elevation to the next educational level and, ultimately, to their completion of a
course.
Education is not a measurable commodity. It is not possible to determine who is "better
educated" than another. Nevertheless, a student's grades are an accepted approximation of what
would otherwise be an intangible product of countless hours of study. The importance of grades
cannot be discounted in a setting where education is generally the gate pass to employment
opportunities and better life; such grades are often the means by which a prospective employer
measures whether a job applicant has acquired the necessary tools or skills for a particular
profession or trade.
Thus, students expect that upon their payment of tuition fees, satisfaction of the set academic
standards, completion of academic requirements and observance of school rules and regulations,
the school would reward them by recognizing their "completion" of the course enrolled in.
The obligation on the part of the school has been established in Magtibay v. Garcia,28 Licup v.
University of San Carlos29 and Ateneo de Manila University v. Garcia,30 in which the Court held
that, barring any violation of the rules on the part of the students, an institution of higher learning

has a contractual obligation to afford its students a fair opportunity to complete the course they
seek to pursue.
We recognize the need of a school to fund its facilities and to meet astronomical operating costs;
this is a reality in running it. Crystal v. Cebu International School31 upheld the imposition by
respondent school of a "land purchase deposit" in the amount of P50,000 per student to be used
for the "purchase of a piece of land and for the construction of new buildings and other facilities
x x x which the school would transfer [to] and occupy after the expiration of its lease contract
over its present site."
The amount was refundable after the student graduated or left the school. After noting that the
imposition of the fee was made only after prior consultation and approval by the parents of the
students, the Court held that the school committed no actionable wrong in refusing to admit the
children of the petitioners therein for their failure to pay the "land purchase deposit" and the 2.5
percent monthly surcharge thereon.
In the present case, PCST imposed the assailed revenue-raising measure belatedly, in the middle
of the semester. It exacted the dance party fee as a condition for the students' taking the final
examinations, and ultimately for its recognition of their ability to finish a course. The fee,
however, was not part of the school-student contract entered into at the start of the school year.
Hence, it could not be unilaterally imposed to the prejudice of the enrollees.
Such contract is by no means an ordinary one. In Non, we stressed that the school-student
contract "is imbued with public interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution
to education and the grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational
institutions."32 Sections 5 (1) and (3) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution provide:
"The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all
levels and shall take appropriate steps to make such declaration accessible to all.
"Every student has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair,
reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements."
The same state policy resonates in Section 9(2) of BP 232, otherwise known as the Education Act
of 1982:
"Section 9. Rights of Students in School. In addition to other rights, and subject to the
limitations prescribed by law and regulations, students and pupils in all schools shall
enjoy the following rights:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(2) The right to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and
to continue their course therein up to graduation, except in cases of academic
deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations."

Liability for Tort

In her Complaint, petitioner also charged that private respondents "inhumanly punish students x
x x by reason only of their poverty, religious practice or lowly station in life, which inculcated
upon [petitioner] the feelings of guilt, disgrace and unworthiness;"33 as a result of such
punishment, she was allegedly unable to finish any of her subjects for the second semester of that
school year and had to lag behind in her studies by a full year. The acts of respondents
supposedly caused her extreme humiliation, mental agony and "demoralization of unimaginable
proportions" in violation of Articles 19, 21 and 26 of the Civil Code. These provisions of the
law state thus:
"Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance
of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith."
"Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage."
"Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of
mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they
may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages,
prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his beliefs, lowly station in life,
place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition."

Generally, liability for tort arises only between parties not otherwise
bound by a contract. An academic institution, however, may be held
liable for tort even if it has an existing contract with its students,
since the act that violated the contract may also be a tort. We ruled thus
in PSBA vs. CA,34 from which we quote:
"x x x A perusal of Article 2176 [of the Civil Code] shows that obligations arising from
quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between
parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, this
impression has not prevented this Court from determining the existence of a tort even
when there obtains a contract. In Air France v. Carrascoso (124 Phil. 722), the private
respondent was awarded damages for his unwarranted expulsion from a first-class seat

aboard the petitioner airline. It is noted, however, that the Court referred to the petitionerairline's liability as one arising from tort, not one arising form a contract of carriage. In
effect, Air France is authority for the view that liability from tort may exist even if there
is a contract, for the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort. x x x This view was
not all that revolutionary, for even as early as 1918, this Court was already of a similar
mind. In Cangco v. Manila Railroad (38 Phil. 780), Mr. Justice Fisher elucidated thus: 'x
x x. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract
under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract
would have constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no
contract existed between the parties.'
"Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations,
particularly Article 21 x x x."35
Academic Freedom
In their Memorandum, respondents harp on their right to "academic freedom." We are not
impressed. According to present jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the
independence of an academic institution to determine for itself (1) who may teach, (2) what may
be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted to study.36 In Garcia v. the Faculty
Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology,37 the Court upheld the respondent therein
when it denied a female student's admission to theological studies in a seminary for prospective
priests. The Court defined the freedom of an academic institution thus: "to decide for itself aims
and objectives and how best to attain them x x x free from outside coercion or interference save
possibly when overriding public welfare calls for some restraint."38
In Tangonan v. Pao,39 the Court upheld, in the name of academic freedom, the right of the
school to refuse readmission of a nursing student who had been enrolled on probation, and who
had failed her nursing subjects. These instances notwithstanding, the Court has emphasized that
once a school has, in the name of academic freedom, set its standards, these should be
meticulously observed and should not be used to discriminate against certain students.40 After
accepting them upon enrollment, the school cannot renege on its contractual obligation on
grounds other than those made known to, and accepted by, students at the start of the
school year.
In sum, the Court holds that the Complaint alleges sufficient causes of action against
respondents, and that it should not have been summarily dismissed. Needless to say, the Court is
not holding respondents liable for the acts complained of. That will have to be ruled upon in due
course by the court a quo.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed Orders REVERSED. The
trial court is DIRECTED to reinstate the Complaint and, with all deliberate speed, to continue
the proceedings in Civil Case No. U-7541. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-11318

October 26, 1918

THE MANILA RAILROAD CO., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
LA COMPAIA TRANSATLANTICA, defendant-appellee. and
THE ATLANTIC GULF & PACIFIC CO., defendant-appellant.
William A. Kincaid & Thomas L. Hartigan for plaintiff-appellant.
Lawrence, Ross & Block for defendant-appellant Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co.
Gilbert, Cohn & Fisher for defendant-appellee Compaia Transatlantica.

STREET, J.:
In March 1914, the steamship Alicante, belonging to the Compaia Transatlantica de
Barcelona, arrived at Manila with two locomotive boilers aboard, the property of The Manila
Railroad Company. The equipment of the ship for discharging heavy cargo was not sufficiently
strong to handle these boilers, and it was therefore necessary for the Steamship Company to
procure assistance in the port of Manila.
The Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company (hereafter called the Atlantic Company) was
accordingly employed by the Steamship Company, as having probably the best equipment for
this purpose of any contracting company in the city. The service to be performed by the Atlantic
Company consisted in bringing it s floating crane alongside the Alicante, lifting the boilers our of
the ship's hold, and transferring them to a barge which would be placed ready to receive them.
Upon the arrival of the Alicante, the Atlantic company sent out its crane in charge of one
Leyden. In preparing to hoist the first boiler the sling was unfortunately adjusted near the middle
of the boiler, and it was thus raised nearly in an horizontal position. The boiler was too long to
clear the hatch in this position, and after one end of the boiler had emerged on one side of the
hatch, the other still remained below on the other side. When the boiler had been gotten into this
position and was being hoisted still further, a river near the head of the boiler was caught under
the edge of the hatch. The weight on the crane was thus increased by a strain estimated at fifteen
tons with the result that the cable of the sling parted and the boiler fell to the bottom of the ship's
hold. The sling was again adjusted to the boiler but instead of being placed near the middle it was
now slung nearer one of the ends, as should have been done at first. The boiler was gain lifted;
but as it was being brought up, the bolt at the end of the derrick book broke, and again the boiler
fell.

The crane was repaired and the boiler discharged, but it was found to be so badly damaged
that it had to be reshipped to England where it was rebuilt, and afterwards was returned to
Manila. The Railroad Company's damage by reason of the cost of repairs, expenses and loss of
the use of the boiler proved to be P23,343.29; and as to the amount of the damage so resulting
there is practically no dispute. To recover these damages the present action was instituted by the
Railroad Company against the Steamship Company. the latter caused the Atlantic Company to be
brought in as a codefendant, and insisted that whatever liability existed should be fixed upon the
Atlantic Company as an independent contractor who had undertaken to discharge the boilers and
had become responsible for such damage as had been done.
The judge of the Court of First Instance gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff against the
Atlantic Company, but the absolved the Steamship Company from the complaint. The plaintiff
has appealed from the action of the court in failing to give judgment against the Steamship
company, while the Atlantic company has appealed from the judgment against it.
The mishap was undoubtedly due, as the lower court found, to the negligence of one
Leyden, the foreman in charge; and we may add that the evidence tends to show that his
negligence was of a type which may without exaggeration be denominated gross. The sling was
in the first place improperly adjusted, and the attention of Leyden was at once called to this by
the man in charge of the stevedores. Nevertheless he proceeded and, instead of lowering the
boiler when it was seen that it could not readily pass through the hatch, he attempted to force it
through; and the ship's tackle was brought into use to assist in this maneuver. The second fall
was, it appears, caused by the weakening of the bolt at the head of the derrick boom, due to the
shock incident to the first accident. This defect was possibly such as not to be patent to external
observation but we are of the opinion that a person of sufficient skill to be trusted with the
operation of machinery of this character should be trusted with the operation of machinery of this
character should have known that the crane had possibly been weakened by the jar received in
the first accident. The foreman was therefore guilty of negligence in attempting to hoist the
boiler the second time under the conditions that had thus developed. It should be noted that the
operation was at all its states entirely under Leyden's control; and, although in the first lift he
utilized the ship's tackle to aid in hoisting the boiler, everything was done under his immediate
supervision. There is no evidence tending to show that the first fall of the boiler might have been
due to any hidden defect in the lifting apparatus; and if it had not been for the additional strain
caused by one end of the boiler catching under the hatch, the operation would doubtless have
been accomplished without difficulty. The accident is therefore to be attributed to the failure of
Leyden to exercise the degree of care which an ordinarily competent and prudent person would
have exhibited under the circumstances which then confronted him. This conclusion of fact
cannot be refuted; and, indeed, no attempt is here made by the appellant to reverse this finding of
the trial court.

Three questions are involved in the case, namely: (1) Is the steamship company liable
to the plaintiff by reason of having delivered the boiler in question in a damaged condition?
(2) Is the atlantic company liable to be made to respond to the steamship company for the
amount the latter may be required to pay to the plaintiff for the damage done? Is the
Atlantic company directly liable to the plaintiff, as the trial court held?
It will be observed that the contractual relation existed between the railroad company and
the steamship company; and the duties of the latter with respect to the carrying and delivery of
the boilers are to be discovered by considering the terms and legal effect of that contract. A
contractual relation also existed between the Steamship company and the atlantic company; and
the duties owing by the latter to the former with respect to the lifting and the transferring of the
boiler are likewise to be discovered by considering the terms and legal effect of the contract
between these parties. On the other hand, no contractual relation existed directly between the
Railroad Company and the Atlantic Company.
We are all agreed, that, under the contract for transportation from England to Manila, the
Steamship company is liable to the plaintiff for the injury done to the boiler while it was being
discharged from the ship. The obligation to transport the boiler necessarily involves the duty to
convey and deliver it in a proper condition according to its nature, and conformably with good
faith, custom, and the law (art. 1258, Civ. Code). The contract to convey import the duty to
convey and deliver safely and securely with reference to the degree of care which, under the
circumstances, are required by law and custom applicable to the case. The duty to carry and to
carry safely is all one.
Such being the contract of the Steamship Company, said company is necessarily liable,
under articles 1103 and 1104 of the Civil Code, for the consequences of the omission of the care
necessary to the proper performance of this obligation. The contact to transport and deliver at the
port of Manila a locomotive boiler, which was received by it in proper condition, is not complied
with the delivery at the port of destination of a mass of iron the utility of which had been
destroyed.
Nor does the Steamship Company escape liability by reason of the fact that it employed a
competent independent contractor to discharge the boilers. The law applicable to this feature of
the case will be more fully discussed further on in this opinion. At this point we merely observe
that in the performance of this service the Atlantic company, and it has never yet been held that
the failure to comply with a contractual obligation can be excused by showing that such
delinquency was due to the negligence of one to whom the contracting party had committed the
performance of the contract.
Coming to the question of the liability of the Atlantic Company to respond to the
Steamship Company for the damages which the latter will be compelled to pay to the plaintiff,

we observe that the defense of the Atlantic company comprises two contentions, to-wit, first, that
by the terms of the engagement in accordance with which the Atlantic company agreed to render
the service, all risk incident to the discharge of the boilers was assumed by the steamship
company, and secondly, that the atlantic company should be absolved under the last paragraph of
article 1903 of the civil code, inasmuch as it had used due care in the selection of the employee
whose negligent act caused the damage in question.
At the hearing in first instance the Atlantic Company introduced four witnesses to prove
that at the time said company agreed to lift the boilers out of the Alicante, as upon other later
occasions, the steamship company not be responsible for damage. The vice-president of the
atlantic company testified that hew as present upon the occasion when the agent of the Steamship
company made arrangements for the discharge of the boilers and he heard the conversation
between the president and said agent. According to this witness the substance of the agreement
was that, while the Atlantic Company would use all due care in getting the boilers out, no
responsibility was assumed for damage done either to ship or cargo. The intermediary who acted
as agent for the Steamship Company in arranging for the performance of this service stoutly
denied that any such terms were announced by the officials or anybody else connected with the
Atlantic Company at any time while the arrangements were pending.
In the conflict of the evidence, we recognize that, by a preponderance of the evidence,
some reservation or other was made as to the responsibility of the Atlantic Company; was made
to the responsibility of the atlantic company and though the agent who acted on behalf of the
steamship company possibly never communicated this reservation to his principal, the latter
should nevertheless be held bound thereby. It thus becomes necessary to discover what the exact
terms of this supposed reservation were.
We think that we must put aside at once the words of studies precision with which the
president of the Atlantic company could exclude the possibility of any liability attaching to his
company, though we may accept his statement as showing that the excepted risk contemplated
breakage of the lifting equipment. There is undoubtedly a larger element of truth in the more
reasonable statement by the vice-president of the company. According to this witness the contract
combined two features, namely, an undertaking on the part of the Atlantic Company to use all
due care, combined with a reservation concerning the company's liability for damage.
The Atlantic Company offered in evidence, a number of letters which had been written by
it at different times, extending over a period of years, in response to inquiries made by other
firms and person in Manila concerning the terms upon which the Atlantic Company was not
accustomed to assume the risk incident to such work and required the parties for whom the
service might be rendered either to carry the risk or insure against it. One such letter, dated
nearly four years prior to the occurrence such letter, dated nearly four years prior to the
occurrences which gave rise to this lawsuit, was addressed to the Compaia Transatlantica de

Barcelona one of the defendants in this case. It was stated in this communication that the
company's derrick would be subject to inspection prior to making the lift but that the Atlantic
Company would not assume responsibility for damage that might occur either to ship or cargo
from any whatsoever. The steamship company rejected the services of the Atlantic company in
that instance as being too onerous.
The letters directed to this parties, it may observed, would not, generally speaking, be
admissible as against the plaintiff for the purpose of proving that a similar reservation was
inserted in the contract with it on this occasion; but if knowledge of such custom is brought
home to the steamship company, the fact that such reservation was commonly made is of some
probative force. Reference to a number of these letters will show that no particular formula was
used by the Atlantic Company in defining its exemption, and the tenor of these various
communications differs materially. We think, however, that some of the letters are of value as an
aid in interpreting the reservation which the Atlantic Company may have intended to make. We
therefore quote from some of these letters as follows:
We will use our best endeavors to carry out the work successfully and will ask you
to inspect our plant but we wish it distinctly understood that we cannot assume
responsibility for damage which may occur . . . while the lift is being made. (To Rear
Admiral, U.S.N., Oct. 4, 1909.)
Our quotation is based on the understanding that we assume no responsibility from
any accident which may happen during our operations. We always insert this clause as
precautionary measure, but we have never had to avail ourselves of it as yet and do not
expect to now. (To "El Varadero de Manila," Nov. 1, 1913.)
As is customary in these cases, we will use all precaution as necessary to handle the
gun in a proper manner. Our equipment has been tested and will be again, before making
the lift, but we do not assume any responsibility for damage to the gun ship, or cargo. (To
Warner, Barnes & Co., June 7, 1909.)
The idea expressed in these letters is, we think entirely consonant with the interpretation
which the vice-president of the company placed upon the contract which was made with the
steamship company upon this occasion, that is, the company recognized its duty to exercise due
supervisory care; and the exemption from liability, whatever may have been its precise words
had reference to disasters which might result from some inherent hidden defect in the lifting
apparatus or other unforeseen occurrence not directly attributable to negligence of the company
in the lifting operations. Neither party could have supposed for a moment that it was intended to
absolve the Atlantic Company from its duty to use due care in the work.

It is not pretended that negligence on the part of the Atlantic Company or its
employees was expressly included in the excepted risk, and we are of the opinion that the
contract should not be understood as covering such an exemption. It is a rudimentary
principle that the contractor is responsible for the work executed by persons whom he
employees in its performance, and this expressed in the Civil Code in the form of a positive
rule of law (art. 1596). It is also expressly declared by law that liability arising from
negligence is demandable in the fulfillment of all kinds of obligations (art. 1103, Civil
Code). Every contract for the presentation of service therefore has annexed to it, as an
inseparable implicit obligation, the duty to exercise due care in the accomplishment of the
work; and no reservation whereby the person rendering the services seeks to escape from
the consequences of a violation of this obligations can viewed with favor.
Contracts against liability for negligence are not favored by law. In some instances,
such as common carriers, they are prohibited as against public policy. In all cases such
contracts should be construed strictly, with every intendment against the party seeking its
protection. (Crew vs. Bradstreet Company, 134 Pa. St., 161; 7 L. R. A., 661; 19 Am. St.
Rep., 681.)
The strictness with which contracts conferring such an unusual exemption are construed is
illustrated in Bryan vs. Eastern & Australian S. S. Co. (28 Phil. Rep., 310). The decision in that
case is not precisely applicable to the case at bar, since the court was there applying the law of a
foreign jurisdiction, and the question at issue involved a doctrine peculiar to contracts of
common carriers. Nevertheless the case is instructive as illustrating the universal attitude of
courts upon the right of a contracting party to stipulate against the consequences of his own
negligence. It there appeared that the plaintiff had purchased from the defendant company a
ticket for the transportation of himself and baggage from Hongkong to Manila By the terms of
the contract printed in legible type upon the back of the ticket it was provided that the company
could not hold itself responsible for any loss or damage to luggage, under any circumstances
whatsoever, unless it had been paid for as freight. It was held that this limitation upon the
liability of the defendant company did not relieve it from liability of the defendant company for
negligence of its servants by which the baggage of the passenger was lost. Said the court:
Ordinarily this language would seem to be broad enough to cover every possible contingency,
including the negligent act of the defendant's servants. To so hold, however, would run counter to
the established law of England and the United States on that subject. The court then quoted the
following proposition from the decision of the King's Bench Division in Price & Co. vs. Union
Lighterage Co. ([1903], 1 K. B. D., 750, 754):
"An exemption in general words not expressly relating to negligence, even
though the words are wide enough to include loss by negligence or default of
carriers' servants' must be construed as limiting the liability of the carrier as

assurer, and not as relieving from the duty of the exercising reasonable skill and
care."
Even admitting that, generally speaking, a person may stipulate against liability for
the consequences of negligence, at least in those cases where the negligence is not gross or
willful, the contract conferring such exemption must be so clear as to leave no room for the
operation of the ordinary rules of liability consecrated by experience and sanctioned by the
express provisions of law.
If the exemption should be understood in the scene that counsel for the Atlantic Company
now insists it should bear, that is, as an absolute exemption from all responsibility for
negligence, it is evident that the agreement was a most inequitable and unfair one, and hence it is
one that the steamship company can not be lightly assumed to have made. Understood in that
sense it is the equivalent of licensing the Atlantic Company to perform its tasks in any manner
and fashion that it might please, and to hold it harmless from the consequences.
It is true that, in these days insurance can usually be obtained in the principal ports of
commerce by parties circumstanced as was the steamship company in the case now before us.
But the best insurance against disasters of this kind is found in the exercise of due care; and the
chief incentive to the exercise of care is a feeling of responsibility on the part of him who
undertakes the work. Naturally the courts are little inclined to aid tin the efforts of contractors to
evade this responsibility.
There may have been in the minds of the officials of the Atlantic Company an idea that the
promise to use due care in the lifting operations was not accompanied by a legal obligation, such
promise being intended merely for its moral effect as an assurance to the steamship company that
the latter might rely upon competence and diligence of the employees of the Atlantic Company
to accomplish the work in a proper way. The contract can not be permitted to operate in this onesided manner. The two features of the engagement, namely, the promise to use due care and
the exemption from liability for damage should be so construed as to give some legal effect
to both. The result is, as already indicated, that the Atlantic Company was bound by its
undertaking to use due care and that he exemption was intended to cover accidents use to
hidden defects in the apparatus or other unforeseeable occurrences not having their origin
in the immediate personal negligence of the party in charge of the operations.
We now proceed to consider the contention that the Atlantic Company under the last
paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code, which declares that the liability there referred to
shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to avoid the damage. In this connection the conclusion of fact must be
conceded in favor of the Atlantic Company that it had used proper care in the selection of
Leyden and that , so far as the company was aware, he was a person to whom might

properly be committed the task of discharging the boilers. The answer to the contention,
however is the obligation of the Atlantic Company was created by contract, and article
1903 is not applicable to negligence arising in the course of the performance of a
contractual obligation. Article 1903 is exclusively concerned with cases where the
negligence arises in the absence of agreement.
In discussing the liability of the Steamship Company to the plaintiff Railroad Company we
have already shown that a party is bound to the full performance of his contractual engagements
under articles 1101 et seq. of the Civil Code, and other special provisions of the Code relative to
contractual obligations; and if he falls short of complete performance by reason of his own
negligence or that of any person to whom he may commit the work, he is liable for the damages
resulting therefrom. What was there said is also applicable with reference to the liability of the
Atlantic Company upon its contract with the Steamship Company, and the same need not be here
repeated. It is desirable, however, in this connection, to bring out somewhat more fully the
distinction between negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation (culpa contractual)
and neligence considered as an independent source of obligation between parties not previously
bound (culpa aquiliana).
This distinction is well established in legal jurisprudence and is fully recognized in the
provisions of the Civil Code. As illustrative of this, we quote the following passage from the
opinion of this Court in the well-known case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co. (7 Phil.
Rep., 359, 365), and in this quotation we reproduce the first paragraph of here presenting a more
correct English version of said passage.
The acts to which these articles are applicable are understood to be those not
growing out of preexisting duties of the parties to one another. But where relations
already formed give arise to duties, whether springing form contract or quasi-contract,
then breaches of those duties are subject to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same
code. A typical application of this distinction may be found in the consequences of a
railway accident due to defective machinery supplied by the employer. His liability to his
employee would arise out of the contract for passage, while that of the injured by-stander
would originate in the negligent act itself. This distinction is thus clearly set forth by
Manresa in his commentary on article 1093:
"We see with reference to such obligations, that culpa, or negligence,
may be understood in two different senses, either as culpa, substantive and
independent, which of itself constitutes the source of an obligation between
two person not formerly bound by any other obligation; or as an incident in
the performance of an obligation which already existed, and which increases
the liability arising from the already existing obligation."

Justice Tracey, the author of the opinion from which we have quoted, proceeds to observe
that Manresa, in commenting on articles 1101 and 1104, has described these two species of
negligence as contractual and extra-contractual, the latter being the culpa aquiliana of the
Roman law. "This terminology is unreservedly accepted by Sanchez Roman (Derecho Civil,
fourth section, chapter XI, article II, No. 12), and the principle stated is supported by decisions of
the supreme court of Spain,. among them those of November 29, 11896 (80 Jurisprudencia Civil,
No. 151), and June 27, 1894 (75 Jurisprudencia Civil, No. 182.)"
The principle that negligence in the performance of a contract is not governed by article of
the Civil Code but rather by article 1104 of the same Code was directly applied by this court in
the case of Baer Senior & Co.'s successors vs. Compaa Maritima (6 Phil. Rep., 215); and the
same idea has been impliedly if not expressly recognized in other cases (N. T. Hashim & Co. vs.
Rocha & Co., 18 Phil. Rep., 315; Tan Chiong Sian vs. Inchausti & Co., 22 Phil. Rep., 152).
What has been said suffices in our opinion to demonstrate that the Atlantic Company is
liable to the Steamship Company for the damages brought upon the latter by the failure of the
Atlantic company to use due care in discharging the boiler, regardless of the fact that the damage
was caused by the negligence of an employee who was qualified for the work and who had been
chosen by the Atlantic Company with due care.
This brings us to the last question here to be answered, which is, Can the Atlantic
Company be held directly liable to the Railroad Company? In other words, can the judgement
entered in the trial court directly in favor of the plaintiff against the Atlantic Company be
sustained? To answer this it is necessary to examine carefully the legal relations existing between
the Atlantic Company and the Railroad Company with reference to this affair; and we shall for a
moment ignore the existence of the contract between the steamship company and the atlantic
company, to which the railroad company was not a party.
Having regard then to the bare fact that the Atlantic Company undertook to remove the
boiler from the ship's hold and for this purpose took the property into its power and control, there
arose a duty to the owner to use due care in the performance of that service and to avoid
damaging was obviously in existence before the negligent act may, if we still ignore the
existence of the express contract, be considered as an act done in violation of this duty.
The duty thus to use due care is an implied obligation, of a quasi contractual nature, since
it is created by implication of liability with which we are here confronted is somewhat similar to
that which is revealed in the case of the depositary, or commodatary, whose legal duty with
respect to the property committed to their care is defined by law even in the absence of express
contract; and it can not be doubted that a person who takes possession of the property of another
for the purpose of moving or conveying it from one place to another, or for the purpose of
performing any other service in connection therewith (locatio operis faciendi), owes to the owner

a positive duty to refrain from damaging it, to the same extent as if an agreement for the
performance of such service had been expressly made with the owner. The obligation as if an
agreement made with the owner. The obligation here is really a species of contract re, and it has
its source and explanation in vital fact, that the active party has taken upon himself to do
something with or to the property and has taken it into his power and control for the purpose of
performing such service. (Compare art. 1889, Civil Code.)
In the passage which we have already from the decision in the Rakes case this Court
recognized the fact that the violation of a quasi-contractual duty is subject to articles 1101, 1103,
1104 of the Civil Code, and not within the purview of article 1903. Manresa also, in the
paragraph reproduced above is of the opinion that negligence, considered a substantive and
independent source of liability, does not include cases where the parties are previously bound by
any other obligation. Again, it is instructive in this connection to refer to the contents of article
1103 of the Civil Code, where it is demandable in the fulfillment of all kinds of obligations.
These words evidently comprehend both forms of positive obligations, whether arising from
express contract or from implied contract (quasi contract).
In this connection it is instructive to recall celebrate case of Coggs vs. Bernard (2 Ld.
Raym, 909), decided in the court of the King's Bench of England in the year of 1803. The action
was brought by the owner of certain casks of brandy to recover damages from a person who had
undertaken to transport them from one place to another. It was alleged that in so doing the
defendant so negligently and improvidently put then down that one of the casks was staved and
the brandy lost. The complaint did not allege that the defendant was a common carrier or that he
was to be paid for his services. It was therefore considered that the compliant did not state facts
sufficient to support an action for breach of any express contract. This made it necessary for the
court to go back to fundamental principles and to place liability on the ground of a violation of
the legal duty incident to the mere fact of carriage. Said Powell, J.: "An action indeed will not lie
for not doing the thing, for want of a sufficient consideration; but yet if the bailee will take the
goods into his custody, he shall be answerable for them; for the taking of the goods into his
custody is his own act." S9 Gould, J.: ". . . any man that undertakes to carry goods in liable to an
action, be he a common carrier or whatever he is, if through his neglect they are lost or come to
any damage: . . . . " Behind these expressions was an unbroken line of ancient English precedents
holding persons liable for damage inflicted by reason of a misfeasance in carrying out an
undertaking. The principle determined by the court in the case cited is expressed in the syllabus
in these words: 'If a man undertakes to carry goods safely and securely, he is responsible for any
damage they may sustain in the carriage through his neglect, though he was not a common
carrier and was to have nothing for the carriage." Though not stated in so many words, this
decision recognizes that from the mere fact that a person takes the property of another into his
possession and control there arises an obligation in the nature of an assumpsit that he will use
due care with respect thereto. This must be considered a principle of universal jurisprudence, for

it is consonant with justice and common sense and as we have already seen harmonizes with the
doctrine above deduced from the provisions of the Civil Code.
The conclusion must therefore be that if there had been no contract of any sort
between the Atlantic company and the Steamship Company, an action could have been
maintained by the Railroad Company, as owner, against the Atlantic Company to recover
the damages sustained by the former. Such damages would have been demandable under
article 1103 of the Civil Code and the action would not have been subject to the
qualification expressed in the last paragraph of article 1903.
The circumstance that a contract was made between the Atlantic Company and the
Steamship company introduces, however, an important, and in our opinion controlling
factor into this branch of the case. It cannot be denied that the Steamship company has
possession of this boiler in the capacity of carrier and that as such it was authorized to
make a contract with Atlantic Company to discharge the same from the ship. Indeed, it
appears in evidence that even before the contract of affreightment was made the Railroad
Company was informed that it would necessary for steamship company to procure the
services of some contractor in the port of Manila to handle the discharge, as the ship's
tackle was inadequate to handle heavy cargo. It is therefore to be assumed that the
Railroad Company had in fact assented to the employment of a contractor to perform this
service.
Now, it cannot be admitted that a person who contract to do a service like that
rendered by the Atlantic company in this case incurs a double responsibility upon entering
upon performance, namely, a responsibility to the party with whom he contracted, and
another entirely different responsibility to the owner, based on an implied contract. The
two liabilities can not in our opinion coexist. It is a general rule that an implied conract
never arises where an express contract has been made.
If double responsibility existed in such case as this, it would result that a person who
had limited his liability by express stipulation might find himself liable to the owner
without regard to the limitation which he had seen fit to impose by contract. There appears
to be no possibility of reconciling the conflict that would be developed in attempting to give
effect to those inconsistent liabilities. The contract which was in fact made, in our opinion,
determine not only the character and extent of the liability of the Atlantic company but also
the person or entity by whom the obligation is eligible. It is of course quite clear that if the
Atlantic company had refused to carry out its agreement to discharge the cargo, the
plaintiff could have enforced specific performance and could not have recovered damages
for non-performance. (Art. 1257, Civil Code; Donaldson, Sim & Co. vs. Smith, Bell & Co.,
2 Phil. Rep., 766; Uy Tam and Uy Yet vs. Leonard, 30 Phil. Rep., 471.) In view of the
preceding discussion it is equally obvious that, for lack of privity with the contract, the

Railroad Company can have no right of action to recover damages from the Atlantic
Company for the wrongful act which constituted the violation of said contract. The rights
of the plaintiff can only be made effective through the Compaia Trasatlantica de Barcelona
with whom the contract of affreightment was made.
The judgment entered in the Court of First Instance must, therefore be reversed not only
with respect to the judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff directly against the Atlantic
company but also with respect to the absolution of the steamship company and the further failure
of the court to enter judgment in favor of the latter against the Atlantic Company. The Compaa
Transatlantic de Barcelona should be and is hereby adjudged to pay to the Manila Railroad
Company the sum of twenty nine thousand three hundred forty three pesos and twenty nine
centavos (P23,343.29) with interest from May 11, 1914, until paid; and when this judgment is
satisfied, the Compaia Transatlantic de Barcelona is declared to be entitled to recover the same
amount from the Atlantic & Pacific Gulf Company, against whom judgment is to this end hereby
rendered in favor of the Compaia Transatlantica de Barcelona. No express adjudication of
costs of either instance will be made. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Araullo and Avancea, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 122039 May 31, 2000
VICENTE CALALAS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE SUNGA and FRANCISCO SALVA,
respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated March
31, 1991, reversing the contrary decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Dumaguete
City, and awarding damages instead to private respondent Eliza Jujeurche Sunga as plaintiff in an
action for breach of contract of carriage.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
At 10 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga,
then a college freshman majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman University, took a
passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to
capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an "extension seat," a
wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle.

On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off.
As she was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as
she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva
bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. She sustained a
fracture of the "distal third of the left tibia-fibula with severe necrosis of the underlying skin."
Closed reduction of the fracture, long leg circular casting, and case wedging were done under
sedation. Her confinement in the hospital lasted from August 23 to September 7, 1989. Her
attending physician, Dr. Danilo V. Oligario, an orthopedic surgeon, certified she would remain on
a cast for a period of three months and would have to ambulate in crutches during said period.
On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of
the contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a
common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva,
the owner of the Isuzu truck.
The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party defendant and absolved Calalas
of liability, holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for the accident.
It took cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and
Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the same court held Salva and his driver Verena
jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the lower court was reversed on the ground that
Sunga's cause of action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the
common carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under the Civil Code. The appellate
court dismissed the third-party complaint against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for damages
to Sunga. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and another one is entered ordering defendant-appellee Vicente Calalas to
pay plaintiff-appellant:
(1) P50,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages;
(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
(4) P1,000.00 as expenses of litigation; and
(5) to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 that the
negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the accident negates his liability and that to rule
otherwise would be to make the common carrier an insurer of the safety of its passengers. He

contends that the bumping of the jeepney by the truck owned by Salva was a caso fortuito.
Petitioner further assails the award of moral damages to Sunga on the ground that it is not
supported by evidence.
The petition has no merit.
The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 finding the driver and the
owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the fact that she was never a party to that case
and, therefore, the principle of res judicata does not apply.
Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case the same. The issue in Civil
Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the
damage caused to petitioner's jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is whether
petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa
aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The
second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the
performance of a contractual obligation.
Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because
it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted
merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the
common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination.2 In case of death
or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily
shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof.
There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490, finding
Salva and his driver Verena liable for the damage to petitioner's jeepney, should be binding
on Sunga. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and
the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is
applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The
doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between
him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where
there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves
who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus
created. Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil Code
are those respecting the diligence required of common carriers with regard to the safety of
passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in cases of death or injury to passengers. It
provides:
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of
public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over
the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to
all the circumstances of each case.

Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed
in articles 1734, 1735, and 1746, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary
diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and
1756.
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.
Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that
they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by articles 1733 and 1755.
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once
arose, and it became the duty of petitioner to prove that he had to observe extraordinary diligence
in the care of his passengers.
Now, did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga "safely as far as human care and foresight could
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances" as required by Art. 1755? We do not think so. Several factors militate against
petitioner's contention.
First, as found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion
being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle
of the highway in a diagonal angle. This is a violation of the R.A. No. 4136, as amended, or the
Land Transportation and Traffic Code, which provides:
Sec. 54. Obstruction of Traffic. No person shall drive his motor vehicle in such
a manner as to obstruct or impede the passage of any vehicle, nor, while
discharging or taking on passengers or loading or unloading freight, obstruct the
free passage of other vehicles on the highway.
Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating
capacity of the jeepney, a violation of 32(a) of the same law. It provides:
Exceeding registered capacity. No person operating any motor vehicle shall
allow more passengers or more freight or cargo in his vehicle than its registered
capacity.
The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that to
which the other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome
the presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the
evidence shows he was actually negligent in transporting passengers.
We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner's contention that Sunga's taking an
"extension seat" amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries

to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely because those
passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. This is also true
of petitioner's contention that the jeepney being bumped while it was improperly parked
constitutes caso fortuito. A caso fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or which,
though foreseen, was inevitable.3 This requires that the following requirements be present: (a) the
cause of the breach is independent of the debtor's will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or
unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation
in a normal manner, and (d) the debtor did not take part in causing the injury to the
creditor.4 Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body
protruding two meters into the highway.
Finally, petitioner challenges the award of moral damages alleging that it is excessive and
without basis in law. We find this contention well taken.
In awarding moral damages, the Court of Appeals stated:
Plaintiff-appellant at the time of the accident was a first-year college student in
that school year 1989-1990 at the Silliman University, majoring in Physical
Education. Because of the injury, she was not able to enroll in the second semester
of that school year. She testified that she had no more intention of continuing with
her schooling, because she could not walk and decided not to pursue her degree,
major in Physical Education "because of my leg which has a defect already."
Plaintiff-appellant likewise testified that even while she was under confinement,
she cried in pain because of her injured left foot. As a result of her injury, the
Orthopedic Surgeon also certified that she has "residual bowing of the fracture
side." She likewise decided not to further pursue Physical Education as her major
subject, because "my left leg . . . has a defect already."
Those are her physical pains and moral sufferings, the inevitable bedfellows of the
injuries that she suffered. Under Article 2219 of the Civil Code, she is entitled to
recover moral damages in the sum of P50,000.00, which is fair, just and
reasonable.
As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a
breach of contract for it is not one of the items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code.5
As an exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the
death of a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and
(2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220.6
In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since there was no factual
finding by the appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract
of carriage. Sunga's contention that petitioner's admission in open court that the driver of the
jeepney failed to assist her in going to a nearby hospital cannot be construed as an admission of
bad faith. The fact that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who took her to the hospital does not

imply that petitioner was utterly indifferent to the plight of his injured passenger. If at all, it is
merely implied recognition by Verena that he was the one at fault for the accident.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 31, 1995, and its resolution,
dated September 11, 1995, are AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral
damages is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 147791

September 8, 2006

CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,

petitioner,
vs.
REBECCA G. ESTRELLA, RACHEL E. FLETCHER, PHILIPPINE PHOENIX SURETY
& INSURANCE INC., BATANGAS LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS CO., and WILFREDO
DATINGUINOO, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review assails the March 29, 2001 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 46896, which affirmed with modification the February 9, 1993 Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 13, in Civil Case No. R-82-2137, finding Batangas
Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. (BLTB) and Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines
(CDCP) liable for damages.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On December 29, 1978, respondents Rebecca G. Estrella and her granddaughter, Rachel E.
Fletcher, boarded in San Pablo City, a BLTB bus bound for Pasay City. However, they never
reached their destination because their bus was rammed from behind by a tractor-truck of CDCP
in the South Expressway. The strong impact pushed forward their seats and pinned their knees to
the seats in front of them. They regained consciousness only when rescuers created a hole in the
bus and extricated their legs from under the seats. They were brought to the Makati Medical
Center where the doctors diagnosed their injuries to be as follows:
Medical Certificate of Rebecca Estrella
Fracture, left tibia mid 3rd
Lacerated wound, chin
Contusions with abrasions, left lower leg
Fracture, 6th and 7th ribs, right3
Medical Certificate of Rachel Fletcher

Extensive lacerated wounds, right leg posterior aspect popliteal area

and antero-lateral aspect mid lower leg with severance of muscles.
Partial amputation BK left leg with severance of gastro-soleus and
antero-lateral compartment of lower leg.
Fracture, open comminuted, both tibial4
Thereafter, respondents filed a Complaint5 for damages against CDCP, BLTB, Espiridion
Payunan, Jr. and Wilfredo Datinguinoo before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 13.
They alleged (1) that Payunan, Jr. and Datinguinoo, who were the drivers of CDCP and BLTB
buses, respectively, were negligent and did not obey traffic laws; (2) that BLTB and CDCP did
not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
employees; (3) that BLTB allowed its bus to operate knowing that it lacked proper maintenance
thus exposing its passengers to grave danger; (4) that they suffered actual damages amounting to
P250,000.00 for Estrella and P300,000.00 for Fletcher; (5) that they suffered physical
discomfort, serious anxiety, fright and mental anguish, besmirched reputation and wounded
feelings, moral shock, and lifelong social humiliation; (6) that defendants failed to act with
justice, give respondents their due, observe honesty and good faith which entitles them to claim
for exemplary damage; and (7) that they are entitled to a reasonable amount of attorney's fees
and litigation expenses.
CDCP filed its Answer6 which was later amended to include a third-party complaint against
Philippine Phoenix Surety and Insurance, Inc. (Phoenix).7
On February 9, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision finding CDCP and BLTB and their
employees liable for damages, the dispositive portion of which, states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:
In the Complaint
1. In favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants BLTB, Wilfredo Datinguinoo,
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (now PNCC) and
Espiridion Payunan, Jr., ordering said defendants, jointly and severally to pay the
plaintiffs the sum of P79,254.43 as actual damages and to pay the sum of P10,000.00 as
attorney's fees or a total of P89,254.43;
2. In addition, defendant Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines
and defendant Espiridion Payunan, Jr., shall pay the plaintiffs the amount of Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos to plaintiff Rachel Fletcher and Twenty Five Thousand
(P25,000.00) Pesos to plaintiff Rebecca Estrella;
3. On the counterclaim of BLTB Co. and Wilfredo Datinguinoo
Dismissing the counterclaim;

4. On the crossclaim against Construction and Development Corporation of the

Philippines (now PNCC) and Espiridion Payunan, Jr.
Dismissing the crossclaim;
5. On the counterclaim of Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines
(now PNCC)
Dismissing the counterclaim;
6. On the crossclaim against BLTB
Dismissing the crossclaim;
7. On the Third Party Complaint by Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines against Philippine Phoenix Surety and Insurance, Incorporated
Dismissing the Third Party Complaint.
SO ORDERED.8
The trial court held that BLTB, as a common carrier, was bound to observe extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the safety of its passengers. It must carry the passengers safely as
far as human care and foresight provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with a due regard for all the circumstances. Thus, where a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier
is presumed to have been at fault or has acted negligently. BLTB's inability to carry respondents
to their destination gave rise to an action for breach of contract of carriage while its failure to
rebut the presumption of negligence made it liable to respondents for the breach.9
Regarding CDCP, the trial court found that the tractor-truck it owned bumped the BLTB bus
from behind. Evidence showed that CDCP's driver was reckless and driving very fast at the time
of the incident. The gross negligence of its driver raised the presumption that CDCP was
negligent either in the selection or in the supervision of its employees which it failed to rebut
thus making it and its driver liable to respondents.10
Unsatisfied with the award of damages and attorney's fees by the trial court, respondents moved
that the decision be reconsidered but was denied. Respondents elevated the case11 to the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial court but modified the amount of damages, the
dispositive portion of which provides:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated October 7, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 13, Manila is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATION:
1. The interest of six (6) percent per annum on the actual damages of P79,354.43 should
commence to run from the time the judicial demand was made or from the filing of the
complaint on February 4, 1980;

2. Thirty (30) percent of the total amount recovered is hereby awarded as attorney's fees;
3. Defendants-appellants Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines
(now PNCC) and Espiridion Payunan, Jr. are ordered to pay plaintiff-appellants Rebecca
Estrella and Rachel Fletcher the amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) each as
exemplary damages and P80,000.00 by way of moral damages to Rachel Fletcher.
SO ORDERED.12
The Court of Appeals held that the actual or compensatory damage sought by respondents for the
injuries they sustained in the form of hospital bills were already liquidated and were ascertained.
Accordingly, the 6% interest per annum should commence to run from the time the judicial
demand was made or from the filing of the complaint and not from the date of judgment. The
Court of Appeals also awarded attorney's fees equivalent to 30% of the total amount recovered
based on the retainer agreement of the parties. The appellate court also held that respondents are
entitled to exemplary and moral damages. Finally, it affirmed the ruling of the trial court that the
claim of CDCP against Phoenix had already prescribed.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING RESPONDENTS BLTB AND/OR ITS DRIVER WILFREDO
DATINGUINOO SOLELY LIABLE FOR THE DAMAGES SUSTAINED BY HEREIN
RESPONDENTS FLETCHER AND ESTRELLA.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING
EXCESSIVE OR UNFOUNDED DAMAGES, ATTORNEY'S FEES AND LEGAL
INTEREST TO RESPONDENTS FLETCHER AND ESTRELLA.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING RESPONDENT PHOENIX LIABLE UNDER ITS INSURANCE POLICY
ON THE GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION.
The issues for resolution are as follows: (1) whether BLTB and its driver Wilfredo
Datinguinoo are solely liable for the damages sustained by respondents; (2) whether the
damages, attorney's fees and legal interest awarded by the CA are excessive and
unfounded; (3) whether CDCP can recover under its insurance policy from Phoenix.
Petitioner contends that since it was made solidarily liable with BLTB for actual damages and
attorney's fees in paragraph 1 of the trial court's decision, then it should no longer be held liable

to pay the amounts stated in paragraph 2 of the same decision. Petitioner claims that the liability
for actual damages and attorney's fees is based on culpa contractual, thus, only BLTB should be
held liable. As regards paragraph 2 of the trial court's decision, petitioner claims that it is
ambiguous and arbitrary because the dispositive portion did not state the basis and nature of such
award.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that petitioner is also at fault, hence, it was properly
joined as a party. There may be an action arising out of one incident where questions of fact are
common to all. Thus, the cause of action based on culpa aquiliana in the civil suit they filed
against it was valid.
The petition lacks merit.
The case filed by respondents against petitioner is an action for culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.13 In this regard, Article 2180 provides that the obligation
imposed by Article 2176 is demandable for the acts or omissions of those persons for whom one
is responsible. Consequently, an action based on quasi-delict may be instituted against the
employer for an employee's act or omission. The liability for the negligent conduct of the
subordinate is direct and primary, but is subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection
and supervision of the employee.14 In the instant case, the trial court found that petitioner failed
to prove that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of Payunan, Jr.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals found petitioner solidarily liable with BLTB for the
actual damages suffered by respondents because of the injuries they sustained. It was established
that Payunan, Jr. was driving recklessly because of the skid marks as shown in the sketch of the
police investigator.
It is well-settled in Fabre, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,15 that the owner of the other vehicle which
collided with a common carrier is solidarily liable to the injured passenger of the same. We
held, thus:
The same rule of liability was applied in situations where the negligence of the driver of
the bus on which plaintiff was riding concurred with the negligence of a third party who
was the driver of another vehicle, thus causing an accident. In Anuran v. Buo, Batangas
Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, and Metro Manila Transit
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the bus company, its driver, the operator of the other
vehicle and the driver of the vehicle were jointly and severally held liable to the
injured passenger or the latter's heirs. The basis of this allocation of liability was
explained in Viluan v. Court of Appeals, thus:

Nor should it make any difference that the liability of

petitioner [bus owner] springs from contract while that of
respondents [owner and driver of other vehicle] arises from
quasi-delict. As early as 1913, we already ruled in Gutierrez vs.

Gutierrez, 56 Phil. 177, that in case of injury to a passenger due to

the negligence of the driver of the bus on which he was riding and
of the driver of another vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners of
the two vehicles are jointly and severally liable for damages. x x x
xxxx
As in the case of BLTB, private respondents in this case and her co-plaintiffs did not stake
out their claim against the carrier and the driver exclusively on one theory, much less on
that of breach of contract alone. After all, it was permitted for them to allege
alternative causes of action and join as many parties as may be liable on such causes
of action so long as private respondent and her co-plaintiffs do not recover twice for
the same injury. What is clear from the cases is the intent of the plaintiff there to recover
from both the carrier and the driver, thus justifying the holding that the carrier and the
driver were jointly and severally liable because their separate and distinct acts concurred
to produce the same injury.16 (Emphasis supplied)
In a "joint" obligation, each obligor answers only for a part of the whole liability; in a "solidary"
or "joint and several" obligation, the relationship between the active and the passive subjects is
so close that each of them must comply with or demand the fulfillment of the whole obligation.
In Lafarge Cement v. Continental Cement Corporation,17 we reiterated that joint tort feasors are
jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. Citing Worcester v. Ocampo,18 we
held that:
x x x The difficulty in the contention of the appellants is that they fail to recognize that
the basis of the present action is tort. They fail to recognize the universal doctrine that
each joint tort feasor is not only individually liable for the tort in which he participates,
but is also jointly liable with his tort feasors. x x x
It may be stated as a general rule that joint tort feasors are all the persons who command,
instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the
commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. They
are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had
performed the wrongful act themselves. x x x
Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. The
persons injured may sue all of them or any number less than all. Each is liable for the
whole damages caused by all, and all together are jointly liable for the whole damage. It
is no defense for one sued alone, that the others who participated in the wrongful act are
not joined with him as defendants; nor is it any excuse for him that his participation in the
tort was insignificant as compared to that of the others. x x x
Joint tort feasors are not liable pro rata. The damages can not be apportioned among
them, except among themselves. They cannot insist upon an apportionment, for the

purpose of each paying an aliquot part. They are jointly and severally liable for the whole
amount. x x x
A payment in full for the damage done, by one of the joint tort feasors, of course satisfies
any claim which might exist against the others. There can be but satisfaction. The release
of one of the joint tort feasors by agreement generally operates to discharge all. x x x
Of course the court during trial may find that some of the alleged tort feasors are liable
and that others are not liable. The courts may release some for lack of evidence while
condemning others of the alleged tort feasors. And this is true even though they are
charged jointly and severally.19
Petitioner's claim that paragraph 2 of the dispositive portion of the trial court's decision is
ambiguous and arbitrary and also entitles respondents to recover twice is without basis. In the
body of the trial court's decision, it was clearly stated that petitioner and its driver Payunan, Jr.,
are jointly and solidarily liable for moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 to respondent
Fletcher and P25,000.00 to respondent Estrella.20 Moreover, there could be no double recovery
because the award in paragraph 2 is for moral damages while the award in paragraph 1 is for
actual damages and attorney's fees.
Petitioner next claims that the damages, attorney's fees, and legal interest awarded by the Court
of Appeals are excessive.
Moral damages may be recovered in quasi-delicts causing physical injuries.21 The award of
moral damages in favor of Fletcher and Estrella in the amount of P80,000.00 must be reduced
since prevailing jurisprudence fixed the same at P50,000.00.22 While moral damages are not
intended to enrich the plaintiff at the expense of the defendant, the award should nonetheless be
commensurate to the suffering inflicted.23
The Court of Appeals correctly awarded respondents exemplary damages in the amount of
P20,000.00 each. Exemplary damages may be awarded in addition to moral and compensatory
damages.24 Article 2231 of the Civil Code also states that in quasi-delicts, exemplary damages
may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.25 In this case, petitioner's driver was
driving recklessly at the time its truck rammed the BLTB bus. Petitioner, who has direct and
primary liability for the negligent conduct of its subordinates, was also found negligent in the
selection and supervision of its employees. In Del Rosario v. Court of Appeals,26 we held, thus:
ART. 2229 of the Civil Code also provides that such damages may be imposed, by way of
example or correction for the public good. While exemplary damages cannot be
recovered as a matter of right, they need not be proved, although plaintiff must show that
he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may
consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded.
Exemplary Damages are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another but to
serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions.

Regarding attorney's fees, we held in Traders Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent v.

National Labor Relations Commission,27 that:
There are two commonly accepted concepts of attorney's fees, the so-called ordinary and
extraordinary. In its ordinary concept, an attorney's fee is the reasonable compensation
paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered to the latter. The basis
of this compensation is the fact of his employment by and his agreement with the client.
In its extraordinary concept, an attorney's fee is an indemnity for damages ordered
by the court to be paid by the losing party in a litigation. The basis of this is any of
the cases provided by law where such award can be made, such as those authorized in
Article 2208, Civil Code, and is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they
have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation
or as part thereof.28 (Emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals correctly awarded attorney's fees and other expenses of
litigation as they may be recovered as actual or compensatory damages when exemplary
damages are awarded; when the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to
satisfy the plaintiff's valid, just and demandable claim; and in any other case where the court
deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.29
Regarding the imposition of legal interest at the rate of 6% from the time of the filing of the
complaint, we held in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,30 that when an obligation,
regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is breached,
the contravenor can be held liable for payment of interest in the concept of actual and
compensatory damages,31 subject to the following rules, to wit
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e.,
a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been
stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the
time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be
12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand
under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an
interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court
at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated
claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable
certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the
interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially
(Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at
the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the
judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be
deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of
legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.

3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and
executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or
paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction,
this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of
credit.32 (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, the legal interest of 6% shall begin to run on February 9, 1993 when the trial court
rendered judgment and not on February 4, 1980 when the complaint was filed. This is because at
the time of the filing of the complaint, the amount of the damages to which plaintiffs may be
entitled remains unliquidated and unknown, until it is definitely ascertained, assessed and
determined by the court and only upon presentation of proof thereon.33 From the time the
judgment becomes final and executory, the interest rate shall be 12% until its satisfaction.
Anent the last issue of whether petitioner can recover under its insurance policy from Phoenix,
we affirm the findings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, thus:
As regards the liability of Phoenix, the court a quo correctly ruled that defendantappellant CDCP's claim against Phoenix already prescribed pursuant to Section 384 of
P.D. 612, as amended, which provides:
Any person having any claim upon the policy issued pursuant to this chapter shall,
without any unnecessary delay, present to the insurance company concerned a
written notice of claim setting forth the nature, extent and duration of the injuries
sustained as certified by a duly licensed physician. Notice of claim must be filed
within six months from date of the accident, otherwise, the claim shall be deemed
waived. Action or suit for recovery of damage due to loss or injury must be
brought in proper cases, with the Commissioner or Courts within one year from
denial of the claim, otherwise, the claimant's right of action shall prescribe. (As
amended by PD 1814, BP 874.)34
The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. A written notice of claim must be filed
within six months from the date of the accident. Since petitioner never made any claim within six
months from the date of the accident, its claim has already prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 46896 dated March 29, 2001, which modified the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 13, in Civil Case No. R-82-2137, is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATIONS that petitioner is held jointly and severally liable to pay (1) actual damages
in the amount of P79,354.43; (2) moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 each for Rachel
Fletcher and Rebecca Estrella; (3) exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00 each for
Rebecca Estrella and Rachel Fletcher; and (4) thirty percent (30%) of the total amount recovered
as attorney's fees. The total amount adjudged shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from
the date of judgment of the trial court until finality of this judgment. From the time this Decision
becomes final and executory and the judgment amount remains unsatisfied, the same shall earn
interest at the rate of 12% per annum until its satisfaction.

SO ORDERED.