Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Gallant Soriano
2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
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DOCTRINE:Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and
employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the
specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate
for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified
voter of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election
Code provides further that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a
citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under
Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution. Qualifications for public office are
continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire
tenure. Filipino citizenship, if previously renounced, may be reacquired by direct act
of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
FACTS: PetitionerJuan Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of Sorsogon province
on January 22, 1988 and assumed office in due time. Respondent Salvador Estuye,
president of the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter, filed with the COMELEC
a petition for the annulment of the election and proclamation of Frivaldo on the
ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United
States in 1983. Frivaldos American citizenship was admitted by him and was
reflected in a certification issued by a US District Court. However, he pleaded the
defense that the American citizenship was forced on him as a measure of protection
from the persecution of the Marcos Dictatorship and that by actively participating in
the elections, he automatically forfeited the same under the laws of the United
States. He further contends that by filing his certificate of candidacy he had already
effectively recovered Philippine citizenship.
ISSUE:Whether or notFrivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his
election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon.
HELD:NO. Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered.
Under CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by
direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.Frivaldo did not invoke
either of the first two methods and it cannot also be said that he was repatriated
because even if he lose his naturalized citizenship by filing a certificate of candidacy
with the COMELEC, it did not and could not have the effect of automatically
restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier renounced.The reason
for resolving Frivaldos citizenship at the time of his election is the provision in
Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and employees owe
ACHAS . BONIFACIO . BERNABE . CALVO . DELOS SANTOS . FERNANDEZ . HABIJAN . HOFFMAN
MABAN . MANLANGIT . NIPAL . PASA . REYES . TAMONDONG . TOQUERO
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the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement
in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office
must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the
constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code
provides further that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen
of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article
V, Section 1, of the Constitution.Qualifications for public office are continuing
requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or
election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of
the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.The fact
that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation
of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this
country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the
electorate alone. Hence, Frivaldo is not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore
disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon.
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therefore ineligible as a candidate for mayor of Baguio City, under Section 42 of the
Local Government Code which provides that An elective local official must be a
citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-three years of age on election day, a
qualified voter registered as such in the barangay, municipality, city or province
where he proposes to be elected Moreover, even if Labo was elected by the
majority, the people of that locality could not change the requirements of the Local
Government Code and the Constitution. The electorate had no power to permit a
foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless
individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over
them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over
their countrymen.The probability that many of those who voted for the petitioner
may have done so in the belief that he was qualified, only strengthens the
conclusion that the results of the election cannot nullify the qualifications for the
office now held by him. These qualifications are continuing requirements; once any
of them is lost during incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. In the
case at bar, the citizenship and voting requirements were not subsequently lost but
were not possessed at all in the first place on the day of the election. The petitioner
was disqualified from running as mayor and, although elected, is not now qualified
to serve as such.
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DOCTRINE:
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The Court upheld the COMELECs findings that Aquino is a resident of San Jose,
Concepcion Tarlac for 52 years immediately preceding the 1992 elections, that his
birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of both of his parents. It
is therefore clear that domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most
recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.
Furthermore, Aquinos intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City
was evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. Domicile of
origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change ofdomicile, petitioner must
prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite
acts which correspond with the purpose.
July 5, 1996
Doctrine:
Facts:
On May 6, 1995, Comelec declared Ronaldo Dela Torre disqualified from running
as the Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna in the last May 8, 1995 citing Sec. 40 (a) of RA 7160
(Local Govt. Code 1991) that a person who is sentenced by final judgement for an
offence involving moral turpitude for an offense by 1 year or more of imprisonment
within 2 years after serving sentence is disqualified from running for any elective
local position. Comelec further held that Dela Torre was found to be guilty of
violation of the Anti fencing law by the Municipal Trial Court on June 1, 1990 and the
decision was later affirmed on appeal in the RTC and became final by January 18,
1991. Comelec held that there exist a legal ground to disqualify Dela Torre to run as
a candidate since the nature of the offence of the Anti Fencing Law certainly
involves moral turpitude.
Dela Torre claims that Section 40 (a) of the Local Government Code does not
apply to his case inasmuch as the probation granted him by the MTC on December
21, 1994 which suspended the execution of the judgment of conviction and all other
legal consequences flowing therefrom, rendered inapplicable Section 40 (a) as well.
Issue:
1.
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the robbery or theft invaded ones peaceful dominion for gain - thus
deliberately reneging in the process private duties they owe their
fellowmen or society in a manner contrary to x x x accepted and
customary rule of right and duty x x x, justice, honesty x x x or good morals.
2. No. Dela Torres conviction of fencing which we have heretofore declared as a
crime of moral turpitude and thus falling squarely under the disqualification
found in Section 40 (a), subsists and remains totally unaffected
notwithstanding the grant of probation
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adjudged to them since probation suspends it and final discharge of probation shall
operate to restore him all civil rights lost or suspended.
FACTS:
In this Petition dated July 6, 2005, Urbano M. Moreno (Moreno) assails the
ResolutionCOMELEC which disqualified him from running for the elective office of
Punong Barangay of Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002
Synchronized Barangay and SangguniangKabataan Elections. The disqualification
was an off shoot of a petition filed by Norma L. Mejes on the ground that the latter
was convicted by final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Two (2)
Years and Four (4) Months by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of Catbalogan,
Samar on August 27, 1998. Moreno filed an answer claiming that the petition states
no cause of action because he was already granted probation. But the COMELEC
since he was only released from probation on December 20, 2000, disqualification
shall commence on this date and end two (2) years thereafter thus he is still
disqualified for the upcoming elections.
Petitioner argues that the disqualification applies only to those who have
served their sentence and not to probationers because the latter do not serve the
adjudged sentence. The Probation Law should allegedly be read as an exception to
the Local Government Code because it is a special law which applies only to
probationers. Further, even assuming that he is disqualified, his subsequent
election as Punong Barangay allegedly constitutes an implied pardon of his previous
misconduct.Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is disqualified from running as Punong Barangay.
SC RULING: NO
The Probation Law is an exception to the provision of the LGC as the
legislature did not intend the inclusion of probationers in the disqualification as it
can be gleaned from its act when it can, through its legislative wisdom and power,
include Probationers since those covered by the disqualification also covers those
who can apply for Probation.
Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code appears innocuous enough at first
glance. The phrase service of sentence, understood in its general and common
sense, means the confinement of a convictedperson in a penal facility for the
period adjudged by the court. COMELEC has broadened the coverage of the law to
include even those who did not serve a day of their sentence because they were
granted probation.
It is to be noted that those who have not served their sentence by reason of the
grant of probation which, the Court reiterates, should not be equated with service of
sentence, should not likewise be disqualified from running for a local elective office
because the two (2)-year period of ineligibility under Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Government Code does not even begin to run. Moreover, Sec. 4 of the Probation
Law specifically provides that the grant of probation suspends the execution of the
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sentence and during the period of probation, the probationer does not serve the
penalty imposed upon him by the court but is merely required to comply with all the
conditions prescribed in the probation order.
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Basco ran for councilor of the Second District of Manila and won in the three
elections he participated in, respectively the Jan. 18, 1988 elections, May 11, 1992
synchronized National Elections and May 8, 1995. His second election was
contested due to the Tordesillas ruling but was dismissed. On his third election,
Grego filed for his disqualification. The COMELEC conducted a hearing of the case
on May 14, 1995, where it ordered the parties to submit simultaneously their
respective memoranda.Before the parties could comply with this directive, however,
the Manila City BOC proclaimed Basco on May 17, 1995, as a duly elected councilor
for the Second District of Manila, placing sixth among several candidates who vied
for the seats. Basco immediately took his oath of office before the Honorable Ma.
Ruby Bithao-Camarista, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch I, Manila.
Petitioner herein, comes to the Court for relief and anchors his basis for
disqualification of Basco on the retroactive effect of the LGC, the irregularity of the
implied condonation of the electorate, the invalidity of the proclamation of Basco
because it was. He asks thatRomualdoMaranan, the 7 th in the elections and next to
Basco be proclaimed as the winner of the last slot.
ISSUE:Whether or not respondent is disqualified because he was removed from
office due to an administrative case which removed him from Office in 1981.
SC RULING: NO
The court proclaimed that there was no grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction evinced by COMELEC in dismissing the petition for
disqualification of Basco. In answering the contentions of Grego, the Court ruled
that in construing Sec. 40 (b) of the LGC, which provides for the disqualification
from running in an elective office of people removed from office as a result of an
Administrative Case which was promulgated and took effect on January 1, 1992.
Absent any express provision in the Law, a newly enacted statute applies
prospectively and not retroactively.
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DOCTRINE: The filing of a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court did not
prevent the administrative decision from attaining finality. An original action of
certiorari is an independent action and does not interrupt the course of the principal
action nor the running of the reglementary period involved in the proceeding; a
case shall not be rendered moot and academic if dilatory tactics were employed to
render such case moot and academic; the second highest in votes cannot be
proclaimed winner if should it appear that the candidate with the highest votes was
declared disqualified.
FACTS: Petitioner Renato U. Reyes was the incumbent mayor of the municipality of
Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro. An administrative complaint was filed against him
with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. After learning that the Sanggunian had
terminated the proceedings in the case and WAS ABOUT TO RENDER JUDGMENT,
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Regional
Trial Court, alleging that the proceedings had been terminated without giving him a
chance to be heard. SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN found petitoner guilty.
A temporary restraining order was issued by the court, enjoining the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan from proceeding with the case. As a result, the decision
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan could not be served upon Reyes. Following the
expiration of the temporary restraining order and without any injunction being
issued by the Regional Trial Court, an attempt was made to serve the decision upon
petitioners counsel in Manila. However, the latter refused to accept the decision.
Subsequent attempts to serve the decision upon petitioner himself also failed, as he
also refused to accept the decision.
Petitoner filed a certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC in Bongabong. A
complainant sought the disqualification of petitioner as candidate for mayor, citing
the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC) which states that persons removed from
office as a result of an administrative case are disqualified from running for any
ACHAS . BONIFACIO . BERNABE . CALVO . DELOS SANTOS . FERNANDEZ . HABIJAN . HOFFMAN
MABAN . MANLANGIT . NIPAL . PASA . REYES . TAMONDONG . TOQUERO
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elective postition. Nonetheless, because of the absence of any contrary order from
the COMELEC, petitioner Reyes was voted for in the elections held on May 8, 1995.
COMELECs Second Division issued the questioned resolution, which found
the petitioner DISQUALIFIED from running for public office, in conformity with the
Local Government Code. Julius M. Garcia, who obtained the second highest number
of votes next to petitioner Reyes intervened in the COMELEC, contending that
because Reyes was disqualified, he (Garcia) was entitled to be proclaimed mayor of
Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro. The Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bongabong,
apparently unaware of the disqualification of Reyes by the COMELEC, proclaimed
him the duly-elected mayor.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of petition for certiorari prevented the Sangguning
Panlalawigan from attaining finality.
2. Whether or not Reyes' reelection rendered the administrative complaint against
him moot and academic.
3. Whether or not Garcia is entitled to be proclamed mayor of Bongabong.
RULING:
1. No. The filing of a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court did not
prevent the administrative decision from attaining finality. An original action of
certiorari is an independent action and does not interrupt the course of the principal
action nor the running of the reglementary period involved in the proceeding.
Consequently, to arrest the course of the principal action during the pendency of
the certiorari proceedings, there must be a restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction from the appellate court directed to the lower court.
In the case at bar, although a temporary restraining order was issued by the
Regional Trial Court, no preliminary injunction was subsequently issued. The
temporary restraining order issued expired after 20 days. From that moment on,
there was no more legal barrier to the service of the decision upon petitioner. The
net result is that when the elections were held on May 8, 1995, the decision of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan had already become final and executory.
2. No. Herein respondent Mayor Reyes was given by this Sanggunian a period of
sixty one (61) days to file his verified answer however, he resorted to dilatory
motions which in the end proved fatal to his cause. Veritably, he neither filed nor
furnished the complainant a copy of his answer. Failure of the respondent to file his
verified answer within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the complaint shall be
considered a waiver of his rights to present evidence in his behalf (Art. 126 of Rules
and Regulations implementing the Local Government Code of 1991). All persons
shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasijudicial, or administrative bodies (Sec. 16, Art. III of the Contitution).
ACHAS . BONIFACIO . BERNABE . CALVO . DELOS SANTOS . FERNANDEZ . HABIJAN . HOFFMAN
MABAN . MANLANGIT . NIPAL . PASA . REYES . TAMONDONG . TOQUERO
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Indeed, it appears that petitioner was given sufficient opportunity to file his answer.
He failed to do so. Nonetheless, he was told that the complainant would be
presenting his evidence and that he (petitioner) would then have the opportunity to
cross-examine the witnesses. But on the date set, he failed to appear. He would say
later that this was because he had filed a motion for postponement and was
awaiting a ruling thereon. This only betrays the pattern of delay he employed to
render the case against him moot by his election.
3. No. In the latest ruling on the question, this Court said:
To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes
would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is
just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a
majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified
candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the
conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate
the results under the circumstances.
Garcias plea that the votes cast for Reyes be invalidated is without merit. The votes
cast for Reyes are presumed to have been cast in the belief that Reyes was qualified
and for that reason can not be treated as stray, void, or meaningless. The
subsequent finding that he is disqualified cannot retroact to the date of the
elections so as to invalidate the votes cast for him.
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RULING:
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1. Whether or not Kuya Edu is disqualified from running for any elective position on
the ground of dual citizenship under the LGC. NO
1. No. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as
a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a
person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such
a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which
adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine
of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is
concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some POSITIVE ACT, loyalty to two or more states. While
dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals
volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, Section 5 of the Constitution provides:
Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with
by law. This provision was included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of
Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained its necessity as follows:
. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual citizenship. I
have circulated a memorandum to the Bernas Committee according to which a dual
allegiance - and I reiterate a dual allegiance - is larger and more threatening than
that of mere double citizenship which is seldom intentional and, perhaps, never
insidious. That is often a function of the accident of mixed marriages or of birth on
foreign soil. And so, I do not question double citizenship at all.
Clearly, in including Section 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the
Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized
citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, Section 40(d)
and in R.A. No. 7854, Section 20 must be understood as referring to dual
allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject
to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with
dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy,
they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual
citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of
conflicting laws of different states.
This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must renounce
all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty of
which at the time he is a subject or citizen before he can be issued a certificate of
naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines.
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Doctrine:
Facts:
Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez was a candidate for the position of Chairman of Barangay
Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo City in the synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataan Elections held on October 29, 2007.
On October 25, 2007, Tessie P. Villanueva filed a petition before the Provincial
Election Supervisor of the Province of Iloilo, praying for the disqualification of
petitioner on the ground that he is an American citizen, hence, ineligible from
running for any public office.
Lopez argued that he is a dual citizen, a Filipino and at the same time an American,
by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. Thus possessing all the qualifications to
run for Barangay Chairman. After the votes for Barangay Chairman were canvassed,
petitioner emerged as the winner.
On February 6, 2008, COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution granting the petition
for disqualification of Lopez,
ruling that he was not able to regain his Filipino citizenship in the manner provided
by law. According to the poll body, to be able to qualify as a candidate in the
Issue:
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elections, petitioner should have made a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship which he failed to do.
Is Lopez a qualified candidate in the elections?
Held:
No. R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those who reacquired Filipino citizenship may run for a public office in the Philippines. Section
5(2) of the said law states that those who retain or reaquire their citizenship and
seek elective public office must meet the qualification for holding such public office
as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
While Lopez re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the cited law, the law explicitly
provides that should one seek elective public office, he should first make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath. Lopez failed to comply with this
requirement. There is no evidence presented that will show that respondent
complied with the provision of R.A. No. 9225.
The affiant must state in clear and unequivocal terms that he is renouncing all
foreign citizenship for it to be effective. In the instant case, respondent Lopezs
failure to renounce his American citizenship as proven by the absence of an affidavit
that will prove the contrary leads this Commission to believe that he failed to
comply with the positive mandate of law. Absent such proof Lopez cannot be
allowed respondent to run for Barangay Chairman of Barangay Bagacay.
While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to
discharge the functions of Barangay Chairman, his victory cannot cure the defect of
his candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election of
a disqualified candidate because the application of the constitutional and statutory
provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity.
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Case no. 11
Rodriguez v. COMELEC
Doctrine: The Marquez Decision defining "fugitive from justice includes not only
those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, after being
charged, flee to avoid prosecution. The definition thus indicates that the intent to
evade is the compelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular
jurisdiction. Obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or
punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted
indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.
Facts:
Petitioner won the Gobernatorial post in Quezon City Province during the May, 1992
elections. Respondent Marquez then challenged such victory contending that
Rodriguez was a fugitive from justice which is a ground for his
disqualification/ineligibility under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code.
Marquez revealed that Rodriguez left the US where a charge, filed on November
12,1985 is pending against the latter before the Los Angeles Municipal Court for
fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft and attempted grand theft of personal
property.
Petitioner on the other hand contends that long before the felony complaint was
allegedly filed, he was already in the Philippines and he did not know of the filing of
the same nor was he aware that he was being proceeded against criminally. He
cannot be deemed a fugitive from justice, because to be so, one must be aware of
the filing of the criminal complaint, and his disappearance in the place where the
long arm of the law, thru the warrant of arrest, may reach him is predicated on a
clear desire to avoid and evade the warrant.
Issue:
Whether or not Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice as comprehended in the
Marquez Decision
Held:
No. The Marquez Decision defining "fugitive from justice includes not only those
who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, after being charged,
flee to avoid prosecution The intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates
one's flight from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent
to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject
of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.
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Rodriguez' case just cannot fit in this concept. There is no dispute that his arrival in
the Philippines from the US on June 25, 1985, preceded the filing of the felony
complaint in the Los Angeles Court on November 12, 1985 and of the issuance on
even date of the arrest warrant by that same foreign court, by almost 5 months. It
was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known about such felony complaint
and arrest warrant at the time he left the US, as there was in fact no complaint and
arrest warrant much less conviction to speak of yet at such time.
Case no. 12
Mateo Caasi v. CA
Doctrine: To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law
requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived his status
as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country." The waiver of an
immigrant status must be manifested by some act/s independent of and done prior
to the filing of candidacy for elective office in the country for without such prior
waiver, he is disqualified to run for any office.
Facts:
Respondent Merito Miguel won as the Mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan during the 1988
local elections. Petitioner Caasi sought Meritos disqualification on the ground that
the former is a green card holder, hence a permanents resident in US and not
Bolinao. Merito contended that although he holds a green card, he is not a
permanent resident in US but in Bolinao, that he obtained the green card only for
convenience, and that he was able to vote in all previous elections including the
plebiscite, ratification of the Constitution and the Congressional elections in 1987.
Issue:
W.O.N. Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident/or of immigrant to
USA prior to local elections in 1988?
Held:
NO. To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires
that the candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country", Sec. 68 of BP 881. The
waiver of an immigrant status must be manifested by some act/s independent of
and done prior to the filing of candidacy for elective office in the country for without
such prior waiver, he is disqualified to run for any office.
The reason for Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is not hard to find.
Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at least
one (1) year at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy, is one of the
qualifications that a candidate for elective public office must possess (Sec. 42,
Chap. 1, Title 2, Local Government Code). Miguel did not possess that qualification
because he was a permanent resident of the United States and he resided in Bolinao
for a period of only three (3) months (not one year) after his return to the
Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipality on
January 18, 1988.
ACHAS . BONIFACIO . BERNABE . CALVO . DELOS SANTOS . FERNANDEZ . HABIJAN . HOFFMAN
MABAN . MANLANGIT . NIPAL . PASA . REYES . TAMONDONG . TOQUERO
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HELD:
Yes, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude, because its
violation imports deceit and certainly relates to and affects the good moral
character of a person. A drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges
on his private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contract to
accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or food morals.
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CASE 14
CASE TITLE: De Guzman vs. Board of Canvassers of La Union
GR NO. L-24721 DATE: November 3, 1925
DOCTRINE: When the Election Law does not provide that a departure from a
prescribed form will be fatal and such departure has been due to an honest mistake
or misinterpretation of the Election Law on the part of him who was obligated to
observe it, and such departure has not been used as a means for fraudulent
practices or for the intimidation of voters, and it is clear that there has been a free
and honest expression of the popular will, the law will be held directory and such
departure will be considered a harmless irregularity.
FACTS: Tomas De Guzman filed a petition for mandamus before the Supreme Court
seeking to compel the Board of Canvassers of La Union to annul the votes counted
in favor of Juan Lucero and to declare him as the duly elected governor of La Union
based on the fact that certificate of candidacy filed by Juan Lucero was not made
under oath in violation of Sec. 404 of the Election Law. Lucero filed a motion to
dismiss the petition on 3 grounds namely: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction on
the subject-matter of the complaint; (2) that the court has no jurisdiction over the
person of the members of the board of canvassers; and (3) the petition failed to
state a cause of action.
ISSUE: WON the failure of Lucero in filing his certificate of candidacy under oath
was fatal to his proclamation as the duly elected governor of La Union
HELD: No. The seeming irregularity in the filing of Luceros certificate of candidacy
does not invalidate his election for the fundamental reason that after it was proven
by the count of the votes that Juan T. Lucero had obtained the majority of the legal
votes, the will of the people cannot be frustrated by a technicality consisting in that
his certificate of candidacy had not been properly sworn to. In the case of Gardiner
vs. Romulo, it was held that The provisions of the Election Law declaring that a
certain irregularity in an election procedure is fatal to the validity of the ballot or of
the returns, or when the purpose and spirit of the law would be plainly defeated by
a substantial departure from the prescribed method, are mandatory. When the
Election Law does not provide that a departure from a prescribed form will be fatal
and such departure has been due to an honest mistake or misinterpretation of the
Election Law on the part of him who was obligated to observe it, and such departure
has not been used as a means for fraudulent practices or for the intimidation of
voters, and it is clear that there has been a free and honest expression of the
popular will, the law will be held directory and such departure will be considered a
harmless irregularity. And in Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, it was held that he rules and
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regulations, for the conduct of elections, are mandatory before the election, but
when it is sought to enforce them after the election, they are held to be directory
only, if that is possible, especially where, if they are held to be mandatory, innocent
voters will be deprived of their votes without any fault on their part. The various and
numerous provisions of the Election Law were adopted to assist the voters in their
participation in the affairs of the government and not to defeat that object. When
the voters have honestly cast their ballots, the same should not be nullified simply
because the officers appointed under the law to direct the election and guard the
purity of the ballot have not done their duty. The law provides a remedy, by criminal
action, against them. They should be prosecuted criminally, and the will of the
honest voter, as expressed through his ballot, should be protected and upheld.
CASE 15
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her candidacy for mayor of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte. However, the
provincial election supervisor of Leyte refused to accept the affidavit of withdrawal
and suggested that, pursuant to a COMELEC resolution, she should file it with the
municipal election officer of Baybay, Leyte where she filed her certificate of
candidacy for mayor.
At that later hour, with only minutes left to midnight, the deadline for filing
certificates of candidacy or withdrawal thereof, and considering that the travel time
from Tacloban to Baybay was two (2) hours, petitioner decided to send her affidavit
of withdrawal by fax to her father at Baybay, Leyte and the latter submitted the
same to the office of the election officer of Baybay, Leyte at 12:28 a.m., 01 March
2001.5 On the same day, at 1:15 p.m., the election officer of Baybay Leyte, received
the original of the affidavit of withdrawal.
ISSUE: Is there a valid withdrawal of the certificate of candidacy for municipal
mayor of Baybay, Leyte?
HELD: YES.
The filing of the affidavit of withdrawal with the election officer of Baybay, Leyte, at
12:28 a.m., 1 March 2001 was a substantial compliance with the requirement of the
law.
Section 73, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election
Code, provides that:
"No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same
election, and if he files his certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall
not be eligible for any of them. However, before the expiration of the period for the
filing of certificates of candidacy, the person who has file more than one certificate
of candidacy may declare under oath the office for which he desires to be eligible
and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices."
There is nothing in this Section which mandates that the affidavit of withdrawal
must be filed with the same office where the certificate of candidacy to be
withdrawn was filed. Thus, it can be filed directly with the main office of the
COMELEC, the office of the regional election director concerned, the office of the
provincial election supervisor of the province to which the municipality involved
belongs, or the office of the municipal election officer of the said municipality.
While it may be true that Section 12 of COMELEC Resolution No. 3253-A, adopted on
20 November 2000, requires that the withdrawal be filed before the election officer
of the place where the certificate of candidacy was filed,such requirement is merely
directory, and is intended for convenience. It is not mandatory or jurisdictional. An
administrative resolution can not contradict, much less amend or repeal a law, or
supply a deficiency in the law. Hence, the filing of petitioner's affidavit of withdrawal
of candidacy for mayor of Baybay with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte
sufficed to effectively withdraw such candidacy. the COMELEC thus acted with grave
abuse of discretion when it declare petitioner ineligible for both positions for which
she filed certificates of candidacy.
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Luna v COMELEC
G.R. No. 165983 April 24, 2007
Doctrine: If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official
candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is
disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same
political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died,
withdrew or was disqualified. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should
occur between the day before the election and mid-day of election day, said
certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the political
subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by
the entire electorate of the country, with the Commission.
Facts: Luna filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of vice-mayor of
Lagayan, Abra as a substitute for Hans Roger, who withdrew his certificate of
candidacy on the same date. Ruperto Blanco, Election Officer of Lagayan, Abra
removed the name of Hans Roger from the list of candidates and placed the name
of Luna. Private respondents filed a petition for the cancellation of the certificate of
candidacy or disqualification of Luna. They alleged that Luna made a false material
representation in her certificate of candidacy because Luna is not a registered voter
of Lagayan, Abra but a registered voter of Bangued, Abra. They also claimed that
Lunas certificate of candidacy was not validly filed because the substitution by
Luna for Hans Roger was invalid and that Hans Roger was only 20 years old on
Election Day and, therefore, he was disqualified to run for vice-mayor and cannot be
substituted by Luna. COMELEC affirmed the finding that Hans Roger, being
underage, may not be validly substituted by Luna. It also ruled that Lunas right to
due process was not violated because Luna was notified of the petition and was
given the opportunity to be heard. However, the COMELEC ruled that Luna was a
registered voter of Lagayan, Abra. Hence, this petition.
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Issue: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled
that there was no valid substitution by Luna for Hans Roger.
Ruling: YES. Section 77 of the Election Code prescribes the rules on substitution of
an official candidate of a registered political party who dies, withdraws, or is
disqualified for any cause after the last day for the filing of certificate of candidacy.
Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. - If
after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a
registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any
cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file
a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was
disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned
may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the
preceding sections not later than mid-day of election day of the election. If the
death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the
election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of
election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the
case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the
Commission.
Since Hans Roger withdrew his certificate of candidacy and the COMELEC found that
Luna complied with all the procedural requirements for a valid substitution, Luna
can validly substitute for Hans Roger. In this case, there was no petition to deny due
course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy of Hans Roger For if the COMELEC
cancelled Hans Rogers certificate of candidacy after the proper proceedings, then
he is no candidate at all and there can be no substitution of a person whose
certificate of candidacy has been cancelled and denied due course. However, Hans
Rogers certificate of candidacy was never cancelled or denied due course by the
COMELEC. Moreover, Hans Roger already withdrew his certificate of candidacy
before the COMELEC declared that he was not a valid candidate. Therefore, unless
Hans Rogers certificate of candidacy was denied due course or cancelled in
accordance with Section 78 of the Election Code, Hans Rogers certificate of
candidacy was valid and he may be validly substituted by Luna.
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Monsale v. Nico
G.R. No. L-2539
May 28, 1949
Doctrine:The evident purposes of the law in requiring the filling of certificates of
candidacy and in fixing a time limit therefor are (a) to enable the voter to know, at
least sixty days before a regular election the candidate among whom they are to
make the choice, and (b) to avoid confusion and inconvenience in the tabulation of
the votes cast; for if the law did not confine the choice or election by the voter to
duly registered candidates, there might be as many person voted for as there were
voters, and votes might be cast even for unknown or fictitious person as a mark to
identify the votes in favor of a candidate for another office in the same election.
Facts:Monsale withdrew his certificate of candidacy on October 10, 1947, but on
November 7, attempted to revive it by withdrawing his withdrawal. The COMELEC,
however, rules on November 8 that Monsale could no longer be a candidate in spite
of his desire to withdrawal. A canvass of the election returns showed that Paulino M.
Nico received 2,291 votes; another candidate, Gregorio Fagutao126, votes; and the
protestant Jose F. Monsale, none, evidently because the vote cast in his favor had
not been counted for the reason that he was not a registered candidate.
Consequently, Nico was proclaimed elected.
Issue: Whether a candidate who has withdrawn his certificate of candidacy may
revive it, either by withdrawing his letter of withdrawal or by filling a new certificate
of candidacy, after the deadline provided by law for the filling of such certificate.
Ruling: No. Section 31 of the Revised Election Code (Republic Act No. 180)
providesthat "no person shall be eligible unless, within the time fixed by law, he
files a duty signed and sworn certificate of candidacy." Section 36 provides that "at
least sixty days before a regular election and thirty days at least before a special
election, the . . . certificates of candidacy for municipal offices shall be filed with the
municipal secretary, who shall immediately send copies thereof to the polling place
concerned, to the secretary of the provincial board and to the Commission on
Elections." Section 38 further that "if, after the expiration of the time limit for filling
certificate of candidacy, a candidate with a certificate of candidacy duly filed should
die or become disqualified, any legally qualified citizen may file a certificate of
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candidacy for the office for which the deceased or disqualified person was a
candidate in accordance with the preceding section on or before midday of the day
of the election, and, if the death or disqualification should occur between the day
before the election and the midday of election day, said certificate may be filed with
any board of inspection of the political division where he is a candidate or in the
case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate, with the Commission on
Elections."
Therefore, thirty-one days before the election, the protestant ceased to be
candidate by his own voluntary act. When he withdrew his withdrawal of his
certificate of candidacy, can only be considered as a new certificate of candidacy
which, having been filed only four days before the election, could not legally be
accepted under the law, which expressly provides that such certificate should be
filed at sixty days before the election.
The only instance wherein the law permit the filling of a certificate ofcandidacy after
the expiration of the time limit for filing it is when a candidate with a certificate of
candidacy duty filed dies or becomes disqualified.The Commission on Election was,
therefore, right in holding as it did that the protestant "can no longer be a candidate
in spite of his desire to withdraw his withdrawal."
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acknowledge its receipt. While the Commission may look into patent defects in the
certificates, it may not go into matters not appearing on their face. The question of
eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper
cognizance of said body.
The denial of due course or cancellation of ones certificate of candidacy is
not within the administrative powers of the Commission, but rather calls for the
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. The determination whether a material
representation in the certificate of candidacy is false or not, or the determination
whether a candidate is eligible for the position he is seeking involves a
determination of fact where both parties must be allowed to adduce evidence in
support of their contentions. Because the resolution of such fact may result to a
deprivation of ones right to run for public office, or, as in this case, ones right to
hold public office, it is only proper and fair that the candidate concerned be notified
of the proceedings against him and that he be given the opportunity to refute the
allegations against him.
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DOCTRINE: in the absence of clear and positive provision to such effect in the law,
the COMELEC cannot pass upon the question as to whether a candidate is qualified
to run for the aspired position.
FACTS:
In anticipation of the upcoming presidential election, petitioner Alfredo
Abcede filed before the COMELEC a certificate of candidacy for presidency. After
which, the COMELEC celled its attention together with other candidates to appear
before the same on "to show cause why their certificates of candidacy should be
considered as filed in good faith and to be given due course". After due hearing, at
which Abcede appeared and introduced evidence, the Commission issued a
resolution, ordering that the certificates of candidacy of including that of said
petitioner, "shall not be given due course. The commission reasoned that with
petitioners platform of redeeming the Japanese war notes which is in violation of
Fraud Order No. 2 issued by Bureau of Posts, his filing of certificate of candidacy was
attendant with bad faithas he was engaged in a scheme to obtain money from the
public by means of false or fraudulent pretenses. The Commission is convinced that
the certificate of candidacy of Alfredo Abcede was filed for motives other than a
bona fide desire to obtain a substantial number of votes of the electorate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC erred in denying the certificate of
candidacy of petitioner.
HELD:
Yes. The COMELEC erred in denying petitioners certificate of
candidacy. The Revised Election Code in Section 36 and 37 mandates the
commission to accept certificate of candidacy and shall order the preparation and
distribution of copies for the same to all the election precincts of the Philippines.
The laws give the Commission no discretion to give or not to give due course to
petitioner's certificate of candidacy. On the contrary, the Commission has,
admittedly, the "ministerial" duty to receive said certificate of candidacy.
As the branch of the executive department to which the Constitution has
given the "exclusive charge" of the "enforcement and administration of all laws
relative to the conduct of elections," the power of decision of the Commission is
limited to purely "administrative questions." (Article X, sec. 2, Constitution of the
Philippines.) It cannot therefore rule as to who whether among the individuals who
equally possess the minimum requirements of the law can run and pursue its
candidacy. The question whether in order to enjoy those benefits a candidate
must be capable of "understanding the full meaning of his acts and the true
significance of election," and must have over a month prior, to the elections "the
tiniest chance to obtain the favorable indorsement of a substantial portion of the
electorate," is a matter of policy, not of administration and enforcement of the law,
which policy must be determined by Congress in the exercise of its legislative
functions. Apart from the absence of specific statutory grant of such general, broad
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Case No. 22
Garvida v. Sales
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Doctrine:
The general rule is that an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must
not be more than 21 years of age on the day of his election. The only exception is
when the official reaches the age of 21 years during his incumbency. The SK official
must hot have turned 21 years old before his election. Reading Section 423 (b)
together with Section 428 of the Local Government Code, the latest date at which
an SK elective official turns 21 years old is on the day of his election. The maximum
age of a youth official must therefore be exactly 21 years on election day.
Facts:
On April 13, 1996, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position
of Chairman, Sangguning Kabataan, Brgy. San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The
election officer disapproved petitioners certificate of candidacy on the ground that
she exceeded the age limit. The COMELEC en banc issued an order directing the
Board of Election Tellers and Board of Canvassers to suspend the proclamation of
petitioner in the event that she won. Petitioner garnered 78 votes as against
respondents votes of 76. In accordance with the COMELEC order, the Board of
Election Tellers did not proclaim petitioner as the winner. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was eligible to run as SK Chairman.
Held:
No.
In the case at bar, petitioner was 21 years old, 11 months and 5 days on the
day of the election. If the candidate is over the maximum age limit on the day of the
election, he is ineligible. In view whereof, petitioner is declared ineligible for being
over the age qualification for candidacy and is ordered to vacate her position as SK
Chairman.
Case No. 23
Loong v. Comelec
G.R. No. 93986. December 22, 1992.
Doctrine:
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Case No. 24
Lanot v. Comelec
G.R. No. 164858. November 16, 2006.
Doctrine:
The essential elements of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code are (1) a
person engages in an election campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act is
designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate; (3) the act is
done outside the campaign period. The second element requires the existence of a
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MABAN . MANLANGIT . NIPAL . PASA . REYES . TAMONDONG . TOQUERO
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candidate. Under Section 79(a), a candidate is one who has filed a certificate of
candidacy to an elective public office. Unless one has filed his certificate of
candidacy, he is not a candidate.
Facts:
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now assails the COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals
and stickers in "mobile" places like cars and other moving vehicles. Sec 21(f) RA
2134.
ISSUE: whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) may prohibit the
posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places, public or private, and limit their
location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.
RULING: The COMELEC's prohibition is null and void on constitutional grounds. First
the prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech
enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). In the National Press Club, case, the
Court had occasion to reiterate the preferred status of freedom of expression even
as it validated COMELEC regulation of campaigns through political advertisements.
When faced with border line situations where freedom to speak by a candidate or
party and freedom to know on the part of the electorate are invoked against actions
intended for maintaining clean and free elections, the police, local officials and
COMELEC, should lean in favor of freedom. Prohibition did not pass the clear and
preset danger rule. Second the questioned prohibition premised on the statute
and as couched in the resolution is void for overbreadth. It is so broad that it
encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a privatelyowned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed
by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights
provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.
Third the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate
equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated
by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section
4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and
other private vehicles. It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals and stickers
on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the consent of
the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen becomes crucial in
this kind of election propaganda not the financial resources of the candidate.
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also noted that it had not authorized or deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake
the exit survey. COURT ISSUED RESTRAINING ORDER. APPROVED BY COMELEC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Respondent Commission acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction when it approved the
issuance of a restraining order enjoining the petitioner or any [other group], its
agents or representatives from conducting exit polls during the x xx May 11
elections.
RULING: The holding of exit polls and the dissemination of their results through
mass media constitute an essential part of the freedoms of speech and of the press.
Hence, the Comelec cannot ban them totally in the guise of promoting clean,
honest, orderly and credible elections. Quite the contrary, exit polls -- properly
conducted and publicized -- can be vital tools in eliminating the evils of electionfixing and fraud. Narrowly tailored countermeasures may be prescribed by the
Comelec so as to minimize or suppress the incidental problems in the conduct of
exit polls, without transgressing in any manner the fundamental rights of our
people. An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified
individuals or groups of individuals for the purpose of determining the probable
result of an election by confidentially asking randomly selected voters whom they
have voted for, immediately after they have officially cast their ballots. The results
of the survey are announced to the public, usually through the mass media, to give
an advance overview of how, in the opinion of the polling individuals or
organizations, the electorate voted. In our electoral history, exit polls had not been
resorted to until the recent May 11, 1998 elections.
48
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FACTS:
ISSUE:
WON Sec.5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 and Resolution 3636 Sec. 24(h)
areinvalid?
HELD:
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FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
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public office. It is true that when petitioner entered into the contracts
or agreements to endorse certain products, he acted as a private
individual and had all the right to lend his name and image to these
products. However, when he filed his certificate of candidacy for
Senator, the billboards featuring his name and image assumed
partisan political character because the same indirectly promoted his
candidacy. Therefore, the COMELEC was acting well within its scope of
powers when it required petitioner to discontinue the display of the
subject billboards. If the subject billboards were to be allowed,
candidates for public office whose name and image are used to
advertise commercial products would have more opportunity to make
themselves known to the electorate, to the disadvantage of other
candidates who do not have the same chance of lending their faces
and names to endorse popular commercial products as image models.
Similarly, an individual intending to run for public office within the next
few months, could pay private corporations to use him as their image
model with the intention of familiarizing the public with his name and
image even before the start of the campaign period. This, without a
doubt, would be a circumvention of the rule against premature
campaigning. Under Article IX (C) (4), the COMELEC is expressly
authorized to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all
media communication or information to ensure equal opportunity,
time, and space. All these are aimed at the holding of free, orderly,
honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
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the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish, Ubilex non distinguitnecnosdistingueredebemos.In the case at bench, as
the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued
his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term "every candidate" must be deemed
to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who
withdrew his candidacy.
The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2348 in implementation or interpretation of the
provisions of R.A. No. 7166 on election contributions and expenditures. Section 13 of
Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to "all candidates who filed their certificates
of candidacy."Furthermore, Section 14 of the law uses the word "shall." As a general
rule, the use of the word "shall" in a statute implies that the statute is mandatory,
and imposes a duty which may be enforced, particularly if public policy is in favor of
this meaning or where public interest is involved. We apply the general rule.
It is noteworthy that Resolution No. 2348 even contemplates the situation where a
candidate may not have received any contribution or made any expenditure. Such a
candidate is not excused from filing a statement, and is in fact required to file a
statement to that effect. Under Section 15 of Resolution No. 2348, it is provided that
"if a candidate or treasurer of the party has received no contribution, made no
expenditure, or has no pending obligation, the statement shall reflect such
fact."Lastly, we note that under the fourth paragraph of Section 73 of the B.P. Blg.
881 or the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, it is provided that "the filing or
withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or
administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred." Petitioner's
withdrawal of his candidacy did not extinguish his liability for the administrative
fine.
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DOCTRINE:What should, instead, be given weight is the consistent rule laid down
by the HRET that a ballot is considered valid and genuine for as long as it bears any
one of these authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC watermark, or (b) the
signature or initials, or thumbprint of the Chairman of the BEI; and, (c) in those
cases where the COMELEC watermarks are blurred or not readily apparent to the
naked eye, the presence of red and blue fibers in the ballots.It is only when none of
these marks appears extant that the ballot can be considered spurious and subject
to rejection.
FACTS:Petitioner MarcelinoLibanan and private respondent Jose Ramirez were
among the candidates for the lone congressional seat of Eastern Samar in the May
1995 elections. After the canvass of the returns was made on May 13, 1995, the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Eastern Samar proclaimed respondent Ramirez to
have been duly elected Representative of the District.Petitioner Libananfiled an
election protest before the HRET. The HRET ruled in favor of respondent Ramirez.
Petitioner Libanan moved for a reconsideration of the decision of the
HRET arguingthat the absence of the BEI Chairman's signature at the back of the
ballots could not but indicate that the ballots were not those issued to the voters
during the elections. He averred that the law would require the Chairman of the BEI
to authenticate or sign the ballot before issuing it to the voter.
As regards the absence of BEI Chairman's signature at the back of the ballots, the
HRET stressed:
"Fraud is not presumed. It must be sufficiently established. Moreover, Section 211
of the Omnibus Election Code provides in part that 'in the reading and appreciation
of ballots, every ballot shall be presumed to be valid unless there is clear and good
reason to justify its rejection.' In the instant case, there is no evidence to support
protestant's allegation that the ballots he enumerated in his Motion for
Reconsideration are substitute ballots. The absence of the BEI Chairman's signature
at the back of the ballot cannot be an indication of ballot switching or
substitution. At best, such absence of BEI Chairman's signature is a prima
facie evidence that the BEI Chairmen concerned were derelict in their duty of
authenticating the ballots. Such omission, as stated in the Decision, is not fatal to
the validity of the ballots."
ISSUE:Whether or not the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that
the absence of the signature of the Chairman of the BEI in the ballots did not render
the ballots spurious.
HELD:No. Section 24 of R.A. No. 7166, provides: Signature of Chairman at the back
of Every Ballot. - In every case before delivering an official ballot to the voter, the
Chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors shall, in the presence of the voter, affix
his signature at the back thereof. Failure to authenticate shall be noted in the
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minutes of the Board of Election Inspectors and shall constitute an election offense
punishable under Section 263 and 264 of the Omnibus Election Code."
There is really nothing in the above law to the effect that a ballot which is not so
authenticated shall thereby be deemed spurious. The law merely renders the BEI
Chairman accountable for such failure. The courts may not, in the guise of
interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and embrace situations neither
provided nor intended by the lawmakers. Where the words and phrases of a statute
are not obscure and ambiguous, the meaning and intention of the legislature should
be determined from the language employed, and where there is no ambiguity in the
words, there should be no room for construction.
What should, instead, be given weight is the consistent rule laid down by the HRET
that a ballot is considered valid and genuine for as long as it bears any one of these
authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC watermark, or (b) the signature or
initials, or thumbprint of the Chairman of the BEI; and, (c) in those cases where the
COMELEC watermarks are blurred or not readily apparent to the naked eye, the
presence of red and blue fibers in the ballots.It is only when none of these marks
appears extant that the ballot can be considered spurious and subject to rejection.
Page
56
Punzalan v. Comelec
G.R. No. 126669, April 27 1998.
DOCTRINE:
Laws and statutes governing election contests especially appreciation of
ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the
choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities.
FACTS:
Two losing mayoralty candidates (Punzalan and Manalastas) in Pampanga
filed separate election protests before the trial court challenging the results of the
elections alleging massive fraud and illegal electoral practices against the declared
winner (Meneses).The trial court found that there was massive fraud and upon
examination of the contested ballots declared Punzalan as the winner. Meneses
elevated the case to the COMELEC with the latter annulling the trial courts decision
and affirming the proclamation of Meneses. Punzalan appealed to the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in
declaring as valid the ballots credited to Meneses which did not bear the
signature of the BEI Chairman?
2. Whether or not the trial courts finding on the authenticity of the
handwritings on the ballots must prevail over the findings of the
COMELEC?
HELD:
1. No. COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
BP Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code) provides that in reading and
appreciation of ballots, every ballot shall be presumed to be valid unless
there is a clear and good reason to justify its rejection.
Here, the failure of the election officer (BEI Chairman) to affix his signature
at the back of the ballot does not constitute as a reason or justification to
reject the said ballot. While the law, RA 7166 An Act Providing for
Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms,
requires the BEI Chairman to affix his signature at the back of the ballot,
failure to affix the same does not invalidate the ballot.
2. No. The trial courts finding must give way to the findings of the COMELEC.
The COMELEC is a constitutional commission vested with the exclusive
original jurisdiction over election contests involving regional, provincial
and city officials, as well as appellate jurisdiction over election protests
involving elective municipal and barangay officials.
Here, the appreciation of the contested ballots and election documents
involves a question of fact which is best left to the determination of the
COMELEC.
.
LAGUMBAY V. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-25444, January 31 1966
ACHAS . BONIFACIO . BERNABE . CALVO . DELOS SANTOS . FERNANDEZ . HABIJAN . HOFFMAN
MABAN . MANLANGIT . NIPAL . PASA . REYES . TAMONDONG . TOQUERO
57
Page
DOCTRINE:
The Doctrine of Statistical Improbabilities occurs when there is a unique
uniformity of tally of all the votes cast in favor of all the candidates belonging to one
party and the systematic blanking of all the candidates of all the opposing parties
appear intheelection return.
FACTS:
The election returns of certain precincts of some municipalities were being
questioned because in these certain precincts no single vote was received by any of
the eight candidates of the Nacionalista Party. The Commission on Elections
declined to reject the said election returns. Thus, the petitioner appealed to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a block voting or a zero vote is probable to be achieved in one
precinct?
HELD:
No. A block voting or zero voting is not probable.
The Supreme Court has held that election result showing no vote to any
candidate was utterly improbable and clearly incredible. It is not likely, in the
ordinary course of things that all the electors of one precinct would, as one man,
vote for all the candidates of one party, without giving a single vote to one of the
candidates of the contending party.
Here, it is clearly impossible and improbable that no one from the eight
candidates of the Nationalist Party received any vote from any voter in the said