Hypatia, Inc.

A European Initiative: Irigaray, Marx, and Citizenship

Author(s): Alison Martin
Source: Hypatia, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Summer, 2004), pp. 20-37
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of Hypatia, Inc.
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A EuropeanInitiative:
Marx,andCitizenship
Irigaray,
ALISON MARTIN

This articlepresentsIrigarayas a philosopher

committedto sociopolitical
changeby
withtheEuropeanParliament.It
discussingherpoliticalthoughtandherengagement
tracesherrecentworkwiththeex-Communist
Partyin Italybackto herearlycritique
of Marxand hersubsequentattractionto Hegel'scivildefinitionof theperson.The
failureof herEuropeanParliamentinitiativesuggeststhatherthinkingis in advance
of its possiblerealization.

Fromher firstpublicationsin the early 1970s, Luce Irigarayhas signalled her

distance from the thought of KarlMarx and FrederickEngels, and it may be
said that subsequentpolitical events in EasternEuropehave not conspiredto
renderthis position in need of furtherjustification.She has also maintained a
distancefromsociologicalthought in general;she is criticalof it for its apparent
objectivismand for its lack of interest in the question of developing"interiority" (Irigaray1987,436).1It is perhapsno coincidence, then, that some of her
most incisive critics have been sociologists in the Marxian tradition, among
them Monique Plaza (1978), who berates Irigarayfor analyses steeped in the
discourseof Westernphilosophythat have not examined the social conditions
of actual women in history.
Irigaray'sworkfalls within the categoryof Frenchthought that wouldnever
directlydeny this history;but somewhatin the guise of a politician who prefers
to displace ratherthan answerquestions, turns instead to issues of language,
representation,and subjectivitythat makehistorya particularkind of discourse.
Yether workdoes not fit the facelessinheritanceof poststructuralismas Jiirgen
Habermascharacterizedit. Indeed, she is perhaps better characterizedas a
fellow traveleron the Marxian-Hegelianpath of historical development,and
Hypatia vol. 19, no. 3 (Summer2004) ? by Alison Martin

Alison Martin

21

her political affinitieslie very much on the Europeansocialist left. The aims
of her writingsare to furtherthe developmentof humanity in a direction that
ends exploitation and brings about a culture of justice for everyone by means
of a peaceful revolution.Although this is viewed as inimical to the capitalist
system, the dialectic of a possible transition is articulatedin Hegelian terms
in her most recent texts (Irigaray1993b, 1996, 2000). Hence the politics of
recognition and questions of the civil definition of the person and citizenship
have become importantconsiderationsin Irigaray'swork.To this end, she has
workedwith the Democratic Left in Italy and put forwarda proposalto the
EuropeanParliamentfor a definitionof Europeancitizenshipstructuredaround
the concept of sexual difference.Whether or not one accepts her philosophy
of sexual difference, it is clear that Irigaray'sthought formspart of a political
movement that is unfolding in places on the Europeancontinent. However,
as we shall see below, the failureof the Europeanparliamentinitiative reveals
that the idea of sexual differenceis one in bud and that it is still too early to
know whether it will blossom.
THE PROBLEM
WITHMARX AND ENGELS

Irigaray's
problemwith Marxand Engelscan be seen as a problemof recognition,
conceived.
Her explicit engagementwith their writingsis restrictedto
broadly
the early stage of her work when she was concerned to establish a critiqueof
patriarchy.Although she later promiseda text devoted to Marx which, along
with her texts on FriedrichNietzsche and Martin Heidegger,wouldhave comthis text has neverappeared(Irigaray
pletedher explorationsof the "elemental,"
The
on
Marx
are
therefore
limited to some brief analyses
1981,43).2
writings
in Speculumof theOtherWoman(1985a)and to two essaysin ThisSex WhichIs
Not One (1985b),which are neverthelesssignificantbecausethey demonstrate
Irigaray'sanalysisof the "innermechanism"of patriarchy.
Irigaraywas thus writingon Marx in the early 1970s,at a time when debates
within feminism were focused on ascertaining the main cause of women's
oppression:patriarchyor capitalism.It was also a moment in French thought
when syntheses of Marxism and psychoanalysiswere prevalent, whether via
Nietzsche in the case of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1972) and JeanFrancoisLyotard(1974),or via G.W.F.Hegel in the case of Jean-JosephGoux
(1973).As a thinkertrainedin psychoanalysis,Irigaray"psychoanalyzed"
Marx,
which was her practicewith other majorWesternthinkers.But she was equally
influencedby the sedimentationof Hegelianism in twentieth-centuryFrench
thought, and her contributionto the feminist debateof capitalismversuspatriarchywas to insist upon a dialecticalanalysisof the two socioeconomicsystems
(1985b, 82). It is clear, however,that as "systems"they are not consideredas
external to the subjectbut as structuralformsof exchange that inhere in the

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very constitution of the subject;exchange is alwaysa matter for the subject

constituted by it. Although Irigarayshareswith Marx a notion of the subject
as producedby a systemof exchange, her emphasisis upon the materialsubject
formedby symbolicexchange in psychicand bodilyprocessesratherthan upon
the subject as the productof a given means of production.It is the potential
subject-subjectrelation that is primaryfor Irigaray,and she views the subjectobject relationas a form of masculine thinking. Her argumentis that in patriarchythe masculine subjecthas failed to recognize the feminine other in the
form of woman, and has set himself up as single universalbeing who defines a
feminine other as his other, an other who belongs to him (Irigaray1985a).
Fromher very earliest writings, then, Irigaray'swork is a form of phenomenology in the broadestsense. But ratherthan take the subjectto be neutral,
Irigarayidentifiesit as masculine and finds herself,as a feminine being, in the
position of the "thingitself,"the object, the other that appearsto appearto the
subjectof philosophy.Her book, Speculum(1985a),is an attempton the partof
someone who appearsto man as his other-woman-to find a voice not as his
other but as an other on her own terms.Unlike the earlySimone de Beauvoir,
who arguedin The SecondSex (1954) that the problemof women'sotherness
could be overcomeby their self-assertionas subject,Irigarayproblematizesthe
culturalprocessesin which such a dialectic of recognitioncan occur.If the very
modalitiesof cultureareboth historicallyand structurallymasculine,how can a
womancome to representationas a subjectin that cultureexcept as masculine?
Hence Irigaray's
now controversialtechniqueof mimicry,an experimentalform
of articulationthat mimes what has appearedas feminine to men in orderto
allow the possibilityfor another form of femininity (the other of the other) to
emerge.This was but an initial technique, an experience of speaking (as a)
woman that Irigaraywent on to develop in other ways (1985b,76).
Her essayon Capital(1970), "Womenon the Market"(Irigaray1985b),is a
classic instance of Irigaray'smimicry,not to say mockery.It perhapsdeliberately taunts the earnest Marxist who believes that the serious issues are ones
of economy properand that other exchanges, of desire and recognition and of
the subject'sdesirefor recognition,are somewhatfrivolous,rathernonmaterial
matters.Yet Irigaray'sintention is entirely serious,for she attemptsto demonstratethat the questionof genderis intrinsicto economic exchangeand that all
formsof economy that claim to be beyond genderemploy,in fact, the illusion
or
of a masculineuniversal.This is what Irigaraydescribesas a hom(m)o-sexuel,
a "masculinehomosexual"economy, one in which all exchange is an issue of
men'sdesireto exchange with (and hence be recognizedby) other men (1985b,
171).The semblanceof the publicvindication of heterosexualityis a necessary
sham for this economy because it enables the question of libidinal investment
to be ostensiblylocated outside of the economy properin the feminine realm

Alison Martin

23

of "sex"and nature (1985b,193). If women function as the naturaldepositories

of men'sdesireand that desirecan be kept in its properplace, men can be seen
to be economically active in a neutral manner,beyond body and desire. Liberal economies thus presupposethe public appearanceof men to one another
in a fashion that foregroundstheir sex only to deny it: only men are able to
undertakerational and fair exchange because paradoxicallythey are the only
sex whose particularsex (and desire) can be discounted because they operate
at the level of the universal.Hence the desire for exchange between men and
the impossibilityof women entering the exchange marketon their own terms
(1985b, 175).
In spiteof Marx's(1970)critiqueof the reificationof the subjectin exchange
relations, Irigarayargues that his emphasis upon the labor theory of value
equally masks a more fundamentalproblemof the "sex"of matter.Although,
like Heidegger,Irigaraydoes not philosophizeby rejectionor acceptance, she
aligns Marx and Engels with the patriarchalphilosophical tradition because
of the break they have made with what she terms "materialcontiguity,"in
their case by construing materialityas nothing other than the product of a
social labor process (Irigaray1985b, 73). Thus for her, Marx'snotion of the
social depends upon a productivistmodel of economy in which bodies make
value out of neutral matter.While Marx (1970) recognizedthe body of laborers in the productionof value, the value producedby that labor still retains a
dichotomousand ultimatelymetaphysicalhierarchybetweenmaterialand value,
given its assumptionof neutral bodies acting upon neutral matter to produce
a universallabor value. Behind this universalistanalysis Irigaraydiscerns an
underlyingsexual scheme that belongs to male-femaleculturalrelations.She
cites Marx'sadmirationforAristotle in orderto highlight the latter'sattribution
of femininity to matterand masculinityto form (Irigaray1985b, 174):having
disinvestedhimselfof sex and his own matter,natureand matterarethen taken
to be formedby man as his own product(1985b, 174).She is thereforeable to
arguethat actual women have historicallyfunctioned as "matter"in the social
structure,so if they appearat all it is only to appearin the formsattributedto
them by men (1985a, 18). That is why, attempting to speak as a woman, she
cannot to be taken seriously.If Marx'sironic textual asides in Capital(1970)
referringto commoditiesas women and how to "take"them are meant for titillation, Irigarayanalyses them as jokes that belie another repressedeconomy,
one embarrassedby the presence of a woman because women function as
commodities (1985b, 175-76). Hence the mimicry.
There is a sense of missedopportunityin Irigaray'scommentson Marxand
Engels.She acknowledgesthat, unlike many other Western thinkers, they do
initially recognize the exploitation of women. Thus she cites Engels's(1971)
claim that the very firstclass oppressionoccurs within monogamousmarriage

24

Hypatia

as that between a man and a woman,becausethe labor-powerof womenconstitutes the firstproperty(Irigaray1985b,82). However,insteadof developingthat
insight in their work,Marxand Engelstend to relegatethis primaryexploitation
to an initial phase of historyand therebyrelegateit to a mythicalorigin,leaving
the question of this exploitation behind in their analyses,too.
For Irigaray,patriarchalexploitation is both historically and structurally
primary,and she situates patriarchyas the positive first term of her dialectic
between capitalismand patriarchy(1985b). This is supportedby her analysis
of appropriation,in that she views capitalismas a mode of appropriationthat
exploitsor reducesmatterto certain restrictedpropertiesand the proper,which
is a versionof Heidegger's(1980) argumentthat metaphysicalidealismreduces
Being to what beingsare in a waythat restrictsthe broaderquestionand reduces
differences to the same (here, of capital accumulation).But Irigarayadjusts
Heidegger'squestion of Being and being into a question of two subjects,and
in her analysisit is the masculine being who reducesBeing to a being (object)
and then rendersthis an immutabledivinity (a masculineother Being), refusing to recognize the other feminine being. The god of capitalism is thus a
masculineuniversalgeneralequivalent,symbolizedby the name-of-the-father,
which representsthe singularmetaphysicaluniversalideal of men who are but
earthlyinstantiationsof the divine formthey can neverbe (Irigaray1985b,173).
Irigaraythereforeagreeswith Marxthat men aresplit and alienated,but forher
they have maintained their impossibleideal by a more profoundexploitation,
one that projectsonto women the unwantedfunction of being matterand body
so that the masculine subjectcan representhimself as transcendent:he who
produceshimself in his own image (1985b, 190).
Likemany leftist intellectuals,then, Irigarayis neitherblind nor indifferent
to the question of exploitation.The critiqueof Marxismaroseaftera half century or so of Stalinism and State socialism in the east, with pressureat certain
momentsfromthe FrenchCommunistPartyto supportthat anticapitalistother.
The critique does not rule out the question, however, and in many respects
Irigaray'swritingassumesa context with a history of Marxismand its concerns
forjustice and ending exploitation,such that somewhat"apolitical"readingsof
her workare more likely to arise in places with no significantsocialist or communist culturalinheritance.That said,her analysispositions capitalistexploitation as but another manifestationof the patriarchaldrive to appropriation,
and she states that the status of women within differentmodes of production
has varied very little (1985a, 121).She comes to the same conclusion as Beauvoir did in The SecondSex when she arguedagainst Engels'sclaim that women
form a class (Beauvoir 1954; Irigaray1985b). This is in part because women
are not an exclusivelyhistorical category-they are defined by their biology.
However,as phenomenologistsneither Beauvoirnor Irigarayassumesa causal

Alison Martin

25

relationshipbetween biology and culture, the assumptionthat constitutes the

lowest common denominatorof the now exhausted debate over essentialism.
The interpretationof the body is crucialforboth, with perhapsIrigarayplacing
more emphasison the body and Beauvoiron interpretation.
Interpretingthe body in Marxianlanguage,Irigaraydoes not view womenas
a classbecausethey do not enterinto an exchangewith anotherclassin relation
to the ownershipof the means of production:They are the "bodymatter"of
the means of productionand exchange. As mothersthey are use-value,and as
virgins and prostitutesthey are exchange value (Irigaray1985a).3Against this
profoundexploitation, Irigaraywishes women to be valued as women and to
receivesymbolicrecognitionas feminine subjectsso that all formsof alienation
may be addressed.That is why she believes sexual differenceto be the issue of
our time (Irigaray1993a,5), not because other differencesare unimportantor
do not take precedencein certain situations,but becauseher analysisleadsher
to conclude that it is the failureto recognizesexual differenceas the primary
and universaldifferencethat has led to an appropriatingdisregardfor all forms
of difference.
CITIZENSHIP

AS RECOGNITION

OF THE OTHER

Irigaray'swritingson citizenshipcoincide with a generalizedrenewalof interest in the question of the civil realm and citizenshipthat arose in the wake of
the fall of EasternEuropeansocialism and the perceivedor actual sterility of
democracyin the West. FollowingMarx'sanalysisin "On the JewishQuestion"
(1972),radicalshad tended to view the questionof citizenshipas a liberalbourgeois diversionfrom the real issuesof socioeconomic inequality.This position
was alwaysmost convincing to those who at least had a place in society, who
could enter the socioeconomicarenaas a materialand symbolicbirthright.The
dualpressuresof growinginternationalmobilityand inequalityhave meant that
displacedpersonsand migrationsareon the increase,leadingto acuteproblems
for those who have no place and forwhom the romanceof nomadiclife is truly
unsettling because they have no entitlement, nowhere to return to. Without
doubtthe turn to citizenship(includingIrigaray's)has limitations,but provided
it is disengagedfroma propertyqualificationit at least signifiesthe veryrightto
be-therein the firstplace. While Irigaray's
proposalsfora Europeancitizenship
attemptto take into account the changing sociopoliticalconditions in Europe,
they are basedon her analysisthat since the inaugurationof patriarchywomen
have never been attributeda symbolicplace in society that recognizesthem as
subjects.The recentacquisitionof citizenshiprightsforwomenwithin European
states has given them access to a place alongsidemen in public,but they have
yet to be defined as citizens qua women. It is thereforeto a sexed definition of

26

Hypatia

citizenship that Irigarayturns, one that she believes will offer to all people a
sense of identity in a worldof fluidand uncertain boundaries.
The appeal of citizenship for Irigaraylies in Hegel's argument that for a
person to be they requirecivil definition as a form of recognition (1942, 50).
Following the earliercritique of patriarchy,her publishedwork in the 1990s
focuses upon reworkinga dialectic of recognition between two sexed subjects.
Like Hegel, she does not envisage this as an idealistic process but an actual
one, and in her case that is because the subjectis alwayssexual and materially
embodied. She accepts the notion that the "universalis within me," but in
order to overcome the abstraction-compulsioninherent in the universalshe
proposestwo universals:the masculineand the feminine (1996,43-48). This is
a paradoxicalnotion of the universalthat simultaneouslyaffirmsa universalism
in the formof a sexed, embodiedsubjectand denies the claims of the universal
to be universalbecauseof its singularity.Hence she is critical of Hegel'smodel
of recognition for its assumptionof a singularsubject,or in other terms for its
assumptionof an identity that begins (at least in rationalthought) as a unified
concept, whether always already mediated or whether unmediated (Irigaray
1996, 37). The same that contains its otherness within itself formsthat otherness on its own terms, accordingto Irigaray;hence it is not an otherness and
it is certainly not an absoluteotherness. To become and develop on the basis
of one requiresthe tension of a negative that must wrench the one from its
immediatewholeness and therebybe destructivein its denial of the whole, so
that the labor of becoming necessitatesa form of historical violence (Irigaray
1997).Renderingviolence and historysynonymousin this wayis undesirablefor
a philosophersuch as Irigaraywho is committed both to the idea of historical
developmentand to peaceful evolution (Irigaray1996, 3).
Irigaray'sobjection to Hegel's dialectic does not lead her to support the
argumentthat it denies an otherness given in the very existence of concrete
humanothers,forthose manyothershave, in her view,generallybeen identified
as the many instances of one actual formof being: the masculineone. Rather,
she insists that absoluteotherness alwaysalreadyexists in the formof the two
genders,and the negativecould createwithout destructionif it wererecognized
as the space between them. Instead of belonging to being as a moment that
drivesthe processof its own assimilationthroughknowledge,Irigaray's
negative
is a boundarynot to be infringed, a space betweento evoke the wonder and
mysteryof the other who can never be known as such (1997, 63). No longer,
then, would it be a question of becoming what you are not but ratherone of
becoming what you are in the recognitionof what you arenot and by returning
to a sexed identity without overcomingthe other sex.
Irigaraydevelops such a dialectical model of two sexed others in various
ways in her writing.This is in part necessitatedby the fact that as in Hegel's
philosophy the model is pervasive:it exists at differentmoments at all levels.

Alison Martin

27

Hence she believes that the dynamicof the relationshipbetween an individual

man and woman could embodythe dynamic that might exist at the civil level
between male and female citizens;indeed, it is its actualization(1996, 51). She
insists that this has nothing to do with issues of sexual choice, but is, rather,
bound to the potential of an objective identity that does not deny the sexed
materialityof the subject(1997,64-65).4 Nevertheless, Irigaraymakeslove the
motor of her dialectic at all levels. Love appearsto be defined as an attraction
in all senses of the wordbetween men and women that should allow the other
to come to be but that leavesthem to themselveswithout attemptingto possess
them (Irigaray1996). The dynamic of love is often articulatedby Irigarayas
a movement of appearanceand withdrawalsomewhatakin to the movement
of Being in late Heidegger(1975),and it assumesan increasingimportancein
her workas it progresses(Irigaray2003). Affirmingthe importanceand validity of love forms part of her concern to explore how relations between two
sexed others could take place to bring about a certain felicity for them both.
In To Be Two (1997),for example,she pursuesa phenomenologyof perception
and of the caressand asks how each sex can appearto the other accordingto
its own modalities without violating the space of the other and her/his possibility of appearanceand withdrawal.Speaking of love in this way inevitably
bringsan idealizedelement to Irigaray'sprojections,not merelybecauseof the
seeming impossibilityof overcoming the acrimony(not to mention conflict)
that alreadyexists in public relationshipsbut also because of the passion such
emotional formsof commitmentunleash. Nevertheless,at the individuallevel
Irigaraybelieves that unless each person in her sexed embodiment improves
her immediaterelationshipswith others and with herselfby both recognizing
the other sex and developing her own interiority,all attempts at social and
political reformwill fail.
Change is, therefore,within the scope of everyone,but it requiresthe impetus
and supportof sociopolitical processesand institutions if it is to come about.
Irigaraydoes not present recourseto juridicalprocessesas the sole means of
overcomingexploitation,but insists that it is necessaryif women are to obtain
the rights necessaryto them as women (1993b,82). Rather than subscribeto
the skepticismregardingthe pragmaticvalue of legalisticreformsheld by many
feminists and radicals,she supportsthe argumentthat civil rights can protect
individualsfromthe powerof the State (Irigaray2000, 133).5She thus advocates
a notion of the active citizen, one that significantlydiffersfromthe notion put
forwardby the BritishConservative Partyin the early 1990s wherebymorally
responsiblemembersof society were called upon to engage in charitableacts
towardthe less fortunate(Plant 1991,50). Rather,for Irigaraythe active citizen
is the one who is actualizedand comes to be in processesof social and civil
engagementwith others (2000, 23). This leads to a kind of freedomnot unlike
the one theorizedby Hannah Arendt (1977):the freedomto be oneself made

28

Hypatia

possibleby the presenceof others in a democracybased more on participation

than on representation.Irigarayrejectsthe political use of compassionin favor
of a discourseof rightsand responsibilitiesin which everyoneenjoysequivalent
treatmentin their differenceand equivalentresponsibilitiesas adults.6
The tone of Irigaray's
writingon politicalchange is undoubtedlyutopian,but
in that she follows a long line of respectablerevolutionaries,including Marx.
She envisages another social order not to provide a blueprint but to offer a
key to opening up other possibilitiesfor being human. This as a necessaryand
importanttask for Irigaraybecause of the dystopiashe sees on the horizon of
emerginghistorical trends. In addition to her ongoing concerns with the ecological crisis, she is also concerned with what she identifiesas the dangersof
the increasedmobility and fragmentationthat have arisen as a counterpartto
globalization(Irigaray2000, 6). Jean-JosephGoux (1994) relatesthe processof
globalizationto the reign of the ultramodern,in which the modern,universal
terms of underwritten exchange have developed into a regime of generalized equivalence, a "systematicplay of a commutative economy"that has no
guarantee and representation(1994, 188). He arguesthat this technology of
the ultramodern,untrammelledby any boundary,is but an intensificationof
modernity'smasculine-neutraluniversalas analyzedby Irigaray,one that does
nothing for individuals'return to themselves.
With regardto citizenship and the EuropeanUnion, Irigaraythus argues
that it is the fear of dislocation and loss of identity in entering an ever larger
supranationalcommunity that is fueling the return of nationalism and of
identitiesbased on the apparentlynaturalcategoriessuch as race, age, and sex
(2000, 49-58). But ratherthan deny the validity of these "natural"categories
because they are socially constructed, she raises the issue of how societies
organizethe passagefrom the naturalrealm to the civil realm,arguingthat it
should be undertakenin a differentway. Given that the family has traditionally constituted the depositoryof the natural,Irigaraydrawsin the question of
family structureas an area of social relationsundergoingtransformationthat
also needs to be reformulatedin civil law.The patriarchalfamilyhas been the
space of use-value,of natural reproductionand domestic productionthat has
servedthe interestsof its head, the male citizen who leavesbehind this private
life in his public exchange. Unlike Arendt in this instance, Irigaraydoes not
lend support to such a private/publicdistinction that ostensibly leaves the
naturalto one space (a feminine space accordingto feminist analysis)and gives
freedomto the other. Apart from the exploitationof the feminine this entails,
it supportsthe "tribal"domain to which a defensive return is possible when
freedom is threatenedor found threatening (Irigaray2000, 52).
Irigaraywishes to redistributethe natural and to cultivate it so that it is
no longer simplya matterof a naturalfunction but something to be respected
as a different culture. Rather than deposit the natural in the feminine, her

Alison Martin

29

argument is that each sex representsa different nature and culture. There
is, therefore, a projectedcontinuity between nature and culture in the two
domains of masculine and feminine that would replace the hierarchicalsplit
between masculinecultureand feminine nature.Hence Irigaraycan advocatea
definitionof the familybasedon individualmen and womenperceivedas sexed
individualsin the first instance (2000, 97). She wishes to see the unity of the
familyas a singularentity replacedby a perceptionof it as an entity made up of
at least two individuals,in which recognition of the other sex would occur as
respectfor the other'sculture and nature.The presenceof women as symbolically recognizedindividualsin the public spherewould,Irigarayargues,enable
that respect to be transferredinto the civil realm that would itself be made up
of masculine and feminine individuals.In that way,she envisagesa continuity
betweenpublicand privateand between natureand cultureat all levels. Instead
of a worldof free men who nourish their freedomby a necessarybut invisible
naturalfunction, she wishes to see a civic space made up of men and women
who share natural and cultural responsibilitiesand undertake them in their
own ways. Women and men identify themselves as such in the first instance
and returnto themselvesas women and men, leaving individualsfree to make
other choices (such as religiousones) without the need for a defensive group
identity (2000, 52).
The case for sexed citizenship is thus made by Irigarayon the basis of the
primacyof sexual difference, one tied to the materialityof persons as sexed
individuals,becauseforher sexual differencerepresentsthe paradigmof difference. While this may appearto be another hierarchyof difference,that could
not be furtherfrom Irigaray'sintentions. She trulybelieves that the problemof
recognizingand acceptingotherformsof differencewill ensue fromthe political
recognition of sexual difference.Her more recent theorizationof citizenshipis
thus as motivatedby concerns over the political significanceof racial,religious,
or culturaldifferencesas it is by the historicalexploitationof womenas a group.
She thus attempts to situate the agenda of women'srights in a context that
recognizes the importance of other differences (Irigaray2000, 14). However,
the processof recognizingsexual differencethrough a sexed citizenship is put
forwardas the political action that can bring about the acceptance of many
formsof differencebecause she believes that an education in recognizingthe
other sex is one that can bring about a profoundsensitivity to difference in
exchange. She arguesthat if differencesin race, age, class, competence, or of
any other kind appearto be greaterthan sexual difference,it is becausewe are
too close to the other:maintaininga distancefromand recognitionof the sexed
other is the most difficulttask (2000, 6).7
The stakes and aims of Irigaray'spolitical projectare clearly idealistic and
ambitious.It is difficult to envisage how the fact of sexual difference can be
representedin political institutions in a universalistfashion without revealing

30

Hypatia

particularcultural traditions'perception of gender.Her philosophy of sexual

difference does not call for a worldwideuniformity in the culture of sexual
difference-quite the opposite-but the process of making rights and laws
appropriateto women and men raisesthe problemof how to define and represent them in a mannerthat does not rule out those culturaldifferences.But in
assumingat least the validity of the claim of sexual difference,this question is
still a long way from dominant political thinking on genderin Europeanlegal
institutions,which, to the extent that differenceis an issue, seem bound to the
ideal of equality.
THE EUROPEANINITIATIVE

At a time when many in the West were still attemptingto come to termswith
the idea of a philosophyof sexual difference,Irigaraywas alreadyworkingwith
membersof the Italian Democratic Left for the establishmentof a European
citizenshipincorporatingthe principleof sexualdifference.In 1994, in association with Renzo Imbeni,an ItalianMEPand Mayorof Bologna,she put forward
a proposalforsexed citizenshipto the EuropeanParliament.Imbeni'sproposals
were not carriedthrough in the formhe wished, but neverthelessthis project
for a sexed civil code and citizenshiphighlights how sexual differencecan be
pursuedas a political ideal.
Irigaray'saffectionfor Italyas a place and cultureis evident in variousplaces
throughout her work. In DemocracyBegins BetweenTwo she cites Antonio
Gramsciand Enrico Berlinguerand talks approvinglyof the distinctive tradition of Italian communismwith its emphasison human dignity, thought, and
poetry (2000, 2). At the invitation of local council leaders she has acted as
advisor to the Commission for Equal Opportunities in the region of EmiliaRomagna,assisting in the promotionof training in citizenship.This included
work with children of all ages in schools, and she has subsequentlypublished
a collection of their drawingsdealing with relations between girls and boys.
Her involvementwith Imbeni dates from 1989,when they came together at a
charged public meeting during his mayoralelection campaign to discuss the
creationof a Europeancitizenship.The significanceof that encounterin Bologna for Irigarayis discussedin the introductionto I Loveto You(1996), a book
dedicatedto Imbeni.There and in DemocracyBeginsBetweenTwo (2000) she
portraystheir joint effortstowardsthe formulationof a Europeancivil code as
an enactment of the processof sexual differenceas well as a means of working
forthe attainmentof its juridicalrecognition.Workingtowarda politicalgoal in
idealof the potentialof
conjunctionwith the othersex is importantforIrigaray's
the dynamicsof sexualdifference,when that dynamicis not repressivelydenied
or oppressivelyhierarchical.She sees it as the actualizationof sexualdifference.

Alison Martin

31

Not surprisingly,therefore, she finds it significant that Italy has patron

saints or guardiansof both sexes: Francisof Assisi and Catherine of Sienna
(2000, 40).
Although Irigarayis advocatinginstitutionalreform,then, she is also aiming
to change the nature of the political process. The liberal ideal of abstract,
rational, and just principle representedby a single leader is replaced by the
embodiedcouple in her politics. With this focus on the couple, Irigaray'sproposals risk assimilationto a premodern,monarchicalorderin which king and
queen embodythe divine principleon earth, the body of the king symbolically
upholdingthe social orderthat risksliteraldisintegrationon his death.However,
such a riskof assimilationis endemic to her projectof sexual difference,which
is sometimesequatedwith a reaffirmationof patriarchy's
hierarchicalinstitution
of sexual difference.In Irigaray'spolitical initiative, the couple is intended to
embodyand not merelyrepresentthe values of each sex in a way that sustains
democracybecauseof the persistentclaim of the other who representsthe limits
of one person'sreason. The existence of two subjectscan only be recognized
and sustainedby a dialoguebetween them, and it is the necessity of otherness
and dialogue that Irigaraycites as the very premiseof democracy.
In her affirmationof democracy,then, Irigaraygives precedence to the
person. Instead of respect for possessionor property,her democraticprinciple
restson the respectof other individuals;she arguesthat each person is entitled
to the status of full citizenship by birth (1996, 53). Her proposalfor a sexed
citizenship is thus based specificallyon a right of personsover a right of property, and she arguesthat the rights and duties of each sex need to be subject
to a written civil code (2000, 57). While the very concept of a civil code is
somewhatalien to the Britishpoliticaltraditionin which subjectshave acquired
rights in a piecemeal fashion, Irigaray'sreference point here is the French
Civil Code, which dates back to 1804 and the Napoleonic era.8Women were
defined as wife and mother by this Code, and marriedwomen were deprived
of any legal rights and responsibilities.The rightsof male citizens were largely
defined in relation to propertyownership.As Dorothy Stetson (1987) argues,
the extensive reformsto Frenchfamilylaw undertakenbetween 1965and 1975
have significantlyunderminedthe patriarchalassumptionsof the Code in favor
of equality, although these were notoriouslylate comparedwith many other
Europeancountries.
The problemwith such reforms,as Irigaraysees it, is that they rest on a
definitionof the citizen as masculine/neuterand whose rightsconcern issuesof
property,and thereforethey cannot deal with issuesspecific to sexed persons.
Irigarayarguesthe negative consequences of this by pointing to the fact that
certain acts of violence against women, such as rape, are taken to be a crime
against the individualratherthan an offense against civil society as a whole,

32

Hypatia

so that in each case the offended party is an individual woman who must
prove the offense rather than appeal to a positive principle of nonviolation
upheldby the collectivity (1993b,87).9In other instances, such as in the case
of pregnancy,specific issues of women'scondition appearas an inconvenient
aberrationto a general norm ratherthan issues to be providedfor in the way
society is organized.
Irigaraythus desiresrightsforwomenthat arebasedon the positivedefinition
of women as women and not as a general,neutercitizen.As farbackas 1988 she
put forwardsuggestionsfor the basic rightsof women that include the right to
humandignityand the rightto humanidentity,incorporatingrightsto virginity
and to motherhood(1993b,86). With these suggestions,Irigarayis not intending
to monopolizethe debateas to what is most appropriateforwomen.Rather,she
intends to initiate a processas to what mightbe applicableonce the principleof
sexed rightshas been established.In elaboratingon these suggestions,however,
it readilybecomes apparenthow controversialsuch rights could become, with
the languageof specificrights open to interpretation.ForIrigaray,the right to
human dignity forwomen entails the cessation of the commercialexploitation
of their bodies in advertising,and preventingthe exploitation of motherhood
by the state or religiousbodies (1993b,86).
With the call forthe need forhuman identityforwomenshe is drawingupon
her analysisof their use as body-matter,and to call for a right to virginity and
motherhoodas a resultleaves her open to the claim that she is reinforcingthe
patriarchaluse of the femalebody.However,by the rightof virginityshe means
somethingquitegeneralin the sense of a fidelityto the self,and somethingquite
specificin the sense of a girl'srightto controlher own physicalintegrityagainst
the commercialand social exploitationof her virginityby the family,the state,
and religiousbodies (Irigaray1996, 87). Similarly,the right to motherhoodis a
matterof women'sright to choose whetheror not they wish to become mothers
in the face of a civil recognition that women'sbodies make them potentially
mothers(1996,87). This is certainlynot an attemptby Irigarayto definewomen
as mothers, but is instead motivated by the limitations of the call for a right
to abortion, which in her view is another restrictive,after-the-effectmeasure
that positions women'scondition as a negative aberrationto the norm of the
singularindividual.As a right it is thus easily revoked,and in many European
countries it is only granted on a case-by-casebasis. For Irigaray,a right to
maternityis a recognition of civil women'sright to choose whetheror not they
become mothers,a choice that situatesthem beyond a naturalfunction (2000,
44). Followingfrom this, Irigaraymakesfurtherproposalsrelatingto the need
for workinghours that respect the bodies and lives of sexed individuals,and
the need for laws to regulatethe specificrights of fathersand mothers (1993b,
87; 2000, 45).

Alison Martin

33

It was the combinationof her associationwith the formerItalianCommunist

Partyand the provisionsof the 1993 MaastrichtTreatythat providedIrigaray
with the opportunity for a concrete political intervention regardingsexed
citizenship.The Treatymade provisionfor citizenshipof the EuropeanUnion,
and Renzo Imbeniwas given the task of putting forwarda reporton European
citizenshipby the CommissionforCivil Libertiesand InternalAffairs.Having
engagedwith Irigarayon the issue of citizenshipduringhis election campaign,
Imbeniinvitedher to workwith him. They wereboth appointedto the Planning
Groupof the EuropeanParliamentaryCommissionand Irigaraywas invited to
put forwarda DraftCode of Citizenship(Irigaray2000, 69-72).
This Draft,signedby Irigarayand Imbeni,was circulatedto Membersof the
EuropeanParliament(MEPs),electedrepresentativesin memberstates'national
parliaments,and variousinterestedorganizations,groups,and individuals.It sets
out the case for a citizenshipof the EuropeanUnion in straightforwardterms
neverthelessindebtedto Irigaray'sphilosophical argumentas outlined here. It
attemptsto take into account particularsociopoliticalphenomenasuch as the
problemsof culturaldifferences,the need to restructurethe family,the need
to addressthe rights of young people and the two sexes, and the problemsof
variations in differentnational codes within the Union and their divergence
from the Universal Declarationof Human Rights. It calls for transformations
to addressthese issues in a way that returnsresponsibilityto male and female
citizens by stressing their responsibilitiesto themselves and others over and
above the right to possess (even the body). There is, of course, a stresson the
need for rights appropriateto women and thereby for a recognition of the
existence of male and female citizens.
Imbeni's "Reporton Citizenship of the Union," reprinted in full as an
appendix to DemocracyBeginsBetweenTwo (Irigaray2000), reiteratesmany
of the concerns of the draft workedon by Irigaray.It stressesthe importance
of positive civil recognition of individualsbeyond economic factorsnarrowly
conceived:
The rights of citizens are to be defined in positive terms and
no longer only through the protection of economic or civil
interestseffected by the codes. The citizen of the Union is not
only an economic subject,and thus the totality of his being is
to be representedin positive right in such a way as to favourthe
structuringof social relationsbased on the reciprocalrecognition of individuals.(Irigaray2000, 209)
With the recognition of civil individualsas its principle, it is nevertheless a
broad-baseddocument,dealingwith issuesof parityin employment,health, the
environment,and education,as well as setting out the rightto developdifferent

34

Hypatia

culturaltraditions.It affirmsthe unity of the Union by calling not only for the
free circulationof people within Europebut also for the rights to vote and to
stand forpublicoffice in other memberstates.Significantly,however,it affirms
the need to recognizeand respectthe differencebetween men and women as the
foundationof democracywithin the union:
Our societies have become multi-ethnic, multicultural,multireligious,phenomena which drive in the direction of the creation of rules enabling coexistence not only on the basis of
definition in the negative of one's own and the other'sfreedom
(the non-interferencein one'spersonalsphereof the other) but
in a positive sense, reinforcingthe civil identity of individuals
as such. Thus even cultural pluralityposes anew the problem
of individual freedom and points to the need for respect for
difference between women and men as the foundation of a
democraticunion between citizens, nations and cultures.The
creation of a widerand, above all, juridicallyrecognisedsphere
of subjectivitybased on new positive norms is necessary.This
has, as its consequence and premise, an extensive redefinition
of the man-womanrelationship.(Irigaray2000, 210)
The Reportwas not approvedby the EuropeanParliamentat the vote in
January1994. This was for a numberof reasons-not all of them theoretical
or political. Some relatedto the pragmaticsof democraticpolitics, such as the
absenceof supportersin the chamberand the lack of time given to understanding it by potentialsupporters.A numberof right-wingamendmentsto the Report
wereproposedand passed,so that finallyImbeniactuallyaskedfora vote against
his own Report,which by that point he found unacceptable.
It is clear, however,from the account that Irigaray(2000) gives of official
responsesto Imbeni'sReportthat, where it had been considered,the insistence
upon the need to recognizedifferencebetween men and women proveda particularstumblingblock to its acceptance.The CommissionforWomen'sRights
replacedthe idea of respect for the differencebetween men and women with
that of respectfor individualchoices. In place of Irigaray'sdemocracyof difference and positive rights,they called for equal opportunityand nondiscrimination, focusing more on social rights than on civil ones. Equalityin the sphere
of employmentwas emphasizedas the importantfactor in gaining autonomy,
ratherthan consideringissuesof women'sworkin the broadercontext of their
lives as women. Although these issues of equality and economic autonomy
have been on the feminist agendasince the 1960s,for Irigaraythey representa
negative identityforwomen, focusingon what they lack in relationto the male
world.Her analysis,that becausewomen have been definedas differentto men
by patriarchythere is no reason to deny their difference,is evidentlyeither not

Alison Martin

35

understoodor viewed as potentiallydangerousby manyparliamentarywomen

because reinforcingthe idea of their differenceto men is seen to endorse the
idea of their inferiority.
As a consequence of her engagementwith the proceduresof the European
Parliament,Irigarayquestions the groundson which women sit on commissions that representwomen, in the sense that unless they do representwomen's
intereststhe qualificationmust be purelybiological, a regressivemove indeed
in her view (2000, 83). However,definingwomen'sinterestsremainsa political
issue, one that even the acceptance of the need for positive rights for women
would leave open to debate. The differencebetween Irigaray'sunderstanding
of women'srightsand those of others in certain institutionsrevealsthe extent
to which her philosophyof sexual differencedetractsfromthe currentpolitical
mainstream.Irigaray'sanalysisof patriarchyas the appropriationof feminine
being to and for a pseudo-universalmasculine being is one that points her in
the directionof the need fora symbolicrecognitionof the civil rightsof women,
particularlyin relation to their sexed bodies. The liberal aim of equality has
alwaysstressedthe irrelevanceof the differenceof bodies before the law, and
socialists have generallygiven precedenceto socioeconomic rights as the way
to meaningfulfreedom.It is most probablethat Irigaray'spolitical projectwill
requirethe supportof these constituencies if it is to continue and develop successfully.That supportseems unlikelyunless Irigaray'sphilosophicalargument
gains more generalunderstandingacrossEurope;hence her political initiative
is perhapsin advance of its own time.

NOTES

1. Ina pamphletpublished
in 1990,"Uneattentionausouffledanslavie,lapensee,
writes:"Inpatriarchal
traditionsit is helddesirableandfeasiblethat
l'amour,"
Irigaray
the lifeof an individualandthe collectivitybe orderedbeyondthe naturalmilieu.The
body,whichis referredto as a microcosm,is thuscut off fromthe universe-in turn
referred
to as a macrocosm.
The bodyis tiedto sociologicalrulesandrhythmsthatare
fromitssensibility
andvitalperceptions,
suchasdayandnight,theseasons,and
estranged
and
vegetablegrowth.Thismeansthatthe experienceof light,noise,music,fragrances
evennaturaltastesceaseto be cultivatedashumanqualities.Ratherthanbeingtrained
to spiritually
the bodyisdetachedfromthe sensibleforthe sake
developitsperceptions,
of a moreabstract,speculative,
culture"(1990,5, mytranslation).
socio-logical
2. The bookpromisedwouldhavebeenon Marxandfire.
3. Fora moredetailedanalysisof Irigaray's
engagementwith Marxsee mywork,
LuceIrigaray
andtheQuestionof theDivine(2000).
4. Fora criticaldiscussionof the potentialheterosexism
of Irigaray's
sexedcouple
thatcan founda community,seeJagose1994andDeutscher2002.

36

Hypatia

5. Her argumenthere contrastswith that of certain Italianfeminists such as Adriana Cavareroinfluencedby her work.Cavarero(1995) sharesHabermas'sconcern with
the juridificationof the life-world,and arguesfor a female space, "home,"which is free
from state intervention and separatefrom public life.
6. Although Irigarayargues that one should be a citizen from birth and she is
concerned with the status of young people, particularlyin relationto the discrepancies
that exist between the age of civil majorityand the legal age of marriage,for example,
she does not really addressthe question of the rights and responsibilitiesof girls and
boys as potential citizens.
7. Irigaraytakes these argumentsfurther in BetweenEast and West(2002), where
she discusses how a culture of sexual difference would facilitate improvedstructural
relationsbetween differentracesand traditions.Unfortunately,I was not able to incorporateconsiderationof that text in this article. However,for a critical discussionof the
shortcomingsof Irigaray'sargumentsee Deutscher'sarticle (2003).
8. In her account of the debate on Imbeni's Reporton Citizenshipof the Union,
Irigaraynotes that a BritishMEPwanted to know what a civil code is (2000, 92).
9. The questionof the rapeof men is subjectto some taboo (arguablybecausemen
tend to deny their bodily existence and its attendant vulnerabilities),but one could
envisage more prosecutions if men also had a positive right to nonviolation, hence
drawingon a pre-establishedcivil recognition of the fact of the rapeof men. This would
not necessarilyequate the violation of men with the violation of women, but it would
certainly foregroundthe issue of men'sbodies and the abusesof them.

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