Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 174205

June 27, 2008

GONZALO A. ARANETA, petitioner,

vs.
INES BOLOS SANTIAGO, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 15 February 2005, which affirmed the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City, Branch 41, finding
petitioner Gonzalo Araneta y Alabastro guilty of violating Section 10(a), Article VI of
Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children Against
Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act," as amended.
On 12 October 1999, petitioner was charged before the RTC with violation of Section
10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610, allegedly committed as follows:
That on April 10, 1998, at about 11:00 oclock in the morning, at Barangay Poblacion,
District III, Dauin, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said Gonzalo Araneta y Alabastro, with intent to abuse, harass
and degrade 17-year-old offended party AAA3, and gratify the sexual desire of said
accused, the latter, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of
force and intimidation, hold and embrace said AAA, after trespassing with violence into
the room of the dwelling occupied by said offended party, all against the latters will and
consent.4
When arraigned on 15 November 1999, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial
ensued.
At the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) the victim herself,
AAA, who testified on matters that occurred prior, during and after her abuse; (2) BBB,
AAAs 12-year-old sister, whose testimony corroborated that of the victim; (3) CCC,
AAAs mother who testified on the fact that the victim was a minor during the alleged
commission of the crime.
As culled from the combined testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the prosecution
was able to establish that at the time of the commission of the crime, AAA was 17 years
old, having been born on 28 March 1981, in Batohon Daco, Dauin, Negros Oriental.5
Because she was then studying at Dauin Municipal High School located at Poblacion,
District III, Dauin, AAA left her birthplace to live near her school. She stayed at the
house of a certain DDD as a boarder.
At around 10:00 oclock in the morning of 10 April 1998, while AAA and her two younger
sisters, BBB and EEE were sitting on a bench at the waiting shed located near her
boarding house, petitioner approached her. Petitioner, who had been incessantly
courting AAA from the time she was still 13 years old, again expressed his feelings for
her and asked her to accept his love and even insisted that she must accept him
because he had a job.6 She did not like what she heard from petitioner and tried to hit
him with a broom but the latter was able to dodge the strike.7 She and her two sisters
dashed to the boarding house which was five meters away and went inside the room.
When they were about to close the door, the petitioner, who was following them, forced
himself inside. The three tried to bar petitioner from entering the room by pushing the
door to his direction. Their efforts, however, proved futile as petitioner was able to

enter.8 There petitioner embraced AAA, who struggled to extricate herself from his hold.
AAA then shouted for help. Meanwhile, petitioner continued hugging her and tried to
threaten her with these words: "Ug dili ko nimo sugton, patyon tike. Akong ipakita nimo
unsa ko ka buang"9 (If you will not accept my love I will kill you. I will show you how bad
I can be). BBB, tried to pull petitioner away from her sister AAA, but to no avail.10
Andrew Tubilag, who was also residing in the same house, arrived and pulled petitioner
away from AAA.11 AAA closed the door of the room and there she cried. She then went
to the police station to report the incident.12
The petitioner, on the other hand, denied the charge. He alone took the stand. Petitioner
narrated that he met AAA and her younger sisters at the waiting shed, but he denied
having embraced or kissed the victim.13 He said he only spoke to her and told her that
he loved her. Although he admitted that he followed AAA and her sisters when they went
to the boarding house, it was because AAA beckoned him to follow her.14 When he was
inside the room, he again told her of his feelings but he was merely told by her to wait
until she finished her studies.15 He further said that he had been courting and visiting
AAA since she was 12 or 13 years old.16
On 27 February 2001, the RTC rendered a decision totally disregarding petitioners bare
denials and flimsy assertions. In convicting petitioner of the crime charged, it held that
petitioners act of forcibly embracing the victim against her will wrought injury on the
latters honor and constituted child abuse as defined under Section 10(a), Article VI of
Republic Act No. 7610. It further ruminated that if the mentioned statute considers as
child abuse a mans mere keeping or having in his company a minor, twelve years or
under or ten years or more his junior, in any public place, all the more would the
unwanted embrace of a minor fall under the purview of child abuse.
The decretal portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Gonzalo Araneta y Alabastro guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period, to pay the
offended party Php50,000.00 as moral damages without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.17
Dissatisfied with the ruling of the RTC, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals. Petitioner claimed that the RTC gravely erred in convicting him of child abuse
despite failure of the prosecution to establish the elements necessary to constitute the
crime charged. Section 10(a) provide: "Any person who shall commit any other acts of
abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the
childs development including those covered by Article Article 59 of Presidential Decree
No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall
suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period"; and Section 3(b)(2) defines
child abuse in this manner: "Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being." From these
provisions, petitioner concludes that an act or word can only be punishable if such be
prejudicial to the childs development so as to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic
worth and dignity of a child as a human being. In other words, petitioner was of the
opinion that an accused can only be successfully convicted of child abuse under
Section 10(a) if it is proved that the victims development had been prejudiced. Thus,
according to petitioner, absent proof of such prejudice, which is an essential element in
the crime charged, petitioner cannot be found guilty of child abuse under the subject
provision.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on the other hand, believes that the
questioned acts of petitioner fall within the definition of child abuse. According to the
OSG, when paragraph (a) of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7610 states: "Any person
who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible
for other condition prejudicial to the childs development x x x," it contemplates two
classes of "other acts" of child abuse, i.e., (1) other acts of child abuse, cruelty, and
exploitation; and (2) other conditions prejudicial to the childs development. It argues

that unlike the second kind of child abuse, the first class does not require that the act be
prejudicial to the childs development.
In a decision dated 15 February 2005, the Court of Appeals concurred in the opinion of
the OSG. It affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC, viz:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED and accordingly, the assailed Decision is
AFFIRMED in toto.18
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration dated 14 March 2005, which was denied by
the Court of Appeals in its 10 August 2006 Resolution.
Hence, the instant petition.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Republic Act No. 7610 is a measure geared towards the implementation of a national
comprehensive program for the survival of the most vulnerable members of the
population, the Filipino children, in keeping with the Constitutional mandate under Article
XV, Section 3, paragraph 2, that "The State shall defend the right of the children to
assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development."19 This piece of legislation supplies the inadequacies of existing laws
treating crimes committed against children, namely, the Revised Penal Code and
Presidential Decree No. 603 or the Child and Youth Welfare Code.20 As a statute that
provides for a mechanism for strong deterrence against the commission of child abuse
and exploitation, the law has stiffer penalties for their commission, and a means by
which child traffickers could easily be prosecuted and penalized.21 Also, the definition
of child abuse is expanded to encompass not only those specific acts of child abuse
under existing laws but includes also "other acts of neglect, abuse, cruelty or
exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to the childs development."
Article VI of the statute enumerates the "other acts of abuse." Paragraph (a) of Section
10 thereof states:
Article VI
OTHER ACTS OF ABUSE
SEC. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions
Prejudicial to the Childs Development.
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the childs development including those
covered by Article Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not
covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision
mayor in its minimum period. (Emphasis supplied.)
As gleaned from the foregoing, the provision punishes not only those enumerated under
Article 5922 of Presidential Decree No. 603, but also four distinct acts, i.e., (a) child
abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c) child exploitation and (d) being responsible for conditions
prejudicial to the childs development. The Rules and Regulations of the questioned
statute distinctly and separately defined child abuse, cruelty and exploitation just to
show that these three acts are different from one another and from the act prejudicial to
the childs development. Contrary to petitioners assertion, an accused can be
prosecuted and be convicted under Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 if
he commits any of the four acts therein. The prosecution need not prove that the acts of
child abuse, child cruelty and child exploitation have resulted in the prejudice of the child
because an act prejudicial to the development of the child is different from the former
acts.
Moreover, it is a rule in statutory construction that the word "or" is a disjunctive term
signifying dissociation and independence of one thing from other things enumerated.23

It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use
of "or" in Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 before the phrase "be responsible for
other conditions prejudicial to the childs development" supposes that there are four
punishable acts therein. First, the act of child abuse; second, child cruelty; third, child
exploitation; and fourth, being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the childs
development. The fourth penalized act cannot be interpreted, as petitioner suggests, as
a qualifying condition for the three other acts, because an analysis of the entire context
of the questioned provision does not warrant such construal.
The subject statute defines children as persons below eighteen (18) years of age; or
those over that age but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect
themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a
physical or mental disability or condition.24 It is undisputed that the victim, under said
law, was still a child during the incident.
Subsection (b), Section 3, Article I of Republic Act No. 7610, states:
(b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which
includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth
and dignity of a child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter;
or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious
impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
The evidence of the prosecution proved that petitioner, despite the victims protestation,
relentlessly followed the latter from the waiting shed to her boarding house and even to
the room where she stayed. He forcibly embraced her and threatened to kill her if she
would not accept his love for her. Indeed, such devious act must have shattered her
self-esteem and womanhood and virtually debased, degraded or demeaned her intrinsic
worth and dignity. As a young and helpless lass at that time, being away from her
parents, the victim must have felt desecrated and sexually transgressed, especially
considering the fact that the incident took place before the very eyes of her two younger,
innocent sisters. Petitioner who was old enough to be the victims grandfather, did not
only traumatize and gravely threaten the normal development of such innocent girl; he
was also betraying the trust that young girls place in the adult members of the
community who are expected to guide and nurture the well-being of these fragile
members of the society. Undoubtedly, such insensible act of petitioner constitutes child
abuse. As the RTC aptly observed:
It bears stressing that the mere keeping or having in a mans companion a minor, twelve
(12) years or under or who is ten (10) years or more his junior in any public or private
place already constitutes child abuse under Section 10(b) of the same Act. Under such
rationale, an unwanted embrace on a minor would all the more constitute child abuse.25
This factual findings of the RTC, which were affirmed by the Court of Appeals are
entitled to respect and are not to be disturbed on appeal, unless some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance, having been overlooked or misinterpreted,
might materially affect the disposition of the case.26 The assessment by the trial court
of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight. It is even conclusive and
binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of
weight and influence. In the case under consideration, we find that the trial court did not
overlook, misapprehend, or misapply any fact of value for us to overturn the said
findings.

The RTC imposed upon petitioner the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
The penalty is in order, pursuant to Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610.
As to the award of damages, the victim is entitled to moral damages, having suffered
undue embarrassment when petitioner forcibly hugged her and threatened to kill her if
she would not accept petitioners love. There is no hard-and-fast rule in the
determination of what would be a fair amount of moral damages, since each case must
be governed by its own peculiar facts.27 The yardstick should be that it is not palpably
and scandalously excessive.28 The Court finds that the award of moral damages in the
amount of P50,000.00 is reasonable under the facts obtaining in this case.
WHEREFORE, the 15 February 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 25168, which affirmed in toto the Decision of the Dumaguete City Regional Trial
Court, Branch 41 in Criminal Case No. 14246 finding Gonzalo A. Araneta guilty of
violating Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and awarding to the victim moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, is AFFIRMED in toto. No
costs.

G.R. No. 173988

October 8, 2014

FELINA ROSALDES, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The petitioner, a public schoolteacher, was charged with and found guilty of child abuse,
a violation of Republic Act No. 7610.1 The victim was her own Grade 1 pupil whom she
physically maltreated for having accidentally bumped her knee while she was drowsing
off on a bamboo sofa as he entered the classroom. Her maltreatment left him with
physical injuries, as duly certified by a physician.
Whether or not the petitioner thereby committed child abuse is the question that this
appeal must determine, in light of the Court's pronouncement in Bongalon v. People of
the Philippines2 that:
Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes the crime of child abuse
under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610. Only when the laying of hands is shown
beyond reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase, degrade or demean
the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being should it be punished as
child abuse. Otherwise, it is punished under the Revised Penal Code.
Antecedents
The State, through the Office ofthe Solicitor General, summed up the factual
antecedents in its comment,3 as follows:
On February 13, 1996, seven yearold Michael Ryan Gonzales, then a Grade 1 pupil at
Pughanan Elementary School located in the Municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo, was
hurriedly entering his classroom when he accidentally bumped the knee of his teacher,
petitioner Felina Rosaldes, who was then asleep on a bamboo sofa (TSN, March 14,
1997, pp. 5-6). Roused from sleep, petitioner asked Michael Ryan to apologize to her.
When Michael did not obey but instead proceeded to his seat (TSN, March 14, 1997, p.
6), petitioner went to Michael and pinched him on his thigh. Then, she held him up by
his armpits and pushed him to the floor. As he fell, Michael Ryans body hit a desk. As a
result, he lost consciousness. Petitioner proceeded topick Michael Ryan up by his ears
and repeatedly slammed him down on the floor. Michael Ryan cried (TSN, March 14,
1997, p. 6; TSN, November 13, 1997, p. 7).
After the incident, petitioner proceeded to teach her class. During lunch break, Michael
Ryan, accompanied by two of his classmates, Louella Loredo and Jonalyn Gonzales,
went home crying and told his mother about the incident (TSN, March 14, 1997, p. 7).
His mother and his Aunt Evangeline Gonzales reported the incident to their Barangay
Captain, Gonzalo Larroza (TSN, February 1, 1999, p. 4) who advised them to have
Michael Ryan examined by a doctor. Michael Ryans aunt and Barangay Councilman
Ernesto Ligante brought him to the Dr. Ricardo Y. Ladrido Hospital where he was
examined by Dr. Teresita Castigador. They, likewise, reported the incident to the Police
Station (TSN, July 27, 1997, p. 6; TSN, February 1, 1999, p. 4).
The medical certificate issued by Dr. Teresita Castigador reads, in part:
1. Petechiae and tenderness of both external ears 1x2 cm. and 1x1 cm.;
2. Lumbar pains and tenderness at area of L3-L4;
3. Contusions at left inner thigh 1x1 and 1x1 cm.;
4. Tenderness and painful on walking especially at the area of femoral head.

The petitioner was criminally charged with child abusein the Regional Trial Court in Iloilo
City (RTC), and the case was assigned to Branch 27 of that court. The information
alleged as follows: The Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo, upon approval and Directive of
the Deputy OMBUDSMAN for the Visayas accuses FELINA ROSALDES of the crime of
VIOLATION OF CHILD ABUSE LAW
(Section 10 (a) of R.A. 7610), committed as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of February 1996, in the Municipality of Lambunao,
Province of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, being a public school teacher in Grade 1 of Pughanan
Elementary School, with a Salary Grade below 26, under the DECS, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously maltreat her pupil Michael Ryan Gonzales, a seven
year old child, by pinching him on different parts of his body, and thereafter slumping
him to the ground, thereby causing Michael Ryan Gonzales to lose his consciousness
and has suffered injuries on different parts of his body.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On June 26, 2003, the RTC rendered judgment convicting the petitioner of child abuse,5
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of
Section 10 (a), Article VI of R.A. 7610, the Court sentences her to an indeterminate
prison term ranging from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum, and to pay the costs.
No pronouncement as to civil liability, the same not having been proved.
SO ORDERED.6
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of the petitioner through its assailed decision
promulgated on May 11, 2005,7 with a modification of the penalty, viz: WHEREFORE,
premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered by us DISMISSING the appeal filed
in this case and AFFIRMING the decision rendered on June 26, 2003 by the court a quo
in Criminal Case No. 46893 with the MODIFICATION that the accusedappellant is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one
(1) day of prision correccional, as the minimum of it, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as the maximum thereof.
IT IS SO ORDERED.8
In her petition for review on certiorari,9 the petitioner submits that:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in convicting the petitioner by holding that the acts of the
petitioner constitute child abuse penalized under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No.
7610[,] and notunder the Revised Penal Code.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in convicting the petitioner by holding that petitioners
constitutional right to due process and her right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against her was not violated when the essential elements of the crime
charged were not properly recited in the information.10
Countering, the State, through the OSG, insists that the issues the petitioner is raising
are mainly factual and, therefore, not reviewable under the mode of appeal chosen; that
the affirmance of her conviction by the CA was in accord with the pertinent law and

jurisprudence, and supported by the overwhelming evidence of the trial; and that the
information charging her with child abuse was sufficient in form and substance.11
Ruling of the Court
The appeal lacks merit.
First of all, the State correctly contends that the petitioner could raise only questions of
law in her present recourse. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the appeal is limited
to questionsof law. The immediate implication of the limitation is to have the findings of
fact by the CA, which affirmed the findings of fact by the trial court, conclude the Court
by virtue of its not being a trier of fact. As such, the Court cannot analyze or weigh the
evidence all over again.
It is true that the limitation of the review to errors of law admits of exceptions. Under
Section 4, Rule 3 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, the following situations
are the exceptions in which the Court may review findings of fact by the lower courts, to
wit: (a) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and
conjecture; (b) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (c) there is grave abuse of
discretion; (d) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) the findings of
fact are conflicting; (f) the collegial appellate courts went beyond the issues of the case,
and their findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) the
findings of fact of the collegial appellate courts are contrary to those of the trial court; (h)
said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based; (i) the facts set forth in the petition aswell as in the petitioners main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; (j) the findings of fact of the collegial
appellate courts are premised on the supposed evidence, but are contradicted by the
evidence on record; and (k) all other similar and exceptional cases warranting a review
of the lower courts findings of fact. A further exception is recognized when the CA
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed bythe parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.12 Yet, none of the exceptions applies
herein.
Secondly, the petitioner contends that she did not deliberately inflict the physical injuries
suffered by MichaelRyan to maltreat or malign him in a manner that would debase,
demean or degrade his dignity. She characterizes her maltreatment as anact of
discipline that she as a school teacher could reasonably do towards the development of
the child. She insists that her act further came under the doctrine of in loco parentis.
The contention of the petitioner is utterly bereft of merit.
Although the petitioner, as a school teacher, could duly discipline Michael Ryan as her
pupil, her infliction of the physical injuries on him was unnecessary, violent and
excessive. The boy even fainted from the violence suffered at her hands.13 She could
not justifiably claim that she acted only for the sake of disciplining him. Her physical
maltreatment of him was precisely prohibited by no less than the Family Code, which
has expressly banned the infliction of corporal punishmentby a school administrator,
teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising special parental authority (i.e., in
loco parentis), viz:
Article 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same
authority over the person of the child as the parents.
In no case shall the school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care
exercising special parental authority inflict corporal punishment upon the child. (n)
Proof of the severe results of the petitioners physical maltreatment of Michael Ryan
was provided by Dr. Teresita Castigador, the Medico-Legal Officer of the Dr. Ricardo Y.
Ladrido Memorial Hospital in Iloilo who examined the victim at about 1:00 oclock in the
afternoon of February 13, 1996, barely three hours from the timethe boy had sustained
his injuries. Her Medical Report stated as follows:

1. Petechiae and tenderness of both external ears 1x2 cm. and 1x1 cm.;
2. Lumbar pains and tenderness at area of L3-L4;
3. Contusions at left inner thigh 1x1 and 1x1 cm.;
4. Tenderness and painful on walking especially at the area of femoral head.
Reflecting her impressions of the physical injuries based on the testimonial explanations
of Dr. Castigador, the trial judge observed in the decision of June 26, 2003:
A petechiae (wound no. 1), according to Dr. Castigador is a discoloration of the skin
caused by the extravasation of blood beneath it. She opined that the petechiae and
tenderness of the ears of the victim could have been caused by pinching. As to the
lumbar pain and tenderness at the third and fourth level of the vertebrae (wound no. 2),
the doctor testified that during her examination of the victim the latter felt pain when she
put pressure on the said area. She stated that this could be caused by pressure or
contact with a hard object. Wound No. 3 is located on the victimsleft inner thigh.
According to her this could not have been caused by ordinary pinching with pressure.
Wound No. 4 is located on the upper part of the left thigh. Dr. Castigador testified that
she noticed that the boy was limping as he walked.14
Section 3 of RepublicAct No. 7610 defines child abusethusly:
xxxx
(b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which
includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth
and dignity of a child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter;
or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious
impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
xxxx
In the crime charged against the petitioner, therefore, the maltreatment may consist of
an act by deedsor by wordsthat debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and
dignity of a child as a human being. The act need not be habitual. The CA concluded
that the petitioner "went overboard in disciplining Michael Ryan, a helpless and weak 7year old boy, when she pinched hard Michael Ryan on the left thigh and when she held
him in the armpits and threw him on the floor[; and as] the boy fell down, his body hit the
desk causing him to lose consciousness [but instead] of feeling a sense of remorse, the
accused-appellant further held the boy up by his ears and pushed him down on the
floor."15 On her part, the trial judge said that the physical pain experienced by the victim
had been aggravated by an emotional trauma that caused him to stop going to school
altogether out of fear of the petitioner, compelling his parents to transfer him to another
school where he had to adjust again.16 Such established circumstances proved beyond
reasonable doubt thatthe petitioner was guilty of child abuse by deeds that degraded
and demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of Michael Ryan as a human being.
It was also shown that Michael Ryans physical maltreatment by the petitioner was
neither her first or only maltreatment of a child. Prosecution witness Louella Loredo
revealed on cross examination that she had also experienced the petitioners cruelty.17
The petitioner was also convicted by the RTC in Iloilo City (Branch 39) in Criminal Case

No. 348921 for maltreatment of another childnamed Dariel Legayada.18 Such previous
incidents manifested that the petitioner had "a propensity for violence," as the trial judge
stated in her decision of June 26, 2003.19
Thirdly, the petitioner submits that the information charging her with child abuse was
insufficient in form and substance, in that the essential elements of the crime charged
were not properly alleged therein; and that her constitutional and statutory right to due
process of law was consequently violated.
The petitioners submission deserves scant consideration.
Under Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the information is sufficient if it states
the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
proximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.
The information explicitly averred the offense of child abusecharged against the
petitioner in the context of the statutory definition of child abuse found in Section 3 (b) of
Republic Act No. 7610, supra, and thus complied with the requirements of Section 6,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the Court should no longer entertain the
petitioners challenge against the sufficiency of the information in form and substance.
Her last chance to pose the challenge was prior to the time she pleaded to the
information through a motion to quash on the ground that the information did not
conform substantially to the prescribed form, or did not charge an offense. She did not
do so, resulting in her waiver of the challenge.
Fourthly, the RTC did not grant civil damages as civil liability ex delictobecause no
evidence had been adduced thereon.20 The CA saw nothing wrong with the omission
by the trial court. The explanation tendered by the trial judge for the omission was
misplaced, however, because even without proof of the actual expenses, or testimony
on the victims feelings, the lower courts still had the authority to define and allow civil
liability arising from the offense and the means to fix their extent. The child abuse surely
inflicted on Michael Ryan physical and emotional trauma as well as moral injury. It
cannot also be denied that his parents necessarily spent for his treatment. We hold that
both lower courts committed a plain error that demands correction by the Court. Indeed,
as the Court pointed out in Bacolod v. People,21 it was "imperative that the courts
prescribe the proper penalties when convicting the accused, and determine the civil
liability to be imposed on the accused, unless there has been a reservation of the action
to recover civil liability or a waiver of its recovery," explaining the reason for doing so in
the following manner:
It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their express
mandate under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Courtto have the judgment, if it was
of conviction, state: "(1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts
committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which
attended its commission; (2) the participation ofthe accused in the offense, whether as
principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the
accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to
be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the
enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived."
Their disregard compels us to actas we now do lest the Court be unreasonably seen as
tolerant of their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not themselves seek the
correction of the omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action because the
Court, as the final reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but also the duty to
correct at any time a matter of law and justice.1wphi1
We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting reliefs that the
parties are properly entitled to by law or in equity under the established facts. Their
judgments will not be worthy of the name unless they thereby fully determine the rights
and obligations of the litigants. It cannot be otherwise, for only by a full determination of
such rights and obligations would they betrue to the judicial office of administering

justice and equity for all. Courts should then be alert and cautious in their rendition of
judgments of conviction in criminal cases. They should prescribe the legal penalties,
which is what the Constitution and the law require and expect them to do. Their
prescription of the wrong penalties will be invalid and ineffectual for being done without
jurisdiction or in manifest grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
They should also determine and set the civil liability ex delictoof the accused, in order to
do justice to the complaining victims who are always entitled to them. The Rules of
Court mandates them to do so unless the enforcement of the civil liability by separate
actions has been reserved or waived.22
Moral damages should be awarded to assuage the moral and emotional sufferings of
the victim, and in that respect the Court believes and holds that P20,000.00 is
reasonable. The victim was likewise entitled to exemplary damages, considering that
Article 2230 of the Civil Code authorizes such damages if at least one aggravating
circumstance attended the commission of the crime. The child abuse committed by the
petitioner was aggravated her being a public school teacher, a factor in raising the
penalty to its maximum period pursuantto Section 31(e) of Republic Act No. 7610. The
amount of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages is imposed on in order to set an example
for the public good and as a deterrent to other public school teachers who violate the
ban imposed by Article 233 of the Family Code, supra, against the infliction of corporal
punishment on children under their substitute parental authority. The lack of proof of the
actual expenses for the victims treatmentshould not hinder the granting of a measure of
compensation in the formof temperate damages, which, according to Article 2224 of the
Civil Code, may be recovered when some pecuniary loss has been suffered butits
amount cannot be proved with certainty. There being no question aboutthe injuries
sustained requiring medical treatment, temperate damages ofat least P20,000.00 are
warranted, for it would be inequitable not to recognize the need for the treatment. Lastly,
interest of 6% per annum shall be charged on all the items of civil liability, to be
reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment.
The penalty for the child abusecommitted by the petitioner is that prescribed in Section
10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610, viz:
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions
Prejudicial to the Child's Development.
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or
to be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including
those covered by Atiicle 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not
covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision
mayor in its minimum period.
xxxx
The CA revised the penalty fixed by the R TC by imposing the indeterminate penalty of
four years, two months and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years
and one day of prision mayor, as the maximum, on the ground that the offense was
aggravated by the petitioner being a public schoolteacher.23 It cited Section 3 l(e) of
Republic Act No. 7610, which commands that the penalty provided in the Act "shall be
imposed in its maximum period if the offender is a public officer or employee." Her being
a public schoolteacher was alleged in the information and established by evidence as
well as admitted by her. The revised penalty was erroneous, however, because Section
10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610 punishes the crime committed by the petitioner with
prision mayor in its minimum period, whose three periods are six years and one day to
six years and eight months, for the minimum period; six years, eight months and one
day to seven years and four months, for the medium period; and seven years, four
months and one day to eight years, for the maximum period. The maximum of the
indeterminate sentence should come from the maximum period, therefore, and the
Court fixes it at seven years, four months and one day of prision mayor. The minimum
of the indeterminate sentence should come from prision correccional in the maximum
period, the penalty next lower than prision mayor in its minimum period, whose range is
from four years, two months and one day to six years.1wphi1 Accordingly, the

minimum of the indeterminate sentence is four years, nine months and 11 days, and the
maximum is seven years, four months and one day of prision mayor.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on May 11, 2005, subject
to the MODIFICATIONS that: (a) the petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of
four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as
minimum, to seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of pr is ion mayor, as the
maximum; (b) the petitioner shall pay to Michael Ryan Gonzales P20,000.00 as moral
damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P20,000.00 as temperate damages,
plus interest at the rate of 6% per annum on each item of the civil liability reckoned from
the finality of this decision until full payment; and (c) the petitioner shall pay the costs of
suit.
SO ORDERED.