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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 31951

September 4, 1929

PHILIPPINE TRUST CO., petitioner,


vs.
FRANCISCO SANTAMARIA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, and F. M. YAPTICO & CO.,
LTD.,respondents.
W. E. Greenbaum for petitioner.
A. de Aboitiz Pinaga for respondent F. M. Yaptico & Co.
The respondent Judge in his own behalf.
STATEMENT
This is a petition for mandamus in which the petitioner alleges that it is plaintiff in civil cases Nos. 6720 and 6721
pending in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. That on October 19, 1927, that court in those actions rendered the
following judgments:
CIVIL CASE NO. 6720
Whereof, judgment is rendered in so far as it refers to said case No. 6720, in favor of the Philippine Trust
Co. and against the defendant F. M. Yaptico & Co., Ltd., for the sum of 25,000, with interest thereon at the
rate of 9 per cent per annum from March 6, 1924, until paid, and with legal interest of 6 per cent per annum
on the accumulated interest from the filing of the complaint to the date of the judgment, together with the
costs of the action.
CIVIL CASE NO. 6721
Whereof, judgment is rendered against F. M. Yaptico & Co., Ltd., jointly with the Visayan General Supply
Co., Inc., for the sum of 50,000, with interest thereon at the rate of 9 per cent per annum from February 11,
1924, until paid, and with legal interest of 6 per cent per annum on the accumulated interest from the filing of
the complaint to the date of the judgment. And judgment is rendered against the defendant F. M. Yaptico &
Co., Ltd., for the sum of 25,000, with interest thereon at 9 per cent per annum from March 5, 1924, plus the
legal interest of 6 per cent per annum on the accumulated interest from the date of the filing of the
complainant to that of the judgment, together with the costs of this action.
It is alleged that on such judgments there is now due and owing from the defendant to the petitioner about 110,000.
That on November 25, 1927, the plaintiff asked the court to issue an execution pending the defendant's appeal to
this court which request was denied on December 5, 1927. That an appeal was taken to this court which affirmed
the judgments on October 25, 1928. That on November 23, 1928, plaintiff again asked the lower court to issue an
execution on the judgments, and that execution was issued on December 14, 1928. That the sheriff made return
that no property of defendant F. M. Yaptico & Co., Ltd., could not pay them. That on January 18, 1929, the petitioner
asked the lower court to appoint a receiver of the property of F. M. Yaptico & Co., Ltd. That on March 6,1929, the
court denied that petition. That on April 24, 1929, the petitioner prayed the court for an order to require the manager
of F. M. Yaptico & Co., Ltd., to appear and answer interrogatories as the assets of F. M. Yaptico & Co., Ltd. That on
June 13,1929, F. M. Yaptico & Co., Ltd., asked the court to suspend the execution of the judgments for a period of
four months, which request was opposed by the petitioner on the ground that the court was without jurisdiction, and
it again renewed its motion for the court to appoint a receiver. That the manager appear in court on June 29, 1929,
from which it appeared that the property of the defendant was being disposed of to the damage of the petitioner;
that F. M. Yaptico & Co., Ltd., had rendered the petitioner a false and misleading statements of its assets and
liabilities; and that after an examination of the manager and as a result of the disclosures made by him, petitioner
again prayed for the appointment of a receiver. That on June 30, 1929, the court denied the application, and
"suspended execution of the said judgments for a period of four months from and after the 30th day of June, 1929,
to give the respondent F. M. Yaptico & Co., Ltd., more time to pay said judgments." That on July 12, 1929, the court
again affirmed its order of June thirtieth, and on July 15, 1929, denied the motion for reconsideration.

JOHNS, J.:

There is no dispute about any material fact. It appears that the judgments in favor if the petitioner against F. M.
Yaptico & Co., Ltd., were rendered in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo on October 19, 1927, from which F. M.
Yaptico & Co., Ltd., appeared to this court which affirmed the judgments. 1 It also appears that the petitioner asked
for an execution of the judgment pending the appeal to this court, which was denied, and that after the cases were
affirmed by this court, it again asked for an execution of judgments. The petitioner then applied to the court for the
appointment of a receiver upon the ground that F. M. Yaptico & Co., Ltd., was fraudulently putting its property
beyond the reach of its creditor and the petitioner in particular. After a hearing, that motion was denied, and the
lower court on July 30, 1929, suspended the execution of the judgment of the judgments for four months from June
30, 1929.
Hence, we have this situation: The petitioner obtained its judgments in the Court of First Instance on October 19,
1927, and also it has made diligent efforts to obtain an execution from one cause or another, it has been delayed
been delayed by order of the court, and its last and in final order, the court suspended the right of the petitioner to
enforce its judgments until October 30, 1929, which would be more than two years after the judgments were
rendered in the lower court, and one year after the judgments were affirmed by this court. In other words, for ten
months the petitioner has not been able to obtain and enforce an execution on final judgments rendered in this
court.
We do not know anything about the whys and wherefores, but suffice it to say that such proceedings brings the
courts in to disrepute and subject them to severe criticisms. After a final judgment has been rendered in this court, in
particular or even in the Court of First Instance, it is the duty of the court to enforce the judgment according to its
terms, and no court has the power to suspend an execution issued on the final judgment, except as to matters and
things which may have arisen after the rendition of the judgment, and which would be a valid defense.
As this court said in Wolfson (Trustee) vs. Del Rosario (Judge) and Fajardo (46 Phil., 41):
An extension of the time fixed by the judgment which has become final for the payment of a certain sum of
money is in effect of modification of the judgment and is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance.
And on page 43, the opinion says:
On the facts stated, its seems obvious that the respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction in calling the writ
of execution in question. It is true that the court retains a certain amount of control over a writ of execution
even after it leaves its hands, but such control is limited and regulated by such fairly definite rules of law and
is not unrestricted. A writ of execution may thus be quashed when it appears that it has been improvidently
issued, or that it is defective in substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt
has been paid, or when the writ has been issued without authority, etc. But the writ had not been recalled by
reason of any defense which could not been made at the time of the trial of the case, nor can the recall be
made so as to practically change the terms of a judgment which has become final.
We are clearly of the opinion that the lower court exceeded its jurisdiction in suspending the execution for the period
of four months from June 30, 1929. We are also of the opinion that upon the facts shown in this record, it was the
duty of the court to appoint a receiver for F. M. Yaptico & Co., Ltd., to protect and preserve its property and assets
for the use and benefit of its creditors and in particular this petitioner, under the provision of section 483 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. The very fact that the judgments in question were rendered on October 19,1927, and that no part
of them has yet been paid and that F. M. Yaptico & Co., Ltd., has so far been able to defeat the petitioner in the
collection of its judgments, is a very strong and cogent reason why a receiver should be appointed.
It is the order of the court that a writ of mandamus be forthwith as prayed for in the petition, and that the lower court
at once appoint a receiver of all the property and assets of F. M. Yaptico & Co., Ltd., and that petitioner have
judgments for costs. So ordered.
Avancea, C. J., Street, Villamor, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.