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RULE 7
1. TRAVENO v. BOBONGON
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 164205. September 3, 2009.]
OLDARICO S. TRAVEO, ROVEL A. GENELSA, RUEL U.
VILLARMENTE, ALFREDO A. PANILAGAO, CARMEN P.
DANILA, ELIZABETH B. MACALINO, RAMIL P. ALBITO,
REYNALDO A. LADRILLO, LUCAS G. TAMAYO, DIOSDADO
A. AMORIN, RODINO C. VASQUEZ, GLORIA A. FELICANO,
NOLE E. FERMILAN, JOSELITO B. RENDON, CRISTETA D.
CAA, EVELYN D. ARCENAL and JEORGE M.
NONO, petitioners, vs. BOBONGON BANANA GROWERS
MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, TIMOG AGRICULTURAL
CORPORATION, DIAMOND FARMS, INC., and DOLE ASIA
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J p:
By the account of petitioner Oldarico Traveo and his 16 copetitioners, in 1992, respondent Timog Agricultural Corporation
(TACOR) and respondent Diamond Farms, Inc. (DFI) hired
them to work at a banana plantation at Bobongon, Santo
Tomas, Davao Del Norte which covered lands previously
planted with rice and corn but whose owners had agreed to
convert into a banana plantation upon being convinced that
TACOR and DFI could provide the needed capital, expertise,
and equipment. Petitioners helped prepare the lands for the
planting of banana suckers and eventually carried out the
planting as well. 1 CAIHTE
Petitioners asseverated that while they worked under the direct
control of supervisors assigned by TACOR and DFI, these
companies used different schemes to make it appear that
petitioners were hired through independent contractors,
including
individuals,
unregistered
associations,
and
cooperatives; that the successive changes in the names of
their employers notwithstanding, they continued to perform the
same work under the direct control of TACOR and DFI
supervisors; and that under the last scheme adopted by these
companies, the nominal individual contractors were required
to, as they did, join a cooperative and thus became members
of respondent Bobongon Banana Growers Multi-purpose
Cooperative (the Cooperative). 2
Continued petitioners: Sometime in 2000, above-named
respondents began utilizing harassment tactics to ease them
out of their jobs. Without first seeking the approval of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), they changed
their compensation package from being based on a daily rate
to a pakyawan rate that depended on the combined
productivity of the "gangs" they had been grouped into. Soon
thereafter, they stopped paying their salaries, prompting them
to stop working. 3
party-
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Corona, * Del Castillo and Abad, JJ., concur.
in
the
leased
The CA did not err in finding that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the Order dated March 22, 2002
denying the admission of respondent's second amended
complaint.
The RTC applied the old Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of
Court:
Section 3. Amendments by leave of court. after the case is
set for hearing, substantial amendments may be made only
upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it
appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to
delay the action or that the cause of action or defense is
substantially altered. Orders of the court upon the matters
provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed in
court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity
to be heard.
instead of the provisions of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
amending Section 3, Rule 10, to wit:
SECTION 3. Amendments by leave of court. Except as
provided in the next preceding section, substantial
amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But
such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that
the motion was made with intent to delay. Orders of the
court upon the matters provided in this section shall be made
upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the adverse party,
and an opportunity to be heard.
The Court has emphasized the import of Section 3, Rule 10 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in Valenzuela v. Court of
Appeals, 3 thus:
Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure amended the former rule in such manner that the
phrase "or that the cause of action or defense is substantially
altered" was stricken-off and not retained in the new rules. The
clear import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is
that under the new rules, "the amendment may (now)
substantially alter the cause of action or defense." This
should only be true, however, when despite a substantial
change or alteration in the cause of action or defense, the
amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher
interests of substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally
promote the laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a
"just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding." 4
The application of the old Rules by the RTC almost five years
after its amendment by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
patently constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on October 24,
2002 and its Resolution dated May 15, 2003 are hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Corona, * Nachura and Reyes, JJ., concur.
2. SWAGMAN v. CA
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 161135. April 8, 2005.]
SWAGMAN HOTELS AND TRAVEL, INC., petitioner, vs.
HON.
COURT
OF
APPEALS,
and
NEAL
B.
CHRISTIAN, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J p:
May a complaint that lacks a cause of action at the time it was
filed be cured by the accrual of a cause of action during the
pendency of the case? This is the basic issue raised in this
petition for the Court's consideration.
Sometime in 1996 and 1997, petitioner Swagman Hotels and
Travel, Inc., through Atty. Leonor L. Infante and Rodney David
Hegerty, its president and vice-president, respectively, obtained
from private respondent Neal B. Christian loans evidenced by
three promissory notes dated 7 August 1996, 14 March 1997,
and 14 July 1997. Each of the promissory notes is in the
amount of US$50,000 payable after three years from its date
with an interest of 15% per annum payable every three
months. 1 In a letter dated 16 December 1998, Christian
informed the petitioner corporation that he was terminating the
loans and demanded from the latter payment in the total
amount of US$150,000 plus unpaid interests in the total
amount of US$13,500.2
On 2 February 1999, private respondent Christian filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 59, a complaint for
a sum of money and damages against the petitioner
corporation, Hegerty, and Atty. Infante. The complaint alleged
as follows: On 7 August 1996, 14 March 1997, and 14 July
1997, the petitioner, as well as its president and vice-president
obtained loans from him in the total amount of US$150,000
payable after three years, with an interest of 15% per
annum payable quarterly or every three months. For a while,
they paid an interest of 15% per annum every three months in
accordance with the three promissory notes. However, starting
January 1998 until December 1998, they paid him only an
interest of 6% per annum,instead of 15% per annum, in
violation of the terms of the three promissory notes. Thus,
Christian prayed that the trial court order them to pay him
jointly and solidarily the amount of US$150,000 representing
the total amount of the loans; US$13,500 representing unpaid
interests from January 1998 until December 1998; P100,000
for moral damages; P50,000 for attorney's fees; and the cost of
the suit. 3
The petitioner corporation, together with its president and vicepresident, filed an Answer raising as defenses lack of cause of
action and novation of the principal obligations. According to
Despite its finding that the petitioner corporation did not violate
the modified terms of the three promissory notes and that the
payment of the principal loans were not yet due when the
complaint was filed, the trial court did not dismiss the
complaint, citing Section 5, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which reads:
Ynares-Santiago,
||| (Swagman Hotels & Travel Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
161135, [April 8, 2005], 495 PHIL 161-176)