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you find it. Heraclitus and Anaxagoras had conceived the
idea, and used it under their own terms. Plato used it, and, as
Professor Tufts says, attempted to embody in it the opposite
principles of unity and plurality, of timeless being and changing
process, which he usually contrasted so sharply. It was thus a
mediating conception. In the centuries to follow, in European
thought, the idea was adopted by Bruno (a.d. 1548 1600);
Spinoza (1632 1677), and through the latter, in varying forms,
by Herder, Lessing and Goethe. Schelling was largely under
its influence; Hegel and Schopenhauer embodied it in their
opposing conceptions, the lead of the latter being followed
by von Hartmann; Herbert Spencer narrowly escapes it in his
Unknowable; Emerson recognizes it in his Over-Soul; modern
Science assumes it partially in its Monism; and it is in evidence
in the present swing to pantheism which has attracted the
attention of the thinking world. The World-Spirit is the essence
of pantheism. It is the conception of The All in All; and All in
The All-God in nature, and nature in God.
Naturally arising from this fundamental conception, we find
the Stoic philosophy of life in connection with which the school
is now chiefly known. The Stoic creed was that of resignation
almost apathy. Fate or necessity ruled the universe through
Unchanging Law. The soul of man, being divine, should not
descend to allowing itself to be affected by the passions and
things of sense, nor by the changing things of the objective
world. The Stoic when told of some mighty impending calamity,
said, Well, what is that to me? Self-control was esteemed the
highest virtue. The passions were to be subordinated to reason
and will. Mental disturbances, grief, worries, sorrow and pain,
were but false judgments of mortal mind, and were to be
overcome by true wisdom and a positive refusal to be subject
to their sway. An authority says:
The Stoic ethics was the ethics of apathy. The soul should not allow
itself to be carried away by the passions aroused in it by external things.
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A man must be self-controlled. The passions are due to raise judgments
and mental disturbances, hence they can be overcome by wisdom, and
by a refusal to assent to their dictation. A man is not, indeed, master of
his fate, but he can keep his self-control and proud self-complacency
through all the vicissitudes of life.
The Stoic ideal was a simple, natural life for nature was
divine, and to live near to her was to be more divine. Duty was
derived from the Laws of Nature. The Stoics held that all men
are brothers, because of their common origin and nature
all being manifestations of the one Spirit, or expressions of
the one Over-Soul. This being so, it was held that it was their
manifest duty to live in brotherly love and in a spirit of mutual
helpfulness.
Distinctions of rank were held to be illusions and follies, and
did not interfere with the social relations of the members of the
school. Marcus Aurelius, the Roman Emperor, was a prominent
Stoic, and wrote one of its classics; Epictetus, the slave, the
author of the immortal Discourses, was a Stoic. These two
men, representing the two extremes of social rank, are perhaps
the most widely known of the Stoics; this fact alone gives the
Stoic idea and practice of the equality of spirit.
Prof. William James has said concerning the Stoic ideal:
Neither threats nor pleadings can move a man unless they touch
some one of his potential or actual selves. Only thus can we, as a
rule, get a purchase on another s will. The first care of diplomatists
and monarchs and all who wish to rule or influence is, accordingly,
to find out their victim s strongest principle of self-regard, so as to
make that the fulcrum of all appeals. But if a man has given up those
things which are subject to foreign fate, and ceased to regard them as
parts of himself at all, we are well-nigh powerless over him. The Stoic
recipe for contentment was to dispossess yourself in advance of all that
was out of your own power, then fortune s shocks might rain down
unfelt. Epictetus exhorts us, by thus narrowing and at the same time
Stoics, Epicureans, and Neo-Platonists.
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solidifying ourself to make it invulnerable: I must die; well, but must
I die groaning too? I will speak what appears to be right, and if the
despot says, Then I will put you to death, I will reply, When did I
ever tell you I was Immortal? You will do your part, and I mine; it is
yours to kill, and mine to die intrepid; yours to banish, mine to depart
untroubled. How do we act in a voyage? We choose the pilot, the
sailors, the hour. Afterwards comes a storm. What have I to care for?
My part is performed. This matter belongs to the pilot. But the ship is
sinking; what then have I to do? That which alone I can do submit to
be drowned without fear, without clamor or accusing of God, but as
one who knows that what is born must likewise die. This Stoic fashion,
though efficacious and heroic enough in its place and time, is, it must
be confessed, only possible as an habitual mood of the soul to narrow
and unsympathetic characters. It proceeds altogether by exclusion. If
I am a Stoic, the goods I cannot appropriate cease to be my goods,
and the temptation lies very near to deny that they are goods at all.
We find this mode of protecting the self by exclusion and denial very
common among people who are in other respects not Stoics. All
narrow people intrench their Me, they retract it, from the region of
what they cannot securely possess. People who don t resemble them,
or who treat them with indifference, people over whom they gain no
influence, are people on whose existence, however meritorious it may
intrinsically be, they look with chill negation, if not with positive hate.
Who will not be mine I will exclude from existence altogether; that is,
as far as I can make it so, such people shall be as if they were not. Thus
may a certain absoluteness and definiteness in the outline of my Me
console me for the smallness of its content.
The concluding portions of the above quotation are
interesting, when considered in the light of certain tendencies
of modern philosophical thought. In spite of Prof. James s
adverse comment, it is true that there is an increase of this spirit
of the mental shutting out of unpleasant and unavoidable
things and persons. In certain phases of the New Thought
and similar movements we find the teaching of the denial in
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consciousness of undesirable circumstances and persons. Prof.
James has stated but one side of the question the latter-day
Stoic insists upon the virtue of the opposite side.
Perhaps one of the most characteristic expressions of this
latter-day Stoic spirit is found in that splendid poem of Henley,
which has given courage and strength to so many in their hours
of trial. I think it well to reproduce it at this point, in connection
with this consideration of the spirit of the Stoic philosophy:
Invictus
By W. E. Henley.
Out of the night that covers me,
Black as the pit from pole to pole,