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ESCUETA, RUBIO & THE HEIRS OF BALOLOY V.

LIM
G.R.No.137162

January 24, 2007

Facts: Respondent Rufina Lim filed an action to remove cloud on, or quiet title to,
real property, with preliminary injunction and issuance of [a hold-departure order]
from the Philippines against Ignacio Rubio. Respondent amended her complaint to
include specific performance and damages. She alleged that she bought the
hereditary shares consisting of 10 lots of Rubio and the heirs of Luz Baloloy and that
a contract of sale was executed in her favour. Allegedly, said vendors received a
downpayment or earnest money of P102,169.86 and P450,000. Also, it was agreed
in the contract of sale that the vendors would secure certificates of title covering
their respective hereditary shares; that the balance of the purchase price would be
paid to each heir upon presentation of their individual certificates of title; and that
Rubio and the heirs of Baloloy refused to receive the other half of the down
payment and refuse to deliver to the respondents the certificates of title covering
his share on the two lots.
As to petitioner Corazon Escueta, in spite of her knowledge that the disputed lots
have already been sold by Ignacio Rubio to respondent, it is alleged that a
simulated deed of sale involving said lots was effected by Ignacio Rubio in her favor
and that the simulated deed of sale by Rubio to Escueta has raised doubts and
clouds over respondents title.
In their separate amended answers, petitioners denied the material allegations of
the complaint and alleged inter alia the following:
The heirs of Baloloy said that respondent has no cause of action, because the
subject contract of sale has no more force and effect as far as the Baloloys are
concerned, since they have withdrawn their offer to sell for the reason that
respondent failed to pay the balance of the purchase price as orally promised on or
before May 1, 1990.
As for Rubio and Escueta, they said that respondent has no cause of action because
Rubio has not entered into a contract of sale with her; that he has appointed his
daughter Patricia Llamas to be his attorney-in-fact and not in favor of Virgiania
Laygo-Lim who was the one who represented him in the sale of the disputed lots in
favor of respondent; that the P100,000 respondent claimed he received as down
payment for the lots is a simple transaction by way of a loan with Lim.
The trial court ruled in favour of Lim, and so did the CA. Now, petitioners are
alleging that the CA erred, considering that the CA did not consider the
circumstances surrounding petitioners failure to appear at the pre-trial and to file
the petition for relief on time. As to the failure to appear at the pre-trial, there was
fraud, accident and/or excusable neglect, because petitioner Bayani was in the
United States. There was no service of the notice of pre-trial or order. Furthermore,
petitioner Alejandrino was not clothed with a power of attorney to appear on behalf
of Bayani at the pre-trial conference.
Second, petitioners allege that the sale by Virginia to respondent is not binding
Virginia was not authorized to transact business in his behalf pertaining to the
property. The Special Power of Attorney was constituted in favor of Llamas, and the
latter was not empowered to designate a substitute attorney-in-fact. Llamas even
disowned her signature appearing on the "Joint Special Power of Attorney," which
constituted Virginia as her true and lawful attorney-in-fact in selling Rubios
properties.
Petitioners further allege that the amount encashed by Rubio represented not the
down payment, but the payment of respondents debt. His acceptance and
encashment of the check was not a ratification of the contract of sale.

Also, they say that the contract between respondent and Virginia is a contract to
sell, not a contract of sale. The real character of the contract is not the title given,
but the intention of the parties. They intended to reserve ownership of the property
to petitioners pending full payment of the purchase price.
Issue: W/N the contract of sale between petitioner and respondent is valid.

Ratio: YES, valid.


1. No fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence exists in order that the
petition for relief may be granted. Article. 1892 provides that the agent may appoint
a substitute if the principal has not prohibited him from doing so, although such
agent shall be responsible for the acts of the substitute when he was not given the
power to appoint one.
2. Applying the above-quoted provision to the special power of attorney executed
by Ignacio Rubio in favor of his daughter Patricia Llamas, it is clear that she is not
prohibited from appointing a substitute. By authorizing Virginia Lim to sell the
subject properties, Patricia merely acted within the limits of the authority given by
her father, but she will have to be "responsible for the acts of the sub-agent,"
among which is precisely the sale of the subject properties in favor of respondent.
3. Even assuming that Virginia Lim has no authority to sell the subject properties,
the contract she executed in favor of respondent is not void, but simply
unenforceable, under the second paragraph of Article 1317 of the Civil Code which
provides that a contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no
authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers, shall be
unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose
behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the other contracting party.
Applying this to the case at bar: Rubio is now estopped since he accepted and
encashed the check. Such acts constitute ratification and produce the effects of an
express power of agency. The same applies to the Baloloy heirs.
4. Indeed, Virginia Lim and respondent have entered into a contract of sale. Not only
has the title to the subject properties passed to the latter upon delivery of the thing
sold, but there is also no stipulation in the contract that states the ownership is to
be reserved in or "retained by the vendor until full payment of the price."
Other Doctrines:
1. As regards the pre-trial: The notices of pre-trial had been sent to both the
Baloloys and their former counsel of record. Not having raised the ground of lack of
a special power of attorney in their motion, they are now deemed to have waived it.
For lack of representation at the pre-trial, Bayani Baloloy was properly declared in
default.
2. All the elements of a valid contract of sale under Article 1458 of the Civil Code
are present, such as: (1) consent or meeting of the minds; (2) determinate subject
matter; and (3) price certain in money or its equivalent. Ignacio Rubio, the Baloloys,
and their co-heirs sold their hereditary shares for a price certain to which
respondent agreed to buy and pay for the subject properties. The offer and the
acceptance are concurrent, since the minds of the contracting parties meet in the
terms of the agreement.
In fact, earnest money has been given by respondent and it shall be considered as
part of the price and as proof of the perfection of the contract.

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and


Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48282, dated. Consequently,
Ignacio Rubio could no longer sell the subject properties to Corazon Escueta.
October 26, 1998 and January 11, 1999, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR v. HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN, EULOGIO M.
MARIANO, JOSE D. JIMENEZ, JR.,TORIBIO E. ILAO, JR. and ERNESTO R.
SALENGA 510 SCRA 74 December 6, 2006
FACTS: Paciencia Regala owns a seven (7)-hectare fishpond located at Sasmuan,
Pampanga. Her Attorney-in-Fact Faustino R.Mercado leased the fishpond to Eduardo
Lapid for a three (3)-year period. Lessee Eduardo Lapid in turn sub-leased
thefishpond to Rafael Lopez during the last seven (7) months of the original lease.
Ernesto Salenga was hired by EduardoLapid as fishpond watchman (banteencargado). In the sub-lease, Rafael Lopez rehired respondent Salenga.
ErnestoSalenga Salenga, sent the demand letter to Rafael Lopez and Lourdes Lapid
for unpaid salaries and non-payment of the 10% share in the harvest. Salenga was
promted to file a Complaint before the Provincial Agrarian ReformAdjudication Board
(PARAB), Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga docketed as DARAB Case No. 552-P93
entitled Ernesto R. Salenga v. Rafael L. Lopez and Lourdes L. Lapid for Maintenance
of Peaceful Possession, Collection of Sumof Money and Supervision of
Harvest.Pending resolution of the agrarian case, the instant case was instituted by
petitioner Antonio Baltazar, an allegednephew of Faustino Mercado, through a
Complaint-Affidavit against private respondents before the Office of
theOmbudsman which was docketed as OMB-1-94-3425 entitled Antonio B. Baltazar
v. Eulogio Mariano, Jose Jimenez, Jr.,Toribio Ilao, Jr. and Ernesto Salenga for violation
of RA 3019. Petitioner maintains that respondent Ilao, Jr. had no jurisdiction to hear
and act on DARAB Case No. 552-P93 filed by respondent Salenga as there was no
tenancy relation between respondent Salenga and Rafael L. Lopez, and thus, the
complaint was dismissible on its face.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to pursue the instant
petition?
Whether or not the Ombudsman likewise erred in reversing his own resolution
where it was resolved that accused as Provincial Agrarian Adjudicator has no
jurisdiction over a complaint where there exist no tenancy relationship?
HELD: The "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. The
Complaint-Affidavit filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, there is no question
on his authority and legal standing. The Ombudsman can act on anonymous
complaints and motu proprio inquire into alleged improper official acts or omissions
from whatever source, e.g., a newspaper. Faustino Mercado, is an agent himself and
as such cannot further delegate his agency to another. An agent cannot delegate to
another the same agency. Re-delegation of the agency would be detrimental to the
principal as the second agent has no privity of contract with the former. In the
instant case, petitioner has no privity of contract with Paciencia Regala, owner of
the fishpond and principal of Faustino Mercado. The facts clearly show that it was
not the Ombudsman through the OSP who allowed respondent Ilao, Jr. to submit his
Counter-Affidavit. It was the Sandigan bayan who granted the prayed for reinvestigation and ordered the OSP to conduct the re-investigation. The OSP simply
followed the graft courts directive to conduct the re-investigation after the CounterAffidavit of respondent Ilao, Jr. was filed. Indeed, petitioner did not contest nor
question the August 29, 1997 Order of the graft court. Moreover, petitioner did not
file any reply-affidavit in the re-investigation despite notice.

The nature of the case is determined by the settled rule that jurisdiction over the
subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint. The nature of an
action is determined by the material averments in the complaint and the character
of the relief sought not by the defenses asserted in the answer or motion to dismiss.
Respondent Salengas complaint and its attachment clearly spells out the
jurisdictional allegations that he is an agricultural tenant in possession of the
fishpond and is about to be ejected from it, clearly, respondent Ilao, Jr. could not be
faulted in assuming jurisdiction as said allegations characterize an agricultural
dispute.
Besides, whatever defense asserted in an answer or motion to dismiss is not to be
considered in resolving the issue on jurisdiction as it cannot be made dependent
upon the allegations of the defendant.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the Order and the
October 30, 1998 Memorandum of the Office of the Special Prosecutor in Criminal
Case No. 23661 (OMB-1-94-3425) are hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO, with costs against
petitioner employee.

MENDEZONA V VIUDA DE GOITIA


March 11, 1930; VILLAMOR, J. (lora)

FACTS:
- Defendant Encarnacion C. Vda, de Goitia has been duly appointed judicial
administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband BenignoGoitia
- BenignoGoitia was the representative and attorney- in-fact of the plaintiffs in the
joint-account partnership known as the Tren de Aguadas, of which the plaintiff
Leonor Mendezona, widow of Juan Bautista Goitia, owns 180 shares worth P18,000,
and the plaintiff ValentinaIzaguirre y Nazabal owns 72 shares worth P7,200
- Prior to 1915, BenignoGoitia, at that time the manager of the co-partnership,
collected the dividends for the plaintiffs, which he remitted to them every year. That
the usual dividends which BenignoGoitia forwarded to plaintiff Leonor Mendezona
each year were P540, and to plaintiff ValentinaIzaguirre y Nazabal, P216
- From 1915 until his death in August, 1926, BenignoGoitia failed to remit the
dividends
- Some time before his death, more particularly, in July, 1926, BenignoGoitia, who
was no longer the manager of the said business, receive as attorney-in-fact of both
plaintiff, the amount of P90 as dividend upon plaintiff Leonor Mendezona's shares,
and P36 upon ValentinaIzaguirre y Nazabal's stock
- During the period from 1915 to 1926, BenignoGoitia collected and received certain
sums as dividends and profits upon the plaintiffs's stock in the Tren de Aguadas in
his capacity as representative and attorney- in-fact for both of them, which he has
neither remitted nor accounted for to the said plaintiffs
Evidence
- Counsel for both plaintiffs filed their claims with the committee of claims and
appraisal of the estate of BenignoGoitia, and, upon their disallowance, appealed
from the committee's decision by means of the complaints in these two cases.

- The court below ordered the defendant, as judicial administratrix of


BenignoGoitia's estate to render a judicial account of the intestate estate of the
deceased BenignoGoitia, to render an account of the amounts collected by her
aforesaid husband as attorney-in-fact and representative of the plaintiffs in the
copartnership from 1915 to July, 1926, within thirty days from notice of this decision
- Defendant, reiterating her exception to the court's decision enjoining her to render
accounts, manifested that after a painstaking examination of the books of account
of the copartnership and several attempts to obtain data from Ruperto Santos, the
manager and administrator thereof, she has found no more evidence of any amount
received by her late husband than a book of accounts where she came upon an
item of P90 for Leonor Mendezona, and another of P36 for ValentinaIzaguirre.
- The court ordered the defendant, as judicial administratrix of the estate of the
deceased BenignoGoitia, to pay the plaintiff Leonor Mendezona the sum of P13,140
with legal interest from the date of the filing of the complaint, and to pay the
plaintiff ValentinaIzaguirre P5,256 likewise with legal interest from the date of the
filing of the complaint, and moreover, to pay the costs of both instances.
- The defendant appealed from this judgment.
-The appellees made depositions before the American consul at Bilbao, Spain, in
accordance with section 356 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Counsel for the
appellant was notified of the taking of these depositions, and he did not suggest any
other interrogatory in addition to the questions of the committee. When these
depositions were read in court, the defendant objected to their admission, invoking
section 383, No. 7, of the Code of Civil Procedure. Her objection referred mainly to
the following questions:
1. Did Mr. BenignoGoitia render you an account of your partnership in the "Tren de
Aguadas?" Yes, until the year 1914.
2. From the year 1915, did Mr. BenignoGoitia send you any report or money on
account of profits upon your shares? He sent me nothing, nor did he answer, my
letters.
3. Did you ever ask him to send you a statement of your account Yes, several
times by letter, but I never received an answer.
ISSUE:
WON the appellees' depositions are admissible.
HELD:
YES. The first of these questions tends to show the relationship between the
principals and their attorney- in-fact BenignoGoitia up to 1914. Supposing it was
error to permit such a question, it would not be reversible error, for that very
relationship is proved by the Exhibits . - As to the other two questions, it is to be
noted that the deponents deny having received from the deceased BenignoGoitia
any money on account of profits on their shares, since 1915. We are of opinion that
the claimants' denial that a certain fact occurred before the death of their attorneyin-fact BenignoAgoitia does not come within the legal prohibitions (section 383, No.
7, Code of Civil Procedure).
- The law prohibits a witness directly interested in a claim against the estate of a
decedent from testifying upon a matter of fact which took place before the death of
the deceased. The underlying principle of this prohibition is to protect the intestate
estate from fictitious claims. But this protection should not be treated as an
absolute bar or prohibition from the filing of just claims against the decedent's
estate.

- The facts in the case of Maxilom vs. Tabotabo differ from those in the case at bar.
- Maxilom vs. Tabotabo: the plaintiff Maxilom liquidated his accounts with the
deceased Tabotabo during his lifetime, with the result that there was a balance in
his favor and against Tabotabo of P312.37, Mexican currency. The liquidation was
signed by both Maxilom and Tabotabo. In spite of this, some years later, or in 1906,
Maxilom filed a claim against the estate of Tabotabo for P1,062.37alleging that P750
which included the 1899 liquidation had not really been received, and that therefore
instead of P312.37, Mexican currency, that liquidation should have shown a balance
of P1,062.37 in favor of Maxilom. It is evident that in view of the prohibition of
section 383, paragraph 7, of the Code of Civil Procedure, Maxilom could not testify
in his own behalf against Tabotabo's estate, so as to alter the balance of the
liquidation made by and between himself and the decedent.
-But in the case before us there has been no such liquidation between the plaintiffs
and the deceased Goitia. They testify, denying any such liquidation. To apply to
them the rule that "if death has sealed the lips of one of the parties, the law seals
those of the other," would be to exclude all possibility of a claim against the
testamentary estate. This was the legislator's intention. - The plaintiffs-appellees did
not testify to a fact which took place before their representative's death, but on the
contrary denied that it had taken place at all, i.e. they denied that a liquidation had
been made or any money remitted on account of their shares in the "Tren de
Aguadas" which is the ground of their claim. It was incumbent upon the appellant to
prove by proper evidence that the affirmative proposition was true, either by
bringing into court the books which the attorney-in-fact was in duty bound to keep,
or by introducing copies of the drafts kept by the banks which drew them, as was
the decedents's usual practice according to Exhibit I, or by other similar evidence.
- The appellant admits having found a book of accounts kept by the decedent
showing an item of P90 for the account of Leonor Mendezona and another of P36 for
the account of ValentinaIzaguirre, which agrees with the statement of Ruperto
Santos, who succeeded BenignoGoitia in the administration of said partnership, to
the effect that the deceased attorney-in-fact had collected the amounts due the
plaintiffs as dividends on their shares for the months of May and June, 1926, or P90
for Leonor Mendezona, and P36 for ValentinaIzaguirre, amounts which had not been
remitted by the deceased to the plaintiffs.
Disposition Judgment affirmed
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 88866

February, 18, 1991

Cruz, J.:

Facts:
Eduardo Gomez opened an account with Golden Savings and deposited 38
treasury warrants. All warrants were subsequently indorsed by Gloria Castillo as
Cashier of Golden Savings and deposited to its Savings account in Metrobank
branch in Calapan, Mindoro. They were sent for clearance. Meanwhile, Gomez is not
allowed to withdraw from his account, later, however, exasperated over Floria
repeated inquiries and also as an accommodation for a valued client Metrobank
decided to allow Golden Savings to withdraw from proceeds of the warrants. In turn,
Golden Savings subsequently allowed Gomez to make withdrawals from his own
account. Metrobank informed Golden Savings that 32 of the warrants had been
dishonored by the Bureau of Treasury and demanded the refund by Golden Savings
of the amount it had previously withdrawn, to make up the deficit in its account. The
demand was rejected. Metrobank then sued Golden Savings.

Issue:
1. Whether or not Metrobank can demand refund agaist Golden Savings with regard
to the amount withdraws to make up with the deficit as a result of the dishonored
treasury warrants.
2. Whether or not treasury warrants are negotiable instruments

Held:
No. Metrobank is negligent in giving Golden Savings the impression that the
treasury warrants had been cleared and that, consequently, it was safe to allow
Gomez to withdraw. Without such assurance, Golden Savings would not have
allowed the withdrawals. Indeed, Golden Savings might even have incurred liability
for its refusal to return the money that all appearances belonged to the depositor,
who could therefore withdraw it anytime and for any reason he saw fit.
It was, in fact, to secure the clearance of the treasury warrants that Golden Savings
deposited them to its account with Metrobank. Golden Savings had no clearing
facilities of its own. It relied on Metrobank to determine the validity of the warrants
through its own services. The proceeds of the warrants were withheld from Gomez
until Metrobank allowed Golden Savings itself to withdraw them from its own
deposit.
Metrobank cannot contend that by indorsing the warrants in general, Golden
Savings assumed that they were genuine and in all respects what they purport to
be, in accordance with Sec. 66 of NIL. The simple reason that NIL is not applicable
to non negotiable instruments, treasury warrants.

No. The treasury warrants are not negotiable instruments. Clearly stamped
on their face is the word: non negotiable. Moreover, and this is equal significance,
it is indicated that they are payable from a particular fund, to wit, Fund 501. An
instrument to be negotiable instrument must contain an unconditional promise or
orders to pay a sum certain in money. As provided by Sec 3 of NIL an unqualified
order or promise to pay is unconditional though coupled with: 1st, an indication of a
particular fund out of which reimbursement is to be made or a particular account to
be debited with the amount; or 2nd, a statement of the transaction which give rise
to the instrument. But an order to promise to pay out of particular fund is not
unconditional. The indication of Fund 501 as the source of the payment to be made
on the treasury warrants makes the order or promise to pay not conditional and
the warrants themselves non-negotiable. There should be no question that the
exception on Section 3 of NIL is applicable in the case at bar.
Austria v.s. Court of Appeals 39 SCRA 527 (1971)
G.R. No. L-29640
DATE: June 10, 1971
FACTS:
Guillermo Austria gave Maria G. Abad a pendant with diamonds to be sold on a
commission basis or to return on demand. However, on her way home, 2 men
snatched her pursue which contained the jewelry and cash. In short, Abad failed to
return the jewelry upon demand. A case was filed for the recovery or for damages.
In defense, the alleged robbery extinguished the obligation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Abad is liable?
HELD:
YES. The Court cited Article 1174 of the Civil Code is not applicable, in the case the
agreement provided that except in cases expressly specified by the law or when it
is otherwise declared by stipulation or when the nature of the obligation requires
the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could
not be foreseen or which though foreseen were inevitable. It is a recognized
jurisdiction that to constitute a caso fortuito that would exempt a person from
responsibility. It is necessary that the event must be independent of the human will
or the obligors will.

International Films (China) Ltd. v.s. The Lyric Film Exchange, Inc. 63 Phil.
778 (1936)
DOCKET NO. / CASE NO.: G.R. No. L-42465
DATE: November 19, 1936
FACTS:
On April 5, 1933, the plaintiff company made Bernard Gabelman as its agent in the
Philippines through a power of attorney. Through its agent, he can lease the films
and show them in Cavite and other places. One of the conditions of the contract was
the defendant (Lyric) would answer for the loss of the film in question whatever the
cause. Thereafter, the chief of the film department, Vicente Albo of Lyric telephoned
the said agent (Gabelman) informing that the showing of said film had already
finished and asked at the same time, where he wished to have the film returned to
him. Gabelman went to Albos and asked whether he could deposit the film in
question in the vault of the defendant as the plaintiff did not have a safety vault,
yet as required by the fire department. Albo declined the offer but Gabelman
insisted thus there was a verbal agreement. Gabelman was replaced by Lazarus
Joseph, a new agent and informed the latter of the agreement they took
immediately the deposited films except of one which was in their possession of their
bodega.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant is responsible for the destruction of the film Monte
Carlo Madness?

HELD:
NO. Verbal contract between Gabelman and Albo was a sub-agency the defendant
company is not civilly liable for the destruction because a mere submandatroy or
sub-agent, it was not obliged to fulfill more than the contents of the mandate and to
answer for damages caused to the principal (Art. 1718 of the Civil Code). The fact
that the film was not insured against fire does not constitute fraud or negligence on
the part of Lyric because as sub-agent, it received no instruction to that effect from
its principal and the insurance does not form a part of the obligation.

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