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LIM
G.R.No.137162
Facts: Respondent Rufina Lim filed an action to remove cloud on, or quiet title to,
real property, with preliminary injunction and issuance of [a hold-departure order]
from the Philippines against Ignacio Rubio. Respondent amended her complaint to
include specific performance and damages. She alleged that she bought the
hereditary shares consisting of 10 lots of Rubio and the heirs of Luz Baloloy and that
a contract of sale was executed in her favour. Allegedly, said vendors received a
downpayment or earnest money of P102,169.86 and P450,000. Also, it was agreed
in the contract of sale that the vendors would secure certificates of title covering
their respective hereditary shares; that the balance of the purchase price would be
paid to each heir upon presentation of their individual certificates of title; and that
Rubio and the heirs of Baloloy refused to receive the other half of the down
payment and refuse to deliver to the respondents the certificates of title covering
his share on the two lots.
As to petitioner Corazon Escueta, in spite of her knowledge that the disputed lots
have already been sold by Ignacio Rubio to respondent, it is alleged that a
simulated deed of sale involving said lots was effected by Ignacio Rubio in her favor
and that the simulated deed of sale by Rubio to Escueta has raised doubts and
clouds over respondents title.
In their separate amended answers, petitioners denied the material allegations of
the complaint and alleged inter alia the following:
The heirs of Baloloy said that respondent has no cause of action, because the
subject contract of sale has no more force and effect as far as the Baloloys are
concerned, since they have withdrawn their offer to sell for the reason that
respondent failed to pay the balance of the purchase price as orally promised on or
before May 1, 1990.
As for Rubio and Escueta, they said that respondent has no cause of action because
Rubio has not entered into a contract of sale with her; that he has appointed his
daughter Patricia Llamas to be his attorney-in-fact and not in favor of Virgiania
Laygo-Lim who was the one who represented him in the sale of the disputed lots in
favor of respondent; that the P100,000 respondent claimed he received as down
payment for the lots is a simple transaction by way of a loan with Lim.
The trial court ruled in favour of Lim, and so did the CA. Now, petitioners are
alleging that the CA erred, considering that the CA did not consider the
circumstances surrounding petitioners failure to appear at the pre-trial and to file
the petition for relief on time. As to the failure to appear at the pre-trial, there was
fraud, accident and/or excusable neglect, because petitioner Bayani was in the
United States. There was no service of the notice of pre-trial or order. Furthermore,
petitioner Alejandrino was not clothed with a power of attorney to appear on behalf
of Bayani at the pre-trial conference.
Second, petitioners allege that the sale by Virginia to respondent is not binding
Virginia was not authorized to transact business in his behalf pertaining to the
property. The Special Power of Attorney was constituted in favor of Llamas, and the
latter was not empowered to designate a substitute attorney-in-fact. Llamas even
disowned her signature appearing on the "Joint Special Power of Attorney," which
constituted Virginia as her true and lawful attorney-in-fact in selling Rubios
properties.
Petitioners further allege that the amount encashed by Rubio represented not the
down payment, but the payment of respondents debt. His acceptance and
encashment of the check was not a ratification of the contract of sale.
Also, they say that the contract between respondent and Virginia is a contract to
sell, not a contract of sale. The real character of the contract is not the title given,
but the intention of the parties. They intended to reserve ownership of the property
to petitioners pending full payment of the purchase price.
Issue: W/N the contract of sale between petitioner and respondent is valid.
The nature of the case is determined by the settled rule that jurisdiction over the
subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint. The nature of an
action is determined by the material averments in the complaint and the character
of the relief sought not by the defenses asserted in the answer or motion to dismiss.
Respondent Salengas complaint and its attachment clearly spells out the
jurisdictional allegations that he is an agricultural tenant in possession of the
fishpond and is about to be ejected from it, clearly, respondent Ilao, Jr. could not be
faulted in assuming jurisdiction as said allegations characterize an agricultural
dispute.
Besides, whatever defense asserted in an answer or motion to dismiss is not to be
considered in resolving the issue on jurisdiction as it cannot be made dependent
upon the allegations of the defendant.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the Order and the
October 30, 1998 Memorandum of the Office of the Special Prosecutor in Criminal
Case No. 23661 (OMB-1-94-3425) are hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO, with costs against
petitioner employee.
FACTS:
- Defendant Encarnacion C. Vda, de Goitia has been duly appointed judicial
administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband BenignoGoitia
- BenignoGoitia was the representative and attorney- in-fact of the plaintiffs in the
joint-account partnership known as the Tren de Aguadas, of which the plaintiff
Leonor Mendezona, widow of Juan Bautista Goitia, owns 180 shares worth P18,000,
and the plaintiff ValentinaIzaguirre y Nazabal owns 72 shares worth P7,200
- Prior to 1915, BenignoGoitia, at that time the manager of the co-partnership,
collected the dividends for the plaintiffs, which he remitted to them every year. That
the usual dividends which BenignoGoitia forwarded to plaintiff Leonor Mendezona
each year were P540, and to plaintiff ValentinaIzaguirre y Nazabal, P216
- From 1915 until his death in August, 1926, BenignoGoitia failed to remit the
dividends
- Some time before his death, more particularly, in July, 1926, BenignoGoitia, who
was no longer the manager of the said business, receive as attorney-in-fact of both
plaintiff, the amount of P90 as dividend upon plaintiff Leonor Mendezona's shares,
and P36 upon ValentinaIzaguirre y Nazabal's stock
- During the period from 1915 to 1926, BenignoGoitia collected and received certain
sums as dividends and profits upon the plaintiffs's stock in the Tren de Aguadas in
his capacity as representative and attorney- in-fact for both of them, which he has
neither remitted nor accounted for to the said plaintiffs
Evidence
- Counsel for both plaintiffs filed their claims with the committee of claims and
appraisal of the estate of BenignoGoitia, and, upon their disallowance, appealed
from the committee's decision by means of the complaints in these two cases.
- The facts in the case of Maxilom vs. Tabotabo differ from those in the case at bar.
- Maxilom vs. Tabotabo: the plaintiff Maxilom liquidated his accounts with the
deceased Tabotabo during his lifetime, with the result that there was a balance in
his favor and against Tabotabo of P312.37, Mexican currency. The liquidation was
signed by both Maxilom and Tabotabo. In spite of this, some years later, or in 1906,
Maxilom filed a claim against the estate of Tabotabo for P1,062.37alleging that P750
which included the 1899 liquidation had not really been received, and that therefore
instead of P312.37, Mexican currency, that liquidation should have shown a balance
of P1,062.37 in favor of Maxilom. It is evident that in view of the prohibition of
section 383, paragraph 7, of the Code of Civil Procedure, Maxilom could not testify
in his own behalf against Tabotabo's estate, so as to alter the balance of the
liquidation made by and between himself and the decedent.
-But in the case before us there has been no such liquidation between the plaintiffs
and the deceased Goitia. They testify, denying any such liquidation. To apply to
them the rule that "if death has sealed the lips of one of the parties, the law seals
those of the other," would be to exclude all possibility of a claim against the
testamentary estate. This was the legislator's intention. - The plaintiffs-appellees did
not testify to a fact which took place before their representative's death, but on the
contrary denied that it had taken place at all, i.e. they denied that a liquidation had
been made or any money remitted on account of their shares in the "Tren de
Aguadas" which is the ground of their claim. It was incumbent upon the appellant to
prove by proper evidence that the affirmative proposition was true, either by
bringing into court the books which the attorney-in-fact was in duty bound to keep,
or by introducing copies of the drafts kept by the banks which drew them, as was
the decedents's usual practice according to Exhibit I, or by other similar evidence.
- The appellant admits having found a book of accounts kept by the decedent
showing an item of P90 for the account of Leonor Mendezona and another of P36 for
the account of ValentinaIzaguirre, which agrees with the statement of Ruperto
Santos, who succeeded BenignoGoitia in the administration of said partnership, to
the effect that the deceased attorney-in-fact had collected the amounts due the
plaintiffs as dividends on their shares for the months of May and June, 1926, or P90
for Leonor Mendezona, and P36 for ValentinaIzaguirre, amounts which had not been
remitted by the deceased to the plaintiffs.
Disposition Judgment affirmed
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 88866
Cruz, J.:
Facts:
Eduardo Gomez opened an account with Golden Savings and deposited 38
treasury warrants. All warrants were subsequently indorsed by Gloria Castillo as
Cashier of Golden Savings and deposited to its Savings account in Metrobank
branch in Calapan, Mindoro. They were sent for clearance. Meanwhile, Gomez is not
allowed to withdraw from his account, later, however, exasperated over Floria
repeated inquiries and also as an accommodation for a valued client Metrobank
decided to allow Golden Savings to withdraw from proceeds of the warrants. In turn,
Golden Savings subsequently allowed Gomez to make withdrawals from his own
account. Metrobank informed Golden Savings that 32 of the warrants had been
dishonored by the Bureau of Treasury and demanded the refund by Golden Savings
of the amount it had previously withdrawn, to make up the deficit in its account. The
demand was rejected. Metrobank then sued Golden Savings.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Metrobank can demand refund agaist Golden Savings with regard
to the amount withdraws to make up with the deficit as a result of the dishonored
treasury warrants.
2. Whether or not treasury warrants are negotiable instruments
Held:
No. Metrobank is negligent in giving Golden Savings the impression that the
treasury warrants had been cleared and that, consequently, it was safe to allow
Gomez to withdraw. Without such assurance, Golden Savings would not have
allowed the withdrawals. Indeed, Golden Savings might even have incurred liability
for its refusal to return the money that all appearances belonged to the depositor,
who could therefore withdraw it anytime and for any reason he saw fit.
It was, in fact, to secure the clearance of the treasury warrants that Golden Savings
deposited them to its account with Metrobank. Golden Savings had no clearing
facilities of its own. It relied on Metrobank to determine the validity of the warrants
through its own services. The proceeds of the warrants were withheld from Gomez
until Metrobank allowed Golden Savings itself to withdraw them from its own
deposit.
Metrobank cannot contend that by indorsing the warrants in general, Golden
Savings assumed that they were genuine and in all respects what they purport to
be, in accordance with Sec. 66 of NIL. The simple reason that NIL is not applicable
to non negotiable instruments, treasury warrants.
No. The treasury warrants are not negotiable instruments. Clearly stamped
on their face is the word: non negotiable. Moreover, and this is equal significance,
it is indicated that they are payable from a particular fund, to wit, Fund 501. An
instrument to be negotiable instrument must contain an unconditional promise or
orders to pay a sum certain in money. As provided by Sec 3 of NIL an unqualified
order or promise to pay is unconditional though coupled with: 1st, an indication of a
particular fund out of which reimbursement is to be made or a particular account to
be debited with the amount; or 2nd, a statement of the transaction which give rise
to the instrument. But an order to promise to pay out of particular fund is not
unconditional. The indication of Fund 501 as the source of the payment to be made
on the treasury warrants makes the order or promise to pay not conditional and
the warrants themselves non-negotiable. There should be no question that the
exception on Section 3 of NIL is applicable in the case at bar.
Austria v.s. Court of Appeals 39 SCRA 527 (1971)
G.R. No. L-29640
DATE: June 10, 1971
FACTS:
Guillermo Austria gave Maria G. Abad a pendant with diamonds to be sold on a
commission basis or to return on demand. However, on her way home, 2 men
snatched her pursue which contained the jewelry and cash. In short, Abad failed to
return the jewelry upon demand. A case was filed for the recovery or for damages.
In defense, the alleged robbery extinguished the obligation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Abad is liable?
HELD:
YES. The Court cited Article 1174 of the Civil Code is not applicable, in the case the
agreement provided that except in cases expressly specified by the law or when it
is otherwise declared by stipulation or when the nature of the obligation requires
the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could
not be foreseen or which though foreseen were inevitable. It is a recognized
jurisdiction that to constitute a caso fortuito that would exempt a person from
responsibility. It is necessary that the event must be independent of the human will
or the obligors will.
International Films (China) Ltd. v.s. The Lyric Film Exchange, Inc. 63 Phil.
778 (1936)
DOCKET NO. / CASE NO.: G.R. No. L-42465
DATE: November 19, 1936
FACTS:
On April 5, 1933, the plaintiff company made Bernard Gabelman as its agent in the
Philippines through a power of attorney. Through its agent, he can lease the films
and show them in Cavite and other places. One of the conditions of the contract was
the defendant (Lyric) would answer for the loss of the film in question whatever the
cause. Thereafter, the chief of the film department, Vicente Albo of Lyric telephoned
the said agent (Gabelman) informing that the showing of said film had already
finished and asked at the same time, where he wished to have the film returned to
him. Gabelman went to Albos and asked whether he could deposit the film in
question in the vault of the defendant as the plaintiff did not have a safety vault,
yet as required by the fire department. Albo declined the offer but Gabelman
insisted thus there was a verbal agreement. Gabelman was replaced by Lazarus
Joseph, a new agent and informed the latter of the agreement they took
immediately the deposited films except of one which was in their possession of their
bodega.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant is responsible for the destruction of the film Monte
Carlo Madness?
HELD:
NO. Verbal contract between Gabelman and Albo was a sub-agency the defendant
company is not civilly liable for the destruction because a mere submandatroy or
sub-agent, it was not obliged to fulfill more than the contents of the mandate and to
answer for damages caused to the principal (Art. 1718 of the Civil Code). The fact
that the film was not insured against fire does not constitute fraud or negligence on
the part of Lyric because as sub-agent, it received no instruction to that effect from
its principal and the insurance does not form a part of the obligation.