Ramit Sethi

Tutorial with Sara Kreindler

ramit@stanford.edu
11/11/02

CAN A RIOT BE RATIONAL?

AN INVESTIGATION OF COMPETING THEORIES AND EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE

Since the early 20th century, theorists have studied group processes in an attempt to
understand the theoretical and applied mechanics that underlie situations such as crowds
and riots. As an excellent example of growth and development, this fields researchers
have redefined what group processes comprise several times, developing several theories
that have built on strengths and accounted for apparent flaws of previous research. When
applied to group scenarios, current evidence will show that humans in fact do behave
rationally, even in extreme situations such as riots. While behavior may seem
unrestrained and illogical, complex groups like rioters are still governed by rational group
processes, influences, and situational factors.

A Brief History of Group Theories

A short tour of this arenas theorists is in order, as they have held widely differing
accounts of crowds for nearly a century.

Crowds have been regarded as representing the darkest desires of the human condition,
with theorists frequently ascribing their actions to irrationality and frivolity: Le Bon
(1908) wrote disparagingly of the ancestral savagery[of] the collective mind. Trotter
(1919) held an even lower opinion of these groups, calling them herds of animals that

respond to their leaders as a guide for behavioral norms. This trend continued, including
opinions from Allport (1924) and his Convergence Theory, Penrose (1951), and none
other than Freud (1922). While it is easy to dismiss these relatively unsophisticated
theories, they are evocative in their consideration of group dynamics; indeed, later
theorists borrow heavily from some of these earlier worksusing more appropriate
language, perhaps, but nonetheless building off of core elements of these group-process
theories.

Which modern theories are responsible for our current understanding of crowd
psychology? The first, deindividuation theory, was most fully developed by Zimbardo
(1970). Emergent-norm theory was constructed by Turner and Killian (1957); finally,
Reicher (1982) countered with the advancement of social-identity theory. These modern
theories will be examined in detail belowalong with the emergence of several
peripheral variables, such as public vs. private self-attention, anonymity, and selfidentityin the context of crowd behavior, to arrive at a better understanding of group
processes and, specifically, the rationality of riots.

What Happens in a Riot?

Reichers (2001) examination of the St. Pauls riot between town residents and police is
both illustrative in his advancement for social-identity theory, and troubling in the
number of questions his analysis does not answer. In St. Pauls, we see highly complex
group processes manifested (e.g., ad hoc norm formation, limiting of behaviors,
ostensible attitude change). However, care must be taken not to generalize on this one

example: a riot does not always involve such processes, nor does it always result in
violence (an important point: riots can, by definition, be a simple crowd provoking only
disorder(Merriam-Webster, 2002)).

What, then, happens on a practical level? How do people assemble? How and why do
they establish group norms? Change behavior? Set limits? These are questions that
theorists have struggled to define for years, and modern theories bring us closer to
understanding the truly impressive complexity of the riot.

Deindividuation Theory
Deindividuation theory takes a decidedly negative view of human character: very
generally, people are prevented from becoming self-aware during group involvement,
losing their self-identity in the group and therefore acting in largely anti-social ways.
Upon deeper inspection of deindividuation-related experiments, however, the theory is
far more complex.

There is, for example, little consensus on why one allows oneself to join a group and
submit to its influences (Hogg and Abrams, 1988). Indeed, in Zimbardos attempt to
answer this question regarding riots, we see just how heavily he has borrowed from other
theorists: By chance or necessity, individuals find themselves in a situation in which
their personal needs can be expressed and where there is no superordinate group goal to
which such individual needs must be subjugated. Here, a small minority can effectively

steer a large group Note the startling resemblance to Trotters label of crowds as
easily directed herds of animals.

Furthermore, anonymity plays a key role in deindividuation: it is the first step to losing
ones identityfollowed, of course, by focusing attention on the group, perceiving it as
a whole unit, engaging in physical activity, and a high conscious processing load, [which]
all prevent self-awareness (Hogg and Abrams). As individuals lose their anonymity,
then, they are less self-conscious and are more likely to follow the immediate stimuli of
the groupand, suggests Zimbardo, to be much more aggressive. His first study on this
idea involved subjects shocking others in two conditions: the first had subjects essentially
anonymous, with large lab coats and hoods (a la KKK); members of the second group, on
the other hand, were personally identifiable with the name tags and other personal
information. The results were clear and, no pun intended, shocking: the anonymous group
shocked twice as long as the identifiable group, regardless of the attractiveness of the
victim.

Zimbardo followed this experiment with a catharsis test, which showed that
deindividuated subjects still shocked more even after a so-called release of aggression.
In his eyes, therefore, deindividuated individuals are stripped of appropriate social norms,
and therefore behave anti-socially. The Stanford Prison Experiment (Haney, Banks, and
Zimbardo, 1973) seemingly provided even further evidence of this.

While a provocative finding, newer evidence has increasingly shown deindividuation

theory to be flawed. In one of Zimbardos own studies, the Belgian-Prisoner Experiment,
deindividuated subjects shocked less than identifiable subjects. Zimbardo did attempt to
explain this finding, but it lacked clarity and depth: The Identifiable Ss were still
relatively deindividuated (they were in uniform), while the Non-Identifiable Ss were
made to feel self-conscious, suspicious, and anxiouswhich may have inhibited
aggression (Zimbardo, 1969). In fact, the definitive claim against one-dimensional, antisocial deindividuation came with Johnson and Downings (1979) Nurse Study: they
found, quite interestingly, that while anonymous subjects dressed in KKK-like costumes
did indeed shock more, subjects dressed as nurses shocked less. Therefore, the quality of
anonymitynot just the existence of itis responsible for resulting behavior. Indeed, as
Hogg and Abrams write,
disinhibited behaviour, and particularly aggression, may only be one possible
outcome (rather than an integral part) of immersion in a group. Furthermore, in
the Prison Experiment, it was more the acquisition of a new role rather than a
loss of identity which was responsible [for the behavior displayed].

Emergent-Norm Theory
In the face of the increasingly rejected deindividuation theory arose emergent-norm
theory: Turner and Killian suggested that group processes are governed by normative
influence; i.e., peoples action is a sort of compliance motivated by their seeking approval
and avoiding punishment by the group. The key point of their theory explains, not
surprisingly, the emergence of norms: Because the crowd lacks formal organization (it

may have no specific goal, no obvious leaders, and no well defined boundary to
membership) the norm must be specific to the situation to some degree (Hogg and
Abrams). This makes intuitive sense. But the revolution implicit in emergent-norm theory
is the treatment of crowd behavior not as irrational and governed by a weak collective
mind, but by rational group processesprocesses that have been studied and are, to an
extend, understood. Never before had a theory embraced the power of human rationale to
such a degree.

Unfortunately, when pressed to explain precisely how norms emerged, Turner and Killian
suggest that, in a group, certain individuals are more distinctive than others and
therefore establish crowd norms. Researchers pounced on this explanation, correctly, as
an elitist version of Allportian individualism; instead of crowd behaviour being
explained in terms of the personalities of all participants it is tied to the personality of a
dominant few (Reicher, 2001). As criticism of the emergent-norm model continued,
other researchers questioned the use of normative influence in this framework: certainly,
behavior may be simple compliance, but normative influence does not explain why
certain individuals follow the crowd while others resist. In yet another theoretical
development, social-identity theory was born.

Social-Identity Theory
When applied to crowd psychology and riots, Reichers (1982) social-identity theory has
come to be accepted as the most developed, comprehensive modern theory in this field.
In contrast to other theoriesdeindividuation and its loss of identity; emergent-norm

theory and its normative influencesocial-identity theory explains crowd behavior in

terms of reference informational influence. Following the traditional mechanisms of
reference influence (Turner, 1982), an individual (1) categorizes himself as part of some
social identity, (2) creates or discovers the norms of that group, and (3) assigns, those
stereotypes to himself (self-stereotypes), providing a framework for future behavior.

This is a powerful concept when related to riots. It provides a way of explaining both
why individuals join a crowd, and why they behave as they do: first, if the group is part
of their social identity, then they are more likely to join (this makes intuitive sense
would you expect to see uninterested protesters in a march against, say, NAFTA?).
Second, the framework for future behavior provides a reference point for the groups
behavior, including limitationsas seen in the St. Pauls example, where rioters were
extraordinarily careful not to damage private property, and even helpful enough to direct
traffic!

To be clear, there are some similarities between this theory and others: the establishment
of norms here is similar to emergent-norm theorywith crowd members following the
same norms seemingly in unisonwhile deindividuation theory shares some ideas of
the diminished salience of personal identity in the crowd, and the lack of personal
responsibility (Hogg and Abrams).

The differences in theories, however, is marked: social-identity theory involves a

transformation of identitynot a loss, as in deindividuation. The behavior of rioters, for

example, is thus determined not by compliance (emergent-norm), but by a new, social

identity that individuals have chosen to adopt. Far from the low opinion of crowds held
by Le Bon et al., social-identity theory gives credit to the decision-making abilities of the
individual as an explanation of why one joins a group, and then uses the new social
identity to describe the bases and limits of crowd behavior.

But what is the single major determinant of behavior under this framework? Social
identity theory proposes that group behaviour will occur irrespective of anonymity and
identifiability when social identity is salient (Hogg and Abrams). Reicher conducted
several experiments that have supported this idea: in one study (1987), his team increased
the salience of social identity (by repeatedly calling subjects social science students), or
decreased salience by referring to them by code numbers. When social identity was
salient, their answers on a question of punishing sexual offenders followed the answers of
other social-science students (they were led to believe that social science students
strongly favored punishment). When it was not salient, the results were opposite. In
other words, Reicher showed that interpersonal influence was high from similar others
when social identity was made salient.

How, then, do norms form in crowds? Social-identity theory uses two techniques: the
relationship to an outgroup (we dont like what the police are doing to our town and
look!theres a police car right there. Lets get it!) and inductive inference from the
behavior of other ingroup membersthe latter, a similar idea to both other major current

theories. The result is a generally cohesive and parsimonious theory that can well explain
group dynamics in a wide variety of situations.

Analysis of Theories in Relation to Riots

The field studying crowd psychology has been particularly interesting: the process of
developing new theories to address previous theories weaknesses has forced researchers
to grapple at applied questions and their own empirical shortcomings. In other words, the
process has been even more exciting than arriving at the current model we hold as being
right. Here, we explore what questions and answers this process has raised in crowd
psychology.

Limitations of the Field

The process has given us insights into not only crowds, but the development of theories
themselves. One major problem of group-processes theories involves retroactive labeling
and prediction: first, its easy to look back on some event (e.g., the St. Pauls riot) and
apply a framework that nicely describes what happened. But there are inherent problems
in this: Zimbardo did just such a thing with the Prison Experiment, and it was later
discovered that his interpretation of deindividuation was largely mistaken. Second,
group-process theories are immature at prediction: they cannot predict when and how,
say, a group of 50 factory workers and 20 policemen will interact if placed near each
other. In other words, social-identity theory and its peers are good at retroactive
labelingwhich, evidence has shown, can be very wrongand bad at prediction, which
is a logical next step for the maturation of this field and, if it ever happens, a profound

contribution from social psychology. These are the limitations, then, of current groupprocess research.

Clarified Variables
Nevertheless, nearly a century of research has produced several exciting findings,
clarifying previously confusing variables. For example, it is clear that anonymity, selfawareness, and social identity can lead to both good and bad behavior. We now know
that this is contextually dependent (see Hogg and Abrams, 1988, for a full explanation).

Practical Implications for Riots

The St. Pauls riot of 1980 took place in real-life, not a laboratory; therefore, we can use
it only as a case study, not as evidence. What we do know is that highly complex,
rational processes were occurring amid the many mitigating variables (dissatisfaction
between citizens and police, etc). Some takeaways:

Riots involve sudden changes: while each theory attempts to explain sudden
behavioral shifts, we are left with broad statements like the following:
Since there is no formal means of validating a given behavioural normeither
by means of orders in a hierarchical system or a democratic decision-making
processthen crowd norms may quickly be suspended as new behaviours come
to be seen as more appropriate. This would account for the rapidly changing yet
homogenous nature of crowd action. (cg. Wright, 1978; quoted in Reicher, 2001)

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In other words, theorists can broadly explain the cause of behavioral change as a concept.
But in response to the question, Well, why did they turn the police car over? we may
well never know.

In a riot, there are certain limits and norms that are rationally adhered to. In St. Pauls,
Reicher repeatedly explains the helping nature of the crowd in relation to directing
traffic and protecting private property. And it is here that social-identity theory
clearly trumps emergent-norm theory: if control truly were maintained under
compliance (emergent-norm), then why would the norm be helping traffic instead
of respecting the police? This question can be posed to almost any riot: as citizens, we
are taught to respect the police from a young age. It is doubtful that one gathering
could manipulate such deeply held valuesif viewed through a compliance lens. But
from a social-identity perspective, it makes perfect sense: I support abortion, and so
does this group, so Ill join them. But the police donttheyre blocking our
march!and I know other people here with me dont like them either. This is the
social identity at work.

Above all, what happens in a riot nearly always contains rational group processes.
Although we may not fully understand the mechanics of these processes, it is an
antiquated notion that humans behave on their most base desires and tendencies with
no cause for reason or values, when given the opportunityor, in other words,
irrationally. In an excellent summation of the issue, Muukkonen (1999) writes:
Another theme of the previous studies had been the question of irrationality and
emotionality. Turner and Killian critisise [sic] the observers tendency to single
out only those phenomena that (s)he disapproves and label them with value-laden

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terms. With normal definitions, much of the institutional behaviour is emotional

and irrational. They also point that in everyday usage the irrationality is often
linked to nonconformal behaviour: it is irrational to violate the norms of the
society. However, they remind that their definition of collective behaviour deals
just those occasions where the old norms cease to influence or they do not exist at
all. "To refer to this behavior as irrational or emotional is either fallacious or a
tautology." (Turner and Killian, 1959)
With the idea, then, that social psychology is still in a dark tunnel in terms of truly
understanding riots and crowd behavior, these theories have made it clear that there is a
light at the end of that tunneland that the light represents not only an understanding of
riot behavior, but a knowledge that individuals generally act rationally and under wellunderstood group norms in collective behavior.

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WORKS CITED
Hogg, M., & Abrams, D. (1988). Social Identifications. London: Routledge.
Muukkonen, M. From Deviant Phenomenon to Collective Identity: Paradigm Shifts in
Social Movement Studies.
Reicher, S.D. (2001). The St. Pauls Riot: An Explanation of the Limits of Crowd Action
in Terms of a Social Identity Model. In Hogg, M.A. & Abrams, D. (Ed.) Intergroup
Relations: Essential Readings.
Zimbardo, P.G. (1969). The human choice: Individuation, Reason, and Order Versus
Deindividuation, Impulse, and Chaos. Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 17.

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