[G.R. No. 122646.

March 14, 1997]

ADELIA C. MENDOZA, for herself and Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of the late
NORBERTO B. MENDOZA, petitioners, vs. Hon. Angelito C. Teh, Presiding Judge,
Branch 87, RTC, Rosario, Batangas, Sps. Herminio & Clarita Tayag @ Sps. George
T. Tiglao & Clarizza T. Tiglao and/or @ Teofilo M. Esguera, Leonor M. Esguera.
Leticia M. Esguera, Joel M. Esguera, Ricardo M. Esguera, Voltaire E. Tayag,
Benito I. Tayag, Merlie Malig, Alberto T. Tayag, Rosemarie T. Tayag. Leticia E.
Lulu and the Register of Deeds for the Province of Batangas,respondents.
DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:
On October 28, 1994, petitioner for herself and as administratrix of the intestate estate of
her deceased husband Norberto Mendoza filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas
a complaint for reconveyance of title (involving parcels of lot in Batangas) and damages with
petition for preliminary injunction docketed as Civil Case No. R94-009. [1] Paragraphs 2 and 3 of
said complaint states:
2. That Adelia C. Mendoza likewise represents her co-plaintiff, the Intestate Estate of the late
Norberto B. Mendoza in her capacity as the surviving wife of the deceased Norberto B. Mendoza
who died on December 29, 1993;
3. That Adelia C. Mendoza should be appointed by this Honorable Court as the judicial
administratrix of her co-plaintiff for purposes of this case; [2]
Private respondents filed on January 21, 1995 [3] their answer with motion to
dismiss[4] alleging among others that the complaint states no cause of action and that
petitioners demand had already been paid. [5] On February 17, 1995, private respondents filed
another pleading entitled motion to dismiss invoking, this time, lack of jurisdiction, lack of
cause of action, estoppel, laches and prescription. In support of their argument of lack of
jurisdiction, private respondents contend that a special proceedings case for appointment of
administratrix of an estate cannot be incorporated in the ordinary action for reconveyance. In her
opposition to the motions, petitioner asserts among others, that the allegation seeking
appointment as administratrix is only an incidental matter which is not even prayed for in the
complaint. Replying to the opposition, private respondents argued that since petitioners
husband resided in Quezon City at the time of his death, the appointment of the estate
administratrix should be filed in the RTC of that place in accordance with Section 1 Rule 73 of the
Rules of Court. Accordingly, it is their argument that the RTC of Batangas has no jurisdiction over
the case.
In a Resolution dated June 14, 1995, the RTC of Batangas thru respondent Judge Teh
dismissed without prejudice the complaint for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the rules
governing an ordinary civil action and a special proceeding are different. Accordingly, the lower
court found it unnecessary to discuss the other grounds raised in the motion to dismiss. [6] Upon
denial of petitioners motion for reconsideration, he filed this petition under Rule 45 on pure
questions of law. The Court thereafter gave due course to the petition.
The issue is whether or not in an action for reconveyance, an allegation seeking appointment
as administratrix of an estate, would oust the RTC of its jurisdiction over the whole case?
We rule in the negative. First, Section 19 of B.P. 129 as amended by RA 7691 provides:
Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1)
In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation;

(2)
In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, where the assessed value of property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00)...
xxx

xxx
xxx

(4)

In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate ....

Likewise, Section 33 of the same law provides that:

Metropolitan Trial Court shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and
intestate... (italics ours).
The above law is clear. An action for reconveyance, which involves title title to property worth
millions of pesos, such as the lots subject of this case, is cognizable by the RTC. Likewise falling
within its jurisdiction are actions incapable of pecuniary estimation, such as the appointment
of an administratrix for an estate. Even the Rules on venue of estate proceedings (Section 1 of
Rule 73[7]) impliedly recognizes the jurisdiction of the RTC over petitions for granting of letters of
administration. On the other hand, probate proceedings for the settlement of estate are within
the ambit of either the RTC or MTC depending on the net worth of the estate. By arguing that the
allegation seeking such appointment as administratrix ousted the RTC of its jurisdiction, both
public and private respondents confuses jurisdiction with venue. Section 2 of Rule 4 as revised by
Circular 13-95[8] provides that actions involving title to property shall be tried in the province
where the property is located, in this case, - Batangas. The mere fact that petitioners deceased
husband resides in Quezon City at the time of his death affects only the venue but not the
jurisdiction of the Court.[9]
Second, the cases cited[10] by private respondents are not at point as they involve settlement
of estate where the probate court was asked to resolve questions of ownership of certain
properties. In the present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but merely an allegation
seeking appointment as estate administratrix which does not necessarily involve settlement of
estate that would have invited the exercise of the limited jurisdiction of a probate court . The
above allegation is not even a jurisdictional fact which must be stated in an action for
reconveyance. The Court therefore, should have at least, proceeded with the reconveyance suit
rather than dismiss the entire case.
Third, jurisprudential rulings that a probate court cannot generally decide questions of
ownership or title to property [11] is not applicable in this case, because: there is no settlement of
estate involved and the RTC of Batangas was not acting as a probate court. It should be clarified
that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the RTC in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction, is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of
procedure.[12] Moreover, the instant action for reconveyance does not even invoke the limited
jurisdiction of a probate court.[13] Considering that the RTC has jurisdiction, whether it be on the
reconveyance suit or as to the appointment of an administratrix, it was improper for respondent
judge to dismiss the whole complaint for alleged lack of jurisdiction.
Finally, judges should not dismiss with precipitate haste, complaints or petitions filed before
them, just so they can comply with their administrative duty to dispose cases within 90 days at
the expense of their judicial responsibility.
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions dated June 14, 1995 and November 14, 1995 of the RTC of
Batangas are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court is ordered to immediately proceed with
the disposition of the case in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-21993

June 21, 1966

ANGELA RODRIGUEZ, MARIA RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
HON. JUAN DE BORJA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III,
ANATOLIA PANGILINAN and ADELAIDA JACALAN, respondents.
Lorenzo Somulong for petitioners.
Torres and Torres for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Petitioners Angela, Maria, Abelardo and Antonio, surnamed Rodriguez, petition this Court for a writ of certiorariand
prohibition to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, for its refusal to grant their motion to dismiss its Special
Proceeding No. 1331, which said Court is alleged to have taken cognizance of without jurisdiction.
The facts and issues are succinctly narrated in the order of the respondent court, dated June 13, 1963 (Petition,
Annex 0), in this wise:
It is alleged in the motion to dismiss filed by Angela, Maria, Abelardo and Antonio Rodriguez, through
counsel, that this Court "has no jurisdiction to try the above-entitled case in view of the pendency of another
action for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Rev. Fr. Celestino Rodriguez in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, namely, Sp. Proceedings No. 3907 entitled 'In the matter of the Intestate Estate of the
deceased Rev. Fr. Celestino Rodriguez which was filed ahead of the instant case".
The records show that Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on February 12, 1963 in the City of Manila; that on
March 4, 1963, Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a
purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez; that on March 8, 1963, Maria Rodriguez and Angela
Rodriguez, through counsel filed a petition for leave of court to allow them to examine the alleged will; that

on March 11, 1963 before the Court could act on the petition, the same was withdrawn; that on March 12,
1963, aforementioned petitioners filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition for the settlement
of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging, among other things, that Fr. Rodriguez was a resident of
Paraaque, Rizal, and died without leaving a will and praying that Maria Rodriguez be appointed as Special
Administratrix of the estate; and that on March 12, 1963 Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan filed a
petition in this Court for the probation of the will delivered by them on March 4, 1963. It was stipulated by the
parties that Fr. Rodriguez was born in Paraaque, Rizal; that he was Parish priest of the Catholic Church of
Hagonoy, Bulacan, from the year 1930 up to the time of his death in 1963; that he was buried in Paraaque,
and that he left real properties in Rizal, Cavite, Quezon City and Bulacan.
The movants contend that since the intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal was filed at
8:00 A.M. on March 12, 1963 while the petition for probate was filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
at 11:00 A.M. on the same date, the latter Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate, citing
as authority in support thereof the case of Ongsingco Vda. de Borja vs. Tan and De Borja, G.R. No. 7792,
July 27, 1955.
The petitioners Pangilinan and Jacalan, on the other hand, take the stand that the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over the case upon delivery by them of the will to the Clerk of Court on March
4, 1963, and that the case in this Court therefore has precedence over the case filed in Rizal on March 12,
1963.
The Court of First Instance, as previously stated denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that a difference of a
few hours did not entitle one proceeding to preference over the other; that, as early as March 7, movants were
aware of the existence of the purported will of Father Rodriguez, deposited in the Court of Bulacan, since they filed
a petition to examine the same, and that movants clearly filed the intestate proceedings in Rizal "for no other
purpose than to prevent this Court (of Bulacan) from exercising jurisdiction over the probate proceedings".
Reconsideration having been denied, movants, now petitioners, came to this Court, relying principally on Rule 73,
section 1 of the Rules of Court, and invoking our ruling in Ongsingco vs. Tan and De Borja, L-7792, July 27, 1955.
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines
at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration
granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time
of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province which
he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, as far as it depends on
the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears
on the record.
We find this recourse to be untenable. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon
the delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no petition for its allowance
was filed until later, because upon the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the
time and place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by
section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule 77, of the old Rules):
SEC. 3. Court to appoint time for proving will. Notice thereof to be published. When a will is delivered to,
or a petition for the allowance of a will is filed in, the Court having jurisdiction, such Court shall fix a time and
place for proving the will when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and shall cause
notice of such time and place to be published three (3) weeks successively, previous to the time appointed,
in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
But no newspaper publication shall be made where the petition for probate has been filed by the testator
himself.
The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to OR a petition for the allowance of a will is filed"
plainly indicates that the court may act upon the mere deposit therein of a decedent's testament, even if no petition
for its allowance is as yet filed. Where the petition for probate is made after the deposit of the will, the petition is
deemed to relate back to the time when the will was delivered. Since the testament of Fr. Rodriguez was submitted
and delivered to the Court of Bulacan on March 4, while petitioners initiated intestate proceedings in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal only on March 12, eight days later, the precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan
court is incontestable.
1wph1.t

But, petitioners object, section 3 of revised Rule 76 (old Rule 77) speaks of a will being delivered to "the Court
having jurisdiction," and in the case at bar the Bulacan court did not have it because the decedent was domiciled in
Rizal province. We can not disregard Fr. Rodriguez's 33 years of residence as parish priest in Hagonoy, Bulacan
(1930-1963); but even if we do so, and consider that he retained throughout some animus revertendi to the place of
his birth in Paraaque, Rizal, that detail would not imply that the Bulacan court lacked jurisdiction. As ruled in
previous decisions, the power to settle decedents' estates is conferred by law upon all courts of first instance, and
the domicile of the testator only affects the venue but not the jurisdiction of the Court (In re Kaw Singco, 74 Phil.
239; Reyes vs. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484; Bernabe vs. Vergara, 73 Phil. 676). Neither party denies that the late Fr.
Rodriguez is deceased, or that he left personal property in Hagonoy, province of Bulacan (t.s.n. p. 46, hearing of
June 11, 1963, Annex "H", Petition, Rec., p. 48). That is sufficient in the case before us.
In the Kaw Singco case (ante) this Court ruled that:
"... If we consider such question of residence as one affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court over the
subject-matter, the effect shall be that the whole proceedings including all decisions on the different
incidents which have arisen in court will have to be annulled and the same case will have to be commenced
anew before another court of the same rank in another province. That this is of mischievous effect in the
prompt administration of justice is too obvious to require comment. (Cf. Tanunchuan vs. Dy Buncio & Co.,
G.R. No. 48206, December 31, 1942). Furthermore, section 600 of Act No. 190, providing that the estate of
a deceased person shall be settled in the province where he had last resided, could not have been intended
as defining the jurisdiction of the probate court over the subject matter, because such legal provision is
contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters, and, as we have said time and
again, procedure is one thing and jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. (Attorney General vs.
Manila Railroad Company, 20 Phil. 523.) The law of jurisdiction Act No. 136, Section 56, No. 5 confers
upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of
the deceased.1 Since, however, there are many Courts of First Instance in the Philippines, the Law of
Procedure, Act No. 190, section 600, fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. Thus,
the place of residence of the deceased is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of
venue. And it is upon this ground that in the new Rules of Court the province where the estate of a deceased
person shall be settled is properly called "venue" (Rule 75, section 1.) Motion for reconsideration is denied.
The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan Court of First Instance ahead of any other, that court is
entitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a case of wrong venue by express
provisions of Rule 73 (old Rule 75) of the Rules of Court, since the same enjoins that:
The Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to
the exclusion of all other courts. (Sec. 1)
This disposition presupposes that two or more courts have been asked to take cognizance of the settlement of the
estate. Of them only one could be of proper venue, yet the rule grants precedence to that Court whose jurisdiction is
first invoked, without taking venue into account.
There are two other reasons that militate against the success of petitioners. One is that their commencing intestate
proceedings in Rizal, after they learned of the delivery of the decedent's will to the Court of Bulacan, was in bad
faith, patently done with a view to divesting the latter court of the precedence awarded it by the Rules. Certainly the
order of priority established in Rule 73 (old Rule 75) was not designed to convert the settlement of decedent's
estates into a race between applicants, with the administration of the properties as the price for the fleetest.
The other reason is that, in our system of civil law, intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the
testate, since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid operative will. Says Article 960 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines:
ART. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place:
(1) If a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has subsequently lost its validity;
(2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose of all the property belonging to the testator. In such
case, legal succession shall take place only with respect to the property in which the testator has not
disposed;

(3) If the suspensive condition attached to the institution of heir does not happen or is not fulfilled, or if the
heir dies before the testator, or repudiates the inheritance, there being no substitution, and no right of
accretion takes place;
(4) When the heir instituted is incapable of succeeding, except in cases provided in this Code.
Therefore, as ruled in Castro, et al. vs. Martinez, 10 Phil. 307, "only after final decision as to the nullity of testate
succession could an intestate succession be instituted in the form of pre-established action". The institution of
intestacy proceedings in Rizal may not thus proceed while the probate of the purported will of Father Rodriguez is
pending.
We rule that the Bulacan Court of First Instance was entitled to priority in the settlement of the estate in question,
and that in refusing to dismiss the probate. proceedings, said court did not commit any abuse of discretion. It is the
proceedings in the Rizal Court that should be discontinued.
Wherefore, the writ of certiorari applied for is denied. Costs against petitioners Rodriguez.
Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

MENDOZA v. TEH
G.R. No. 122646 March 14, 1997
FACTS
Adelia Mendoza filed a complaint for RECONVEYANCE of titleinvolving lots in Batangas against
several people (the Tayags, theTiglaos and the Esgueras, or the private respondents) beforeRTC of
Batangas
. In her complaint, she likewise alleged that she representedthe intestate estate of her deceased
husband Norberto and asked thecourt that she be appointed as judicial administratrix of the
estate forthe said case.The private respondents initially moved to dismiss claiminglack of
jurisdiction in that a special proceeding of appointment ofadministratrix cannot be incorporated
in the ordinary action ofreconveyance. After Adelia opposed the motion to dismiss,
therespondents replied saying that RTC Batangas hadno jurisdictionasNorberto resided in Quezon
City at the time of his death.
Judge Teh of RTC Batangas thereafter dismissed the complainton the ground that rules governing
ordinary civil actions and specialproceedings are different.
ISSUE
WON or not in an action for reconveyance, an allegationseeking appointment as administratrix of
an estate, would oust the RTCof its jurisdiction over the whole case
HELD
NO.
RATIO
Under BP 129, RTCs shall exercise exclusive originaljurisdiction over all civil actions which involve
the title to, orpossession of, real property or any interest therein where the assessedvalude of
the property exceeds Php 20k. As the value of the propertiesinvolved in this case is in the
millions, the case is properly cognizableby the RTC.Likewise falling under its jurisdiction are
actions incapable of pecuniary estimation such as the appointment of administratrix of anestate.
Even the Rules on venue of estate proceedings (Section 1 of Rule73[7]) impliedly recognizes the
jurisdiction of the RTC over petitionsfor granting of letters of administration. On the other hand,
probateproceedings for the settlement of estate are within the ambit of eitherthe RTC or MTC
depending on the net worth of the estate.By arguing that the allegation seeking such
appointment asadministratrix ousted the RTC of its jurisdiction, both public andprivate
respondents confuses jurisdiction with venue.
Section 2 of Rule 4 as revised by Circular 13-95 provides thatactions involving title to property
shall be tried in the province wherethe property is located, in this case, - Batangas. The mere fact
that
petitioners deceased husband resides in Quezon City at the time of his
death affects only the venue but not the jurisdiction of the Court.In the present suit, no
settlement of estate is involved, butmerely an allegation seeking appointment as estate

administratrixwhich does not necessarily involve settlement of estate that would haveinvited the
exercise of the limited jurisdiction of a probate court. Theabove allegation is not even a
jurisdictional fact which must be stated inan action for reconveyance.
The Court therefore, should have atleast, proceeded with the reconveyance suit rather than
dismissthe entire case.
Lastly, jurisprudential rulings that a probate court cannotgenerally decide questions of ownership
or title to property is notapplicable in this case, because there is no settlement of estateinvolved
and
the RTC of Batangas was not acting as a probate court.
It should be clarified that whether a particular matter should beresolved by the RTC in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction or itslimited probate jurisdiction, is not a jurisdictional issue
but a merequestion of procedure. Moreover, the instant action for reconveyancedoes not even
invoke the limited jurisdiction of a probate court.
Considering that the RTC has jurisdiction, whether it be on thereconveyance suit or as to the
appointment of an administratrix, itwas improper for respondent judge to dismiss the
wholecomplaint for alleged lack of jurisdiction

G.R. No. 75773 April 17, 1990

TOMAS JIMENEZ, VISITACION JIMENEZ, DIGNO JIMENEZ, ANTONIO JIMENEZ, AMADEO JIMENEZ, MODESTO
JIMENEZ and VIRGINIA JIMENEZ, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. AMANDA VALERA-CABIGAO, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch XXXVII, Lingayen, Pangasinan, LEONARDO JIMENEZ, JR. and
CORAZON JIMENEZ, respondents.
Simplicio M. Sevilleja for petitioners. Bitty S. Viliran for private respondents. Leonardo B. Jimenez, Jr. for respondents.
FERNAN, CJ.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated May
29, 1986 which dismissed the petition for certiorari and mandamus in AC-G.R. No. 06578 entitled "Tomas Jimenez, et. al.
vs. Hon. Amanda Valera-Cabigao."
The facts are as follows:
The marriage of Leonardo (Lino) Jimenez and Consolacion Ungson produced four (4) children, namely: Alberto,
Leonardo, Sr., Alejandra and Angeles. During the existence of the marriage, Lino Jimenez acquired five (5) parcels of land
in Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan.
After the death of Consolacion Ungson, Lino married Genoveva Caolboy with whom he begot the seven petitioners
herein: Tomas, Visitacion, Digno, Antonio, Amadeo, Modesto and Virginia, all surnamed Jimenez. Lino Jimenez died on
August 11, 1951 while Genoveva Caolboy died on November 21, 1978.
Thereafter, in April 1979, Virginia Jimenez filed a petition before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V,
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 5346, praying to be appointed as administratrix of the properties of the deceased
spouses Lino and Genoveva. Enumerated in her petition were the supposed heirs of the deceased spouses which
included herein co-petitioners and the four children of Lino Jimenez by Consolacion Ungson, his previous wife. 2
In October, 1979, herein private respondent Leonardo Jimenez, Jr., son of Leonardo Jimenez, Sr., filed a motion for the
exclusion of his father's name and those of Alberto, Alejandra, and Angeles from the petition, inasmuch as they are

children of the union of Lino Jimenez and Consolacion Ungson and not of Lino Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy and
because they have already received their inheritance consisting of five (5) parcels of lands in Salomague, Bugallon,
Pangasinan. 3
On March 23, 1981, petitioner Virginia Jimenez was appointed administrator of the Intestate Estate of Lino Jimenez and
Genoveva Caolboy. 4 On May 21, 1981, she filed an inventory of the estate of the spouses Lino Jimenez and Genoveva
Caolboy wherein she included the five (5) parcels of land in Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan. As a consequence,
Leonardo Jimenez, Jr. moved for the exclusion of these properties from the inventory on the ground that these had
already been adjudicated to Leonardo Sr., Alberto, Alejandra and Angeles by their deceased father Lino Jimenez. Private
respondent Leonardo Jimenez, Jr. presented testimonial and documentary evidence in support of his motion while
petitioner Virginia Jimenez, other than cross-examining the witnesses of Leonardo, presented no evidence of her own,
oral or documentary.
On September 29, 1981, the probate court ordered the exclusion of the five (5) parcels of land from the inventory on the
basis of the evidence of private respondent Leonardo Jimenez, Jr. which consisted among others of: (1) Tax Declaration
showing that the subject properties were acquired during the conjugal partnership of Lino Jimenez and Consolacion
Ungson; and, (2) a Deed of Sale dated May 12, 1964 wherein Genoveva Caolboy stated, that the subject properties had
been adjudicated by Lino Jimenez to his children by a previous marriage, namely: Alberto, Leonardo, Alejandra and
Angeles. 5 The motion for reconsideration of said order was denied on January 26, 1982. 6
Petitioner Virginia Jimenez then went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed thereat
as CA-G.R. No. SP-13916, seeking the annulment of the order dated September 29, 1981 as well as the order of January
26, 1982. On November 18, 1982, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition because (1) Genoveva Caolboy, petitioners'
mother, had admitted that the subject parcels of land had been adjudicated to the children of the previous nuptial; (2) the
subject properties could not have been acquired during the marriage of Lino Jimenez to Genoveva Caolboy because they
were already titled in the name of Lino Jimenez even prior to 1921, long before Lino's marriage to Genoveva in 1940; (3)
the claim of Virginia Jimenez was barred by prescription because it was only in 1981 when they questioned the
adjudication of the subject properties, more than ten (10) years after Genoveva had admitted such adjudication in a public
document in 1964; and, (4) petitioner Virginia Jimenez was guilty of laches. This decision became final and executory. 7
Two (2) years after, petitioners filed an amended complaint dated December 10, 1984 before the Regional Trial Court of
Pangasinan, Branch XXXVII, docketed thereat as Civil Case No. 16111, to recover possession/ownership of the subject
five (5) parcels of land as part of the estate of Lino Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy and to order private respondents to
render an accounting of the produce therefrom. Private respondents moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the
grounds that the action was barred by prior judgment in CA-G.R. No. SP-13916 dated November 18, 1982 and by
prescription and laches. However, petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss contending that (1) the action was not barred
by prior judgment because the probate court had no jurisdiction to determine with finality the question of ownership of the
lots which must be ventilated in a separate action; and, (2) the action instituted in 1981 was not barred by prescription or
laches because private respondents' forcible acquisition of the subject properties occurred only after the death of
petitioners' mother, Genoveva Caolboy in 1978.
On February 13, 1985, the trial court resolved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata. 8 On May 31, 1985,
petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the resolution was denied. As earlier intimated, the petition
for certiorari andmandamus filed by petitioners before the appellate court was likewise denied due course and dismissed
in a decision dated May 29, 1986. 9
Hence, this recourse.
The issue in this case is whether in a settlement proceeding (testate or intestate) the lower court has jurisdiction to settle
questions of ownership and whether res judicata exists as to bar petitioners' present action for the recovery of possession
and ownership of the five (5) parcels of land. In the negative, is the present action for reconveyance barred by prescription
and/or laches?
We reverse. Petitioners' present action for recovery of possession and ownership is appropriately filed because as a
general rule, a probate court can only pass upon questions of title provisionally. Since the probate, court's findings are not
conclusive being prima facie, 10 a separate proceeding is necessary to establish the ownership of the five (5) parcels of
land. 11
The patent reason is the probate court's limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title or ownership, which
result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, can only be settled in a separate action. 12
All that the said court could do as regards said properties is determine whether they should or should not be included in
the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then the

opposing parties and the administrator have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting
claims of title because the probate court cannot do so. 13
The provisional character of the inclusion in the inventory of a contested property was again reiterated in the following
cases: Pio Barreto Realty Development, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 14 Junquera vs. Borromeo, 15 Borromeo vs.
Canonoy, 16 Recto vs. de la Rosa. 17 It has also been held that in a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the
question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. 18 This pronouncement
no doubt applies with equal force to an intestate proceeding as in the case at bar.
Res judicata 19 does not exist because of the difference in the causes of actions. Specifically in S.P. No. 5346, the action
was for the settlement of the intestate estate of Lino Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy while Civil Case No. 16111 was an
action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the five (5) parcels of land. Moreover, while admittedly, the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V in S.P. No. 5346 had jurisdiction, the same was merely limited jurisdiction. Any
pronouncement by said court as to title is not conclusive and could still be attacked in a separate proceeding. Civil Case
No. 16111, on the other hand. was lodged before the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan, Branch XXXVII in the exercise
of the court's general jurisdiction. It was, in fact, such "separate or ordinary proceedings" contemplated by the rules for a
final determination of the issue of ownership of the disputed properties. To repeat, since the determination of the question
of title to the subject properties in S.P. 5346 was merely provisional, petitioners are not barred from instituting the
appropriate action in Civil Case No. 16111.
Indeed, the grounds relied upon by private respondents in their motion to dismiss do not appear to be indubitable.Res
judicata has been shown here to be unavailable and the other grounds of prescription and laches pleaded by private
respondents are seriously disputed. The allegation in the complaint is that the heirs of Leonardo Jimenez, Sr. (referring to
private respondents,) forcibly intruded into and took possession of the disputed properties only in 1978, after the death of
Genoveva Caolboy. Since the action for reconveyance was instituted in 1984, it would appear that the same has not yet
prescribed or otherwise barred by laches.
There are a number of factual issues raised by petitioners before the lower court which cannot be resolved without the
presentation of evidence at a full-blown trial and which make the grounds for dismissal dubitable. Among others, the
alleged admission made by petitioners' mother in the deed of sale is vehemently denied, as well as the fact itself of
adjudication, there being no showing that the conjugal partnership of Lino Jimenez and Consolacion Ungson had been
liquidated nor that a judicial or extra-judicial settlement of the estate of Lino Jimenez was undertaken whereby such
adjudication could have been effected.
The grounds stated in the motion to dismiss not being indubitable, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 16111.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the respondent appellate court is hereby REVERSED. Civil Case No. 16111 is
reinstated and the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan, Branch XXXVII is directed to proceed in said case with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 108581 December 8, 1999

LOURDES L. DOROTHEO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA D. QUINTANA, for Herself and as Attorney-in-Fact of
VICENTE DOROTHEO and JOSE DOROTHEO, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an order
that has become final and executory still be given effect? This is the issue that arose from
the following antecedents:
Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes.
The latter died in 1969 without her estate being settled. Alejandro died thereafter. Sometime
in 1977, after Alejandro's death, petitioner, who claims to have taken care of Alejandro

before he died, filed a special proceeding for the probate of the latter's last will and
testament. In 1981, the court issued an order admitting Alejandro's will to probate. Private
respondents did not appeal from said order. In 1983, they filed a "Motion To Declare The Will
Intrinsically Void." The trial court granted the motion and issued an order, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Order is hereby issued declaring Lourdes
Legaspi not the wife of the late Alejandro Dorotheo, the provisions of the last will
and testament of Alejandro Dorotheo as intrinsically void, and declaring the
oppositors Vicente Dorotheo, Jose Dorotheo and Nilda Dorotheo Quintana as the
only heirs of the late spouses Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes, whose
respective estates shall be liquidated and distributed according to the laws on
intestacy upon payment of estate and other taxes due to the government. 1
Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to some compensation since
she took care of Alejandro prior to his death although she admitted that they were not
married to each other. Upon denial of her motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to
the Court of Appeals, but the same was dismissed for failure to file appellant's brief within
the extended period granted. 2 This dismissal became final and executory on February 3,
1989 and a corresponding entry of judgment was forthwith issued by the Court of Appeals on
May 16, 1989. A writ of execution was issued by the lower court to implement the final and
executory Order. Consequently, private respondents filed several motions including a motion
to compel petitioner to surrender to them the Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCT) covering
the properties of the late Alejandro. When petitioner refused to surrender the TCT's, private
respondents filed a motion for cancellation of said titles and for issuance of new titles in their
names. Petitioner opposed the motion.
An Order was issued on November 29, 1990 by Judge Zain B. Angas setting aside the final
and executory Order dated January 30, 1986, as well as the Order directing the issuance of
the writ of execution, on the ground that the order was merely "interlocutory", hence not
final in character. The court added that the dispositive portion of the said Order even directs
the distribution of the estate of the deceased spouses. Private respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated February 1, 1991. Thus, private
respondents filed a petition before the Court of Appeals, which nullified the two assailed
Orders dated November 29, 1990 and February 1, 1991.
Aggrieved, petitioner instituted a petition for review arguing that the case filed by private
respondents before the Court of Appeals was a petition under Rule 65 on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner contends that in issuing the two assailed
orders, Judge Angas cannot be said to have no jurisdiction because he was particularly
designated to hear the case. Petitioner likewise assails the Order of the Court of Appeals
upholding the validity of the January 30, 1986 Order which declared the intrinsic invalidity of
Alejandro's will that was earlier admitted to probate.
Petitioner also filed a motion to reinstate her as executrix of the estate of the late Alejandro
and to maintain the status quo or lease of the premises thereon to third parties. 3 Private
respondents opposed the motion on the ground that petitioner has no interest in the estate
since she is not the lawful wife of the late Alejandro.
The petition is without merit. A final and executory decision or order can no longer be
disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may be. In setting aside the January 30,
1986 Order that has attained finality, the trial court in effect nullified the entry of judgment
made by the Court of Appeals. It is well settled that a lower court cannot reverse or set aside
decisions or orders of a superior court, for to do so would be to negate the hierarchy of
courts and nullify the essence of review. It has been ruled that a final judgment on probated
will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world. 4

It has been consistently held that if no appeal is taken in due time from a judgment or order
of the trial court, the same attains finality by mere lapse of time. Thus, the order allowing the
will became final and the question determined by the court in such order can no longer be
raised anew, either in the same proceedings or in a different motion. The matters of due
execution of the will and the capacity of the testator acquired the character of res
judicata and cannot again be brought into question, all juridical questions in connection
therewith being for once and forever closed. 5 Such final order makes the will conclusive
against the whole world as to its extrinsic validity and due execution. 6
It should be noted that probate proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic validity of the
will sought to be probated, 7 particularly on three aspects:
n whether the will submitted is indeed, the decedent's
last will and testament;
n compliance with the prescribed formalities for the
execution of wills;
n the testamentary capacity of the testator;

n and the due execution of the last will and testament. 9

Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the testator was of
sound and disposing mind at the time of its execution, that he had freely executed the will
and was not acting under duress, fraud, menace or undue influence and that the will is
genuine and not a forgery, 10 that he was of the proper testamentary age and that he is a
person not expressly prohibited by law from making a will. 11
The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised
even after the will has been authenticated. 12 Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an
extrinsically valid last will and testament is always intrinsically valid. Even if the will was
validly executed, if the testator provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful
heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance according to the laws on succession, 13 the
unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect. This is specially so when the
courts had already determined in a final and executory decision that the will is intrinsically
void. Such determination having attained that character of finality is binding on this Court
which will no longer be disturbed. Not that this Court finds the will to be intrinsically valid,
but that a final and executory decision of which the party had the opportunity to challenge
before the higher tribunals must stand and should no longer be reevaluated. Failure to avail
of the remedies provided by law constitutes waiver. And if the party does not avail of other
remedies despite its belief that it was aggrieved by a decision or court action, then it is
deemed to have fully agreed and is satisfied with the decision or order. As early as 1918, it
has been declared that public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of
occasional errors, judgments of courts must at some point of time fixed by law 14 become
final otherwise there will be no end to litigation. Interes rei publicae ut finis sit litium the
very object of which the courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies. 15 To
fulfill this purpose and to do so speedily, certain time limits, more or less arbitrary, have to
be set up to spur on the slothful. 16 The only instance where a party interested in a probate
proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of
circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to
negligence, 17 which circumstances do not concur herein.
Petitioner was privy to the suit calling for the declaration of the intrinsic invalidity of the will,
as she precisely appealed from an unfavorable order therefrom. Although the final and
executory Order of January 30, 1986 wherein private respondents were declared as the only
heirs do not bind those who are not parties thereto such as the alleged illegitimate son of the

testator, the same constitutes res judicata with respect to those who were parties to the
probate proceedings. Petitioner cannot again raise those matters anew for relitigation
otherwise that would amount to forum-shopping. It should be remembered that forum
shopping also occurs when the same issue had already been resolved adversely by some
other court. 18 It is clear from the executory order that the estates of Alejandro and his
spouse should be distributed according to the laws of intestate succession.
Petitioner posits that the January 30, 1986 Order is merely interlocutory, hence it can still be
set aside by the trial court. In support thereof, petitioner argues that "an order merely
declaring who are heirs and the shares to which set of heirs is entitled cannot be the basis of
execution to require delivery of shares from one person to another particularly when no
project of partition has been filed." 19 The trial court declared in the January 30, 1986 Order
that petitioner is not the legal wife of Alejandro, whose only heirs are his three legitimate
children (petitioners herein), and at the same time it nullified the will. But it should be noted
that in the same Order, the trial court also said that the estate of the late spouses be
distributed according to the laws of intestacy. Accordingly, it has no option but to implement
that order of intestate distribution and not to reopen and again re-examine the intrinsic
provisions of the same will.
It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the Civil Code, on the law of successional rights
that testacy is preferred to intestacy. 20 But before there could be testate distribution, the will
must pass the scrutinizing test and safeguards provided by law considering that the
deceased testator is no longer available to prove the voluntariness of his actions, aside from
the fact that the transfer of the estate is usually onerous in nature and that no one is
presumed to give Nemo praesumitur donare. 21 No intestate distribution of the estate can
be done until and unless the will had failed to pass both its extrinsic and intrinsic validity. If
the will is extrinsically void, the rules of intestacy apply regardless of the intrinsic validity
thereof. If it is extrinsically valid, the next test is to determine its intrinsic validity that is
whether the provisions of the will are valid according to the laws of succession. In this case,
the court had ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but the intrinsic
provisions thereof were void. Thus, the rules of intestacy apply as correctly held by the trial
court.
Furthermore, Alejandro's disposition in his will of the alleged share in the conjugal properties
of his late spouse, whom he described as his "only beloved wife", is not a valid reason to
reverse a final and executory order. Testamentary dispositions of properties not belonging
exclusively to the testator or properties which are part of the conjugal regime cannot be
given effect. Matters with respect to who owns the properties that were disposed of by
Alejandro in the void will may still be properly ventilated and determined in the intestate
proceedings for the settlement of his and that of his late spouse's estate.
Petitioner's motion for appointment as administratrix is rendered moot considering that she
was not married to the late Alejandro and, therefore, is not an heir.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.