Operation Uranus

Operation Uranus (Russian: ,

romanised: Operatsiya Uran) was the codename of
the Soviet 1923 November 1942 strategic operation in
World War II which led to the encirclement of the German Sixth Army, the Third and Fourth Romanian armies,
and portions of the German Fourth Panzer Army. The
operation formed part of the ongoing Battle of Stalingrad,
and was aimed at destroying German forces in and around
Stalingrad. Planning for Operation Uranus had commenced in September 1942, and was developed simultaneously with plans to envelop and destroy German Army
Group Center and German forces in the Caucasus. The
Red Army took advantage of the German armys poor
preparation for winter, and that its forces in the southern
Soviet Union were overstretched near Stalingrad, using
weaker Romanian troops to guard their anks; the oensives starting points were established along the section of
the front directly opposite Romanian forces. These Axis
armies lacked heavy equipment to deal with Soviet armor.

not react quickly enough nor decisively enough to disengage German armored forces in Stalingrad and reorient
them to defeat the impending threat. By late 22 November Soviet forces linked up at the town of Kalach, encircling some 290,000 men east of the Don River. Instead
of attempting to break out of the encirclement, German
dictator Adolf Hitler decided to keep Axis forces in Stalingrad and resupply them by air. In the meantime, Soviet
and German commanders began to plan their next movements.

1 Background
On 28 June 1942, the Wehrmacht began its oensive
against Soviet forces opposite of Army Group South, codenamed Case Blue.[5] After breaking through Red Army
forces by 13 July, German forces encircled and captured
the city of Rostov.[6] Following the fall of Rostov, Hitler
split German forces operating in the southern extremity
of the southern Russian SFSR in an eort to simultaneously capture the city of Stalingrad and the Caucasus oil
elds.[7] The responsibility to take Stalingrad was given
to the Sixth Army, which immediately turned towards the
Volga River and began its advance with heavy air support
from the Luftwae's Luftotte 4.[8] On 7 August, two German panzer corps were able to ank and encircle a Soviet
force of 50,000 personnel and approximately 1,000 tanks,
and on 22 August German forces began to cross the Don
River to complete the advance towards the Volga.[9] The
following day, the Battle of Stalingrad began when vanguards of the Sixth Army penetrated the suburbs of the
city.[10]

Due to the length of the front created by the German

summer oensive, aimed at taking the Caucasus oil elds
and the city of Stalingrad, German and other Axis forces
were forced to guard sectors beyond the length they were
meant to occupy. The situation was exacerbated by the
German decision to relocate several mechanized divisions
from the Soviet Union to Western Europe. Furthermore,
units in the area were depleted after months of ghting,
especially those which took part in the ghting in Stalingrad. The Germans could only count on the 48th Panzer
Corps, which had the strength of a single panzer division,
and the 29th Panzergrenadier Division as reserves to bolster their Romanian allies on the German Sixth Armys
anks. In comparison, the Red Army deployed over one
million personnel for the purpose of beginning the oensive in and around Stalingrad. Soviet troop movements
were not without problems, due to the diculties of concealing their build-up, and to Soviet units commonly arriving late due to logistical issues. Operation Uranus
was rst postponed from 8 to 17 November, then to 19
November.

At 07:20 Moscow time on 19 November, Soviet forces on

the northern ank of the Axis forces at Stalingrad began
their oensive; forces in the south began on 20 November. Although Romanian units were able to repel the rst
attacks, by the end of 20 November the Third and Fourth
Romanian armies were in headlong retreat, as the Red
Army bypassed several German infantry divisions. Ger- German troops advancing in the Soviet Union, June 1942
man mobile reserves were not strong enough to parry the
Soviet mechanized spearheads, while the Sixth Army did By November the Sixth Army had occupied most of Stalingrad, pushing the defending Red Army to the banks
1

2
of the Volga River.[11] By this stage, there were indications of an impending Soviet oensive which would
target Wehrmacht forces around the city, including increased Soviet activity opposite the Sixth Armys anks,
and information gained through the interrogation of Soviet prisoners.[12] However, the German command was
intent upon nalizing its capture of Stalingrad.[13] In fact,
head of Army General Sta General Franz Halder had
been dismissed in September after his eorts to warn
about the danger which was developing along the overextended anks of the Sixth Army and the Fourth Panzer
Army.[14] As early as September the Soviet Stavka (high
command) began planning a series of counteroensives
to encompass the destruction of German forces in the
south, ghting in Stalingrad and in the Caucasus, and
against Army Group Center.[15] Ultimately, command of
Soviet eorts to relieve Stalingrad was put under the leadership of General Aleksandr Vasilevsky.[16]

2 COMPARISON OF FORCES
which was split from Army Group South (the forces operating around the Caucasus were named Army Group A),
seemed strong on paper:[24] it included the Second and
Sixth German, Fourth Panzer, Fourth and Third Romanian, Eighth Italian, and Second Hungarian Armies.[25]
Army Group B had the 48th Panzer Corps, which had
the strength of a weakened panzer division, and a single infantry division as reserves.[26] For the most part the
German anks were held by arriving non-German Axis
armies, while German forces were used to spearhead continued operations in Stalingrad and in the Caucasus.[27]

The Stavka developed two major operations to be conducted against Axis forces near Stalingrad, Uranus and
Saturn, and also planned for Operation Mars designed
to engage German Army Group Center in an eort to
distract reinforcements and to inict as much damage as
possible.[17] Operation Uranus involved the use of large
Soviet mechanized and infantry forces to encircle German and other Axis forces directly around Stalingrad.[18]
As preparations for the oensive commenced, the attacks starting points were positioned on stretches of
front to the rear of the German Sixth Army, largely
preventing the Germans from reinforcing those sectors
quickly where Axis units were too overstretched to occupy eectively.[19] The oensive was a double envelopment; Soviet mechanized forces would penetrate deep
into the German rear, while another attack would be
made closer to the German Sixth Army in an eort to attack German units there directly in the rear.[20] While the
Red Army prepared, the German high commanders
inuenced by their belief that the Red Army, building
up opposite Germany Army Group Center to the north, General Friedrich Paulus, commander of the German Sixth
was incapable of mounting a simultaneous oensive in Army
the southcontinued to deny the possibility of an impending Soviet oensive.[21]
While Adolf Hitler expressed condence in the ability
of non-German Axis units to protect German anks,[28]
in reality these units relied on largely obsolete equipment and horse-drawn artillery, while in many cases the
2 Comparison of forces
harsh treatment of enlisted personnel by ocers caused
poor morale.[29] In regard to mechanization, the First
2.1 Axis forces involved
Romanian Armored Division was equipped with around
100 Czech-built Panzer 35(t) tanks,[24] armed with a 37Case Blue involved German and other Axis forces millimeter (1.5 in) gun[30] ineective against the armor
sprawled out across a front over 480 kilometers (300 of Soviet T-34 tanks.[31] Similarly, their 37-millimeter
mi) wide and several hundred kilometers deep, while (1.5 in) PaK anti-tank guns were also antiquated and they
the decision to conquer Stalingrad had stretched Axis were largely short of ammunition.[32] Only after repeated
forces even more thinly by drawing away personnel requests did the Germans send the Romanian units 75eastwards.[22] For example, in early July the Sixth Army millimeter (3.0 in) PaK guns; six per division.[33] These
was defending a 160-kilometer (99 mi) line, while also units were extended over very large sections of front;
committing to an oensive which involved a distance for example, the Third Romanian Army occupied a line
of around 400 kilometers (250 mi).[23] Army Group B, 140 kilometers (87 mi) long, while the Fourth Romanian

3
Army protected a line no less than 270 kilometers (170
mi) long.[27] The Italians and Hungarians were positioned
at the Don west of the Third Romanian Army,[27] but the
German commanders did not hold in high regard the capability of those units to ght.[34]
Generally, German forces were in no better shape; they
were weakened by months of ghting the Red Army,
and, while Stavka raised new armies, the German high
command attempted to maintain its existing mechanized units.[35] Furthermore, during the course of the
German oensive between May and November 1942,
two motorized divisions, the elite Leibstandarte and the
Grodeutschland, were redeployed from Army Group A
to the West, to provide a mechanized reserve in case of
an Allied landing in France.[36] The Sixth Army had also
suered many casualties during the ghting in the city of
Stalingrad proper.[37] In some cases, such as that of the
22nd Panzer Division, their equipment was no better than
that of the First Romanian Armored Division.[38] German
formations were also overextended along large stretches
of front; the XI Army Corps, for example, had to defend
a front around 100 kilometers (62 mi) long.[39]

The Soviet Stalingrad Front forces were subject to heavy

bombardment, making mobilization more dicult. The
38 engineer battalions allocated to the front were responsible for ferrying ammunition, personnel and tanks
across the Volga River while carrying out minor reconnaissance along sections of the front which were to be
the breakthrough points of the impending oensive. In
three weeks the Red Army transported around 111,000
soldiers, 420 tanks and 556 artillery pieces across the
Volga.[47]

On 17 November Vasilevsky was recalled to Moscow,

where he was shown a letter written to Stalin by General
Volsky, commander of the 4th Mechanized Corps, who
urged calling o the oensive.[48] Volsky believed the offensive as planned was doomed to failure due to the state
of the forces earmarked for the operation; he suggested
postponing the oensive and redesigning it entirely.[49]
Many Soviet soldiers had not been issued with winter garments, and many died of frostbite, due to the irresponsible attitude of commanders.[50] Although Soviet intelligence made honest eorts to collect as much information
as possible on the disposition of the Axis forces arrayed in
front of them,[51] there was not much information on the
state of the German Sixth Army.[52] The Soviet commanders, overruling Vasilevsky, agreed the oensive would
2.2 Soviet forces involved
not be called o, and Stalin personally rang Volsky, who
The Red Army allocated an estimated 1,100,000 person- reiterated his intention to carry out the operation if or[53]
nel, 804 tanks, 13,400 artillery pieces and over 1,000 dered to do so.
[40]
aircraft for the upcoming oensive.
Across the Third
Romanian Army, the Soviets placed the redeployed 5th
Tank Army, as well as the 21st and 65th Armies, in order
to penetrate and overrun the German anks.[41] The Ger- 3 Soviet oensive
man southern ank was targeted by the Stalingrad Fronts
51st and 57th Armies, led by the 13th and 4th Mecha- Operation Uranus, postponed until 17 November, was
nized Corps; these would punch through the Fourth Ro- again postponed for two days when Soviet General
manian Army, in order to link up with the 5th Tank Army Georgy Zhukov was told the air units allotted to the
near the town of Kalach.[42] In total, the Soviets had operation were not ready;[54] it was nally launched on
amassed 11 armies and various independent tank brigades 19 November.[55] Shortly after 5 a.m. Lieutenant Gerand corps.[39] Preparations for the oensive were, how- hard Stck, posted with the Romanian IV Army Corps
ever, far from perfect; on 8 November, Stavka issued or- on the Kletskaya sector called Sixth Army headquarters
ders to postpone the launch date of the operation, because housed in Golubinsky, oering intelligence on a pendtransportation delays had prevented many units from be- ing attack which would occur after 05:00 that morning;
ing able to move into place.[43] In the meantime, units at however, because his call had come in after ve and false
the front went through a number of war games to practice alarms were common during this time, the duty ocer
repelling an enemy counterattack and exploiting a break- on the other end of the line was not keen on waking
through with mechanized forces.[44] These movements the Army Chief of Sta, General Arthur Schmidt.[56]
were masked through a deception campaign by the Sovi- Although Soviet commanders suggested postponing the
ets, including the decrease of radio trac, camouage, bombardment due to poor visibility due to thick fog, front
operational security, using couriers for communication headquarters decided to proceed.[57] At 07:20 Moscow
instead of radio, and active deception, such as increas- time (05:20 German time) Soviet artillery commaning troop movements around Moscow.[45] Troops were ders received the codeword Siren, prompting an 80ordered to build defensive fortications, to oer false im- minute artillery bombardment directed almost entirely
pressions to the Germans, while fake bridges were put up against the non-German Axis units protecting the Gerto divert attention from the real bridges being built across man anks.[54][58] Some 3,500 guns opened up against
the Don River.[46] The Red Army also stepped up attacks the Third Romanian Army and the northern shoulder
against Army Group Center and set up dummy forma- of the German Sixth Armys ank. Although thick fog
tions to maintain the idea of a main oensive against Ger- prevented the Soviet artillery from correcting their aim,
man forces in the center of the Soviet Union.[21]
their weeks of preparation and ranging allowed them

3 SOVIET OFFENSIVE
5th Tank Army.[61] The rst two assaults were repulsed by
the Romanian defenders,[62] and the eects of the heavy
artillery bombardment had actually made it more dicult for Soviet armor to navigate through the mineelds
and terrain. However, the lack of heavy anti-tank artillery
caused the Romanian defense to collapse; a breakthrough
by the 4th Tank Corps and 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps was
established by noon. Soon after, the 5th Tank Army was
able to gain a breakthrough against the Second Romanian
Corps, followed by the Eighth Cavalry Corps.[63] As Soviet armor navigated through the thick fog by compass,
overrunning Romanian and German artillery positions,
three Romanian infantry divisions began to fall back in
disarray; the Third Romanian Army had been outanked
to the West and East.[64] After receiving the news of the
Soviet attack, Sixth Army headquarters failed to order the
16th and 24th Panzer Divisions, hitherto engaged in Stalingrad, to reorient themselves to bolster the Romanian
defenses;[65] instead the task was given to the seriously understrength and poorly equipped 48th Panzer Corps.[66]

Romanian soldier on the front

to lay down accurate re on enemy positions along the

front.[59] The eect was devastating, as communication
lines were breached, ammunition dumps destroyed and
forward observation points shattered. Many Romanian
personnel who survived the bombardment began to ee
to the rear.[54] Soviet heavy artillery aimed at Romanian artillery positions and second-echelon formations
also caught the retreating Romanian soldiers.[60]

Unit locations of Axis and Soviet Armies on Nov 18, 1942.

3.1

Against the Third Romanian Army: 19

November

The oensive against the Third Romanian Army began

at 08:50, led by the 21st and 65th Soviet Armies and the

The 48th Panzer Corps had fewer than 100 serviceable

modern tanks to combat Soviet armor. Furthermore,
they lacked fuel, and the shortage of tanks forced commanders to organize tank crews into infantry companies; the 22nd Panzer Division, which formed part of the
corps, was almost completely destroyed in the ghting
that ensued.[67] The 22nd had entered the ghting with
fewer than thirty working tanks,[68] and left with a company of tanks.[67] The Romanian 1st Armored Division,
attached to the 48th Panzer Corps, engaged the Soviet
26th Tank Corps after having lost communications with
their German corps commanders, and were defeated by
20 November.[69] As the Soviets continued to advance
southwards, many Soviet tank crews began to suer from
the worsening blizzard, which aected men and equipment, and blocked gunsights. It was not uncommon for
tanks to lose traction on the ground, and for a crew member to have an arm broken as he was thrown around inside the hull.[70] However, the blizzard also neutralized
the German corps coordination.[71]
The rout of the Third Romanian Army began by the
end of 19 November.[69] The Soviet 21st Army and 5th
Tank Army were able to capture some 27,000 Romanian prisonersthe bulk of three divisionsand then
continue their advance southwards.[72] Soviet cavalry was
used to exploit the breakthrough, sever communications
between the Romanians and the Italian 8th Army, and
to block any possible counterattack against the Soviet
ank.[73] While the Red Air Force strafed retreating Romanian soldiers, the Luftwae provided only negligible
opposition.[73][74] The withdrawal of the 1st Romanian
Cavalry Division, originally positioned on the German
376th Infantry Divisions ank, allowed the 65th Army
to bypass German defenses.[75] As German forces began
to react late on 19 November, another attack developed
on the Sixth Armys ank to the south.[76]

3.3

3.2

Continued operations: 2023 November

Against the German southern ank:

20 November

Panzer III in the southern Soviet Union, December 1942

In the early morning of 20 November Stavka telephoned

Stalingrad Front commander Andrei Yeremenko asking
if he would begin his portion of the oensive on schedule, at 08:00. He responded he would do so only if the
fog lifted; although the 51st Army opened its artillery barrage on time because front headquarters could not contact
the division, the rest of the forces prepared for the operation received orders to postpone the attack until 10:00.[77]
The 51st Army engaged the Romanian 6th Corps, taking
many prisoners. As the 57th Army joined the attack at
10:00, the situation developed in such a way that the Stalingrad Front could throw its armored corps into battle.[78]
The German 297th Infantry Division watched as its Romanian support failed to put up resistance against the Red
Army.[79] However, confusion and lack of control caused
the Soviet 4th and 13th Mechanized Corps to stumble as
they began to exploit the breakthroughs achieved by the
opening oensive.[80]

Tank Corps advanced beyond the German 11th Corps,

while the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps crashed into the German units rear.[83] The German 376th Infantry Division
and the Austrian 44th Infantry Division began to redeploy
to face the enemy on their anks, but were hindered by
shortage of fuel.[84] The 14th Panzer Division's remaining
panzer regiment destroyed a anking regiment of the Soviet 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps, but its anti-tank artillery
suered heavy casualties when it was overrun by Soviet
forces.[83] By the end of the day the Soviet 1st Tank Corps
was chasing the retreating 48th Panzer Corps, while the
Soviet 26th Tank Corps had captured the town of Perelazovsky, almost 130 kilometers (81 mi) to the northwest
of Stalingrad.[85]

The Germans responded quickly by redeploying their

only reserve in the area, the 29th Panzergrenadier Division. Despite initial victories against Soviet armored
forces, the Romanian collapse forced the division to
again redeploy in an attempt to shore up defenses to the
south.[79] The 29th Panzergrenadier Divisions counterattack had cost the Red Army around fty tanks, and caused
Soviet commanders to worry about the safety of their left
ank.[81] However, the German divisions redeployment
meant that by the end of the day only the 6th Romanian
Cavalry Regiment was positioned between advancing Soviet forces and the Don River.[82]
General Paulus in the southern Soviet Union

3.3

The Red Armys oensive continued on 21 November,

Continued operations: 2023 Novem- with forces of the Stalingrad Front achieving penetrations
ber
of up to 50 kilometers (31 mi). By this time remain-

While the Stalingrad Front launched its oensive on 20

November, the 65th Soviet Army continued to apply
pressure to the German 11th Corps along the northern
shoulder of the Sixth Armys ank. The Red Armys 4th

ing Romanian units in the north were being destroyed

in isolated battles, while the Red Army began to engage
anking portions of the German Fourth Panzer and Sixth
Armies.[86] The German 22nd Panzer Division, despite
attempting a short counterattack, was reduced to little

6
more than a tank company and forced to withdraw to
the southwest.[87] The Soviet 26th Tank Corps, having
destroyed a large portion of the Romanian 1st Armored
Division, continued its advance to the southeast, avoiding engaging enemy left behind, although remnants of
the Romanian 5th Corps were able to reorganize and put
up a hastily constructed defense in the hope that it would
be aided by the German 48th Panzer Corps.[88] That day
German General Friedrich Paulus, commander of the
Sixth Army, received reports that the Soviets were less
than 40 kilometers (25 mi) from his headquarters; furthermore, there were no remaining units which could contest the Soviet advance.[89] In the south, after a brief halt,
the Soviet 4th Mechanized Corps continued its advance
north, removing German defenders from several towns
in the area, towards Stalingrad.[90] As German forces in
and around Stalingrad were at risk, Hitler ordered German forces in the area to establish an all-around defensive position and designated forces between the Don and
Volga rivers as Fortress Stalingrad, rather than allow
the Sixth Army to attempt to break out.[85][91] The Sixth
Army, other Axis units, and most of the Fourth Panzer
Armys German units were caught inside the growing Soviet encirclement. Only the 16th Panzergrenadier Division began to ght its way out. Lack of coordination between Soviet tanks and infantry as the Red Armys tank
corps attempted to exploit the breakthrough along the
Germans southern ank allowed much of the Fourth Romanian Army to escape destruction.[85]
On 22 November Soviet forces began to cross the Don
River and continued their advance towards the town
of Kalach.[92] German forces defending Kalach, mostly
composed of maintenance and supply personnel, were
not aware of the Soviet oensive until 21 November,
and even then did not know in what strength the Red
Army was approaching.[93] The task of taking the bridge
at Kalach was given to the Soviet 26th Tank Corps, which
used two captured German tanks and a reconnaissance
vehicle to approach it and re on the guards.[94] Soviet
forces broke into the town by mid-morning and drove
the defenders out, allowing themselves and the 4th Tank
Corps to link up with the Red Armys 4th Mechanized
Corps approaching from the south.[95] The encirclement
of German forces in Stalingrad was completed on 22
November 1942.[96] That day Soviet formations also continued to ght pockets of Romanian resistance, such as
that put up by the Romanian 5th Corps.[97]
Fighting continued on 23 November as the Germans attempted in vain to mount local counterattacks to break
the encirclement.[92] By this time Axis personnel inside
the encirclement moved east towards Stalingrad to avoid
Soviet tanks, while those that managed to escape the encirclement moved west toward German and other Axis
forces.[98]

4 AFTERMATH

4 Aftermath
Operation Uranus trapped between 250,000 and 300,000
Axis soldiers within an area stretching 50 kilometers (31
mi) from east to west and 40 kilometers (25 mi) north
to south.[99] The pocket contained four infantry corps, a
panzer corps belonging to the Fourth Panzer and Sixth
Armies, and surviving elements of two Romanian divisions, a Croat infantry regiment and other specialist units.
Trapped equipment included around 100 tanks, 2,000
artillery pieces and mortars and 10,000 trucks.[100] The
withdrawal to Stalingrad left lines of retreat littered with
helmets, weapons and other equipment, and heavy equipment which had been destroyed was left on the side of the
road.[101] Bridges spanning the Don River were jammed
with trac, as surviving Axis soldiers hastily made their
way eastwards in the cold weather, attempting to escape
Soviet armor and infantry threatening to cut them o
from Stalingrad.[102] Many wounded Axis personnel were
trampled, and many of those who attempted to cross the
river on foot on the ice fell through and drowned.[103]
Hungry soldiers lled Russian villages scouring for supplies, while supply dumps were often looted in search
of cans of food.[104] The last stragglers crossed the Don
River by 24 November, and demolished the bridges to
seal o the Fourth Panzer and Sixth Armies from the Soviets in Stalingrad.[105]
The Sixth Army, in the midst of chaos, began to build
defensive lines, hampered by the lack of fuel, ammunition and rations, and further burdened by the advancing Russian winter. It was also tasked with plugging
gaps in the line caused by the disintegrating Romanian
forces.[106] On 23 November, some German units destroyed or burned everything not necessary for a breakout operation and began to pull back towards the northern end of Stalingrad. However, after the Germans had
abandoned their winter bunkers, the Soviet 62nd Army
was able to destroy the German 94th Infantry Division on
the open ground; survivors of the German division were
attached to the 16th and 24th Panzer Divisions.[107] Although German military commanders were of the opinion
that Wehrmacht forces caught in the encirclement should
break out, between 23 and 24 November Hitler decided
instead to hold the position and attempt to resupply the
Sixth Army by air.[108] The personnel trapped in Stalingrad would require at least 680 metric tons (750 short
tons) of supplies per day, a task which the depleted Luftwae was actually in no condition to carry out. Furthermore, the revived Red Air Force was a threat to German aircraft attempting to y over the encirclement. Although by December the Luftwae had assembled a eet
of around 500 aircraft, this was still insucient to supply
the Sixth Army and elements of the Fourth Panzer Army
with the required supplies.[109] During the rst half of December the Sixth Army received less than 20% of their
daily requirements.[110]
In the meantime, the Red Army strengthened its outer en-

7
circlement with the intention of destroying the encircled
German units. Soviet armies would attack German units
to the east and the south, aiming to split German units
into smaller groups. These orders became eective on
24 November, and were to be executed without a major
regrouping or movement of reserves.[111] The outer encirclement ran for an estimated 320 kilometers (200 mi),
although only three-quarters of that distance was actually
covered by Soviet troops; the distance between the outer
and inner encirclements was around 16 kilometers (9.9
mi).[112] The Soviet high command also began planning
for Operation Saturn,[113] which was aimed at destroying
the Italian Eighth Army and cutting o German forces
in the Caucasus.[114] The Soviet Stavka planned Saturn to
start on about 10 December.[115]

[14] McCarthy & Syron (2002), pp. 137138

German forces in the area had been further split up,

as German general Erich von Manstein was given command of the newly created Army Group Don, comprising the German Fourth Panzer and Sixth Armies, and
the Third and Fourth Romanian Armies.[116] Although
the situation looked bleak for the Germans, a moment
of relative calm had settled after the end of Operation
Uranus; German and Soviet forces were planning their
next movements.[117]

[24] Erickson (1975), p. 453

[15] Glantz (1999), p. 17

[16] Glantz (1999), p. 18
[17] Glantz (1995), pp. 129130
[18] Glantz (1995), p. 130
[19] Beevor (1998), pp. 225226
[20] Beevor (1998), p. 226
[21] McTaggart (2006), pp. 4950
[22] Cooper (1978), p. 420
[23] Cooper (1978), p. 418

[25] Erickson, pp. 453454

[26] Erickson, p. 454
[27] McTaggart (2006), p. 49
[28] McTaggart (2006), p. 48
[29] McTaggart (2006), pp. 4849
[30] Perrett (1998), p. 17

See also

[31] Perrett (1998), p. 21

[32] Beevor (1998), p. 229

Romanian Armies in the Battle of Stalingrad

Operation Little Saturn

[33] Clark (1975), pp. 240241

[34] Manstein (1982), p. 293
[35] Glantz (1995), p. 124

Notes

[1] Glantz & House (1995), p. 134

[2] Bergstrm (2007), p. 87
[3] Bergstrm (2007), p. 88
[4] Anthony Tihamer Komjathy (1982). A Thousand Years of
the Hungarian Art of War. Toronto: Rakoczi Foundation.
pp. 14445. ISBN 0819165247.
[5] McCarthy & Syron (2002), p. 131
[6] Glantz (1995), p. 119
[7] Glantz (1995), p. 120
[8] McCarthy & Syron (2002), pp. 135136
[9] McCarthy & Syron (2002), p. 136

[36] Cooper (1978), p. 425

[37] Cooper (1978), pp. 425426
[38] McTaggart (2006), pp. 5051
[39] McTaggart (2006), p. 50
[40] Glantz (1995), p. 134
[41] Glantz (1995), p. 131
[42] Glantz (1995), pp. 131132
[43] Erickson (1975), p. 456
[44] Erickson (1975), pp. 456457
[45] Beevor (1998), pp. 226227
[46] Beevor (1998), p. 227
[47] Erickson (1975), p. 457

[10] Cooper (1978), p. 422

[48] Erickson (1975), p. 461

[11] Clark (1965), p. 239

[49] Erickson (1975), pp. 461462

[12] Clark (1965), p. 241

[50] Beevor (1998), p. 232

[13] Clark (1965), p. 242

[51] Beevor (1998), p. 233

[52] Beevor (1998), p. 234

[90] Erickson (1975), pp. 468469

[53] Erickson (1975), p. 462

[91] Beevor (1998), p. 254

[54] McTaggart (2006), p. 51

[92] Erickson (1975), p. 469

[55] Glantz (1996), p. 118

[93] McTaggart (2006), p. 72

[56] Beevor (1998), p. 239

[94] Beevor (1998), p. 255

[57] Beevor (1998), pp. 239240

[95] Beevor (1998), pp. 255256

[58] McCarthy & Syron (2002), p. 138

[96] McCarthy & Syron (2002), pp. 140141

[59] Beevor (1998), p. 240

[97] Beevor (1998), p. 256

[60] McTaggart (2006), pp. 5152

[98] Erickson (1975), pp. 469470

[61] Erickson (1975), p. 464

[99] McCarthy & Syron (2002), p. 141

[62] Beevor (1998), pp. 240241

[100] Erickson (1975), p. 470

[63] Beevor (1998), p. 241

[101] Beevor (1998), p. 258

[64] Erickson (1975), pp. 464465

[102] Beevor (1998), pp. 258259

[65] McCarthy & Syron (2002), pp. 138139

[103] Beevor (1998), p. 259

[66] McCarthy & Syron (2002), pp. 139140

[104] Beevor (1998), pp. 259260

[67] McCarthy & Syron (2002), p. 140

[105] Beevor (1998), pp. 260262

[68] Beevor (1998), p. 245

[106] Erickson (1983), p. 2

[69] Erickson (1975), pp. 465466

[107] Erickson (1983), pp. 23

[70] Beevor (1998), pp. 245246

[108] Erickson (1983), p. 3

[71] Beevor (1998), p. 246

[109] Bell (2006), p. 62

[72] Glantz (1995), p. 133

[110] Bell (2006), pp. 6263

[73] McTaggart (2006), p. 52

[111] Erickson (1975), pp. 470471

[74] Bell (2006), p. 61

[112] Erickson (1975), pp. 471472

[75] McTaggart (2006), pp. 5253

[113] Erickson (1983), p. 5

[76] McTaggart (2006), pp. 5354

[114] Beevor (1998), pp. 292293

[77] Erickson (1975), p. 466

[115] Beevor (1998), p. 293

[78] Erickson (1975), pp. 466467

[116] Erickson (1983), p. 7

[79] McTaggart (2006), p. 54

[117] Erickson (1983), pp. 57

REFERENCES

[80] Beevor (1998), p. 250

[81] Erickson (1975), pp. 467468
[82] Beevor (1998), pp. 250251
[83] Beevor (1998), p. 251
[84] McTaggart (2006), pp. 5455
[85] McTaggart (2006), p. 55
[86] Erickson (1975), p. 468
[87] Beevor (1998), p. 252
[88] Beevor (1998), pp. 252253
[89] Beevor (1998), p. 253

7 References
Beevor, Antony (1998). Stalingrad: The Fateful
Siege: 1942 1943. Harmondsworth, United Kingdom: Penguin Putnam Inc. ISBN 0-670-87095-1.
Bell, Kelly (Fall 2006). Struggle for Stalins Skies.
WWII History: Russian Front. Special (Herndon,
Virginia: Sovereign Media). Issue. 1539-5456.
Bergstrm, Christer (2007). Stalingrad The
Air Battle: 1942 through January 1943. Harmondsworth, United Kingdom: Chevron Publishing
Limited. ISBN 978-1-85780-276-4.

9
Clark, Alan (1965). Barbarossa: The RussianGerman Conict, 19411945. New York City, New
York: William Morrow. ISBN 0-688-04268-6.
Cooper, Matthew (1978). The German Army 1933
1945. Lanham, Maryland: Scarborough House.
ISBN 0-8128-8519-8.
Erickson, John (1983). The Road to Berlin: Stalins
War with Germany. Yale University Press. ISBN
0-300-07813-7.
Erickson, John (1975). The Road to Stalingrad:
Stalins War With Germany. Yale University Press.
ISBN 0-300-07812-9.
Glantz, David M. (January 1996). Soviet Military
Strategy During the Second Period of War (November 1942 December 1943): A Reappraisal. The
Journal of Military History (Society for Military
History) 60 (1): 35. doi:10.2307/2944451.
Glantz, David M.; Jonathan House (1995). When
Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler.
Lawrence, Kansas: Kansas University Press. ISBN
0-7006-0717-X.
Glantz, David M. (1999). Zhukovs Greatest Defeat:
The Red Armys Epic Disaster in Operation Mars,
1942. Lawrence, Kansas: Kansas University Press.
ISBN 0-7006-0944-X.
McCarthy, Peter; Mike Syron (2002). Panzerkrieg:
The Rise and Fall of Hitlers Tank Divisions. New
York City, New York: Carroll & Graf. ISBN 07867-1009-8.
McTaggart, Pat (Fall 2006). Soviet Circle of Iron.
WWII History: Russian Front. Special (Herndon,
Virginia: Sovereign Media). Issue. 1539-5456.
Perrett, Bryan (1998). German Light Panzers 1932
42. Oxford, United Kingdom: Osprey. ISBN 185532-844-5.
von Manstein, Erich (1982). Lost Victories. St.
Paul, MN: Zenith Press. ISBN 0891411305.

External links
Order of Battle for operation Uranus, by Anton Joly

10

9 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

9.1

Text

Operation Uranus Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Uranus?oldid=655486903 Contributors: Mav, Bobby D. Bryant,

Ixfd64, Hike395, PaulinSaudi, Maximus Rex, Altenmann, HaeB, Andries, Oberiko, Wwoods, Everyking, Michael Devore, KirbyMeister, Spottedowl, Flyhighplato, Lacrimosus, Ularsen, Kostja, El C, Art LaPella, SS451, Colonel Cow, Wendell, Alansohn, LtNOWIS,
Andrew Gray, Hohum, BadSeed, LARS, Catalan, Pol098, Tabletop, Cloaked Romulan, Zzyzx11, Ronnotel, DavidCane, Vberger~enwiki,
Rjwilmsi, RJP, Old Moonraker, Pinkville, Jaraalbe, Roboto de Ajvol, YurikBot, Noclador, TSO1D, Brandmeister (old), Bleakcomb, Kirill Lokshin, Manxruler, David R. Ingham, NawlinWiki, Mareklug, Paul Erik, Nick-D, Hux, Eskimbot, TypoDotOrg, Yamaguchi ,
Hmains, MalafayaBot, Rcbutcher, Famspear, Trekphiler, Tswold@msn.com, Andreas1968, Saminferno, GameKeeper, John, Shrew,
Robosh, KarlM, Volker89, SandyGeorgia, WilliamJE, Twas Now, GrahamBould, The ed17, Yarnalgo, Grahamec, Thijs!bot, JAnDbot, Turgidson, Ericoides, East718, Acroterion, WolfmanSF, Dodo19~enwiki, Bongwarrior, Buckshot06, The Anomebot2, Emw, Zipline~enwiki, EyeSerene, Dapi89, ColorOfSuering, CommonsDelinker, RockMFR, J.delanoy, DrKiernan, Uncle Dick, Gmchambless1,
Mrg3105, Chiswick Chap, MisterBee1966, Lulo.it, Juliancolton, Esdrasbarnevelt, CardinalDan, VolkovBot, Ilya1166, GimmeBot, Piratedan, Truthanado, Climie.ca, Christwelfwww, 4wajzkd02, WereSpielChequers, DavisGL, Dawn Bard, Interchange88, Altzinn, Richard
David Ramsey, MBK004, ClueBot, Phoenix-wiki, The Thing That Should Not Be, Jappalang, Mild Bill Hiccup, Piledhigheranddeeper,
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Udafed, Gravios123456789, Pusegona, ZCman1217, Vietbook, Robertiki, Betamw, 564dude, Ryan.opel, RjwilmsiBot, TjBot, EmausBot,
ZroBot, Ain92, WorldWarTwoEditor, ClueBot NG, MJ1996, Helpful Pixie Bot, Hamish59, Mhman, LoanP8, Googlehoops, Dexbot,
Lorackio, Monkbot and Anonymous: 128

9.2

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9.3

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