September 2013 Philippine Supreme

Court Decisions on Criminal Law

and Procedure
Posted on October 7, 2013 by Dominador Maphilindo O. Carrillo Posted in Criminal Law, Philippines Cases, Philippines - Law Tagged arraignment, dangerous drugs, estafa, evident
premeditation, preliminary investigation, qualified rape, rape

Here are select September 2013 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on
criminal law and procedure:
1.

REVISED PENAL CODE

Estafa under Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code; elements. In order to
constitute estafa under Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code, the act of
postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of
the defraudation. This means that the offender must be able to obtain money or
property from the offended party by reason of the issuance of the check, whether dated
or postdated. In other words, the Prosecution must show that the person to whom the
check was delivered would not have parted with his money or property were it not for
the issuance of the check by the offender. The essential elements of this crime are the
following: (a) a check is postdated or issued in payment of an obligation contracted at
the time the check is issued; (b) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and
(c) damage to the payee thereof. People of the Philippines v. Gilbert Reyes Wagas, G.R.
No. 157943, September 4, 2013.
Estafa under Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code; what the law punishes is fraud
or deceit, not the mere issuance of a worthless check. In this case, the Prosecution
established that Ligaray had released the goods to Caada because of the postdated
check the latter had given to him; and that the check was dishonored when presented
for payment because of the insufficiency of funds. In every criminal prosecution,
however, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. In that regard, the Prosecution did not establish beyond
reasonable doubt that it was accused Wagas who had defrauded Ligaray by issuing the
check. Firstly, Ligaray expressly admitted that he did not personally meet the person
with whom he was transacting over the telephone. Even after the dishonor of the check,
Ligaray did not personally see and meet whoever he had dealt with and to whom he had
made the demand for payment, and that he had talked with him only over the
telephone. Secondly, the check delivered to Ligaray was made payable to cash this
type of check was payable to the bearer and could be negotiated by mere delivery
without the need of an indorsement. This rendered it highly probable that Wagas had
issued the check not to Ligaray, but to somebody else like Caada, his brother-in-law,
who then negotiated it to Ligaray. Relevantly, Ligaray confirmed that he did not himself
see or meet Wagas at the time of the transaction and thereafter, and expressly stated
that the person who signed for and received the stocks of rice was Caada. It bears
stressing that the accused, to be guilty of estafa as charged, must have used the check
in order to defraud the complainant. What the law punishes is the fraud or deceit, not
the mere issuance of the worthless check. Wagas could not be held guilty of estafa
simply because he had issued the check used to defraud Ligaray. The proof of guilt must
still clearly show that it had been Wagas as the drawer who had defrauded Ligaray by
means of the check. Thus, considering that the circumstances of the identification of

Wagas as the person who transacted on the rice did not preclude a reasonable
possibility of mistake, the proof of guilt did not measure up to the standard of proof
beyond reasonable doubt demanded in criminal cases. People of the Philippines v.
Gilbert Reyes Wagas, G.R. No. 157943, September 4, 2013.
Evident premeditation; requisites. In order for evident premeditation to be appreciated,
the following requisites must concur: (1) the time when accused decided to commit the
crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he has clung to his determination; and,
(3) sufficient lapse of time between such a determination and the actual execution to
allow the accused time to reflect upon the consequences of his act. In this case, the
courts below based their finding of evident premeditation on the entries in the Dispatch
Logbook, the alleged pretense made by the appellant and cohorts that they were going
to conduct a police operation regarding illegal drugs, as well as the telephone call made
by the victim to his friend Reyes before the incident. To the Supreme Courts mind,
however, these circumstances do not constitute clear and positive evidence of outward
acts showing a premeditation to kill. At most, these circumstances are indicative only of
conspiracy among the accused. Settled is the rule that when it is not shown how and
when the plan to kill was hatched or how much time had elapsed before it was carried
out, evident premeditation cannot be considered. It must appear not only that the
accused decided to commit the crime prior to the moment of its execution but also that
this decision was the result of meditation, calculation, reflection or persistent attempt.
Notably, even the Office of the Solicitor General admitted that the lapse of time from
the moment the victim was fetched until the shooting cannot be considered sufficient
for appellant to reflect upon the consequences of his act. People of the Philippines v.
SPO1 Alfredo Alawig, G.R. No. 187731, September 18, 2013.
Qualified rape; knowledge of the offender of the mental disability of the victim.
Knowledge of the offender of the mental disability of the victim during the commission
of the crime of rape qualifies and makes it punishable by death. However, such
knowledge by the rapist should be alleged in the Information since a crime can only be
qualified by circumstances pleaded in the indictment. In this case, appellants
knowledge of the mental disability of AAA at the time of the commission of the crime
of rape was properly alleged in the Amended Information. As found by the lower courts,
the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was aware of the
mental retardation of AAA. Appellant testified that he knew AAA and that he even
used to reside with her and her relatives. He was treated as a member of their family. In
fact, he regarded AAA as his niece. His boarding house was also a few minutes away
from the residence of AAA. He also admitted that AAA was known to be mentally
retarded in their community. The low intellect of AAA was easily noticeable to the trial
court from the answers she gave to the questions propounded to her in the course of
her testimony. Further, the Supreme Court stressed that from the filing of this case until
its appeal, appellant did not assail AAAs mental disability and even admitted
knowledge of her intellectual inadequacy. Thus, appellants knowledge of AAAs
mental disability at the time of the commission of the crime qualifies the crime of rape.
Appellant is therefore guilty of the crime of qualified rape. People of the Philippines v.
Jojie Suansing, G.R. No. 189822, September 2, 2013.
Rape; the lack of lacerated wounds in the vagina is not a defense. In an effort to secure
his exoneration from the charge of rape, Rivera pointed out that the records were bereft
of evidence to prove that AAA suffered vaginal lacerations. The Supreme Court held that
the lack of lacerated wounds in the vagina, however, does not negate sexual
intercourse. Laceration of the hymen, even if considered the most telling and irrefutable
physical evidence of sexual assault, is not always essential to establish the
consummation of the crime of rape. In the context used in the Revised Penal Code,
carnal knowledge, unlike its ordinary connotation of sexual intercourse, does not

necessarily require that the vagina be penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured.
Accordingly, granting arguendo that AAA did not suffer any laceration, Rivera would still
be guilty of rape after it was clearly established that he did succeed in having carnal
knowledge of her. At any rate, it has been repeatedly held that the medical examination
of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. Expert testimony is merely
corroborative in character and not essential to a conviction. People of the Philippines v.
Christopher Rivera y Royo, G.R. No. 200508, September 4, 2013.
Self-defense; burden of proof in self-defense. Appellant faults the Court of Appeals (CA)
when it imposed on him the burden of proving the elements of self-defense. He claims it
was PO3 Ventinilla who acted in self-defense and, therefore, it was incumbent upon the
latter to establish such fact. He avers that his defense is denial as found by the trial
court. Obviously, appellant was confused. It must be noted that he was the only witness
who testified on the circumstances surrounding the tragic death of the victim. It was he
who supplied the necessary evidence showing that there was unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim. Contrary to the undisputed finding of Dr. Bernales that there are
more than one assailant in view of the multiple bullet wounds on the body of the victim,
appellant insists it was only PO3 Ventinilla who killed the victim. However, neither PO3
Ventinilla nor the victim could be resurrected from their graves to controvert appellants
version of the story. Besides, in the Counter-Affidavit of SPO4 Miraples, appellants coaccused, he stated therein that appellant acted in self-defense when the victim
allegedly went berserk. More important, in his Answer to the administrative complaint
filed by the victims widow, appellant interposed self-defense by alleging that it was the
victim who initiated the attack through unlawful aggression. Hence, the CA committed
no error in imposing upon him the burden of proving the elements of selfdefense. People of the Philippines v. SPO1 Alfredo Alawig, G.R. No. 187731, September
18, 2013.
2.
SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Section 3(e) offense; elements. In all, the petitioner
failed to demonstrate that the Sandiganbayan committed reversible errors in finding
him guilty of the violating section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. For the aforecited provision to lie
against the petitioner, the following elements must concur: 1) The accused must be a
public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; 2) He must have
acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and 3)
That his action caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving
any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
functions. Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as when the
accused acted with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa, as when the
accused committed gross inexcusable negligence. Jovito C. Plameras v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 187268, September 4, 2013.
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Section 3(e) offense; elements. As correctly
observed by the Sandiganbayan, certain established rules, regulations and policies of
the Commission on Audit and those mandated under the Local Government Code of
1991 were knowingly sidestepped and ignored by the petitioner which enabled
CKLEnterprises/Dela Cruz to successfully get full payment for the school desks and
armchairs, despite non-delivery an act or omission evidencing bad faith and manifest
partiality. It must be borne to mind that any procurement or acquisition of supplies or
property by local government units shall be through competitive public bidding. The
petitioner admitted in his testimony that he is aware of such requirement, however, he
proceeded just the same due to the alleged advice of the unnamed DECS representative
that there was already a negotiated contract a representation or misrepresentation he
willfully believed in without any verification. As a Governor, he must know that

negotiated contract can only be resorted to in case of failure of a public bidding. As it is,
there is no public bidding to speak of that has been conducted. Intentionally or not, it is
his duty to act in a circumspect manner to protect government funds. To do otherwise is
gross inexcusable negligence, at the very least, especially so, that petitioner acted on
his own initiative and without authorization from the Provincial School Board. Jovito C.
Plameras v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 187268, September 4, 2013.
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Section 3(e) offense; elements. The same thing can
be said about the act of petitioner in signing the sales invoice and the bank draft
knowing that such documents would cause the withdrawal by CKL Enterprises/Dela Cruz
of the corresponding amount covered by the Irrevocable Domestic Letter of Credit. It
must be noted that any withdrawal with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) must be
accompanied by the appropriate document evidencing deliveries. In signing the draft
and sales invoice, petitioner made it possible for CKL Enterprises/Dela Cruz to withdraw
the entire P5,666,600.00 without any delivery of the items. As the records would bear,
the CKL Enterprises Invoice dated 16 April 1997, contains the signature of the accused
as customer. Above the customers signature is the phrase: Received and accepted the
above items in good condition. The significance of the customers signature on the
invoice is that it initiates the process of releasing the payment to the seller. This is all
that the LBP needs in order to release the money alloted for the purchase.
Unfortunately, despite receipt of payment, it was almost a year after when delivery of
the items was made on a piece meal basis-some of which were even defective. The
Supreme Court, therefore, was not persuaded that petitioner deserves to be
exonerated. On the contrary, evidence of undue injury caused to the Province of Antique
and giving of unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to CKL Enterprises/DelaCruz
committed through gross inexcusable negligence was proven beyond reasonable
doubt. Jovito C. Plameras v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 187268, September 4,
2013.

Chain of custody rule; legal effect of failure to prove chain of custody. The chain of
custody rule is a method of authenticating evidence which requires that the admission
of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what the proponent claims it to be. In this case, the Supreme Court found
reasonable doubt on the evidence presented to prove an unbroken chain of custody.
First, it is not clear from the evidence that the marking, which was done in the police
station, was made in the presence of the accused or his representative. Thus, there is
already a gap in determining whether the specimens that entered into the chain were
actually the ones examined and offered in evidence. Second, the prosecution failed to
duly accomplish the Certificate of Inventory and to take photos of the seized items
pursuant to the law. There is nothing in the records that would show at least an attempt
to comply with this procedural safeguard; neither was there any justifiable reason
propounded for failing to do so. Third, the Supreme Court found conflicting testimony
and glaring inconsistencies that would cast doubt on the integrity of the handling of the
seized drugs. The material inconsistency of who actually received the specimens in the
Crime Laboratory creates a cloud of doubt as to whether the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items were preserved. The gaps in the chain of custody creates a
reasonable doubt as to whether the specimens seized from the accused were the same
specimens brought to the laboratory and eventually offered in court as evidence.
Without adequate proof of the corpus delicti, the conviction cannot stand. People of the
Philippines v. Freddy Salonga y Afiado, G.R. No. 194948, September 2, 2013.
3.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Arraignment; purpose. Arraignment is indispensable in bringing the accused to court

and in notifying him of the nature and cause of the accusations against him. The
importance of arraignment is based on the constitutional right of the accused to be
informed. It is at this stage that the accused, for the first time, is given the opportunity
to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is only imperative that he is thus made
fully aware of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of
the imputed crime. Letecia I. Kummer v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 174461,
September 11, 2013.
Arraignment; the need for arraignment where the complaint or information is amended.
The need for arraignment is equally imperative in an amended information or complaint.
This, however, pertains only to substantial amendments and not to formal amendments
that, by their very nature, do not charge an offense different from that charged in the
original complaint or information; do not alter the theory of the prosecution; do not
cause any surprise and affect the line of defense; and do not adversely affect the
substantial rights of the accused, such as an amendment in the date of the commission
of the offense. Further, an amendment done after the plea and during trial, in
accordance with the rules, does not call for a second plea since the amendment is only
as to form. The purpose of an arraignment, that is, to inform the accused of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, has already been attained when the accused
was arraigned the first time. The subsequent amendment could not have conceivably
come as a surprise to the accused simply because the amendment did not charge a new
offense nor alter the theory of the prosecution. Applying these rules and principles to
the prevailing case, the records of the case evidently show that the amendment in the
complaint was from July 19, 1988 to June 19, 1988, or a difference of only one month. It
is clear that consistent with the rule on amendments, the change in the date of the
commission of the crime of homicide is a formal amendment it does not change the
nature of the crime, does not affect the essence of the offense nor deprive the accused
of an opportunity to meet the new averment, and is not prejudicial to the accused.
Further, the defense under the complaint is still available after the amendment, as this
was, in fact, the same line of defenses used by the petitioner. Letecia I. Kummer v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 174461, September 11, 2013.
Preliminary investigation; the conduct of preliminary investigation belongs to the public
prosecutor. The well-established rule is that the conduct of preliminary investigation for
the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause is a function that belongs to
the public prosecutor. The prosecution of crimes lies with the executive department of
the government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that the laws of the
land are faithfully executed. Thus, the rule is that the Supreme Court (SC) will not
interfere in the findings of the Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary on the insufficiency
of the evidence presented to establish probable cause unless it is shown that the
questioned acts were done in a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
evidencing a clear case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. The party seeking the writ of certiorari must establish that the DOJ
Secretary exercised his executive power in an arbitrary and despotic manner, by reason
of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross
as would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or
to act in contemplation of law. In the present case, there was no clear evidence of grave
abuse of discretion committed by the DOJ when it set aside its March 23, 2000
Resolution and reinstated the July 28, 1998 Resolution of the public prosecutor. The DOJ
was correct when it characterized the complaint for attempted murder as already
covered by two (2) other criminal cases. As to the other complaints, the SC agreed with
the DOJ that they were weak and not adequately supported by credible evidence. Thus,
the CA erred in supplanting the prosecutors discretion with its own. Evidently, the

conclusions arrived at by the DOJ were neither whimsical nor capricious as to be

corrected by certiorari. Even on the assumption that the DOJ Secretary made erroneous
conclusions, this error alone would not subject his act to correction or annulment by the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari. After all, not every erroneous conclusion of law or
fact is an abuse of discretion. Rosalinda Punzalan, Randall Punzalan and Rainier
Punzalan v. Michael Gamaliel J. Plata and Ruben Plata, G.R. No. 160316, September 2,
2013.
(Lindy thanks Isabel F. Serina, Elaine B. de los Santos, and Vincent C. Juan for assisting
in the preparation of this post.)

September 2013 Philippine Supreme

Court Decisions on Criminal Law
and Procedure
Posted on October 7, 2013 by Dominador Maphilindo O. Carrillo Posted in Criminal Law, Philippines Cases, Philippines - Law Tagged arraignment, dangerous drugs, estafa, evident
premeditation, preliminary investigation, qualified rape, rape

Here are select September 2013 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on
criminal law and procedure:
1.

REVISED PENAL CODE

Estafa under Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code; elements. In order to
constitute estafa under Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code, the act of
postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of
the defraudation. This means that the offender must be able to obtain money or
property from the offended party by reason of the issuance of the check, whether dated
or postdated. In other words, the Prosecution must show that the person to whom the
check was delivered would not have parted with his money or property were it not for
the issuance of the check by the offender. The essential elements of this crime are the
following: (a) a check is postdated or issued in payment of an obligation contracted at
the time the check is issued; (b) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and
(c) damage to the payee thereof. People of the Philippines v. Gilbert Reyes Wagas, G.R.
No. 157943, September 4, 2013.
Estafa under Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code; what the law punishes is fraud
or deceit, not the mere issuance of a worthless check. In this case, the Prosecution
established that Ligaray had released the goods to Caada because of the postdated
check the latter had given to him; and that the check was dishonored when presented
for payment because of the insufficiency of funds. In every criminal prosecution,
however, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. In that regard, the Prosecution did not establish beyond
reasonable doubt that it was accused Wagas who had defrauded Ligaray by issuing the
check. Firstly, Ligaray expressly admitted that he did not personally meet the person
with whom he was transacting over the telephone. Even after the dishonor of the check,
Ligaray did not personally see and meet whoever he had dealt with and to whom he had
made the demand for payment, and that he had talked with him only over the
telephone. Secondly, the check delivered to Ligaray was made payable to cash this
type of check was payable to the bearer and could be negotiated by mere delivery
without the need of an indorsement. This rendered it highly probable that Wagas had

issued the check not to Ligaray, but to somebody else like Caada, his brother-in-law,
who then negotiated it to Ligaray. Relevantly, Ligaray confirmed that he did not himself
see or meet Wagas at the time of the transaction and thereafter, and expressly stated
that the person who signed for and received the stocks of rice was Caada. It bears
stressing that the accused, to be guilty of estafa as charged, must have used the check
in order to defraud the complainant. What the law punishes is the fraud or deceit, not
the mere issuance of the worthless check. Wagas could not be held guilty of estafa
simply because he had issued the check used to defraud Ligaray. The proof of guilt must
still clearly show that it had been Wagas as the drawer who had defrauded Ligaray by
means of the check. Thus, considering that the circumstances of the identification of
Wagas as the person who transacted on the rice did not preclude a reasonable
possibility of mistake, the proof of guilt did not measure up to the standard of proof
beyond reasonable doubt demanded in criminal cases. People of the Philippines v.
Gilbert Reyes Wagas, G.R. No. 157943, September 4, 2013.
Evident premeditation; requisites. In order for evident premeditation to be appreciated,
the following requisites must concur: (1) the time when accused decided to commit the
crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he has clung to his determination; and,
(3) sufficient lapse of time between such a determination and the actual execution to
allow the accused time to reflect upon the consequences of his act. In this case, the
courts below based their finding of evident premeditation on the entries in the Dispatch
Logbook, the alleged pretense made by the appellant and cohorts that they were going
to conduct a police operation regarding illegal drugs, as well as the telephone call made
by the victim to his friend Reyes before the incident. To the Supreme Courts mind,
however, these circumstances do not constitute clear and positive evidence of outward
acts showing a premeditation to kill. At most, these circumstances are indicative only of
conspiracy among the accused. Settled is the rule that when it is not shown how and
when the plan to kill was hatched or how much time had elapsed before it was carried
out, evident premeditation cannot be considered. It must appear not only that the
accused decided to commit the crime prior to the moment of its execution but also that
this decision was the result of meditation, calculation, reflection or persistent attempt.
Notably, even the Office of the Solicitor General admitted that the lapse of time from
the moment the victim was fetched until the shooting cannot be considered sufficient
for appellant to reflect upon the consequences of his act. People of the Philippines v.
SPO1 Alfredo Alawig, G.R. No. 187731, September 18, 2013.
Qualified rape; knowledge of the offender of the mental disability of the victim.
Knowledge of the offender of the mental disability of the victim during the commission
of the crime of rape qualifies and makes it punishable by death. However, such
knowledge by the rapist should be alleged in the Information since a crime can only be
qualified by circumstances pleaded in the indictment. In this case, appellants
knowledge of the mental disability of AAA at the time of the commission of the crime
of rape was properly alleged in the Amended Information. As found by the lower courts,
the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was aware of the
mental retardation of AAA. Appellant testified that he knew AAA and that he even
used to reside with her and her relatives. He was treated as a member of their family. In
fact, he regarded AAA as his niece. His boarding house was also a few minutes away
from the residence of AAA. He also admitted that AAA was known to be mentally
retarded in their community. The low intellect of AAA was easily noticeable to the trial
court from the answers she gave to the questions propounded to her in the course of
her testimony. Further, the Supreme Court stressed that from the filing of this case until
its appeal, appellant did not assail AAAs mental disability and even admitted
knowledge of her intellectual inadequacy. Thus, appellants knowledge of AAAs
mental disability at the time of the commission of the crime qualifies the crime of rape.

Appellant is therefore guilty of the crime of qualified rape. People of the Philippines v.
Jojie Suansing, G.R. No. 189822, September 2, 2013.
Rape; the lack of lacerated wounds in the vagina is not a defense. In an effort to secure
his exoneration from the charge of rape, Rivera pointed out that the records were bereft
of evidence to prove that AAA suffered vaginal lacerations. The Supreme Court held that
the lack of lacerated wounds in the vagina, however, does not negate sexual
intercourse. Laceration of the hymen, even if considered the most telling and irrefutable
physical evidence of sexual assault, is not always essential to establish the
consummation of the crime of rape. In the context used in the Revised Penal Code,
carnal knowledge, unlike its ordinary connotation of sexual intercourse, does not
necessarily require that the vagina be penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured.
Accordingly, granting arguendo that AAA did not suffer any laceration, Rivera would still
be guilty of rape after it was clearly established that he did succeed in having carnal
knowledge of her. At any rate, it has been repeatedly held that the medical examination
of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. Expert testimony is merely
corroborative in character and not essential to a conviction. People of the Philippines v.
Christopher Rivera y Royo, G.R. No. 200508, September 4, 2013.
Self-defense; burden of proof in self-defense. Appellant faults the Court of Appeals (CA)
when it imposed on him the burden of proving the elements of self-defense. He claims it
was PO3 Ventinilla who acted in self-defense and, therefore, it was incumbent upon the
latter to establish such fact. He avers that his defense is denial as found by the trial
court. Obviously, appellant was confused. It must be noted that he was the only witness
who testified on the circumstances surrounding the tragic death of the victim. It was he
who supplied the necessary evidence showing that there was unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim. Contrary to the undisputed finding of Dr. Bernales that there are
more than one assailant in view of the multiple bullet wounds on the body of the victim,
appellant insists it was only PO3 Ventinilla who killed the victim. However, neither PO3
Ventinilla nor the victim could be resurrected from their graves to controvert appellants
version of the story. Besides, in the Counter-Affidavit of SPO4 Miraples, appellants coaccused, he stated therein that appellant acted in self-defense when the victim
allegedly went berserk. More important, in his Answer to the administrative complaint
filed by the victims widow, appellant interposed self-defense by alleging that it was the
victim who initiated the attack through unlawful aggression. Hence, the CA committed
no error in imposing upon him the burden of proving the elements of selfdefense. People of the Philippines v. SPO1 Alfredo Alawig, G.R. No. 187731, September
18, 2013.
2.
SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Section 3(e) offense; elements. In all, the petitioner
failed to demonstrate that the Sandiganbayan committed reversible errors in finding
him guilty of the violating section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. For the aforecited provision to lie
against the petitioner, the following elements must concur: 1) The accused must be a
public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; 2) He must have
acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and 3)
That his action caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving
any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
functions. Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as when the
accused acted with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa, as when the
accused committed gross inexcusable negligence. Jovito C. Plameras v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 187268, September 4, 2013.
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Section 3(e) offense; elements. As correctly
observed by the Sandiganbayan, certain established rules, regulations and policies of

the Commission on Audit and those mandated under the Local Government Code of
1991 were knowingly sidestepped and ignored by the petitioner which enabled
CKLEnterprises/Dela Cruz to successfully get full payment for the school desks and
armchairs, despite non-delivery an act or omission evidencing bad faith and manifest
partiality. It must be borne to mind that any procurement or acquisition of supplies or
property by local government units shall be through competitive public bidding. The
petitioner admitted in his testimony that he is aware of such requirement, however, he
proceeded just the same due to the alleged advice of the unnamed DECS representative
that there was already a negotiated contract a representation or misrepresentation he
willfully believed in without any verification. As a Governor, he must know that
negotiated contract can only be resorted to in case of failure of a public bidding. As it is,
there is no public bidding to speak of that has been conducted. Intentionally or not, it is
his duty to act in a circumspect manner to protect government funds. To do otherwise is
gross inexcusable negligence, at the very least, especially so, that petitioner acted on
his own initiative and without authorization from the Provincial School Board. Jovito C.
Plameras v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 187268, September 4, 2013.
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Section 3(e) offense; elements. The same thing can
be said about the act of petitioner in signing the sales invoice and the bank draft
knowing that such documents would cause the withdrawal by CKL Enterprises/Dela Cruz
of the corresponding amount covered by the Irrevocable Domestic Letter of Credit. It
must be noted that any withdrawal with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) must be
accompanied by the appropriate document evidencing deliveries. In signing the draft
and sales invoice, petitioner made it possible for CKL Enterprises/Dela Cruz to withdraw
the entire P5,666,600.00 without any delivery of the items. As the records would bear,
the CKL Enterprises Invoice dated 16 April 1997, contains the signature of the accused
as customer. Above the customers signature is the phrase: Received and accepted the
above items in good condition. The significance of the customers signature on the
invoice is that it initiates the process of releasing the payment to the seller. This is all
that the LBP needs in order to release the money alloted for the purchase.
Unfortunately, despite receipt of payment, it was almost a year after when delivery of
the items was made on a piece meal basis-some of which were even defective. The
Supreme Court, therefore, was not persuaded that petitioner deserves to be
exonerated. On the contrary, evidence of undue injury caused to the Province of Antique
and giving of unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to CKL Enterprises/DelaCruz
committed through gross inexcusable negligence was proven beyond reasonable
doubt. Jovito C. Plameras v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 187268, September 4,
2013.

Chain of custody rule; legal effect of failure to prove chain of custody. The chain of
custody rule is a method of authenticating evidence which requires that the admission
of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what the proponent claims it to be. In this case, the Supreme Court found
reasonable doubt on the evidence presented to prove an unbroken chain of custody.
First, it is not clear from the evidence that the marking, which was done in the police
station, was made in the presence of the accused or his representative. Thus, there is
already a gap in determining whether the specimens that entered into the chain were
actually the ones examined and offered in evidence. Second, the prosecution failed to
duly accomplish the Certificate of Inventory and to take photos of the seized items
pursuant to the law. There is nothing in the records that would show at least an attempt
to comply with this procedural safeguard; neither was there any justifiable reason
propounded for failing to do so. Third, the Supreme Court found conflicting testimony

and glaring inconsistencies that would cast doubt on the integrity of the handling of the
seized drugs. The material inconsistency of who actually received the specimens in the
Crime Laboratory creates a cloud of doubt as to whether the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items were preserved. The gaps in the chain of custody creates a
reasonable doubt as to whether the specimens seized from the accused were the same
specimens brought to the laboratory and eventually offered in court as evidence.
Without adequate proof of the corpus delicti, the conviction cannot stand. People of the
Philippines v. Freddy Salonga y Afiado, G.R. No. 194948, September 2, 2013.
3.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Arraignment; purpose. Arraignment is indispensable in bringing the accused to court
and in notifying him of the nature and cause of the accusations against him. The
importance of arraignment is based on the constitutional right of the accused to be
informed. It is at this stage that the accused, for the first time, is given the opportunity
to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is only imperative that he is thus made
fully aware of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of
the imputed crime. Letecia I. Kummer v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 174461,
September 11, 2013.
Arraignment; the need for arraignment where the complaint or information is amended.
The need for arraignment is equally imperative in an amended information or complaint.
This, however, pertains only to substantial amendments and not to formal amendments
that, by their very nature, do not charge an offense different from that charged in the
original complaint or information; do not alter the theory of the prosecution; do not
cause any surprise and affect the line of defense; and do not adversely affect the
substantial rights of the accused, such as an amendment in the date of the commission
of the offense. Further, an amendment done after the plea and during trial, in
accordance with the rules, does not call for a second plea since the amendment is only
as to form. The purpose of an arraignment, that is, to inform the accused of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, has already been attained when the accused
was arraigned the first time. The subsequent amendment could not have conceivably
come as a surprise to the accused simply because the amendment did not charge a new
offense nor alter the theory of the prosecution. Applying these rules and principles to
the prevailing case, the records of the case evidently show that the amendment in the
complaint was from July 19, 1988 to June 19, 1988, or a difference of only one month. It
is clear that consistent with the rule on amendments, the change in the date of the
commission of the crime of homicide is a formal amendment it does not change the
nature of the crime, does not affect the essence of the offense nor deprive the accused
of an opportunity to meet the new averment, and is not prejudicial to the accused.
Further, the defense under the complaint is still available after the amendment, as this
was, in fact, the same line of defenses used by the petitioner. Letecia I. Kummer v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 174461, September 11, 2013.
Preliminary investigation; the conduct of preliminary investigation belongs to the public
prosecutor. The well-established rule is that the conduct of preliminary investigation for
the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause is a function that belongs to
the public prosecutor. The prosecution of crimes lies with the executive department of
the government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that the laws of the
land are faithfully executed. Thus, the rule is that the Supreme Court (SC) will not
interfere in the findings of the Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary on the insufficiency
of the evidence presented to establish probable cause unless it is shown that the
questioned acts were done in a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
evidencing a clear case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. The party seeking the writ of certiorari must establish that the DOJ

Secretary exercised his executive power in an arbitrary and despotic manner, by reason
of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross
as would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or
to act in contemplation of law. In the present case, there was no clear evidence of grave
abuse of discretion committed by the DOJ when it set aside its March 23, 2000
Resolution and reinstated the July 28, 1998 Resolution of the public prosecutor. The DOJ
was correct when it characterized the complaint for attempted murder as already
covered by two (2) other criminal cases. As to the other complaints, the SC agreed with
the DOJ that they were weak and not adequately supported by credible evidence. Thus,
the CA erred in supplanting the prosecutors discretion with its own. Evidently, the
conclusions arrived at by the DOJ were neither whimsical nor capricious as to be
corrected by certiorari. Even on the assumption that the DOJ Secretary made erroneous
conclusions, this error alone would not subject his act to correction or annulment by the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari. After all, not every erroneous conclusion of law or
fact is an abuse of discretion. Rosalinda Punzalan, Randall Punzalan and Rainier
Punzalan v. Michael Gamaliel J. Plata and Ruben Plata, G.R. No. 160316, September 2,
2013.
(Lindy thanks Isabel F. Serina, Elaine B. de los Santos, and Vincent C. Juan for assisting
in the preparation of this post.)