Republic of The Philippines Supreme Court Manila

Republic of the Philippines
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony
SUPREME COURT
between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario
Manila
outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent

judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial
SECOND DIVISION
Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was

solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996
Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the
municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant,
kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
vs.
In his letter-comment to the office of the Court Administrator,

respondent judge avers that the office and name of the Municipal
JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.
Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone else, who, as the

mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with his actuations both as
ROMERO, J.:p
judge and as a private person. The same person had earlier filed
Administrative Matter No 94-980-MTC, which was dismissed for lack
The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of
of merit on September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter No. OCA-
Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted
IPI-95-16, "Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," which
evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by respondent
is still pending.
Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he

contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks
and ignorance of the law.
exculpation from his act of having solemnized the marriage between

Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the
F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the
wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the
Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr.
knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife.
Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven
years. 1 With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in
solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did
cohabitation and having borne five children, Ida Pearanda left the
not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states
conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not
that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of
returned nor been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving
the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;" and that article 8 thereof
rise to the presumption that she is already dead.
applies to the case in question.

In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since
affidavit is sufficient proof of Ida Pearanda's presumptive death, and
the pleadings submitted were considered sufficient for a resolution of
ample reason for him to proceed with the marriage ceremony. We do
the case. 2
not agree.
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
complainant have not been sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt
upon. The acts complained of and respondent judge's answer
A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a
thereto will suffice and can be objectively assessed by themselves to
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
prove the latter's malfeasance.
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been

absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states that Tagadan's civil status is
disappearance where there is danger of death under the
"separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding ceremony was
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil
solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in evidence a joint
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer,

subscribed and sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla,
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar. 3 The affidavit was not
preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary
issued by the latter judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
merely acknowledged before him. In their affidavit, the affiants stated
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D.
reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis added.)
Pearanda in September 1983; that after thirteen years of
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this

provision. In fact, the law is clear and simple. Even if the spouse
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's
present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
jurisdiction;
already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of

presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent
xxx
xxx
xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely

incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers
marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been
the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the
dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in
office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may
accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on

the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary
this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in
proceeding for the declaration of his first wife's presumptive death.
writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or
Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida
place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
Pearanda. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on

the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the
submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has
justification for his having solemnized the marriage between Floriano
resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under Article
Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction.
35 of the Family Code, " The following marriage shall be void from
As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside
the beginning: (4) Those bigamous . . . marriages not falling under
of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances:
Article 41."
(1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with

Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage
statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or
ceremony outside the court's jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8
del Rosario was at the point of death or in the remote place.
of the Family Code, thus:
Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the

respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario.
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by :
By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the

More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is
exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again
the authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the
demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil
formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing
law.
officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among

others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross
jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the
ignorance of the law. The legal principles applicable in the cases
venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the
brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated,
authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding
prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is
provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
due to a lack of comprehension of the law.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are
marry the faithful, is authorized to do so only within the area of the
at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the
diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or
ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in
a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to
understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be
solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the
conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in instant
requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are
case. 6 It is not too much to expect them to know and apply the law
appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only
intelligently. 7 Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky
within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a
foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by those
marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant
not learned in the law. While magistrates may at times make
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it
mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the
may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating
respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of
official to administrative liability. 5
law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married

persons.
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities

of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to
solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is

considered bigamous and void, there being a subsisting marriage
between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Pearanda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its
Memorandum to the Court, a six-month suspension and a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in question
resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the other
lacked the necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts
said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more
circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate a deeper
understanding of the law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C.
Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and
given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely.
Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
b. That the ceremony was attended by PACIFICO MAGHACOT who
Manila
acted as our principal sponsor and spouses RAMON DEAN and

TERESITA DEAN; . . .
FIRST DIVISION
c. That after our wedding, my husband BERNARDITO YMAN
A.M. No. 99-1211
January 28, 2000
abandoned me without any reason at all;
(Formerly OCA-IPI No. 98-471-MTJ)

d. That I smell something fishy; so what I did was I went to Calbayog
ZENAIDA S. BESO, complainant,
City and wrote the City Civil Registrar to inquire my Marriage
vs.
Contract;
Judge JUAN DAGUMAN, MCTC, Sta. Margarita-TaranganPagsanjan, Samar, respondent.
e. That to my surprise, I was informed by the Local Civil Registrar of

Calbayog City that my marriage was not registered; . . .
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
f. That upon advisement of the Local Civil Registrar; I wrote Judge
In this administrative complaint, respondent Judge stands charged
Juan Daguman, to inquire;
with Neglect of Duty and Abuse of Authority. In a Complaint-Affidavit

dated December 12, 1997, Zenaida S. Beso charged Judge Juan J.
g. That to my second surprise, I was informed by Judge Daguman
Daguman, Jr. with solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction
that all the copies of the Marriage Contract were taken by Oloy
and of negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering the
(Bernardito A. Yman);
marriage contract with the office of the Local Registrar alleging

h. That not copy was retained by Judge Daguman;
a. That on August 28, 1997, I and my fiancee (sic) BERNARDITO A.
YMAN got married and our marriage was solemnized by judge (sic)
i. That I believe that the respondent judge committed acts prejudicial
Juan Daguman in his residence of J.P.R. Subdivision in Calbayog
to my interest such as:
City, Samar; . . .
1. Solemnizing our marriage outside his jurisdiction;
sponsors; third, if they failed to get married on August 28, 1997,

complainant would be out of the country for a long period and their
2. Negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering our
marriage license would lapse and necessitate another publication of
marriage before the office of the Local Civil Registrar.
notice; fourth, if the parties go beyond their plans for the scheduled
marriage, complainant feared it would complicate her employment
The Affidavit-Complaint was thereafter referred to respondent Judge
abroad; and, last, all other alternatives as to date and venue of
for comment.
marriage were considered impracticable by the parties;
In his Comment, respondent Judge averred that:
1.2. The contracting parties were ready with the desired cocuments
(sic) for a valid marriage, which respondent found all in
1. The civil marriage of complainant Zenaida Beso and Bernardito
order.1wphi1.nt
Yman had to be solemnized by respondent in Calbayog City though

outside his territory as municipal Judge of Sta. Margarita, Samar due
1.3. Complainant bride is an accredited Filipino overseas worker,
to the following and pressing circumstances:
who, respondent realized, deserved more than ordinary official

attention under present Government policy.
1.1. On August 28, 1997 respondent was physically indisposed and

unable to report to his station in Sta. Margita. In the forenoon of that
2. At the time respondent solemnized the marriage in question, he
date, without prior appointment, complainant Beso and Mr. Yman
believed in good faith that by so doing he was leaning on the side of
unexpectedly came to the residence of respondent in said City,
liberality of the law so that it may be not be too expensive and
urgently requesting the celebration of their marriage right then and
complicated for citizens to get married.
there, first, because complainants said she must leave that same
day to be able to fly from Manila for abroad as scheduled; second,
3. Another point brought up in the complaint was the failure of
that for the parties to go to another town for the marriage would be
registration of the duplicate and triplicate copies of the marriage
expensive and would entail serious problems of finding a
certificate, which failure was also occasioned by the following
solemnizing officer and another pair of witnesses or sponsors, while
circumstances beyond the control of respondent:
in fact former Undersecretary Pacifico Maghacot, Sangguniang

Panglunsod [member] Ramon Dean were already with them as
3.1. After handling to the husband the first copy of the marriage
3.4. Under the facts above stated, respondent has no other recourse
certificate, respondent left the three remaining copies on top of the
but to protect the public interest by trying all possible means to
desk in his private office where the marriage ceremonies were held,
recover custody of the missing documents in some amicable way
intending later to register the duplicate and triplicate copies and to
during the expected hearing of the above mentioned civil case in the
keep the forth (sic) in his office.
City of Marikina, failing to do which said respondent would confer

with the Civil Registrar General for possible registration of
3.2. After a few days following the wedding, respondent gathered all
reconstituted copies of said documents.
the papers relating to the said marriage but notwithstanding diligent

search in the premises and private files, all the three last copies of
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in an evaluation report
the certificate were missing. Promptly, respondent invited by
dated August 11, 1998 found that respondent Judge ". . . committed
subpoena . . . . Mr. Yman to shed light on the missing documents
non-feasance in office" and recommended that he be fined Five
and he said he saw complainant Beso put the copies of the marriage
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) with a warning that the commission of
certificate in her bag during the wedding party. Unfortunately, it was
the same or future acts will be dealt with more severely pointing out
too late to contract complainant for a confirmation of Mr. Yman's
that:
claim.
As presiding judge of the MCTC Sta. Margarita Tarangnan3.3. Considering the futility of contracting complainant now that she
Pagsanjan, Samar, the authority to solemnize marriage is only
is out of the country, a reasonable conclusion can be drawn on the
limited to those municipalities under his jurisdiction. Clearly,
basis of the established facts so far in this dispute. If we believe the
Calbayog City is no longer within his area of jurisdiction.
claim of complainant that after August 28, 1997 marriage her

husband, Mr. Yman, abandoned her without any reason . . . but that
Additionally, there are only three instances, as provided by Article 8
said husband admitted "he had another girl by the name of LITA
of the Family Code, wherein a marriage may be solemnized by a
DANGUYAN" . . . it seems reasonably clear who of the two marriage
judge outside his chamber[s] or at a place other than his sala, to wit:
contracting parties probably absconded with the missing copies of

the marriage certificate.
(1) when either or both of the contracting parties is at the point of

death;
(2) when the residence of either party is located in a remote place;
to locate the duplicate and triplicate copies of the marriage

certificate, he should have exerted more effort to locate or
(3) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing
reconstitute the same. As a holder of such a sensitive position, he is
in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place
expected to be conscientious in handling official documents. His
designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
imputation that the missing copies of the marriage certificate were

taken by Bernardito Yman is based merely on conjectures and does
The foregoing circumstances are unavailing in the instant case.
not deserve consideration for being devoid of proof.
Moreover, as solemnizing officer, respondent Judge neglected his
After a careful and thorough examination of the evidence, the Court
duty when failed to register the marriage of complainant to
finds the evaluation report of the OCA well-taken.
Bernardito Yman.
Jimenez v. Republic1 underscores the importance of marriage as a
Such duty is entrusted upon him pursuant to Article 23 of the Family
social institution thus: "[M]arriage in this country is an institution in
Code which provides:
which the community is deeply interested. The state has surrounded

it with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and permanence.
It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish
The security and stability of the state are largely dependent upon it. It
either of the contracting parties the original of the marriage certificate
is the interest and duty of each and every member of the community
referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies
to prevent the bringing about a condition that would shake its
of the certificate not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the
foundation and untimely lead to its destruction."
local civil register of the place where the marriage was

solemnized. . . . (emphasis ours)
With regard to the solemnization of marriage, Article 7 of the Family

Code provides, among others, that
It is clearly evident from the foregoing that not only has the
respondent Judge committed non-feasance in office, he also
Art. 7. Marriage my be solemnized by:
undermined the very foundation of marriage which is the basic social

institution in our society whose nature, consequences and incidents
are governed by law. Granting that respondent Judge indeed failed
jurisdiction; . . . (Emphasis ours)
than ordinary official attention under present Government policy."

In relation thereto, Article 8 of the same statute mandates that:
Respondent Judge further avers that in solemnizing the marriage in

question, "[h]e believed in good faith that by doing so he was leaning
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of
on the side of liberality of the law so that it may not be too expensive
and complicated for citizens to get married."
office of the counsel-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may

be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted at
A person presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law
but must also live and abide by it and render justice at all times
this Code, or were both parties request the solemnizing officer in
without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for.2 A judge is not only
bound by oath to apply the law;3 he must also be conscientious and
thorough in doing so.4 Certainly, judges, by the very delicate nature
(Emphasis ours)
of their office should be more circumspect in the performance of their

duties.5
As the above-quoted provision clearly states, a marriage can be held

outside the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following
If at all, the reasons proffered by respondent Judge to justify his
instances: 1.] at the point of death; 2.] in remote places in
hurried solemnization of the marriage in this case only tends to
accordance with Article 29, or 3.] upon the request of both parties in
degrade the revered position enjoined by marriage in the hierarchy of
writing in a sworn statement to this effect.
social institutions in the country. They also betray respondent's

cavalier proclivity on its significance in our culture which is more
In this case, there is no pretense that either complainant Beso or her
disposed towards an extended period of engagement prior to
fianc Yman was at the point of death or in a remote place. Neither
marriage and frowns upon hasty, ill-advised and ill-timed marital
was there a sworn written request made by the contracting parties to
unions.
respondent Judge that the marriage be solemnized outside his

chambers or at a place other than his sala. What, in fact, appears on
An elementary regard for the sacredness of laws let alone that
record is that respondent Judge was prompted more by urgency to
enacted in order to preserve so sacrosanct an inviolable social
solemnize the marriage of Beso and Yman because complainant
institution as marriage and the stability of judicial doctrines laid
was "[a]n overseas worker, who, respondent realized deserved more
down by superior authority should have given respondent judge
pause and made him more vigilant in the exercise of his authority
likewise commanded to observance extra precautions to ensure that
and the performance of his duties as a solemnizing officer. A judge
the event is properly documented in accordance with Article 23 of the
is, furthermore, presumed to know the constitutional limits of the
Family Code which states in no uncertain terms that
authority or jurisdiction of his court.6 Thus respondent Judge should

be reminded that
Art. 23. It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage
to furnish either of the contracting parties, the original of the marriage
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his ordinary to marry
contract referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and
the faithful, is authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese
triplicate copies of the certificate not later than fifteen days after the
or place allowed by is Bishop. An appellate court justice or a Justice
marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage
of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize
was solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued by the local civil
marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the
registrar to the solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the marriage
law are complied with. However, Judges who are appointed to
certificate. The solemnizing officer shall retain in his file the
specific jurisdictions may officiate in weddings only within said areas
quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the original of the
and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his
marriage license and, in proper cases, the affidavit of the contracting
court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal
party regarding the solemnization of the marriage in a place other
requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the
than those mentioned in Article 8. (Emphasis supplied)
validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to

administrative liability.7
In view of the foregoing, we agree with the evaluation of the OCA

that respondent Judge was less than conscientious in handling
Considering that respondents Judge's jurisdiction covers the
official documents. A judge is charged with exercising extra care in
municipality of Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar only, he
ensuring that the records of the cases and official documents in his
was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the City of
custody are intact. There is no justification for missing records save
Calbayog.8
fortuitous events.9 However, the records show that the loss was
occasioned by carelessness on respondent Judge's part. This Court
Furthermore, from the nature of marriage, aside from the mandate
reiterates that judges must adopt a system of record management
that a judge should exercise extra care in the exercise of his
and organize their dockets in order to bolster the prompt and efficient
authority and the performance of his duties in its solemnization, he is
dispatch of business.10 It is, in fact, incumbent upon him to devise
an efficient recording and filing system in his court because he is

after all the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of his
official functions.11
In the evaluation report, the OCA recommended that respondent
Judge be fined Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and warned that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
This Court adopts the recommendation of the OCA.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Judge is
hereby FINED Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar infractions will be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
b. That the ceremony was attended by PACIFICO MAGHACOT who
Manila
acted as our principal sponsor and spouses RAMON DEAN and

TERESITA DEAN; . . .
FIRST DIVISION
c. That after our wedding, my husband BERNARDITO YMAN
A.M. No. 99-1211
January 28, 2000
abandoned me without any reason at all;
(Formerly OCA-IPI No. 98-471-MTJ)

d. That I smell something fishy; so what I did was I went to Calbayog
ZENAIDA S. BESO, complainant,
City and wrote the City Civil Registrar to inquire my Marriage
vs.
Contract;
Judge JUAN DAGUMAN, MCTC, Sta. Margarita-TaranganPagsanjan, Samar, respondent.
e. That to my surprise, I was informed by the Local Civil Registrar of

Calbayog City that my marriage was not registered; . . .
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
f. That upon advisement of the Local Civil Registrar; I wrote Judge
In this administrative complaint, respondent Judge stands charged
Juan Daguman, to inquire;
with Neglect of Duty and Abuse of Authority. In a Complaint-Affidavit

dated December 12, 1997, Zenaida S. Beso charged Judge Juan J.
g. That to my second surprise, I was informed by Judge Daguman
Daguman, Jr. with solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction
that all the copies of the Marriage Contract were taken by Oloy
and of negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering the
(Bernardito A. Yman);
marriage contract with the office of the Local Registrar alleging

h. That not copy was retained by Judge Daguman;
a. That on August 28, 1997, I and my fiancee (sic) BERNARDITO A.
YMAN got married and our marriage was solemnized by judge (sic)
i. That I believe that the respondent judge committed acts prejudicial
Juan Daguman in his residence of J.P.R. Subdivision in Calbayog
to my interest such as:
City, Samar; . . .
1. Solemnizing our marriage outside his jurisdiction;
sponsors; third, if they failed to get married on August 28, 1997,

complainant would be out of the country for a long period and their
2. Negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering our
marriage license would lapse and necessitate another publication of
marriage before the office of the Local Civil Registrar.
notice; fourth, if the parties go beyond their plans for the scheduled
marriage, complainant feared it would complicate her employment
The Affidavit-Complaint was thereafter referred to respondent Judge
abroad; and, last, all other alternatives as to date and venue of
for comment.
marriage were considered impracticable by the parties;
In his Comment, respondent Judge averred that:
1.2. The contracting parties were ready with the desired cocuments
(sic) for a valid marriage, which respondent found all in
1. The civil marriage of complainant Zenaida Beso and Bernardito
order.1wphi1.nt
Yman had to be solemnized by respondent in Calbayog City though

outside his territory as municipal Judge of Sta. Margarita, Samar due
1.3. Complainant bride is an accredited Filipino overseas worker,
to the following and pressing circumstances:
who, respondent realized, deserved more than ordinary official

attention under present Government policy.
1.1. On August 28, 1997 respondent was physically indisposed and

unable to report to his station in Sta. Margita. In the forenoon of that
2. At the time respondent solemnized the marriage in question, he
date, without prior appointment, complainant Beso and Mr. Yman
believed in good faith that by so doing he was leaning on the side of
unexpectedly came to the residence of respondent in said City,
liberality of the law so that it may be not be too expensive and
urgently requesting the celebration of their marriage right then and
complicated for citizens to get married.
there, first, because complainants said she must leave that same
day to be able to fly from Manila for abroad as scheduled; second,
3. Another point brought up in the complaint was the failure of
that for the parties to go to another town for the marriage would be
registration of the duplicate and triplicate copies of the marriage
expensive and would entail serious problems of finding a
certificate, which failure was also occasioned by the following
solemnizing officer and another pair of witnesses or sponsors, while
circumstances beyond the control of respondent:
in fact former Undersecretary Pacifico Maghacot, Sangguniang

Panglunsod [member] Ramon Dean were already with them as
3.1. After handling to the husband the first copy of the marriage
3.4. Under the facts above stated, respondent has no other recourse
certificate, respondent left the three remaining copies on top of the
but to protect the public interest by trying all possible means to
desk in his private office where the marriage ceremonies were held,
recover custody of the missing documents in some amicable way
intending later to register the duplicate and triplicate copies and to
during the expected hearing of the above mentioned civil case in the
keep the forth (sic) in his office.
City of Marikina, failing to do which said respondent would confer

with the Civil Registrar General for possible registration of
3.2. After a few days following the wedding, respondent gathered all
reconstituted copies of said documents.
the papers relating to the said marriage but notwithstanding diligent

search in the premises and private files, all the three last copies of
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in an evaluation report
the certificate were missing. Promptly, respondent invited by
dated August 11, 1998 found that respondent Judge ". . . committed
subpoena . . . . Mr. Yman to shed light on the missing documents
non-feasance in office" and recommended that he be fined Five
and he said he saw complainant Beso put the copies of the marriage
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) with a warning that the commission of
certificate in her bag during the wedding party. Unfortunately, it was
the same or future acts will be dealt with more severely pointing out
too late to contract complainant for a confirmation of Mr. Yman's
that:
claim.
As presiding judge of the MCTC Sta. Margarita Tarangnan3.3. Considering the futility of contracting complainant now that she
Pagsanjan, Samar, the authority to solemnize marriage is only
is out of the country, a reasonable conclusion can be drawn on the
limited to those municipalities under his jurisdiction. Clearly,
basis of the established facts so far in this dispute. If we believe the
Calbayog City is no longer within his area of jurisdiction.
claim of complainant that after August 28, 1997 marriage her

husband, Mr. Yman, abandoned her without any reason . . . but that
Additionally, there are only three instances, as provided by Article 8
said husband admitted "he had another girl by the name of LITA
of the Family Code, wherein a marriage may be solemnized by a
DANGUYAN" . . . it seems reasonably clear who of the two marriage
judge outside his chamber[s] or at a place other than his sala, to wit:
contracting parties probably absconded with the missing copies of

the marriage certificate.
(1) when either or both of the contracting parties is at the point of

death;
(2) when the residence of either party is located in a remote place;
to locate the duplicate and triplicate copies of the marriage

certificate, he should have exerted more effort to locate or
(3) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing
reconstitute the same. As a holder of such a sensitive position, he is
in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place
expected to be conscientious in handling official documents. His
designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
imputation that the missing copies of the marriage certificate were

taken by Bernardito Yman is based merely on conjectures and does
The foregoing circumstances are unavailing in the instant case.
not deserve consideration for being devoid of proof.
Moreover, as solemnizing officer, respondent Judge neglected his
After a careful and thorough examination of the evidence, the Court
duty when failed to register the marriage of complainant to
finds the evaluation report of the OCA well-taken.
Bernardito Yman.
Jimenez v. Republic1 underscores the importance of marriage as a
Such duty is entrusted upon him pursuant to Article 23 of the Family
social institution thus: "[M]arriage in this country is an institution in
Code which provides:
which the community is deeply interested. The state has surrounded

it with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and permanence.
It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish
The security and stability of the state are largely dependent upon it. It
either of the contracting parties the original of the marriage certificate
is the interest and duty of each and every member of the community
referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies
to prevent the bringing about a condition that would shake its
of the certificate not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the
foundation and untimely lead to its destruction."
local civil register of the place where the marriage was

solemnized. . . . (emphasis ours)
With regard to the solemnization of marriage, Article 7 of the Family

Code provides, among others, that
It is clearly evident from the foregoing that not only has the
respondent Judge committed non-feasance in office, he also
Art. 7. Marriage my be solemnized by:
undermined the very foundation of marriage which is the basic social

institution in our society whose nature, consequences and incidents
are governed by law. Granting that respondent Judge indeed failed
jurisdiction; . . . (Emphasis ours)
than ordinary official attention under present Government policy."

In relation thereto, Article 8 of the same statute mandates that:
Respondent Judge further avers that in solemnizing the marriage in

question, "[h]e believed in good faith that by doing so he was leaning
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of
on the side of liberality of the law so that it may not be too expensive
and complicated for citizens to get married."
office of the counsel-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may

be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted at
A person presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law
but must also live and abide by it and render justice at all times
this Code, or were both parties request the solemnizing officer in
without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for.2 A judge is not only
bound by oath to apply the law;3 he must also be conscientious and
thorough in doing so.4 Certainly, judges, by the very delicate nature
(Emphasis ours)
of their office should be more circumspect in the performance of their

duties.5
As the above-quoted provision clearly states, a marriage can be held

outside the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following
If at all, the reasons proffered by respondent Judge to justify his
instances: 1.] at the point of death; 2.] in remote places in
hurried solemnization of the marriage in this case only tends to
accordance with Article 29, or 3.] upon the request of both parties in
degrade the revered position enjoined by marriage in the hierarchy of
writing in a sworn statement to this effect.
social institutions in the country. They also betray respondent's

cavalier proclivity on its significance in our culture which is more
In this case, there is no pretense that either complainant Beso or her
disposed towards an extended period of engagement prior to
fianc Yman was at the point of death or in a remote place. Neither
marriage and frowns upon hasty, ill-advised and ill-timed marital
was there a sworn written request made by the contracting parties to
unions.
respondent Judge that the marriage be solemnized outside his

chambers or at a place other than his sala. What, in fact, appears on
An elementary regard for the sacredness of laws let alone that
record is that respondent Judge was prompted more by urgency to
enacted in order to preserve so sacrosanct an inviolable social
solemnize the marriage of Beso and Yman because complainant
institution as marriage and the stability of judicial doctrines laid
was "[a]n overseas worker, who, respondent realized deserved more
down by superior authority should have given respondent judge
pause and made him more vigilant in the exercise of his authority
likewise commanded to observance extra precautions to ensure that
and the performance of his duties as a solemnizing officer. A judge
the event is properly documented in accordance with Article 23 of the
is, furthermore, presumed to know the constitutional limits of the
Family Code which states in no uncertain terms that
authority or jurisdiction of his court.6 Thus respondent Judge should

be reminded that
Art. 23. It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage
to furnish either of the contracting parties, the original of the marriage
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his ordinary to marry
contract referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and
the faithful, is authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese
triplicate copies of the certificate not later than fifteen days after the
or place allowed by is Bishop. An appellate court justice or a Justice
marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage
of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize
was solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued by the local civil
marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the
registrar to the solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the marriage
law are complied with. However, Judges who are appointed to
certificate. The solemnizing officer shall retain in his file the
specific jurisdictions may officiate in weddings only within said areas
quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the original of the
and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his
marriage license and, in proper cases, the affidavit of the contracting
court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal
party regarding the solemnization of the marriage in a place other
requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the
than those mentioned in Article 8. (Emphasis supplied)
validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to

administrative liability.7
In view of the foregoing, we agree with the evaluation of the OCA

that respondent Judge was less than conscientious in handling
Considering that respondents Judge's jurisdiction covers the
official documents. A judge is charged with exercising extra care in
municipality of Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar only, he
ensuring that the records of the cases and official documents in his
was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the City of
custody are intact. There is no justification for missing records save
Calbayog.8
fortuitous events.9 However, the records show that the loss was
occasioned by carelessness on respondent Judge's part. This Court
Furthermore, from the nature of marriage, aside from the mandate
reiterates that judges must adopt a system of record management
that a judge should exercise extra care in the exercise of his
and organize their dockets in order to bolster the prompt and efficient
authority and the performance of his duties in its solemnization, he is
dispatch of business.10 It is, in fact, incumbent upon him to devise
an efficient recording and filing system in his court because he is

after all the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of his
official functions.11
In the evaluation report, the OCA recommended that respondent
Judge be fined Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and warned that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
This Court adopts the recommendation of the OCA.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Judge is
hereby FINED Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar infractions will be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.
2011 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC

dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment
SUPREME COURT
(or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue
Manila
and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the

petition.
SECOND DIVISION
The Facts
G.R. No. 196049
June 26, 2013

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines2
vs.
on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioners
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL
parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he
CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE
resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE

NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara

(Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and
DECISION
Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines.

Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly
CARPIO, J.:
suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started
to contact Fujiki.3
The Case
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court
their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment
(RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City, through a petition for review on
from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of
Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January
law. The petition assails the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the
2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition
RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March
of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)."
Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be
residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the
recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and
case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the
Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the
Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x
Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the
Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in
Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and
"gross violation" of the above provisions. The trial court based its
Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the
dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides
Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics
that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may
Office (NSO).6
be a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the

RTC took the view that only "the husband or the wife," in this case
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their

marriage void, and not Fujiki.
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued
an Order dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case from its
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M.
active civil docket.7 The RTC cited the following provisions of the
No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a

special proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or a
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
particular fact,"9 and not a civil action which is "for the enforcement
or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."10 In
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
other words, the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife

and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court
xxxx
judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as

void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the
Sec. 4. Venue. The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the
province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has been
Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family
Code of the Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to
annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the
recognition by Philippine courts.12
certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
In any case, it was also Fujikis view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
Fujikis motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the
applied only to void marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on
trial court "gravely erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the petition
the ground of psychological incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M.
based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be
No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute
confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction,
nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the
because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a
wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because only
case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate
the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki,
Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the
"[i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize that the party interested in
defendants prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue
having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be the husband
by motu proprio dismissing the case."20 Moreover, petitioner alleged
in the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest and
that the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the
therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he

substantially complied with the provision.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in

the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the
"procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioners motion for
3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil
reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-
Register Law imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce
11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree
or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the
of absolute nullity of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two
court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or
grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper
annulled marriage was solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108
venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC
provides that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages,"
considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the proceeding because he
"judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring
"is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese
marriages void from the beginning" are subject to cancellation or
Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x
correction.18 The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to
x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of
impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec.
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their
4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be
comment on the petition for review.30 The public respondents, the
taken together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x which is
Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil
Sec. 2(a) x x x."24
Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of the

Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition
Manifestation and Motion.31
based on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City,

Negros Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the
proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or
RTCs "pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with x x x
Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be
jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x."26 Braza emphasized that the
reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings.32 The Solicitor
"validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be
General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an
questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper
injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage
party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for
between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited
correction of entry] x x x."27
Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No.

02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity
Court explained:
of marriage between Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that
this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the petition.28 Moreover,
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or
the verification and certification against forum shopping of the
she had only discovered during the connubial period that the
petition was not authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M.
marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had
No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the "immediate
already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit
dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.
from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they

would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General
circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal
and the Letters of Marinay and Maekara
remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is

clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional
marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior
infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De
spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the
Castro v. De Castro39 and Nial v. Bayadog40 which declared that
infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which
"[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked."41
sanctity is protected by the Constitution.34

Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the
with the directive for them to comment on the petition.42 Maekara
Japanese Family Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108
wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was
proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that
previously married to Fujiki.43 Maekara also denied that he inflicted
"[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a
any form of violence on Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay
Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings
wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition.45 She would
(such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."37 While
cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.46
Corpuz concerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present case the

Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the
The Issues
parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.

Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is
the procedure to record "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as required
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-
by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires
SC) is applicable.
the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal
consequences upon a persons legal capacity and status x x x."38
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition
The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil
to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage
status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in
between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of
a Rule 108 proceeding.
bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign
certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the
judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in
judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such
the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or

consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and
The Ruling of the Court
authenticated by the seal of office.50
We grant the petition.
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for

recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the trial court and
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not
contents of the petition,51 the service of summons,52 the
apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-trial,54 the
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign
trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because it
country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held
will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing
that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife
foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and
can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not
issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating
apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy."48
the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Raada,58 this Court explained

that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the
I.
merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of

action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation."59
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the

status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil
country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a
status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect
fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the
of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a
foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact
foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine
under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section
if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and
48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese
other mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that
Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a
"[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be
Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex
repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction,
nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine
fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and
courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it
the protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the
exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and
jurisdiction of other states.62
legal capacity of such citizen.

Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void
recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign
does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if
citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of evidence.64
it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine
Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of
courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the
a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure
foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the
judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign
Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may,
citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine
however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second
courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino
the rules of evidence.
citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce

decree abroad.65
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign

judgment or final order against a person creates a "presumptive
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in
fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the
Court states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by
Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine
marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of
courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not
the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised
allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign
Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese
Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24
Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil
and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
II.
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese

Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact
Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns
of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for
his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule
the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of
108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court
marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the
provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party
basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108

creates a remedy to rectify facts of a persons life which are recorded
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material
by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753.
interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and
These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or
the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is
marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by
interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in
the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared
the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his
that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a
marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the
Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings
spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68) his
(such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."67
interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts

marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right to
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family"70

and preserving the property regime of the marriage.71
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act,
event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the
has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for
Constitution,72 but a spouses right in a marriage extends further to
the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the
relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations
between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-
personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting
10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of
marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest
the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage.74 In any case,
of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right
interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.
by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the

union recognized by law.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the
spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in the
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of
judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is
a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent
clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior
2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"75it refers
spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled
to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article
to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this
35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the
purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment
beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the
nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that
husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the
such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there
prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a
should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under
marriage in the civil registry.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

III.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages
void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros
Revised Penal Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public
Occidental, this Court held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to
crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any
nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or
citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes.77
correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.81 Thus, the
If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of
"validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct action"
nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer
to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the
petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on
foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the

substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition
law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A
of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of
recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a
the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the

effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the
was already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in
civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a
A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the
foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family
parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369
Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these
define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the
dissolution of marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts
children,84 the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties
to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse
of the spouses,85 and the investigation of the public prosecutor to
without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of
determine collusion.86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or
the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of
provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located."87 In
Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the
other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the
legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to
mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or
married to the Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his or her
cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition of a
country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only
authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce
discriminatedthe foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino
decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce.
spouse cannot remarry.
Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is

tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,

Philippine courts are empowered to correct a situation where the
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to
Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is
address the anomaly that results from a marriage between a Filipino,
free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family
whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws
Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect
allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied
of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign
to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the
judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical
laws of his or her country. The correction is made by extending in the
difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a
Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already
foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a
effective in the country where it was rendered. The second
ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this Courts
public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and
decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the
spouse "should not be discriminated against in her own country if the
option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity
ends of justice are to be served."91
of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only
remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without
between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign
prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The

Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are
void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph
incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was decided
of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse,
under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights and
after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to
duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign
remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment
citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts
is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be
are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the
349 of the Revised Penal Code.93 The recognition of a foreign
status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for
courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party,
extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised
under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil
Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code,
Code.
"[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when
the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago."
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether
the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees
the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove
the need to address the questions on venue and the contents and
an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of
form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No.
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
02-11-10-SC.
mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public

policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January
should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the
2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial
comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states
Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are
that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED
between the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this
to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance
right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for
with this Decision.
the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The

recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is
SO ORDERED.
a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact92

that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be
an inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the
foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines.1wphi1
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article
Brion, Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City, docketed as Civil

Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109. Syed
SUPREME COURT
alleged the absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article
Manila
4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive Order No. 269, otherwise known as

the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 183896
his marriage to Gloria.

January 30, 2013
In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that

Marriage License No. 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner,
January 8, 1993, was presented to the solemnizing officer. It is this
vs.
information that is crucial to the resolution of this case.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.

At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met
DECISION
Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were married on

August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan.4 He arrived in the
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5

oclock in the afternoon, he was at his mother-in-laws residence,
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
located at 2676 F. Muoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law
Rules of Civil Procedure, questioning the Decision1 of the Court of
arrived with two men. He testified that he was told that he was going
Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760,
to undergo some ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in
which reversed the Decision2 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM dated
the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said ceremony.
October 5, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109,
During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed
Pasay City, and the CA Resolution dated July 24, 2008, denying
that he did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision.
told him later. He further testified that he did not go to Carmona,

Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar
in that area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil
Abbas (Syed) for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license,
and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein the
whether or not there was a marriage license on advice of his
marriage license number could be found.5 The Municipal Civil
counsel.8
Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on July

11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number appearing in
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of
the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967,
the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared
was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain
under a letter of authority from the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.6 Said certification reads as
Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents pertaining to Marriage
follows:
License No. 9969967, which was issued to Arlindo Getalado and

Myra Mabilangan on January 20, 1993.9
11 July 2003
Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
licenses and that the numbers are issued chronologically.10 He

testified that the certification dated July 11, 2003, was issued and
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in
signed by Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of
this office, Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued in favor of MR.
Carmona, Cavite, certifying that Marriage License No. 9969967 was
ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on January
issued for Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 19,
19, 1993.
1993, and that their office had not issued any other license of the
same serial number, namely 9969967, to any other person.11
No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED

AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, 1993.
For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented
Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for
May Ann Ceriola.
whatever legal purpose or intents it may serve.7

Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of
On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy
the Gospel and a barangay captain, and that he is authorized to
cases against him in 2001 and 2002, and that he had gone to the
solemnize marriages within the Philippines.12 He testified that he
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification on
solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at the
residence of the bride on January 9, 1993.13 He stated that the
marriage was to take place, a male person went to their house with
witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann
the application for marriage license.23 Three days later, the same
Ceriola.14 He testified that he had been solemnizing marriages since
person went back to their house, showed her the marriage license
1982, and that he is familiar with the requirements.15 Rev. Dauz
before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz,
further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the marriage license the
the solemnizing officer.24 She further testified that she did not read
day before the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract was
all of the contents of the marriage license, and that she was told that
prepared by his secretary.16 After the solemnization of the marriage,
the marriage license was obtained from Carmona.25 She also
it was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev.
testified that a bigamy case had been filed by Gloria against Syed at
Dauz submitted the marriage contract and copy of the marriage
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, evidenced by an information for
license with that office.17
Bigamy dated January 10, 2003, pending before Branch 47 of the

Regional Trial Court of Manila.26
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the

wedding of Syed Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother of the bride,
As to Mary Ann Ceriolas testimony, the counsels for both parties
Felicitas Goo.18 He testified that he requested a certain Qualin to
stipulated that: (a) she is one of the sponsors at the wedding of
secure the marriage license for the couple, and that this Qualin
Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in
secured the license and gave the same to him on January 8,
the wedding photos and she could identify all the persons depicted in
1993.19 He further testified that he did not know where the marriage
said photos; and (c) her testimony corroborates that of Felicitas Goo
license was obtained.20 He attended the wedding ceremony on
and Atty. Sanchez.
January 9, 1993, signed the marriage contract as sponsor, and

witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by the couple, the
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and
solemnizing officer and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.21
presented the marriage contract bearing their signatures as proof.27

She and her mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a
Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed
marriage license, and asked him to be one of the sponsors. A certain
Azhar Abbas is her son-in-law, and that she was present at the
Qualin went to their house and said that he will get the marriage
wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her house.22 She
license for them, and after several days returned with an application
testified that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City
for marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed did. After
Hall in securing the marriage license, and that a week before the
Qualin returned with the marriage license, they gave the license to
Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer.
resident of Carmona, Cavite, the place where Marriage License No.
Gloria testified that she and Syed were married on January 9, 1993
9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the Family Code.33
at their residence.28
As the marriage was not one of those exempt from the license
requirement, and that the lack of a valid marriage license is an
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on
absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on
June 15, 1993.29
January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
had married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura during the

existence of the previous marriage, and that the case was docketed
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila.30
petitioner, and against the respondent declaring as follows:
Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August
1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar
9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she did not know if said marriage had
Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby annulled;
been celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who

celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and those around them at
2. Terminating the community of property relations between the
the time were Chinese.31
petitioner and the respondent even if no property was acquired

during their cohabitation by reason of the nullity of the marriage of
The Ruling of the RTC
the parties.
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General,
valid marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of
National Statistics Office, are hereby ordered to cancel from their
Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License
respective civil registries the marriage contracted by petitioner Syed
No. 9969967 had been issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas on January 9, 1993
Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite
in Manila.
had certified that no marriage license had been issued for Gloria and
Syed.32 It also took into account the fact that neither party was a
SO ORDERED.34
HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE OF NOT LESS THAN

Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005,
TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.
but the RTC denied the same, prompting her to appeal the
questioned decision to the Court of Appeals.
III
The Ruling of the CA
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF

ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN
In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of
ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT BELOW.35
errors:
The CA gave credence to Glorias arguments, and granted her
I
appeal. It held that the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar

failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE
license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said
BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AS NULL AND
certification could not be accorded probative value.36 The CA ruled
VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE
that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that
DESPITE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS
Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there was
ONE.
compliance with all the requisites laid down by law.37
II
It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed
the marriage contract. The CA also considered that the parties had
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A
comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only
REQUISITE OF A VALID MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING
instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a case against him for
EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK
bigamy.38
PLACE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING

PARTIES BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR
PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The

Decision dated 05 October 2005 and Order dated 27 January 2006
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil Case
REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND
No. 03-0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Petition
LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage
GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
between Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas contracted
MARRIAGE.42
on 09 January 1993 remains valid and subsisting. No costs.

The Ruling of this Court
SO ORDERED.39
The petition is meritorious.
Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 200840
but the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated July 24,
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9,
2008.41
1993, Executive Order No. 209, or the Family Code of the

Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent provisions that would
Hence, this petition.
apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read as
follows:
Grounds in Support of Petition

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
I
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
ERROR OF LAW IN CITING REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in
AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT AND
Chapter 2 of this Title; and
CONTRARY TO THE COURTS OWN FINDINGS AND

CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of

the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their
II
personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife
no valid marriage license had been issued. The CA held that there
in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
was a valid marriage license.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.
render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).

Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage
copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as well as the
voidable as provided in Article 45.
testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license.

To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the office
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of
of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had
the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity
allegedly issued said license. It was there that he requested
shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
certification that no such license was issued. In the case of Republic

v. Court of Appeals43 such certification was allowed, as permitted by
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
xxxx
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an

officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy that
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the
after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found
preceding Chapter.
to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as

above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the
office contain no such record or entry.
Family Code, nor with the formal requisites of the authority of the
solemnizing officer and the conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor is
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil
the marriage one that is exempt from the requirement of a valid
Registrar of Pasig to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license,
marriage license under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The
the Court held:
resolution of this case, thus, hinges on whether or not a valid

marriage license had been issued for the couple. The RTC held that
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify
The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent
that despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in
search" in the certification, and since the certification used stated
his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be
that no marriage license appears to have been issued, no diligent
found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars
search had been conducted and thus the certification could not be
are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a
given probative value.
register book where they are required to enter all applications for
marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of
the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data.44
Appeals.45 It is worth noting that in that particular case, the Court, in

sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was
The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil
lacking, relied on the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of
registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to maintain
Pasig, which merely stated that the alleged marriage license could
records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
not be located as the same did not appear in their records. Nowhere
in the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the
conducted a diligent search, nor is a categorical declaration
marriage license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a
absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court to
certification to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and
apply.
Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage license
pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable
A certified machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was
presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed,
presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the
absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The
names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in the document.
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by

affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty."46 No
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the
such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil
certification, stating that it did not comply with Section 28, Rule 132
Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of
of the Rules of Court.
their office, thus the presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist
of a diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage License No.
996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that
the names in said license do not correspond to those of Gloria and
could have simply been secured from that office and submitted to the
Syed does not overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted
court. However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening
a diligent search of the records of her office.
her claim that there was a valid marriage license issued for her and
Syed.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a

copy thereof to the court. She failed to explain why the marriage
In the case of Cario v. Cario,47 following the case of Republic,48 it
license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where,
was held that the certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their
admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to apply for the
office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the
license, so she is not the best witness to testify to the validity and
non-issuance of said license. The case of Cario further held that the
existence of said license. Neither could the other witnesses she
presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome,
presented prove the existence of the marriage license, as none of
and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage
them applied for the license in Carmona, Cavite. Her mother,
to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage
Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license,
license had been secured.49 Gloria has failed to discharge that
having admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one
burden, and the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid
of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for
marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a
assistance in securing the license, admitted not knowing where the
simple irregularity in the marriage license that would not affect the
license came from. The task of applying for the license was
validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by the
delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have testified as to how the
respondent. No marriage license was proven to have been issued to
license was secured and thus impeached the certification of the
Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of the Municipal Civil
Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of her
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Glorias failure to produce a copy
representative. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the
of the alleged marriage license.
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative

value.
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its

conclusion that Gloria and Syed were validly married. To quote the
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage
contract and a copy of the marriage license were submitted to the
Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage license
CA:
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and
him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his own
documentary, that appellant and appellee have been validly married
deceit and perfidy.50
and there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law.
Both parties are legally capacitated to marry. A certificate of legal
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony
capacity was even issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of
was conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not operate
appellee. The parties herein gave their consent freely. Appellee
to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the
admitted that the signature above his name in the marriage contract
Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of any of the
was his. Several pictures were presented showing appellant and
essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other
except as stated in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code
members of appellants family, taken during the marriage ceremony,
also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void
as well as in the restaurant where the lunch was held after the
from the beginning, except those exempt from the license
marriage ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C" which shows
requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same
appellee signing the Marriage Contract.
Code.51 Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among the

exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized without a marriage
xxxx
license, is void ab initio.1wphi1
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it
has [sic] one offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on 15
may well be that his motives are less than pure, that he seeks to
June 1993. It took appellee more than ten (10) years before he filed
evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make up
on 01 August 2003 his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid
under Article 4 of the Family Code. We take serious note that said
marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by
Petition appears to have been instituted by him only after an
petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be attributed to
Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was filed
him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law
against him for contracting a second or subsequent marriage with
must be applied. As the marriage license, a formal requisite, is
one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not ready to
clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.
reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby

GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2008 and
Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated
October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling the
marriage of petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby
REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision [1] of the
Supreme Court
Manila
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a
petition for review on certiorari[2]under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
(present petition).
THIRD DIVISION
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen
who
GERBERT R. CORPUZ,
G.R. No. 186571
acquired
Canadian
citizenship
through
naturalization
on November 29, 2000.[3] On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married

respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.[4] Due to
Petitioner,
Present:
work
and
other
for Canada soon
versus -
professional
after
the
commitments,
wedding. He
Gerbert
left
returned
to
CARPIO MORALES,
the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was
BRION,
shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another
BERSAMIN,
man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a
ABAD, and
petition
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted
for
divorce. The
Superior
Gerberts
Court
petition
of
for
divorce onDecember 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a

month later, on January 8, 2006.[5]
Promulgated:
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The
August 11, 2010
SOLICITOR GENERAL,
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has
found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina
Respondents. -- fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce

decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed
Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court,
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.[6]

Where a marriage between a Filipino
Accordingly, Gerbert
filed
petition
for
judicial
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case
herself
but
was
prevented
by
financial
and
personal
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative
circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a
intent behind the enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of
party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts.
the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido

III;[10] the provision was enacted to avoid the absurd situation where
In its October 30, 2008 decision,[7] the RTC denied Gerberts

petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper
the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. [11]
party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign

divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled
THE PETITION
that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, [8] in order for him
or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law. [9] Article 26 of the
Family Code reads:
From the RTCs ruling,[12] Gerbert filed the present petition.[13]

Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially
for declaratory relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus,
similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the
the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force
rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
in the country where they were solemnized, and
Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of
the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the
is in favor of the
doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to
Filipino spouse
the Filipino spouse an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the

essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history
Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient
and intent behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he
Code.
might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiance in the

Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages
on file with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor
void[15] and voidable[16] marriages. In both cases, the basis for
General and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments, [14] both support
the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the
Gerberts position.
marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the

other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second
cause arising after the marriage.[17] Our family laws do not recognize
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the
absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.[18]
right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of

a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURTS RULING
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in

marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C.
Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom
Constitution,[19] enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending
The alien spouse
Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:
can claim no right

under the second
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside
paragraph of
the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force
Article 26 of the
Family Code as
the substantive
right it establishes
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino

citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in
the law to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
no longer married to the Filipino spouse. [23] The legislative intent is

for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO
status,
settling
the
doubts
created
by
the
divorce
227 effectively incorporated into the law this Courts holding in Van
decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[20] and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.[21] In both cases,
Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to
the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of
have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as
marital rights after a foreign courts divorce decree between the alien
dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.[24] Without the
and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial
had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The
recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding
Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another

proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the
our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital
Filipino spouse] has to be considered still
bond;[25] Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against
married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to
absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in
a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The
a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26
Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live
of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and
serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage
render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter
between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
should not continue to be one of her heirs with

possible rights to conjugal property. She should not
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26
be discriminated against in her own country if
of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign
the ends of justice are to be served.
[22]
divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the
alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino
of aliens with the complementary statement that this conclusion is
spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court
not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In
in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the
other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26
alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree),
of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of
whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his
legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign
[26]
national law.
divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity
and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the
according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive
purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39
the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for
of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign
the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino
judgments. This Section states:
spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family

Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final

orders.The effect of a judgment or final order of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction
The foreign
to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
divorce decree is
presumptive
(a)
In case of a judgment or final
evidence of a right
order upon a specific thing, the
that clothes the
judgment or final order is conclusive
party with legal
upon the title of the thing; and
interest to petition
for its recognition
in this jurisdiction
(b)
In case of a judgment or final

order
against
judgment
or
person,
final
order
the
is
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second
presumptive evidence of a right
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor
as between the parties and their
successors
in
interest
by
subsequent title.
invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or

defense.
In either case, the judgment or final order
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and
may be repelled by evidence of a want of
the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section
requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign
by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of
judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to
official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a)
institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by
the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her
the seal of his office.
[27]
national law.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce
copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates
judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial
proving its authenticity,[30] but failed to include a copy of the Canadian
notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that,
law on divorce.[31] Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply
as a rule, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a
dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless
judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country.
[28]
This means
we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to
that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts
determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the
under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens applicable
Canadian divorce law.
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
herself.[29] The recognition may be made in an action instituted
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of
specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party
action, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the
Filipina wifes (Daisylyns) obvious conformity with the petition. A
remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to
based on the mere presentation of the decree. [34] We consider the
oppose
recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of
the
foreign
judgment
and
overcome
petitioners
presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want
the bench and the bar to what had been done.
of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or

fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that [a]cts, events and judicial
conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign
decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in
judgment,
of res
the civil register. The law requires the entry in the civil registry of
between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of
judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a
judicata
[32]
once
the Rules of Court.
recognized,
shall
have
the
effect
[33]
persons legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting all his
personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature,
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the

practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between
not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate
or illegitimate, or his being married or not.[35]
nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce

serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign
considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect,
one, affecting a persons legal capacity and status that must be
as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not
recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status
for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil
Family Code provides.
registry:
Considerations
Sec.
1. Civil
Register. A
civil
register
is
beyond the
established for recording the civil status of
recognition of the
persons, in which shall be entered:
foreign divorce
decree
(a)
As a matter of housekeeping concern, we note that
births;
(b) deaths;
the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the
(c)
marriages;
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e)
divorces;
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil
(f)
legitimations;
registry, the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do
(g) adoptions;
not ipso facto authorize the decreesregistration. The law should be
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the
(i)
naturalization; and
foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the
(j)
changes of name.
context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists

recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil
xxxx
Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law
when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars

shall keep and preserve in their offices the following
Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign

decree presented by Gerbert.
books, in which they shall, respectively make the

proper entries concerning the civil status of persons:
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of

the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4,
series of 1982,[36] and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series
(1) Birth and death register;
of 1982[37] both of which required a final order from a competent

(2) Marriage register, in which shall be
entered not
only
solemnized
but
the
marriages
also divorces
and
dissolved marriages.
Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage,

can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the
registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration
of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition
is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.
(3) Legitimation,
adoption,
change
naturalization register.
acknowledgment,
of
name
and
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the

recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree
does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil
registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the
proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the
as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the
cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party

or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil
serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding [41] by which the
register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order. The
applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in
Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by
terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion,
specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or

corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the
WHEREFORE,
we GRANT the
review
on certiorari,
with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction,
the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City,
may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others,
its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to
that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province
the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling
where the corresponding civil registry is located;
that the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be
made parties to the proceedings; [39] and that the time and place for
hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation.
[40]
As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in
the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with
the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be
construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the registration
of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry one for recognition of
the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the
entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself,
30,
for
jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied
[38]
and REVERSE the October
petition
Branch
2008 decision
of
11,
as
as
well
above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar

General. No costs.
G.R. No. 171557, February 12, 2014
determine if collusion exists between Rodolfo and Natividad and
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. RODOLFO O. DE

GRACIA, Respondent.
found that there was none.9 Trial on the merits then ensued.
In support of his complaint, Rodolfo testified, among others, that he
DECISION
first met Natividad when they were students at the Barangay High
PERLASBERNABE, J.:
School of Sindangan,10 and he was forced to marry her barely three
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the
(3) months into their courtship in light of her accidental
Decision2 dated June 2, 2005 and Resolution3dated February 3,
pregnancy.11 At the time of their marriage, he was 21 years old, while
2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CV No. 69103 which
Natividad was 18 years of age. He had no stable job and merely
affirmed the Decision dated October 17, 2000 of the Regional Trial
worked in the gambling cockpits as kristo and bangkero sa
Court of Zamboanga del Norte, Branch 11 (RTC) in Civil Case No.
hantak. When he decided to join and train with the army,12 Natividad
S665 declaring the marriage of respondent Rodolfo O. De Gracia
left their conjugal home and sold their house without his
(Rodolfo) and Natividad N. Rosalem (Natividad) void on the ground
consent.13Thereafter, Natividad moved to Dipolog City where she
of psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code
lived with a certain Engineer Terez (Terez), and bore him a child
named Julie Ann Terez.14 After cohabiting with Terez, Natividad
of the Philippines (Family Code).

The Facts
contracted a second marriage on January 11, 1991 with another man
Rodolfo and Natividad were married on February 15, 1969 at the

6
named Antonio Mondarez and has lived since then with the latter in
Parish of St. Vincent Ferrer in Salug, Zamboanga del Norte. They
Cagayan de Oro City.15 From the time Natividad abandoned them in
lived in Dapaon, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte and have two (2)
1972, Rodolfo was left to take care of Ma. Reynilda and Ma.
children, namely, Ma. Reynilda R. De Gracia (Ma. Reynilda) and Ma.
Rizza16 and he exerted earnest efforts to save their marriage which,
Rizza R. De Gracia (Ma. Rizza), who were born on August 20, 1969
however, proved futile because of Natividads psychological
and January 15, 1972, respectively.
incapacity that appeared to be incurable.17
On December 28, 1998, Rodolfo filed a verified complaint for
For her part, Natividad failed to file her answer, as well as appear
declaration of nullity of marriage (complaint) before the RTC,
during trial, despite service of summons.18 Nonetheless, she
docketed as Civil Case No. S665, alleging that Natividad was
informed the court that she submitted herself for psychiatric
psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital
examination to Dr. Cheryl T. Zalsos (Dr. Zalsos) in response to
obligations. In compliance with the Order8 dated January 5, 1999 of
Rodolfos claims.19 Rodolfo also underwent the same examination.20
the RTC, the public prosecutor conducted an investigation to
In her twopage psychiatric evaluation report,21 Dr. Zalsos stated that
but manifested only thereafter. It likewise concurred with Dr. Zalsoss
both Rodolfo and Natividad were psychologically incapacitated to
observation that Natividads condition is incurable since it is deeply
comply with the essential marital obligations, finding that both parties
rooted within the makeup of her personality. Accordingly, it
suffered from utter emotional immaturity [which] is unusual and
concluded that Natividad could not have known, much more
unacceptable behavior considered [as] deviant from persons who
comprehend the marital obligations she was assuming, or, knowing
22
abide by established norms of conduct. As for Natividad, Dr.
them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof.27
Zalsos also observed that she lacked the willful cooperation of being
The Republic appealed to the CA, averring that there was no
a wife and a mother to her two daughters. Similarly, Rodolfo failed to
showing that Natividads personality traits constituted psychological
perform his obligations as a husband, adding too that he sired a son
incapacity as envisaged under Article 36 of the Family Code, and
with another woman. Further, Dr. Zalsos noted that the mental
that the testimony of the expert witness was not conclusive upon the
condition of both parties already existed at the time of the celebration
court.28
of marriage, although it only manifested after. Based on the
The CA Ruling
foregoing, Dr. Zalsos concluded that the couples union was bereft
In a Decision29 dated June 2, 2005, the CA affirmed the ruling of the
of the mind, will and heart for the obligations of marriage. 23
RTC, finding that while Natividads emotional immaturity,
On February 10, 1999, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
irresponsibility and promiscuity by themselves do not necessarily
representing petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), filed
equate to psychological incapacity, their degree or severity, as duly
24
an opposition to the complaint, contending that the acts committed
testified to by Dr. Zalsos, has sufficiently established a case of
by Natividad did not demonstrate psychological incapacity as
psychological disorder so profound as to render [Natividad]
contemplated by law, but are mere grounds for legal separation
incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.30
under the Family Code.25
The Republic moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied

The RTC Ruling
In a Decision26 dated October 17, 2000, the RTC declared the
in a Resolution31 dated February 3, 2006, hence, the instant petition.

The Issue Before the Court
marriage between Rodolfo and Natividad void on the ground of
The primordial issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in
psychological incapacity. It relied on the findings and testimony of Dr.
sustaining the RTCs finding of psychological incapacity.
Zalsos, holding that Natividads emotional immaturity exhibited a

behavioral pattern which in psychiatry constitutes a form of
personality disorder that existed at the time of the parties marriage
The Ruling of the Court

The petition is meritorious.
Psychological incapacity, as a ground to nullify a marriage under

32
irresponsibility could not be equated with psychological incapacity
Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental
as it was not shown that these acts are manifestations of a
not merely physical incapacity that causes a party to betruly
disordered personality which make her completely unable to
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
discharge the essential marital obligations of the marital state,
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
not merely due to heryouth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity.42 In
which, as so expressed in Article 6833 of the Family Code, among
the same light, the Court, in the case of Pesca v. Pesca43 (Pesca),
others,34 include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
ruled against a declaration of nullity, as petitioner therein utterly
love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is
failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of
the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious
respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage, significantly
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
noting that the [e]motional immaturity and irresponsibility,
marriage.35 In Santos v. CA36 (Santos), the Court first declared that
invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.
psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it
In Pesca, the Court upheld the appellate courts finding that the
must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of
petitioner therein had not established that her husband showed
carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage); (b)juridical
signs of mental incapacity as would cause him to be truly incognitive
antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party
of the basic marital covenant, as so provided for in Article 68 of the
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
Family Code; that the incapacity is grave, has preceded the marriage
emerge only after the marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be
and is incurable; that his incapacity to meet his marital responsibility
incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
is because of a psychological, not physical illness; that the root
37
means of the party involved). The Court laid down more definitive
cause of the incapacity has been identified medically or clinically, and
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the
has been proven by an expert; and that the incapacity is permanent
Family Code in Republic of the Phils. v. CA,38 whose salient points
and incurable in nature.44
are footnoted hereunder.39 These guidelines incorporate the basic
The Court maintains a similar view in this case. Based on the
requirements that the Court established inSantos.
40
Keeping with these principles, the Court, in Dedel v. CA,41 held that
therein respondents emotional immaturity and
evidence presented, there exists insufficient factual or legal basis to

conclude that Natividads emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, or
even sexual promiscuity, can be equated with psychological
emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity do not rise to the
incapacity.
level of psychological incapacity that would justify the nullification of
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, heavily relied on the psychiatric
the parties marriage. Indeed, to be declared clinically or medically
evaluation report of Dr. Zalsos which does not, however, explain in
incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to perform ones
reasonable detail how Natividads condition could be characterized
duties is another. To hark back to what has been earlier discussed,
as grave, deeplyrooted, and incurable within the parameters of
psychological incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of
psychological incapacity jurisprudence. Aside from failing to disclose
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
the types of psychological tests which she administered on
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. 46 In the
Natividad, Dr. Zalsos failed to identify in her report the root cause of
final analysis, the Court does not perceive a disorder of this nature to
Natividads condition and to show that it existed at the time of the
exist in the present case. Thus, for these reasons, coupled too with
parties marriage. Neither was the gravity or seriousness of
the recognition that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the
Natividads behavior in relation to her failure to perform the essential
foundation of the family,47 the instant petition is hereby granted.
marital obligations sufficiently described in Dr. Zalsoss report.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June
Further, the finding contained therein on the incurability of Natividads
2, 2005 and Resolution dated February 3, 2006 of the Court of
condition remains unsupported by any factual or scientific basis and,
Appeals in CAGR. CV No. 69103 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
hence, appears to be drawn out as a bare conclusion and even self
Accordingly, the complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage filed
serving. In the same vein, Dr. Zalsoss testimony during trial, which is
under Article 36 of the Family Code is DISMISSED.
essentially a reiteration of her report, also fails to convince the Court

of her conclusion that Natividad was psychologically incapacitated.
Verily, although expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding
the psychological temperament of parties are usually given
considerable weight by the courts, the existence of psychological
incapacity must still be proven by independent evidence. 45 After
poring over the records, the Court, however, does not find any such
evidence sufficient enough to uphold the court a quos nullity
declaration. To the Courts mind, Natividads refusal to live with
Rodolfo and to assume her duties as wife and mother as well as her
A finding of psychological incapacity must be supported by well-established
Supreme Court
facts. It is the plaintiffs burden to convince the court of the existence of
Manila
these facts.
Before the Court is a Petition for Review[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) May
FIRST DIVISION
27, 2004 Decision[2] and December 15, 2004 Resolution[3] in CA-G.R. CV

VALERIO E. KALAW,
G.R. No. 166357
Petitioner,
No. 64240, which reversed the trial courts declaration of nullity of the herein
parties marriage. The fallo of the assailed Decision reads:
Present:
WHEREFOREthe
CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

- versus -
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
appeal
is GRANTED,
and
the
assailed Decision is SET ASIDE and VACATED while

the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is
hereby DISMISSED.
DEL CASTILLO, and

SO ORDERED.[4]
PEREZ, JJ.
MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
September 19, 2011
Factual Antecedents
x------------------------------------------------------------------x
Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez
DECISION
(Malyn) met in 1973. They maintained a relationship and eventually married

in Hong Kong on November 4, 1976.They had four children, Valerio (Rio),
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Maria Eva (Ria), Ramon Miguel (Miggy or Mickey), and Jaime Teodoro
(Jay).
Shortly after the birth of their youngest son, Tyrone had an extramarital affair
with Jocelyn Quejano (Jocelyn), who gave birth to a son in March 1983.[5]
the time of the celebration of their marriage. He further claimed that her
In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home (the house of her Kalaw in-laws)
psychological incapacity was manifested by her immaturity and
and her four children with Tyrone. [6] Meanwhile, Tyrone started living with
irresponsibility towards Tyrone and their children during their co-habitation,
Jocelyn, who bore him three more children.[7]
as shown by Malyns following acts:
In 1990, Tyrone went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and their
children. He left his four children from his marriage with Malyn in a rented
1. she left the children without proper care and

attention as she played mahjong all day and all night;
[8]
house in Valle Verde with only a househelp and a driver. The househelp
would just call Malyn to take care of the children whenever any of them got
sick. Also, in accordance with their custody agreement, the children stayed
with Malyn on weekends.
2. she left the house to party with male friends

and returned in the early hours of the following day; and
[9]
3. she committed adultery on June 9, 1985,

In 1994, the two elder children, Rio and Ria, asked for Malyns permission to
which act Tyrone discovered in flagrante delicto.[13]
go to Japan for a one-week vacation. Malyn acceded only to learn later that
Tyrone brought the children to the US.[10] After just one year, Ria returned to
the Philippines and chose to live with Malyn.
During trial,[14] Tyrone narrated the circumstances of Malyns alleged
Meanwhile, Tyrone and Jocelyns family returned to the Philippines and
infidelity. According to him, on June 9, 1985, he and his brother-in-law,
resumed physical custody of the two younger children, Miggy and
Ronald Fernandez (Malyns brother), proceeded to Hyatt Hotel and learned
Jay. According to Malyn, from that time on, the children refused to go to her
that Malyn was occupying a room with a certain Benjie Guevarra
house on weekends because of alleged weekend plans with their father.[11]
(Benjie). When he proceeded to the said room, he saw Benjie and Malyn
inside.[15] At rebuttal, Tyrone elaborated that Benjie was wearing only a
Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage
towel around his waist, while Malyn was lying in bed in her underwear. After
an exchange of words, he agreed not to charge Malyn with adultery when
On July 6, 1994, nine years since the de facto separation from his wife,
the latter agreed to relinquish all her marital and parental rights. [16] They put
Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article
their agreement in writing before Atty. Jose Palarca.
36 of the Family Code.[12] He alleged that Malyn was psychologically

incapacitated to perform and comply with the essential marital obligations at
Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr. Gates), and a

Catholic canon law expert, Fr. Gerard Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), to testify on
Fr. Healy clarified that playing mahjong and spending time with friends are
Malyns psychological incapacity.
not disorders by themselves. They only constitute psychological incapacity

whenever inordinate amounts of time are spent on these activities to the
Dr. Gates explained on the stand that the factual allegations regarding
detriment of ones familial duties.[23] Fr. Healy characterized Malyns
Malyns behavior her sexual infidelity, habitual mahjong playing, and her
psychological incapacity as grave and incurable.[24]
frequent nights-out with friends may reflect a narcissistic personality

disorder (NPD).[17] NPD is present when a person is obsessed to meet her
wants and needs in utter disregard of her significant others.
[18]
Malyns NPD
is manifest in her utter neglect of her duties as a mother.[19]
He based his opinion on his interview with Tyrone, the trial transcripts, as
well as the report of Dr. Natividad Dayan (Dr. Dayan), Malyns expert
witness.[25] He clarified that he did not verify the truthfulness of the factual
allegations regarding Malyns habits because he believed it is the courts
Dr. Gates reported that Malyns personality disorder may have been evident
duty to do so.[26] Instead, he formed his opinion on the assumption that the
even prior to her marriage because it is rooted in her family background and
factual allegations are indeed true.
upbringing, which the psychologist gathered to be materially deprived and

without a proper maternal role model.[20]
Malyns version
Dr. Gates based her diagnosis on the facts revealed by her interviews with
Malyn denied being psychologically incapacitated.[27] While she admitted
Tyrone, Trinidad Kalaw (Tyrones sister-in-law), and the son Miggy. She also
playing mahjong, she denied playing as frequently as Tyrone alleged. She
read the transcript of Tyrones court testimony.[21]
maintained that she did so only two to three times a week and always
between 1 p.m. to 6 p.m. only.[28] And in those instances, she always had
Fr. Healy corroborated Dr. Gates assessment. He concluded that Malyn

was psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital duties.
[22]
He
explained that her psychological incapacity is rooted in her role as the
Tyrones permission and would often bring the children and their
respective yayaswith her.[29] She maintained that she did not neglect her
duties as mother and wife.
breadwinner of her family. This role allegedly inflated Malyns ego to the
point that her needs became priority, while her kids and husbands needs
Malyn admitted leaving the conjugal home in May 1985. She, however,
became secondary.Malyn is so self-absorbed that she is incapable of
explained that she did so only to escape her physically abusive husband.
prioritizing her familys needs.
[30]
On the day she left, Tyrone, who preferred to keep Malyn a housewife,
was upset that Malyn was preparing to go to work. He called up the security
dependence, habitual drinking, womanizing, and physical violence.[35] Malyn
guards and instructed them not to let Malyn out of the house. Tyrone then
presented Dr. Dayan a clinical psychologist, as her expert witness.
placed cigarette ashes on Malyns head and proceeded to lock the bedroom
doors. Fearing another beating, Malyn rushed out of their bedroom and into
Dr. Dayan interviewed Tyrone, Malyn, Miggy/Mickey, Jay, and Ria for her
her mother-in-laws room. She blurted that Tyrone would beat her up again
psychological evaluation of the spouses. The factual narrations culled from
so her mother-in-law gave her P300 to leave the house.
[31]
She never
returned to their conjugal home.
these interviews reveal that Tyrone found Malyn a lousy mother because of
her mahjong habit,[36] while Malyn was fed up with Tyrones sexual infidelity,
drug habit, and physical abuse.[37] Dr. Dayan determined that both Tyrone
Malyn explained that she applied for work, against Tyrones wishes,
and Malyn were behaviorally immature. They encountered problems
because she wanted to be self-sufficient. Her resolve came from her
because of their personality differences, which ultimately led to the demise
discovery that Tyrone had a son by Jocelyn and had secretly gone to the
of their marriage. Her diagnostic impressions are summarized below:
US with Jocelyn.
[32]
The marriage of Tyrone and Malyn was a mistake from

Malyn denied the allegation of adultery. She maintained that Benjie only
the very beginning. Both of them were not truly ready for
booked a room at the Hyatt Hotel for her because she was so drunk after
marriage even after two years of living together and
partying with friends. She admitted finding her brother Ronald and Tyrone
having a child. When Malyn first met Tyrone who
at the door of the Hyatt Hotel room, but maintained being fully clothed at
showered her with gifts, flowers, and affection she
that time.
[33]
Malyn insisted that she wrote the letter relinquishing all her
spousal and parental rights under duress.[34]
resisted his overtures. She made it clear that she could

take him or leave him. But the minute she started to care,
she became a different person clingy and immature,
After the Hyatt Hotel incident, Malyn only saw her children by surreptitiously
doubting his love, constantly demanding reassurance that
visiting them in school. She later obtained partial custody of the children as
she
an incident to the legal separation action filed by Tyrone against her (which
life. She became relationship-dependent. It appears that
action was subsequently dismissed for lack of interest).
her style then was when she begins to care for a man,
was
the
most
important
person
in
his
she puts all her energy into him and loses focus on
As an affirmative defense, Malyn maintained that it was Tyrone who was
herself. This imbalance between thinking and feeling was
suffering from psychological incapacity, as manifested by his drug
overwhelming to Tyrone who admitted that the thought of
commitment scared him. Tyrone admitted that when he
committing himself to his duties as a husband. He is unable to remain
was in his younger years, he was often out seeking other
faithful to Malyn and is psychologically incapacitated to perform this duty.[41]
women. His interest in them was not necessarily for sex,

just for fun dancing, drinking, or simply flirting.
Childrens version
Both of them seem behaviorally immature. For some
The children all stated that both their parents took care of them, provided for
time, Malyn adapted to her husband who was a moody
their needs, and loved them. Rio testified that they would accompany their
man with short temper and unresolved issues with
mother to White Plains on days that she played mahjong with her
parents and siblings. He was a distancer, concerned
friends. None of them reported being neglected or feeling abandoned.
more about his work and friends tha[n] he was about

spending time with his family. Because of Malyns and
The two elder kids remembered the fights between their parents but it was
Tyrones backgrounds (both came from families with high
only Ria who admitted actually witnessing physical abuse inflicted on her
conflicts) they experienced turmoil and chaos in their
mother.[42] The two elder kids also recalled that, after the separation, their
marriage. The conflicts they had struggled to avoid
mother would visit them only in school.[43]
suddenly
galloped
out
of
control Their
individual
personalities broke through, precipitating the demise of

their marriage.
[38]
The children recalled living in Valle Verde with only the househelp and driver
during the time that their dad was abroad.[44] While they did not live with
their mother while they were housed in Valle Verde, the kids were in
agreement that their mother took care of them on weekends and would see
Dr. Dayan likewise wrote in her psychological evaluation report that Malyn
to their needs. They had a common recollection that the househelp would
exhibited significant, but not severe, dependency, narcissism, and
call their mother to come and take care of them in Valle Verde whenever
compulsiveness.
[39]
any of them was sick.[45]

Other witnesses
On the stand, the psychologist elaborated that while Malyn had relationship
problems with Tyrone, she appeared to have a good relationship with her
Dr. Cornelio Banaag, Tyrones attending psychiatrist at the Manila
kids.[40] As for Tyrone, he has commitment issues which prevent him from
Sanitarium, testified that, for the duration of Tyrones confinement, the

couple appeared happy and the wife was commendable for the support she
gave to her spouse.[46] He likewise testified that Tyrone tested negative for
drugs and was not a drug dependent.
[47]
respective schools. And while she was only granted weekend custody of
the children, it appeared that she made efforts to personally attend to their
needs and to devote time with them.[51]
Malyns brother, Ronald Fernandez, confirmed Tyrones allegation that they
On the contrary, Tyrone, who had custody of the children since the
found Malyn with Benjie in the Hyatt hotel room. Contrary to Tyrones
couples de facto separation, simply left the children for several years with
version, he testified that neither he nor Tyrone entered the room, but stayed
only a maid and a driver to care for them while he lived with his second
in the hallway. He likewise did not recall seeing Benjie or Malyn half-naked.
family abroad.[52] The social worker found that Tyrone tended to prioritize his
[48]
second family to the detriment of his children with Malyn. Given this history
during the formative years of the children, the social worker did not find
Tyrone then presented Mario Calma (Mario), who was allegedly part of
Tyrone a reliable parent to whom custody of adolescents may be awarded.
Malyns group of friends. He stated on the stand that they would go on

nights-out as a group and Malyn would meet with a male musician-friend
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court[53]
afterwards.[49]
After summarizing the evidence presented by both parties, the trial court
Social worker
concluded that both parties are psychologically incapacitated to perform the

essential marital obligations under the Family Code. The courts Decision is
The trial court ordered the court social worker, Jocelyn V. Arre (Arre), to
encapsulated in this paragraph:
conduct a social case study on the parties as well as the minor

children. Arre interviewed the parties Tyrone and Malyn; the minor
From the evidence, it appears that parties are both
children Miggy/Mickey and Jay; Tyrones live-in partner, Jocelyn; [50] and
suffering from psychological incapacity to perform their
Tyrone and Malyns only daughter, Ria. While both parents are financially
essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family
stable and have positive relationships with their children, she recommended
Code. The parties entered into a marriage without as
that the custody of the minor children be awarded to Malyn. Based on the
much as understanding what it entails. They failed to
interviews of family members themselves, Malyn was shown to be more
commit themselves to its essential obligations: the
available to the children and to exercise better supervision and care. The
conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering
social worker commended the fact that even after Malyn left the conjugal
of mutual help, the procreation and education of their
home in 1985, she made efforts to visit her children clandestinely in their
children to become responsible individuals. Parties
psychological incapacity is grave, and serious such that
Petitioners arguments
both are incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties

required in marriage. The incapacity has been clinically
Petitioner Tyrone argues that the CA erred in disregarding the factual
established and was found to be pervasive, grave and
findings of the trial court, which is the court that is in the best position to
incurable.
[54]
appreciate the evidence. He opines that he has presented preponderant
The trial court then declared the parties marriage void ab initio pursuant to
evidence to prove that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to
Article 36 of the Family Code.[55]
perform her essential marital obligations, to wit:
Ruling of the Court of Appeals[56]
a) the expert witnesses, Dr. Gates and Fr. Healy, proved

on the stand that respondents egocentric attitude, immaturity, self-
Malyn appealed the trial courts Decision to the CA. The CA reversed the
trial courts ruling because it is not supported by the facts on record. Both
obsession
and
respondents NPD;
self-centeredness
were
manifestations
of
[61]
parties allegations and incriminations against each other do not support a

finding of psychological incapacity. The parties faults tend only to picture
b) these expert witnesses proved that respondents NPD
their immaturity and irresponsibility in performing their marital and familial
is grave and incurable and prevents her from performing her
obligations.At most, there may be sufficient grounds for a legal separation.
essential martial obligations;[62] and
[57]
Moreover, the psychological report submitted by petitioners expert
witness, Dr. Gates, does not explain how the diagnosis of NPD came to be
c) that respondents NPD existed at the time of the
drawn from the sources. It failed to satisfy the legal and jurisprudential
celebration of the marriage because it is rooted in her upbringing,
requirements for the declaration of nullity of marriage.[58]
family background, and socialite lifestyle prior to her marriage.[63]
Tyrone filed a motion for reconsideration [59] but the same was denied
Petitioner stresses that even respondent insisted that their marriage is void
on December 15, 2004.[60]
because of psychological incapacity, albeit on petitioners part.[64]

Respondents arguments
Respondent maintains that Tyrone failed to discharge his burden of proving

[65]
her alleged psychological incapacity.
She argues that the testimonies of
Whether petitioner has sufficiently proved that respondent suffers from

psychological incapacity
her children and the findings of the court social worker to the effect that she
was a good, loving, and attentive mother are sufficient to rebut Tyrones
allegation that she was negligent and irresponsible.
Our Ruling
[66]
The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting

She assails Dr. Gatess report as one-sided and lacking in depth. Dr. Gates
aside the trial courts Decision for lack of legal and factual basis.
did not interview her, their common children, or even Jocelyn. Moreover, her
report failed to state that Malyns alleged psychological incapacity was grave
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is governed by Article 36 of
and incurable.[67] Fr. Healys testimony, on the other hand, was based only
the Family Code which provides:
on Tyrones version of the facts.
[68]
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party

who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
Malyn reiterates the appellate courts ruling that the trial court Decision is
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
intrinsically defective for failing to support its conclusion of psychological
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity with factual findings.
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Almost four years after filing her memorandum, respondent apparently had
a change of heart and filed a Manifestation with Motion for Leave to
Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take
Withdraw Comment and Memorandum.[69]She manifested that she was no
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations.[72] The burden of
longer disputing the possibility that their marriage may really be void on the
proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff.[73] The plaintiff must prove
basis of Tyrones psychological incapacity. She then asked the Court to
that the incapacitated party, based on his or her actions or behavior, suffers
dispose of the case with justice.
[70]
Her manifestation and motion were
noted by the Court in its January 20, 2010 Resolution.[71]
a serious psychological disorder that completely disables him or her from

understanding and discharging the essential obligations of the marital state.
The psychological problem must be grave, must have existed at the time of
Issue
marriage, and must be incurable.[74]
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers
present any proof, other than his own testimony, that the mahjong sessions
from psychological incapacity. He presented the testimonies of two
were so frequent that respondent neglected her family. While he intimated
supposed
is
that two of his sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this
psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were
episode to respondents mahjong-playing. The least that could have been
premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been
done was to prove the frequency of respondents mahjong-playing during
sufficiently proven.Petitioners experts heavily relied on petitioners
the years when these two children were in second grade. This was not
allegations of respondents constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty
done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its
parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children.
alleged debilitating frequency and adverse effect on the children were not
Petitioners experts opined that respondents alleged habits, when performed
proven.
constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her
Also unproven was petitioners claim about respondents alleged constant
duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form
visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, and obsessive need for
of NPD.
attention from other men. No proof whatsoever was presented to prove her
expert
witnesses who
concluded
that
respondent
visits to beauty salons or her frequent partying with friends. Petitioner

But petitioners allegations, which served as the bases or
presented Mario (an alleged companion of respondent during these nights-
underlying premises of the conclusions of his experts, were not actually
out) in order to prove that respondent had affairs with other men, but Mario
proven. In fact, respondent presented contrary evidence refuting these
only testified that respondent appeared to be dating other men. Even
allegations of the petitioner.
assuming arguendo that petitioner was able to prove that respondent had
an extramarital affair with another man, that one instance of sexual infidelity
For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played mahjong
cannot, by itself, be equated with obsessive need for attention from other
and neglected their children as a result. Respondent admittedly played
men. Sexual infidelity per se is a ground for legal separation, but it does not
mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so frequently
necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.
that she neglected her duties as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted
Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the
petitioners allegations that she played four to five times a week. She
behaviors described as constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for concluding
maintained it was only two to three times a week and always with the
that she was indeed psychologically incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the
permission of her husband and without abandoning her children at
evidence points to the opposite conclusion. A fair assessment of the facts
home. The children corroborated this, saying that they were with their
would show that respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of
mother when she played mahjong in their relatives home. Petitioner did not
appreciating and performing her marital and parental duties. Not once did
the children state that they were neglected by their mother. On the contrary,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of
they narrated that she took care of them, was around when they were sick,
Appeals May 27, 2004 Decision and its December 15, 2004 Resolution in
and cooked the food they like. It appears that respondent made real efforts
CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 areAFFIRMED.
to see and take care of her children despite her estrangement from their
father.There was no testimony whatsoever that shows abandonment and
neglect of familial duties. While petitioner cites the fact that his two sons,
Rio and Miggy, both failed the second elementary level despite having
tutors, there is nothing to link their academic shortcomings to Malyns
actions.
After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis for
the conclusion of psychological incapacity. There is no error in the CAs
reversal of the trial courts ruling that there was psychological incapacity. The
trial courts Decision merely summarized the allegations, testimonies, and
evidence of the respective parties, but it did not actually assess the veracity
of these allegations, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of the
evidence. The trial court did not make factual findings which can serve as
bases for its legal conclusion of psychological incapacity.
What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps,
infidelity, which may have constrained them from dedicating the best of
themselves to each other and to their children. There may be grounds for
legal separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity that voids a
marriage.
FIRST DIVISION
divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino

spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the
Court to make a definite ruling on this apparently novel question,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 154380
Petitioner,
presented as a pure question of law.

In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails
the Decision[1] dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Present:
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and itsResolution[2] dated

July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a
- versus -
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is
(Chairman),
capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
Quisumbing,
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the
Ynares-Santiago,
second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and

by reason of the divorce decree obtained against
Carpio, and
him by his American wife, the petitioner is given the

capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.
Azcuna, JJ.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[3]
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,

Respondent.
Promulgated:
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as
October 5, 2005
x-------------------------------------------------
follows.
-x
Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M.

an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V.

Orbecido.
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where
In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing
one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid
along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that
his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed
wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain
before the trial court actually constituted a petition for declaratory
Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at
relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court
5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
provides:
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to
RULE 63
remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted
the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the
Section
Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
interested under a deed, will, contract or other
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a
WHETHER
OR
NOT
RESPONDENT
1. Who
may
file
petitionAny
person
CAN
statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or
REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY
other governmental regulation may, before breach or
CODE[4]
violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
Regional Trial Court to determine any question of
is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid
construction or validity arising, and for a declaration
mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino
of his rights or duties, thereunder.
citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to

file a petition for annulment or for legal separation.
[5]
...
Furthermore,
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must
the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondents situation.
be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between
The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial
persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the
determination.
[6]
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly
relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is
ripe for judicial determination.[8]
applicable to his case but insists that when his naturalized alien wife
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article
obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is
26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens where one later
likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12,
acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried
Article II of the Constitution.[7]
while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as
petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the
institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a
declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief,
has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries,
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen
litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second
and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
marriage.
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
of the Family Code apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
must dwell on how this provision had come about in the first place,
Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to
Brief Historical Background
govern the situation presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into
only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code,
the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is
which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were
All
marriages
solemnized
outside
the
two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her
the country where they were solemnized, and valid
capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen
there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
while residing in the U.S.A.

Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings [9] on the
except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and

38.
Family Code, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original
(CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article
Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law,
amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second
paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
26:
1.
The
rule
is
discriminatory.
It
discriminates against those whose spouses
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside
are Filipinos who divorce them abroad.
the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
These spouses who are divorced will not be
able to re-marry, while the spouses of
foreigners who validly divorce them abroad
of Quita v. Court of Appeals.[11] In Quita, the parties were, as in this
can.
2.
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case
This is the beginning of the recognition
case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a
of the validity of divorce even for Filipino
naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the
citizens. For those whose foreign spouses
same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a
validly divorce them abroad will also be
Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer
considered to be validly divorced here and
married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
can re-marry. We propose that this be
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and
deleted and made into law only after more
applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26
widespread
should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the
consultation.
(Emphasis
supplied.)
time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later
Legislative Intent
on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations
a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of theCivil Code Revision
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction
Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is
according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous
no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the
be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far
1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[10] The Van Dorn case involved
as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be
a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held
extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long
therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is
as they come within its spirit or intent.[12]
valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is

capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the

absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of
alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to
the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but
the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as
later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?
coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the

application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1.
2.
hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain

married to the naturalized alien spouse.
There is a valid marriage that has been
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
duly submitted by respondent concerning the divorce decree and the
foreigner; and
naturalization of respondents wife. It is settled rule that one who
A valid divorce is obtained abroad by
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not
evidence.[13]
remarry.
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the
his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen.
time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time
Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the
own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
latter to remarry.
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. [14] Such
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an
foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial
American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been
notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged
celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the
and proved.[15] Furthermore, respondent must also show that the
naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce
divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically
capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the
required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case.
sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another
Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to
marriage.
remarry.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of
We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the
Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O.
proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for
No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has
annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a
been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and
long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even
remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present
feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have
petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we
all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation would
are unable to declare, based on respondents bare allegations that
not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie;
his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a
divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is

now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made
properly upon respondents submission of the aforecited evidence in
his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines
is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and
Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy

contracted marriage on November 15, 1973 at the Church of Our
Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. 4 Both were then 22 years old. Their
union was blessed with two children, Frederick and Farrah Sheryll
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 127263
April 12, 2000
FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE
who were born on July 8, 1975 and February 14, 1978, respectively.5
The spouses first established their residence in Singalong, Manila,
then in Apalit, Pampanga, and later at San Matias, Sto. Tomas,
Pampanga. They operated a lumber and hardware business in Sto.
Tomas, Pampanga.6
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA,
On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since
BRANCH XLI, and FERNANDO SY, respondents.
then, the spouses lived separately, and their two children were in the
custody of their mother. However, their son Frederick transferred to
his father's residence at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila on May 15,
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the decision1 dated May 21, 1996 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44144, which affirmedthe decision2 of
the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, denying the
petition3 for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of the spouses
Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy.
1988, and from then on, lived with his father.7

On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation,
docketed as Civil Case No. 7900 before the Regional Trial Court of
San Fernando, Pampanga. Later, upon motion of petitioner, the
action was later amended to a petition for separation of property on
the grounds that her husband abandoned her without just cause; that
they have been living separately for more than one year; and that
they voluntarily entered into a Memorandum of Agreement dated
September 29, 1983, containing the rules that would govern the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership.8 Judgment was rendered
dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and approving a regime
of separation of properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement

9
grounds: (1) repeated physical violence; (2) sexual infidelity; (3)
executed by the spouses. The trial court also granted custody of the
attempt by respondent against her life; and (4) abandonment of her
children to Filipina. 10
by her husband without justifiable cause for more than one year. The
Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its
In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide
decision 13 dated December 4, 1991, granted the petition on the
against her husband, docketed as Criminal Case No. 88-68006,
grounds of repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity, and
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Filipina testified that in the
issued a decree of legal separation. It awarded custody of their
afternoon of May 15, 1988, she went to the dental clinic at
daughter Farrah Sheryll to petitioner, and their son Frederick to
Masangkay, Tondo, Manila, owned by her husband but operated by
respondent.
his mistress, to fetch her son and bring him to San Fernando,
14
Pampanga. While she was talking to her son, the boy ignored her
On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition
and continued playing with the family computer. Filipina got mad,
absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of
took the computer away from her son, and started spanking him. At
psychological incapacity. She points out that the final judgment
that instance, Fernando pulled Filipina away from their son, and
rendered by the Regional Trial Court in her favor, in her petitions for
punched her in the different parts of her body. Filipina also claimed
separation of property and legal separation, and Fernando's infliction
that her husband started choking her when she fell on the floor, and
of physical violence on her which led to the conviction of her
released her only when he thought she was dead. Filipina suffered
husband for slight physical injuries are symptoms of psychological
from hematoma and contusions on different parts of her body as a
incapacity. She also cites as manifestations of her husband's
result of the blows inflicted by her husband, evidenced by a Medical
psychological incapacity the following: (1) habitual alcoholism; (2)
Certificate issued by a certain Dr. James Ferraren. She said it was
refusal to live with her without fault on her part, choosing to live with
not the first time Fernando maltreated her.
11
for the declaration of
his mistress instead; and (3) refusal to have sex with her, performing
the marital act only to satisfy himself. Moreover, Filipina alleges that
The Regional Trial Court of Manila, however, in its decision
12
dated
such psychological incapacity of her husband existed from the time
April 26, 1990, convicted Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight
of the celebration of their marriage and became manifest
physical injuries, and sentenced him to 20 days imprisonment.
thereafter. 15
Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation against private
respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 8273, on the following
The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its

decision
16
dated December 9, 1993, denied the petition of Filipina
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT
Sy for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando.
ON THE DATE OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE PARTIES'
It stated that the alleged acts of the respondent, as cited by
MARRIAGE ON NOVEMBER 15, 1973, NOT DISPUTED BY
petitioner, do not constitute psychological incapacity which may
RESPONDENT FERNANDO, THERE WAS NO MARRIAGE
warrant the declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage.
LICENSE THERETO;
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
decision of the trial court. In the decision
17
of the Court of Appeals
APPEALS COMMITTED MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS
dated May 21, 1996, it ruled that the testimony of petitioner
BY STATING THAT THE GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY
concerning respondent's purported psychological incapacity falls
APPELLANT [herein petitioner] DO NOT CONSTITUTE
short of the quantum of evidence required to nullify a marriage
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY AS WOULD JUSTIFY
celebrated with all the formal and essential requisites of law.
NULLIFICATION OF HER MARRIAGE TO APPELLEE
Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner failed to show
[herein respondent];
that the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent had existed

at the time of the celebration of their marriage in 1973. It reiterated
the finding of the trial court that the couple's marital problems
APPEALS COMMITTED MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS
surfaced only in 1983, or almost ten years from the date of the
BY STATING THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO SHOW THAT
celebration of their marriage. And prior to their separation in 1983,
THE ALLEGED UNDESIRABLE ACTUATIONS OF
they were living together harmoniously. Thus, the Court of Appeals
APPELLEE HAD EXISTED OR WERE PRESENT AT THE
affirmed the judgment of the lower court which it found to be in
TIME THEIR MARRIAGE WAS CELEBRATED IN 1973;
accordance with law and the evidence on record.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
19
18
which the Court of
Appeals denied in its resolution dated November 21, 1996.
20
APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

IN AFFIRMING THE ERRONEOUS RULING OF THE
LOWER COURT THAT THERE IS A REDEEMING
Hence, this appeal by certiorari 21 wherein petitioner now raises the
ATTITUDE SHOWN TO THE COURT BY RESPONDENT
following issues:
FERNANDO WITH RESPECT TO HIS CHILDREN AND
ALSO BELIEVES THAT RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE
rights of litigants. We said that certain rules ought not to be applied
PARTIES IS NOT A REMOTE POSSIBILITY WHICH IS
with severity and rigidity if by so doing, the very reason for their
ERRONEOUS; AND
existence would be defeated. 24 Hence, when substantial justice

plainly requires, exempting a particular case from the operation of
5. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE OF SANTOS V. COURT

OF APPEALS (240 SCRA 20) IS APPLICABLE HERETO.
22
In sum, two issues are to be resolved:

1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private
respondent is void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license
at the time of the ceremony; and
2. Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated
at the time of said marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its
absolute nullity.
technicalities should not be subject to cavil.
25
In our view, the case at
bar requires that we address the issue of the validity of the marriage
between Filipina and Fernando which petitioner claims is void from
the beginning for lack of a marriage license, in order to arrive at a
just resolution of a deeply seated and violent conflict between the
parties. Note, however, that here the pertinent facts are not disputed;
and what is required now is a declaration of their effects according to
existing law.
Petitioner states that though she did not categorically state in her
petition for annulment of marriage before the trial court that the
incongruity in the dates of the marriage license and the celebration of
Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being
the marriage itself would lead to the conclusion that her marriage to
void for lack of a valid marriage license at the time of its celebration.
Fernando was void from the beginning, she points out that these
It appears that, according to her, the date of the actual celebration of
critical dates were contained in the documents she submitted before
their marriage and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate
the court. The date of issue of the marriage license and marriage
and marriage license are different and incongruous.
certificate, September 17, 1974, is contained in their marriage

contract which was attached as Annex "A" in her petition for
Although we have repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot raise an
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and
issue for the first time on appeal, as this would contravene the basic
thereafter marked as Exhibit "A" in the course of the trial.
rules of fair play and justice, 23 in a number of instances, we have
of celebration of their marriage at Our Lady of Lourdes, Sta. Teresita
relaxed observance of procedural rules, noting that technicalities are
Parish, on November 15, 1973, is admitted both by petitioner and
not ends in themselves but exist to protect and promote substantive
private respondent, as stated in paragraph three of petitioner's
26
The date
petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the

trial court, and private respondent's answer admitting it.
27
This fact
marriage license was issued on September 17, 1974, almost one

year after the ceremony took place on November 15, 1973. The
was also affirmed by petitioner, in open court, on January 22, 1993,
ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted
during her direct examination, 28 as follows:
without a marriage license. Nowhere do we find private respondent

denying these dates on record. Article 80 of the Civil Code
31
is
ATTY. RAZON: In the last hearing, you said that you were
clearly applicable in this case. There being no claim of an
married on November 15, 1973?
exceptional character, the purported marriage between petitioner and

private respondent could not be classified among those enumerated
FILIPINA SY: Yes, Sir.
in Articles 72-79 32 of the Civil Code. We thus conclude that under
November 15, 1973, also appears as the date of marriage of the

parents in both their son's and daughter's birth certificates, which are
also attached as Annexes "B" and "C" in the petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and thereafter
marked as Exhibits "B" and "C" in the course of the trial.
29
These
pieces of evidence on record plainly and indubitably show that on the

day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. A
marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the
marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract shows that
the marriage license, numbered 6237519, was issued in Carmona,
Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in
Carmona. 30
Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on record, we
find that indeed petitioner did not expressly state in her petition
before the trial court that there was incongruity between the date of
the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of the issuance
of their marriage license. From the documents she presented, the
Article 80 of the Civil Code, the marriage between petitioner and

private respondent is void from the beginning.
We note that their marriage certificate and marriage license are only
photocopies. So are the birth certificates of their son Frederick and
daughter Farrah Sheryll. Nevertheless, these documents were
marked as Exhibits during the course of the trial below, which shows
that these have been examined and admitted by the trial court, with
no objections having been made as to their authenticity and due
execution. Likewise, no objection was interposed to petitioner's
testimony in open court when she affirmed that the date of the actual
celebration of their marriage was on November 15, 1973. We are of
the view, therefore, that having been admitted in evidence, with the
adverse party failing to timely object thereto, these documents are
deemed sufficient proof of the facts contained therein. 33
The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private
respondent need no longer detain us. It is mooted by our conclusion
that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab initio for lack

of a marriage license at the time their marriage was solemnized.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, dated December
9, 1993 as well as the Decision promulgated on May 21, 1996 by the
Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated November 21, 1996 in CAG.R. No. 44144 are set aside. The marriage celebrated on
November 15, 1973 between petitioner Filipina Yap and private
respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared void ab initio for lack of
a marriage license at the time of celebration. No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of The Philippines Supreme Court Manila

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Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony

between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario

outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent

Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was

A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant,

kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.

In his letter-comment to the office of the Court Administrator,

JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.

Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone else, who, as the

The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of

of merit on September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter No. OCA-

Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted

IPI-95-16, "Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," which

evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by respondent

Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he

In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks

and ignorance of the law.

exculpation from his act of having solemnized the marriage between

First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the

F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the

wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the

solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did

not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states

conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not

that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of

rise to the presumption that she is already dead.

applies to the case in question.

affidavit is sufficient proof of Ida Pearanda's presumptive death, and

the pleadings submitted were considered sufficient for a resolution of

ample reason for him to proceed with the marriage ceremony. We do

Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of

Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:

A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a

thereto will suffice and can be objectively assessed by themselves to

previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the

prove the latter's malfeasance.

celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been

The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar

Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states that Tagadan's civil status is

disappearance where there is danger of death under the

"separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding ceremony was

circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil

solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in evidence a joint

Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer,

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the

Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar. 3 The affidavit was not

preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary

issued by the latter judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but

proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of

merely acknowledged before him. In their affidavit, the affiants stated

presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of

reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis added.)

Pearanda in September 1983; that after thirteen years of

There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's

present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was

already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of

xxx (Emphasis supplied.)

marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely