2.

Apprentice/Learners/Persons with Disabilities

B. Human Resource Development
1. Policy Objectives
RA 7796
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - I t is hereby declared the policy of the State to provide
relevant, accessible, high quality and efficient technical education and skills development in
support of the development of high quality Filipino middle-level manpower responsive to and in
accordance with Philippine development goals and priorities.
The State shall encourage active participation of various concerned sectors, particularly private
enterprises, being direct participants in and immediate beneficiaries of a trained and skilled
workforce, in providing technical education and skills development opportunities.
SEC. 3. Statement of Goals and Objectives. - It is the goal and objective of this Act to:
Promote and strengthen the quality of technical education and skills development programs to
attain international competitiveness;
Focus technical education and skills development on meeting the changing demands for
quality middle-level manpower;
Encourage critical and creative thinking by disseminating the scientific and technical
knowledge base of middle-level manpower development programs;
Recognize and encourage the complementary roles of public and private institutions in
technical education and skills development and training systems; and
Inculcate desirable values through the development of moral character with emphasis on work
ethic, self-discipline, self-reliance and nationalism.
2. Apprentice
A. Art. 58. Definition of Terms.
As used in this Title:
a. An "apprentice" is a worker who is covered by a written apprenticeship agreement with
an individual employer or any of the entities recognized under this Chapter.
"Apprentice" is a person undergoing training for an approved apprenticeable occupation
during an apprenticeship agreement (RA 7796, Sec 4(j))
b. An "apprenticeable occupation" means any trade, form of employment or occupation
which requires more than three (3) months of practical training on the job supplemented
by related theoretical instruction.
"Apprenticeable Occupation" is an occupation officially endorsed by a tripartite body
and approved for apprenticeable by the Authority (RA 7796, Sec 49(m))
B. Qualifitcations
Art. 59. Qualifications of apprentice. To qualify as an apprentice, a person shall:
a. Be at least fourteen (14) years of age;
b. Possess vocational aptitude and capacity for appropriate tests; and

c. Possess the ability to comprehend and follow oral and written instructions.
Trade and industry associations may recommend to the Secretary of Labor appropriate
educational requirements for different occupations.
C. Allowed Employment; Requirement Program Approval
Art. 60. Employment of apprentices. Only employers in the highly technical industries
may employ apprentices and only in apprenticeable occupations approved by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment. (As amended by Section 1, Executive Order No.
111, December 24, 1986)
NITTO ENTERPRISES vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul the decision 1
rendered by public respondent National Labor Relations Commission, which reversed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Briefly, the facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Nitto Enterprises, a company engaged in the sale of glass and aluminum products,
hired Roberto Capili sometime in May 1990 as an apprentice machinist, molder and core maker
as evidenced by an apprenticeship agreement 2 for a period of six (6) months from May 28,
1990 to November 28, 1990 with a daily wage rate of P66.75 which was 75% of the applicable
minimum wage.
At around 1:00 p.m. of August 2, 1990, Roberto Capili who was handling a piece of glass which
he was working on, accidentally hit and injured the leg of an office secretary who was treated at
a nearby hospital.
Later that same day, after office hours, private respondent entered a workshop within the office
premises which was not his work station. There, he operated one of the power press machines
without authority and in the process injured his left thumb. Petitioner spent the amount of
P1,023.04 to cover the medication of private respondent.
The following day, Roberto Capili was asked to resign in a letter 3 which reads:
August 2, 1990
Wala siyang tanggap ng utos mula sa superbisor at wala siyang
experiensa kung papaano gamitin and "TOOL" sa pagbuhat ng salamin,
sarili niyang desisyon ang paggamit ng tool at may disgrasya at nadamay
pa ang isang sekretarya ng kompanya.
Sa araw ding ito limang (5) minute ang nakakalipas mula alas-singko ng
hapon siya ay pumasok sa shop na hindi naman sakop ng kanyang
trabaho. Pinakialaman at kinalikot ang makina at nadisgrasya niya ang
kanyang sariling kamay.
Nakagastos ang kompanya ng mga sumusunod:
Emergency and doctor fee P715.00
Medecines (sic) and others 317.04
Bibigyan siya ng kompanya ng Siyam na araw na libreng sahod
hanggang matanggal ang tahi ng kanyang kamay.
Tatanggapin niya ang sahod niyang anim na araw, mula ika-30 ng Hulyo
at ika-4 ng Agosto, 1990.

Ang kompanya ang magbabayad ng lahat ng gastos pagtanggal ng tahi

ng kanyang kamay, pagkatapos ng siyam na araw mula ika-2 ng Agosto.
Sa lahat ng nakasulat sa itaas, hinihingi ng kompanya ang kanyang
resignasyon, kasama ng kanyang comfirmasyon at pag-ayon na ang
lahat sa itaas ay totoo.
Naiintindihan ko ang lahat ng nakasulat sa itaas, at ang lahat ng ito ay
aking pagkakasala sa hindi pagsunod sa alintuntunin ng kompanya.
(Sgd.) Roberto Capili
Roberto Capili
On August 3, 1990 private respondent executed a Quitclaim and Release in favor of petitioner
for and in consideration of the sum of P1,912.79. 4
Three days after, or on August 6, 1990, private respondent formally filed before the NLRC
Arbitration Branch, National Capital Region a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of
other monetary benefits.
On October 9, 1991, the Labor Arbiter rendered his decision finding the termination of private
respondent as valid and dismissing the money claim for lack of merit. The dispositive portion of
the ruling reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the termination is valid and for
cause, and the money claims dismissed for lack of merit.
The respondent however is ordered to pay the complainant the amount of
P500.00 as financial assistance.
SO ORDERED. 5
Labor Arbiter Patricio P. Libo-on gave two reasons for ruling that the dismissal of Roberto
Capilian was valid. First, private respondent who was hired as an apprentice violated the terms
of their agreement when he acted with gross negligence resulting in the injury not only to
himself but also to his fellow worker. Second, private respondent had shown that "he does not
have the proper attitude in employment particularly the handling of machines without authority
and proper training. 6
On July 26, 1993, the National Labor Relations Commission issued an order reversing the
decision of the Labor Arbiter, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby set aside. The
respondent is hereby directed to reinstate complainant to his work last
performed with backwages computed from the time his wages were
withheld up to the time he is actually reinstated. The Arbiter of origin is
hereby directed to further hear complainant's money claims and to
dispose them on the basis of law and evidence obtaining.
SO ORDERED. 7
The NLRC declared that private respondent was a regular employee of
petitioner by ruling thus:
As correctly pointed out by the complainant, we cannot understand how
an apprenticeship agreement filed with the Department of Labor only on
June 7, 1990 could be validly used by the Labor Arbiter as basis to
conclude that the complainant was hired by respondent as a plain
"apprentice" on May 28, 1990. Clearly, therefore, the complainant was
respondent's regular employee under Article 280 of the Labor Code, as

early as May 28,1990, who thus enjoyed the security of tenure

guaranteed in Section 3, Article XIII of our 1987 Constitution.
The complainant being for illegal dismissal (among others) it then
behooves upon respondent, pursuant to Art. 227(b) and as ruled in Edwin
Gesulgon vs. NLRC, et al. (G.R. No. 90349, March 5, 1993, 3rd Div.,
Feliciano, J.) to prove that the dismissal of complainant was for a valid
cause. Absent such proof, we cannot but rule that the complainant was
illegally dismissed. 8
On January 28, 1994, Labor Arbiter Libo-on called for a conference at which only private
respondent's representative was present.
On April 22, 1994, a Writ of Execution was issued, which reads:
NOW, THEREFORE, finding merit in [private respondent's] Motion for
Issuance of the Writ, you are hereby commanded to proceed to the
premises of [petitioner] Nitto Enterprises and Jovy Foster located at No. l
74 Araneta Avenue, Portero, Malabon, Metro Manila or at any other
places where their properties are located and effect the reinstatement of
herein [private respondent] to his work last performed or at the option of
the respondent by payroll reinstatement.
You are also to collect the amount of P122,690.85 representing his
backwages as called for in the dispositive portion, and turn over such
amount to this Office for proper disposition.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.
The issues raised before us are the following:
I
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT WAS NOT AN APPRENTICE.
II
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAD
NOT ADEQUATELY PROVEN THE EXISTENCE OF A VALID CAUSE IN
TERMINATING THE SERVICE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
We find no merit in the petition.
Petitioner assails the NLRC's finding that private respondent Roberto Capili cannot plainly be
considered an apprentice since no apprenticeship program had yet been filed and approved at
the time the agreement was executed.
Petitioner further insists that the mere signing of the apprenticeship agreement already
established an employer-apprentice relationship.
Petitioner's argument is erroneous.
The law is clear on this matter. Article 61 of the Labor Code provides:

Contents of apprenticeship agreement. Apprenticeship agreements,

including the main rates of apprentices, shall conform to the rules issued
by the Minister of Labor and Employment. The period of apprenticeship
shall not exceed six months. Apprenticeship agreements providing for
wage rates below the legal minimum wage, which in no case shall start
below 75% per cent of the applicable minimum wage, may be entered
into only in accordance with apprenticeship program duly approved by the
Minister of Labor and Employment. The Ministry shall develop standard
model programs of apprenticeship. (emphasis supplied)
In the case at bench, the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent
was executed on May 28, 1990 allegedly employing the latter as an apprentice in the trade of
"care maker/molder." On the same date, an apprenticeship program was prepared by petitioner
and submitted to the Department of Labor and Employment. However, the apprenticeship
Agreement was filed only on June 7, 1990. Notwithstanding the absence of approval by the
Department of Labor and Employment, the apprenticeship agreement was enforced the day it
was signed.
Based on the evidence before us, petitioner did not comply with the requirements of the law. It is
mandated that apprenticeship agreements entered into by the employer and apprentice shall be
entered only in accordance with the apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of
Labor and Employment.
Prior approval by the Department of Labor and Employment of the proposed
apprenticeship program is, therefore, a condition sine quo non before an apprenticeship
agreement can be validly entered into.
The act of filing the proposed apprenticeship program with the Department of Labor and
Employment is a preliminary step towards its final approval and does not
instantaneously give rise to an employer-apprentice relationship.
Article 57 of the Labor Code provides that the State aims to "establish a national apprenticeship
program through the participation of employers, workers and government and non-government
agencies" and "to establish apprenticeship standards for the protection of apprentices." To
translate such objectives into existence, prior approval of the DOLE to any apprenticeship
program has to be secured as a condition sine qua non before any such apprenticeship
agreement can be fully enforced. The role of the DOLE in apprenticeship programs and
agreements cannot be debased.
Hence, since the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent has no
force and effect in the absence of a valid apprenticeship program duly approved by the DOLE,
private respondent's assertion that he was hired not as an apprentice but as a delivery boy
("kargador" or "pahinante") deserves credence. He should rightly be considered as a regular
employee of petitioner as defined by Article 280 of the Labor Code:
Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of written
agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral
agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular
where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific
project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been
determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the
work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the
employment is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the
preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at
least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken,
shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in

which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such

activity exists. (Emphasis supplied)
and pursuant to the constitutional mandate to "protect the rights of workers and
promote their welfare." 9
Petitioner further argues that, there is a valid cause for the dismissal of private respondent.
There is an abundance of cases wherein the Court ruled that the twin requirements of due
process, substantive and procedural, must be complied with, before valid dismissal exists. 10
Without which, the dismissal becomes void.
The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process.
This simply means that the employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and
to defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires.
Ample opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord the
employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense including legal representation.

11

As held in the case of Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., Inc. v. NLRC: 12

The law requires that the employer must furnish the worker sought to be
dismissed with two (2) written notices before termination of employee can
be legally effected: (1) notice which apprises the employee of the
particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the
subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employer's decision
to dismiss him (Sec. 13, BP 130; Sec. 2-6 Rule XIV, Book V, Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Labor Code as amended). Failure to
comply with the requirements taints the dismissal with illegality. This
procedure is mandatory, in the absence of which, any judgment reached
by management is void and in existent (Tingson, Jr. vs. NLRC, 185 SCRA
498 [1990]; National Service Corp. vs. NLRC, 168 SCRA 122; Ruffy vs.
NLRC. 182 SCRA 365 [1990]).
The fact is private respondent filed a case of illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter only three
days after he was made to sign a Quitclaim, a clear indication that such resignation was not
voluntary and deliberate.
Private respondent averred that he was actually employed by petitioner as a delivery boy
("kargador" or "pahinante").
He further asserted that petitioner "strong-armed" him into signing the aforementioned
resignation letter and quitclaim without explaining to him the contents thereof. Petitioner made it
clear to him that anyway, he did not have a choice. 13
Petitioner cannot disguise the summary dismissal of private respondent by orchestrating the
latter's alleged resignation and subsequent execution of a Quitclaim and Release. A judicious
examination of both events belies any spontaneity on private respondent's part.
WHEREFORE, finding no abuse of discretion committed by public respondent National Labor
Relations Commission, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
D. Terms and Conditions of Employment
Art. 61. Contents of apprenticeship agreements. Apprenticeship agreements,
including the wage rates of apprentices, shall conform to the rules issued by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment. The period of apprenticeship shall not exceed six
months. Apprenticeship agreements providing for wage rates below the legal minimum
wage, which in no case shall start below 75 percent of the applicable minimum wage,
may be entered into only in accordance with apprenticeship programs duly approved by
the Secretary of Labor and Employment. The Department shall develop standard model

programs of apprenticeship. (As amended by Section 1, Executive Order No. 111,

December 24, 1986).
Art. 72. Apprentices without compensation. The Secretary of Labor and Employment
may authorize the hiring of apprentices without compensation whose training on the job
is required by the school or training program curriculum or as requisite for graduation or
board examination.
F. Costs
Art. 71. Deductibility of training costs. An additional deduction from taxable income of
one-half (1/2) of the value of labor training expenses incurred for developing the
productivity and efficiency of apprentices shall be granted to the person or enterprise
organizing an apprenticeship program: Provided, That such program is duly recognized
by the Department of Labor and Employment: Provided, further, That such deduction
shall not exceed ten (10%) percent of direct labor wage: and Provided, finally, That the
person or enterprise who wishes to avail himself or itself of this incentive should pay his
apprentices the minimum wage.

G. Enforcement
Art. 65. Investigation of violation of apprenticeship agreement. Upon complaint of
any interested person or upon its own initiative, the appropriate agency of the
Department of Labor and Employment or its authorized representative shall investigate
any violation of an apprenticeship agreement pursuant to such rules and regulations as
may be prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment.
Art. 66. Appeal to the Secretary of Labor and Employment. The decision of the
authorized agency of the Department of Labor and Employment may be appealed by
any aggrieved person to the Secretary of Labor and Employment within five (5) days
from receipt of the decision. The decision of the Secretary of Labor and Employment
shall be final and executory.
Art. 67. Exhaustion of administrative remedies. No person shall institute any action
for the enforcement of any apprenticeship agreement or damages for breach of any such
agreement, unless he has exhausted all available administrative remedies.
3. Learners
A. Definition
Art. 73. Learners defined. Learners are persons hired as trainees in semi-skilled and
other industrial occupations which are non-apprenticeable and which may be learned
through practical training on the job in a relatively short period of time which shall not
exceed three (3) months.
"Learners" refers to persons hired as trainees in semi-skilled and other industrial
occupations which are non-apprenticeable. Learnership programs must be approved by
the Authority. (RA 7796, Sec. 4)
B. Allowed Employment
Art. 74. When learners may be hired. Learners may be employed when no
experienced workers are available, the employment of learners is necessary to prevent
curtailment of employment opportunities, and the employment does not create unfair
competition in terms of labor costs or impair or lower working standards.

C. Terms and Conditions of Employment

Art. 75. Learnership agreement. Any employer desiring to employ learners shall enter
into a learnership agreement with them, which agreement shall include:
a. The names and addresses of the learners;
b. The duration of the learnership period, which shall not exceed three (3) months;
c. The wages or salary rates of the learners which shall begin at not less than seventyfive percent (75%) of the applicable minimum wage; and
d. A commitment to employ the learners if they so desire, as regular employees upon
completion of the learnership. All learners who have been allowed or suffered to work
during the first two (2) months shall be deemed regular employees if training is
terminated by the employer before the end of the stipulated period through no fault of
the learners.
The learnership agreement shall be subject to inspection by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment or his duly authorized representative.
Art. 76. Learners in piecework. Learners employed in piece or incentive-rate jobs
during the training period shall be paid in full for the work done.
4. Persons with Disabilities (Handicapped), ILO Convention 159(1983)
A. Definition
Sec. 4. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Act, these terms are defined
as follows:

(a) Disabled persons are those suffering from restriction or different abilities, as a result
of a mental, physical or sensory impairment, to perform an activity in the manner or
within the range considered normal for a human being;
(b) Impairment is any loss, diminution or aberration of psychological, physiological, or
anatomical structure or function;
(c) Disability shall mean 1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more psychological, physiological or anatomical function of an individual or activities
of such individual; 2) a record of such an impairment; or 3) being regarded as having
such an impairment;
(d) Handicap refers to a disadvantage for a given individual, resulting from an
impairment or a disability, that limits or prevents the function or activity, that is
considered normal given the age and sex of the individual;
B. Policy Declaration
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy The grant of the rights and privileges for disabled
persons shall be guided by the following principles:

(a) Disabled persons are part of Philippine society, thus the State shall give full support
to the improvement of the total well-being of disabled persons and their integration into
the mainstream of society. Toward this end, the State shall adopt policies ensuring the
rehabilitation, self-development and self-reliance of disabled persons. It shall develop
their skills and potentials to enable them to compete favorably for available
opportunities.
(b) Disabled persons have the same rights as other people to take their proper place in
society. They should be able to live freely and as independently as possible. This must
be the concern of everyone the family, community and all government and
nongovernment organizations. Disabled persons' rights must never be perceived as
welfare services by the Government.
(c) The rehabilitation of the disabled persons shall be the concern of the Government in
order to foster their capacity to attain a more meaningful, productive and satisfying life.
To reach out to a greater number of disabled persons, the rehabilitation services and
benefits shall be expanded beyond the traditional urban-based centers to community
based programs, that will ensure full participation of different sectors as supported by
national and local government agencies. chan robles virtual law library
(d) The State also recognizes the role of the private sector in promoting the welfare of
disabled persons and shall encourage partnership in programs that address their needs
and concerns.
(e) To facilitate integration of disabled persons into the mainstream of society, the State
shall advocate for and encourage respect for disabled persons. The State shall exert all
efforts to remove all social, cultural, economic, environmental and attitudinal barriers that
are prejudicial to disabled persons.
C. Coverage
Sec. 3. Coverage. This Act shall cover all disabled persons and, to the extent herein
provided, departments, offices and agencies of the National Government or
nongovernment organizations involved in the attainment of the objectives of this Act.
D. Rights and Privileges
Sec. 5. Equal Opportunity for Employment. No disable person shall be denied
access to opportunities for suitable employment. A qualified disabled employee shall be
subject to the same terms and conditions of employment and the same compensation,
privileges, benefits, fringe benefits, incentives or allowances as a qualified able bodied
person.
Five percent (5%) of all casual emergency and contractual positions in the Departments
of Social Welfare and Development; Health; Education, Culture and Sports; and other
government agencies, offices or corporations engaged in social development shall be
reserved for disabled persons.
Sec. 6. Sheltered Employment If suitable employment for disabled persons cannot
be found through open employment as provided in the immediately preceding Section,
the State shall endeavor to provide it by means of sheltered employment. In the
placement of disabled persons in sheltered employment, it shall accord due regard to

the individual qualities, vocational goals and inclinations to ensure a good working
atmosphere and efficient production.
Sec. 7. Apprenticeship. Subject to the provisions of the Labor Code as amended,
disabled persons shall be eligible as apprentices or learners: Provided, That their
handicap is not as much as to effectively impede the performance of job operations in
the particular occupation for which they are hired; Provided, further, That after the lapse
of the period of apprenticeship, if found satisfactory in the job performance, they shall be
eligible for employment.
Bernardo vs NLRC & FEBTC
Facts:
The dismissed complainants, numbering 43, are deaf-mutes who were hired on various periods
from 1988 to 1993 by respondent Far East Bank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and Counters
through a uniformly worded agreement called "Employment Contract for Handicapped
Workers". Disclaiming that complainants were regular employees, respondent Far East Bank
and Trust Company maintained that complainants were hired temporarily under a special
employment arrangement which was a result of overtures made by some civic and political
personalities to the respondent Bank; that complainant[s] were hired due to "pakiusap"; that the
tellers themselves already did the sorting and counting chore as a regular feature and integral
part of their duties; that through the "pakiusap" of Arturo Borjal, the tellers were relieved of this
task of counting and sorting bills in favor of deaf-mutes without creating new positions as there
is no position either in the respondent or in any other bank in the Philippines which deals with
purely counting and sorting of bills in banking operations. The LA &, on appeal, the NLRC ruled
against petitioners, holding that they could not be deemed regular employees since they were
hired as an accommodation to the recommendation of civic oriented personalities whose
employments were covered by Employment Contracts w/ special provisions on duration of
contract as specified under Art. 80. Hence, the terms of the contract shall be the law between
the parties.
Issue:
Whether petitioners have become regular employees
Held:
Only the employees, who worked for more than six months and whose contracts were renewed
are deemed regular. Hence, their dismissal from employment was illegal. The facts, viewed in
light of the Labor Code and the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, indubitably show that the
petitioners, except sixteen of them, should be deemed regular employees.
The uniform employment contracts of the petitioners stipulated that they shall be trained for a
period of one month, after which the employer shall determine whether or not they should be
allowed to finish the 6-month term of the contract. Furthermore, the employer may terminate the
contract at any time for a just and reasonable cause. Unless renewed in writing by the employer,
the contract shall automatically expire at the end of the term.
The stipulations in the employment contracts indubitably conform with Art. 80 LC w/c provides
for the requisites in the employment agreement between an employer who employs
handicapped workers. Succeeding events and the enactment of RA No. 7277 (the Magna Carta
for Disabled Persons), 13 however, justify the application of Article 280 of the Labor Code.
Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped workers
and renewed the contracts of 37 of them. Verily, the renewal of the contracts of the handicapped

workers and the hiring of others lead to the conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and
necessary to the bank. More important, these facts show that they were qualified to perform the
responsibilities of their positions. In other words, their disability did not render them unqualified
or unfit for the tasks assigned to them.
In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified disabled employee
should be given the same terms and conditions of employment as a qualified able-bodied
person.
The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons necessarily removes the
employment contracts from the ambit of Article 80. Since the Magna Carta accords them the
rights of qualified able-bodied persons, they are thus covered by Article 280 of the Labor Code.
Without a doubt, the task of counting and sorting bills is necessary and desirable to the
business of respondent bank. With the exception of sixteen of them, petitioners performed these
tasks for more than six months. Thus, the twenty-seven petitioners should be deemed regular
employees.
The contract signed by petitioners is akin to a probationary employment, during which the bank
determined the employees' fitness for the job. When the bank renewed the contract after the
lapse of the six-month probationary period, the employees thereby became regular employees.
16
No employer is allowed to determine indefinitely the fitness of its employees.
Moreover, it must be emphasized that a contract of employment is impressed with public
interest. Provisions of applicable statutes are deemed written into the contract, and the "parties
are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the impact of labor laws and
regulations by simply contracting with each other." Clearly, the agreement of the parties
regarding the period of employment cannot prevail over the provisions of the Magna Carta for
Disabled Persons, which mandate that petitioners must be treated as qualified able-bodied
employees.
An employee is regular because of the nature of work and the length of service, not because of
the mode or even the reason for hiring them.
E. Discrimination
Sec. 32. Discrimination on Employment. No entity, whether public or private, shall
discriminate against a qualified disabled person by reason of disability in regard to job
application procedures, the hiring, promotion, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.
The following constitute acts of discrimination:
(a) Limiting, segregating or classifying a disabled job applicant in such a manner that
adversely affects his work opportunities;
(b) Using qualification standards, employment tests or other selection criteria that screen
out or tend to screen out a disabled person unless such standards, tests or other
selection criteria are shown to be job-related for the position in question and are
consistent with business necessity;
(c) Utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration that:
(1) have the effect of discrimination on the basis of disability; or

(2) perpetuate the discrimination of others who are subject to common administrative
control.
(d) Providing less compensation, such as salary, wage or other forms of remuneration
and fringe benefits, to a qualified disabled employee, by reason of his disability, than the
amount to which a non-disabled person performing the same work is entitled;
(e) Favoring a non-disabled employee over a qualified disabled employee with respect to
promotion, training opportunities, study and scholarship grants, solely on account of the
latter's disability;
(f) Re-assigning or transferring a disabled employee to a job or position he cannot
perform by reason of his disability;
(g) Dismissing or terminating the services of a disabled employee by reason of his
disability unless the employer can prove that he impairs the satisfactory performance of
the work involved to the prejudice of the business entity: Provided, however, That the
employer first sought to provide reasonable accommodations for disabled persons;
(h) Failing to select or administer in the most effective manner employment tests which
accurately reflect the skills, aptitude or other factor of the disabled applicant or employee
that such tests purports to measure, rather than the impaired sensory, manual or
speaking skills of such applicant or employee, if any; and
(i) Excluding disabled persons from membership in labor unions or similar
organizations.

Sec. 33. Employment Entrance Examination. Upon an offer of employment, a

disabled applicant may be subjected to medical examination, on the following occasions:
(a) all entering employees are subjected to such an examination regardless of disability;
(b) information obtained during the medical condition or history of the applicant is
collected and maintained on separate forms and in separate medical files and is treated
as a confidential medical record; Provided, however, That:
(1) supervisors and managers may be informed regarding necessary restrictions on the
work or duties of the employees and necessary accommodations;
(2) first aid and safety personnel may be informed, when appropriate, if the disability
may require emergency treatment;
(3) government officials investigating compliance with this Act shall be provided relevant
information on request; and
(4) the results of such examination are used only in accordance with this Act.
F. Enforcement
Sec. 44. Enforcement by the Secretary of Justice.
(a) Denial of Right

(1) Duty to Investigate the Secretary of Justice shall investigate alleged violations of
this Act, and shall undertake periodic reviews of compliance of covered entities under
this Act.
(b) Potential Violations If the Secretary of Justice has reasonable cause to believe
that
(1) any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination
under this Act; or
(2) any person or group or persons has been discriminated against under this Act and
such discrimination raises an issue of general public importance, the Secretary of
Justice may commence a legal action in any appropriate court.
Sec. 45. Authority of Court. The court may grant any equitable relief that such court
considers to be appropriate, including, to the extent required by this Act:
(a) granting temporary, preliminary or permanent relief;
(b) providing an auxiliary aid or service, modification of policy, practice or procedure, or
alternative method; and
(c) making facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities.

Sec. 46. Penal Clause. (a) Any person who violates any provision of this Act shall
suffer the following penalties:
(1) for the first violation, a fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) but not
exceeding One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or imprisonment of not less than
six (6) months but not more than two (2) years, or both at the discretion of the court; and
(2) for any subsequent violation, a fine of not less than One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) but not exceeding Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) or
imprisonment for not less than two (2) years but not more than six (6) years, or both at
the discretion of the court.
(b) Any person who abuses the privileges granted herein shall be punished with
imprisonment of not less than six (6) months or a fine of not less than Five thousand
pesos (P5,000.00), but not more than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), or both, at the
discretion of the court.
(c) If the violator is a corporation, organization or any similar entity, the officials thereof
directly involved shall be liable therefor.
(d) If the violator is an alien or a foreigner, he shall be deported immediately after service
of sentence without further deportation proceedings.
3. Women Workers
A. Women under the Constitution
Art. II, Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure
the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.

Art. XIII, Section 14. The State shall protect working women by providing safe and healthful
working conditions, taking into account their maternal functions, and such facilities and
opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the
service of the nation.
PASEI vs Drilon
Facts: The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm
"engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas
placement," challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of
the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE
TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND
HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. The measure is
assailed for "discrimination against males or females," that it 'does not apply to all Filipino
workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills," and that it is violative of
the right to travel. It was likewise held to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police
power being legislative, and not executive, in character.
In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution,
providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights
and benefits as may be provided by law." In addition, it was contended that Department Order
No. 1 was passed in the absence of prior consultations. It was claimed to be in violation of the
Charter's non-impairment clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI
members face should the Order be further enforced.
The Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondent Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, invokes the police power of the Philippine
State.
Issue: Whether or not deployment ban for female domestic helpers is valid under our
Constitution.
Held: Yes. It is a valid exercise of police power. The concept of police power is well-established
in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." As defined, it
consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the
common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general
terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
"Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future
where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to
conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits."
It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando, it is "rooted in the
conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to
safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of
citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to ensure
communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare." Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself does not
purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties "Even liberty itself, the
greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's will." It is subject to the
far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number.