Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
No. 53. Adjustments were made by deducting amounts from subsequent disbursements
of honoraria. By June 1989, NCC No. 53 was being complied with. 7
On 6 July 1989, Bonifacio Icu, COA resident auditor at PSU, alleging that there were excess
payments ofhonoraria, issued a "Notice of Disallowance" 8 disallowing P64,925.00 from the
amount of P70,375.00 stated in Voucher No. 8902007, mentioned earlier. The resident auditor
based his action on the premise that Compensation Policy Guidelines ("CPG") No. 80-4, dated 7
August 1980, issued by the Department of Budget and Management which provided for lower
rates than NCC No. 53 dated 21 June 1988, also issued by the Department of Budget and
Management, was the schedule forhonoraria and per diems applicable to work done under the
MOA of 9 December 1988 between the PSU and the DENR.
FELICIANO, J.:
On 18 October 1989, a letter 9 was sent by PSU Vice President and Assistant Project Director
Espero to the Chairman of the COA requesting reconsideration of the action of its resident
auditor. In the meantime, the Department of Budget and Management ("DBM"), upon request by
PSU, issued a letter 10 clarifying that the basis for the project's honoraria should notbe CPG No.
80-4 which pertains to locally funded projects but rather NCC No. 53 which pertains to foreignassisted projects. A copy of this clarification was sent to the COA upon request by PSU.
In this Petition for Certiorari, Rufino O. Eslao in his capacity as President of the Pangasinan
State University ("PSU") asks us to set aside Commission on Audit ("COA") Decisions Nos. 1547
(1990) and 2571 (1992) which denied honoraria and per diems claimed under National
Compensation Circular No. 53 by certain PSU personnel including petitioner.
On 18 September 1990, COA Decision No. 1547 11 was issued denying reconsideration of the
decision of its resident auditor. The COA ruled that CPG. No. 80-4 is the applicable guideline in
respect of the honoraria as CPG No. 80-4 does not distinguish between projects locally funded
and projects funded or assisted with monies of foreign-origin.
On 9 December 1988, PSU entered into a Memorandum of Agreement ("MOA") 1 with the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR") for the evaluation of eleven (11)
government reforestation operations in Pangasinan. 2 The evaluation project was part of the
commitment of the Asian Development Bank ("ADB") under the ADB/OECF Forestry Sector
Program Loan to the Republic of the Philippines and was one among identical project
agreements entered into by the DENR with sixteen (16) other state universities.
PSU President Eslao sent a letter 12 dated 20 March 1991 requesting reconsideration of COA
Decision No. 1547 (1990) alleging that (a) COA had erred in applying CPG No. 80-4 and not
NCC No. 53 as the project was foreign-assisted and (b) the decision was discriminatory
honoraria based on NCC No. 53 having been approved and granted by COA resident
auditors in two (2) other state universities engaged in the same reforestation project. PSU then
submitted to the COA (a) a certification 13 from the DENR to the effect that the DENR evaluation
project was foreign- assisted and (b) the letter of the DBM quoted in the margin supra.
On 9 December 1988, a notice to proceed 3 with the review and evaluation of the eleven (11)
reforestation operations was issued by the DENR to PSU. The latter complied with this notice
and did proceed.
On 16 November 1992, COA Decision No. 2571 (1992) 14 was issued denying reconsideration.
On 16 January 1989, per advice of the PSU Auditor-in-Charge with respect to the payment
of honoraria and per diems of PSU personnel engaged in the review and evaluation project,
PSU Vice President for Research and Extension and Assistant Project Director Victorino P.
Espero requested the Office of the President, PSU, to have the University's Board of Regents
("BOR") confirm the appointments or designations of involved PSU personnel including the rates
of honoraria and per diems corresponding to their specific roles and functions. 4
The BOR approved the MOA on 30 January 1989 5 and on 1 February 1989, PSU issued
Voucher No. 8902007 6representing the amount of P70,375.00 for payment of honoraria to PSU
personnel engaged in the project. Later, however, the approved honoraria rates were found to
be somewhat higher than the rates provided for in the guidelines of National Compensation
Circular ("NCC") No. 53. Accordingly, the amounts were adjusted downwards to conform to NCC
In the meantime, in December 1990, the DENR informed petitioner of its acceptance of the PSU
final reports on the review and evaluation of the government reforestation
projects. 15 Subsequently, honoraria for the period from January 1989 to January 1990 were
disbursed in accordance with NCC No. 53. A Certificate of Settlement and Balances (CSB No.
92-0005-184 [DENR]) 16 was then issued by the COA resident auditor of PSU showing
disallowance of alleged excess payment of honoraria which petitioner was being required to
return.
The instant Petition prays that (a) COA Decision Nos. 1547 (1990) and 2571 (1992) be set
aside; (b) the COA be ordered to pass in audit the grant of honoraria for the entire duration of
the project based on the provisions and rates contained in NCC No. 53; and (c) the COA be held
liable for actual damages as well as petitioner's legal expenses and attorney's fees.
The resolution of the dispute lies in the determination of the circular or set of provisions
applicable in respect of the honoraria to be paid to PSU personnel who took part in the
evaluation project, i.e., NCC No. 53 or CPG No. 80-4.
In asserting that NCC No. 53 supplies the applicable guideline and that the COA erred in
applying CPG No. 80-4 as the pertinent standard, petitioner contends that:
(a) CPG No. 80-4 applies to "special projects" the definition and scope of which do not
embrace the evaluation project undertaken by petitioner for the DENR;
(b) NCC No. 53 applies to foreign-assisted projects ("FAPs") while CPG No.
80-4 applies to locally-funded projects as no reference to any foreign
component characterizing the projects under its coverage is made;
(c) the DENR evaluation project is a foreign-assisted project per certification
and clarification of the DENR and DBM respectively as well as the implied
admission of the COA in its Comment; and
(d) the DBM's position on the matter should be respected since the DBM is
vested with authority to (i) classify positions and determine appropriate
salaries for specific position classes, (ii) review the compensation benefits
programs of agencies and (iii) design job evaluation programs.
The Office of the Solicitor General, in lieu of a Comment on the Petition, filed a
Manifestation 17 stating that (a) since, per certification of the DENR and
Letter/Opinion of the DBM that the project undertaken by PSU is foreign-assisted,
NCC No. 53 should apply; and (b) respondent COA's contention that CPG No. 80-4
does not distinguish between projects which are foreign-funded from locally-funded
projects deserves no merit, since NCC No. 53, a special guideline, must be construed
as an exception to CPG No. 80-4, a general guideline. The Solicitor General, in other
words, agreed with the position of petitioner.
Upon the other hand, respondent COA filed its own comment, asserting that:
(a) while the DBM is vested with the authority to issue rules and
regulations pertaining to compensation, this authority is regulated
by Sec. 2 (2) of Art. IX-D of the 1987 Constitution which vests
respondent COA with the power to "promulgate accounting and
auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention
and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant
or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and
properties;
(b) the Organizational Arrangement and Obligations of the Parties
sections of the MOA clearly show that the evaluation project is an
"inter-agency activity" between the DENR and PSU and therefore a
"special project";
Respondent COA maintains that the sections of the MOA detailing the
"Organizational Arrangement and Obligations of the Parties" clearly show that the
evaluation project is an "inter-agency activity." The pertinent sections of the MOA
are as follows:
3. Reserve the right to accept or reject the final report and in the
latter case, DENR may request PSU to make some
revisions/modifications on the same.
Obligations of the PSU:
ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
The PSU shall have the following obligations:
A Coordinating Committee shall be created which shall be
responsible for the overall administration and coordination of the
evaluation, to be chaired by a senior officer of the DENR. The
Committee shall [be] composed [of] the following:
1. Undertake the review and evaluation of the eleven (11) DENRfunded reforestation projects in accordance with the attached
TOR;
3. Submit the final report to DENR fifteen (15) days after the
completion of the work. The report should at least contain the
information which appears in Annex D;
drawn from the agencies represented in the coordinating group. In other words, an
"inter-agency or inter-committee activity or . . . undertaking" must be one which is
actually carried out by a composite group of officials and employees from the two
(2) or more participating agencies.
That the instant evaluation project is a Foreign-Assisted Project is borne out by the
records: (a) the MOA states that the project is "part of the commitment with the
Asian Development Bank (ADB) under the Forestry Sector Program Loan"; (b) the
certification issued by the DENR certifies that
As already noted, in the case at hand, the project team actually tasked with carrying
out the evaluation of the DENR reforestation activity is composed exclusively of
personnel from PSU; the project team's responsibility and undertaking are quite
distinct from the responsibilities of the coordinating [DENR and PSU] committee.
Thus, the project team is not a "composite group" as required by the definition of
CPG No. 80-4 of "special projects." It follows that the evaluation projects here
involved do not fall within the ambit of a "special project" as defined and regulated
by CPG No. 80-4.
Petitioner also argues that the project's duration stipulated in the MOA was implicitly
extended by the parties. The DENR's acceptance, without any comment or objection,
of PSU's (a) letter explaining the delay in its submission of the final project report
and (b) the final project report itself brought about, according to petitioner, an
implied agreement between the parties to extend the project duration. It is also
contended that by the very nature of an evaluation project, the project's duration is
difficult to fix and as in the case at bar, the period fixed in the MOA is merely an
initial estimate subject to extension. Lastly, petitioner argues that whether the
project was impliedly extended is an inconsequential consideration; the material
consideration being that the project stayed within its budget. The project having
been extended, petitioner concludes that the evaluation team should be
paidhonoraria from the time it proceeded with the project and up to the time the
DENR accepted its final report.
Mindful of the detailed provisions of the MOA and Project Proposal governing project
duration and project financing as regulated by NCC No. 53, the Court is not
persuaded that petitioner can so casually assume implicit consent on the part of the
DENR to an extension of the evaluation project's duration.
d. FOURTH RELEASE
b. SECOND RELEASE
Forty percent of the total cost upon submission of a progress
report of the activities that were so far undertaken;
c. THIRD RELEASE
Thirty percent (30%) of the total amount upon submission of the
draft final report;
a. FIRST RELEASE
SERVICES
for
A.
Position
Director
Level
Project
Manager/Project
Parttime P400.00
Responsibility . . .
Parttime P2,000.00
B. Position Level Assistant Project
Director
Responsibility . . .
Parttime P1,500.00
C. Position Level Project Consultant
Responsibility . . .
Parttime P1,000.00
D. Position Level Supervisor/Senior Staff
Member
Responsibility . . .
Parttime P1,000.00
E. Position Level Staff Member
Responsibility . . .
Parttime P700.00
Administrative and Clerical Support
From the clear and detailed provisions of the MOA and Project Proposal in relation to
NCC No. 53, consent to any extension of the evaluation project, in this instance,
must be more concrete than the alleged silence or lack of protest on the part of the
DENR. Although tacit acceptance is recognized in our jurisdiction, 24 as a rule, silence
is not equivalent to consent since its ambiguity lends itself to error. And although
under the Civil Code there are instances when silence amounts to consent, 25 these
circumstances are wanting in the case at bar. Furthermore, as correctly pointed out
by the respondent COA, the date when the DENR accepted the final project report is
by no means conclusive as to the terminal date of the evaluation project.
Examination of the MOA (quoted earlier on pages 19-20) reveals that the submission
of reports merely served to trigger the phased releases of funds. There being no
explicit agreement between PSU and the DENR to extend the duration of the
evaluation project, the MOA's "Budget Estimate" which, among others, provides in
detail the duration of service for each member of the evaluation project as amended
by the rates provided by NCC No. 53 must be the basis of the honoraria due to the
evaluation team.
The other arguments of respondent COA appear to us to be insubstantial and as,
essentially, afterthoughts. The COA apparently does not agree with the policy basis
of NCC No. 53 in relation to CPG No. 80-4 since COA argues that loan proceeds
regardless of source eventually become public funds for which the government is
accountable. The result would be that any provisions under any [foreign] loan
agreement should be considered locally-funded. We do not consider that the COA is,
under its constitutional mandate, authorized to substitute its own judgment for any
applicable law or administrative regulation with the wisdom or propriety of which,
however, it does not agree, at least not before such law or regulation is set aside by
the authorized agency of government i.e., the courts as unconstitutional or
illegal and void. The COA, like all other government agencies, must respect the
presumption of legality and constitutionality to which statutes and administrative
regulations are entitled 26 until such statute or regulation is repealed or amended, or
until set aside in an appropriate case by a competent court (and ultimately this
Court).
Finally, we turn to petitioner's claim for moral damages and reimbursement of legal
expenses. We consider that this claim cannot be granted as petitioner has failed to
present evidence of bad faith or tortious intent warranting an award thereof. The
presumption of regularity in the performance of duty must be accorded to
respondent COA; its action should be seen as its effort to exercise (albeit
erroneously, in the case at bar) its constitutional power and duty in respect of uses
of government funds and properties.
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby GRANTED.
COA Decisions Nos. 1547 and 2571, respectively dated 18 September 1990 and 16
November 1992, are hereby SET ASIDE. The instant evaluation project being a
Foreign-Assisted Project, the following PSU personnel involved in the project shall be
paid according to the Budget Estimate schedule of the MOA as aligned with NCC No.
53:
A. A. For Experts
Duration Rate/
Expert of month Total
Service (NCC
(mo.) No. 53)
1. Dr. Rufino O. Eslao Policy/Admi- 4 P2,000 P8,000 nistrative
expert*2. Dr. Victorino P. Espero Ecologist** 4 1,500 6,000
3. Dean Antonio Q. Repollo Silvicul- 3 1,000 3,000
turist***
4. Prof. Artemio M. Rebugio Forestry 4 1,000 4,000
Economist
5. Ms. Naomenida Olermo Soils Expert 2 1,000 2,000
6. Dr. Elvira R. Castillo Social 4 1,000 4,000
Forestry
Expert
7. Dr. Alfredo F. Aquino Management 2 1,000 2,000
Expert
8. Dr. Lydio Calonge Horticul 2 1,000 2,000
turist
9. Engr. Manolito Bernabe Agricultural 2 1,000 2,000
Engineer
10. Prof. Rolando J. Andico Systems 2 1,000 2,000
Analysts/
Programmer
11. Dr. Eusebio Miclat, Jr. Statistician 2 1,000 2,000
12. Dr. Porferio Basilio Shoreline 2 1,000 2,000
Resources
Expert
13. Dr. Elmer C. Vingua Animal 2 1,000 2,000
Science
Specialist
41,000
12,098
* Per Attachment to DBM Clarification dated 10
November 1989, Rollo, p. 59.
** Staff Member
*** Administrative Assistants.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137489. May 29, 2002]
COOPERATIVE
DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs. DOLEFIL
AGRARIAN
REFORM
BENEFICIARIES
COOPERATIVE,
INC.,
ESMERALDO A. DUBLIN, ALICIA SAVAREZ, EDNA URETA, ET
AL., respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR. J.
At the core of the instant petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals, 13th Division, in CA-G.R. SP. No. 47933 promulgated on
September 9, 1998 and its Resolution [2] dated February 9, 1999 is the issue of
whether or not petitioner Cooperative Development Authority (CDA for brevity) is
vested with quasi-judicial authority to adjudicate intra-cooperative disputes.
The record shows that sometime in the later part of 1997, the CDA received
from certain members of the Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative, Inc.
(DARBCI for brevity), an agrarian reform cooperative that owns 8,860 hectares of
land in Polomolok, South Cotabato, several complaints alleging mismanagement
and/or misappropriation of funds of DARBCI by the then incumbent officers and
members of the board of directors of the cooperative, some of whom are herein
private respondents.
Acting on the complaints docketed as CDA-CO Case No. 97-011, CDA Executive
Director Candelario L. Verzosa, Jr. issued an order [3] dated December 8, 1997
directing the private respondents to file their answer within ten (10) days from
receipt thereof.
Before the private respondents could file their answer, however, CDA
Administrator Alberto P. Zingapan issued on December 15, 1997 an order, [4] upon the
motion of the complainants in CDA-CO Case No. 97-011, freezing the funds of
DARBCI and creating a management committee to manage the affairs of the said
cooperative.
On December 18, 1991, the private respondents filed a Petition
for Certiorari[5] with a prayer for preliminary injunction, damages and attorneys fees
against the CDA and its officers namely: Candelario L. Verzosa, Jr. and Alberto P.
Zingapan, including the DOLE Philippines Inc. before the Regional Trial Court (RTC for
brevity) of Polomolok, South Cotabato, Branch 39. The petition which was docketed
as SP Civil Case No. 25, primarily questioned the jurisdiction of the CDA to resolve
the complaints against the private respondents, specifically with respect to the
authority of the CDA to issue the freeze order and to create a management
committee that would run the affairs of DARBCI.
On February 24, 1998, CDA Chairman Jose C. Medina, Jr. issued an order [6] in
CDA-CO Case No. 97-011 placing the private respondents under preventive
newly-created
management
On March 27, 1998, the RTC of Polomolok, South Cotabato, Branch 39, issued a
temporary restraining order[8] (TRO), initially for seventy-two (72) hours and
subsequently extended to twenty (20) days, in an Order dated March 31, 1998. The
temporary restraining order, in effect, directed the parties to restore status
quo ante, thereby enabling the private respondents to reassume the management of
DARBCI.
The CDA questioned the propriety of the temporary restraining order issued by
the RTC of Polomolok, South Cotabato on March 27, 1998 through a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals, 12 th Division, which was docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 47318.
On April 21, 1998, the Court of Appeals, 12 th Division, issued a temporary
restraining order[9] in CA-G.R. SP No. 47318 enjoining the RTC of Polomolok, South
Cotabato, Branch 39, from enforcing the restraining order which the latter court
issued on March 27, 1998, and ordered that the proceedings in SP Civil Case No. 25
be held in abeyance.
Consequently, the CDA continued with the proceedings in CDA-CO Case No. 97011. On May 26, 1998 CDA Administrator Arcadio S. Lozada issued a
resolution[10] which directed the holding of a special general assembly of the
members of DARBCI and the creation of an ad hoc election committee to supervise
the election of officers and members of the board of directors of DARBCI scheduled
on June 14, 1998.
The said resolution of the CDA, issued on May 26, 1998 prompted the private
respondents to file on June 8, 1998 a Petition for Prohibition [11] with a prayer for
preliminary mandatory injunction and temporary restraining order with the Court of
Appeals, 13th Division, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 47933. On June 10,
1998, the appellate court issued a resolution [12] restraining the CDA and its
administrator, Arcadio S. Lozada, the three (3) members of the ad hoc election
committee or any and all persons acting in their behalf from proceeding with the
election of officers and members of the board of directors of DARBCI scheduled on
June 14, 1998.
Incidentally, on the same date that the Court of Appeals issued a temporary
restraining order in CA-G.R. SP No. 47933 on June 10, 1998, a corporation by the
name of Investa Land Corporation (Investa for brevity) which allegedly executed a
Lease Agreement with Joint Venture with DARBCI filed a petition [13] with the RTC of
Polomolok, South Cotabato, Branch 39, docketed as SP Civil Case No. 28, essentially
seeking the annulment of orders and resolutions issued by the CDA in CDA-CO Case
No. 97-011 with a prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction. On the following day, June 11, 1998, the trial court issued a temporary
restraining order[14] enjoining the respondents therein from proceeding with the
scheduled special general assembly and the elections of officers and members of
the board of directors of DARBCI on June 14, 1998. Thereafter, it also issued a writ
of preliminary injunction.
With the issuance of the two (2) restraining orders by the Court of Appeals,
13th Division, and the RTC of Polomolok, South Cotabato, Branch 39, on June 10 and
11, 1998, respectively, the scheduled special general assembly and the election of
officers and members of the board of directors of DARBCI on June 14, 1998 did not
take place.
Nevertheless, on July 12, 1998, the majority of the 7,511 members of DARBCI,
on their own initiative, convened a general assembly and held an election of the
members of the board of directors and officers of the cooperative, thereby
effectively replacing the private respondents. Hence, the private respondents filed a
Twin Motions for Contempt of Court and to Nullify Proceedings [15] with the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47933.
On September 9, 1998 the Court of Appeals, 13 th Division, promulgated its
subject appealed Decision[16] granting the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 47933, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, the foregoing considered, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Orders of
the respondent Cooperative Development Authority in CDA-CO case No. 97-011
dated 08 December 1997, 15 December 1997, 26 January 1998, 24 February 1998,
03 March 1998, and the Resolution dated 26 May 1998, are hereby declared NULL
AND VOID and of no legal force and effect.
Further, the respondents are hereby ORDERED to perpetually CEASE AND DESIST
from taking any further proceedings in CDA-CO Case No. 97-011.
Lastly, the respondent CDA is hereby ORDERED to REINSTATE the Board of Directors
of DARBCI who were ousted by virtue of the questioned Orders, and to RESTORE
the status quo prior to the filin
SO ORDERED
intention of the Philippines to enter into similar treaties with other interested
countries; and the need for rules to guide the executive department and the courts
in the proper implementation of said treaties.
On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition
Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the
Government of the United States of America" (hereinafter referred to as the RP-US
Extradition Treaty). The Senate, by way of Resolution No. 11, expressed its
concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in the
Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility
of the documents accompanying an extradition request upon certification by the
principal diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state resident in the
Requesting State). Kycalr
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 139465. January 18, 2000]
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B.
JIMENEZ, respondents. Esmso
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of
Foreign Affairs U. S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition
of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the Note
Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S.
District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said
extradition. Based on the papers submitted, private respondent appears to be
charged in the United States with violation of the following provisions of the United
States Code (USC):
A)......18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud
the United States; two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on
each count);
DECISION
MELO, J.:
The individual citizen is but a speck of particle or molecule vis--vis the vast and
overwhelming powers of government. His only guarantee against oppression and
tyranny are his fundamental liberties under the Bill of Rights which shield him in
times of need. The Court is now called to decide whether to uphold a citizens basic
due process rights, or the governments ironclad duties under a treaty. The bugle
sounds and this Court must once again act as the faithful guardian of the
fundamental writ.
The petition at our doorstep is cast against the following factual backdrop:
(p. 14, Rollo.)
On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree
No. 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have
Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". The Decree is founded on: the doctrine of
incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual concern for the suppression of
crime both in the state where it was committed and the state where the criminal
may have escaped; the extradition treaty with the Republic of Indonesia and the
On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order No. 249 designating and
authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case pursuant
to Section 5(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1069. Accordingly, the panel began with
the "technical evaluation and assessment" of the extradition request and the
documents in support thereof. The panel found that the "official English translation
of some documents in Spanish were not attached to the request and that there are
some other matters that needed to be addressed" (p. 15, Rollo).Calrky
Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, private respondent,
through counsel, wrote a letter dated July 1, 1999 addressed to petitioner requesting
copies of the official extradition request from the U. S. Government, as well as all
documents and papers submitted therewith; and that he be given ample time to
comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested
papers. Private respondent also requested that the proceedings on the matter be
held in abeyance in the meantime.
Later, private respondent requested that preliminarily, he be given at least a copy
of, or access to, the request of the United States Government, and after receiving a
copy of the Diplomatic Note, a period of time to amplify on his request.
In response to private respondents July 1, 1999 letter, petitioner, in a reply-letter
dated July 13, 1999 (but received by private respondent only on August 4, 1999),
denied the foregoing requests for the following reasons:
1. We find it premature to furnish you with copies of the
extradition request and supporting documents from the United
States Government, pending evaluation by this Department of the
sufficiency of the extradition documents submitted in accordance
with the provisions of the extradition treaty and our extradition
law. Article 7 of the Extradition Treaty between the Philippines and
the United States enumerates the documentary requirements and
establishes the procedures under which the documents submitted
shall be received and admitted as evidence. Evidentiary
requirements under our domestic law are also set forth in Section
4 of P.D. No. 1069.
Evaluation by this Department of the aforementioned documents is not a preliminary
investigation nor akin to preliminary investigation of criminal cases. We merely
determine whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law and
treaty have been complied with by the Requesting Government. The constitutionally
guaranteed rights of the accused in all criminal prosecutions are therefore not
available.
It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition when the person sought to be
extradited will be furnished by the court with copies of the petition, request and
extradition documents and this Department will not pose any objection to a request
for ample time to evaluate said documents. Mesm
2. The formal request for extradition of the United States contains grand jury
information and documents obtained through grand jury process covered by strict
secrecy rules under United States law. The United States had to secure orders from
the concerned District Courts authorizing the United States to disclose certain grand
jury information to Philippine government and law enforcement personnel for the
purpose of extradition of Mr. Jimenez. Any further disclosure of the said information
is not authorized by the United States District Courts. In this particular extradition
request the United States Government requested the Philippine Government to
prevent unauthorized disclosure of the subject information. This Departments denial
of your request is consistent with Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty which
provides that the Philippine Government must represent the interests of the United
States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition. The Department of
Justice under P.D. No. 1069 is the counsel of the foreign governments in all
extradition requests.
3. This Department is not in a position to hold in abeyance proceedings in
connection with an extradition request. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, to which we are a party provides that "[E]very treaty in force is
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith".
Extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement and to be effective, requests for
extradition or surrender of accused or convicted persons must be processed
expeditiously.
(pp. 77-78, Rollo.)
Such was the state of affairs when, on August 6, 1999, private respondent filed with
the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region a petition against the
Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National
Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel herein petitioner to furnish
private respondent the extradition documents, to give him access thereto, and to
afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and
thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively); certiorari (to
set aside herein petitioners letter dated July 13, 1999); and prohibition (to restrain
petitioner from considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition
petition in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of
the NBI from performing any act directed to the extradition of private respondent to
the United States), with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and a writ of preliminary injunction (pp. 104-105, Rollo). Scslx
The aforementioned petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 99-94684 and
thereafter raffled to Branch 25 of said regional trial court stationed in Manila which is
presided over by the Honorable Ralph C. Lantion.
After due notice to the parties, the case was heard on August 9, 1999. Petitioner,
who appeared in his own behalf, moved that he be given ample time to file a
memorandum, but the same was denied.
On August 10, 1999, respondent judge issued an order dated the previous day,
disposing:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby Orders the respondents, namely:
the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the
Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, their agents
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 149335. July 1, 2003]
On August 24, 1998, the Office of the President, concurring with the findings
and adopting the recommendation of the PCAGC, issued Administrative Order No.
12,[4] ordering petitioners dismissal from service with forfeiture of all government
benefits.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied. His appeal to the Court of
Appeals was likewise dismissed.[5]
Hence, this petition for review where petitioner raises the following issues for
resolution: first, whether he was denied due process in the investigation before the
PCAGC; second, whether
his
guilt was
proved
by substantial evidence; and, third, whether the earlier dismissal of similar cases
before the Ombudsman rendered the administrative case before the PCAGC moot
and academic.
On the issue of due process, petitioner submits that the PCAGC committed
infractions of the cardinal rules of administrative due process when it relied on
Bundalians unverified letter-complaint. He gripes that his counter-affidavit should
have been given more weight as the unverified complaint constitutes hearsay
evidence. Moreover, petitioner insists that in ruling against him, the PCAGC failed to
respect his right to confront and cross-examine the complainant as the latter never
appeared in any of the hearings before the PCAGC nor did he send a representative
therein.
We find no merit in his contentions. The essence of due process in
administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain ones side or seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are
given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due
process are sufficiently met.[6] In the case at bar, the PCAGC exerted efforts to notify
the complainant of the proceedings but his Philippine residence could not be
located.[7] Be that as it may, petitioner cannot argue that he was deprived of due
process because he failed to confront and cross-examine the complainant. Petitioner
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the PCAGC by participating in the
proceedings before it. He was duly represented by counsel. He filed his counteraffidavit, submitted documentary evidence, attended the hearings, moved for a
reconsideration of Administrative Order No. 12 issued by the President and
eventually filed his appeal before the Court of Appeals. His active participation in
every step of the investigation effectively removed any badge of procedural
deficiency, if there was any, and satisfied the due process requirement. He cannot
now be allowed to challenge the procedure adopted by the PCAGC in the
investigation.[8]
Neither can we sustain petitioners contention that the charge against him was
unsupported by substantial evidence as it was contained in an unverified
complaint. The lack of verification of the administrative complaint and the nonappearance of the complainant at the investigation did not divest the PCAGC of its
authority to investigate the charge of unexplained wealth. Under Section 3 of
Executive Order No. 151 creating the PCAGC, complaints involving graft and
the loan statement[13] he adduced showing that he obtained a loan from the World
Savings and Loan Association for $195,000.00 on June 23, 1993 to finance the
acquisition of the property. Then, three (3) years later, on May 30, 1996, petitioner
and his wife executed a Quitclaim Deed[14]donating the Burbank property to his
sisters-in-law Estela and Rose Fajardo allegedly to prove his non-ownership of the
property. It is obvious that the Quitclaim Deed is a mere afterthought, having been
executed only after a complaint for unexplained wealth was lodged against
petitioner. Why the Quitclaim Deed included Rose Fajardo when it was only Estela
Fajardo who allegedly owned the property was not explained on the
record. Petitioners evidence failed to clarify the issue as it produced, rather than
settled, more questions.
Petitioner admitted that the Grant Deed over the property was in his name. He
never denied the existence and due execution of the Grant Deed and the Special
Power of Attorney he conferred to Estela Fajardo with respect to the acquisition of
the Burbank property. With these admissions, the burden of proof was shifted to
petitioner to prove non-ownership of the property. He cannot now ask this Court to
remand the case to the PCAGC for reception of additional evidence as, in the
absence of any errors of law, it is not within the Courts power to do so. He had
every opportunity to adduce his evidence before the PCAGC.
Lastly, we cannot sustain petitioners stance that the dismissal of similar
charges against him before the Ombudsman rendered the administrative case
against him before the PCAGC moot and academic. To be sure, the decision of the
Ombudsman does not operate as res judicata in the PCAGC case subject of this
review. The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers. [15] Petitioner was
investigated by the Ombudsman for his possible criminal liability for the acquisition
of the Burbank property in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and
the Revised Penal Code. For the same alleged misconduct, petitioner, as a
presidential appointee, was investigated by the PCAGC by virtue of the
administrative power and control of the President over him. As the PCAGCs
investigation of petitioner was administrative in nature, the doctrine of res
judicata finds no application in the case at bar.
Thus, we find that the Court of Appeals correctly sustained petitioners
dismissal from service as the complaint and its supporting documents established
that he acquired a property whose value is disproportionate to his income in the
government service, unless he has other sources of income which he failed to
reveal. His liability was proved by substantial evidence.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Service Law (Republic Act No. 2260), the Civil Service Decree (Presidential Decree
No. 807), and the Civil Service Rules and Regulation fails to disclose a specific
provision which supports the CSC rule at issue. That being the case, the petitioner
contented that he cannot be deprived of his pay or salary corresponding to the
intervening Saturdays, Sundays or Holidays (in the factual situation posed), and that
the withholding (or deduction) of the same is tantamount to a deprivation of
property without due process of law.
On 25 May 1990, respondent Commission promulgated Resolution No. 90-497, ruling
that the action of the DTI in deducting from the salary of petitioner, a part thereof
corresponding to six (6) days (September 29, 30, October 1, 20, 21, 22, 1989) is in
order. 2 The CSC stated that:
In a 2nd Indorsement dated February 12, 1965 of this Commission,
which embodies the policy on leave of absence without pay
incurred on a Friday and Monday, reads:
Mrs. Rosalinda Gonzales is not entitled to
payment of salary corresponding to January 23
and
24,
1965,
Saturday
and
Sunday,
respectively, it appearing that she was present
on Friday, January 22, 1965 but was on leave
without pay beginning January 25, the
succeeding Monday. It is the view of this Office
that an employee who has no more leave credit
in his favor is not entitled to the payment of
salary on Saturdays, Sundays or holidays unless
such non-working days occur within the period
of
service
actually
rendered.
(Emphasis
supplied)
The rationale for the above ruling which applies only to those
employees who are being paid on monthly basis, rests on the
assumption that having been absent on either Monday or Friday,
one who has no leave credits, could not be favorably credited with
intervening days had the same been working days. Hence, the
above policy that for an employee on leave without pay to be
entitled to salary on Saturdays, Sundays or holidays, the same
must occur between the dates where the said employee actually
renders service. To rule otherwise would allow an employee who is
on leave of absent (sic) without pay for a long period of time to be
entitled to payment of his salary corresponding to Saturdays,
Sundays or holidays. It also discourages the employees who have
exhausted their leave credits from absenting themselves on a
Friday or Monday in order to have a prolonged weekend, resulting
in the prejudice of the government and the public in general. 3
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and in Resolution No. 90-797, the
respondent Commission denied said motion for lack of merit. The respondent
Commission in explaining its action held:
The Primer on the Civil Service dated February 21, 1978,
embodies the Civil Service Commission rulings to be observed
whenever an employee of the government who has no more leave
credits, is absent on a Friday and/or a Monday is enough basis for
the deduction of his salaries corresponding to the intervening
Saturdays and Sundays. What the Commission perceived to be
without basis is the demand of Peralta for the payment of his
salaries corresponding to Saturdays and Sundays when he was in
fact on leave of absence without pay on a Friday prior to the said
days. A reading of Republic Act No. 2260 (sic) does not show that a
government employee who is on leave of absence without pay on
a day before or immediately preceding Saturdays, Sunday or legal
holiday is entitled to payment of his salary for said days. Further, a
reading of Senate Journal No. 67 dated May 4, 1960 of House Bill
No. 41 (Republic Act No. 2625) reveals that while the law excludes
Saturdays, Sundays and holidays in the computation of leave
credits, it does not, however, include a case where the leave of
absence is without pay. Hence, applying the principle of inclusio
unius est exclusio alterius, the claim of Peralta has no merit.
Moreover, to take a different posture would be in effect giving
more premium to employees who are frequently on leave of
absence without pay, instead of discouraging them from incurring
further
absence
without
pay. 4
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the
present petition.
What is primarily questioned by the petitioner is the validity of the respondent
Commission's policy mandating salary deductions corresponding to the intervening
Saturdays, Sundays or Holidays where an employee without leave credits was
absent on the immediately preceding working day.
During the pendency of this petition, the respondent Commission promulgated
Resolution No. 91-540 dated 23 April 1991 amending the questioned policy,
considering that employees paid on a monthly basis are not required to work on
Saturdays, Sunday or Holidays. In said amendatory Resolution, the respondent
Commission resolved "to adopt the policy that when an employee, regardless of
whether he has leave credits or not, is absent without pay on day immediately
preceding or succeeding Saturday, Sunday or holiday, he shall not be considered
absent on those days." Memorandum Circular No. 16 Series of 1991 dated 26 April
1991, was also issued by CSC Chairman Sto. Tomas adopting and promulgating the
new policy and directing the Heads of Departments, Bureaus and Agencies in the
national and local governments, including government-owned or controlled
The Civil Service Commission in its here questioned Resolution No. 90-797 construed
R.A. 2625 as referring only to government employees who have earned leave credits
against which their absences may be charged with pay, as its letters speak only
of leaves of absence with full pay. The respondent Commission ruled that a reading
of R.A. 2625 does not show that a government employee who is on leave of
absence without pay on a day before or immediately preceding a Saturday, Sunday
or legal holiday is entitled to payment of his salary for said days.
Administrative construction, if we may repeat, is not necessarily binding upon the
courts. Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the
judicial department if there is an error of law, or abuse of power or lack of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or
the spirit of a legislative enactment. 10
We find this petition to be impressed with merit.
As held in Hidalgo vs. Hidalgo:
11
. . . . where the true intent of the law is clear that calls for the
application of the cardinal rule of statutory construction that such
intent or spirit must prevail over the letter thereof, for whatever is
within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, since adherence
to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions
and would defeat the plain and vital purpose of the statute.
The intention of the legislature in the enactment of R.A. 2625 may be gleaned from,
among others, the sponsorship speech of Senator Arturo M. Tolentino during the
second reading of House Bill No. 41 (which became R.A. 2625). He said:
The law actually provides for sick leave and vacation leave of 15
days each year of service to be with full pay. But under the present
law, in computing these periods of leaves, Saturday, Sunday and
holidays are included in the computation so that if an employee
should become sick and absent himself on a Friday and then he
reports for work on a Tuesday, in the computation of the leave the
Saturday and Sunday will be included, so that he will be
considered as having had a leave of Friday, Saturday, Sunday and
Monday, or four days.
Sundays or legal holidays (as herein petitioner was so deprived) since 12 February
1965, be entitled to recover the amounts corresponding to such non-working days?
The general rule vis-a-vis legislation is that an unconstitutional act is not a law; it
confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it
is in legal contemplation as inoperative as though it had never been passed. 13
But,
as
Bank: 14
held
Furthermore, before their amendment by R.A. 2625, Sections 284 and 285-A of the
Revised Administrative Code applied to all government employee without any
distinction. It follows that the effect of the amendment similarly applies to all
employees enumerated in Sections 284 and 285-A, whether or not they have
accumulated leave credits.
Drainage
District
vs. Baxter
State
As the questioned CSC policy is here declared invalid, we are next confronted with
the question of what effect such invalidity will have. Will all government employees
on a monthly salary basis, deprived of their salaries corresponding to Saturdays,
County
in Chicot