adionLIBERTY

Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro

a legitimate exertion of the police power. Section 2145 of the Administrative

Code of 1917 is constitutional.

Facts: The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 wherein

non-Christian inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) will be directed to take up their
habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands. It is resolved that under
section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the
sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent
settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit
homesteads on this reservation providing that said homestead applications
are previously recommended by the provincial governor.

Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts for the advancement of the
non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only successfully method
for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent
settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The protection of the
Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5)
the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.

In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code, all
the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east
of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's
place in Calapan, were ordered to take up their habitation on the site of
Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply
with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days,
in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code.

One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without
when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are
restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines.
Liberty regulated by law": Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good
of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society
and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases.
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of
law.

Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary

measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the
protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized
customs among them.

Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their

liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.

It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their
dwelling within thereservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished.

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

ESTRADA VS SANDIGANBAYAN (READ FULL TEXT!)

It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by
the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to
be held on the reservationestablished at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will,
and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff
in the prison at Calapan for having run away form thereservation.

Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts: Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be
prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of
Plunder), as amended by RA 7659, wishes to impress upon us that the
assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct
line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore
makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible
of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the
vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in
criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes
already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are
purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due
process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him

Issue: Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprive a

person of his liberty pf abode. Thus, WON Section 2145 of the Administrative
Code of 1917 is constitutional.
Held: The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not
deprive a person of his liberty of abode and does not deny to him the equal
protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance
with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. The
Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is

Issue: Is the Plunder Law void for being vague

Ruling: this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law,
as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL

This due to the fact that Congress is not restricted in the form of expression
of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not
necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the
legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which
is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Publication Requirement
Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the
disclosure of a number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not
been published as required by Law. The government argued that while
publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise
provided, as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to
become effective immediately upon approval. The court decided on April 24,
1985 in affirming the necessity for publication of some of the decrees. The
court ordered the respondents to publish in the official gazette all
unpublished Presidential Issuances which are of general force and effect.
The petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of
general applicability and those which are not. The publication means
complete publication, and that publication must be made in the official
gazette. In a comment required by the solicitor general, he claimed first that
the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and therefore be dismissed.
And on the clause unless otherwise provided in Article 2 of the new civil
code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative,
that the publication when necessary, did not have to be made in the official
gazette.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not all laws shall be published in the official gazette.
(2) Whether or not publication in the official gazette must be in full.
Held:
(1) The court held that all statute including those of local application shall
be published as condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
(2) The publication must be full or no publication at all since its purpose is
to inform the public of the content of the laws.
In 2005, tapes which allegedly contained a conversation between GMA and
COMELEC Commissioner Garcillano surfaced. The said conversation
contained a plan to rig the elections to favor GMA. The recordings then
became subject to legislative hearings conducted separately by each House.
In his privilege speech, Sen. Escudero motioned a congressional
investigation jointly conducted by the Committees on Public Information,
Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security, Information and

Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms

(respondent House Committees). During the inquiry, several versions of the
wiretapped conversation emerged. Lacsons motion for a senate inquiry was
referred to the Committee on National Defense and Security headed by
Biazon. Garci subsequently filed to petitions. One to prevent the playing of
the tapes in the each House for they are alleged to be inadmi8ssible and the
other to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped
conversation.
ISSUE: Whether or not to grant the petitions of Garci.
HELD: Garcis petition to strike the tapes off the record cannot be granted.
The tapes were already played in Congress and those tapes were already
highly publicized. The issue is already overtaken by these incidents hence it
has become moot and academic. The second petition must be granted
however. The Senate cannot be allowed tocontinue with the conduct of the
questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in
clearderogation of the constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that [t]he
Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure. The requisite of publication of the rules is
intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. Publication is
indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise
burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no
notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What constitutes publication
is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that [l]aws shall take
effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the
Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
The Senate admits in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the
Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had
been published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in
2006. Withrespect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of
which the term of half of its memberscommenced on June 30, 2007, no effort
was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their
session.
JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS
EL BANCO ESPANOL- FILIPINO VS PALANCA
Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land as
security to his debt. His debt amounted to P218,294.10. His property is worth
75k more than what he owe. Due to the failure of Engracio to make his
payments, El Banco executed an instrument to mortgage Engracios
property. Engracio however left for China and he never returned til he died.
Since Engracio is a non resident El Banco has to notify Engracio about their
intent to sue him by means of publication using a newspaper. The lower court
further orderdd the clerk of court to furnish Engracio a copy and that itd be

sent to Amoy, China. The court eventually granted El Banco petition to

execute Engracios property. 7 years thereafter, Vicente surfaced on behalf of
Engracio as his administrator to petition for the annulment of the ruling.
Vicente averred that there had been no due process as Engracio never
received the summons.
ISSUE: Whether or not due process was not observed.
HELD: The SC ruled against Palanca. The SC ruled that the requisites for
judicial due process had been met. The requisites are;
1. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial
power to hear and decide the matter before it.
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the
defendant or over the property subject of the proceedings.
3. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard.
4. Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing.

REQUIREMENTS, IN GENERAL
Impartial Tribunal, Judicial
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. PEDRO S. ESPINA, CRISTETA REYES, JOHNY SANTOS, ANTONIO
ALEGRO, ROGELIO MENGUIN, PETE ALVERIO, ROGEN DOCTORA and
JANE GO, respondents. (digest!!!)
RESOLUTION
MELO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review with an urgent prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order which seeks to: (a) annul and
set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 31733
entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Pedro S. Espina et al.", insofar
as it denied the People's prayer to inhibit respondent Judge Pedro S. Espina
of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City from hearing Criminal Cases No.
93-01-38 & 9301-39, respectively, entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Cristeta Reyes, et al." and "People of the Philippines vs. Jane C. Go"; and
b) enjoin respondent judge from conducting further proceedings in the
aforesaid criminal cases.
Acting on the said petition, the Court on April 3, 1995 resolved to require
respondents all of whom are the accused in the aforesaid criminal cases, to
comment thereon within 10 days from notice, to issue the temporary
restraining order prayed for, and to enjoin respondent judge from taking
further action in Criminal Cases No. 93-01-38 & 93-01-39 until further orders
from the Court.
It appearing that private respondents Cristeta Reyes & Rogen Doctora,
Johny Santos & Antonio Alegro & Jane C. Go failed to file their respective
comments within the period which expired on April 17, 1995 and April 18,
1995, respectively, the Court on June 26, 1995 resolved to require said

private respondents to show cause why they should not be disciplinary dealt
with for such failure, and to file the required comments, both within ten (10)
days from notice.
As to respondents Johny Santos & Antonio Alegro (prisoners at the Tacloban
City Jail), copies of the resolution requiring them to file comment were
returned unserved with the postmaster's notation "unknown in said address".
The Court, on October 11, 1995 directed the Solicitor General to serve the
same on said respondents and to inform the Court of such service, both
within ten (10) days from notice.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Compliance stating that the
required copies were sent to private respondents Santos & Alegro through
ordinary mail on December 26, 1995.
To date, all the respondents have not yet filed their comments, for verily,
delay in the submission of the same would appear to benefit respondents,
and sanction against them may not really amount to much, considering that
most of them are under detention. Thus, so as not to unduly delay the
disposition of Criminal Cases No. 93-01-38 and 93-01-39, we now resolve to
dispense with respondent's comments and to proceed with the disposition of
the petition.
One of the essential requirements of procedural due process in a judicial
proceeding is that there must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with
judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it. Thus, every
litigant, including the State, is entitled to the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge which was explained in Javier vs. Commission of Elections (144 SCRA
194 [1986]), in the following words:
This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of
an impartial judge" as the indispensable imperative of due process. To
bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be
impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the
parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than
that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a
judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they
will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise
they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no
point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance
with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls
for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a
court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made
and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the
charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings are
not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the
motions and reach the denoucement according to a prepared script. There is
no writer to foreordain the ending. The Judge will reach his conclusions only
after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the
established facts and the pertinent law.

In the case at bar, Judge Pedro Espina, as correctly pointed out by the
Solicitor General, can not be considered to adequately possess such cold
neutrality of an impartial judge as to fairly assess both the evidence to be
adduced by the prosecution and the defense in view of his previous decision
in Special Civil Action No. 92-11-219 wherein he enjoined the preliminary
investigation at the Regional State Prosecutor's Office level against herein
respondent Jane Go, the principal accused in the killing of her husband
Dominador Go.
Judge Espina's decision in favor of respondent Jane Go serves as sufficient
and reasonable basis for the prosecution to seriously doubt his impartiality in
handling the criminal cases. Verily, it would have been more prudent for
Judge Espina to have voluntarily inhibited himself from hearing the criminal
cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 31733 is hereby SET ASIDE and The Honorable
Pedro Espina, Presiding Judge of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of the
8th Judicial Region stationed in Tacloban is hereby declared disqualified from
taking cognizance of Criminal Cases No. 93-01-38 and 93-01-39. It is further
ordered that these criminal cases be re-raffled to another branch of the
Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City.
SO ORDERED.
TABUENA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
Then President Marcos instructed Luis Tabuena over the phone to pay
directly to the presidents office and in cash what the Manila International
Airport Authority (MIAA) owes the Philippine National Construction
Corporation (PNCC), pursuant to the 7 January 1985memorandum of then
Minister Trade and Industry Roberto Ongpin. Tabuena agreed. About a week
later, Tabuena received from Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez, and then private
secretary of Marcos, a Presidential Memorandum dated 8 January 1986
reiterating in black and white such verbal instruction. In obedience to
President Marcos verbal instruction and memorandum, Tabuena, with the
help of Gerardo G. Dabao and Adolfo Peralta, caused the release of P55
Million of MIAA funds by means of three (3) withdrawals. On 10 January
1986, the first withdrawal was made for P25 Million, following a letter of even
date signed by Tabuena and Dabao requesting the PNB extension office at
the MIAA the depository branch of MIAA funds, to issue a managers check
for said amount payable to Tabuena. The check was encashed, however, at
the PNB Villamor Branch. Dabao and the cashier of the PNB Villamor branch
counted the money after which, Tabuena took delivery thereof. The P25
Million in cash was delivered on the same day to the office of Mrs. Gimenez.
Mrs. Gimenez did not issue any receipt for the money received. Similar
circumstances surrounded the second withdrawal/encashment and delivery
of another P25 Million, made on 16 January 1986. The third and last

withdrawal was made on 31January 1986 for P5 Million. Peralta was

Tabuenas co-signatory to the letter- request for a managers check for this
amount. Peralta accompanied Tabuena to the PNB Villamor branch as
Tabuena requested him to do the counting of the P5 Million. After the
counting, the money was loaded in the trunk of Tabuenas car. Peralta did not
go with Tabuena to deliver the money to Mrs.Gimenez office. It was only
upon delivery of the P5 Million that Mrs. Gimenez issued a receipt for all the
amounts she received from Tabuena. The receipt was dated January 30,
1986.Tabuena and Peralta were charged for malversation of funds, while
Dabao remained at large. One of the justices of the Sandiganbayan actively
took part in the questioning of a defense witness and of the accused
themselves; the volume of the questions asked were more the combined
questions of the counsels. On 12 October 1990, they were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. Tabuena and Peralta filed separate petitions for
review, appealing the Sandiganbayan decision dated 12 October 19990 and
the Resolution of 20 December 1991.
Issue: Whether Tabuena and Peralta were denied due process by the active
participation of the Sandiganbayan justice in the questioning witnesses in the
trial.
Held: Due process requires no less than the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge. Bolstering this requirement, we have added that the judge must not
only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial, to give added
assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The parties are entitled
to no less than this, as a minimum guaranty of due process. Our courts
should refrain from showing any semblance of one-sided or more or less
partial attitude in order not to create any false impression in the minds of the
litigants. For obvious reasons, it is the bounden duty of all to strive for the
preservation of the peoples faith in our courts. Respect for the Constitution is
more important than securing a conviction based on a violation of the rights
of the accused. The Court was struck by the way the Sandiganbayan actively
took part in the questioning of a defense witness and of the accused
themselves, as shown in the records. The volume of questions hurled by the
Sandiganbayan was more the combined questions of the counsels. More
importantly, the questions of the court were in the nature of cross
examinations characteristic of confrontation, probing and insinuation. We
have not adopted in this country the practice of making the presiding judge
the chief inquisitor. It is better to observe our time-honored custom of orderly
judicial procedure, even at the expense of occasional delays. The impartiality
of the judge; his avoidance of the appearance of becoming the advocate of
either one side or the other of the pending controversy is a fundamental and
essential rule of special importance in criminal cases. WHEREFORE, in view
of the foregoing, herein petitioners Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo M. Peralta are
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of malversation as defined and penalized
under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. The Sandiganbayan Decision
of October 12, 1990 and the Resolution dated December 20, 1991 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Impartial Tribunal, Administrative and Quasi-Judicial

javier vs. commission on elections
Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to
be members of the Batasan in May 1984 in Antique. During election, Javier
complained of massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud,
tampering and falsification of election returns under duress, threat and
intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men of
Pacificador. COMELEC just referred the complaints to the AFP. On the same
complaint, the 2nd Division of the Commission on Elections directed the
provincial board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to
suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. On
June 7, 1984, the same 2nd Division ordered the board to immediately
convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the
case before the Commission. On certiorari before the SC, the proclamation
made by the board of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been
made before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal, which the Javier had
seasonably made. Javier pointed out that the irregularities of the election
must first be resolved before proclaiming a winner. Further, Opinion, one of
the Commissioners should inhibit himself as he was a former law partner of
Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was made by only the 2nd Division but
the Constitute requires that it be proclaimed by the COMELEC en banc. In
Feb 1986, during pendency, Javier was gunned down. The Solicitor General
then moved to have the petition close it being moot and academic by virtue of
Javiers death.
ISSUE: Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of
Pacificador.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gens tenor.
The SC has repeatedly and consistently demanded the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster
that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but
must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that
his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They
should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who
shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go
to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will
not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in
invoking his action for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance
with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls
for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a
court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made
and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the

charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings are

not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the
motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is
no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only
after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the
established facts and the pertinent law.
TEJANO VS OMBUDSMAN
DIGEST!!!
The Facts
The instant petition stemmed from the report of Philippine National Bank
(PNB) Resident Auditor Alexander A. Tan, dated 15 October 1992, on his
investigation regarding an alleged unfunded withdrawal in the amount of P2.2
million by V&G Better Homes Subdivision (V&G) under Savings Account No.
365-5355-6-4.
The report, as summarized by Special Prosecution Officer III Jesus A. Micael,
is as follows:[3]
. . . [I]n the morning of 17 July 1992, Emilio P. Montesa (Bank Executive
Officer of PNB Cebu) handed a note to Jane Rita Jecong (Cashier)
instructing her to include her cash requisition for the day from Central Bank
Cebu, the amount of P2.2 M at P1,000.00 denomination; that on 20 July
1992 at about past 10:00 A.M., Juanito Mata (Cashier III), upon the
instruction of Cayetano A. Tejano Jr. (Vice President and Branch Manager of
PNB Cebu), took the P2.2 M from Ms. Jecong and delivered the same to Mr.
Tejano; that at about noontime of same day, Mr. Mara handed to Ms. Jecong
a pre-signed withdrawal slip against SA No. 365-535506-4 under the name of
V & G Better Homes for the same amount to replace the cash withdrawn and
to serve as cash-on-hand at the end of the days transaction; that the
withdrawal slip was approved by Mr. Tejano and was postdated 21 July 1992;
that as of 20 July 1992 V & G Better Homes SA No. 365-535506-4 has only
P33,436.78; that in the afternoon of 20 July 1992 the amount of
P2,336,563.32 (consisting of P2,200,000.00 in cash; P100,000.00 in check;
and P36,563.22 in withdrawal slip) was received by Teller Mary Ann Aznar as
payment for the loan of V & G Better Homes for which PNB Official Receipt
No. 952981E was issued; that the transaction was recognized as an increase
in PNB Cebu Branchs cash-on-hand and a decrease in the loan account of V
& G Better Homes; that the PNB Cebu Credit Committee approved the loan
at the rate of 23% lower than the 26% interest rate on its first renewal and
27% on its second renewal; that the loan proceeds was credited to the
account of V & G Better Homes on 21 July 1992, the same day that the
withdrawal slip of P2.2 M was taken by Mr. Montesa from Ms. Jecong and
given to Irene Abellanosa to be taken as her transaction for the day; and that
upon the instruction of Montesa, Savings Account No. 365-535506-4 of V &

G Better Homes was debited and the withdrawal slip was validated by Teller
Abellanosa although no actual cash withdrawal was made.
The report of Resident Auditor Alexander A. Tan implicated Vice President
Cayetano A. Tejano, Jr., the petitioner herein, Executive Officer Emilio
Montesa, and Supervising Branch Teller Jane Rita Jecong, all of the PNB,
Cebu City Branch, including Juana dela Cruz and Vicente dela Cruz of V&G,
as persons involved in the irregular withdrawal of P2.2 million of PNB funds.
In an order dated 22 December 1992, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for the Visayas ordered Tejano, Montesa, Jecong, Juana dela Cruz and
Vicente dela Cruz to file their respective counter-affidavits.[4]
In a resolution dated 29 March 1993, Graft Investigation Officer Edgardo G.
Canton recommended the filing of the proper information for violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019,[5] as amended, against petitioner
Cayetano A. Tejano, Jr., Juana dela Cruz and Vicente dela Cruz of V&G.[6]
The case against Montesa and Jecong was dismissed for lack of evidence.
The resolution was approved by Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas Arturo C.
Mojica and then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez.
The resolution was thereafter referred for review to Special Prosecutor III
Orlando I. Ines of the Office of the Special Prosecutor.
In a Memorandum[7] dated 25 October 1994, Ines affirmed the resolution of
Graft Investigation Officer Edgardo G. Canton.
On 28 October 1994, Deputy Special Prosecutor Jose De G. Ferrer
recommended the approval of the memorandum of Special Prosecution
Officer Ines.
On 08 November 1994, Aniano A. Desierto, then the Special Prosecutor,
concurred in the approval of Ferrer.[8] Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez
concurred thereto on 11 November 1994.
Subsequently, on 24 November 1994, an Information for violation of Section
3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended, was filed before the Sandiganbayan,
and docketed as Criminal Case No. 21654.
On 08 December 1994, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent
Motion for a Period of Time to File Motion for Reinvestigation.
In an order dated[9] 12 December 1994, the Sandiganbayan granted the
motion for reinvestigation.
On 22 December 1994, petitioner filed his motion for reinvestigation in the
Office of the Special Prosecutor.
On 20 April 1995, the Sandiganbayan ordered the Office of the Special
Prosecutor to conduct the reinvestigation.[10] The reinvestigation was
assigned to Special Prosecution Officer III Jesus Micael.
Convinced that no probable cause existed to indict petitioner Tejano, and
spouses Juana and Vicente dela Cruz, Special Prosecutor Micael, in a
memorandum[11] dated 03 November 1999, recommended the dismissal of
the case. The recommendation was approved by Deputy Special Prosecutor
Robert E. Kallos and concurred in by Special Prosecutor Leonardo P.
Tamayo.

On 10 December 1999, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, who earlier

participated in the initial preliminary investigation as Special Prosecutor,
disapproved the recommendation for the dismissal of the case with the
marginal note assign the case to another prosecutor to prosecute the case
aggressively.
On 02 February 2000, Special Prosecutor Micael filed a Manifestation, to
which was attached a copy of his memorandum, informing the
Sandiganbayan of the disapproval by Ombudsman Desierto of his
recommendation to dismiss the case.
On 10 February 2000, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
disapproval by Ombudsman Desierto of the recommendation of Micael.
Apparently, petitioners motion for reconsideration was not resolved on the
merits because on 27 June 2000, Special Prosecution Officer III Joselito R.
Ferrer filed a Motion to Set the Case for Arraignment alleging therein that the
prosecution did not give due course to the motion for reconsideration on the
ground that it was the second motion which is prohibited under the
Ombudsman Act of 1989. He added that the results of the reinvestigation
were already submitted to the respondent court before receiving the motion
for reconsideration.[12]
Petitioner manifested before the Sandiganbayan the Office of the Special
Prosecutors failure to resolve his motion for reconsideration. Thus, in a
resolution[13] dated 24 March 2003, the respondent court directed the Office
of the Ombudsman to resolve the said motion.
In a memorandum[14] dated 09 June 2003, Special Prosecutor Joselito R.
Ferrer recommended the denial of the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner. Deputy Special Prosecutor Robert E. Kallos changed his previous
position and recommended that the memorandum for the dismissal of the
motion for reconsideration be approved, with Special Prosecutor Dennis M.
Villa-Ignacio concurring in the denial.
On 14 July 2003, Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, who succeeded
Ombudsman Desierto when he retired, approved Joselito Ferrers
memorandum recommending the denial of the motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner thus filed the instant petition with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from taking further
action in Criminal Case No. 21654.
On 25 August 2003, the First Division of this Court issued the temporary
restraining order prayed for.
On 28 July 2004, the instant petition was transferred to the Second Division
of this Court.
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DISAPPROVED
THE EARLIER RECOMMENDATION FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE

AGAINST ALL THE ACCUSED WITHOUT ANY COGENT OR VERIFIABLE

REASON AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN THEY:
1.
THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN THE DISAPPROVAL OF THE RESOLUTION DATED NOVEMBER 3,
1999 AGAINST ALL ACCUSED FOR LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE AS
MANDATED UNDER SECTION 13 R.A. 6770 IN RELATION TO SECTION 3,
RULE 112 OF THE RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.
2.
THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROCECUTOR DID NOT DETERMINE
THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE IN A RESOLUTION DENYING
PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FOR APPROVAL BY
THE NEW OMBUDSMAN.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE FILED AGAINST THE ACCUSED IS A
CLEAR CASE OF PERSECUTION AND NOT PROSECUTION
CONTEMPLATED UNDER R.A. 3019, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT,
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1374 AND CHAPTER II, SECTION 2, TITLE VII, BOOK
II OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.
Ruling of the Court
Quite apart from the above, we find a focal issue apparently glossed over by
the parties - whether or not Ombudsman Desierto committed grave abuse of
discretion in disapproving the 03 November 1999 memorandum of Special
Prosecutor Jesus Micael recommending the dismissal of Criminal Case No.
21654 against petitioner Tejano, and spouses Juana and Vicente dela Cruz
of V&G for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, where he had
earlier participated in the preliminary investigation of the said criminal case
recommending the filing of the information.
This Court has been consistent in holding that it will not interfere with the
Ombudsmans exercise of his constitutionally mandated investigatory and
prosecutory powers, and respect the initiative and independence inherent in
the Ombudsman who beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the
people and the preserver of the integrity of public service.[15] Such
discretionary power of the Ombudsman is beyond the domain of this Court to
review, save in cases where there is clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction of the latter.
Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment on the part of the public officer concerned which is equivalent to an
excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason
of passion or hostility.[16]

Ombudsman Desierto, in this case, committed grave abuse of discretion.

Petitioner attributes partiality on the part of Ombudsman Desierto for having
participated in the reinvestigation of the instant case despite the fact that he
earlier participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the same when he
was a Special Prosecutor by concurring in the recommendation for the filing
of the information before the Sandiganbayan.
We agree with the petitioner. Steadfastly, we have ruled that the officer who
reviews a case on appeal should not be the same person whose decision is
under review. [17] InZambales Chromite Mining Company v. Court of
Appeals,[18] the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources was set aside by this Court after it had been established that the
case concerned an appeal of the Secretarys own previous decision, which
he handed down while he was yet the incumbent Director of Mines. We have
equally declared void a decision rendered by the Second Division of the
National Labor Relations Commission, because one of its members,
Commissioner Raul Aquino, participated in the review of the case which he
had earlier decided on as a former labor arbiter.[19] Likewise, this Court
struck down a decision of Presidential Executive Assistance Jacobo Clave
over a resolution of the Civil Service Commission, in which he, then
concurrently its Chairman, had earlier concurred.[20]
Having participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the instant case
and having recommended the filing of an appropriate information, it
behooved Ombudsman Desierto to recuse himself from participating in the
review of the same during the reinvestigation. He should have delegated the
review to his Deputies pursuant to Section 15 of Rep. Act No. 6770, which
provides:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman
shall have the following powers, functions and duties:
...
(10) Delegate to the Deputies, or its investigators or representatives such
authority or duty as shall ensure the effective exercise or performance of the
powers, functions and duties herein or hereinafter provided; . . .
In earlier recommending the filing of information, then Special Prosecutor
Desierto was already convinced, from that moment, that probable cause
exists to indict the accused. It becomes a farfetched possibility that in a
subsequent review of the same, Ombudsman Desierto would make a
turnabout and take a position contradictory to his earlier finding.
Due process dictates that one called upon to resolve a dispute may not
review his decision on appeal.[21] We take our bearings from Zambales
Chromite Mining Co. v. Court of Appeals[22] which succinctly explained that:
In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn
out to be farce, the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer
whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view
or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing
officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since

being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the
case.
Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government[23]
concedes the applicability of the prohibition on the reviewing officer to handle
a case he earlier decided, thus:
Where the circumstances do not inspire confidence in the objectivity and
impartiality of the judge, such judge should inhibit voluntarily or if he refuses,
he should be prohibited from handling the case. A judge must not only be
impartial but must also appear impartial as an assurance to the parties that
his decision will be just. His actuation must inspire that belief. This is an
instance when appearance is as important as reality.
The same rule of thumb should apply to an investigating officer conducting a
preliminary investigation. This is the reason why under Section 1679 of the
former Revised Administrative Code, the Secretary of Justice, who has
supervision over the prosecution arm of the government, is given ample
power to designate another prosecutor to handle the investigation and
prosecution of a case when the prosecutor handling the same is otherwise
disqualified by personal interest, or is unable or fails to perform his duty.
(Underlining supplied)
The fact that the motion for reconsideration of Ombudsman Desiertos
disapproval of the 03 November 1999 memorandum of Special Prosecutor
Jesus Micael recommending the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 21654 was
denied by another reviewing officer, Ombudsman Marcelo, does not cure the
infirmity of Ombudsman Desiertos actuation. As stressed in Singson v.
NLRC:[24]
. . . The infirmity of the resolution was not cured by the fact that the motion for
reconsideration of the petitioner was denied by two commissioners and
without the participation of Commissioner Aquino. The right of petitioner to
an impartial review of his appeal starts from the time he filed his appeal. He
is not only entitled to an impartial tribunal in the resolution of his motion for
reconsideration. Moreover, his right is to an impartial review of three
commissioners. The denial of petitioners right to an impartial review of his
appeal is not an innocuous error. It negated his right to due process.
(Underlining supplied)
With the foregoing conclusion, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the other
issues raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the Ombudsmans disapproval of the memorandum dated 03
November 1999, where Prosecutor Jesus A. Micael of the Office of the
Special Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 21654,
as well as the memorandum dated 09 June 2003, which denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration, are SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the
Office of the Ombudsman for further proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Impartial Tribunal, Prejudicial Publicity

Estrada vs Desierto
FACTS
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Estrada was elected
President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected VicePresident. From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued
by problems that slowly eroded his popularity. On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur
Governor Chavit Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, accused the
petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng
lords. The expose immediately ignited reactions of rage. On November 13,
2000, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed
by 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of
Representatives to the Senate. On November 20, 2000, the Senate formally
opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. On January 16, 2001, by a
vote of 11-10, the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second
envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held
P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name Jose Velarde. The
ruling was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of the
metropolis. Thereafter, the Armed Forces and the PNP withdrew their support
to the Estrada government. Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries,
assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs resigned from their posts.
On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered
the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. On the same
day, petitioner issued a press statement that he was leaving Malacanang
Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the
nation. It also appeared that on the same day, he signed a letter stating that
he was transmitting a declaration that he was unable to exercise the powers
and duties of his office and that by operation of law and the Constitution, the
Vice-President shall be the Acting President. A copy of the letter was sent to
Speaker Fuentebella and Senate President Pimentel on the same day.
After his fall from the power, the petitioners legal problems appeared in
clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the
Ombudsman were set in motion. Petitioner sought to enjoin the respondent
Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in any criminal
complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as
President is over and only if legally warranted. Erap also filed a Quo
Warranto case, praying for judgment confirming petitioner to be the lawful
and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily
unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have
taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an
acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.

ISSUES
Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President
Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as
President
Whether or not the petitioner was not denied the right to impartial
trial.
HELD
1. Using the totality test, the SC held that petitioner resigned as
President.
The

proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not
be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up
the presidency even at that time.
The
Angara diary shows that the President wanted only
five-day period
promised by Reyes, as well as to open the
second envelop to clear
his name.
If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday.
The President says. Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang
masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I
dont want any more of this its too painful. Im tired of the red tape, the
bureaucracy, the intrigue.)
I just want to clear my name, then I will go.
The SC held that this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned.
The intent to resign is clear when he said x x x Ayoko na masyado nang
masakit. Ayoko na are words of resignation.
During the negotiations, the resignation of the petitioner was treated as a
given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures
to be undertaken by the parties during and after transition period.
His

resignation was also confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. In the

press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged
the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic
albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he

was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of
peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He
did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and
he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the
disability
disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity
to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given
him to serve the people as President;
(4) he assured that he will not shirk
from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our
country. Petitioners
reference is to a future challenge after occupying the
office of
the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his
supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he
did
not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioners
valedictory,
his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the
past tense.
2.The petitioner is permanently unable to act as President. Section 11 of
Article VII provides that Congress has the ultimate authority under the
Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing
his functions. Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo
as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the
inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly
rejected petitioners claim of inability. Even if petitioner can prove that he did
not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave
on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has
been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the
de jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be
reviewed by the Supreme Court
3. Petitioner was not denied the right to impartial trial.Pervasive publicity
is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact
that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage
does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial
judge and impaired his impartiality. In the case at bar, the records do not
show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a
consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his
case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial
judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is
incapable if change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant
has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the
burden.
re petition for radio and television coverage of the multiple murder
cases against Maguindanao Governor Zaldy Ampatuan
On the possible influence of media coverage on the impartiality oftrial court
judges, the Court found that prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the

right to a fair trial must pass the totality of circumstances test, applied in
People v. Teehankee, Jr. and Estrada v. Desierto, that the right of an accused
to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press, that pervasive publicity is not
per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to a fair trial, and that there must
be allegation and proof of the impaired capacity of a judge to render a biasfree decision. Mere fear of possible undue influence is not tantamount to
actual prejudice resulting in the deprivation of the right to a fair trial.
Re: Petition for Radio and Television Coverage of the Multiple Murder Cases
AgainstMaguindanao Governor Zaldy AmpatuanFacts:Almost a year after the
Maguindanao Massacre, the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines,
broadcasting networks, and the relatives of the victims, filed apetition before
the Court, praying that live television and radio coverage of the trial inthe
criminal cases be allowed, and that recording devices (e.g., still cameras,
taperecorders) be permitted inside the courtroom.Petitioners seek the lifting
of the absolute ban on live television and radio coverage of court
proceedings, contending that previous rulings regarding such matter,
violatethe doctrine that proposed restrictions on constitutional rights are to be
narrowlyconstrued and outright prohibition cannot stand when regulation is a
viablealternative.Issue:WON lifting the absolute ban on live broadcasting of
court proceedings in the casewould infringe constitutional
rightsHeld:Respecting the possible influence of media coverage on the
impartiality of trial court judges, the right of an accused to a fair trial is not
incompatible to a free press.Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the
right of an accused to a fair trial,and that there must be allegation and proof
of the impaired capacity of a judge torender a bias-free decision. Mere fear of
possible undue influence is not tantamountto actual prejudice resulting in the
deprivation of the right to a fair trial. Hence, thecourt allowed pro hac vice the
live broadcasting
Opportunity to be Heard
Budiongan vs Dela Cruz (DIGEST!!!)
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails
the Memorandum[1] dated April 28, 2004 of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman, recommending that petitioners be
charged with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 and
petitioner Pedro E. Budiongan with violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019.
Also assailed is the Resolution[2] dated October 19, 2005 denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

By virtue of Municipal Ordinance No. 2, series of 2001, the Municipality
of Carmen, Bohol appropriated the amount of P450,000.00 for the purchase
of a road roller for the municipality. However, on November 16, 2001, the
Municipal Development Council through Resolution No. 3 recommended that
the amount of P450,000.00 be realigned and used for the asphalt laying of a
portion of the Tan Modesto Bernaldez Street.[3] The proposed realignment
was included in the December 21, 2001 agenda of the Sangguniang Bayan
of Carmen but discussion thereon was deferred.
On February 6, 2002, petitioner Municipal Treasurer, Fulgencio V.
Paa, issued a Certificate of Availability of Funds for the project. Thereafter,
the Office of the Municipal Engineer prepared a Program of Works and Cost
Estimates duly noted/approved by Municipal Budget Officer Taciana B.
Espejo and Mayor Budiongan.
Bidding was conducted on March 5, 2002. The next day, March 6,
2002, Mayor Budiongan issued the Notice of Award and Notice to
Commence Work in favor of Herbert Malmis General Merchandise and
Contractor, Inc. who emerged as the lowest complying bidder. On March 22,
2002, the Sangguniang Bayan passed Resolution No. 60,[4] series of 2002,
authorizing Mayor Budiongan to sign and enter into contract with Malmis
relative to the above project in the amount of P339,808.00. With such
authority, Malmis commenced with the project.
Thereafter, it was discovered that there was yet no ordinance approving the
realignment of the funds. Thus, on May 17, 2002, the Sangguniang Bayan
passed Ordinance No. 8,[5] series of 2002, approving the realignment of the
fund. On June 14, 2002, Malmis was paid the contract price.
On July 3, 2002, private respondents Arlene P. Palgan and Valeriano
U. Nadala filed a complaint[6] against the petitioners before the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas alleging illegality in the conduct of the
bidding, award and notice to commence work since there was no fund
appropriated for the purpose.
On July 31, 2003, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas
found probable cause and recommended the filing of an information for
violation of Article 220[7] of the Revised Penal Code against the petitioners.
However, the complaint against Hermosila Logrono, Desiderio Gudia, Jr. and
Herbert Malmis was dismissed for lack of merit.[8]
Upon review, the Case Assessment, Review and Reinvestigation
Bureau of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, issued the assailed

Memorandum dated April 28, 2004, modifying the charge from violation of
Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code to (1) violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019 against petitioners for allegedly giving unwarranted benefit to
Malmis and (2) violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019 against petitioner
Budiongan for allegedly directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary
interest in a contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or
takes part in his official capacity.
Thus, two separate Informations were filed before the Sandiganbayan
(1) for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 against the petitioners
docketed as Criminal Case No. 28075 and (2) for violation of Section 3(h) of
R.A. No. 3019 against petitioner Budiongan docketed as Criminal Case No.
28076.
Thereafter, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash[9] the information charging
them with violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. In a Resolution[10] dated
June 10, 2005, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion to quash and
remanded Criminal Case No. 28075 to the Office of the Ombudsman for
amendment of the Information. It held that although Malmis benefited from
the contract, the same is not unwarranted considering that the project was
implemented, executed and completed.
On June 27, 2005, an Amended Information[11] was filed charging petitioners
with violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, alleging that petitioners, by
prematurely awarding to Malmis the project despite the absence of funds
specifically appropriated for such purpose, and thereafter paying the contract
price from the Municipal Treasury which was originally appropriated for the
purchase of a road roller, caused damage and undue injury to the
government.
Finding that the Amended Information contains all the material averments
necessary to make out a case for the first mode of violating Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019, i.e., causing any undue injury to any party, including the
government, the Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Information in its
Resolution dated August 18, 2005.[12]
On even date, petitioners filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion for
Leave of Court to File Motion for Reinvestigation[13] arguing that the above
Informations were filed without affording them the opportunity to file counteraffidavits to answer/rebut the modified charges. On September 20, 2005, the
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution[14] denying the motion insofar as
Criminal Case No. 28076 is concerned. It held that it is too late in the day to
remand the case for reinvestigation considering that Budiongan had already
been arraigned and the case had long been set for pre-trial proceedings, with
both parties having filed their respective briefs. As regards Criminal Case
No. 28075, the Sandiganbayan noted that although the conduct of the

preliminary investigation was regular, petitioners however were not given the
opportunity to seek reconsideration of the modified charges. Thus, it granted
leave to the petitioners to file with the Office of the Special Prosecutor a
motion for reconsideration (not a motion for reinvestigation) of the said
offices Memorandum dated April 28, 2004.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Office of the
Special Prosecutor which was denied for lack of merit in the Resolution dated
October 19, 2005.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENTS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN REJECTING THE FINDINGS AND
AMENDING/MODIFYING THE RESOLUTION OF THE GRAFT
INVESTIGATING OFFICER, OMBUDSMAN VISAYAS, AND IN FILING THE
INFORMATION FOR VIOLATION OF SEC. 3(e) OF RA 3019 WITHOUT
AFFORDING PETITIONERS THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT THEIR
COUNTER EVIDENCE IN A RE-INVESTIGATION;
II.
WHETHER THE REFUSAL OR FAILURE TO CONDUCT A REINVESTIGATION HAS VIOLATED PETITIONERS' RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS;
III.
WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENTS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN ISSUING RESOLUTIONS DATED APRIL 28, 2004 AND
OCTOBER 19, 2005 FINDING PROBABLE CAUSE FOR VIOLATION OF
SEC. 3(e) OF RA 3019 AGAINST HEREIN PETITIONERS; and
IV.
WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENTS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN FILING THE INFORMATION FOR VIOLATION OF
SEC.3(e) OF RA 3019 AGAINST PETITIONERS IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN
DOCKETED AS CRIMINAL CASE NO. 28075.
Petitioners maintain that the modification of the charge from violation
of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code to violation of Sections 3(e) and
3(h) of R.A. No. 3019 denied their rights to due process since they were not
given the opportunity to answer and present evidence on the new charge in
a preliminary investigation. Furthermore, the petitioners argue that public
respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the challenged resolutions finding probable
cause for violation of R.A. No. 3019.

The petition lacks merit.

The right to a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right, but
is merely a right conferred by statute. The absence of a preliminary
investigation does not impair the validity of the Information or otherwise
render the same defective. It does not affect the jurisdiction of the court over
the case or constitute a ground for quashing the Information.[15] If absence
of a preliminary investigation does not render the Information invalid nor
affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case, then the denial of a motion
for reinvestigation cannot likewise invalidate the Information or oust the court
of its jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioners were not deprived of due process because they were
afforded the opportunity to refute the charges by filing their counter-affidavits.
The modification of the offense charged did not come as a surprise to the
petitioners because it was based on the same set of facts and the same
alleged illegal acts. Moreover, petitioners failed to aver newly discovered
evidence nor impute commission of grave errors or serious irregularities
prejudicial to their interest to warrant a reconsideration or reinvestigation of
the case as required under Section 8, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman.[16] Thus, the modification of the offense
charged, even without affording the petitioners a new preliminary
investigation, did not amount to a violation of their rights.
Furthermore, the right to preliminary investigation is deemed waived
when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at
arraignment.[17] Petitioner Budiongan was arraigned in Criminal Case No.
28076 on March 28, 2005. He was also arraigned together with the rest of
the petitioners under the Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 28075
on December 2, 2005.
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is merely to determine
whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to
believe that the person accused of the crime is probably guilty thereof and
should be held for trial.[18] A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and
was committed by the suspect. Probable cause need not be based on clear
and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt
beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt. [19]
The Office of the Special Prosecutor is an integral component of the
Ombudsman and is under the latters supervision and control. Thus,
whatever course of action that the Ombudsman may take, whether to
approve or to disapprove the recommendation of the investigating
prosecutor, is but an exercise of his discretionary powers based upon

constitutional mandate. Generally, courts should not interfere in such

exercise. It is beyond the ambit of this Court to review the exercise of
discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed
before it, save in cases where there is clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
Ombudsman.[20] Absent any showing of arbitrariness on the part of the
prosecutor or any other officer authorized to conduct preliminary
investigation, as in the instant case, courts as a rule must defer to said
officers finding and determination of probable cause, since the
determination of the existence of probable cause is the function of the
prosecutor.[21]
In fine, certiorari will not lie to invalidate the Office of the Special
Prosecutor's resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration since
there is nothing to substantiate petitioners claim that it gravely abused its
discretion in ruling that there was no need to conduct a reinvestigation of the
case.[22]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is
DISMISSED. The assailed Memorandum of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman, dated April 28, 2004 finding probable
cause that petitioners violated Sections 3(e) and 3(h) of Republic Act No.
3019 and the Resolution dated October 19, 2005 denying petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Information and Arraignment
summary dismissal board vs. torcita
Read full text!
FACTS: Respondent was charged with 12 administrative complaints which
were consolidated into one major complaint, which is, conduct unbecoming of
a police officer. The Summary Dismissal Board suspended respondent from
service for 20 days, for simple irregularity in the performance of service.
The Board later found respondent to have committed a breach of internal
discipline by taking alcoholic drinks while on duty.
HELD: Respondent was entitled to know that he was being charged with
being drunk while in the performance of duty. Although he was given the
opportunity to be heard on the multiple and broad charges filed against him,
the absence of specification of the offense for which he was eventually found
guilty is not a proper observance of due process.
Sanity

People vs estrada
Nature: Automatic review of the death penalty
Facts: December 27, 1994, at the St. Johns Cathedral, Dagupan City, while
the sacrament of confirmation was being performed by the Bishop, a man
from the crowd walked towards the center of the altar and sat on the Bishops
chair. Crisanto Santillan, who was an assistant saw this. He requested the
accused to vacate, but the latter refused. They called on the guard. Despite
repeated request, he did not move. As the guard was attempting to strike the
victim with his nightstick to make him leave accused-appellant drew a knife
and stabbed Mararac. He repeated it a lot. After, he got up and shouted via
the mic; No one can beat me here! SPO1 Francisco saw a man, with red
stains on his shirt and a knife in one hand sitting on a chair. He advised him
to drop the knife. Accused-appellant obeyed, Mararac, the security guard,
was brought to the hospital where he expired a few minutes upon arrival.
Accused-appellant, filed a Demurrer to Evidence where he claims that:
prosecution failed to prove murder; that there was unlawful aggression by the
victim; and that accused-appellant was of unsound mind. Inspector Valdez
(Jail warden) requested the court to allow accused-appellant, to be treated at
the Baguio General Hospital to determine whether he should remain in jail or
be transferred to some other institution. While motion for reconsideration was
pending, counsel for accused-appellant filed a Motion to Confine Accused
for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric Examination. Appellants counsel
informed the court that accused-appellant had been exhibiting abnormal
behavior for the past weeks. There were 2 letters of the warden requesting
the same. The trial court denied reconsideration of the order denying the
Demurrer to Evidence. Dr. Maria Soledad Gawidan, a resident physician in
the Department of Psychiatry at the Baguio General Hospital, testified to the
accused being confined and diagnosed with Schizophrenic Psychosis,
Paranoid Typeschizophrenia, paranoid, chronic, paranoid type.
The trial court rendered a decision on June 23, 1997. It upheld the
prosecution evidence and found accused-appellant guilty of the crime
charged and thereby sentenced him to death,
Issue: WON he was indeed insane
Held: When a person commits a felonious act the act is presumed to have
been done voluntarily. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law
presumes that every person is of sound mind and that all acts are voluntary.
An insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted during
a lucid interval. In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a
complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act. Mere abnormality
of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. Since the presumption is
always in favor of sanity, he who invokes insanity as an exempting
circumstance must prove it by clear and positive evidence. There are certain
circumstances that should have placed the trial court on notice that appellant
may not have been in full possession of his mental faculties e.g. when he
attacked Mararac, then went up the microphone. Accused-appellants history
of mental illness was brought to the courts.

To test whether the accused would have a fair trial there are two distinct
matters to be determined (1) whether defendant is coherent to provide his
counsel with information necessary (2) whether he is able to comprehend the
significance of the trial and his relation to it. To put a legally incompetent
person on trial or to convict and sentence him is a violation of the
constitutional rights to a fair trial. The determination of whether a sanity
investigation or hearing should be ordered rests generally in the discretion of
the trial court. In the case at bar, when accused-appellant moved for
suspension of the arraignment on the ground of accuseds mental condition,
the trial court denied the motion after finding that the questions propounded
on appellant were intelligently answered by him. The fact that accusedappellant was able to answer the questions asked by the trial court is not
conclusive evidence that he was competent enough to stand trial and assist
in his defense. The trial court took it solely upon itself to determine the sanity
of accused-appellant. The trial judge is not a psychiatrist or psychologist or
some other expert equipped with the specialized knowledge. If the medical
history was not enough to create a reasonable doubt in the judges mind of
accused-appellants competency to stand trial, subsequent events should
have done so. One month after the prosecution rested its case, there were
letters requesting that accused be confined in hospital, as well as the
counsels filing of motion. And despite all the overwhelming indications of
accused-appellants state of mind, the judge persisted in his personal
assessment and never even considered subjecting accused-appellant to a
medical examination. To top it all, the judge found appellant guilty and
sentenced him to death!
Judgment: At this late hour, a medical finding alone may make it impossible
for us to evaluate appellants mental condition at the time of the crimes
commission for him to avail of the exempting circumstance of insanity.
Nonetheless, under the present circumstances, accused-appellants
competence to stand trial must be properly ascertained to enable him to
participate in his trial meaningfully. Remanded to the court a quo for the
conduct of a proper mental examination on accused-appellant, a
determination of his competency to stand trial, and for further proceedings.
extradition
secretary of justice vs lantion
Nature: Petition for review of a decision of the Manila RTC
Facts: On June 18, 1999 the Department of Justice received from the
Department of Foreign Affairs a request for the extradition of private
respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant
for his arrest, and other supporting documents for said extradition were
attached along with the request. Charges include:
1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US
2. Attempt to evade or defeat tax
3. Fraud by wire, radio, or television

4. False statement or entries

5. Election contribution in name of another
The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel proceeded
with the technical evaluation and assessment of the extradition treaty which
they found having matters needed to be addressed. Respondent, then
requested for copies of all the documents included in the extradition request
and for him to be given ample time to assess it.
The Secretary of Justice denied request on the ff. grounds:
1. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the
evaluation. At that point in time, the DOJ is in the process of evaluating
whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law (PD 1069
Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty) have been
complied with by the Requesting Government. Evaluation by the DOJ of the
documents is not a preliminary investigation like in criminal cases making the
constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal prosecution
inapplicable.
2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the
information in the documents.
3. Finally, country is bound to Vienna convention on law of treaties such that
every treaty in force is binding upon the parties.
The respondent filed for petition of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition. The
RTC of NCR ruled in favor of the respondent. Secretary of Justice was made
to issue a copy of the requested papers, as well as conducting further
proceedings.
Issues:
1. WON private is respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of
notice and hearing
Yes. 2(a) of PD 1086 defines extradition as the removal of an accused from
the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign
authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in
connection with any criminal investigation directed against him in connection
with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a
penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting
state or government. Although the inquisitorial power exercised by the DOJ
as an administrative agency due to the failure of the DFA to comply lacks any
judicial discretion, it primarily sets the wheels for the extradition process
which may ultimately result in the deprivation of the liberty of the prospective
extradite. This deprivation can be effected at two stages: The provisional
arrest of the prospective extradite pending the submission of the request &
the temporary arrest of the prospective extradite during the pendency of the
extradition petition in court. Clearly, theres an impending threat to a
prospective extraditees liberty as early as during the evaluation stage.

Because of such consequences, the evaluation process is akin to an

administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the
consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical
assessment sets off or commences the procedure for & ultimately the
deprivation of liberty of a prospective extradite. In essence, therefore, the
evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. There
are certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily available only in criminal
prosecution. But the Court has ruled in other cases that where the
investigation of an administrative proceeding may result in forfeiture of life,
liberty, or property, the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or
penal, & such forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. In the case at bar,
similar to a preliminary investigation, the evaluation stage of the extradition
proceedings which may result in the filing of an information against the
respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, & to the deprivation of his liberty.
Thus, the extraditee must be accorded due process rights of notice & hearing
according to A3 14(1) & (2), as well as A3 7the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern & the corollary right to access to
official records & documents
The court held that the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a
criminal investigation, having consequences which will result in deprivation of
liberty of the prospective extradite. A favorable action in an extradition
request exposes a person to eventual extradition to a foreign country, thus
exhibiting the penal aspect of the process. The evaluation process itself is
like a preliminary investigation since both procedures may have the same
result the arrest and imprisonment of the respondent.
The basic rights of notice & hearing are applicable in criminal, civil &
administrative proceedings. Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the
proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case
affecting their interests, & upon notice, may claim the right to appear therein
& present their side.
Rights to notice and hearing: Dispensable in 3 cases:
a. When there is an urgent need for immediate action (preventive suspension
in administrative charges, padlocking filthy restaurants, cancellation of
passport).
b. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, & the respondent
isnt prevented from enjoying the right to notice & hearing at a later time
(summary distraint & levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer,
replacement of an appointee)
c. Twin rights have been offered, but the right to exercise them had not been
claimed.
2. WON this entitlement constitutes a breach of the legal commitments and
obligation of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Treaty?

No. The U.S. and the Philippines share mutual concern about the
suppression and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. Both
states accord common due process protection to their respective citizens.
The administrative investigation doesnt fall under the three exceptions to the
due process of notice and hearing in the Sec. 3 Rules 112 of the Rules of
Court.
3. WON theres any conflict between private respondents basic due process
rights & provisions of RP-US Extradition treaty
No. Doctrine of incorporation under international law, as applied in most
countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing
with, but are not superior to national legislative acts. Treaty can repeal statute
and statute can repeal treaty. No conflict. Veil of secrecy is lifted during trial.
Request should impose veil at any stage.

Upon the filing of the said complaint, respondent judge issued a TRO and set
the hearing on the application for the issuance of the preliminary injunction.
Summons, together with a copy of the complaint and a notice, was also
served on both parties. Marohombsar filed an ex parte urgent motion to
dissolve the TRO. Pangadapun was given the time to comment. Respondent
judge issued an order stating that a preliminary conference had been held
and that both parties had waived the raffle of the case and reset the hearing
on the application for the issuance of a writ of injunction. The judge gave
another time to file her comment again.
During the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, none of the lawyers appeared. Hence, respondent judge
considered it submitted for resolution and issued the preliminary injunction.
Hence, this complaint for gross ignorance of law, abuse of discretion and
conduct unbecoming a judge.

Judgment: Petition dismissed for lack of merit.

Issues: 1) Whether or not TRO ex parte is allowed in the instant case.

Kapunan, separate concurring opinion: While the evaluation process

conducted by the DOJ is not exactly a preliminary investigation of criminal
cases, it is akin to a preliminary investigation because it involves the basic
constitutional rights of the person sought to be extradited. A person ordered
extradited is arrested, forcibly taken from his house, separated from his
family and delivered to a foreign state. His rights of abode, to privacy, liberty
and pursuit of happiness are taken away from hima fate as harsh and cruel
as a conviction of a criminal offense. For this reason, he is entitled to have
access to the evidence against him and the right to controvert them.

2) Whether or not trial-type hearing is essential to due process.

Puno, dissenting: Case at bar does not involve guilt or innocence of an

accused but the interpretation of an extradition treaty where at stake is our
governments international obligation to surrender to a foreign state a citizen
of its own so he can be tried for an alleged offense committed within that
jurisdiction.
Panganiban, dissenting: Instant petition refers only to the evaluation stage.
Preliminary Injuction
BAILINANG MAROHOMBSAR VS. JUDGE SANTOS ADIONG
G.R. No. RTJ-02-1674. January 22, 2004
Facts: Complainant Marohombsar was the defendant in the civil case for
injunction. The case was filed by Yasmira Pangadapun questioning the
legality of Marohombsars appointment as Provincial Social Welfare Officer of
the DSWD-ARMM. Prior to his appointment, Pangadapun used to occupy
said position.

3) Whether or not respondent judge erred in ordering the issuance of the writ
of preliminary injunction.
Held: 1) A TRO is generally granted without notice to the opposite party and
is intended only as a restraint on him until the propriety of granting a
temporary injunction can be determined. It goes no further than to preserve
the status quo until that determination. Respondent judge was justified in
issuing the TRO ex parte due to his assessment of the urgency of the relief
sought.
2) In applications for preliminary injunction, the dual requirement of prior
notice and hearing before injunction may issue has been relaxed to the point
that not all petitions for preliminary injunction need undergo a trial-type
hearing, it being doctrinal that a formal or trial-type hearing is not, at all times
and in all instances, essential to due process. The essence of due process is
that a party is afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present
any evidence he may have in support of his defense. It is a rule that a party
cannot claim that he has been denied due process when he was given the
opportunity to present his position.
3) As a matter of public policy, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are
not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous,
provided he acts in good faith and without malice. Respondent judge, or any
other member of the bench for that matter, is presumed to have acted
regularly and in the manner that preserves the ideal of the cold neutrality of
an impartial judge implicit in the guarantee of due process.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
DE BISSCHOP VS GALANG


De Bisschop was allowed to stay as a pre-arranged employee; when
he applied for extension of stay it was denied due to reports that the
company he is working for is used as a gambling front and that he has
evaded payment of taxes; he requested for a copy of the adverse decision of
the Bureau and was advised that no formal decision, order or resolution is
promulgated by the Board.

Phil Immig Act is silent as to procedure to be followed in matters of

petition for extension HENCE courts have no jurisdiction to review purely
admin practice of immig authorities because of PRACTICABILITY &
EXPEDIENCY, of not granting formal hearings.

Due process clause is not violated since a day in court is not a matter
of right in admin proceedings.

Nothing in the law that decisions of BoC for extension of stay of aliens
be in writing.

Decision in Sec. 8 refers to number of votes necessary to constitute

decision of the Board.

Use of habeas corpus to test the legality of an aliens confinement &

proposed expulsion from the Phils will bar the issuance of a writ of
prohibition.

C017 De Bisschop vs. Galang GR L-18365, 31 May 1963; En Banc,

Reyes JBL [J]
FACTS:
Petitioner-appellee George de Bisschop, an American citizen, was allowed to
stay in this country for three years, expiring 1 August 1959, as the
prearranged employee of the Bissmag Production, Inc., of which he is
president and general manager. He applied for extension of stay with the
Bureau of Immigration, in a letter dated 10 July 1959. In view, however, of
confidential and damaging reports of Immigration Officer Benjamin de Mesa
to the effect that the Bissmag Production, Inc., is more of a gambling front
than the enterprise for promotion of local and imported shows that it purports
to be, and that de Bisschop is suspect of having evaded payment of his
income tax, the Commissioner of Immigration advised him that his application
for extension of stay as a prearranged employee has been denied by the
Board of Commissioners, and that he should depart within 5 days.
To forestall his arrest and the filing of the corresponding deportation
proceedings, de Bisschop filed the present case on 18 September 1959.
Pending resolution of the main case for prohibition, a writ of preliminary
injunction was issued ex-parte by the court a quo on the same day ordering
herein respondent-appellant to desist from arresting and detaining petitionerappellee unless and until proper and legal proceedings are conducted by the

Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration in connection with the

Application for extension of stay filed by petitioner with said Board.
Appellant Commissioner raises two main issues: That the lower court erred
(a) in holding that the Commissioners of Immigration are required by law to
conduct formal hearings on all applications for extension of stay of aliens,
and (b) in ruling that said Commissioners are enjoined to promulgate written
decisions in such cases.
ISSUE:
Whether the right to a notice and hearing in certain administrative
proceedings is essential to due process?
HELD:
No. The administration of immigration laws is the primary and exclusive
responsibility of the Executive branch of the government. Extension of stay of
aliens is purely discretionary on the part of the immigration authorities. Since
Commonwealth Act No. 613, otherwise known as the Philippine Immigration
Act of 1940, is silent as to the procedure to be followed in these cases, we
are inclined to uphold the argument that courts have no jurisdiction to review
the purely administrative practice of immigration authorities of not granting
formal hearings in certain cases as the circumstances may warrant, for
reasons of practicability and expediency. This would not violate the due
process clause if we take into account that, in this particular case, the letter
of appellant-commissioner advising de Bisschop to depart in 5 days is a mere
formality, a preliminary step, and, therefore, far from final, because, as
alleged in paragraph 7 of appellant's answer to the complaint, the
"requirement to leave before the start of the deportation proceedings is only
an advice to the party that unless he departs voluntarily, the State will be
compelled to take steps for his expulsion". In Cornejo vs. Gabriel and
Provincial Board of Rizal, it was held that a day in court is not a matter of
right in administrative proceedings. The fact should not be lost sight of that
we are dealing with an administrative proceeding and not with a judicial
proceeding. As Judge Cooley, the leading American writer on Constitutional
Law, has well said, due process of law is not necessarily judicial process;
much of the process by means of which the Government is carried on, and
the order of society maintained, is purely executive or administrative, which is
as much due process of law, as is judicial process. While a day in court is a
matter of right in judicial proceedings, in administrative proceedings, it is
otherwise since they rest upon different principles. . . . In certain proceedings,
therefore, of all administrative character, it may be stated, without fear of
contradiction, that the right to a notice and hearing are not essential to due
process of law.
SUNTAY VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
acts:
Case is a petition for certoriari to annul the order of the CFI of Quezon City
directing the NBI andthe DFA to take the proper steps in order that accused
Suntay, allegedly in the US, be brought back to the Philippines, so that he

may be dealt with in accordance with law; and of prohibition toenjoin the DFA
Secretary from canceling the petitioners passport without previous hearing
On 26 June 1954, Dr. Antonio Nubla, father of Alicia Nubla, a minor of 16
years, filed a verifiedcomplaint against Emilio Suntay in the Office of the City
Attorney of Quezon City, alleging thaton June 21, 1954, the accused took
Alicia Nubla, with lewd design, somewhere near the UPcompound in Diliman
and had carnal knowledge of her, and Alicia being a minor of 16 years old
On Dec. 15, 1954, after investigation, Asst City Atty recommended to the City
Attorney of Quezon City that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit. On
23 December 1954 attorney for the complainant addressed a letter to the City
Attorney of Quezon City wherein he took exceptionto the recommendation of
the Assistant City Attorney referred to and urged that a complaint for
seduction be filed against the herein petitioner.
On 10 January 1955 the petitioner applied for and was granted a passport by
the Department of Foreign Affairs
On 20 January 1955 the petitioner left the Philippines for San Francisco,
California, U.S.A., wherehe is at present enrolled in school. On 31 January
1955 the offended girl subscribed and swore to acomplaint charging the
petitioner with seduction which was filed in the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City after preliminary investigation had been conducted
On 9 February 1955 the private prosecutor filed a motion praying the Court to
issue an order "directing such government agencies as may be concerned,
particularly the National Bureau of Investigation and the Department of
Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of having the accused brought back to the
Philippines so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law."
On 10 February 1955 the Court granted the motion (Exhibit D). On 7 March
1955 the respondentSecretary cabled the Ambassador to the United States
instructing him to order the Consul Generalin San Francisco to cancel the
passport issued to the petitioner and to compel him to return to thePhilippines
to answer the criminal charges against him.
However, this order was not implemented or carried out in view of the
commencement of the proceeding in order that the issues raised may be
judicially resolved. On 5 July 1955 counsel for the petitioner wrote to the
respondent Secretary requesting that the action taken by him
bereconsidered, and filed in the criminal case a motion praying that the
respondent Court reconsider its order of 10 February 1955. On 7 July 1955
the respondent Secretary denied counsel's requestand on 15 July 1955 the
Court denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence this petition.Petitioners
Claim:
while the Secretary for Foreign Affairs has discretion in the cancellation of
passports, "suchdiscretion cannot be exercised until after hearing," because
the right to travel or stay abroad is a personal liberty within the meaning and
protection of the Constitution and hence he cannot bedeprived of such liberty
without due process of law.Issue: WON the cancellation of passport requires
prior hearing

Ruling:The petitioner's contention cannot be sustained. The petitioner is

charged with seduction. And the order of the respondent Court directing the
Department of Foreign Affairs "to take proper steps in order that theaccused .
. . may be brought back to the Philippines, so that he may be dealt with in
accordance with law,"is not beyond or in excess of its jurisdiction. the
respondent Court did not specify what step the respondentSecretary must
take to compel the petitioner to return to the Philippines to answer the
criminal charge preferred against him. True, the discretion granted, to the
Secretary for Foreign Affairs to withdraw or cancel a passport already issued
may not be exercised at whim. But here the petitioner was hailed to Courtto
answer a criminal charge for seduction and although at first all Assistant City
Attorney recommended thedismissal of the complaint previously subscribed
and sworn to by the father of the offended girl, yet the petitioner knew that no
final action had been taken by the City Attorney of Quezon City as the case
wasstill under study. And as the Solicitor General puts it, "His suddenly
leaving the country in such aconvenient time, can reasonably be interpreted
to mean as a deliberate attemption his part to flee from justice, and,
therefore, he cannot now be heard to complain if the strong arm of the law
should join together to bring him back to justice." In issuing the order in
question, the respondent Secretary was convinced thata miscarriage of
justice would result by his inaction and as he issued it in the exercise of his
sounddiscretion, he cannot be enjoined from carrying it out.Hearing would
have been proper and necessary if the reason for the withdrawal or
cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful. But where the holder
of a passport is facing a criminal a charge in our courts and left the country to
evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the
exerciseof his discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held
to have acted whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such
passport. Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing.
When discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon an undisputed
fact, such asthe filing of a serious criminal charge against the passport
holder, hearing maybe dispensed with by suchofficer as a prerequisite to the
cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does not violate the due
process of law clause of the Constitution; and the exercise of the discretion
vested in him cannot be deemedwhimsical and capricious of because of the
absence of such hearing. If hearing should always be held inorder to comply
with the due process of clause of the Constitution, then a writ of preliminary
injunctionissued ex parte would be violative of the said clause.The petition is
denied, with costs against the petitioner
philippines communications satellite corporation vs alcuaz
By virtue of RA 5514, Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation was
granted a franchise to establish, construct, maintain and operate in the
Philippines, at such places as the grantee may select, station or stations and
associated equipment and facilities for international satellite

communications. Under this franchise, it was likewise granted the authority

to construct and operate such ground facilities as needed to deliver
telecommunications services from the communications satellite system and
ground terminal or terminals. Under Sec 5 of the same law, PhilComSat was
exempt from the jurisdiction, control and regulation of the Public Service
Commission later known as the National Telecommunications Commission.
However, EO 196 was later proclaimed and the same has placed
PhilComSat under the jurisdiction of NTC. Consequently, PhilComSat has to
acquire permit to operate from NTC in order to continue operating its existing
satellites. NTC gave the necessary permit but it however directed
PhilComSat to reduce its current rates by 15%. NTC based its power to fix
the rates on EO 546. PhilComSat assailed the said directive and holds that
the enabling act (EO 546) of respondent NTC empowering it to fix rates for
public service communications does not provide the necessary standards
constitutionally required hence there is an undue delegation of legislative
power, particularly the adjudicatory powers of NTC. PhilComSat asserts that
nowhere in the provisions of EO 546, providing for the creation of respondent
NTC and granting its rate-fixing powers, nor of EO 196, placing petitioner
under the jurisdiction of respondent NTC, can it be inferred that respondent
NTC is guided by any standard in the exercise of its rate-fixing and
adjudicatory powers. PhilComSat subsequently clarified its said submission
to mean that the order mandating a reduction of certain rates is undue
delegation not of legislative but of quasi-judicial power to respondent NTC,
the exercise of which allegedly requires an express conferment by the
legislative body.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.
HELD: Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be
sustained only upon the ground that some standard for its exercise is
provided and that the legislature in making the delegation has prescribed the
manner of the exercise of the delegated power. Therefore, when the
administrative agency concerned, NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act
must both be non-confiscatory and must have been established in the
manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed
standard, the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a
delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is
required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that
the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the
absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may
be implied. In the case at bar, the fixed rate is found to be of merit and
reasonable.
ang tibay vs court of industrial relations
Facts: There was agreement between Ang Tibay and the National Labor
Union, Inc (NLU). The NLU alleged that the supposed lack of leather material
claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically
discharge all the members of the NLU, from work. And this averment is

desired to be proved by the petitioner with the records of the Bureau of

Customs and Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather. That
NationalWorker's Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer
union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, which was alleged by the NLU as an
illegal one. The CIR, decided the case and elevated it to the Supreme Court,
but a motion for new trial was raised by the NLU. But the Ang Tibay filed a
motion for opposing the said motion.
Issue: Whether or Not, the motion for new trial is meritorious to be granted.
Held: To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR.
The CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law
of its creation which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an
administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the
nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of thegovernment.
Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its
jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the
parties litigant, the function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its
organic law is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises
judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between
employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and
extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider,
investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or disputes
arising between, and/ or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and
landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulates the relations between
them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103.
As laid down in the case of Goseco v. CIR, the SC had the occasion to point
out that the CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure,
and equity and substantial meritsof the case, without regard to technicalities
or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence
but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.
The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain
procedural requirements does not mean that it can in justiciable cases
coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative
character. There cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in
proceedings of this character:
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and
submit evidence in support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;

(4) The evidence must be substantial;

(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or
at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept
the views of a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the
various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.
The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable
to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a
new trial should be, and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of
this case shall be remanded to the CIR, withinstruction that it reopen the
case receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in
accordance with the requirements set forth. So ordered.
montemayor vs araneta university foundation
F: Petitioner was a professor at the Araneta University Foundation. On
7/8/74, he was found guilty of making homosexual advances on one
Leonardo De Lara by a faculty investating committee. On 11/8/74, another
committee was appointed to investigate another charge of a similar nature
against petitioner. Petitioner, through cousel, asked for the postponement of
the hearing set for 11/18 and 19, 1974, but the w/c motion was denied. The
committe then proceeded to hear the testimony of the complainants and on
12/5/74, submitted its report recommending the separation of petitioner from
the University. On 12/12/74, the University applied w/ the NLRC for
clearance to terminate petitioner''''s employment. Meanwhile, petitioner filed
a complaint w/ the NLRC for reinstatement and backwages. Judgement was
rendered in petitioner''''s favor, but on appeal to the Sec. of Labor, the latter
found petitioner''''s dismissal to be justified. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
HELD: The Consti. assures to workers security of tenure. In the case of
petitioner, this guarantee is reinforced by the provision on academic freedom.
In denying petitioner''''s motion for postponement of the hearing, the
committee did not accord procedural due process to the petitioner. This was,
however, remedied at the mediation conference called at the Dept. of Labor
during w/c petitioner was heard on his evidence. There he was given the
fullest opportunity to present his case. Petition dismissed. Petitioner filed a
MFR contending that the hearing in the NLRC did not conform to ther
requirements of due process as the witnesses against petitioner were not
called so that petitioner could cross-examine them.
*other facts: Petitioner was a professor at the Araneta University Foundation.
On 7/8/74, he was found guilty of making homosexual advances on one
Leonardo De Lara by a faculty investigating committee. On 11/8/74, another

committee was appointed to investigate another charge of a similar nature

against petitioner. Petitioner, through counsel, asked for the postponement of
the hearing set for 11/18 and 19, 1974, but the motion was denied. The
committee then proceeded to hear the testimony of the complainants and on
12/5/74, submitted its report recommending the separation of petitioner from
the University. On 12/12/74, the University applied w/ the NLRC for clearance
to terminate petitioner's employment. Meanwhile, petitioner filed a complaint
w/ the NLRC for reinstatement and backwages. Judgement was rendered in
petitioner's favor, but on appeal to the Sec. of Labor, the latter found
petitioner's dismissal to be justified. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Does academic freedom include the right of schools to dismiss
teachers?
RULING:
Yes. Institutional academic freedom was vindicated in this case, where,
against the plea of academic freedom and security of tenure of a professor,
the school was allowed to separate a professor who after due process had
been found guilty of violating behavioral standards.
The stand taken by petitioner as to his being entitled to security of tenure is
reinforced by the provision on academic freedom which, as noted, is found in
the Constitution. It was pointed out in Garcia v. The Faculty Admission,
Committee that academic freedom "is more often Identified with the right of a
faculty member to pursue his studies in his particular specialty and thereafter
to make known or publish the result of his endeavors without fear that
retribution would be visited on him in the event that his conclusions are found
distasteful or objectionable to the powers that be, whether in the political,
economic, or academic establishments. For the sociologist, Robert Maclver, it
is 'a right claimed by the accredited educator, as teacher and as investigator,
to interpret his findings and to communicate his conclusions without being
subjected to any interference, molestation, or penalization because these
conclusions are unacceptable to some constituted authority within or beyond
the institution. Tenure, according to him, is of the essence of such freedom.
For him, without tenure that assures a faculty member "against dismissal or
professional penalization on grounds other than professional incompetence
or conduct that in the judgment of his colleagues renders him unfit" for
membership in the faculty, the academic right becomes non-existent,
Security of tenure, for another scholar, Love joy, is "the chief practical
requisite for academic freedom" of a university professor. As with Maclver, he
did not rule out removal but only "for some grave cause," Identified by him as
"proved incompetence or moral delinquency."
alcuaz vs philippine school of business administration (digest!!!)
On May 2, 1988, this Court through its Second Division rendered a Decision
in the instant case which prodded the Intervenor Union (hereinafter referred

to as the Union) to file a motion for reconsideration. Its argument hinges on

the pronouncement that
x x x. Likewise, it is provided in the Manual, that the "written contracts"
required for college teachers are for one semester. It is thus evident that after
the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing
contract either with the students or with intervening teachers. Such being the
case, charge of denial of due process is untenable. It is time-honored
principle that contracts are respected as the law between the contracting
parties. x x x (p. 12, Decision, italics supplied).(p. 874-875, Rollo)
with the allegedly inevitable consequence of extenuating the pernicious
practice of management to arbitrarily and wantonly terminate teachers simply
because their contracts of employment have already lapsed.
The motion likewise points out the fact that two of the faculty members,
namely Mr. Asser (Bong) Tamayo, and Mr. Rene Encarnacion, supposedly
found guilty by the Investigating Committee headed by Mr. Antonio M.
Magtalas (p. 342, Rollo), had been issued permanent appointments (not
mere temporary contracts) by no less than the President of the School
himself. The appointment of Mr. Asser (Bong) Tamayo dated August 9, 1986
(p. 887, Rollo) can attest to this claim.
It is on the basis of the foregoing that We hereby amend Our previous
statements on the matter.
In a recent Decision, 1 this Court had the opportunity to quite emphatically
enunciate the precept that full-time teachers who have rendered three (3)
years of satisfactory service shall be considered permanent (par. 75 of the
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools). Thus, having attained a
permanent status, they cannot be removed from office except for just cause
and after due process.
Now applying the same principle in the case at bar, Mr. Asser (Bong) Tamayo
having stayed in the Philippine School of Business Administration, Quezon
City Branch (PSBA, for brevity) for three and one-half (3 1/2) years (in a fulltime capacity) may be deemed a permanent faculty member provided, of
course, the services rendered have been satisfactory to the school. However,
because the investigation showed that Mr. Tamayo had participated in the
unlawful demonstration, his services cannot be deemed satisfactory.
In the case of Mr. Rene Encarnacion, and Mr. Severino Cortes, Jr. who
taught in PSBA for two and one-half (2 1/2) years and one and one-half (1
1/2) years respectively, to them a permanent status cannot be accorded for
failure to meet the minimum requirement of three (3) years set by the
aforementioned Manual of Regulations. Of equal importance, at this point, is
the fact that the letter of appointment had been extended only to Mr. Tamayo
and not to Mr. Encarnacion, neither to Mr. Cortes, Jr.
WHEREFORE, for the reasons adverted to hereinabove, the motion for
reconsideration, except insofar as We have made the aforementioned
clarificatory statements about the tenure of full-time teachers and professors,
is hereby DENIED.

In conclusion, We wish to reiterate that while We value the right of students

to complete their education in the school or university of their choice, and
while We fully respect their right to resort to rallies and demonstrations for the
redress of their grievances and as a part of their freedom of speech and their
right to assemble, still such rallies, demonstrations, and assemblies must
always be conducted peacefully, and without resort to intimidation, coercion,
or violence. Academic freedom in all its forms, demands the full display of
discipline. To hold otherwise would be to subvert freedom into degenerate
license.
non vs dames
Facts: Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. in
Daet, Camarines Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the
academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actions
against the school in the preceding semester. The subject of the protests is
not, however, made clear in the pleadings.
Petitioners filed a petition in the court seeking their readmission or reenrollment to the school, but the trial court dismissed the petition. They now
petition the court to reverse its ruling in Alcuaz vs. PSBA1, which was also
applied in the case. The court said that petitioners waived their privilege to be
admitted for re-enrollment with respondent college when they adopted,
signed, and used its enrollment form for the first semester of school year
1988-89, which states that: The Mabini College reserves the right to deny
admission ofstudents whose scholarship and attendance are unsatisfactory
and to require withdrawal ofstudents whose conduct discredits the institution
and/or whose activities unduly disrupts or interfere with the efficient operation
of the college. Students, therefore, are required to behave in accord with the
Mabini College code of conduct and discipline.
Issue: Whether or Not the students right to freedom of speech and assembly
infringed.
Held: Yes. The protection to the cognate rights of speech and assembly
guaranteed by theConstitution is similarly available to students is well-settled
in our jurisdiction. However there are limitations. The permissible limitation on
Student Exercise of Constitutional Rights withinthe school presupposes that
conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason whether it
stems from time, place, or type of behavior should not materially disrupt
classwork or must not involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of
others