1

Phil. Migrant Rights Watch vs OWWA

FACTS:
Petitioners alleged that the OWWA was created by law to provide
welfare services to all Filipino overseas contract workers, without
limiting the same to member-contributors only. However, because of the
passage of the Omnibus Policies, the OWWA benefits shall be
available only to those overseas contract workers who have paid their
monetary contribution on a per contract basis. It imposed on the
overseas workers the compulsory payment of OWWA membership
contribution in the amount of US$25.00, which was originally collected
from their employers. This, petitioners contend, is violative of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution for it created a distinction between
Filipino overseas workers who contributed to the OWWA Fund and
those who have not.
Respondents countered that the assailed Omnibus Policies do not
violate the equal protection clause for the same is germane to the
purpose of the law, which requires registration and documentation of
overseas workers for their protections from exploitation in foreign
countries. Moreover, the prescribed membership fees chargeable to the
employers had long been implemented.
On August 31, 2004, the RTC promulgated its Order dismissing the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. According to the lower court, the
determination of constitutionality of the assailed resolution rests, not
within its jurisdiction, but within the jurisdiction of this Court. As such, it
ruled that the appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the subject
issuance was a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. Thus, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, the
lower court held that it could not arrogate unto itself the authority to
resolve the constitutionality of the administrative act.
On February 18, 2005, petitioners filed the instant petition essentially
invoking the following argument:
I.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
OF LAW IN DISMISSING CIVIL CASE NO. 04-0077 ON THE
GROUND OF LACK OF JURISDICTION FOR REGIONAL TRIAL
COURTS HAVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND DECIDE
CASES INVOLVING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OR VALIDITY OF
ADMINISTRATIVE RULES AND REGULATIONS.
Petitioners fault the RTC for abruptly dismissing their complaint for lack
of jurisdiction when it is well established in law and jurisprudence that
Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over cases involving the
constitutionality or legality of administrative rules and regulations, such
as the Omnibus Policies promulgated by respondents herein. The
reliance on our ruling in Fortich v. Corona, petitioners posit, is
misplaced for the same involves a resolution issued by the Office of the
President in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Hence, the
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
not the appropriate remedy in the instant case.
In their Comment, respondents counter that petitioners, in filing the
instant action with this Court, committed serious procedural error for

violating the doctrine of judicial hierarchy of courts. According to

respondents, petitioners should have first filed an appeal before the
Court of Appeals (CA), pursuant to Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules
of Court.6 Respondents further reiterated the validity of the subject
Omnibus Policies.
We rule in favor of petitioners.
Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that the mode of
appeal in all cases involving only questions of law shall be by petition
for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court in accordance with Rule
45.7
Time and again, this Court has distinguished cases involving pure
questions of law from those of pure questions of fact in the following
manner:
A question of fact exists when a doubt or difference arises as to the
truth or falsity of alleged facts. If the query requires a re-evaluation of
the credibility of witnesses or the existence or relevance of surrounding
circumstances and their relation to each other, the issue in that query is
factual. On the other hand, there is a question of law when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts and
which does not call for an existence of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the parties-litigants.
In a case involving a question of law, the resolution of the issue rests
solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.8
In the present petition, the appeal interposed by petitioners stems from
the Orders of the RTC dismissing their complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
The issue raised herein is one of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
specifically, whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over petitioners
complaint challenging the constitutionality of the Omnibus Policies
issued by respondents.
Jurisdiction is the right to act or the power and authority to hear and
determine a case.9 It is conferred only by the Constitution or by
statute.10 The question as to whether or not the dismissal by the lower
court for lack of jurisdiction is proper involves the determination of
whether, admitting the facts alleged in the complaint to be true, the trial
court has jurisdiction over the same in light of the laws governing
jurisdiction.11 As such, jurisdiction is neither a question of fact or of fact
and law but a matter of law. For this reason, We have consistently held
that a courts jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is a question
of law,12 and have, in fact, affirmed dismissals by the CA of appeals
brought to them involving pure questions of law.13 Considering that
only questions of law was raised in this petition, direct resort to this
Court is proper.14
We cannot, therefore, give credence to the lower courts contention that
the appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the issuance subject of
this case is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. Certiorari, as a special civil action, is available only if:
(1) it is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal nor any

2
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.15chanrobleslaw
In this case, respondents did not act in any judicial or quasi-judicial
capacity in issuing the assailed resolution. They were not called upon
to adjudicate the rights of contending parties to exercise, in any
manner, discretion of a judicial nature. Instead, their issuance of the
challenged resolution was done in the exercise of their quasi-legislative
and administrative functions within the confines of the granting law.
Hence, contrary to the lower courts contention, certiorari is not the
proper remedy in the instant case.
As to whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter involved
in this case, it is settled in law and jurisprudence that the RTC has
jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, presidential
decree, executive order, or administrative regulation, as recognized in
Section 2(a), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as
the law or the Rules of Court may provide final judgments and orders of
lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.16
In view of the foregoing provision, the jurisdiction of regular courts
involving the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation cannot be
denied. We have had several occasions wherein We affirmed the power
of the RTC to take cognizance of actions assailing a specific rule or set
of rules promulgated by administrative bodies for the power of judicial
review is vested by the Constitution not only in this Court but in all
Regional Trial Courts.17 It was, therefore, erroneous for the RTC to
abruptly dismiss the complaint filed by petitioners on the basis of lack
of jurisdiction since said court clearly had the power to take cognizance
of the same. In so doing, the lower court failed to ascertain factual
issues necessary to determine whether the subject issuance is, indeed,
invalid and violative of the Constitution. Considering the settled rule that
this Court is not a trier of facts,18 a remand of this case to the RTC for
the proper determination of the merits of the complaint is just and
proper.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition
is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court, dated August
31, 2004 and January 14, 2005, in Civil Case No. 04-0077,
are REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. This case is hereby REMANDED to
the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXI (111), Pasay City, for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
OFELIA FAUNI REYES AND NOEL FAUNI REYES, PETITIONERS,
VS.
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., RESPONDENT.
DECISION

FACTS:
Joseph Fauni Reyes took out two life insurance policies from
respondent Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. (Insular Life),
designating the petitioners as his beneficiaries. In September and
October 1998, Insular Life issued Insurance Policy Nos. A001440747
and A001440758, respectively, with a total face value of P8,000,000.00
in favor of Joseph.
On 1998, a charred body inside the trunk of a burnt BMW car that
Joseph owned was found in Ternate, Cavite. The petitioners, believing
that the charred body belonged to Joseph, filed a claim for death
benefits before Insular Life. The latter, however, denied the claim on the
grounds of Josephs alleged misrepresentation and concealment of
material facts in life insurance applications.
On 1999, Insular Life filed against the petitioners a complaint for
rescission of insurance contracts and damages before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati Branch 57.
The Issue
The case comes to us with the sole issue of whether the petitioners are
entitled to execution pending appeal.
The Courts Ruling
We deny the petition.
The petition has already been rendered moot and academic with the
entry of judgment in G.R. No. 189605
The existence of an actual case or controversy is a condition precedent
for the courts exercise of its power of adjudication. An actual case or
controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an assertion
of opposite legal claims between the parties that is susceptible or ripe
for judicial resolution. In negative terms, a justiciable controversy must
neither be conjectural nor moot and academic. There must be a definite
and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of the parties who
have adverse legal interests. The reason is that the issue ceases to be
justiciable when a controversy becomes moot and academic;
otherwise, the court would engage in rendering an advisory opinion on
what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. The
disposition of the case would not have any practical use or value as
there is no actual substantial relief to which the applicant would be
entitled to and which would be negated by the dismissal or denial of the
petition.
There is a final judgment when the court has adjudicated on the merits
of the case or has categorically determined the rights and obligations of
the parties in the case. A final judgment, once rendered, leaves nothing
more to be done by the court. Consequently, a final judgment also
becomes executory by operation of law; it becomes a fact upon the
lapse of the reglementary period to appeal if no appeal or motion for
new trial or reconsideration is filed or perfected. It becomes incumbent
for the clerk of court to enter in the book of entries the judgment and
the date of finality of the judgment shall also be deemed to be the date
of the entry of judgment. Thereafter, the prevailing party is entitled to a
writ of execution, and the issuance of the writ becomes the courts
ministerial duty.

3
In the present case, the issue of the propriety of discretionary execution
has already been rendered moot and academic with our denial of
Insular Lifes petition and issuance of the entry of judgment in G.R. No.
189605. This means that our affirmation of the lower courts rulings on
the main case has become final and executory. Consequently, the
issue of whether the petitioners are entitled to discretionary execution
pending appeal no longer presents any justiciable controversy. It
becomes the RTCs ministerial duty to issue a writ of execution in favor
of the petitioners who are now entitled to execution as a matter of right.
In relation to this, Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that
a final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion
within five years from the date of its entry. A judgment may also be
enforced by action after the lapse of five years and before it is barred
by the statute of limitations. The revived judgment may then be
enforced by motion within five years from the date of its entry.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for
being moot and academic. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 187883 June 16, 2009
ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO and ATTY. EVANGELINE J. LOZANOENDRIANO, Petitioners,
versus
SPEAKER PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, Representative, Majority,
House of Representatives, Respondents

G.R. No. 187910

LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner
versus
SPEAKER PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, Speaker of the House of
Representatives, Congress of the Philippines, Respondents.
Facts:
The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities
as concerned citizens and taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of
House Resolution No. 1109 entitled A Resolution Calling upon the
Members of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of Considering
Proposals to Amend or Revise the Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths
Vote of All the Members of Congress, convening the Congress into a
Constituent Assembly to amend the 1987 Constitution. In essence,
both petitions seek to trigger a justiciable controversy that would
warrant a definitive interpretation by this Court of Section 1, Article
XVII, which provides for the procedure for amending or revising the
Constitution. The petitioners contend that the House Resolution
contradicts the procedures set forth by the 1987 Constitution regarding
the amendment or revision of the same as the separate voting of the
members of each House (the Senate and the House of
Representatives) is deleted and substituted with a vote of three-fourths
of all the Members of Congress (i.e., of the members of Congress
without distinction as to which institution of Congress they belong to).
Issue:
Whether the court has the power to review the case of the validity of
House Resolution No. 1109.

Held:
No. The Supreme Court cannot indulge petitioners supplications. While
some may interpret petitioners moves as vigilance in preserving the
rule of law, a careful perusal of their petitions would reveal that they
cannot hurdle the bar of justiciability set by the Court before it will
assume jurisdiction over cases involving constitutional disputes.
The Courts power of review may be awesome, but it is limited to actual
cases and controversies dealing with parties having adversely legal
claims, to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties,
and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis
mota presented. The case-or-controversy requirement bans this court
from deciding abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions, lest the
court give opinions in the nature of advice concerning legislative or
executive action
An aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement is the requisite of
ripeness. In the United States, courts are centrally concerned with
whether a case involves uncertain contingent future events that may
not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. Another
approach is the evaluation of the twofold aspect of ripeness: first, the
fitness of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship to
the parties entailed by withholding court consideration. In our
jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual
injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the
act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it. An alternative road to review similarly taken would be to
determine whether an action has already been accomplished or
performed by a branch of government before the courts may step in.
In the present case, the fitness of petitioners case for the exercise of
judicial review is grossly lacking. In the first place, petitioners have not
sufficiently proven any adverse injury or hardship from the act
complained of. In the second place, House Resolution No. 1109 only
resolved that the House of Representatives shall convene at a future
time for the purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to the
Constitution. No actual convention has yet transpired and no rules of
procedure have yet been adopted. More importantly, no proposal has
yet been made, and hence, no usurpation of power or gross abuse of
discretion has yet taken place. In short, House Resolution No. 1109
involves a quintessential example of an uncertain contingent future
event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.
The House has not yet performed a positive act that would warrant an
intervention from this Court.
The possible consequence of House Resolution No. 1109 is yet
unrealized and does not infuse petitioners with locus standi
The rule on locus standi is not a plain procedural rule but a
constitutional requirement derived from Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which mandates courts of justice to settle only actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable.
Moreover, while the Court has taken an increasingly liberal approach to
the rule of locus standi, evolving from the stringent requirements of
personal injury to the broader transcendental importance doctrine,
such liberality is not to be abused. It is not an open invitation for the

4
ignorant and the ignoble to file petitions that prove nothing but their
cerebral deficit.

personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article

12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are dismissed.

Echegaray v Secretary G.R. No. 132601 October 12, 1998
FACTS:
On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of
petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public
respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing
that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of
judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant
reprieve.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution of Echegaray
despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already been
rendered that by granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect
granted reprieve which is an executive function.
HELD:
No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the
source of power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final
judgment. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the
power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their
finality.
The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save
the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple
reason that there is no higher right than the right to life.
For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive
can protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to
violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three
branches of our government.

In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5,

respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive
issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist
insurgents of the New Peoples Army, and some members of the
political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo.
They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and takeover the reins of government as a clear and present danger.
Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on
February 24, 2006 on their way to EDSA. Meanwhile, the offices of the
newspaper Daily Tribune, which was perceived to be anti-Arroyo, was
searched without warrant at about 1:00 A.M. on February 25, 2006.
Seized from the premises in the absence of any official of the Daily
Tribune except the security guard of the building were several
materials for publication. The law enforcers, a composite team of PNP
and AFP officers, cited as basis of the warrantless arrests and the
warrantless search and seizure was Presidential Proclamation 1017
issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the exercise of
her constitutional power to call out the Armed Forces of the Philippines
to prevent or suppress lawless violence.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

A. PROCEDURAL:
1) Whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and
academic.
2) Whether petitioners in 171485 (Escudero et al.), G.R. Nos.
171400 (ALGI), 171483 (KMU et al.), 171489 (Cadiz et al.),
and 171424 (Legarda) have legal standing.
B.
SUBSTANTIVE:
1) Whether the Supreme Court can review the factual bases of PP
1017.
2) Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional.
a. Facial Challenge
b. Constitutional Basis
c. As Applied Challenge

I.

A.

Randolf S. David v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3,

2006 (and other consolidated cases)
DECISION

THE FACTS

Filipino nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA People

Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017, implemented by G.O. No. 5,
declaring a state of national emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the
Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by
Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that:
The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out
(the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in my
capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as
any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the
laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me

PROCEDURAL

First, we must resolve the procedural roadblocks.

I- Moot and Academic Principle
But the power of judicial review does not repose upon the courts
a self-starting capacity. Courts may exercise such power only when
the following requisites are present:

there must be an actual case or controversy;

petitioners have to raise a question of constitutionality;
the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and
the decision of the constitutional question must be necessary
to the determination of the case itself.[24]

5
Respondents maintain that the first and second requisites are absent,
hence, we shall limit our discussion thereon.

as a direct result of its issuance. The present case falls right within
this exception to the mootness rule pointed out by the Chief Justice.

An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an

opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. It is definite and
concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse
legal interest; a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific
relief.The Solicitor General refutes the existence of such actual case or
controversy, contending that the present petitions were rendered moot
and academic by President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021.

IBP vs. Zamora G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000

Such contention lacks merit.

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration
thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts
decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness.
The Court holds that President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021 did not
render the present petitions moot and academic. During the eight (8)
days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers, according to
petitioners, committed illegal acts in implementing it. Are PP 1017 and
G.O. No. 5 constitutional or valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal
acts? These are the vital issues that must be resolved in the present
petitions. It must be stressed that an unconstitutional act is not a law,
it confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no protection; it is in
legal contemplation, inoperative.
The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will
decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if:

there is a grave violation of the Constitution;

the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount

public interest is involved;

when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of

controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public;

the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Courts
assumption of jurisdiction over the instant petitions. Petitioners alleged
that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the
Constitution. There is no question that the issues being raised affect
the publics interest, involving as they do the peoples basic rights to
freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the
Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional
precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating
the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the
police, on the extent of the protection given by constitutional
guarantees. And lastly, respondents contested actions are capable of
repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial review.
In their attempt to prove the alleged mootness of this case,
respondents cited Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganibans Separate
Opinion in Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary. However, they failed to
take into account the Chief Justices very statement that an otherwise
moot case may still be decided provided the party raising it in a
proper case has been and/or continues to be prejudiced or damaged

Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art.

VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff
and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment
and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or
suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that
the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely
temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time
when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking
to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and
unconstitutional.
Issues:
Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of
calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review
Held:
The petition has no merit.
First, petitioner failed to sufficiently show that it is in possession of
the requisites of standing to raise the issues in the petition. Second, the
President did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction nor did he commit a violation of the civilian
supremacy clause of the Constitution.
The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the
Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following
requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and
appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party
raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is
pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is
the lis mota of the case.[12]
The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of
standing in this case.
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged.[13] The term interest means a material interest, an interest in
issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the
question involved, or a mere incidental interest.[14] The gist of the
question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.[15]
In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its
alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the

6
Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no
other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the
IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while
undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this
case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups
and the whole citizenry. Based on the standards above-stated, the IBP
has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution
of the case.
Case Digest: G.R. No. 138570. October 10, 2000. 342 SCRA 449
BAYAN vs Zamora.

(3) No. In fine, absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion
on the part of respondents, the Court as the final arbiter of legal
controversies and staunch sentinel of the rights of the people is then
without power to conduct an incursion and meddle with such affairs
purely executive and legislative in character and nature. For the
Constitution no less, maps out the distinct boundaries and limits the
metes and bounds within which each of the three political branches of
government may exercise the powers exclusively and essentially
conferred to it by law.
Gonzales v. Narvasa

Facts:
Philippines and the United States of America forged a Military Bases
Agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations in
the Philippine territory by United States military personnel. In view of
the impending expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in
1991, the Philippines and the United States negotiated for a possible
extension of the military bases agreement. Philippine Senate rejected
the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security
which, in effect, would have extended the presence of US military
bases in the Philippines. United States panel met with the Philippine
panel, headed by Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino Jr.,
to exchange notes on the complementing strategic interests of the
United States and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region. Both sides
discussed, among other things, the possible elements of the Visiting
Forces Agreement (VFA for brevity). Thereafter, then President Fidel V.
Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by public
respondent Secretary Siazon and Unites States Ambassador Thomas
Hubbard.President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary
of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA. President, acting through
respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, officially transmitted
to the Senate of the Philippines, the Instrument of Ratification, the letter
of the President and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant to Section 21,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Issues (justiciable controversy): (1) Whether or not petitioners have
legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to
question the constitutionality of the VFA; (2) whether the VFA is
governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article VII or of Section 25,
Article XVIII of the Constitution; (3) and whether or not the Supreme
Court has jurisdiction.
Ruling: (1) No. Petitioners failed to show that they have sustained, or
are in danger of sustaining any direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the VFA. As taxpayers, petitioners have not established
that the VFA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or
spending powers. On this point, it bears stressing that a taxpayers suit
refers to a case where the act complained of directly involves the illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.
(2) The fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under
Section 21, Article VII, and that the Senate extended its concurrence
under the same provision, is immaterial. For in either case, whether
under Section 21, Article VII or Section 25, Article XVIII, the
fundamental law is crystalline that the concurrence of the Senate is
mandatory to comply with the strict constitutional requirements.

FACTS:
Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and
taxpayer, filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus filed on
December 9, 1999, assailing theconstitutionality of the creation of the
Preparatory Commission on ConstitutionalReform (PCCR) and of
the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. The
Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was
created by President Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue
of Executive OrderNo. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order to study and
recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the 1987
Constitution, and the manner of implementing the same. Petitioner
disputes the constitutionality of the PCCR based on the groundsthat it
is a public office which only the legislature can create by way of a law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has a legal standing to assail
the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 43
HELD:
The Court dismissed the petition. A citizen acquires standing only if he
can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as
a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is
fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action. Petitioner has not shown that he has
sustained or is in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable
to the creation of the PCCR. If at all, it is only Congress, not petitioner,
which can claim any injury in this case since, according to petitioner,
the President has encroached upon the legislatures powers to createa
public office and to propose amendments to the Charter by forming the
PCCR. Petitioner has sustained no direct, or even any indirect,
injury. Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or
are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any
penalties or burdens as a result of the PCCRs activities. Clearly,
petitioner has failed to establish his locus standing so as to enable him
to seek judicial redress as a citizen.
Furthermore, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise
a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have been
disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. It is
readily apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of its taxing or
spending power. The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of
E.O. No. 43, as amended by E.O. No. 70. Under section 7 of E.O. No.
43, the amount of P3 million is appropriated for its operational
expenses to be sourced from the funds of the Office of
the President. Being that case, petitioner must show that he is a real
party in interest - that he will stand to be benefited or injured by the

7
judgment or that he will be entitled to the avails of the suit. Nowhere in
his pleadings does petitioner presume to make such a representation.
Republic vs Garcia

noticeably explicit in its requirement that the party applying for an order
of attachment should file a bond.
On this, Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution provides:

Civil Case No. 0193 was a petition for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired
properties filed by the Republic of the Philippines against Maj. Gen.
Carlos F. Garcia, his wife and children in the Sandiganbayan. In praying
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, the Republic
maintained that, as a sovereign political entity, it was exempt from filing
the required attachment bond.
Sandiganbayan issued a resolution ordering the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment against the properties of the Garcias upon the
filing by the Republic of a P1 million attachment bond. On November 2,
2004, the Republic posted the required attachment bond to avoid any
delay in the issuance of the writ as well as to promptly protect and
secure its claim.
Republic filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the October 29,
2004 resolution claiming that it was exempt from filing an attachment
bond and praying for the release thereof.
Sandiganbayan ruled that there was nothing in the Rules of Court that
exempted the Republic from filing an attachment bond. It
reexamined Tolentino v. Carlos which was invoked by the Republic to
justify its claimed exemption. That case was decided under the old
Code of Civil Procedure enacted more than a century ago.
Whether or not Sandiganbayan erred in requiring the state to file a
bond? YES.
The Sandiganbayan thus erred when it disregarded the foregoing
presumption and instead ruled that the Republic should file an
attachment bond. The error was not simply an error of judgment but
grave abuse of discretion.
Worse, the Sandiganbayan transgressed the Constitution and
arrogated upon itself a power that it did not by law possess. All courts
must take their bearings from the decisions and rulings of this
Court. Tolentino has not been superseded or reversed. Thus, it is
existing jurisprudence and continues to form an important part of our
legal system. Surprisingly, the Sandiganbayan declared
that Tolentino need(ed) to be carefully reexamined in the light of the
changes that the rule on attachment ha(d) undergone through the
years. According to the court a quo:

(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved

with the concurrence of majority of the Members who actually took part
in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in
no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members.
When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be
decided en banc; Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid
down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be
modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc. (emphasis
supplied)

The Constitution mandates that only this Court sitting en banc may
modify or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court
in a decision rendered en banc or in division. Any court, the
Sandiganbayan included, which renders a decision in violation of this
constitutional precept exceeds its jurisdiction.
Therefore, the Sandiganbayan could not have validly reexamined,
much less reversed, Tolentino. By doing something it could not validly
do, the Sandiganbayan acted ultra vires and committed grave abuse of
discretion.
The fact was, the revisions of the Rules of Court on attachment,
particularly those pertaining to the filing of an attachment bond, did not
quash Tolentino.
Accordingly, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The January 14, 2005
and March 2, 2005 resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Republic of the Philippines is declared exempt
from the payment or filing of an attachment bond for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment issued in Civil Case No. 0193. The
Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to release the P1,000,000 bond
posted by the Republic of the Philippines to the Office of the
Ombudsman.
SO ORDERED.
ITF VS. COMELEC G.R. No. 159139. January 13, 2004.

[Tolentino] was decided by the Supreme Court employing the old Code
of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190) which was enacted by the Philippine
Commission on August 7, 1901 or more than a century ago.

Facts: On June 7, 1995, Congress passed Republic Act 8046, which

authorized Comelec to conduct a nationwide demonstration of a
computerized election system and allowed the poll body to pilot-test the
system in the March 1996 elections in the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).

That was then, this is now. The provisions of the old Code of Civil
Procedure governing attachment have been substantially modified in
the subsequent Rules of Court. In fact, Rule 57 of the present 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure is an expanded modification of the provisions
of the old Code of Civil Procedure governing attachment. Unlike the old
Code of Civil Procedure, the present 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is

On October 29, 2002, Comelec adopted in its Resolution 02-0170 a

modernization program for the 2004 elections. It resolved to conduct
biddings for the three (3) phases of its Automated Election System;
namely, Phase I Voter Registration and Validation System; Phase II
Automated Counting and Canvassing System; and Phase III
Electronic Transmission.

8
On January 24, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Executive Order No. 172, which allocated the sum of P2.5 billion to
fund the AES for the May 10, 2004 elections. Upon the request of
Comelec, she authorized the release of an additional P500 million.
On January 28, 2003, the Commission issued an "Invitation to Apply
for Eligibility and to Bid".
Five individuals and entities (including the herein Petitioners
Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines, represented by
its president, Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma. Corazon Akol) wrote a letter
to Comelec Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. They protested the award of
the Contract to Respondent MPC "due to glaring irregularities in the
manner in which the bidding process had been conducted." Citing
therein the noncompliance with eligibility as well as technical and
procedural requirements (many of which have been discussed at length
in the Petition), they sought a re-bidding.

Issue: Whether the petitioner has standing; and

Whether the petition is premature.

Respondents chorus that petitioners do not possess locus standi,

inasmuch as they are not challenging the validity or constitutionality of
RA 8436. Moreover, petitioners supposedly admitted during the Oral
Argument that no law had been violated by the award of the
Contract. Furthermore, they allegedly have no actual and material
interest in the Contract and, hence, do not stand to be injured or
prejudiced on account of the award.
On the other hand, petitioners -- suing in their capacities as
taxpayers, registered voters and concerned citizens -- respond that the
issues central to this case are of transcendental importance and of
national interest. Allegedly, Comelecs flawed bidding and questionable
award of the Contract to an unqualified entity would impact directly on
the success or the failure of the electoral process. Thus, any taint on
the sanctity of the ballot as the expression of the will of the people
would inevitably affect their faith in the democratic system of
government.Petitioners further argue that the award of any contract for
automation involves disbursement of public funds in gargantuan
amounts; therefore, public interest requires that the laws governing the
transaction must be followed strictly.
We agree with petitioners. Our nations political and economic
future virtually hangs in the balance, pending the outcome of the 2004
elections. Hence, there can be no serious doubt that the subject matter
of this case is a matter of public concern and imbued with public
interest;[18] in other words, it is of paramount public interest [19] and
transcendental importance.[20]This fact alone would justify relaxing the
rule on legal standing, following the liberal policy of this Court
whenever a case involves an issue of overarching significance to our
society.[21]Petitioners legal standing should therefore be recognized and
upheld.
Moreover, this Court has held that taxpayers are allowed to sue
when there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds, [22] or if
public money is being deflected to any improper purpose; [23] or when
petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds
through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. [24] In the

instant case, individual petitioners, suing as taxpayers, assert a

material interest in seeing to it that public funds are properly and
lawfully used. In the Petition, they claim that the bidding was defective,
the winning bidder not a qualified entity, and the award of the Contract
contrary to law and regulation. Accordingly, they seek to restrain
respondents from implementing the Contract and, necessarily, from
making any unwarranted expenditure of public funds pursuant
thereto. Thus, we hold that petitioners possess locus standi.
House of Sara lee vs Rey
Cynthia Rey, the Accounts Receivable Clerk and later Credit
Administration Supervisor, was found to have violated the company
policies pertaining to the unauthorized extension of credit periods,
noncollection of remittances, non-imposition of penalty charges,
authorizing purchases and giving of supervision fees despite nonremittance, etc. As a result, she was dismissed the respondent for
breach of trust and confidence. NLRC and CA ruled in favor of Rey
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case
Ruling:
Yes. While as a general rule, the factual findings of administrative
agencies are not subject to review by this Court, it is equally
established that we will not uphold erroneous conclusions which are
contrary to the evidence, because the agency a quo, for that reason,
would be guilty of a grave abuse of discretion. Nor is this Court bound
by conclusions which are not supported by substantial evidence. The
substantial evidence rule does not authorize any finding just as long as
there is any evidence to support it. It does not excuse administrative
agencies from considering contrary evidence which fairly detracts from
the evidence supporting a finding.
Sec. of Justice vs Koyuga
Facts:
BI Commissioner Andrea Domingo received an anonymous
letterrequesting the deportation of respondent as an undesirable alien
for having been found guilty of Violation of the Uniform Controlled
Substances Act in the State of Washington, United States of America
(USA) for attempted possession of cocaine sometime in 1983.
On the basis of a Summary of Information,[4] the Commissioner
issued Mission Order , Chief of the Intelligence Mission and any
available BI Special Operations Team Member to conduct verification/
validation of the admission status and activities of respondent and
effect his immediate arrest if he is found to have violated the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, as amended.
Respondent was arrested and charged before the Board of Special
Inquiry (BSI) for violation of Section 37(a)(4) of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, as amended.
Bureau of Commissioners of BI rendered a decision for deportation.
Respondent appealed in DOJ which denied his motion. Unaware of
DOJs decision, respondent appeal in CA. CA reversed BC and DOJs
decision.
ISSUE:

9
whether the exclusive authority of the BOC over deportation
proceedings bars judicial review
Ruling:
No. It is beyond cavil that the BI has the exclusive authority and
jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an alleged alien, and that the
BOC has jurisdiction over deportation proceedings. Nonetheless,
Article VIII, Section 1of the Constitution has vested power of judicial
review in the Supreme Court and the lower courts such as the CA, as
established by law. Although the courts are without power to directly
decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government and
are not empowered to execute absolutely their own judgment from that
of Congress or of the President, the Court may look into and resolve
questions of whether or not such judgment has been made with grave
abuse of discretion, when the act of the legislative or executive
department is contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence, or
when executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill
will or personal bias.

As evidenced by the American experience during the so-called

When acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency are involved, a

petition for certiorari or prohibition may be filed in the CA as provided
by law or by the Rules of Court, as amended.[30]Clearly, the filing by
respondent of a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA to
assail the order of deportation on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion is permitted.
Senate vs Ermita
FACTS:
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole
issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for
them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway
project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China
National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail
Project).
On September 28, 2005, the President then issued Executive Order
464, Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers,
Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the
Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes, which,
pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the legislative inquiry is subject to judicial review
RULING:

expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary

YES. Since Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the

McCarthy era, however, the right of Congress to conduct inquiries in

aid of legislation is, in theory, no less susceptible to abuse than
executive or judicial power. It may thus be subjected to judicial review
pursuant to the Courts certiorari powers under Section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution.
Francisco vs. HR
Ernesto Francisco, Jr. vs. The House of Representatives
G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003
Carpio Morales, J.:
Facts: On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a
Resolution which directed the Committee on Justice to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
Development Fund (JDF). Then on June 2, 2003, former President
Joseph Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices. The complaint was
endorsed and was referred to the House Committee in accordance with
Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the
first impeachment complaint was sufficient in form, but voted to
dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in
substance. On October 23, 2003, a second impeachment complaint
was filed against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the
alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned
House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was
accompanied by a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed
by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.
Issues:
whether or not impeachment is subject to judicial review
Held:

executive branch, it would be incongruous to hold that the power of

Yes There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised

inquiry does not extend to executive officials who are the most familiar

the power of judicial review over congressional action. Thus,

with and informed on executive operations.

in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,[60] this Court ruled that it is well within the
power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its

As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, with process to enforce

officials committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of

it, is grounded on the necessity of information in the legislative

discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Tanada

process. If the information possessed by executive officials on the

v. Angara,[61] in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the

operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that

ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition

subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that

raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the

information and the power to compel the disclosure thereof.

legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution,

it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle

10
the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,[62] this Court declared null and void a
resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination,
and rescinding the election, of a congressman as a member of the
House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17, Article VI of
the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,[63] it held that the resolution of
whether the House representation in the Commission on Appointments
was based on proportional representation of the political parties as
provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to
judicial review. In Daza v. Singson,[64] it held that the act of the House of
Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on
Appointments is subject to judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,[65] it
held that although under the Constitution, the legislative power is
vested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of
the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress.
In Angara v. Electoral Commission,[66] it ruled that confirmation by the
National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of
whether his election is contested, is not essential before such memberelect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of
the National Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that
the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would
upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to
be interpreted as a whole and one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another.[67] Both are integral components of the calibrated system of
independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of
government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

Macalintal vs PET, GR 191618, June 7, 2011

Posted by Pius Morados on November 13, 2011
(Admin Law, PET, Quasi-judicial power)
Facts: Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: The
Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or
Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of the
Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be
designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions.
The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the
SCs decision dismissing the formers petition and declaring the
establishment of the respondent PET as constitutional.
Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4,
Art VII of the Constitution does not provide for the creation of the PET,
and it violates Sec 12, Art VIII of the Constitution.

The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on

firm footing on the basis of the grant of authority to the Supreme Court
to be the sole judge of all election contests for the President or VicePresident under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not PET is constitutional.
Whether or not PET exercises quasi-judicial power.
Held:
Yes. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional
Commission to a Presidential Electoral Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin
Bernas categorically declaring that in crafting the last paragraph of Sec.
4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution, they constitutionalized what was
statutory. Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same
Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary
implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and vicepresidential elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it
into effect.
No. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution which provides that the power shall be vested in
one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law. The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterize
the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial
power. When the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or
vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a
judicial power.
The COMELEC, HRET and SET are not, strictly and literally speaking,
courts of law. Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless,
empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an
exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional
empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC)
and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral
Tribunals) of the Constitution.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are dismissed.
LAMP VS. SEC OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY AND POVERTY (LAMP),
represented by its Chairman and counsel, CEFERINO PADUA,
Members, ALBERTO ABELEDA, JR., ELEAZAR ANGELES,
GREGELY FULTON ACOSTA, VICTOR AVECILLA, GALILEO BRION,
ANATALIA BUENAVENTURA, EFREN CARAG, PEDRO CASTILLO,
NAPOLEON CORONADO, ROMEO ECHAUZ, ALFREDO DE
GUZMAN, ROGELIO KARAGDAG, JR., MARIA LUZ ARZAGAMENDOZA, LEO LUIS MENDOZA, ANTONIO P. PAREDES,
AQUILINO PIMENTEL III, MARIO REYES, EMMANUEL SANTOS,
TERESITA SANTOS, RUDEGELIO TACORDA, SECRETARY GEN.
ROLANDO ARZAGA, Board of Consultants, JUSTICE ABRAHAM
SARMIENTO, SEN. AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR., and BARTOLOME
FERNANDEZ, JR.
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, THE
TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT,

11
and THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE and the SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES in representation of the Members of
the Congress
G.R. No. 164987, April 24, 2012
FACTS: For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari
assailing the constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in
Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004
(GAA of 2004).
Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty(LAMP), a group of
lawyers who have banded together with a mission of dismantling all
forms of political, economic or social monopoly in the country.
According to LAMP, the above provision is silent and, therefore,
prohibits an automatic or direct allocation of lump sums to individual
senators and congressmen for the funding of projects. It does not
empower individual Members of Congress to propose, select and
identify programs and projects to be funded out of PDAF.
For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of
powers because in receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their
chosen projects, the Members of Congress in effect intrude into an
executive function. Further, the authority to propose and select projects
does not pertain to legislation. It is, in fact, a non-legislative function
devoid of constitutional sanction, and, therefore, impermissible and
must be considered nothing less than malfeasance.
RESPONDENTS POSITION: the perceptions of LAMP on the
implementation of PDAF must not be based on mere speculations
circulated in the news media preaching the evils of pork barrel.
ISSUES: 1) whether or not the mandatory requisites for the exercise of
judicial review are met in this case; and 2) whether or not the
implementation of PDAF by the Members of Congress is
unconstitutional and illegal.

been illegally disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an

invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue.
Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed
with paramount public interest. The ramification of issues involving the
unconstitutional spending of PDAF deserves the consideration of the
Court, warranting the assumption of jurisdiction over the petition.
NOTES:
POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW:
(1)
there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power;
(2)
(2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to
question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement;
(3)
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and
(4)
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of
the case.
Gutierrez vs HR

complaint

A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has
had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. In this case,
the petitioner contested the implementation of an alleged
unconstitutional statute, as citizens and taxpayers. The petition
complains of illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation
and this is sufficient reason to say that there indeed exists a definite,
concrete, real or substantial controversy before the Court.
LOCUS STANDI: The gist of the question of standing is whether a party
alleges such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions. Here, the sufficient interest preventing
the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation required in
taxpayers suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have

(First

Complaint)

against

Ombudsman

Ma.

Merceditas N. Gutierrez (petitioner) based on betrayal of

public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution.

On 3 August 2010, a Second Complaint was filed by Reyes, et

al. against the same respondent also based on betrayal of
public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution.

On 11 August 2010, the two complaints were referred by the

House Plenary to the Committee on Justice at the same time.

HELD:
I.

On 22 July 2010, Baraquel, et al. filed an impeachment

On 1 September 2010, the Committee on Justice found the

First and Second Complaints sufficient in form. On 7
September 2010, the Committee on Justice, found the First
and Second Complaints were sufficient in form.

On 13 September 2010, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari

and prohibition before the Supreme Court seeking to enjoin
the

Committee

impeachment

on

Justice

proceedings.

from
The

proceeding
petition

with

prayed

for

the
a

temporary restraining order.

Petitioner: She invokes the Courts expanded certiorari
jurisdiction to "determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government."

12
Public Respondent: The petition is premature and not yet

Indubitably, the Court is not asserting its ascendancy over the

ripe for adjudication since petitioner has at her disposal a

Legislature in this instance, but simply upholding the supremacy of the

plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of the

Constitution as the repository of the sovereign will.

proceedings before public respondent. Public respondent

argues that when petitioner filed the present petition on
September 13, 2010, it had not gone beyond the
determination of the sufficiency of form and substance of
the two complaints. Hence, certiorari is unavailing.

The following day, during the en banc morning session of 14

September 2010, the majority of the Court voted to issue
a status

quo

ante order

suspending

the

impeachment

proceedings against petitioner. (Note: In urgent cases, it is a

matter of practice for the Court that all the Justices should
have been given time, at least an hour or two, to read the
petition before voting on the issuance of the status quo
ante order. Unfortunately, this was not done.)

Section 3(5), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that

"no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year."

ISSUE #1: Does the Supreme Court have the power to determine
whether public respondent committed a violation of the Constitution in
the exercise of its discretion relating to impeachment proceeding?

HELD: YES, under the doctrine of expanded judicial review. The

Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the
sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined
limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,"judicially discoverable
standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such
discretion, through the power of judicial review.

There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise
of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the
system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be

UDK-15143, January 21, 2015

IN THE MATTER OF: SAVE THE SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE AND FISCAL AUTONOMY
MOVEMENT v. ABOLITION OF JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT FUND
(JDF) AND REDUCTION OF FISCAL AUTONOMY.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
This case involves the proposed bills abolishing the Judiciary
Development Fund and replacing it with the Judiciary Support Fund.
Funds collected from the proposed Judiciary Support Fund shall be
remitted to the national treasury and Congress shall determine how the
funds will be used.
Petitioner Rolly Mijares (Mijares) prays for the issuance of a writ of
mandamus in order to compel this court to exercise its judicial
independence and fiscal autonomy against the perceived hostility of
Congress.
This matter was raised to this court through the letter signed by Mijares
and addressed to the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court. In the letter-petition, Mijares alleges that he is a
Filipino citizen, and a concerned taxpayerHe filed this petition as part of
his continuing crusade to defend and uphold the Constitution because
he believes in the rule of law. He is concerned about the threats against
the judiciary after this court promulgated Priority Development
Assistance Fund case on November 19, 2013 and Disbursement
Acceleration Program case on July 1, 2014.
The complaint implied that certain acts of members of Congress and
the President after the promulgation of these cases show a threat to
judicial independence.
In the first week of July 2014, Ilocos Norte Representative Rodolfo
Farias filed House Bill No. 4690, which would require this court to
remit its Judiciary Development Fund collections to the national
treasury.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A week later, Iloilo Representative Niel Tupas, Jr., filed House Bill No.
4738 entitled The Act Creating the Judicial Support Fund (JSF) under
the National Treasury, repealing for the purpose Presidential Decree
No. 1949.

interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat

another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of
independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of
government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

Petitioner argues that Congress gravely abused its discretion with a

blatant usurpation of judicial independence and fiscal autonomy of the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the act of the congress is subject to judicial review

13
RULING: No.
This court resolves to deny the petition.
The power of judicial review, like all powers granted by the Constitution,
is subject to certain limitations. Petitioner must comply with all the
requisites for judicial review before this court may take cognizance of
the case. The requisites are:
(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise
of judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question
the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement;

independent branches of government.34 (Emphasis supplied, citations

omitted)
Similar to Montesclaros, petitioner is asking this court to stop Congress
from passing laws that will abolish the Judiciary Development Fund.
This court has explained that the filing of bills is within the legislative
power of Congress and is not subject to judicial restraint[.]35 A
proposed bill produces no legal effects until it is passed into law. Under
the Constitution, the judiciary is mandated to interpret laws. It cannot
speculate on the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a bill that
Congress may or may not pass. It cannot rule on mere speculations or
issues that are not ripe for judicial determination.36 The petition,
therefore, does not present any actual case or controversy that is ripe
for this courts determination.
Petitioner has no legal standing

No actual case or controversy

Even assuming that there is an actual case or controversy that this

court must resolve, petitioner has no legal standing to question the
validity of the proposed bill. The rule on legal standing has been
discussed in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo:37
Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on
a given question. In private suits, standing is governed by the realparties-in interest rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that every action
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest. Accordingly, the real-party-in interest is the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Succinctly put, the plaintiffs standing is
based on his own right to the relief sought.

One of the requirements for this court to exercise its power of judicial
review is the existence of an actual controversy. This means that there
must be an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the
court would amount to an advisory opinion.
Thus, there can be no justiciable controversy involving the
constitutionality of a proposed bill. The Court can exercise its power of
judicial review only after a law is enacted, not before.

The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here,

the plaintiff who asserts a public right in assailing an allegedly illegal
official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He
may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person.
He could be suing as a stranger, or in the category of a citizen, or
taxpayer. In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled
to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a
sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing
of relief as a citizen or taxpayer.

(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest

opportunity; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.23
Petitioners failure to comply with the first two requisites warrants the
outright dismissal of this petition.
I
The petition does not comply with the requisites of judicial review

Under the separation of powers, the Court cannot restrain Congress

from passing any law, or from setting into motion the legislative mill
according to its internal rules. Thus, the following acts of Congress in
the exercise of its legislative powers are not subject to judicial restraint:
the filing of bills by members of Congress, the approval of bills by each
chamber of Congress, the reconciliation by the Bicameral Committee of
approved bills, and the eventual approval into law of the reconciled bills
by each chamber of Congress. Absent a clear violation of specific
constitutional limitations or of constitutional rights of private parties, the
Court cannot exercise its power of judicial review over the internal
processes or procedures of Congress.
....
. . . To do so would destroy the delicate system of checks and balances
finely crafted by the Constitution for the three co-equal, coordinate and

....
This Court adopted the direct injury test in our jurisdiction. In People
v. Vera, it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.
The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases, such as, Custodio v.
President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers Association v. De
la Fuente, Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Anti-Chinese
League of the Philippines v. Felix.38
Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or will sustain a direct
injury if the proposed bill is passed into law. While his concern for
judicial independence is laudable, it does not, by itself, clothe him with
the requisite standing to question the constitutionality of a proposed bill
that may only affect the judiciary.
This court, however, has occasionally relaxed the rules on standing

14
when the issues involved are of transcendental importance to the
public. Specifically, this court has stated that:
the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for
nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators
when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or
of paramount public interest.39
Transcendental importance is not defined in our jurisprudence, thus,
in Francisco v. House of Representatives:40
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the
following instructive determinants formulated by former Supreme Court
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the
funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear
case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the
public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3)
the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in
raising the questions being raised.
A mere invocation of transcendental importance in the pleading is not
enough for this court to set aside procedural rules:

The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of

the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the petitions for the principal
reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore,
the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some
petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions
are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has
no original jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the
assailed legislation took effect.
ISSUES: 1) Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review
over the controversy; 2) Whether the RH law is unconstitutional.
HELD:
1) In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or
controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination.
REMEDIAL LAW: actual case or controversy

Whether an issue is of transcendental importance is a matter

determined by this court on a case-to-case basis. An allegation of
transcendental importance must be supported by the proper allegations
None of the determinants in Francisco are present in this case. The
events feared by petitioner are merely speculative and conjectural.
In addition to the determinants in Francisco, it must also be shown that
there is a clear or imminent threat to fundamental rights.
For this reason, we appreciate petitioners concern for the judiciary. It is
often only through the vigilance of private citizens that issues relating to
the judiciary can be discussed in the political sphere. Unfortunately, the
remedy he seeks cannot be granted by this court. But his crusade is
not a lost cause. Considering that what he seeks to be struck down is a
proposed bill, it would be better for him to air his concerns by lobbying
in Congress. There, he may discover the representatives and senators
who may have a similar enthusiastic response to truly making the
needed investments in the Rule of Law.
Petition is DISMISSED.
Imbong vs Ochoa
Facts:
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are
assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds: The
RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn, the right to health and
the right to protection against hazardous products, and to religious
freedom, equal protection clause, involuntary servitude, among others.
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors
of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment,
as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice
on reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full
and correct information on reproductive health programs and service,
although it is against their religious beliefs and convictions.

Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not

have the unbridled authority to rule on just any and every claim of
constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the
power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz : (a)
there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must
possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and ( d) the issue of constitutionality
must be the lis mota of the case.
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subject petitions do not
present any actual case or controversy because the RH Law has yet to
be implemented. They claim that the questions raised by the petitions
are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one has been
charged with violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing
that any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by its
operation. In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH Law is
premature.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy
that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory
opinion. The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic
questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually
challenging. The controversy must be justiciable-definite and concrete,
touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.
In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic
assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof, on the
other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a
theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and
substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree
conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what
the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the
requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the
act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual

15
challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a
prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed
by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the
petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened
injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that
he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct
injury as a result of the act.
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy
exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination.
Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already
taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have
already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a
justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution,
it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the
dispute.
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because
medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being
criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof,
particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed
from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They
must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW.
2) Is there a locus standi on the part of the petitioner
No. However, pursuant to the doctrine of transcendental importance, In
view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents,
not only to the public, but also to the bench and bar, the
issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After
all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional provisions
on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and
expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these
and the fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive
health have already caused deep division among a broad
spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the
petitions raise issues of transcendental importance warranting
immediate court adjudication. More importantly, considering
that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn which is
primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be
taken away before taking action.
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at
this time when rights enshrined in the Constitution are being
imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the life of either the

mother or her child is at stake, would lead to irreparable

consequences.
G.R. No. 152295
July 9, 2002
Montesclaros, et al vs. Comelec, et al

Facts:
Petitioners sought to prevent the postponement of the 2002 SK election
to a later date since doing so may render them unqualified to vote or be
voted for in view of the age limitation set by law for those who may
participate. The SK elections was postponed since it was
deemed "operationally very difficult" to hold both SK and Barangay
elections simultaneously in May 2002. Petitioners also sought to enjoin
the lowering of age for membership in the SK.
Issue:
Whether or not judicial review can be applied
Held:
No. The Court held that, in the present case, there was no actual
controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review.
While seeking to prevent a postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK
elections, petitioners are nevertheless amenable to a resetting of the
SK elections to any date not later than July 15, 2002. RA No. 9164 has
reset the SK elections to July 15, 2002, a date acceptable to
petitioners. Under the same law, Congress merely restored the age
requirement in PD No. 684, the original charter of the SK, which fixed
the maximum age for membership in the SK to youths less than 18
years old. Petitioners do not have a vested right to the permanence of
the age requirement under Section 424 of the Local Government Code
of 1991.
RA 9164 which resets and prescribes the qualifications of candidates
and voters for the SK elections was held to be applicable on the July 15
2002 election. Its constitutionality not having been assailed in the first
place.
The Court ruled that petitioners had no personal and substantial
interest in maintaining this suit, that the petition presented no actual
justiciable controversy, that petitioners did not cite any provision of law
that is alleged to be unconstitutional, and that there was no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents.