THIRD DIVISION

GERTRUDES TEH,
Petitioner,
-versusJanuary 11, 2005

G.R. No. 141180

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is the Petition for Review on C ertiorari filed by Gertrudes Teh assailing the Resolution [1] of the Court of Appeals dated October 4,
1999 in CA-G.R. CR No. 23482 dismissing her petition for review and its Resolution dated November 29, 1999 denying her Motion for
Reconsideration.
The factual backdrop of this case is as follows:
Petitioner Gertrudes Teh and Josalie Baguio were charged with estafa before the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2, Davao
City. The Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 45,542-B-96, reads:
That on or about December 18, 1995, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-mentioned
accused received on consignment basis from Rodsons Collection Center, represented by Elizabeth E. Maridable, goods worth P1,583.00
with the express obligation on her part to sell the consigned items and to remit the proceeds from the sale or to return the same if unsold to
said complainant; but far from complying with the aforesaid obligation, with grave abuse of confidence and in violation of trust and with intent
to defraud, the said accused willfully and unlawfully failed to remit the proceeds from the sale nor to return the same items despite demands
therefore, thereby misappropriating and converting the same to her personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of herein
complainant in the said amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Josalie Baguio has remained at large.
The evidence for the prosecution show that petitioner was formerly an area manager of Rodsons Collection Center which sells various
personal products, such as ladies T-shirts and perfumes, mens cologne, care soap and shading strip. Under her were several dealers, one
of whom was Josalie Baguio. Based on a ride on system, the area manager was allowed in certain instances to withdraw stocks for sale in
the name of the dealer, provided that both would sign a trust receipt agreement. The trust receipt agreement provides that they should remit
the proceeds of the goods sold within a specified time. If not sold, then they should return the unsold items to Rodsons Collection Center.
On December 18, 1995, petitioner and Josalie Baguio withdrew from the Rodsons Collection Center several items consisting of mens
cologne, soap, and other sundries worth P1,583.00. Both signed the required trust receipt agreement.
However, petitioner and Josalie failed to remit the proceeds of the sale despite Rodsons Collection Centers several demands, hence, they
were charged with estafa.
Petitioner contends that while she signed the trust receipt agreement, however, she did so only for the purpose of identifying her as the area
manager of Josalie Baguio. She denied receiving any item. The stocks withdrawn were for the account of Josalie.
On February 15, 1999, the MTCC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused GERTRUDES TEH guilty beyond reasonable doubt, she is hereby sentenced to an imprisonment of THREE
(3) MONTHS of arresto mayor as minimum to TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of prision correccional as maximum; to indemnify
the offended party the sum of ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE PESOS (P1,583.00) and to pay the proportionate share
of the costs.
Accused is further ordered to indemnify the offended party expenses incurred in enforcing her claim from the time the case was filed in 1996
to its final termination in 1999, which the Court hereby fixed as reasonable in the amount of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00).
As regards accused JOSALIE S. BAGUIO who remains at-large, let the case be sent to the ARCHIVES to be withdrawn therefrom as soon
as she is apprehended.
SO ORDERED. [2]

In finding petitioner guilty as charged, the MTCC ruled that inasmuch as she signed the trust receipt agreement, she is bound by the terms
stipulated therein. Her failure to remit the proceeds or to return the goods to Rodsons Collection Center constitutes estafa under Article
315(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Davao City, affirmed the MTCC Decision.
Petitioner then elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review.
However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for being insufficient in form, not being accompanied by duplicate original or certified
true copies of the documents and material parts of the record that would support the allegations. Moreover, there was no written explanation
why service of the petition was not done personally.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Appellate Court.
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that she failed to comply with Section 2, Rule 42 and
Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
In his comment on the petition, the Solicitor General maintains that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition in CA-G.R. CR
No. 23482.
Section 2, Rule 42 of the same Rules provides:
SEC. 2. Form and contents. The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies, with the original copy intended for the court being
indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case, without impleading the lower courts or judges
thereof either as petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the specific material dates showing that it was filed on time; (c) set forth concisely a
statement of the matters involved, the issues raised, the specification of errors of fact or law, or both, allegedly committed by the Regional
Trial Court, and the reasons or arguments relied upon for the allowance of the appeal; (d) be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate
originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court,
the requisite number of plain copies thereof and of the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of
the petition.
x x x
We note that petitioner herself admits that the only documents attached to the petition in CA-G.R. CR No. 23482 were certified true copies of
the Decisions of the RTC and the MTCC. There were no copies of the pleadings filed below or other material portions of the record which
would support the allegations in the petition. Indeed, this is contrary to Section 2, Rule 42 quoted above.
Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure reads:
SEC. 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. Whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done
personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written explanation
why the service or filing was not done personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed.
Again, petitioner admits that she failed to comply with the above provision. She contends, however, that no prejudice was caused to the
parties by her non-compliance.
Clearly, petitioner violated both provisions quoted above which warrants the dismissal of her petition by the Court of Appeals.
We thus rule that in dismissing the petition in CA-G.R. CR No. 23482, the Court of Appeals did not commit any error.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated October 4, 1999 and November 29, 1999 in CA-G.R.
CR No. 23482 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, J., (Chairman), Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Supreme Courts judicial errors in death-penalty cases

THE recent admission by Supreme Court Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban that a judicial error could have been committed in the conviction and
execution of Leo Echegaray has prompted a hail of criticisms some even self-serving addressed at the infallibility of the High Court magistrates.
In June 1996, the Court affirmed a Quezon City courts decision to mete the death penalty on Echegaray for the rape of a minor. Echagaray was the first to
die by lethal injection in 1999 with the reimposition of the death penalty. But Panganiban was of the opinion that Echegarays penalty should have been
reduced to reclusion perpetua (equivalent to life imprisonment with eligibility for parole after 30 years) since it was not proven during the trial that he was
the father, stepfather or grandfather of the victim, a qualifying circumstance for him to have been meted the capital punishment.
But the Echagaray case is not the first time that the SC, the ultimate arbiter of a convicted persons innocence or guilt, has proved itself not infallible. At
least two recent cases involving Marlon Parazo (1999) and Roberto Lara and Roderick Licayan (2004) illustrate this malady, according to
Mamamayang Tutol sa Bitay-Movement for Restorative Justice (MTB-MRJ), a nationwide network of some 150 human rights, sectoral, political, and church
groups opposed to the death penalty.
Parazo, deaf, blind, mute and retarded, was meted the death sentence in 1995 for rape and attempted homicide. The court that tried his case never
bothered to ensure that he understood the proceedings against him. His multiple disabilities were never mentioned in court, not even by his courtappointed lawyer. His sentence was affirmed by the Supreme Court in 1997. Taking up his case, the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) was able to
have the high court reverse itself in 1999.
Scheduled for execution on January 30, 2004, Roberto Lara and Roderick Licayan were given a 30-day reprieve pending an appeal to reopen their case in
light of new evidence. By a very close vote of 7-6, the SC decided to look at the new evidence: the sworn affidavit of a recently apprehended co-defendant
that cleared both Lara and Licayan of the crime for which they were about to be executed. The retrial is ongoing at RTC Branch 272 in Marikina City, where
both hope to prove themselves innocent.
In the above cases, the SC was able to rectify its miscarriage of justice. Panganiban also said that the Court has taken measures to review death penalty
cases with painstaking care, citing the case of Edgar Gallo wherein the Court belatedly reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua, even though the
decision meting out death had already become final.
Still, there have been instances when it was not able to do so. MTB-MRJ cites a study by Dawson and Gregory (2004) which documents the case of a 79year-old man wrongfully sentenced to death (Republic Act No. 7659, recently repealed by Congress, prohibited the meting of the death penalty on those
below 18 and above 70 years old). Unfortunately, the man died on death row before the SC could review his case, five years after sentencing.
To be fair, the Supreme Court has acknowledged in GR No. 147678-87 (People v. Mateo, July 7, 2004) the judicial error rate of 71.77 percent on death
penalty cases, though this would even increase to almost 80 percent early this year.
The SCs review of capital punishment cases up to January 2006, as documented by MTB-MRJ, found out that four out of five death inmates have been
wrongfully sentenced by the various lower courts. Of the 1,513 cases reviewed, almost half (645) were modified (from death penalty to reclusion perpetua
or indeterminate sentence), close to a third (456) were transferred to the Court of Appeals, 69 were acquitted, and 37 were remanded for further
proceedings. Only 270 cases (18 percent) were affirmed by the high court.
The figures reported by the chief justice are however slightly lower 65 acquittals, 230 affirmations, 651 cases either remanded for further proceedings, or
reduced to reclusion perpetua or other lower penalties out of 907 cases reviewed.
A study conducted by the University of Westminster-based Centre for Capital Punishment Studies observed that in most cases of wrongful sentences, the
letter of the law is often ignored, either because documentary evidence does not exist or because the presiding judge is ignorant of the law.
The most glaring defects involve the well-documented cases of minors (below 18) and the elderly (above 70) sentenced to death, in clear disregard of the
law. In 2000, for instance, an 81-year-old woman received the death sentence. In October 2005, the Alyansa ng mga Inmates sa Death Row (Alis-DR)
reported that 18 male death row inmates were minors at the time of the alleged crimes for which they were sentenced, while another 11 were over the age
of 70.
MTB-MRJ has also documented several instances when judges have sentenced mentally ill persons. The most bizarre example of this concerns a woman
who received the capital punishment despite incontrovertible medical evidence (from two doctors) that she was severely mentally ill at the commission of
the crime. Said the MTB-MRJ report:
The trial judge disregarded the doctors testimonies, pointing out that the accused herself failed to give evidence of her mental condition. In an even more
bizarre twist to the case, another criminal action was brought against the woman for property damage she caused at the time of the crime. This time,
relying on evidence from the same doctors, the trial judge found the woman not guilty on grounds of insanity.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO, accused-appellant.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Amidst the endless debates on whether or not the reimposition of the death penalty is indeed a deterrent as far as the commission of heinous crimes is
concerned and while the attendant details pertaining to the execution of a death sentence remain as yet another burning issue, we are tasked with
providing a clear-cut resolution of whether or not the herein accused-appellant deserves to forfeit his place in human society for the infliction of the primitive
and bestial act of incestuous lust on his own blood.
Before us for automatic review is the judgment of conviction, dated September 7, 1994, for the crime of Rape, rendered after marathon hearing by the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused LEO ECHEGARAY Y PILO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE as
charged in the complaint, aggravated by the fact that the same was committed by the accused who is the father/stepfather of the complainant, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH, as provided for under RA. No. 7659; to pay the complainant Rodessa Echegaray the sum of P50,000.00 as
damages, plus all the accessory penalties provided by law, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs."[1]
We note, however, that the charge had been formulated in this manner:
"C O M P L A I N T
The undersigned accuses LEO ECHEGARAY Y PILO of the crime of RAPE, committed as follows:
That on or about the month of April 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant his daughter, a minor, 10 years of age, all against her will and
without her consent, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW."[2]
Upon being arraigned on August 1, 1994, the accused-appellant, assisted by his counsel de oficio, entered the plea of "not guilty."
These are the pertinent facts of the case as summarized by the Solicitor-General in his brief:
"This is a case of rape by the father of his ten-year old daughter.
Complainant RODESSA ECHEGARAY is a ten-year old girl and a fifth-grader, born on September 11, 1983. Rodessa is the eldest of five siblings. She has
three brothers aged 6, 5 and 2, respectively, and a 3-month old baby sister. Her parents are Rosalie and Leo Echegaray, the latter being the accusedappellant himself. The victim lives with her family in a small house located at No. 199 Fernandez St., Barangay San Antonio, San Francisco Del Monte,
Quezon City (pp. 5-9, Aug. 9, 1994, TSN).
Sometime in the afternoon of April 1994, while Rodessa was looking after her three brothers in their house as her mother attended a gambling session in
another place, she heard her father, the accused-appellant in this case, order her brothers to go out of the house (pp. 10-11, ibid.). As soon as her brothers
left, accused-appellant Leo Echegaray approached Rodessa and suddenly dragged her inside the room (p. 12, ibid). Before she could question the
appellant, the latter immediately removed her panty and made her lie on the floor (p. 13, ibid.). Thereafter, appellant likewise removed his underwear and
immediately placed himself on top of Rodessa. Subsequently, appellant forcefully inserted his penis into Rodessa's organ causing her to suffer intense pain
(pp. 14-15, ibid.). While appellant was pumping on her, he even uttered: 'Masarap ba, masarap ba?' and to which Rodessa answered: 'Tama na Papa,
masakit' (p. 16, ibid.). Rodessa's plea proved futile as appellant continued with his act. After satisfying his bestial instinct, appellant threatened to kill her
mother if she would divulge what had happened. Scared that her mother would be killed by appellant, Rodessa kept to herself the ordeal she suffered. She
was very afraid of appellant because the latter, most of the time, was high on drugs (pp. 17-18, ibid.). The same sexual assault happened up to the fifth
time and this usually took place when her mother was out of the house (p. 19, ibid.). However, after the fifth time, Rodessa decided to inform her
grandmother, Asuncion Rivera, who in turn told Rosalie, Rodessa's mother. Rodessa and her mother proceeded to the Barangay Captain where Rodessa
confided the sexual assaults she suffered. Thereafter, Rodessa was brought to the precinct where she executed an affidavit (p. 21, ibid.). From there, she
was accompanied to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for medical examination (p. 22, ibid.).
Rodessa testified that the said sexual assaults happened only during the time when her mother was pregnant. Rodessa added that at first, her mother was
on her side. However, when appellant was detained, her mother kept on telling her: 'Kawawa naman ang Tatay mo, nakakulong' (pp. 39-40, ibid.).
When Rodessa was examined by the medico-legal officer in the person of Dra. Ma. Cristina B. Preyna,[3] the complainant was described as physically on
a non-virgin state, as evidenced by the presence of laceration of the hymen of said complainant (TSN., Aug. 22,1995, pp. 8-9)."[4]
On the other hand, the accused-appellant's brief presents a different story:
"x x x the defense presented its first witness, Rosalie Echegaray. She asserted that the RAPE charge against the accused was only the figment of her
mother's dirty mind. That her daughter's complaint was forced upon her by her grandma and the answers in the sworn statement of Rodessa were
coached. That the accusation of RAPE was motivated by Rodessa's grandmother's greed over the lot situated at the Madrigal Estate-NHA Project,
Barangay San Antonio, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, which her grandmother's paramour, Conrado Alfonso gave to the accused in order to
persuade the latter to admit that Rodessa executed an affidavit of desistance after it turned out that her complaint of attempted homicide was substituted

with the crime of RAPE at the instance of her mother. That when her mother came to know about the affidavit of desistance, she placed her granddaughter
under the custody of the Barangay Captain. That her mother was never a real mother to her.
She stated that her complaint against accused was for attempted homicide as her husband poured alcohol on her body and attempted to burn her. She
identified the certification issued by the NHA and Tag No. 87-0393 (Exh. 2). That the Certification based on the Masterlist (Exh. 3) indicates that the
property is co-owned by accused and Conrado Alfonso. That Rodessa is her daughter sired by Conrado Alfonso, the latter being the paramour of her
mother. That Conrado Alfonso waived his right and participation over the lot in favor of the accused in consideration of the latter's accepting the fact that he
is the father of Rodessa to simulate the love triangle and to conceal the nauseating sex orgies from Conrado Alfonso's real Wife.
Accused testified in his behalf and stated that the grandmother of the complainant has a very strong motive in implicating him to the crime of RAPE since
she was interested to become the sole owner of a property awarded to her live-in partner by the Madrigal Estate-NHA Project. That he could not have
committed the imputed crime because he considers Rodessa as his own daughter. That he is a painter-contractor and on the date of the alleged
commission of the crime, he was painting the house of one Divina Ang of Barangay Vitalis, Paraaque, Metro Manila (Exh 4). The travel time between his
work place to his residence is three (3) hours considering the condition of traffic. That the painting contract is evidenced by a document denominated
'Contract of Services' duly accomplished (see submarkings of Exh. 4). He asserted that he has a big sexual organ which when used to a girl 11 years old
like Rodessa, the said female organ will be 'mawawarak.' That it is abnormal to report the imputed commission of the crime to the grandmother of the
victim.
Accused further stated that her(sic) mother-in-law trumped-up a charge of drug pushing earlier and he pleaded guilty to a lesser offense of using drugs.
The decretal portion of the judgment of conviction ordering the accused to be confined at the Bicutan Rehabilitation Center irked the grandmother of
Rodessa because it was her wish that accused should be meted the death penalty.
Accused remain steadfast in his testimony perorating the strong motive of Rodessa's grandmother in implicating him in this heinous crime because of her
greed to become the sole owner of that piece of property at the National Housing Authority-Madrigal Project, situated at San Francisco del Monte, Quezon
City, notwithstanding rigid cross-examination. He asserted that the imputed offense is far from his mind considering that he treated Rodessa as his own
daughter. He categorically testified that he was in his painting job site on the date and time of the alleged commission of the crime.
Mrs. Punzalan was presented as third defense witness. She said that she is the laundry woman and part time baby sitter of the family of accused. That at
one time, she saw Rodessa reading sex books and the Bulgar newspaper. That while hanging washed clothes on the vacant lot she saw Rodessa
masturbating by tinkering her private parts. The masturbation took sometime.
This sexual fling of Rodessa were corroborated by Silvestra Echegaray, the fourth and last witness for the defense. She stated that she tried hard to correct
the flirting tendency of Rodessa and that she scolded her when she saw Rodessa viewing an X-rated tape. Rodessa according to her was fond of going
with friends of ill-repute. That (sic) she corroborated the testimony of Mrs Punzalan by stating that she herself saw Rodessa masturbating inside the room
of her house."[5]
In finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, the lower court dismissed the defense of alibi and lent credence to
the straightforward testimony of the ten-year old victim to whom no ill motive to testify falsely against accused-appellant can be attributed. The lower court
likewise regarded as inconsequential the defense of the accused-appellant that the extraordinary size of his penis could not have insinuated itself into the
victim's vagina and that the accused is not the real father of the said victim.
The accused-appellant now reiterates his position in his attempt to seek a reversal of the lower court's verdict through the following assignment of errors:
1. THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE SINISTER MOTIVE OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT'S GRANDMOTHER THAT PRECIPITATED
THE FILING OF THE CHARGE OF RAPE, HENCE IT ERRED IN HOLDING ACCUSED GUILTY AS CHARGED.
2. THE COURT BELOW OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT THE HEALED LACERATIONS AT 3 AND 7 O'CLOCK COULD NOT HAVE BEEN DUE TO THE
PUMPING OF THE PENIS OF ACCUSED TO THE VAGINA OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT, HENCE IT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED
COMMITTED THE CRIME CHARGED, NOTWITHSTANDING VEHEMENT DENIAL.
3. THE COURT A QUO WHIMSICALLY IGNORED THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI THAT ACCUSED WAS IN PARAAQUE ON THE DATE AND TIME OF THE
IMPUTED CRIME HENCE, IT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ALIBI IS NOT SUSTAINABLE IN THE CASE AT BAR."[6]
Considering that a rape charge, in the light of the reimposition of the death penalty, requires a thorough and judicious examination of the circumstances
relating thereto, this Court remains guided by the following principles in evaluating evidence in cases of this nature: (a) An accusation for rape can be made
with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the accused though innocent to disprove; (b) In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where
only two persons are involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) The evidence for the prosecution must
stand and fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense."[7]
Anent the first assigned error, no amount of persuasion can convince this Court to tilt the scales of justice in favor of the accused-appellant notwithstanding
that he cries foul insisting that the rape charge was merely concocted and strongly motivated by greed over a certain lot situated at the NHA-Madrigal
Estate Housing Project, Barangay San Antonio, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. The accused-appellant theorizes that prosecution witness
Asuncion Rivera, the maternal grandmother of the victim Rodessa, concocted the charge of rape so that, in the event that the accused-appellant shall be
meted out a death sentence, title to the lot will be consolidated in her favor. Indeed, the lot in question is co-owned by the accused-appellant and Conrado
Alfonso, the live-in partner of Asuncion Rivera, according to the records of the National Housing Authority (Exh. "3"). The accused-appellant would want us
to believe that the rape charge was fabricated by Asuncion Rivera in order to eliminate the accused-appellant from being a co-owner. So, the live-in
partners would have the property for their own.[8]

We believe, as did the Solicitor-General, that no grandmother would be so callous as to instigate her 10-year old granddaughter to file a rape case against
her own father simply on account of her alleged interest over the disputed lot.[9]
It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that the testimony of a rape victim is credible where she has no motive to testify against the accused.[10]
We find no flaws material enough to discredit the testimony of the ten-year old Rodessa which the trial court found convincing enough and unrebutted by
the defense. The trial court not surprisingly noted that Rodessa's narration in detail of her father's monstrous acts had made her cry.[11] Once again, we
rule that:
"x x x The testimony of the victim who was only 12 years old at the time of the rape as to the circumstances of the rape must be given weight for testimony
of young and immature rape victims are credible (People v. Guibao, 217 SCRA 64 [1993]). No woman especially one of tender age, practically only a girl,
would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and thereafter expose herself to a public trial, if she were not motivated
solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished (People v. Guibao, supra)."[12]
The accused-appellant points out certain inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses in his attempt to bolster his claim that the rape
accusation against him is malicious and baseless. Firstly, Rodessa's testimony that the accused-appellant was already naked when he dragged her inside
the room is inconsistent with her subsequent testimony that the said accused-appellant was still wearing short pants when she was dragged inside the
room. Secondly, Rodessa's sworn statement before the police investigator which indicated that, while the accused was executing pumping acts, he uttered
the words "Masarap ba?", differ from her testimony in court wherein she related that when the accused took out his penis from her vagina, the accused
said "Masarap, tapos na." Thirdly, the victim's grandmother, Asuncion Rivera, recounted in her sworn statement that it was the accused who went to see
her to apprise her of the rape committed on her granddaughter. However, in her testimony in court, Asuncion Rivera claimed that she was the one who
invited the accused-appellant to see her in her house so as to tell her a secret.[13] These alleged discrepancies merely pertain to minor details which in no
way pose serious doubt as to the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. Whether or not the accused was naked when he dragged Rodessa inside the
room where he sexually assaulted her bears no significant effect on Rodessa's testimony that she was actually raped by the accused-appellant. Moreover,
a conflicting account of whatever words were uttered by the accused-appellant after he forcefully inserted his penis into Rodessa's private organ against
her will cannot impair the prosecution's evidence as a whole. A determination of which version earmarks the truth as to how the victim's grandmother
learned about the rape is inconsequential to the judgment of conviction.
As we have pronounced in the case of People v. Jaymalin:[14]
"This Court has stated time and again that minor inconsistencies in the narration of a witness do not detract from its essential credibility as long as it is on
the whole coherent and intrinsically believable. Inaccuracies may in fact suggest that the witness is telling the truth and has not been rehearsed as it is not
to be expected that he will be able to remember every single detail of an incident with perfect or total recall."
After due deliberation, this Court finds that the trial judge's assessment of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses deserves our utmost respect in the
absence of arbitrariness.
With respect to the second assigned error, the records of the instant case are bereft of clear and concrete proof of the accused-appellant's claim as to the
size of his penis and that if that be the fact, it could not have merely caused shallow healed lacerations at 3:00 and 7:00 o'clock.[15] In his testimony, the
accused- appellant stated that he could not have raped Rodessa because of the size of his penis which could have ruptured her vagina had he actually
done so.[16] This Court gives no probative value on the accused-appellant's self-serving statement in the light of our ruling in the case of People v. Melivo,
supra,[17] that:
"The vaginal wall and the hymenal membrane are elastic organs capable of varying degrees of distensibility. The degree of distensibility of the female
reproductive organ is normally limited only by the character and size of the pelvic inlet, other factors being minor. The female reproductive canal being
capable of allowing passage of a regular fetus, there ought to be no difficulty allowing the entry of objects of much lesser size, including the male
reproductive organ, which even in its largest dimensions, would still be considerably smaller than the full-term fetus.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bench, the presence of healed lacerations in various parts of the vaginal wall, though not as extensive as appellant might have expected
them to be, indicate traumatic injury to the area within the period when the incidents were supposed to have occurred." (At pp. 13-14, Italics supplied)
In rape cases, a broken hymen is not an essential element thereof.[18] A mere knocking at the doors of the pudenda, so to speak, by the accused's penis
suffices to constitute the crime of rape as full entry into the victim's vagina is not required to sustain a conviction.[19] In the case, Dr. Freyra, the medicolegal examiner, categorically testified that the healed lacerations of Rodessa on her vagina were consistent with the date of the commission of the rape as
narrated by the victim to have taken place in April, 1994.[20]
Lastly, the third assigned error deserves scant consideration. The accused-appellant erroneously argues that the Contract of Services (Exhibit 4) offered as
evidence in support of the accused-appellant's defense of alibi need not be corroborated because there is no law expressly requiring so.[21] In view of our
finding that the prosecution witnesses have no motive to falsely testify against the accused-appellant, the defense of alibi, in this case, uncorroborated by
other witnesses, should be completely disregarded.[22] More importantly, the defense of alibi which is inherently weak becomes even weaker in the face of
positive identification of the accused-appellant as perpetrator of the crime of rape by his victim, Rodessa.[23]
The Contract of Services whereby the accused-appellant obligated himself to do some painting Job at the house of one Divina Ang in Paranaque, Metro
Manila, within 25 days from April 4, 1994, is not proof of the whereabouts of the accused-appellant at the time of the commission of the offense.

The accused-appellant in this case is charged with Statutory Rape on the basis of the complaint, dated July 14, 1994. The gravamen of the said offense,
as stated in paragraph 3, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, is the carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve years old.[24] Rodessa positively
identified his father accused-appellant, succeeded in consummating his grievous and odious sexual assault on her is free from any substantial selfcontradiction. It is highly inconceivable that it is rehearsed and fabricated upon instructions from Rodessa's maternal grandmother Asuncion Rivera as
asserted by the accused-appellant. The words of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, speaking for the Court, more than two decades ago, are relevant and
worth reiterating, thus:
"x x x it is manifest in the decisions of this Court that where the offended parties are young and immature girls like the victim in this case, (Cited cases
omitted) there is marked receptivity on its part to lend credence to their version of what transpired. It is not to be wondered at. The state, as parens patria,
is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those, who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of
tender years deserve its utmost protection. Moreover, the injury in cases of rape is not inflicted on the unfortunate victim alone. The consternation it causes
her family must also be taken into account. It may reflect a failure to abide by the announced concern in the fundamental law for such institution. There is
all the more reason then for the rigorous application of the penal law with its severe penalty for this offense, whenever warranted. It has been aptly
remarked that with the advance in civilization, the disruption in public peace and order it represents defies explanation, much more so in view of what
currently appears to be a tendency for sexual permissiveness. Where the prospects of relationship based on consent are hardly minimal, self-restraint
should even be more marked."[25]
Under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 often referred to as the Death Penalty Law, Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code was amended, to wit:
"The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
xxx xxx xxx
(Italics supplied)
Apparently, as a last glimpse of hope, the accused-appellant questions the penalty imposed by the trial court by declaring that he is neither a father,
stepfather or grandfather of Rodessa although he was a confirmed lover of Rodessa's mother.[26] On direct examination, he admitted that before the
charge of rape was filed against him, he had treated Rodessa as his real daughter and had provided for her food, clothing, shelter and education.[27] The
Court notes that Rodessa uses the surname of the accused-appellant, not Rivera (her mother's maiden name) nor Alfonso (her grandmother's live-in
partner). Moreover, Rodessa's mother stated during the cross-examination that she, the accused-appellant and her five children, including Rodessa, had
been residing in one house only.[28] At any rate, even if he were not the father, stepfather or grandfather of Rodessa, this disclaimer cannot save him from
the abyss where perpetrators of heinous crimes ought to be, as mandated by law. Considering that the accused-appellant is a confirmed lover of
Rodessa's mother,[29] he falls squarely within the aforequoted portion of the Death Penalty Law under the term "common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim."
The fact that the ten-year old Rodessa referred to the accused-appellant as "Papa" is reason enough to conclude that accused-appellant is either the father
or stepfather of Rodessa. Thus, the act of sexual assault perpetrated by the accused on his young victim has become all the more repulsive and perverse.
The victim's tender age and the accused-appellant's moral ascendancy and influence over her are factors which forced Rodessa to succumb to the
accused's selfish and bestial craving. The law has made it inevitable under the circumstances of this case that the accused-appellant face the supreme
penalty of death.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and
Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.