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CASE COMMENTARY
ON
PAUL FELTHOUSE v BINDLEY
142 E.R. 1037
1862
BY:
SYED MOHAMMAD
KHURSHEED
13/B.B.A/054.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
FACTS OF THE CASE........................................................................................................................... 3
ISSUES FRAMED BY THE COURT. ................................................................................................... 5
DECISION OF THE HONBLE COURT. ............................................................................................. 6
Willes J. .............................................................................................................................................. 6
Byle J. and Keating J. ......................................................................................................................... 7
REASON FOR THE DECISION OF THE COURT. ............................................................................. 8
PERSONAL ANALYSIS OF THE CASE. ............................................................................................ 9
CASE NOT A DEPARTURE FROM ANY PRECEDENT. ................................................................ 10
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January 2nd, 1861.Dear Nephew,Your price, I admit, was 30 guineas. I offered 30l.,
never offered more: and you said the horse was mine. However, as there may be a mistake
about him, I will split the difference,30l. 15s.I paying all expenses from Tamworth. You
can send him at your convenience, between now and the 25th of March. If I hear no more
about him, I consider the horse mine at 30l. 15s.
Paul Felthouse.
To this letter the nephew i.e. Mr. Paul Felthouse did not sent any reply.
On the 25th of February, Mr. bindley, an auctioneer, auctioned the stocks of Mr. Paul
Felthouse. Although Mr. Paul, told bindley not to sell that specific horse but by mistake the
horse in question was sold with the rest of the stock, and fetching, which sum was handed
over to John Felthouse. On the following day, the defendant, being apprised of the mistake,
wrote to the plaintiff a letter seeking apology for his mistake and assuring that he would do
his best to get the horse back.On the 27th of February 1861, Mr. John wrote a letter to the
plaintiff expressing his regret towards the sale of the horse by the defendant. He in his letter
also mentioned .i said the horse is sold.1 Which acts as an evidence that he intended to
sell the horse to the plaintiff and was satisfied with the bargains that took place before 25th
February 1861. He also intended to compensate for the mistake of the defendant by
mentioning ..i have one horse ..if you like to have it for a few months, say five or six,
you are welcome to it, free of any charge, except the expenses of travelling: and if, at the end
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of that time, you like to return him, you can; or you can keep him, and let me know what you
think he is worth 2.Mr. Paul Felthouse not satisfied with the compensation filed a case at
the court of common pleas against Mr. bindley for the conversion of the horse.
The case was heard by a three judge bench that included Willes J, Byles J and Keating J.
Ibid.
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Whether or not the silence of Mr. John till 27th of February makes a valid contract
and thus gives the possession of the horse to Mr. Paul.?
Whether or not the letter sent by Mr. John on 27th of February in which he showed
intention leads the formation of a contract?
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Willes J.
Firstly, He was of the opinion there was no complete bargain on the 2nd of January
and it is also clear that the plaintiff had no right to impose upon Mr.john the sale of his horse
for 30l. 15s unless he chose to comply with the condition of writing to repudiate the offer.
Mr.john might, no doubt, have bound his uncle to the bargain by writing to him; the plaintiff
might also have retracted his offer at any time before acceptance. It stood an open offer and
so things remained until the 25th of February3, when Mr. John was about to sell his farming
stock by auction. The horse in question being catalogued with the rest of the stock, the
defendant was told that it was already sold. It is clear, therefore, that Mr. John in his own
mind intended his uncle to have the horse at the price which plaintiff had named for 30l. 15s.
But he had not communicated such his intention to the plaintiff, or done anything to bind
himself. Nothing, therefore, had been done to vest the property in the horse in the plaintiff
down to the 25th of February, when the horse was sold by the defendant. It appears to that,
independently of the subsequent letters, there had been no bargain to pass the property in the
horse to the plaintiff, and therefore that he had no right to complain of the sale of the horse.4
the letter of John Felthouse of the 27th of February, 1861, was not also admissible in
evidence against the defendant as after the sale of the horse by the defendant, it did not confer
title on the plaintiff; and that there was at the time of the alleged conversion no sufficient
memorandum in writing, or possession of the horse, or payment, to satisfy the statute of
frauds. The honble judge cited the case Carter v. Toussaint5 and Bloxam v. Sanders6 with
refrence to the abovementioned lines.
Secondly, he mentioned that the letter sent by Mr. John to the plaintiff on 25th of
February may be considered as a completion of bargain under the statute of fraud but does
not constitutes the formation of a contract.
Supra note 1.
Ibid.
5
Carter v Toussaint (1822) 5 B & Ald 855.
6
Bloxam v. Sanders (1825) 4 B. & C. 941, 7 D. & R. 396.
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Thirdly, by citing the case of Stockdale v. Dunlop7 he mentioned that assuming that
there had been a complete parol bargain before the 25th of February, and that the letter of
the 27th was a mere expression of the terms of that prior bargain, and not a bargain then for
the first time concluded, it would be directly contrary to the decision8 of the
aforementioned case in which it was held that there can be no compensation for the breach of
a contract which was made verbally and thus is incapable for being enforced9.
At the end, on the contrary to his whole judgement he stated that by taking the case of Coats
v. Chaplin10 as an authority, there can be a remedy for the plaintiff against the defendants . In
this case the traveller of Morrisons, tradesmen in London, verbally ordered goods for
Morrisons of the plaintiffs, manufacturers at Paisley. No order was given as to sending the
goods. The plaintiffs gave them to the defendants, carriers, directed to Morrisons, to be taken
to them, and also sent an invoice by post to Morrisons, who received it. The goods having
been lost by the defendants' negligence, and not delivered to Morrisons,it was held that the
defendants were liable to the plaintiffs.11 In the case in hand it can be observed that the
plaintiff sent a letter to Mr. John for the purchase of the horse. Mr. John also intended to sell
the horse to the plaintiff but due to the negligence on behalf of the third party i.e. the
defendant, the plaintiff was not able to get the horse. On this ground and citing the above
mentioned case the plaintiff may incur the compensation for the conversion of the horse.
Final judgement
Thus, the decision to this case was delivered in the favour of the defendant and no remedy or
compensation was awarded.
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Mere silence to an offer, even though the party to which the offer is made intended to
accept the offer ; does not explicitly accepts or does not show acceptance by any means does
not form a contract between the parties.
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The first contention is, The judgement unambiguously clears the fact that the contract
cannot bind either of the parties to the contract. The fact that Mr.john intended to sell
the horse to the plaintiff of the case leads to dilemma that will he surely sell the horse
or not? Such term in cloud cannot be held as a binding contract for either of the
parties.
The second contention is, that party cannot impose the offer on the other part. The
phrase If I hear no more about him, I consider the horse mine at 30l. 15s.12
imposed Mr. John to enter into a contract with the plaintiff. It is thus, unjustifiable to
bind a party to a contract unilaterally.
Nevertheless, it is submitted that judgment was sound but the argument of professor Miller
criticizing the judgment also seems relevant. He argues
The common pleas held for the auctioneer on the grounds that the plaintiff had no title to
sue since the date of the auction the nephew had not effectively accepted the offer. Given that
he admittedly told the auctioneer that the horse was reserved for his uncle and that the latter
had equally assumed that it was so. It is not clear that why anything further should be
regarded as essential to the formation of a contract. On balance it can be supported that the
approach of the common pleas was wrong in principle and the actual result of the case can
only be supported because there had been no delivery, part payments or memorandum in
writing to satisfy the requirements of the statute of fraud.13
Hence, from the aforementioned argument by professor miller the flaw in the judgment can
be expressly showeth that when Mr. John himself mentioned that ...I said that horse is
sold14 (with reference to the horse in question) to the defendant it can be inferred that he
felt the contract to be complete on his part which was the same in the mind of the plaintiff.
Therefore there was a definite meeting of minds of the party on the contract. This forms a
clear evidence that there was a contract between the parties. If the court had given the
judgment only on the reasoning that there was no written contract or any payment made by
the party that could satisfy the statute of fraud, then, the reasoning behind the judgement
could have been considered effective.
12
Supra note 1.
Prof. C.J. Miller, The modern law review, Volume 35, 489 (1972).
14
Supra note 1.
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