Development Finance Institutions & Extractive Industry

International Financial Institutions: Transparency and disclosure
requirements for the extractive sector

Development Finance Institutions
Class of The Resource Curse, Fall 2013, The New School University
Table of Contents
Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 5
List of Acronyms ........................................................................................................................ 6
1 International Finance Corporation ................................................................................. 7
1.1 Extractive Sector Profile ....................................................................................................... 7

1.2 Transparency in the Extractive Sector............................................................................. 7
1.3 Requirements Regarding Contract, Revenue, and Payment Disclosure .............. 7
1.3.1 Revenue and payments ................................................................................................................7
1.3.2 Accessibility of disclosed revenue and payments: ............................................................8
1.3.3 Contracts.............................................................................................................................................9
1.3.4 Accessibility of disclosed contract information: ............................................................. 10
1.3.5 Additional disclosed information .......................................................................................... 10
1.4 Enforcement and Compliance .......................................................................................... 10
1.5 Gaps and weaknesses .......................................................................................................... 11
1.6 Recommendations................................................................................................................ 11
2 Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency .............................................................. 12

2.1 Extractive Sector Profile .................................................................................................... 12
2.2 Transparency in the Extractive Sector.......................................................................... 13
2.2.1 Comparison to IFC Sustainability Framework................................................................. 15
2.3 Requirements Regarding Contract, Revenue, and Payment Disclosure ........... 15
2.3.1 Revenue and payments disclosure ....................................................................................... 16
2.3.2 Contract disclosure ..................................................................................................................... 16
2.3.3 Additional disclosure requirements .................................................................................... 17
2.4 Enforcement and Compliance .......................................................................................... 17
2.5 Gaps and Weaknesses ......................................................................................................... 18
2.6 Recommendations................................................................................................................ 19
3 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development ......................................... 20

3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
Financing in the Extractive Sector .................................................................................. 20

Transparency and Accountability Policies .................................................................. 22
Access to Information ......................................................................................................... 23
Enforcement Mechanisms ................................................................................................. 25
Dodd-Frank, EU Directives and IFC Sustainability Framework ........................... 25
4 Inter-American Development Bank ............................................................................ 27

4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
Financing in the Extractive Sector .................................................................................. 27

Transparency and Accountability Policies .................................................................. 28
Access to Information ......................................................................................................... 29
Enforcement Mechanisms ................................................................................................. 29
Dodd-Frank, EU Directives, and IFC Sustainability Framework .......................... 29
5 African Development Bank ............................................................................................. 30

5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.5
5.6
Extractive Sector Profile .................................................................................................... 30

Transparency in the extractive sector .......................................................................... 30
Requirements regarding revenue, payments, and contract disclosure ............ 32
Enforcement and Compliance .......................................................................................... 32
Gaps and weaknesses .......................................................................................................... 33
Recommendations................................................................................................................ 34
6 Asian Development Bank ................................................................................................ 36

6.1 Supporting Energy Infrastructure and Governance................................................. 36
6.2 Methodology ........................................................................................................................... 36
6.3 Data Collection ....................................................................................................................... 37
6.3.1 Scope and Size of the Problem................................................................................................ 37
6.3.2 Transparency Policy and Execution ..................................................................................... 37
6.4 Gaps in ADB Policy and Recommendations ................................................................ 38
7 Japan Bank for International Cooperation................................................................ 40

7.1 Extractive Sector Profile .................................................................................................... 40
7.2 Transparency in the Extractive Sector.......................................................................... 40
7.3 Requirements regarding revenue, payments, and contract disclosure ............ 41
7.3.1 Revenue and payments: ............................................................................................................ 41
7.3.2 Contracts.......................................................................................................................................... 41
7.3.3 Additional disclosed information .......................................................................................... 41
7.3.4 Enforcement and Compliance................................................................................................. 41
7.3.5 Gaps and weaknesses ................................................................................................................. 41
7.3.6 Recommendations ....................................................................................................................... 42
7.4 Development Finance Power Map .................................................................................. 42
7.4.1 Relevant stakeholders and decision makers .................................................................... 42
7.4.2 Relevant advocates and potential allies/ Potential areas of influence .................. 42
8 Overseas Private Investment Corporation................................................................ 43

8.1 Supporting Private Finance and Investment with a Development Agenda ..... 43
8.2 Decreasing Investments in Extractive Projects in Favor of Renewables .......... 43
8.3 Methodology ........................................................................................................................... 44
8.4 Data Collection ....................................................................................................................... 45
8.4.1 Scope and Size of the Problem................................................................................................ 45
8.5 Transparency ......................................................................................................................... 46
8.5.1 Payment and Contract Disclosure ......................................................................................... 46
8.5.2 Mechanisms of Compliance ..................................................................................................... 47
8.5.3 Accessibility of Information .................................................................................................... 48
8.5.4 Comparison of Coverage ........................................................................................................... 48
8.5.5 Recommendations ....................................................................................................................... 48
9 Annexes ................................................................................................................................. 51
9.1 International Finance Corporation ................................................................................ 51
9.1.1 Power Map ...................................................................................................................................... 51
9.1.2 Tables and Charts ........................................................................................................................ 55
9.2 Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency ................................................................ 62
9.2.1 Power Map ...................................................................................................................................... 62
9.2.2 Tables and Charts ........................................................................................................................ 64
9.3 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development ........................................... 67
9.3.1 EBRB Draft Mining Strategy .................................................................................................... 67
9.3.2 Criticisms of the EBRD Mining Operations Policy .......................................................... 68
9.3.3 EBRD Public Information Policy ............................................................................................ 69
9.3.4 EBRD Administration Tribunal Case Study....................................................................... 70
9.3.5 EBRD Financed Extractive Industry Projects ................................................................... 71
9.3.6 Transcript of EBRD-related Interviews .............................................................................. 71
9.3.7 EBRD Financed Extractive Industry Projects ................................................................... 76
9.4 Inter-American Development Bank ............................................................................... 77
9.5 African Development Bank ............................................................................................... 77

9.6 Asian Development Bank ................................................................................................... 77
9.7 Japan Bank for International Cooperation .................................................................. 78
9.8 Overseas Private Investment Corporation .................................................................. 80
9.8.1 Power Map ...................................................................................................................................... 80
9.8.2 OPIC Extractive Projects ........................................................................................................... 80
9.8.3 Communication with OPIC regarding Policy inquiry .................................................... 81
Introduction
Terra Lawson-Remer, J.D., PhD, Assistant Professor, The New School
Manuel Valderrama Florez, PhD Student, The New School
The present report is product of a collaborative research project between Revenue Watch
Institute and the Studley Program in International Affairs at The New School University. The
project sought to provide background analysis for potential broad-based coalition efforts to
improve global governance of extractive industries by promoting the transparent and
accountable management of oil, gas and mineral resources. For this, the research addressed
two main topics: a) transparency and disclosure requirements in the official development
finance (private sector development loans and sovereign risk guarantees) from bilateral
import-export credit agencies and multilaterals, and b) beneficial ownership in the
extractive industries sector. These distinct arms were developed through two respective
deliverables. All research and the respective deliverables were executed and written by the
class of the Resource Curse course of the fall semester of 20131.
The main objective of the first arm of the research project was to examine the current
requirements of International Finance Institutions regarding revenue, payment, and
contract disclosure. In addition to mapping these said requirements, the project also
assessed how did these compare to those included in the 2012 IFC Sustainability
Framework, and to new US-EU mandatory disclosure rules through stock market
regulations (e.g., Cardin-Lugar); examined the different enforcement mechanisms deployed
by all IFIs; determined the accessibility of the information that was being disclosed if any-;
and, estimated the coverage of stock market regulations in terms of projects and capital
where possible-. The researchers used existing RWI comments on IFI policies (e.g. EBRD
and US Ex-Im), international good practices (e.g. IMF Guide on Resource Revenue
Transparency), New Schools Resource Curse course literature, and other secondary
literature, for the assessments. Additionally, the project also described the key stakeholders
and decision makers of the IFIs examined.
Due to its extent, the deliverable for the first arm of this research was divided into two
reports, according to the type of IFI: a) Development Finance Institutions (DFI), and b)
Export-Credit Agencies (ECA). This document addresses transparency and disclosure
requirements in Development Finance Institutions. Each chapter develops the abovementioned research objectives to the extent that was possible due to information
constraints2-, and presents the results in four broad sections: background information of
each DFI, contract and payment transparency requirements, a comparison of these said
requirements with mandatory disclosure rules through stock market regulations, and policy
recommendations. The DFIs examined in this document are the following: i) International
Finance Corporation, ii) Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, iii) European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, iv) Inter-American Development Bank, v) African
Development Bank, vi) Asian Development Bank, vii) Japan Bank for International
Cooperation, and viii) Overseas Private Investment Corporation.
Except Chapter 6 - The United States Export-Import Bank of the report dedicated to Export-Import Credit
Agencies, which was developed by project manager Manuel Valderrama Flrez, PhD Student at The New School
University.
2 Since we are dealing with transparency requirements, not all IFIs have included these sort of reforms in to
their policies.
1
List of Acronyms
ADB: Asian Development Bank
AfDB: African Development Bank
ATI: Aid Transparency Index
BTC Pipeline: BakuTbilisiCeyhan pipeline
China ExIm: The Export-Import Bank of China
COFACE: The Compagnie Franaise d'Assurance pour le Commerce Extrieur
COO: Country of Operation
CSE: Civil Society Engagement Unit
CSO: Civil Society Organization
EA: Environmental Analyses
EU: European Union
EBRD: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ECA: Export-Credit Agency
ECG: Export Credits and Credit Guarantees
EI: Extractive Industry
EIA: Environmental Impact Assessments
EITI: Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative
ESHR: Environmental, Social and Human Rights
ESIA: Environment and Social Impact Assessment
ESMR: Environmental and Social Management Reports
ESS: Environmental and Social Strategies
EU: European Union
Dodd-Frank: Dodd- Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
ICC: Inter-American Investment Corporation
IDB: Inter-American Development Bank
IFC: International Finance Corporation
IFI: International Institution
JBIC: The Japan Bank for International Cooperation
KEXIM: Korea Export Import Bank
LAC: Latin America and the Caribbean
MIGA: The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPIC: Overseas Private Investment Corporation
PCM: Project Complaint Mechanism
PIP: Public Information Policy
PSD: Project Summary Document
PWYP: Publish What You Pay
RWI: Revenue Watch Institute
SCF: Structured and Corporate Finance
SDR: Special Drawing Rights
SEA: Strategic Environmental Analyses
SEC: U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
US Ex-Im: United States Export Import Bank
UKEF: United Kingdom Export Finance Department
WBG: World Bank Group
1 International Finance Corporation3

The International Finance Corporation (IFC) is a legally and financially independent affiliate
of the World Bank Group with 184 member countries. The IFC provides investment
services, advisory services, and asset management with a vision to end extreme poverty and
increase shared prosperity in every developing country.
1.1 Extractive Sector Profile

The International Financial Corporation (IFC) works with 30 companies in 23 countries on
oil and gas projects and has a $2 billion oil and gas portfolio. It has 37 mining projects in 25
countries, with a $500 million mining portfolio. 4 During the fiscal year ending June 30th
2013, the IFC invested $389.34 million in oil & gas, and mining projects (Flow variable:
spans across a period). 5
Table 1: Oil, gas and mining sector portfolio fiscal year 2013
Number of Projects
Number of Countries
Total Portfolio
Oil & Gas
Mining
30 (companies)
37
23
225
$2billion
$500million
FY13 Total Invested in All Extractive Industries: $389.34million
Source: IFC Annual Report 2013: Industry Results, www.ifc.org
1.2 Transparency in the Extractive Sector

According to the Access to Information Policy outlined by the IFC, transparency is essential
to building and maintaining public dialogue and increasing public awareness about IFCs
development role and mission. It is also critical for enhancing good governance,
accountability, and development effectiveness. Through the IFCs Sustainability
Framework, the corporation promotes transparency of revenue payments from extractive
industry projects to host governments.
1.3 Requirements Regarding Contract, Revenue, and Payment Disclosure

1.3.1 Revenue and payments
IFCs Policy on Social and Environmental Sustainability states that all IFC-financed
extractive industry projects are required to publicly disclose their material project
payments made to the host government (such as royalties, taxes, and profit sharing). Such
This section was elaborated by The New Schools students Alix Schroder <schra652@newschool.edu>, Kaili
Jackson <jackk073@newschool.edu>, Zo Meroney <meroz441@newschool.edu>, Rudy Shaffer
<shafr174@newschool.edu.
4 Oil & Gas Overview Presentation, International Finance Corporation (IFC).
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/2e17440049a5ca20a138e3a8c6a8312a/IFC2012_Oil_andGasOverv
iew.pdf?MOD=AJPERES (accessed November 20, 2013.
5 Annual Report 2013: Industry Results, International Finance Corporation (IFC)
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/corp_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/annual+report/2013
_online_report/global_results/industry_results/ar13_results_industry_ogmc (accessed November 20, 2013).
3
disclosure is made on a project basis or on a corporate basis, depending on what is most

appropriate given country taxation and corporate arrangements.6
The IFC now provides links to its clients revenue payments to host governments on its
website: The site only includes projects approved as of January 1, 2007. Reports are
available up to 2011. Clients payment data is updated every August.
Beginning in August 2010, IFC commits to ensure that clients report on a standardized
disaggregated basis. As part of this initiative, the IFC has developed a standardized revenuereporting template for it extractive industry clients (however, to date the link for this
template is broken on the website).
1.3.2 Accessibility of disclosed revenue and payments:

As client projects enter a phase in which revenues will accrue, disclosure documents are
available on the IFC website. Information included spans economic data and impact,
government material payments such as royalties and taxes paid, and environmental and
social impacts.
Out of the 14 payments disclosed in 20117 (See Annex 9.1.2, Table 2 for more
details):
o Some used some form of an easy to understand consolidated chart disclosing
total payments to host government (Vostok, Peru LNG, Kuwait Energy)
o Hyperlinks were unavailable for 2011 (Melrose and ROCH)
o 1 used an easy to read template however it aggregated totals paid for the
entire region (Salamander Energy/Southeast Asia (Thailand, Borneo, and
Indonesia)
o 1 used an easy to understand template that broke payments down to local,
regional, national, and aggregate country total (Geopark)
o 1 used an easy template broken down into PAYE, SDL, UIF, Royalties, and
VAT payments to a country however, some website digging was needed
(Petra Diamonds)
o 1 used a Spanish only website (Medanito)
o 1 file was corrupted when downloaded. Only linked method of disclosure
(Pan American Energy)
o embedded payment disclosures in lengthy documents or annual reports
making it difficult to find the actual amounts disclosed (Lonmin, BPZ
Resources, Bankers Petroleum, Candax).
Of the disclosure methods deployed those with a direct link from the IFC website to
a consolidated chart detailing specific payment data such as income tax, VAT,
royalties, license and production bonuses, and other material payments provided
the clear and functional understanding. Companies such as Salamander Energy and
Kuwait Energy exemplified this method. Those companies employing the use of an
Policy on Environmental and Social Sustainability, in IFC Sustainability Framework, International Financial
Corporation: World Bank Group. January 1, 2012, p11
7 Government Revenues, International Finance Corporation (IFC),
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/industry_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/industries/oil%2
C+gas+and+mining/development_impact/development_impact_disclosure/development_impact_disclosure
_government_revenues (accessed November 15, 2013)
6
Annual Report to disclose payments had a tendency to embed the information

amongst lengthy Management Discussion and Analysis reports and financial
statements, making it difficult for the layman to decipher payments made directly to
the host government. Examples would be reporting the Sales, net royalties and Gross
Sales across various financial statements essentially withholding the specific value
of the royalty paid. Thus affording a calculation to be made.8 It is unclear as to the
reason for the lack of specificity.
Project specificity was similarly difficult to find unless the company was created to
work on only one project or if the IFC funded multiple fields headed under a single
project name. In the case of Peru LNG, the company was created specifically for the
project the IFC is funding and thus it was easy to delineate the payments made to
the host country.9 Yet, typically if multiple countries were involved in the IFC funded
project disaggregated totals would be disclosed by country, but not necessarily by
specific projects. For example, Petra Diamonds discloses its payments by country
and by type of payment, but not by specific project or field. This is problematic in
that according to the Summary of Investment by the IFC only one field in South
Africa is funded by the IFC commitment, yet Petra has licenses for five mining
sites.10
Other projects were disaggregated by stages of project development. No payment

disclosures were available for projects in the exploration phases as no material
payments were yet made. Summarized investment information is available via the
www.ifc.org under the subheading of Projects.
1.3.3 Contracts
The IFC requires that those extractive industry projects backed financially by the IFC are
made publicly available. As stated in the Policy on Environmental and Social Sustainability,
the principal contract set forth between the IFC client corporation and the host government
that outlines the key terms and conditions, under which the resource will be exploited,
along with any significant amendments to that contract, are to be made public.11 These
contracts include host government agreements (HGAs) and intergovernmental agreements
(IGAs). A summary may be accepted in lieu of full contract disclosure if it includes the life of
the contract, any material payments due to the government, other fiscal terms and
conditions, and a summary of any significant stabilization clauses.
Candex Energy, Inc. Annual Report 2011, p27, 50

to Governmental Authorities 2011 Peru LNG.
https://portal.perulng.com/irj/go/km/docs/documents/PLNG%20Website/English/Static%20Content/W
SiteV2_ENG/POPUP_ENG_WSiteV2/NUESTRO_PROYECTO_ENG_WSiteV2/POPUP_IMPECOGLOBALENG_201
1_ENG_WSiteV2.htm (accessed on December 8, 2013)
10 Sustainable Development Report 2011, Petra Diamonds.
http://petradiamonds2011.html.investis.com/economic-performance.html (accessed November 15, 2013)
11 Policy on Environmental and Social Sustainability in IFC Sustainability Framework. International Financial
Corporation: World Bank Group. January 1, 2012, p11
8
9Payment
1.3.4 Accessibility of disclosed contract information:

In practice contracts and contractual summaries are not very accessible. Specific details of
contracts are not available from the IFC website unless by proxy of disclosure within an
annual report. For example, the 2011 10-K Annual Report for BPZ Resources, Inc. can be
found on the IFC website and embedded within are the details of the license contract
between Peru and BPZ. Details included key terms such as the duration of the contract,
terms of exploration, tax deferment, bonds, and royalty percentages along with details on
labor, technology, and environmental issues.12 Possibly due to the passage of the CardinLugar provision within the Dodd-Frank Act in which it is required that those companies
publically traded on US stock markets disclose contracts or summaries thereof accessing
contracts was possible. See Annex 9.1.2 for more details. Methods used in locating the
contracts was either through the IFC website or the Securities and Exchange Commission
website, www.sec.gov. However, locating contracts of those companies not traded in US
stock markets proved difficult.
1.3.5 Additional disclosed information

The IFC makes available investment information and project details as according to the
Performance Standards outlined in the IFC Sustainability Framework. Available details on
IFC investment information is accessible on IFC website, www.ifc.org, through the Oil & Gas
and Mining drop-tab under the subheading Industries.
A Summary of Investment Information (SII) from the proposal to approval stages and each
subsequent year is available whilst an IFC commitment. The SII provides details of the
project and the expected role of the IFC including the proposed investment amount, type of
project, the use of IFC funding, major shareholders, total project cost, amount, nature of IFCs
investment, and the development impact.
The Environment and Social Summary Review includes information on the development
impact on the environment, the clients adherence to the Performance Standards as outlined
by the IFC Sustainability Framework, and compliance with Good International Industry
Practice (GIIP).13
1.4 Enforcement and Compliance

The Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman, an independent recourse mechanism for the IFC and
MIGA, ensures enforcement and accountability. With a purpose of addressing complaints by
people affected by IFC/MIGA projects and to enhance the social and environmental
accountability of both institutions. Revenue payment disclosure is enforced by the IFC as
outlined per the Performance Standards. Supervision is conducted by the IFC through the
clients Annual Monitoring Report. If a client fails to comply with IFC standards, the IFC will
work with the client to reestablish compliance and exercise remedies as appropriate.14
Additionally, the Independent Evaluation Group, a unit within the World Bank charged with
objectively evaluating and assessing members of the World Bank Groups performance. As a
BPZ Energy, Inc. 2011 Annual Report, p. 26-28

Access to Information Policy, in IFC Sustainability Framework. International Financial Corporation: World
Bank Group. January 1, 2012, p62-65
14 Policy on Environmental and Social Sustainability and Access to Information Policy, in IFC Sustainability
Framework. International Financial Corporation: World Bank Group. January 1, 2012, p8, 67
12
13
10
member of the World Bank Group, the IFC is subjected to project and policy level
evaluations to ensure adherence to the goals as stated by the IFCs mission.15
1.5 Gaps and weaknesses

The IFC Sustainability Framework fails to indicate the method in which disclosure of
payments and contracts should be made publicly available (e.g. location, languages, etc.).16
The IFC does not require that its client organizations disclose disaggregated project specific
payments from the client companies to governments. Instead what can be attained from
client is dependent on what is deemed appropriate by the company or corporation. Also, the
types of data that the companies do disclose vary greatly among companies. For example,
some companies only report company-level aggregated data across all operations and some
aggregate across more than one year.17
The IFC requires public accessibility of contracts, yet provides limited knowledge in which
to locate contracts.
The IFC has no policy provision concerning transparency in operations with Financial
Intermediaries. Though there are requirements regarding compliance of Performance
Standards, there are no specific extractive industry requirements regarding revenue
payments or contract disclosure. This is of significant concern as over 40 percent of all IFC
lending takes place through financial intermediaries allowing for secondary investments
(those companies who are being invested by a financial intermediary) to lack the same kind
of scrutiny as direct investments.
1.6 Recommendations
The IFC should create an addendum to the Policy on Environmental and Social Sustainability
specifying the types of payments to be disclosed, how they are to be disclosed, and where
they are to be disclosed. Additionally, an accessible template preferably in the form of a
consolidated chart detailing the determined payment types should be required.
The IFC should develop a hyper linked table of all Oil & Gas and Mining projects with links
to SII, ERSR, Annual Reports, above template, and contracts. Increasing the accessibility of
information for the public.
Develop an action plan to encourage contract disclosure requirements by those
governments with a high number of extractive industry corporations. Possible avenues may
be through the EITI, its advisory commitments, and through its member states and partners.
Methodology, Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) www.ieg.worldbankgroup.org/methodology (accessed

November 15, 2013)
16 Quick Reference Guide to Extractive Industries Revenue and Contract Transparency at the International
Finance Institutions, Bank Information Center (BIC), January 2010. http://www.bicusa.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/01/2010_Reference_IFIPolicies.pdf (accessed October 25, 2013)
17 Government Revenues, International Finance Corporation.
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/industry_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/industries/oil%2
C+gas+and+mining/development_impact/development_impact_disclosure/development_impact_disclosure
_government_revenues (accessed October 29, 2013)
15
11
2 Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency18

The Multilateral Investment Agency (MIGA) is a member of the World Bank Group with 179
member countries. MIGA provides political risk insurance guarantees to private sector
investors and lenders, with the mission to promote foreign direct investment (FDI) into
developing countries.

Since its inception in 1988, MIGA has issued guarantee contracts totaling $3.4 billion for
projects in the extractive sector $1.8 billion for projects in the oil and gas sector19 and $1.6
billion in the mining sector20. In the 2013 fiscal year ending June 30th, the oil and gas
portfolio stood at $918.4 million and the mining portfolio stood at $240 million.
Figure 1. MIGAs Extractive Sector Portafolio, Fiscal Year 2013 - Source: MIGA 2013 Annual Report,
http://www.miga.org/documents/Annual_Report13.pdf
In 2013, MIGA issued $652.1 in guarantees of oil, gas, and mining projects. The two sectors
accounted for 11 percent of MIGAs outstanding gross portfolio.21 It is significant to note
that during MIGAs 2013 fiscal year, new business by sector shifted dramatically from the
financial sector to infrastructure and oil, gas and mining. The financial sector accounted for
17 percent of new volume in 2013, while infrastructure accounted for 46 percent of new
volume and the oil, gas, and mining sectors accounted for 23 percent of new volume (See
Annex 9.2.2 for outstanding portfolio distribution by sector).22
19 MIGA Brief: Oil and Gas, MIGA, April 2013. http://www.miga.org/documents/oil&gasbrief.pdf, (accessed
Oct. 23, 2013), p.3
20 MIGA Brief: Mining, MIGA, April 2013, http://www.miga.org/documents/miningbrief.pdf, (accessed October
23, 2013), p.3
21 MIGA Annual Report 2013, MIGA, June 30, 2013, http://www.miga.org/documents/Annual_Report13.pdf,
(accessed December 4, 2013), p.3
22 MIGA Annual Report 2013, p.23
18
12
Infrastructure, 46%
Oil, gas, and mining 23%
Financial, 17%
Agribusiness, manufacturing,
and service, 14%
Figure 2: MIGA Guarantees issued in FY 2013, by sector (by $ volume)

Source: MIGA 2013 Annual Report, http://www.miga.org/documents/Annual_Report13.pdf
Currently, MIGA has 7 active oil and gas projects and 5 active mining projects (See Annex
9.2.2 for a complete list of active projects) 23. The majority of these projects are located in
Africa, with the remaining located in Latin America, Asia, and Central Europe. The guarantee
holders for MIGA-supported extractive sector projects include private companies,
development banks, and national banks. Several of the companies guaranteed through MIGA
for extractive industry projects are publicly listed in United States and European Union
stock exchanges (See Figure 3). Note: The companies listed in the U.S. exchange markets
have to comply with the Dodd-Frank Act transparency requirements, and the companies
listed in E.U. exchange markets have to comply with disclosure and transparency
requirements as dictated by the E.U Transparency Directive24.
U.S. Exchange Markets
London Stock Exchange (LSE)

Deutsche Boerse
Euronext Paris
Sasol Ltd
El Paso Corporation
Kinross Gold Corporation
(owns BEMA Gold
Corporation)
Kenmare Resources Plc.
Anglooval Mining Ltd
Sasol Ltd
Kenmare Resources Plc.
Mitsubishi Corporation
Dodd-Frank Act
EU Transparency
Directive
EU Transparency
Directive
EU Transparency
Directive
Table 2: Extractive sector companies in U.S. and E.U Exchange Markets - Source: Oil and Mining
Companies on Global Stock Exchanges, http://data.revenuewatch.org/listings/
Eramet SA

On October 1, 2007 MIGA released an updated Policy on Disclosure of Information that
supersedes its previous Disclosure Policy from July 1999. The Policy states that MIGA
believes transparency and accountability are fundamental to fulfilling its development
Note: all extractive sector projects (including non-active projects) can be found on
http://www.miga.org/sectors/index.cfm?stid=1813.
24 Transparency Requirements for Listed Companies, The European Commission (EC),
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/transparency/ (accessed December 6, 2013)
23
13
mandate and to strengthening public trust in MIGA and its clients25. While the updated
Policy does not explicitly mention the extractive sector, it has several implications for
extractive sector transparency:
The Policy on Disclosure of Information stipulates that MIGA has to make available
certain specific information,26 including an Environmental and Social Review
Summary (ESRS) and Summary of Proposed Guarantee (SPG) for each MIGAsupported project. This encompasses all extractive sector projects.
The Policy on Disclosure of Information also stipulates which information is publicly

disclosed by MIGA and how it can be accessed. All information referred to in MIGAs
Policy on the Disclosure of Information as being publicly available or routinely
disclosed by MIGA is accessible on MIGAs web site (www.miga.org), through the
World Bank InfoShop located in Washington D.C., and through Public Information
Centers (PICS), which are situated around the world in World Bank member
countries.27 In the event that information is not readily available from the
aforementioned sources can be requested in writing (by email, mail, or fax) from
MIGA.
Extractive industry-specific information is easily accessible on MIGAs website. Extractive

industry projects are divided into two categoriesoil and gas, and miningand are located
in the Extractive Industries subheading under the Sectors tab. Each extractive industry
project has an independent page with active links to PDF files of the project-specific ESPS
and SPG. The following information is also accessible for each extractive industry project:
(1) project name, (2) fiscal year, (3) status (active or inactive), (4) guarantee holder, (4)
investor country, (5) host country, (6) environmental category, (7) date SPG disclosed, (8)
project board date, (9) gross exposure, (10) project type, and (11) strategic priority area.
All MIGA policy documents and discourse emphasize the importance of information
disclosure, yet the actual scope of said disclosure is limited. For example, the MIGAs Policy
on Social and Environmental Sustainability (Sustainability Policy) states that through the
Performance Standards, MIGA requires its project companies to engage with affected
communities through the disclosure of information, consultation and informed
participation.28 However, this is the extent of the detail provided on requirements for the
disclosure of this information. It does not specify when or where this information should be
disclosed, nor does it specify any requirements or methods for how the information is to be
made public to the affected communities.
MIGAs Performance Standards is the only document that outlines which information clients
are required to disclose to affected communities. According to the Performance Standards,
clients are required to disclose relevant project information to affected communities and
MIGAs Policy on Disclosure of Information, MIGA, October 1, 2007.

http://www.miga.org/documents/environ_social_disclosure_policy_021507.pdf (accessed November 18,
2013), Section 1: Purpose, p.1
26 MIGA Policy on Disclosure of Information, Section III: Information Made Available by MIGA, p.2
27 MIGA Policy on Disclosure of Information, Section IV: Access to Information, p.9
28 MIGAs Policy on Social and Environmental Sustainability, MIGA, October 1, 2007.
http://www.miga.org/documents/environ_social_review_021507.pdf (accessed November 18, 2013), p.4
25
14
other stakeholders.29 Relevant project information is defined as (1) information on the

purpose, nature and scale of project, (2) the duration of proposed project activities, and (3)
any risks to and potential impacts on such communities.30 A note on accessibility: this
information was found on the Performance Standards document from October 1, 2007. The
document states that the Performance Standards were revised in October 2013 and to visit
www.miga.org/sustainability to access them. However, there is no link or, even reference,
to the 2013 Performance Standards on the MIGA site.
It appears that the majority of the responsibility for disclosure of information actually rests
with the client, not with MIGA. The Policy on Disclosure of Information states that most of
the responsibility for disclosing information about MIGA-supported activities rests with the
relevant client31.
2.2.1 Comparison to IFC Sustainability Framework

As a World Bank member, MIGAs policies on transparency and accountability closely align
with IFC policies. However, there are notable differences between MIGAs policies and the
updated 2012 IFC Sustainability Framework.
Contract disclosure requirements in MIGAs Sustainability Policy only apply to

significant new extractive industry projects (those projects expected to account
for ten percent or more of government revenues). The updated IFC Sustainability
Framework removed this stipulation.
The IFC Framework requires its clients to publicly disclose the principal contract
with government that sets out the key terms and conditions under which a resource
will be exploited and any significant amendments to that contract. MIGA does not
have this requirement32. Additionally, IFC provides links to its clients revenue
payments to host governments on its website and has developed a standardized
revenue-reporting template for its extractive industry clients.
The IFC Framework provides a two-stage appeals mechanism for those who believe
an information request has been unreasonably denied33
(1) Submit an appeal to the Access to Information Policy Advisor (AIP Advisor)
(2) Ability to appeal the AIP Advisors denial within thirty calendar days
Compared to MIGA policies, the IFC Framework requires increased engagement
with affected communities, including the requirement to provide periodic reports to
affected communities.
2.3 Requirements Regarding Contract, Revenue, and Payment Disclosure

As noted above, MIGAs Policy on Disclosure of Information does not explicitly reference
extractive industry disclosure requirements. The Policy on Social and Environmental
Sustainability is the only MIGA policy document that makes explicit reference to the
MIGA Performance Standards on Social and Environmental Sustainability, MIGA, October 1, 2007.
http://www.miga.org/documents/performance_standards_social_and_env_sustainability.pdf (accessed
November 18, 2013), p.5
30 MIGA Performance Standards, p.5
31 MIGA Policy on Disclosure of Information, Section III, p.2
32 IFC Sustainability Framework, International Financial Corporation (IFC),
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/b9dacb004a73e7a8a273fff998895a12/IFC_Sustainability_+Frame
work.pdf?MOD=AJPERES (accessed December 8, 2013, p.11
33 IFC Sustainability Framework, p.66
29
15
extractive industries. The Sustainability Policy, and accompanying Performance Standards,

went into effective as of October 1, 2007. Under Section 3: MIGAs Roles and
Responsibilities, MIGA designates a subsection to extractive industry projects that outlines
MIGAs extractive sector-specific initiatives on governance and disclosure. The Policy states,
In the extractive industrieswhere a project can have potentially broader implications for
the public at large, MIGA recognizes the importance of assessment of governance risks and
disclosure of information as a means to manage governance risks.34 The requirements for
contract, revenue and payment disclosure are outlined below.
2.3.1 Revenue and payments disclosure

The Sustainability Policy states that MIGA promotes transparency of revenue payments
from extractive industry projects to host governments35. According to the Policy, MIGA
requires clients of all MIGA-supported extractive industry projects to publicly disclose their
material payments (such as royalties, taxes, and profit sharing) from those projects to the
host government(s).36 Disclosure can be made on a project-by-project or corporate basis.
However, it is unclear how this disclosure occurs or how it is monitored. The extractive
industry project pages on MIGAs website do not include any links or information regarding
revenue and payment streams to host governments.
MIGA requires that clients complete development effectiveness indicators on the third
anniversary of the effective date in order to monitor and track the project enterprises
development outcomes in the years following the implementation of the investment project.
The required indicators to be reported are investment, taxes and fees, locally procured
goods, training outlays, direct employment, and community development outlays.37
However, it is unclear if clients are required to disclose the indicators publicly. There are no
references to these indicators anywhere on the website, only in the fine print in MIGA
contract templates.
2.3.2 Contract disclosure

For significant new extractive industries projects those expected to account for ten
percent or more of government revenues clients are required to publicly disclose the
relevant terms of key agreements that are of public concern, such as host government
agreements (HGAs) and intergovernmental agreements (IGAs)38. However, contracts are
not accessible on the website, despite correspondence with MIGA that told us they were. We
sent an email to Mallory Saleson, Head of Communications at MIGA, inquiring where we
could locate the key agreements of public concern (as mentioned above). She responded,
MIGA Performance Standards on Social and Environmental Sustainability, MIGA, October 1, 2007.
http://www.miga.org/documents/performance_standards_social_and_env_sustainability.pdf (accessed
November 18, 2013), p.5
35 MIGA Sustainability Policy, p.5
36 MGA Sustainability Policy, p.5
37 Contract of Guarantee for Equity Investments between MGA and Guarantee Holder, MIGA, December 31,
2012, accessed November 19, 2013,
http://www.miga.org/documents/disclosure/Contract%20of%20Guarantee%20for%20Equity%20Invest
ments.pdf, Annex 3B
38 MIGA Operations Regulations, MIGA, amended through December 5, 2012,
http://www.miga.org/documents/Operations-Regulations.pdf (accessed October 23, 2013), p.132
34
16
They are disclosed on our websiteyou can find all projects and documentation we
publicly disclose related to those projects [on our website]39. However, we were unable to
locate any HGAs, IGAs, or similar on their website.
2.3.3 Additional disclosure requirements

The disclosure requirements listed in MIGAs Sustainability Policy are required in addition
to the disclosure requirements specified in MIGAs Performance Standard 1: Social and
Environmental Assessment and Management Systems. MIGAs Performance Standards do
not include requirements for contract, revenue, or payment disclosure to host countries, nor
do they specifically reference the extractive industry sector. For reference, the Performance
Standard 1 has the following disclosure requirements40:
Where the client has undertaken a process of Social and Environmental Assessment,
the client is required to publicly disclose the Assessment document.
If communities may be affected by risks or adverse impacts from the project, the
client is required to provide the communities with access to information on the
purpose, nature, and scale of the project, the duration of proposed project activities,
and any risks to and potential impacts on such communities.
To remain eligible for MIGA guarantees, MIGA requires the guarantee holder to maintain
and preserve the following: (1) audited accounts of the project enterprise in accordance
with IFI reporting standards, (2) any other material information relating to the investment
project and (3) all required registrations, filing, declarations, authorizations, approvals,
permits, consents, concessions and licenses.41 The document does not explicitly state if the
guarantee holder has to maintain these records publicly.

To ensure accountability, MIGA carries out an integrity/corporate risk assessment in all
projects for MIGA guarantees. These include checks of involved parties, clients safeguards
for dealing with fraud and corruption, and project structure and contractual agreements.
After MIGA guarantees a contract of guarantee, MIGA continues to monitor the performance
of the projects being supported42. MIGA reserves the right to terminate the contract if the
guarantee holder omits required information, fails to comply with confidentiality
provisions, violates the laws and regulations of the host country (with respect to the
project) or violates MIGAs performance standards43. Additionally, on their website MIGA
states,
MIGAs stance against fraud, corruption, or related misconduct (coercive, collusive, and
obstructive practices), or a lack of transparency, is also incorporated into the legal
documentation governing its investment guarantees, and gives MIGA the right to deny
Email correspondence with Mallory Saleson, November 15, 2013

MIGA Performance Standards, p.5
41 Contract of Guarantee, p
42 MIGA Operations Regulations, Annex B. 27 (p.134)
43 Contract of Guarantee, p.28-29
39
40
17
compensation payment or terminate guarantee coverage.44
However, we were unable to locate any precedent of MIGA terminating coverage or denying
payment due to failure of lack of transparency. Also, it isnt clear where to find the legal
documentation stating mentioned here. There is no explicit mention of transparency
requirements in any of the contract templates available on the website.
Accountability is also addressed through the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO),
which enables individuals and communities affected by MIGA-supported projects to raise
their concerns to an independent oversight authority45, and the Independent Evaluation
Group (IEG), which assesses the development impact of MIGA programs, guarantee projects
and complementary services46.
2.5 Gaps and Weaknesses
Access to contract and revenue disclosure is limited. Neither are accessible on

MIGAs website and direct requests for access were unsuccessful. According to
Mallory Saleson, Head of Communications at MIGA, since payments are disclosed
through host country governments, this information is not available through MIGA
and we would have to check with individual ministries.47
MIGA limits the requirement for contract disclosure to only significant new
extractive projects.48 A significant new extractive project is a project expected to
account for ten percent or more of government revenues.
The Policy on Disclosure of Information infers communities should have access to

publicly disclosed payments to the government, but it does not stipulate the manner
in which these disclosures should be made available.
None of MIGAs policy documents explicitly specify the necessary types of

investment to be disclosed (i.e. production sharing agreements and concession
agreements are not mentioned) or how they should be disclosed (e.g. location,
languages, etc.).
While there is a surfeit of documentation on environmental and social impact,

MIGAs website offers very little in terms of overall financial disclosure. Annual
financial reports of the clients are not available, only quarterly and annual financial
reports from MIGA itself.
The 2007 Performance Standards document states that the Performance Standards
were revised in October 2013 and to visit www.miga.org/sustainability to access
them. However, there is no link or, even reference, to the 2013 Performance
Institutional Integrity, MIGA, http://www.miga.org/projects/index.cfm?stid=1824 (accessed December 6,

2013).
46 About IEG, Independent Evaluation Group, http://ieg.worldbank.org/about-us (accessed November 18,
2013)
47 Email correspondence with Mallory Saleson, November 15, 2013
44
18
Standards on the MIGA site. Similarly, the Operational Regulations document is

amended through December 5, 2012 but unable to locate a more recent version.
2.6 Recommendations
49
50
Make the revenue, payment, and contract information from clients publicly available
on the MIGA website. Since MIGA requires clients of MIGA-supported projects to
(supposedly) publicly disclose a majority of this information, providing a platform
for public access would be a simple next step. Additionally, it would bolster
transparency and accountability within the client organizations.
Require clients development effectiveness indicators reports to be publicly

disclosed, as outlined in MIGAs guarantee contracts. This would boost transparency
in the extractive sector because one of the required indicators to be reported is
taxes and fees, defined as all transfers to all levels of the Host Government made by
the Project Enterprise, its parent company, or its operating subsidiary on behalf of
the project enterprise, including income or profit taxes, sales, and excise taxes, and
VAT receipts. Other payments collected by the Host Government include royalties,
bonuses, dividends, management/concession fees, value of profit oil and productsharing, construction activities, licensing, permitting, etc.49
Enhance external accountability for decisions regarding disclosure50. MIGA should

address the areas of the disclosure policies that constrain its ability to fulfill its
responsibilities regarding the publics right to know. This should include (1)
conducting a comprehensive and participatory evaluation of disclosure policy
implementation, (2) reviewing the list of exceptions to disclosure, and (3) modifying
ambiguous language regarding extractive sector policies in its Policy on Disclosure
of Information.
Specify the method for affected communities to access disclosed contracts and
payment/revenue information. Currently, no such method is incorporated in MIGA
policy. One recommendation is to require clients to produce an annual report
disclosing revenues and payments that is specifically designed for public
consumption. The reports would be available on MIGAs website in English, as well
as in the language(s) of the host country.
Facilitate relationships between its clients and host country civil society
organizations, as a mechanism to increase public pressure for transparency and
accountability.
Contract of Guarantee, p.41

Assessing World Bank Openness: A Transparency Scorecard, Global Transparency Initiative, September
2006. http://www.bicusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/WBG+Transparency+Scorecard.pdf (accessed
November 20, 2013).
19
3 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development51

The EBRD was created in 1991 for the purpose of building the economies of the formerly
Soviet European states. It has since become the largest financial investor in central Europe,
central Asia and the southern and eastern Mediterranean, and has a mission statement
devoted to promotion of the private sector. The EBRD is owned by The European Union, The
European Investment Bank, and 64 national governments from all over the world.
3.1 Financing in the Extractive Sector

The following facts are presented on EBRDs website, and have been analyzed and criticized
for usefulness. EBRD's total project value of investments in natural resources as a sector
was 14.8 Billion Euros, which is divided across 105 different projects. 52 Its net business
volume is 3 billion Euros.
Unfortunately, these aggregates have little supporting information or explanation. They fail
to explain which time period is being reported upon, how numbers were aggregated, or how
project value is assessed. These numbers, since they are not disaggregated by sub-sector
include many natural resource projects that are not specifically extractive in nature, such as
petrol distribution network projects like Galnaftogaz Loan II.53
Figure 3. EBRDs Natural Resources Portfolio since 2006, by sector Source: Investments in Natural
Resources, EBRD54
In its Investments in Natural Resources section, EBRD does not offer a total investment
figure, but rather visually disaggregates data by sector. By conducting a visual estimation,
EBRD finances approximately $1.5 billion Euros in the extractive sector. The largest
The New Schools students Masha Katz -Katzm969@newschool.edu-, Justin Coburn cobuj499@newschool.edu-, Emma Stoskopf-Ehrlich -stose168@newschool.edu-, Jonatthan Leonard Leonj726@newschool.edu-, and Jaron Vogelsang -vogej566@newschool.edu- elaborated this section.
52
Natural Resource Sector. EBRD. Accessed November 16, 2013.
http://www.ebrd.com/pages/sector/naturalresources.shtml
53
Galnaftogaz Loan II Project Summary Document. EBRD. Accessed Nov. 19 2013 http://www.ebrd.com/
english/pages/project/psd/2013/45462.shtml
54
http://www.ebrd.com/pages/sector/naturalresources.shtml - Accessed Nov. 16 2013
51
20
category of investment claims to be in oil and gas extraction, with an investment of 300
million Euros. 55
The chart suggests that (between coal and metals) only about 70 million Euros have been
invested into mining operations. This seems remarkably low, considering that the EBRDs
project summary documents state that, over the course of the last 10 years, at least $1.49B
has been lent or approved for future loan disbursements, to mining projects56 (for a
breakdown of this figure see Annex 9.3.5 - EBRD Financed Extractive Industry Projects). The
graph fails to identify the time frame for the information presented.
The second largest amount of money invested by the bank is in remediation services with a
total of 270 Million Euros. Environmental remediation is the action of remedying
something, especially the reversal or stopping of damage to the environment.57 EBRD
remediation services include relocation efforts, clean-up projects, or efficiency
improvements i.e. the MOL/Slovnaft Energy Efficiency Project.58 (Remediation projects
were not classified as EI projects by the researcher in Annex 9.3.5 - EBRD Financed
Extractive Industry Projects)
There is no easy way to access the historical data of extractive industry activity in a
coherent or aggregated form. Instead, summary documents (PSDs) of natural resource
projects for the past 10 years were reviewed, and independent decisions which classified
the projects were made and EBRD's amount lent to extractive projects was calculated.
Many of EBRDs natural resource projects were not included as extractive. Generally these
were loans for: refinery construction/improvement, recycling (of coal/gas), pipeline
construction, petrol station construction, treatment facilities, and distribution networks. All
of the aforementioned information was collected into a spreadsheet (Annex 9.3.6 - EBRD
Financed Extractive Industry Projects) and analyzed.
EBRD projects which are classified as B-level (in terms of social/environmental impact)
only sometimes are required to provide PSDs,59 so there may be significant loans made to
clients for projects which are not disclosed. These include non-disclosed B-level projects, Clevel projects, and projects using intermediary financial Institutions.
According to the PSDs used in Annex 9.3.5 - EBRD Financed Extractive Industry Projects, in
the last 10 years (2004 - 2013) EBRD has approved $2.515B USD in strictly extractive
projects:
Mining: $1.5B (16 Projects)
Oil & Gas: $1.0B (14 Projects)
Natural Resources Sector. EBRD. Accessed Nov. 19th 2013

http://www.ebrd.com/pages/sector/naturalresources.shtml
56 Project Summary Documents. EBRD. Accessed Nov. 19th 2013. http://www.ebrd.com/saf/
search.html?type=project
57 Remediation Definition. The Free Dictionary. Accessed Nov 20, 2013. http://www.thefreedictionary.com/
Environmental remediation
58 Project Summary Document: MOL/Slovnaft Energy Efficiency. EBRD. Accessed Nov. 19th 2013.
http://www.ebrd.com/english/pages/project/psd/2012/43869.shtml
59 EBRD Policy Brief. CEE Bankwatch. May 2013. Page 2. http://bankwatch.org/sites/default/files/ briefingEBRD-PIP-ESP-10May2013.pdf
55
21
3.2 Transparency and Accountability

Policies
EBRD encourages their clients to disclose
contracts and payments to governments in
both its Energy Operations Policy and Mining
Operations Policy. However, the policy on
transparency is vague and mostly references
external frameworks, like EITI, without
promising to adhere to them across all
extractive industry projects. The one major
hallmark of progress (which has already been
addressed by RWI) is the requirement of
disclosure of material project payments to host
governments.
The Bank will require mining companies
to publicly disclose their material project
payments to the host government as a
minimum revenue transparency obligation,
both in countries that apply and do not
apply to the EITI principals and criteria. 60
Since this significant progress was made in 2010, there do not seem to have been any
further concrete commitments or actions that EBRD has incorporated into its operational
policy structure. The EBRD scored in the Poor range on the Publish What You Fund
organizations 2013 Aid Transparency Index (ATI). In addition to its poor general rating, it
scored the lowest out of any of the development banks that were investigated, and it scored
only a 2.2/10 in its dedication to transparency.61 The policy does note the upcoming EU
Directive implementation, and states that it will:
Require the implementation of the new EU regulations on transparency of extractive
industries as soon as they will come into application. 62
For more detailed information and feedback on specific policy documents, please see the
following Appendices:
Mining Operations Policy (and its contrast with the Draft Mining Strategy regarding
RWI suggestions for alteration) Annex 9.3.1 EBRB Draft Mining Strategy
Criticisms of the Mining Operations Policy Delivered by CEE Bankwatch Annex
9.3.2. In its Mining Policy, The EBRD states that it encourages EITI compliance and
good governance practices:
The Bank will continue to adhere to best governance, transparency and revenue
management standards by encouraging its clients to implement principles and criteria of the
60 Mining
Operations Policy, October 17, 2012. Page 30

http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/policies/sector/mining-operations-policy.pdf
61 2013 ATI Index. Publish What You Fund. Accessed Nov 25. 2013.
http://ati.publishwhatyoufund.org/donor/ebrd/
62 Mining Operations Policy, October 17, 2012. Page 30
22
EITI.63
This statement begs the question: what has EBRD actually done to encourage its clients to
adhere to good governance standards? To answer this this question, EBRD projects have
been identified in which the client has agreed to adhere to PWYP or EITI policies, or are
otherwise enforcing standards of good governance in well-outlined and substantial ways.
For detailed information about which projects/clients are included, see Annex 9.3.5 EBRD
Financed Extractive Industry Projects. All information regarding the good governance of
these projects was taken from EBRD's own PSDs. Where it was unclear whether adherence
was a solid requirement, it was noted in the Annex 9.3.5, but not included those projects in
the aggregation of good governance projects. All data is gathered from January 2004
November 2013.
Total # of (strictly) extractive projects64: 30
Number of projects (explicitly) requiring adherence to the well-established good
governance principals of either EITI or PWYP: 13
Percentage of EI projects requiring well-defined good governance standards: 42%
Amount of money associated with these 13 Projects: $614M USD
Percentage of Money Invested in EI projects which requires good governance: 24.5%
3.3 Access to Information

EBRD's website is simple and easy to navigate. The bank has published a public information
policy (PIP) that details what type of information it can and cannot share with the general
public. On many of EBRDs policy documents, the bank encourages public commentary to be
made within 60 days of the policy documents creation. This exchange between the public
and the bank is then published separately.65 Despite the seemingly participatory nature of
this process, it has come under criticism by CSOs like Bankwatch.66 For a more granular
breakdown of the PIP and a report on whether EBRD is delivering on their disclosure
promises, please see Annex 9.3.3 - EBRD Public Information Policy.
The PIP provides an interesting insight into EBRD's trend of encouraging transparency for
its clients, rather than requiring it. In the 2011 Public Information Policy (PIP) public
commentary, a representative of EBRD explained the reasoning for the delegation of
transparency accountability:
The EBRD has a philosophy that disclosure of project information should be primarily the
responsibility of the client, and that this helps them to identify stakeholders, engage with
them, manage information flow, and handle complaints.... we want for them (the client) to
63
64
65
66
Mining Operations Policy. EBRD. http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/policies/sector/mining-operationspolicy.pdf

Strictly Extractive Project Categorization includes: Projects which some or all of the money lent has been
allocated to either exploration or direct extraction of resources, according to EBRDs PSDs. It does NOT include
natural resource operations in the post-extraction phase, i.e. pipeline construction.
Public Information Policy: Report on the Invitation to the Public to Comment. EBRD. May 2011.
http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/policies/pip/0811/BDS11166A1w.pdf
CEE Bankwatch: Bankwatch letter to EBRD on the transparency of the mining strategy review process.
August 3rd, 2012. http://bankwatch.org/publications/bankwatch-letter-ebrd-transparency-miningstrategy-review-process
23
develop the transparency and accountability appropriate for their project. 67
Indeed, much of the PIP seems more concerned with confidentiality than with transparency.
For example, the EBRD offers 9 instances in which it reserves the right to invoke further
confidentiality measures that allowed by its general policies.68 Additionally, despite good
web access to many of its documents, an interview with CEE Bankwatchs EBRD campaign
coordinator revealed that:
..if requested to provide access to such information (Revenue/Payment & Contract
Disclosure), the EBRD refers us to its clients or their financial reports, as published on their
web sites.... When asked by Bankwatch, if any money has been disbursed, the reply was
'check the client's website.' It is not always easy to find or to understand financial reports of
EI companies. And it should be fairly simple for the EBRD to say 'yes, we did this much for
this and that.' or 'no, we did not disburse any moneys yet.'69
When a project is proposed, the EBRD uses the guidelines from the COO's country strategy
document, local/state law, and scale of impact to determine a category for the project. For
high impact projects, it requires its borrowers to conduct and publish an Environmental and
Social Impact Assessment (ESIA). Projects are designated as category A when:
it could result in potentially significant and diverse adverse future environmental and/or
social impacts and issues which, at the time of categorisation, cannot readily be identified or
assessed and which require a formalized and participatory assessment process carried out
by independent third party specialists in accordance with the PRs 70
Projects are designated as Category B when:

The potential adverse environmental and/or social impacts that it may give rise to are
typically site-specific, and/or readily identified and addressed through mitigation measures.
These impacts could be from past, current or future activities. Due diligence requirements
may vary depending on the project and will be agreed with the EBRD on a case-by-case
basis71
Each category has different standards of project transparency. Category A projects require
a publicly posted Project Summary Document (PSD), whereas category B projects can
circumvented disclosure at the discretion of the Secretary General. Several of EBRD's
category B projects have come under criticism from CSOs for inaccurate categorization, and
their associated lower standards of project disclosure. In an interview with CEE Bankwatch,
its representative explained that:
...there is the problem with categorization of EI projects, as so-called brown-field projects
get a category B, which have lesser requirements on disclosure and shorter periods for
public consultation. The problem is that 'brown-field' projects are usually associated with a
legacy of heavy historic pollution and dodgy privatization agreements, issues that raise
67
68
69
70
71
Public Information Policy: Report on the Invitation to the Public to Comment. EBRD. May 2011. Page 9.
http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/policies/pip/comment.pdf
EBRD Public Information Policy. (2011) Page 10-13.
http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/policies/pip/pipe.pdf
Interview with Fidanka Bacheva McGrath. CEE Bankwatch EBRD Campaign Coordinator. October 21, 2013.
EBRD Environmental and Social Policy. (2008) Page 6.
http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/policies/2008policy.pdf
ibid
24
significant public interest that is not matched by the level of transparency provided for
category B investments. Projects that BW has followed that are examples of the B
categorization problem are: Chelopech Mining, DPM Long Term, and Centerra Gold
Revolver.72
3.4 Enforcement Mechanisms

The bank retains a number of mechanisms and reports that address policy infractions,
allegations of wrongdoing, and other types of complaints.
The Project Complaint Mechanism (PCM)
A detailed complaint-lodging process which is published on the EBRD website. The PCM
process is under review this year, and many civil society organizations are in the process of
submitting commentary. CEE Bankwatch is currently lodging a complaint using the PCM
regarding the Nuclear Safety Upgrade Project in Ukraine. The only EBRD project that is
strictly extractive and has an open PCM complaint pending is the Oyu Tolgoi mine in
Mongolia.73 However, this complaint is regarding road development and not transparency
practices.
EBRDAT Administrative Tribunal
See Annex 9.3.4 - EBRD Administration Tribunal Case Study
Civil Society Engagement
The bank maintains a Civil Society Engagement unit (CSE), which corresponds with and
listens to criticisms from (CSOs) and the society at large. In an interview, Bankwatch said
that the CSO department has been mostly very helpful.74
3.5 Dodd-Frank, EU Directives and IFC Sustainability Framework

As a method of measurement as to which of EBRD's extractive industry clients are/will be
subject to Dodd-Frank and EU Directives, the researcher used RWIs Oil and Mining
Companies on Global Stock Exchanges tool75 to look up which (if any) stock exchange the
client company was listed under. If the company seemed to be unlisted, the researcher
looked up its country of incorporation, to discern whether it was US/EU listed. This
information is all located in Annex 9.3.5 EBRD Financed Extractive Industry Projects. Here
are some figures that aim to demonstrate how much of EBRDs EI portfolio will be affected
by the new EU directives. (None of their EI clients are US listed or owned).
Total number of Projects: 30
Projects with Clients that are listed on EU stock exchanges: 10
Projects with clients that are not publicly listed, but are registered in the EU: 4
Percentage of projects which would/will adhere to EU Directives: 46.6%
Amount of Money Effected by Directives: $1.01B USD
Percentage of money invested in EI which would be effected: 40.4%
Energy Resources Phase II and Oyu Tolgoi Complaint. EBRD Project Complaint Mechanism register. Feb 8th,
2013. http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/integrity/OT_complaint_1.07.2013.pdf
74
75 Oil and Mining Companies on Global Stock Exchange. Revenue Watch Institute. Accessed Nov. 20 2013.
http://data.revenuewatch.org/listings/
72
73
25
26
4 Inter-American Development Bank76

The Inter-American Development bank (IDB) was founded in 1959 to support efforts by
Latin American and Caribbean countries to reduce poverty and inequality. The Bank aims
to bring about development in a sustainable, climate-friendly manner and states that it is
committed to increasing the transparency, accountability and integrity in all of its activities.
The majority of the IDBs financial activity is in the public sector, however the Bank does
offer private sector loans through its Structured and Corporate Finance (SCF) department
and the Inter-American Investment Corporation (ICC), which is a member of the InterAmerican Development Bank Group. The former focuses on large corporations while the ICC
is dedicated to strengthening small, medium and family owned businesses.77
4.1 Financing in the Extractive Sector

Since 1961, the IDB has lent a total of $124.3 billion to both public and private sector
borrowers and of that $124.3 billion only $2.3 billion of it has gone towards extractive
industry loans.78 According to the project documents available on the IDB website, the Bank
has only made one private sector, extractive industry loan in the past ten years, a $488
million loan to the Dutch company Delba Drilling International Coopeartie (a private
company) for the construction and operation of an off-shore mobile oil-drilling vessel
located in Brazil.79
In 2008-2012, the ICC (the private sector window of the IDB that is focused on supporting
small and medium sized businesses) lent a total of $50.8 million for extractive industry
projects. Considering that the total amount of money lent by the ICC in 2008-2012 was
$29.3 billion, extractive industry loans made up a very small percentage of the ICCs lending
portfolio.80
The New Schools students Masha Katz -Katzm969@newschool.edu-, Justin Coburn cobuj499@newschool.edu-, Emma Stoskopf-Ehrlich -stose168@newschool.edu-, Jonatthan Leonard Leonj726@newschool.edu-, and Jaron Vogelsang -vogej566@newschool.edu- elaborated this section.
77 Any projects that are facilitated through the Structured and Corporate Finance department are published on
the IDBs website while all ICC financed projects are found on the ICCs website.
78 Inter-American Development Bank. Approved Loans by Sector/ Subsector. Inter-American Development Bank.
Web. November 16th, 2013. http://www.iadb.org/en/about-us/approved-loans-bysectorsubsector,1329.html?module=01&lg=En&detail=Energy&subtitle=17,680.4
79Inter-American Development Bank. BR-L1120: Delba Vessel. Inter-American Development Bank, October 17 th,
2007. Web. November 15th, 2013. http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=1108308.
Inter-American Development Bank. IDB approves US$488 million for construction and operation of semisubmersible offshore mobile oil-drilling vessel in Brazil. Inter-American Development Bank, October 17th,
2007. Web. November 15th, 2013. http://www.iadb.org/en/news/news-releases/2007-10-17/idbapproves-us488-million-for-construction-and-operation-of-semi-submersible-offshore-mobile-oil-drillingvessel-in-brazil,4088.html
80 Inter-American Investment Corporation. 2012 Annual Report. Inter-American Investment Corporation. Web.
November 11th, 2013. http://www.iic.org/sites/default/files/documents/pub/en/iicdocs-347645-v12012_annual_report_eng_web.pdf. Inter-American Investment Corporation. 2011 Annual Report. InterAmerican Investment Corporation. Web. November 11th, 2013.
http://www.iic.org/sites/default/files/pdf/iic2011ar_eng_lr.pdf. Inter-American Investment Corporation.
2010 Annual Report. Inter-American Investment Corporation. Web. November 11th, 2013.
http://www.iic.org/sites/default/files/documents/pub/en/2010_annual_report_eng.pdf. Inter-American
Investment Corporation. 2009 Annual Report. Inter-American Investment Corporation. Web. November 11th,
2013. http://www.iic.org/sites/default/files/documents/pub/en/2009_annual_report_eng.pdf
76
27
In 2009 the Bank officially endorsed the EITI81 standards and through the Banks
Transparency Trust Fund it offers support to countries that want to strengthen the
transparency and accountability of their extractive industries.82 However, participation in
the Transparency Trust Fund is completely voluntary and is not a requirement for obtaining
an extractive industry loan. It should also be noted that the Transparency Trust Fund only
grants loans to governments and it does not offer its services to private companies who
would like assistance in increasing the transparency in its extractive industry activities.
4.2 Transparency and Accountability Policies

Neither the IDB nor the ICC have any concrete policies regarding contract or payment
disclosure for private sector companies operating in the extractive industries. It was
extremely difficult to find any specific policies that addressed either private sector lending
and/or extractive industry projects despite the Banks repeated claims that it is dedicated to
protecting the interests of native populations as well as fostering transparent and
sustainable development.
According to the Banks current Access to Information Policy there are many exceptions for
disclosure that would allow private sector companies to withhold information regarding
contracts and payments made to host governments. These exceptions include83:
1. Information provided in confidence which can include financial, business, legal
documentation, and other non-public information. This exception is so broad and
vaguely laid out that it could be interpreted to encompass just about any type of
financial or business transaction between company and government, including
arrangements regarding payment streams and contract negotiation.
2. Loan and guarantee proposals for non-sovereign guaranteed operations. This
essentially means that no original proposal documents describing private sector
projects are disclosed. The research team is working under the assumption that
original proposal documents would include contracts between private sector
entities and governments.
3. The IDB only requires that non-sovereign guaranteed operations (i.e. private sector
operations) disclose the following information:
a. Initial Project Abstracts
b. Environmental and Social Strategies (ESS)
c. Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA)
d. Strategic Environmental Analyses (SEA)
e. Environmental Analyses (EA)
f. Environmental and Social Management Reports (ESMR)
g. Abstracts of Approved Projects
81Inter-American
Development Bank. Better Environmental and Social Safeguards. Inter-American Development

Bank. Web. November 2nd, 2013. http://www.iadb.org/en/insitutional-reforms/better-environmental-andsocial-safeguards,1830.html
82 Inter-American Development Bank. Transparency Trust Fund. Web. November 2nd, 2013.
http://www.iadb.org/en/topics/transparency/support-for-countries/anticorruption-activities-trust-fundaaf,1194.html
83 Inter-American Development Bank. Access to Information Policy. Inter-American Development Bank, April
26th, 2010. Web. November 17th, 2013.
28
4.3 Access to Information

It was extremely difficult to locate IDB/ICCs concrete policies regarding private sector
lending and the most concrete guidelines that the research team found were within the
Access to Information Policy. As demonstrated above, the requirements and exceptions to
disclosure are extremely vague and easily manipulated to stretch a variety of
interpretations. Additionally, there was no specific document that addressed mining and/or
extractive industry projects which naturally makes it more difficult to ascertain the Banks
involvement in the sector.
4.4 Enforcement Mechanisms

Considering that the IDB and IIC have no specific policy regarding contract or
payment/revenue disclosure for private sector lending in the extraction industries there are
no enforcement mechanisms that correspond with those requirements. The Bank does
however require all contracted companies and individuals affiliated with the Bank to adhere
to its ethical standards. Prohibited practices include:84
1. Corrupt practices
2. Fraudulent practices
3. Coercive practices
4. Collusive practices
5. Obstructive practices
If any contractor, sub-contractor or borrower engages in any of the above activity then the
Bank can:
1. Not finance any proposal to pay contractors
2. Suspend disbursement of operation
3. Declare misprocurement and cancel the portion of the loan earmarked for
contracted services
5. Report any illegal activity to appropriate law enforcement authority
6. Impose other sanctions it deems appropriate
Any punitive measure taken by the Bank will be immediately disclosed to the public.
4.5 Dodd-Frank, EU Directives, and IFC Sustainability Framework

Considering that the IDB does not have any specific policies related to contract or revenue
disclosure for private companies operating in the extractive industries, the Bank does not
even meet the minimum standards set out by Dodd-Frank, the EU Directives and the IFC
Sustainability to Framework. The IDB has recently completed a project that assessed
whether their borrowing member countries comply with Dodd Franks requirements for
project-by-project revenue and payment disclosure. The Bank plans to use the findings
from the project to determine whether or not they will recommend changing their policies.
If the Bank does decide to amend their policies based on this investigation it sounds as if it
would be only for sovereign loans which obviously means that private companies would not
be beholden to these stricter regulations. The research team attempted to gather more
information on this project by emailing the heads of the project but they heard no response.
84
Inter-American Investment Corporation. The Inter-American Investment Corporations Framework to Prevent

Fraud and Corruption. Inter-American Investment Corporation, April 19, 2011. Web. November 10 th, 2013.
29
5 African Development Bank85

The mission statement of the African Development Bank states, The overarching objective
of the African Development Bank (AfDB) Group is to spur sustainable economic
development and social progress in its regional member countries (RMCs), thus
contributing to poverty reduction86. Their central mission strives to mobilize and allocate
resources for investment in RMCs and provide policy advice and technical assistance to
support development efforts.

The African Development Bank (AfDB) has a long history with the extractive industry in
Africa and has been engaged in the sector for over 30 years. The AFDB states Transparency
must be encouraged in both national and devolved governments, especially in the hiring,
administration and functioning of the civil service. The judicial system, which has been
plagued with perceptions and instances of corruption and injustices in the past, has now
started ambitious plans for reform87.Since the AfDBs engagement in the private sector in
the 1990s, AfDBs cumulative investments in the extractive industries sector total roughly
$1.6 billion88. The AfDB began to scale-up its non-sovereign operations in 2001 and is
currently aiming at total non-sovereign financing operations to exceed US $1.6 billion in
2011. Following preliminary consultations with some of development partners and civil
society actors, the AfDB intends to establish a multi-donor Secretariat to support
coordination and transparency of activities in this sector89.
5.2 Transparency in the extractive sector

The focus of the AFDB is the promotion of transparency, and accountability in the
management of extractive resources, working along the country and regional platforms to
strengthen accountability and transparency in the management of public resources. The
bank endorses the EITI commitments to implement resources in rich member countries,
providing technical and financial assistance for EITI implementation, promoting advocacy
and outreach activities to strengthen the political will to improve governance of natural
resources, expand support for good governance of natural resources, expand support for
good governance of extractive industries at various stages of the governing chain and
mainstream EITI principals in the Banks own natural resource operations90.
86 Mission and objective, AfDB, http://www.afdb.org/en/about-us/mission-objective/ (accessed November 11,
2013)
87,3 http://www.afdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/initiatives-partnerships/multi-donor-secretariat-forextractive-sector-mdses/background
88 Industries and Services, AfBD, http://www.afdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/sectors/private-sector/areasof-focus/industries-and-services/ (accessed October 25, 2013)
85
90
Negatu, Gabriel. Mainstreaming EITI at the African Development Bank.

http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/GenericDocuments/Mainstreaming%20EITI%2
0Presentation.ppt (accessed November 8, 2013)
30
The AfDB website states that through its involvement, AfDB promotes the attraction of
foreign investments based on transparent, stable, and balanced legislation in the sector. 91
The AfDBs policy on transparency and accountability is not extractive industry specific but
applies across the Banks projects. In regard to the oil and gas sector, the AfDBs new Energy
Sector policy states that the Bank Group will promote policies, principles, and practices
that enhance transparency in the exploitation of [oil and gas] as well as in the use and
distribution of the revenues.92 In the mining industry, one of the AfDBs policy objectives is
to ensure compliance with mining codes, foster greater disclosure, and transparency of
revenue management93. In 2006, the AfDB endorsed the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative (EITI) and now holds an observer seat on the EITI board. At the end of 2007, the
AfDB added EITI engagement as an indicator to be monitored by the African Development
Funds results measurement framework. The Bank will continue to provide funding for EITI
implementation of country work plans, the conduct, audit and validations involved and
provide capacity building and technical support for RMCs. The AfDB is also slated to be a
key World Bank partner is promoting value-added approach to the extractive industry
sector, particularly in developing a multi-donor trust fund for the initiative.
As of February 2013 the AfDB has enacted the Disclosure and Access to Information (DAI)
Policy, which replaces the Banks 2005 Policy on Disclosure of Information. The new DAI
policy aims to address shortcomings and gaps in the previous policy including:
Focus on the positive list (a conclusive list of documents to be disclosed) resulting in

constant revision of the policies simply to capture newly generated operational
documents
Insufficient follow-up on implementation
Inadequate supporting infrastructure, particularly IT systems and implementation
guidelines to effectively implement the policy.94
The newly enacted DAI Policy is guided by the following principles:

Maximum Disclosure
Enhanced Access
Limited List of Exceptions
A Consultative Approach
Proactive Disclosure
Right to Appeal
Safe-Guarding Deliberative Processes
Provision for Review95
Industries and Services, AfDB

Energy Sector Policy of the AfDB Group, African Development Bank (AfDB), 2012,
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/PolicyDocuments/Energy%20Sector%20Policy%20of%20the%20AfDB%20Group.pdf (accessed November 18,
2013), p.2
93 Industries and Services, AfDB
94 Disclosure and Access to Information Policy,AfDB,
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/PolicyDocuments/Bank%20Group%20Policy%20on%20Disclosure%20and%20Acess%20to%20Infomation.pdf
Sec. 1.1.6 (accessed November 20, 2013)
95 Disclosure and Access to Information Policy, AfDB.
91
92
31
In particular, Section 3 of the DAI Policy explains what the policy covers and enumerates the
list of exemptions to the policy.
The project details of all AfDB projects can be found at the website
www.afdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/. Board, budget, and compliance reviews are all open
to the public as well as legal documents, policy documents and financial information. All of
the projects are country specific and listed under a given country, with most project
descriptions in French only. It is hard to find a brief summary and key facts without reading
the entire document of each project. It is also difficult to determine how much each project
cost and the specifics of each contract. It is extremely difficult to locate specific numbers and
contractual agreements, given how much information is presented. Each project has its own
document, which clearly states grant information, the sector, the objectives, outcomes,
justification and conclusion, but projects can only be searched by country and not by
sector.96
5.3 Requirements regarding revenue, payments, and contract disclosure
While the AfDB does not explicitly mention extractive industry transparency
requirements, the AfDBs new Disclosure and Access to Information (DIA), enacted
in February 2013, states that all documents should be open and transparent to the
public, facilitating better knowledge and understanding of the Bank Group
Activities, its use of resources, and engagement with client countries.97 While the
DIA Policy actively endorses full disclosure there is still some ambiguity about exact
payment, revenue, and contract disclosure requirements for Bank clients.
The Banks Good Governance Policy encourages transparency, freedom of

information and the disclosure of public expenditures.98
The Bank also has a Voluntary Disclosure Program, which encourages firms or
individuals in Bank-financed projects to volunteer information in which they may
have participated.99

The AfDB states that under legal guidelines, funds are used for the purpose in which they
were intended under the enforcement and accountability guidelines. Firms or individuals
that divert these funds through fraud, corruption, and harmful practices will be sanctioned
through an administrative process. The AfDB is a member of the Joint International
Financial Institutions Anti-Corruption Task Force and signed the Uniform Framework for
Preventing and Combating Fraud and Corruption.100 Following sanctions, the AfDB will fill
Initiatives and Partnerships, AfDB, http://www.afdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/initiatives-partnerships/
(accessed November 20, 2013); Projects and Operations, AfDB, http://www.afdb.org/en/projects-andoperations/ (accessed November 20, 2013)
97 Projects and Operations, AfDB, http://www.afdb.org/en/projects-and-operations/ (accessed October 25,
2013)
98 Bank Group Policy on Good Governance, AfDB, July 1999 (ADB website, Acrobat pdf)
99 Voluntary Disclosure Program, AfDB, http://www.afdb.org/en/about-us/structure/integrity-and-anticorruption/voluntary-disclosure-program/ (accessed November 28, 2013)
100 Integrity and Anti-Corruption Department Of the African Development Bank Group: Standard Operating
Procedures, AfDB, 2006,
96
32
out the Agreement for Mutual Enforcement of Debarment Decision and that client will be
considered ineligible to participate in contracts financed or administered by the African
Development Bank. In order to practice good governance and transparency, the Bank also
has a Whistle-blowing and Complaints Handling Policy where clients can raise concerns. A
whistle-blower is any party who conveys a concern or allegation indicating a prohibited
practice such as fraud and the President will make recommendations based on the specific
case101.
Additionally, the AfDB strives to keep stakeholders informed by ensuring that the intended
beneficiaries of the Banks Groups Development operation understand the intended
objectives and derive the benefits.
5.5 Gaps and weaknesses
While the new DAI Policy is a big step towards articulating clear standards of
information disclosure the list of exemptions included in the document tempers the
success of the policy. Several clauses are so open-ended as to essentially negate the
effectiveness of the Banks commitment to information disclosure. Many of the
clauses offer blanket exemptions rather than applying them on a case-by-case basis
(such as documents related to the deliberation process).
o Key examples of ambiguous clauses:
Section 3.3, Subsection D, Clause i) states: The Bank Group will not
provide access to information provided to it by a member country or
third party that has indicated in writing that such information be
kept confidential.
This allows an incredible amount of leeway for client
countries to obscure important revenue or contract
information and this clause does not clarify if there are any
limits on what can be stated as confidential.
Section 3.3, Subsection F, Clause iii) states: Details of individual
transactions under loans and trust funds, information regarding
amounts overdue from borrowers of a short-term nature, or actions
taken before any loans are declared impaired; and
Section 3.3, Subsection F, Clause iv): Banking or billing information
of Bank Group entities, member countries, clients, donors, recipients,
or vendors, including consultants. 102
This greatly limits the possibility of revenue and payment
disclosure and allows for the obscuring of a great deal of
relevant Bank client information.
In general, the Policy is a proponent of information disclosure without specifically

stating what information must actively be disclosed. The exemptions demonstrate
what can be kept confidential but it is not clear exactly what clients need to disclose
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/GenericDocuments/Integrity%20and%20AntiC
orruption%20Department%20of%20the%20African%20Development%20Bank%20Group%20Standard%
20Operating%20Procedures.pdf (accessed November 20, 2013)
101 Standard Operating Procedures, p.4
102 Disclosure and Access to Information Policy, AfDB, p. 13
33
fully and regularly. Annex I of the Disclosure and Access to Information103 offers a
sample of information to be proactively disclosed but without sufficient explanation.
While the AfDB website makes information widely accessible to the public, there are
several shortcomings with the actual process of acquiring information. Projects are
only found under country specific names, and contract requirements are buried
deep within the text. The most optimal way to find information is through the search
key, and even then, the documents can be hard to sort through to determine what is
actually being presented, who is involved and what was accomplished.
Operational Policy Papers: The most recent and useful operational policy papers on
the website included the Environmental Review Procedure for Private Sector
Operations and of the AfDB May 2000; Environmental and Social Assessment
Procedures for AfDB Public Sector Operations June 2001; Integrated
Environmental and Social Impact Assessment Guidelines October 2003; and a
handbook on Stakeholder Consultation and Participation in AfDB Operations 2001.
These are standard guideline and procedural document, which are apparently
currently being used by the AfDB.104
5.6 Recommendations
The policy is a good start but requires a significant amount of clarification and
specification. On a simple level there needs to be a closer focus on exactly
enumerated client requirements.
The exemptions should be case specific rather than across the board. There should
be more criteria for evaluating why a particular piece of information should be
exempted.
Annex I of the Disclosure and Access to Information is not a sufficient explanation of

information to be disclosed. There should be descriptions of each type of
information and stipulations for how often and in what format each piece should be
provided.
AfDB should reorganize the website. AfDB doesnt struggle with lack of content, it
struggles with an over abundance of content that cannot be easily found, because of
lack of organization. For the purpose of practicality and functionality, less
information and more conscious presentation of the material would enhance the
overall structure of the AfDB website.
o Rather than sorting projects by country, it would be more useful to sort
projects by sector (i.e., health, agriculture, education etc.), similar to that of
IFC and MIGA. Projects should clearly state objectives, costs, analysis, and
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/PolicyDocuments/Bank%20Group%20Policy%20on%20Disclosure%20and%20Acess%20to%20Infomation.pdf (accessed November 20, 2013)

104 Tamufor, Lindlyn and Gary Pienaar, African Development Bank Information Disclosure Policy
Implementation Research Project, Idasa, 2011, http://freedominfo.org/documents/AfDB2011gtiReport.pdf
103
34
outcomes in a way that is clear and easy to understand without having to

guess, or read between the lines.
The homepage should contain a Client Tab where client information can
be found. Since transparency is such a large part of AfDB, it should clearly
stand out in the left hand options panel.
The Institute for Democracy in Africa (Idasa) believes that in order for the AfDB to
be more transparent, the following measures have been proven most effective105:
o Senior management making statements and taking other actions that make
it clear and provides access to information as an organizational priority;
o Providing targeted training on access to information and building access to
information elements into other training activities;
o Incorporating access to information into corporate incentive structures and
appraisal systems;
o Educating the public, particularly in project affected areas, about their right
to access information and how it may be exercised;
o Putting in place a central system for tracking requests when they are
made, who receives them, what response was provided, any appeals, and so
on which should itself be made public;
o Publishing and widely disseminating an annual review of implementation of
the access to information policy (a sort of internal audit);
o Putting in place an effective and progressive system of record management;
o Developing a protocol on what sorts of information should be recorded in
permanent form (such as which sorts of meetings should be minuted); and
o Providing for individual sanctions for willful obstruction of access to
information.
o A discrete budget should be allocated for purposes of implementing this
principle and a dedicated body or individual within the IFI should have
responsibility for discharging these duties.106
Tamufor, Lindlyn and Gary Pienaar, African Development Bank Information Disclosure Policy
Implementation Research Project, Idasa, 2011, http://freedominfo.org/documents/AfDB2011gtiReport.pdf,
p. 46
106 Ibid.
105
35
6 Asian Development Bank107

6.1 Supporting Energy Infrastructure and Governance
Founded in 1966 the Asian Development Bank has grown into an enormous organization
that works with state governments throughout Asia on a wide range of development
infrastructure projects aimed at eliminating poverty.108 Their work has been praised for
engaging positively with renewable energy and sustainable, well-governed business models,
but many question whether they hold governments accountable for the way their loans are
used. I seek to identify what the ADB guidelines are concerning revenue and contract
transparency in the resource extraction sector, and give an overview of the ways in which
the ADB could be leveraged to improve that policy.
The Asian Development Bank is an institution whose breadth of work in the energy sector
spans fossil fuel extraction, construction of dams, solar arrays and other renewable
technologies, electricity distribution planning and pipeline construction as well as direct
policy guidance. The banks work in the extractive sector is mainly comprised of finding and
hiring intermediary consultants for policy research, infrastructure development, and to
build business relationships between governments and private companies. The Asian
Development Bank often works in countries with weak government accountability, and thus
its role in creating sound policy advice, including stringent guidelines for transparency, is
doubly important. The ADB has been criticized in the past for not requiring transparency
policies such as the EITI framework in Myanmar.109 Several other Developing Member
Countries (DMCs) that work extensively with the ADB such as Afghanistan are vulnerable to
corruption as well, as Revenue Watch Institute has detailed in their Resource Governance
Index.110
6.2 Methodology
The Asian Development Bank maintains an extensive online database of policy and project
documents. I have examined this as my primary resource, and augmented it with secondary
sources concerning EITI performance and applications as well as critiques on ADB projects
and policies.
I have also compiled Annex 9.6 of extractive sector projects with total extractive costs,
organized by project. The ADB maintains a comprehensive excel document of all projects on
its website on the project search page, which is useful for looking at trends across time, and
for organizing projects by varying components.111
Report developed by Gabriel Stoltzfus, gabestoltzfus@gmail.com, Resource Curse course student, The New
School University
108 Overview: Asian Development Bank. Website http://www.adb.org/about/overview. Accessed 12/09/13.
109 Door Creaks Open on Myanmars Gas Petrolium Economist. Feb. 2012.
110 Resource Governance Index. Revenue Watch Institute. 2013.
111 This excel spreadsheet of ADB Energy sector projects is available under the link titled: Download Sovereign
Projects (As of October 2013). Asian Development Bank Website. Accessed 12/09/13.
107
36
6.3 Data Collection

6.3.1 Scope and Size of the Problem
Within the energy sector alone the ADB has spent billions of dollars on over 400 projects in
the last 10 years. Many of these projects are centered on renewable energy, energy
governance, and transmission/generation capacity.112 Only six of these projects directly
engage with extractive sector development. My basis for including these projects is their
participation in one of the following activities: gas field rehabilitation, hired consultation
leading to public-private extractive infrastructure development and exploration contracts,
as well as consultation leading to state extractive sector policies. Of the six ADB projects in
the extractive sector in the last ten years, five have been in gas and one has been in oil. Only
one project includes a requirement for EITI compliance: this can be found on pages 1-2,
section 5 of the presidential report on the Kandym Gas Field Development Project. It
reads:
To facilitate the participation of ADB and commercial banks , the government committed to
allowing the sponsor to publicly disclose payments made by it under the PSA to the
government for the life of the ADB loan (ongoing disclosure by the sponsors will be an
ongoing condition of the ADB loan). This disclosure will be made on an annual basis in
English and Uzbek.113
This instance of payment disclosure is singular and unique in the ADB literature, perhaps
because it is a large project (a $100 Million contract with energy conglomerate Lukoil) or
perhaps because transparency in Uzbekistan is poignantly limited by government opacity.
This reference highlights two important things: that the ADB has reliable mechanisms for
disclosure and is interested in exercising responsibility in their projects.
In the case of the Kandym gas project and the Indonesian Tangguh Liquified Natural Gas
project one could allot the entire project cost to extractive infrastructure, but this was not
the case in other projects I identified. These projects are multi-faceted and in most cases
extractive infrastructure cost makes up only a fraction of the whole. The cost break down
for ADB projects is not always available for those currently in-progress, but if they have
already been completed the disaggregated costs can usually be found in completion
documents, posted to the project documents on the ADB website. I examined the
completion documents and presidential reports114 as well as various others for each of the
six projects and found the total cost of the Asian Development Banks extractive sector
projects in the last ten years to be $500,350,074 dollars. A chart containing extractive sector
costs for each project is organized in Annex 9.6 - ADB Extractive Industry Projects.
6.3.2 Transparency Policy and Execution

6.3.2.1 Contract and Payment Disclosure
The regulations concerning energy sector projects are housed in the ADB Energy Policy.
This policy was rewritten in 2009, one year after the organizations commitment to the EITI
See Footnote 4.
Proposed Loan and Partial Risk Guarantee: Lukoil Overseas Uzbekistan kandym Gas Field Development
Project. Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors. August 2011.
http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/projdocs/2011/43925-01-uzb-rrp.pdf Accessed 12/9/13.
114 Out of the many reports and progress reviews stored for each project on the ADB website I found these two
document types the most helpful.
112
113
37
framework in 2008, yet the document only references EITI expectations once, and briefly, in
its sub-section on coal extraction. On page 28, section 59 it states:
The DMC (Developing Member Country) should agree to implement the provisions of the
EITI for all coal mines in its territory. 115
There is no specific language requiring payment or contract disclosure in the Energy Policy.
The singular mention of the EITI framework in this passage is vague, and a suggestion at
best. In the oil and gas sections under the Fossil Fuel heading of the policy no mention is
made of payment or contract disclosure, nor of the EITI recommendations in general.116 All
language concerning disclosure measures and EITI commitment are also absent from the
Public Communications Policy, which directs information management guidelines for the
ADB.117
6.4 Gaps in ADB Policy and Recommendations

As an institution seeking to eliminate poverty, the Asian Development should have an
inherent interest in promoting accountability. In many ways the bank has done well in this
regard and demonstrates a real commitment to sustainable development policies. However,
there are still gaps in its transparency measures that jeopardize much of its work in fighting
corruption and especially resource profiteering. It is important to note that the bank wishes
to be seen as a responsible and progressive institution, one that embraces positive role
modeling. In its Public Communications Policy, published in 2011, the bank states:
While in many areas ADB remains in the vanguard, there are some areas where it has fallen
behind and should align the level of information disclosure with that of its comparators. 118
However, any concrete action has yet to materialize. The ADB has done little in real
language to include disclosure in present policy or future goals, excepting the case of the
Kandym Gas Fields. A working strategy document called the Knowledge management
Directions and Action Plan (2013-2015) lays out a plan for improving a variety of ADB
policies, practices and norms concerning transparency and information sharing, yet the EITI
was not mentioned once. Only on page 22 are any disclosure requirements mentioned
briefly, and as a topic for further work:119
In particular, ADB needs to establish clearer guidelines on, among others, appropriate forms
of engagement for planning and implementing joint CSR and philanthropic programs;
information disclosure and accountability; the nature, forms, and negotiation of co-financing
agreements; use of funds; and what should be minimum levels of resource mobilization that
merit ADBs engagement and partnership.
Similarly, the overarching Strategy 2020, published in 2008, outlines the organizations
future expectations and goals over the next twelve years across a broad spectrum of topics.
It refers to transparency in several places, but does not include language concerning
Energy Policy. The Asian Development Bank. June 2009. Pp 28, sec. 59.
Energy Policy. The Asian Development Bank. June 2009. Pp. 28 30.
117 Public Communications Policy: Disclosure and Exchange of Information. Asian Development Bank. 2011.
118 Public Communications Policy: Disclosure and Exchange of Information. Asian Development Bank. 2011.
Pp. 2.
119 Knowledge Management Directions and Action Plan (2013-2015). Asian Development Bank. 2013.
115
116
38
payment, revenue or contract disclosure, nor its commitment to the EITI framework.
Neither of these policies seem to follow up on the Banks statements of commitment to
transparency. In light of the recurring gap between rhetoric and action on EITI disclosure
requirements, the Asian Development Bank must decide soon whether it wishes to remain
at the vanguard of development institutions on this increasingly visible issue.
Yet I believe there is hope. Although the absence of disclosure policies seems to indicate
unwillingness to reform, the ADB has expressed a strong ethic concerning information
disclosure within their own organization in the past, and possesses the foundation for a
strong disclosure framework.120 In addition to this, the organization has been shown above
to have at least some genuine willingness to address disclosure expectations. It is even
encouraging feedback for its review of the Strategy 2020, in an online feedback tool that
can be found on its website.121 Because the bank has spoken loudly and publicly about a
commitment to partnership and sharing ideas122, it does not seem unreasonable to think
that they would entertain the idea of partnering with RWI to improve upon their disclosure
standards.
The Asian Development Bank is at a turning point: they are a monumental development
institution that is beginning to move in the direction of concrete disclosure policy and they
have an opportunity to help their member countries stave off the governance challenges
that seem to come with resource wealth. The organization still requires some provocation,
but unless the building momentum towards resource extraction accountability ebbs it
would be surprising to see the ADB regress on their current path towards embracing the
EITI framework.
Public Communications Policy: Disclosure and Exchange of Information. Asian Development Bank. 2011.
Section 6, pp. 14 25.
121 Link to Strategy 2020 Feedback Tool:
http://www.adb.org/forms/strategy-2020-mid-term-review-feedback-form
122 Knowledge Management Directions and Action Plan (2013-2015). Asian Development Bank. 2013. Pp. 12
Para 2.
120
39
7 Japan Bank for International Cooperation123

The Japan Bank for International Cooperation is a financial institution completely owned by
the Japanese government. The JBIC was formed in 1999 by merging the Japan ExportImport Bank and the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund. A major focus of the JBIC is
energy and natural resource financing in order ensure future inflows of natural resources to
resource poor Japan. However, the JBIC does not disaggregate its portfolio by sector or type
of project so it is unclear how much of its $113.6 billion in outstanding loans and equity
participations is involved in the extractive sector.124 The bank offers import loans and
overseas investment loans. There is no specific discussion of policy related to extractive
industry or of requirements the JBIC has of its clients involved in the extractive industry.

As mentioned above, JBIC does not disaggregate its financials to make clear what portion
are extractive sector projects. In the 2013 Annual Report JBIC does state that the Bank
provided loans,
for the developing unconventional energy resources in North America coal-bed methane
and shale gas in Canada, shale oil and tight oil in the US. liquefied natural gas projects in
Australia and Papua New Guinea, and coal mine projects in Australia in Australia and
CanadaIn the mineral resources sector, JBIC provided loans for the development of, and
acquisition of interests in, an iron ore mine in Australia and a copper mine in Chile. 125
The best approximation available is that JBIC has signed loans for approximately $74 billion
worth of natural resource projects over the last 10 years.126 See Annex 9.7 for details

The JBIC makes available very little substantive information and does not clearly display the
information that is available. The home website http://www.jbic.go.jp/en/ offers links to
different financial products and information about what JBIC funds and its development
goals. However, upon clicking on the majority of these links very little information is
actually provided. Often only one to two sentences are available giving the basic description
of a product or procedure. The Energy and Natural Resource Financing link goes to one
short page describing the importance of natural resources to Japan and then links back to
the different loan pages, which offer scanty information themselves. Some documents can
be more easily found by searching the web with the key terms. JBIC has a policy regarding
information disclosure for environmental protection that could only be located by searching
externally. A unified list of projects and project requirements is not available via the loan or
natural resource financing tabs and there is no client information provided or client
requirement standards.
124 Profile: Role and Function, Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), 2013,
http://www.jbic.go.jp/wp-content/uploads/page/2013/08/677/jbic-brochure-english.pdf, p.1 (accessed
October 18, 2013)
125 Profile of JBIC, JBIC Annual Report 2013, JBIC, http://www.jbic.go.jp/en/information/annual-report/year2013, (accessed October 12, 2013)
126 Energy, Natural Resources and Environment Finance, JBIC Annual Report 2013, JBIC,
http://www.jbic.go.jp/en/information/annual-report/year-2013, (accessed October 12, 2013)
123
40
Financial information for JBIC can be located by moving through several sets of links before
eventually
being
directed
to
an
external
site
http://www.jfc.go.jp/n/english/pdf/JFC2012e_P9-18.pdf that is part of the previous
incarnation of JBIC. Annual reports and role and function reports can also be obtained but
there is little mention of these issues beyond a basically stated commitment to transparency
and accountability.
7.3 Requirements regarding revenue, payments, and contract disclosure

7.3.1 Revenue and payments:
The JBIC does not have a policy regarding transparency and disclosure of revenues and
payments.
7.3.2 Contracts
There is no clear articulation regarding client contract disclosure requirements in JBICs
materials on loan policies or project financing.
7.3.3 Additional disclosed information

JBIC has created Guidelines for Confirmation of Environmental and Social Considerations
based loosely on the OECD Common Approaches Framework. Information disclosure is
referred to but this does not incorporate revenue or contract disclosure. JBIC merely states
that it will disclose information related to the environmental risk assessment as deemed
necessary but will also respect confidentiality in some cases.127
7.3.4 Enforcement and Compliance

In the absence of a clear policy regarding transparency and disclosure there is little to say
about enforcement, accountability, and compliance. JBIC performs environmental risk
assessments and during that process requires compliance from potential clients. Beyond
this process there is no mention of disclosure requirements that clients must continue to
fulfill or repercussions if they should fail to do so.
7.3.5 Gaps and weaknesses
127
The JBIC does not have a policy regarding revenue, payment, or contract
transparency. There is no mention of international frameworks that are currently
gaining purchase in the extractive industry financing sector.
Information in general is difficult to come by and the JBIC website fails to adequately
provide access to its lending policies and disclosure requirements should any
actually exist.
Documents and project information are not easy to access or unavailable entirely
and project information lacks important financial detail.
There is no discussion of JBIC clients beyond basic loan structures.
Information Disclosure, JBIC, http://www.jbic.go.jp/en/faq/disclosure (accessed October 20, 2013)
41
Contact information to ask further questions is not centralized but must be located
by searching through the organizational structure to find phone numbers/emails.
7.3.6 Recommendations
JBICs financial portfolio should be disaggregated by sector or project type to

provide a clearer picture of its involvement in the extractive industry.
o Documents regarding JBICs policies need to be centralized and information
related to extractive industries should be available through the natural
resource financing link.
o More detailed information for each project needs to be published and JBIC
should publish information regardless of whether the public makes a
request for the information.
Specific policies need to be developed and articulated regarding JBICs requirements

for client revenue, payment and contract disclosures. Simply endorsing
transparency and supporting OECD Common Approaches does not put the Bank any
closer to true disclosure and availability of information.
o JBIC should consider working from existing international frameworks such
as IFCs Access to Information Policy to aid it in the development of its own
policies.
Information related to JBICs clients should be available through the JBIC website.
7.4 Development Finance Power Map

7.4.1 Relevant stakeholders and decision makers
The Japanese government owns JBIC. Within JBIC, in addition to the Board of Directions,
they have established the Board of Corporate Auditors, the Management Advisory and
Evaluation Committee, the Risk Advisory Committee, the Internal Audit Committee, and the
Executive Committee. Financing decisions are then split into sector specific groups: energy,
natural resources and environmental finance group, infrastructure finance group, industry
finance group, corporate group and credit assessment, and systems group. The energy,
natural resources and environmental finance group would be a relevant decision maker.
7.4.2 Relevant advocates and potential allies/ Potential areas of influence

JBIC has stated that it will publish information if requested by the public. If the Japanese
public could be mobilized to request substantive amounts of information and increased
revenue and contract transparency then the JBIC might be pushed to publish more regularly
and in more detail as well as articulate a clear transparency policy.
In its Environmental Guidelines for JBIC Lending Operations the bank endorses the OECD
Common Approaches, which implies that it has a stake in how it is perceived in the
international community. If JBIC considers it important to emphasize its endorsement of
OECD standards in its Environmental Guidelines there is the potential for influencing the
bank to adopt a framework for its transparency policy such as IFCs Sustainability
Framework.
42
8 Overseas Private Investment Corporation128

8.1 Supporting Private Finance and Investment with a Development Agenda
OPIC began operations 1971 in order to assume the investment guaranty and promotion
functions of the U.S. Agency for International Development.129 Today, OPICS primary
objectives include helping U.S. businesses invest overseas, fostering economic
development in new and emerging markets, complementing the private sector in
managing risks associated with foreign direct investment, and supporting U.S. foreign
policy.130 OPIC supports these objectives through three primary mechanisms including 1)
financing for private investors, 2) political risk insurance, and 3) support to investment
funds.131
OPIC is in a somewhat unique position among credit agencies and development banks since
it works primarily with private investors but is also mandated to be mindful of development
objects.132 The OPIC charter states that the agency should be guided by the economic and
social development impact and benefits of projects and the ways that a project
complements, or is compatible with other development assistance programs or projects of
the United States or other donors.133
8.2 Decreasing Investments in Extractive Projects in Favor of Renewables

During the 1990s and early 2000s, OPIC devoted a significant portion of its funding to oil,
gas and mining projects. According to Roshen Hendrickson, who has studied OPICs
investments in Sub-Saharan Africa, from 1989-1993, during the George H.W. Bush
administration, approximately 25% of OPIC funding in Africa went to the oil, gas and mining
sectors. (She estimates that OPIC invested a total of 850 million dollars in Africa in all
project categories during this time.)134 135 From 1993-2000, during the Clinton
administration, the proportion of funding going to the oil, gas, and mining sectors increased,
with approximately 50% of all OPIC funding in Africa going to these three areas (with total
OPIC funding of 1.7 Billion dollars in Africa during this time).136 From 2001-2008, during
the George W. Bush administration, about 25% of OPIC funding in Africa went to the
Report Developed by Annie Juergens Behr, anniejbehr@gmail.com, Resource Curse course student, The New
School Fall, 2013.
129 Shayerah Ilias, The Overseas Private Investment Corporation: Background and Legislative Issues, CRS
Report for Congress, July 5, 2011, p.1
130 OPIC Handbook, available at http://www.opic.gov/sites/default/files/docs/OPIC_Handbook.pdf, accessed
11/1/13, page 4.
131 Blake Puckett, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, OPIC, and the Retreat from Transparency, Indiana Journal
of Global and Legal Studies, Vol 15, #1 (2008): 159.
132 Friends of the Earth and Pacific Environment, Extractive Sector Projects Financed by Export Credit
Agencies, No Date of Publication-possibly 2006, available at
http://pacificenvironment.org/downloads/The%20Need%20for%20Foreign%20Investment%20Contract
%20%20Revenue%20Reform%20at%20ECAs%20_final_.pdf, Accessed October 2013, p. 10.
133 Ibid. p. 10
134 Roshen Hendrickson, Adjustment of the Role of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) in SubSaharan Africa, Africa Today 58 (4), 2013, p. 77.
135 Please note that although Hendricksons article is about Sub-Saharan Africa she uses the term Africa
through the section described above when discussing OPICs investments. This may be because OPIC uses
the category Africato denote all countries in Africain some of its annual reports.
136 Ibid.
128
43
extractive sectors (with OPIC funding in Africa totaling 2.1 billion dollars during this
time).137
In the 2000s however, Hendrickson believes that increasing pressure from environmental
groups led OPIC to take incremental measures to improve [their] environmental impact
through avoidance of extractive projects and requirements to measure carbon output. 138
In 2007, OPIC committed to promoting energy efficiency and low and no-carbon
technology, encouraging carbon sequestration, and reducing direct greenhouse gas
emissions by 50 percent between 2008 and 2023.
Since 2008, with OPICs increased interest in environmental concerns and renewable
energy projects, there has been a significant drop off in financing and investments for
extractive industry projects. In an analysis of OPIC projects for this report, we found that
OPIC investment in extractive projects has decreased significantly over the past five years,
going from 2.4 billion dollars in total investments in extractive projects between 20032007, to 442 million dollars in total investments in extractive projects between 2008-2013
(year to date). OPIC investments in extractive projects over the last five years is less than
1/5 of what it was during the prior five years (see Annex 9.8.2 - Opic Extractive Projects).
In 2011, when OPICs total project portfolio was 14.5 billion dollars139, only 345 million
dollarsor less than 3%--went to extractive industry projects (a total of 4 projects that
included 2 geothermal projects; see Annex 9.8.2 - Opic Extractive Projects). By contrast, in
2011 OPIC reported that 1.1 billion dollarsor just over 7% of their total budgetwent to
renewable energy projects, an amount that was roughly triple the support [for renewable
energy projects] in 2010.140
8.3 Methodology
Information on OPIC was collected through a combination of methods including: 1) a
literature review of secondary sources related to OPIC; 2) a review of primary sources
available on the OPIC website; and 3) email exchanges and phone conversations with OPIC
staff members.
Secondary sources were compiled through a comprehensive literature review. In the first
week of November, I searched Lexis/Nexis and JSTOR for articles with OPIC or Overseas
Private Investment Corporation in the title line or body of the abstract. In addition, during
October, I had previously used a google search to look for articles about OPIC that had been
published by nonprofit organizations concerned with transparency, accountability, and
environment sustainability (such as Revenue Watch Institute, Publish What You Pay, and
Friends of the Earth).
In addition, I reviewed the OPIC website, including policy statements, annual reports141, list
of current projects142, and previous comments from other organizations on OPIC policy.
Ibid. P. 80.
Ibid. p. 79
139 OPIC annual report 2011, available at http://www.opic.gov/sites/default/files/docs/051912-annualreportFINAL.pdf , accessed on Nov 19, 2013, p. 7.
140 Ibid, p. 6.
141 Available at http://www.opic.gov/media-connections/annual-reports , Accessed multiple times over the
course of October and November, 2013.
137
138
44
Using the information in the annual report and the list of current projects, I compiled a list
of extractive oil, gas, and mining projects funded by OPIC over the last 10 years (both
finance and investment funding; see Annex 9.8.2 - Opic Extractive Projects). In addition, all
extractive industry funding recipients were checked against the SEC website and the RWI
database of Oil and Mining Companies listed on Global Stock Exchanges to determine
whether the project would be covered under section 1504 of Dodd Frank or similar global
initiatives.
Finally, I contact OPIC by phone and email to ask for additional information and clarify
information found on the website. In mid October, I spoke by phone with Amanda Burke,
the OPIC press agent to ask for an interview with an OPIC staff member. Ms. Burke asked me
to submit a list of questions, which I did (see email, Annex 9.8.3 Communication with OPIC
regarding policy inquiry). I followed up with Ms. Burke several times during the following
weeks, and she said by phone and email that she was having trouble finding someone who
would be able to answer my questions. On October 25th, I spoke with Ms. Burke and she
said that the person who had been responsible for this area had left OPIC in the spring and
had not yet been replaced, therefore there was no obvious contact person for this area of
expertise. However, she said that she was trying to find someone in the legal department
who would be able to answer my questions. In mid November, I received an email from Ms.
Burke, with written response to my questions, but no indication of who had actually
answered the questions (see email, Annex 9.8.3 Communication with OPIC regarding policy
inquiry).
8.4 Data Collection

8.4.1 Scope and Size of the Problem
Over the last ten and a half years, from 2003-2013 (year to date) OPIC has financed 45
extractive oil, gas, and mining projects, representing 2.8 billion dollars in financing (see
Annex 9.8.2 OPIC Extractive Projects for a description of each project).143 OPIC has approved
two extractive industry projects so far in 2013, with financing totaling 54.5 million. There
are no extractive industry projects currently under review.
As mentioned above, OPIC support for extractive industry projects has decreased
significantly over the last five years, compared to the prior five years. Between 2003-2007,
OPIC gave 2.4 billion dollars to extractive projects. Between 2008-2013, OPIC gave 442
million dollars in total investments in extractive projects (year to date).
(These numbers include the financing of two geothermal drilling projects in 2011: one for
310 Million dollars and one for 10 Million dollars.)
Available at http://www.opic.gov/opic-action/all-project-descriptions, Accessed multiple times over the
course of October and November, 2013.
143 For the OPIC section of this report, extractive industry projects are defined as oil, gas, and mining extractive
projects. In addition, I have included two geothermal mining projects, since these projects seem ambiguous
to me, and I wonder whether they might fit under Revenue Watchs stated mission, even though geothermal
projects are often categorized as renewable. Scientifically, I think you can make the case that many
geothermal are not renewable, and are therefore more appropriately defined as extractive mining projects
(more analogous to natural gas than to solar power). For an overview of the scientific controversy involving
geothermal drilling see, for instance, the New York Times article Deep in Bedrock, Clean Energy and Quake
Fears, June 23, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/24/business/energyenvironment/24geotherm.html?_r=0 . Accessed December 10, 2013.
142
45
8.5 Transparency
8.5.1 Payment and Contract Disclosure
As of October 15, 2010 when OPIC released a new Social and Environmental Policy
Statement, the agency has required compliance with EITI or substantially similar principles
and criteria for most extractive industry projects (this requirement was confirmed in an
email from OPIC dated November 12, 2013; see attached email). Through this mechanism,
OPIC would seem to require companies to disclose payments, including taxes, royalties, and
dividends (and, according to new EITI standards, this reporting would be required on a
project-by-project basis).144 In addition, according to the new EITI standards, companies
would be encouraged to disclose contracts.145
The text of the requirement, found in section 5.22 of OPICs Social and Environmental Policy
Statement, reads as follows:
5.22 Prior to OPCs issuance of approval for a project that significantly involves an
Extractive Industry and OPICs support to the project is valued at $10 million or more
(including contingent liability) (1) Applicants must agree to implement Extractive Industry
Transparency Initiative (EITI) principles and criteria, or substantially similar principles and
criteria related to the Project; and (2) the host country where the project is to be carried out
must have committed to EITI principles and criteria or substantially similar principles and
criteria or be taking the necessary steps to establish functioning systems. OPIC may approve
an Extractive Industry project if the host country does not meet the requirements of this
paragraph only if (1) OPIC determines that it is in the foreign policy interest of the United
States to provide support to the Project and (2) the host country does not prevent the
Applicant from meeting the disclosure requirements of this paragraph. 146
Since 2011, three of the five extractive industry projects that OPIC has financed have
received 10 million dollars or more in financing, and would therefore, in theory, fall under
this requirement (in addition, OPIC has financed two geothermal projects during this
time).147 However, none of these three companies were listed as participants in EITI on the
EITI website. Nor do these companies mention EITI on their own websites.148 I also search
these three company websites to try find out whether they have implemented a
substantially similar principle or initiative for these OPIC sponsored projects. I could find
no evidence that they had.
It would seem that OPIC has not made a significant effort to enforce their EITI requirement,
or to significantly grapple with this requirement. As of this draft, the transparency page on
the OPIC website still displays OPICs previous EITI policy statement, which was adopted in
Revenue Watch Institute, EITI Improves Reporting Standards, March 7, 2013, available at
http://www.revenuewatch.org/news/blog/eiti-improves-reporting-standards, Accessed Nov 19, 2013.
145 Ibid.
146 OPIC, Social and Environmental Policy Statement, October 15, 2010. Available at
http://www.opic.gov/sites/default/files/consolidated_esps.pdf , Accessed in October, 2013. Page, 21.
147 The organizations are: 1) Apache Corporation (http://www.apachecorp.com); 2) Joshi Technologies
International Inc (http://www.joshitech.com), and 3) Parko Services
(http://www.parkoservices.com.co/resultados.php?len=ing).
148 Ibid.
144
46
2006149, and which encouraged EITI compliance.150 When asked about this discrepancy, an
OPIC representative replied:
OPICs policy is what is specified in the Environmental and Social Policy Statement. Other
areas of the website that are not in conformance will need to be revised accordingly. Thank
you for bringing this to our attention.151
Given that OPICs new EITI policy was adopted in 2010, it would seem that OPIC has been
delinquent in making its current EITI policy clear to its funding recipients and its own
officers. (The original OPIC policy in regards to EITI, as reflected on the website, was
originally adopted in 2006.152)
8.5.2 Mechanisms of Compliance

At this point, OPIC does not have a clear mechanism for enforcing compliance with EITI.
When asked about enforcement in an email, an OPIC representative replied that depending
on how OPIC is supporting a transaction and its contractual relationship with the parties
OPIC would tailor its enforcement and seek appropriate rights and remedies (emphasis
added).153 This wording indicates that OPIC does not have clear enforcement mechanisms
for their EITI requirements.
In addition, when asked about how a project might receive an exemption (as described in
section 5.22 of the Social and Environmental Policy Statement) an OPIC representative
replied:
We have not had a need to develop a process for exemption. Since OPIC adopted this policy,
OPICs emphasis has been in support of renewable projects and have had very little potential
transactions supporting extractive projects seek OPIC assistance. Thus, the issues you raise
as a practical matter have not needed to be addressed. We are not an institution with a high
volume of transactions and we support transactions in a multitude of ways, thus we often
appropriately tailor the requirements to the particular project. 154
While it is true that the volume of extractive industry projects may not be significant
compared to other OPIC sectors, it would still seem important that this requirement be
enforced.
OPIC should make it clear throughout all its materials that EITI compliance is required.
Statements about EITI compliance should be added to OPICs application materials. In
addition, all OPIC projects are required to submit an annual self-monitoring questionnaire,
and OPIC should add questions about payment disclosure to these questionnaires (as well
as making it clear that contract disclosure is encouraged) and then follow-up with those
who are not compliant. OPIC also conducts site visits of environmentally sensitive projects.
Hendrickson, p. 79.
See (http://www.opic.gov/who-we-are/transparency), Accessed Nov 20, 2013. ( I also have a screenshot of
this, in case they change it. )
151 Email from unidentified OPIC staff member, November 12, 2013.
152 Hendrickson, p. 79.
153 Email from unidentified OPIC staff member, November 12, 2013.
154 Ibid.
149
150
47
OPIC should monitor compliance with EITI standards on payment and contract disclosure
during these site visits.
8.5.3 Accessibility of Information

Payment and contract information from OPIC financed extractive industries projects is not
available on the OPIC website.
8.5.4 Comparison of Coverage

All OPIC extractive industry funding recipients were checked against the SEC website and
the RWI Database of Oil and Mining Companies listed on Global Stock Exchange to
determine whether the project would be covered under section 1504 of Dodd Frank or
similar global initiatives.
Of the 45 extractive industry projects that were identified, 15 have at least one partner who
would be required to disclose payment information under section 1504 of Dodd Frank.
Four of these 15 projects, are also run by a second organization that is not SEC listed would
not be required to disclose payment information under Dodd Frank.155 An additional two
projects are listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange. (See Sheet 2 from Annex 9.8.2 OPIC
Extractive Projects).
8.5.5 Recommendations
OPIC already has a policy in place that would require payment disclosure, and encourage
contract disclosure, for most of its extractive industry projects. I believe the most effective
way for RWI to influence OPIC policies would be to encourage them to enforce their EITI
policy. While OPIC does not publish lists of employees, other than its top executives, it does
have a clear process for making comments on OPIC compliance with its own policies. The
OPIC Office of Accountability is an independent office within OPIC that can conduct an
investigation of how OPIC applied its relevant policies to the OPIC-supported project.156
This process is open to local communities, other project-affected parties, and their
representatives.157 RWI could make contacts with representatives of communities affected
by one of the extractive industry projects that was funded by OPIC in 2013, and make a joint
complaint to the Office of Accountability, asking OPIC to enforce its own EITI policy. The
two most recent extractive industry projects funded by OPIC include 40 million dollars in
financing for the development and production of oil and natural Gas in 23 Concessions in
Egypt, and 14.5 million dollars in financing for the expansion of the Palagua Oil Field in
Colombia, including the drilling of 32 additional wells.158
It is not clear to me how section 1504 of Dodd Frank applies or will apply to the situation of two companies
operating together on a project, when one is SEC listed and the other is not. I see that Dodd Frank includes
rules that apply to companies that control another company (and requires them to disclose payments
from any company that they control). But, what if the two companies are simply operating together? Will
the one company who is SEC listed simply be able to pass the payment to the other company who is not SEC
listed, thereby allowing the second company to make the payment without disclosing, and thereby
circumventing section 1504 of Dodd Frank?
156 OPIC Office of Accountability Website, Available at http://www.opic.gov/who-we-are/office-ofaccountability, Accessed on Nov 19, 2013
157 Ibid.
158 Information available on the OPIC website, Project Description for the Columbia Project available at
(http://www.opic.gov/sites/default/files/files/joshi-technologies-international-2013.pdf ) and for the
Egypt project at (http://www.opic.gov/sites/default/files/files/apache-iii-information-sumary.pdf).
155
48
49
ANNEXES
50
9 Annexes
9.1 International Finance Corporation
9.1.1 Power Map
9.1.1.1
9.1.1.2
IFC Stakeholders
Global Heads at the IFC:
o Mining: Tom Butler
Tel: (202) 473-5989
E-mail: tbutler@ifc.org
o Oil & Gas: Lance Crist
Tel: 1 202-473-0773
E-mail: lcrist@ifc.org
o Media Inquiries: Josef Skoldeberg
Tel: 1 202-473-6978
E-mail: jskoldeberg@ifc.org
Civil Society:
o Chief, Public Affairs: Aaron Rosenberg
Washington, DC
Tel: (202) 458-9385
Email: ARosenberg1@ifc.org
o Head of Communications and Public Affairs: Oliver Griffith
Western Europe
Tel: (33-1) 4069-3195
Email: OGriffith@ifc.org
o Communications Officer: Andrea Engel
Brussels, Belgium
Tel: (32-2) 552-0039
Email: AEngel@ifc.org
Client Stakeholders
Oil and Gas (Active Projects):
o Bankers Petroleum, Canada
o BPZ Resources, USA
o Candax Energy, Inc, Canada
o Geopark, Chile
o Kuwait Energy, Kuwait
o Medanito, S.A., South Africa
o Pan
American
Energy,
UK/Argentina
o Peru LNG, Peru/US, South Korea,
Japan
Mining (Active Projects):
o Lonmin, South Africa
o Petra Diamonds, Bermuda/
Jersey
o Aricom, UK
o Argentex Mining, Canada
o Baobab Resources, Australia
o Eurasian Minerals, Canada
o Kalukundi (Africo)
o Kasbah Resources, Australia
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
ROCH, Argentina
Salamander Energy, UK
Vostok, UK/Russia
Topic Tunisia, Tunisia
Allan Potash, Canada
Kosmos Energy/Tullow Oil,
Bermuda
Rialto Energy Ltd, Australia
Melrose Resources, Irish
Kiwara
Lydian, Jersey
MBAC Fertilizer Corp (Itafos
Project), Canada
Allana Potash, USA
Antares Minerals, Canada
Far East Energy Corporation,
USA
Greystar Resources, Canada
51
o
o
9.1.1.3
Gryphon Minerals, USA

Mindoro Resources
o
o
Nyota Minerals, Australia

Simandou
Relevant Advocates and Potential Allies
Oxfam America
In 2009, RWI and Oxfam collaborated to Host Discussions on Extractive Industry
Transparency, however since the passage of the Cardin-Lugar section of the Dodd-Frank
Act, Oxfam has spawned another campaign encouraging Big Oil to disclose payments made
to host countries. Strengthening this partnership to develop a collaborative campaign
addressing revenue and payment transparency with a detailed, goal focused, and structured
action plan could prove to be very effective both towards the IFC and at a grassroots level of
involvement.
o Right to Know Right to Decide Campaign
o
o
o
o
www.oxfamamerica.org/BigOil
current campaign to get oil companies to disclose oil payments made to
host governments
info@oxfamamerica.org
campaigns@oxfamamerica.org
Vice President of Policy and Advocacy: Paul OBrien
Media contact: Laura Rusu
Office: (202) 496-1169
Mobile: (202) 459-3739
lrusu@oxfamamerica.org
Senior Policy Manager for Extractive Industries: Ian Gary
Media contact: Alex Blair
Office: (202) 777-2929
Mobile: (202) 460-8272
ablair@oxfamamerica.org
52
World Resources Institute (WRI)

In 2009 the WRI utilized individuals from both the IFC and the Compliance
Advisor/Ombudsman to revise drafts of their Breaking Ground: Engaging Communities in
Extractive and Infrastructure Projects report
o
Personnel used for the report:

Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman of the IFC and MIGA: Peter Bosshard
o No direct contact info available
o Office of the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO)
2121 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20433, USA
Tel: + 1 202 458 1973
Fax: + 1 202 522 7400
E-mail: cao-compliance@ifc.org
IFCs Policy and Standards Unit
Similarly, the IFC sought advisory services from the WRI in its 2011 revision of the IFC
Performance Standards. Capitalizing on the established relationship between the IFC and WRI,
Revenue Watch should attempt a partnership particularly within WRIs The Access Initiative
(TAI). Touted as the largest network of civil society organizations dedicated to ensuring that
local communities have159 access to information so that they can participate in the decisions
that affect their lives.
www.accessinitiative.org
www.wri.org/our-work/project/access-initiative-tai/tools#project-tabs
access@wri.org
Named contacts: Lalanath deSilva, Carole Excell, Jesse Worker, Cait ODonnell
9.1.1.4
Potential Areas of Influence
Listening to Our Stakeholders

In 2004, the IFC conducted a broad public consultation as part of their review of their
environment and social safeguards. In this consultation they spoke to the private sector,
governments, intergovernmental agencies, academia, and civil society. As it has been almost
10 years since the last survey, the likelihood that they will conduct another one is high.160 As
of yet it has not been publicized, but when and if they conduct another survey this would be
an opportune time for the Revenue Watch Institute.
World Bank and Civil Society Partnership

By attending The World Bank and Civil Society Organizations (CSO) Annual Meetings, RWI
would have the option to promote new avenues for the World Bank to improve the
transparency mechanisms. For instance In November 2013 the Bank conducted a CSO survey:
This is an opportunity for RWI to put forth its objectives for the IFC and other IFIs that are
tied to The World Bank considering they publish the findings and feedback gathered from
these surveys.
Additionally, though Revenue Watch has received grant money from the World Bank in the
past, they may have the opportunity to indirectly influence the IFC by moving their
relationship with the World Bank to a consultative partnership in which the Bank would
159About
The Access Initiative, The Access Initiative, www.accessinitiative.org/about (accessed November 30,
2013)
160 Listening to Our Stakeholders, IFC,
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/c5fdb1804657ab38a2e0e7c173ed7557/IFC_Stakeholders.pdf?MOD=
AJPERES (accessed December 7, 2013)
53
procure their ideas and perspectives on certain policies and projects. Another avenue would
be to maneuver the relationship into a direct partnership where RWI could be contracted for
technical assistance or to manage a joint program. The later two options offer an avenue for
RWI to advocate through participating in the Annual Meetings or through directly engaging
with officials at the World Bank.
civilsociety@worldbank.org
specific individuals can be found according to level (country, regional/departmental,
global)
with
whom
RWI
could
partner
with:
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/CSO/0,,contentMDK:20093
777~menuPK:220425~pagePK:220503~piPK:220476~theSitePK:228717,00.html
Advisory arm of the IFC

The advisory arm of the IFC and the training courses offered by Revenue Watch have a similar
goal in improving business practices both by governments and companies. This would be an
interesting avenue for the IFC and Revenue Watch to partner.
54
9.1.2 Tables and Charts

9.1.2.1
9.1.2.2
TABLE 1: IFC PUBLICLY TRADED COMPANIES AND EXCHANGES
TSX
LSE
US
Duetsche
BME
AusSE
JSE
MICEX
Bankers
Bankers
PanAmerican(BP)
Lonmin
Peru LNG
(Repsol)
Gryphon
Lonmin
Vostok
Candax
Geopark
Kosmos
PanAmerican(BP)
Antares
PanAmerican(BP)
Lonmin
BPZ
Petra Diamonds
Kasbah
Greystar (Eco Oro)

Allan Potash
Melrose
PanAmerican(BP)
Salamandar
Aricom
(Petropavlovsk)
Mindoro
Nyota
Lydian
Petra Diamonds
Argentex
Rialto
Salamander
Aricom
(Petropavlovsk)
Baobab
Far East Energy
Baobab
Greystar (Eco Oro)
Nyota
Allan Potash
Antares
Lydian
Mindoro
Nyota
Rialto
55
9.1.2.2
TABLE 2: PROJECTS AVAILABLE ON IFC WEBSITE
Project
Bankers
Petroleum
Host
Government
Albania
Sector
Oil &
Gas
Year of
Commitment
2009
Development Level
Made
material
government
payments
Revenue
Payment
Disclosure
Mechanism*
Disaggregate
d by Project?
Quarterly and
Annual
Financial
Statements
Yes: Albanian
fields are
funded as a
single IFC
project
What Info is
Disclosed?
Income tax,
royalties
Taxes,
royalties
BPZ
Resources
Candax
Energy Inc
Peru
Tunisia
Oil &
Gas
Oil &
Gas
2008
2011
Made
material
government
payments
Made
material
government
payments
Annual Report
No
Annual Report
No:
Disaggregate
d by country
but not by
project or
field
Contract
Accessibility
Income tax,
royalties
(proxy
calculation),
domestic
royalty and
delivery
obligations
Comments
Consolidated
charts
Yes: via
Annual
Report
stipulates
key terms
and
principal
agreement
of contract
No chart or
ledger form
used. Payments
made were
imbedded
within reports
dialog.
Embedded
within a lengthy
annual report.
No consolidated
chart with data
of government
payments.
56
Geopark
Kuwait
Energy
Lonmin
Medanito,
S.A.
Argentina
& Chile
Egypt &
Yemen
Oil &
Gas
Oil &
Gas
South
Africa
Minin
g
Argentina
Oil &
Gas
2009
2009
Made
material
government
payments
Made
material
government
payments
Consolidated
Chart
Consolidated
Chart
2007
Made
material
government
payments
Web-based
Sustainable
Development
Report
2011
Made
material
government
payments
Unable to
Determine
No:
Disaggregate
d by country
but not by
project or
field
Yes:
Disaggregate
d by country
(funded as a
single IFC
project)
Yes:
Marikana
area (IFC
funded
operations)
Government
payments
(Community,
Regional/Prov
inical
Government,
National
Government,
Total)
Royalties;
Bonus
Payments;
Porfit/Income
Tax; Value of
profit oil
delivered to
government;
Other fiscal
benefits to
government
(Field Tax,
KFAS/Zakat,
Export duty,
MRT & VAT);
Total
Cash
payments for
materials and
services
purchased;
Social capital
(donations
and other
community
projects);
Government
Taxes
Easy to read
chart, but lacks
detail and
specificity of
projects and
types of
payments being
made.
Clear and
user/reader
friendly.
Detailed and
specific. Direct
link from ifc.org
website
Direct link to a
report on
sustainable
practices.
Statement is in
ledger form
from the
perspective of
Lomnin.
57
Melrose
Resources
Pan
American
Energy
Peru LNG
Petra
Diamonds
ROCH
Egypt &
Bulgaria
Oil &
Gas
Argentina
Oil &
Gas
Peru
Oil &
Gas
Tanzania
Minin
g
Argentina
Oil &
Gas
Melrose
Resources was
acquired by
Petroceltic.
Disaggregation
of IFC funded
projects and
related
payments
indiscernible.
Corrupted file.
2007
Made
material
government
payments
Unavailable
link from
ifc.org site for
2011;
Petroceltic F12
Report
available via
2010 link on
ifc.org
No
N/A
2007
Made
material
government
payments
Annual Report
No
N/A
2008
Made
material
government
payments
Consolidated
Chart
Yes: Peru
LNG (special
purpose
company
created for
project)
Taxes (VAT
net and
Customs);
Muncipalities;
Others
Easy to read
direct statement
of payments,
but vague in
nature ex.
Others.
Pay-As-YouEarn (PAYE),
Skills
Development
Level (SDL),
Unemploymen
t Insurance
(UIF),
Royalties,
Value Added
Tax (VAT),
withholding
tax
Easy to read
with a easily
navigated
webpage for
disclosure of
payments, but
lacks project
detail.
N/A
2010
Made
material
government
payments
Consolidated
Chart
No:
Disaggregate
d by country
but not by
project or
field
2008
Made
material
government
payments
Unavailable
link from
ifc.org site for
2011
Unavailable
link from
ifc.org site
for 2011
58
Salamande
r Energy
Asia
Oil &
Gas
2008
Made
material
government
payments
Consolidated
Chart
2007
Made
material
government
payments
Consolidated
Chart
Vostok
Russia
Oil &
Gas
Aricom
Russia
Minin
g
2007
Project
evaluation
Payments not
yet made
Topic
Tunisia
Tunisia
Oil &
Gas
2009
Production
not started
Payments not
yet made
MBAC
Fertilizer
Corp
(Itafos
Project)
Brazil
Minin
g
2011
Not in
production
yet
Payments not
yet made
Allana
Potash
Ethiopa
Oil,
Minin
g
2010
Early stage
exploration
Payments not
yet made
Country
totals and an
aggregate
total:
Thailand,
Laos,
Vietnam and
Indonesia
Yes: Diall
Alliance
project in
Russia
Government
Payments
(License
Fees/Signatur
e Bonus/PSC
training, VAT,
Corporate Tax
& SRB,
Royalties,
Production
Bonus)
Community
Development
Outlay (US$);
Purchasers
from National
Suppliers
(Million US$);
Taxes and
Other
Payments
(Million US$)
Summary of
social and
developmen
t
agreements.
No revenue
contract
readily
available
User friendly
consolidated
chart including
data on local
Goods &
Services
purchased and
Community
Based
Payments.
Direct link to
data.
Some detail but
could be more
specific on
whether
royalties and
types of taxes
paid.
59
Antares
Minerals
Peru
Minin
g
2009
Early stage
exploration
Payments not
yet made
Argentex
Mining
Argentina
Minin
g
2010
Early stage
exploration
Payments not
yet made
Baobab
Resources
Mozambiqu
e
Minin
g
2008
Early stage
exploration
Payments not
yet made
Eurasia
Minerals
Haiti
Minin
g
2010
Early stage
exploration
Payments not
yet made
Far East
Energy
Corporatio
n
China
Minin
g
2007
Early stage
exploration
Payments not
yet made
Greystar
Resources
Colombia
Minin
g
2009
Early stage
exploration
Payments not
yet made
Gryphon
Minerals
Burkina
Faso
Minin
g
2009
Early stage
exploration
Payments not
yet made
Gryphon
Minerals
Burkino
Faso
Minin
g
2010
Early stage
exploration
Payments not
yet made
Kalukundi
(Africo)
Democratic
Republic of
the Congo
Minin
g
2007
Early stage
exploration
Payments not
yet made
60
Kasbah
Resources
Morocco
Minin
g
2010
Early stage
exploration
Payments not
yet made
Kiwara
Zambia
Minin
g
2009
Early stage
exploration
Payments not
yet made
Kosmos
Energy/Tul
low Oil
Ghana
Oil &
Gas
2009
Early stage
exploration
Payments not
yet made
Lydian
Kosovo/
Armenia
Minin
g
2007
Early stage
exploration
Payments not
yet made
Mindoro
Resources
Phillipines
Minin
g
2010
Early stage
exploration
Payments not
yet made
Nyota
Minerals
Ethiopa
Minin
g
2010
Early stage
exploration
Payments not
yet made
Rialto
Energy Ltd
Cote
D'Ivoire
Oil &
Gas
2011
Early stage
exploration
Payments not
yet made
Simandou
Guinea
Minin
g
2007
Early stage
exploration
Payments not
yet made
Yes: via
sec.gov and
revenuewatc
h.org
61
9.2 Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency

The following development finance power map includes relevant stakeholders and decision
makers, relevant advocates and potential allies, and potential areas of influence.
9.2.1 Power Map

9.2.1.1
Relevant stakeholders and decision makers
MIGA stakeholders
o
Antonio Barbalho, Sector Manager for Energy and Extractive Industries at MIGA
Barbalho oversees all extractive industry matters at MIGA. Prior to MIGA,
Barbalho held several senior positions at Deutsche Bank and CERA.
Email: abarbahlo@worldbank.org
Aradhana Kumar Capoor, Operations, Sanctions and Governance, Infrastructure,
Oil, Gas, and Mining guarantees; Board Matters; Finance and Risk Management
(Legal Affairs)
Aradhana specializes in the legal side of oil, gas, and mining guarantees. He
is also the lead counsel for MIGA on board matters, finance, and risk
management.
Email: akumarcapoor@worldbank.org
Board of Directors (See Annex D for complete list) 161
The Board of Directors reviews and decides on investment projects and
also oversees general management policies. There are currently 24
directors on the Board. The six largest shareholders in MIGA (France, UK,
Germany, US, Japan and China) each vote for a director. The remaining
directors are elected by the votes of subdivisions of countries.
Client stakeholders 162

o
Oil and Gas Guarantee Holders (Active Projects):

Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), US
SCDM Energie, France
HSBC, UK
BNP Paribas (Suisse) SA, Switzerland
Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd., South Africa
West African Gas Pipeline Company Ltd., Bermuda
Sasol Limited Group of South Africa, South Africa
El Paso Energy International Company, US
Mining Guarantee Holders (Active Projects):
Strand Minerals Pte Ltd., Indonesia
Mitsubishi Corporation, UK
BEMA Gold Corporation, Canada
Socit Gnrale S.A., France
Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau (KfW), Germany
Eramet SA, France
Kenmare Resources PLC, Ireland
Angiovaal Mining Ltd
MIGA Directors and Alternates, MIGA, November 11, 2013, (PDF file),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/278027-1215526322295/MIGADirectors.pdf
(accessed November 20, 2013)
162 Projects, MIGA, http://www.miga.org/projects/index.cfm (accessed November 20, 2013).
161
62
Reinsurance partners (See Annex for complete list)163.

Whenever a project exceeds MIGAs own capacity, the agency reinsures
itself, through a syndication process, with private and public sector
reinsurance companies in order to meet client needs. Thus, the
reinsurance partners have a stake in project operations.
9.2.1.2 Relevant advocates and potential allies

MIGA has created strategic partnerships within the international finance sector, working
closely with public and private insurance providers to increase the political risk industrys
capacity as a whole. Other partners include multilateral and bilateral donors, as well as other
political risk insurers, with the aim to support investment in conflict-affected environments.
MIGA has also established partnerships with public and private sector organizations to help
produce research, including regional banks, guarantee agencies, and the OPEC Fund for
International Development.
New potential allies include the Global Transparency Initiative (GTI) and Bank Information
Center (BIC). Both bodies have published reports on transparency initiatives in the
international finance sector, including MIGA. The GTI is a network of civil society
organizations promoting openness in the IFIs. It aims to positively impact the process towards
greater accountability in these institutions and contribute constructively to the debate about
how the right to know can be implemented by IFIs. BIC is an independent, non-profit, nongovernmental organization that advocates for the protection of rights, participation,
transparency, and public accountability in the governance and operations of IFIs. Specifically,
BIC partners with civil society in developing and transition countries to influence IFIs to
promote social and economic justice and ecological sustainability. A potential contact person
within the organization is Katie Redford, the Board Chair and current director of Earthrights
International.164
9.2.1.3 Potential areas of influence
A potential area of influence is within the Board of Directors165. The Board represents MIGAs
member countries and guides the programs and activities of MIGA. Additionally, the
institution has a historical record of approving changes to its convention, indicating it is open
to reform and change. Accessing these individuals is the most direct path to influencing
change within MIGA. Since member countries vote these individuals, using mechanisms to
raise issues related transparency and accountability in member countries has the potential to
influence policy and investment decisions. Another potential area of influence is with Marcus
S. D. Williams, part of MIGAs senior management team in charge of strategy, communications
and partnerships. Williams is responsible for advising the Executive Vice President on the
agencys strategy and operational activities. His email is mwilliams5@worldbank.org.
Facultative Reinsurance Obtained by MIGA, MIGA,

http://www.miga.org/documents/Reinsurance_Partners.pdf (accessed November 18, 2013)
164 Board and Funders, Bank Information Center (BIC), http://www.bicusa.org/about/board-and-funders/
(accessed November 20, 2013).
165 MIGA Directors and Alternates, MIGA, November 11, 2013, (PDF file),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/278027-1215526322295/MIGADirectors.pdf
(accessed November 20, 2013)
163
63
9.2.2 Tables and Charts

9.2.2.1
OUTSTANDING PORTFOLIO DISTRIBUTION BY SECTOR, PERCENT OF GROSS EXPOSURE

FY07
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
FY12
FY13
Infrastructure
41
41
35
30
33
38
44
Financial
29
37
47
52
49
41
32
Oil, gas and mining
13
11
Agribusiness,
manufacturing and
services
17
13
11
11
13
15
13
Total
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
Source: MIGA Annual Report 2013, http://www.miga.org/documents/Annual_Report13.pdf
9.2.2.2
ACTIVE MIGA PROJECTS IN OIL AND GAS
Investor/Guarantee Holder
Project
Host Country
Guarantee
Amount ($M)
SCDM Energie SAS, France; HSBC,

United Kingdom
Block CI-27 Expansion

Program
Cote dIvoire
437.0
Overseas Private Investment

Corporation (OPIC), United States
Apache Egypt
Egypt
150.0
BNP Paribas (Suisse) SA,

Switzerland
LUKOIL Overseas Uzbekistan

Ltd
Uzbekistan
119.5
Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd.,

South Africa
Companhia Mozambique de
Gasuduto SARL (CMG)
Mozambique
49.7
West African Gas Pipeline

Company Ltd., Bermuda
West African Gas Pipeline

Company Ltd.
Ghana
75.0
Sasol Limited Group of South

Africa, South Africa
Sasol Petroleum Temane Ltd.
Mozambique
72.0
El Paso Energy International

Company, United States
Comaas Asociadas
Petroleras S.A.
Argentina
40.2
Source: MIGA Brief: Oil and Gas
64
9.2.2.3
TABLE 3: ACTIVE MIGA PROJECTS IN MINING

Guarantee
Amount ($M)
Investor/Guarantee Holder
Project
Host Country
Mitsubishi Corporation, United

Kingdom; Socit Gnrale S.A.,
France; BEMA Gold Corporation,
Canada
Kupol
Russian
Federation
304.6
Mitsubishi Corporation, Japan;

Eramet SA, France; Strand
Minerals Pte. Ltd., Indonesia
PT Weda Bay Nickel
Indonesia
207.0
Anglovaal Mining Ltd
Chambishi Metals Plc
Zambia
30.0
Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau

(KfW), Germany; Kenmare
Resources PLC, Ireland
Kenmare Moma Mining
Mozambique
20.8
Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau

(KfW), Germany
Kenmare Moma Mining
Mozambique
12.4
Source: MIGA Brief: Mining
9.2.2.4
TABLE 4: FACULTATIVE REINSURANCE OBTAINED BY MIGA
Investment Insurer
Country
ACE European Group Ltd.
United Kingdom
ACE Global Markets, Lloyds Syndicate 2488
United Kingdom
A.F. Beazley, Esq., and Others, Lloyds

Syndicates 2623 and 623
United Kingdom
African Trade Insurance Agency
Kenya
Ark Syndicate Management Limited,

Lloyds Syndicate 4020
United Kingdom
AXIS Specialty Ltd.
Bermuda
65
Catlin Insurance Company Limited
Bermuda
Coface North America
United States
Finnvera Plc
Finland
Garanti-Institutte for Eksportkreditt (GIEK)
Norway
Great Northern Insurance Company (Chubb &

Son)
United States
Hannover Rckversicherung AG
Germany
Hiscox Syndicates Limited, Lloyds Syndicate 33
United Kingdom
Islamic Corporation for the Insurance of

Investment and Export Credit (ICIEC)
Saudi Arabia
M.D. Reith and Others, Lloyds Syndicate 1414
United Kingdom
Mnchener Rckversicherungs-Gesellschaft
Germany
National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh

(AIG)
United States
Nippon Export Investment Insurance (NEXI)
Japan
Office Nationale du Ducroire (ONDD)
Belgium
QBE Insurance Corporation
United States
S.J. Catlin, Esq., and Others, Lloyds Syndicates

1003 and 2003
United Kingdom
Sovereign Risk Insurance Ltd.
Bermuda
Starr Underwriting Agents on behalf of Lloyds

Syndicate 1919
United Kingdom
Steadfast Insurance Company (Zurich)
United States
66
Swiss Reinsurance Company
Switzerland
Servizi Assicurativi del Commercio Estero (SACE)
Italy
Talbot Underwriting Limited, Lloyds Syndicate

1183
United Kingdom
Source: Reinsurance Partners, http://www.miga.org/documents/Reinsurance_Partners.pdf
9.3 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

9.3.1 EBRB Draft Mining Strategy
The Draft Mining Strategy of June 23 2012
vs.
Mining Operations Policy of October 17 2012
Have RWI suggestions been met?
Has EBRD matched the contract and revenue disclosure standards established by the IFC
Sustainability Framework? No
Has EBRD ensured that project transparency requirements laid out in the EBRD Energy Policy
(2006) are applied to sectors covered by the Mining Strategy? Yes
Revenue Transparency Suggestions (on section 3.3):
Has EBRD created strong institutional safeguards regarding transparency of revenue
payments to governments for its own lending practices? No. Has it defined clear minimum
revenue reporting requirements for its extractive industry projects? Yes, however the
requirements are somewhat minimal, and have already been addressed in RWI's
comments on Capital Resource Review 4 in 2010.
The Bank will require mining companies to publicly disclose their material project payments
to the host government as a minimum revenue transparency obligation, both in countries that
apply and do not apply to the EITI principals and criteria.166
The document does not clarify whether the material project payments will cover all the
categories listed by RWI. (Royalty payments, taxes, profits/dividends, commodity-based
payments, signing bonuses, pipeline/transit tariffs, dividends, acreage fees, rental fees, and
social development funds)167
Has EBRD developed clear, comprehensive, and robust mechanisms of its own? No.
Has it instead identified the precise international corporate governance standards by which it
will strictly adhere regarding its own lending practices? No. It claims to commit to these,
but neither identifies nor details which policies will be used, or how they will be
166
167
Mining Operations Policy, October 17, 2012. Page 30

RWI's Submission to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development's Invitation to Comment on
the EBRD draft mining strategy, supporting responsible mining, June 23, 2012. Page 3.
67
enforced. Has it outlined any specific policy reforms concerning investment in metals
mining? Yes. Please see above.
Has EBRD extended the Energy Operations Policy (2006) requirements regarding
Coal/Hydrocarbon projects to publicly disclose their material project payments to the host
government (such as royalties, taxes and profit-sharing) as a minimum revenue transparency
obligation168 to projects in the mining sector? Yes. Although they do not specify
royalties, taxes and profit sharing as they did in the Energy Operations Policy.
Contract Disclosure Suggestions: (on section 3.3)
Does the Mining Operations Policy require the disclosure of contracts from its clients? No. It
makes mention to contract disclosure only in reference to external frameworks, such
as PWYP, and does not lay out any Bank policies on the issue.
International Best Practice on Legal and Regulatory Framework Suggestions: (on section 3.4)
Is EBRD specific in the framework which it chooses as the current best practice and commits
to enforcing the principals held within? No. All mentions of such frameworks are general,
and never is it specified which one the EBRD follows, or how it plans to update its
current policies to meet these standards. In The Bank's 6 approaches to the issue of
transparency, all of them begin with the term support.169 In this context, it means that
the initiation of any such efforts come from an external actor, and does not entail any
sort of policy commitment on the part of The Bank.
Criticism: One of the Bank's approaches to transparency states: The Bank will implement
best international corporate governance standards in its investments.170 This is clearly
untrue, as many standards (like the IFC's) have emerged which are substantially better in
practice than EBRD's current policies.
9.3.2 Criticisms of the EBRD Mining Operations Policy

Criticisms of the EBRD Mining Operations Policy
Delivered by CEE Bankwatch:171
o
o
168
169
170
171
172
The policy fails to address the majority of expectations and commentary surrounding
its release.
Despite a 3 year submission period for commentary; comments and responses were
not released to the public until the draft strategy was published. This is despite an
open letter issued by a number of CSOs to EBRD's President Sir Suma Chakrabart,
requesting a two-stage process for feedback on the policy.172 The president replied to
this request by saying I highly appreciate your views on the way we could improve
Energy Operations Policy. July 11, 2006. Page 14.

http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/policies/sector/powerenergy.pdf
Mining Operations Policy, October 17, 2012. Page 31
EBRD: Mining Operations Policy, October 17, 2012. Page 30
CEE Bankwatch: The EBRD's new Mining Operations Policy: A commentary on consultation process and
content. November 2nd, 2012. http://bankwatch.org/publications/ebrds-new-mining-operations-policycommentary-consultation-process-and-content
CEE Bankwatch: Bankwatch letter to EBRD on the transparency of the mining strategy review process.
August 3rd, 2012. http://bankwatch.org/publications/bankwatch-letter-ebrd-transparency-mining-strategyreview-process
68
o
o
our consultation practices on the Mining Strategy as well as on policies and strategies
in general in order to strengthen further the Bank's transparency and accountability. I
would strongly encourage you to put your recommendations forward during the
revision of the Public Information Policy which will also take place in 2013.173 The
request was not granted, and instead pushed ahead to the 2013 of the PIP.
Instead of setting new standards, the Policy makes reference to other pre-existing
EBRD policies.
Regarding transparency specifically, Bankwatch had this to report: With regards to
transparency, the initial public submissions were asking for more inclusive and
transparent processes of preparation and reporting on Environmental and Social
Action Plans for EBRD mining projects as well as higher transparency standards and
requirements for the Bank's clients.
9.3.3 EBRD Public Information Policy

Public Information Policy (2011)174
Currently Under Review: Autumn 2013
The policy was reviewed by RWI on May 31, 2011. RWI had few specific suggestions to make,
likely because the PIP (Public Information Policy) doesn't specifically address the extractive
industry. Neither of RWI's two broad requests were granted in the revision of the PIP. These
requests were:
o publication of all contracts, across all sectors, between the EBRD and project loan
sponsors
o publication of information on sub-projects of IFIs affiliated with EBRD Projects.
Note: 2 years is a relatively short turnaround for revisions on a major policy document such
as the PIP. This suggests that the EBRD, as a whole, is recognizing the rapidly-shifting norms
of information disclosure, although their PIP staff seems very reluctant to make major reforms
despite the document's ever-evolving form.
The researcher now finds it helpful to review the bank's disclosure promises of the PIP. These
promises are assessed for completeness, level of access, and how valuable they are to
promoting transparency practices.
(1) List of forthcoming Strategy and Policy Reviews and Updates. These are published
in an easy to find location, and although they are often unclear as to their exact
timetable, EBRD does not seem to marginalizing the invitation to participate in
the review process.175
(2) Board Minutes. The board minutes are published with exactly the information
stated by EBRD: (1) names of attendants, (2) Approval of last meeting's minutes,
(3) Agenda item titles, (4) Agreements and Decisions reached. Let it be noted,
that although all of this information is provided, it is extremely skeletal and of
very little use. It provides no context for decisions, or any mention of decision
making process.176
EBRD: Response letter to Bankwatch regarding consultation practices. September 3rd, 2012.
http://bankwatch.org/sites/default/files/response-EBRD-MiningStrategyProcess-03Sep2012.pdf
174 Public Information Policy. EBRD. July 27th, 2011 http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/
policies/pip/pipe.pdf#page=1&zoom=auto,0,849
175 EBRD Review of the Good Governance Policies. EBRD. Accessed Nov 20, 2013.
http://www.ebrd.com/pages/about/policies/governance.shtml
176 Minutes of the Board Meeting 9 May 2012. EBRD. May 9, 2012.
http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/board/BDSM1209w.pdf
173
69
(3) Board Committees. Terms of Reference and Membership of the Committees of the
Board of Directors. These are published.177
(4) Organogram of the Bank: The bank will post a graphic to identify the various
departments and components of the institution. No. This could not be found by the
researcher.
The only somewhat comparable info-graphic depicting
organizational structure was this Organizational Chart.178 This chart is rather
basic, and doesn't give the viewer the dynamic depiction of process flows and
chain of command which an Organogram suggests it would deliver.
(5) Administrative Tribunal. The Bank will post on its website details of the Bank's
administrate Tribunal, as well as copies of its decisions. The Tribunal is an internal
legal system aimed at resolving disputes of an employment or administrative
nature, and thus not of particular interest to EI studies at large. However,
among the handful of cases disclosed, one very important case stuck-out which
may be of interest to RWI. In fact, the researcher found the case to be relevant
enough to warrant its own appendix.179
9.3.4 EBRD Administration Tribunal Case Study

Administrative Tribunal Case:
Appellant vs. the EBRD
September 17th, 2012 (Corrected on October 22nd, 2012)180
This particular case seemed interesting for a number of reasons. In a nutshell, the case
surrounds a Senior Banker with the bank's Natural Resources Team. He was accused, and
convicted, of taking a bribe from a shady consultancy firm in exchange for the use of their
services in a natural resources project (there was never any proof of services rendered). He
subsequently deposited the bribe money into his sister's offshore bank account, where it was
discovered by a UK police investigation.
Additional Notes from Researcher: There's a lot to be read-into regarding this case.
o The senior bank official had been with the bank since 1994 (16 years at the time of
accusation), and held a high position of power within the organization. This suggests
that the Tribunal is not sparing its old-guard in natural resource corruption
proceedings.
o The Appellant was granted anonymity by EBRD. However, certain bits of information
included in the document could lead to his/her disclosure if RWI is interested in
pursuing it. The document makes reference to the bribe-giving company (referred to
as Y Consulting Inc.) as:
o Having created small businesses in particular selling kitchens and brokering
insurance.
o On its website (of Y Consulting) it claims to be an American consultancy and
risk management firm with offices throughout the world.
o Its business address is listed in rural Pennsylvania.
o It is not listed on the Dunn & Bradstreet database of businesses.
Members of Committees of the Board of Directors as at 1 October 2013. EBRD. October 1, 2013.
http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/board/Committees_13-14_(1_Oct).pdf
178 EBRD Organization. EBRD. October 2013. http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/orgcharts/ebrd.pdf
179 Administrative Tribunal. EBRD. Accessed Nov. 20, 2013.
http://www.ebrd.com/pages/about/principles/tribunal.shtml
180 EBRD Appellant v. EBRD, EBRDAT 2011/AT/01. EBRD (Accessed Nov. 15th, 2013)
http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/integrity/2012-10-22-judgement.pdf
177
70
The Tribunal's proceedings and verdict provide some insight into EBRD's values when dealing
with issues of corruption. They fired this employee despite his senior position and long track
record with the company, which suggests that they are not being selective with who they
target in their proceedings. Because this complaint came from the outside, it suggests that the
Office of the Chief Compliance Officer (OCCO) Headed by Enery Quinones181 - is receiving
complaints in an effective manner, and genuinely lodging those complaints into the system. It
also suggests that those who served as judges for this tribunal have an morally sound attitude
regarding abuses of project income in the Natural Resources sector, and that they are now
more aware of potential corruption and mismanagement of payments. The names and contact
information of the 3 judges are listed below, because they could be good people for RWI to
approach for: additional information, insight into EBRD proceedings, and partnerships for
policy reform aimed at avoiding similar abuses in the future using higher levels of project
payment transparency:
(1) Jan Paulsson (President) - Tel - 305-284-5638. Email: jpaulsson@law.miami.edu
(2) Sarah Christie - http://www.zoominfo.com/p/Sarah-Christie/307473102
(3) Stanislaw Soltysinski - Tel - +48 22 608 70 01. Email:
stanislaw.soltysinski@skslegal.pl http://www.skslegal.pl/team.php?person=38
It could be re-enforced that if EBRD takes RWI's advice on the PIP commentary and practices
publication of all contracts, across all sectors, between the EBRD and project loan sponsors,
that corruption issues, such as this one, would be easier to identify and mitigate.
9.3.5 EBRD Financed Extractive Industry Projects

See Embedded file Digital Annex 9.3.5 EBRD Financed Extractive Industry Projects:
9.3.6 Transcript of EBRD-related Interviews

Interviewer: Jonathan Leonard - Milano School of International Affairs
Interviewee: Fidanka McGrath - CEE Bankwatch campaign coordinator for monitoring the
European Bank of Development and Reconstruction (EBRD).
Seen below is an example of a document produced by Fidanka, regarding recent achievements
made in regard to EBRD policy.182
Email Interview Part 1
October 21, 2013
About us Who we are Our Structure Senior Management Enery Quinones. EBRD. Accessed Nov.
17h 2013. http://www.ebrd.com/pages/about/who/structure/management/quinones.shtml
182 Bacheva-McGrath, Fidanka. When god is high and the king is far. How NGOs and local communities can make their
voices heard? Mega Projects Conference, Istanbul. October 27, 2013. http://web.yesildusunce.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/11/fidanka-McGrath.pdf
181
71
Jonathan: Are you satisfied with EBRD's Revenue Disclosure policies for its extractive projects
(both mining and energy)? If not, can you point out a few key loopholes or failures to disclose?
Jonathan: Are you satisfied with EBRD's Payment disclosures for extractive projects (both mining
and energy)? If not, where have they fallen short, either in policy or practice?
Jonathan Are you satisfied with EBRD's Contract disclosures of extractive projects (both mining
and energy). I don't believe that they disclose these at all, however since the disclosure
requirements vary so much from project to project, I was hoping that you might be able to point
out the most glaring deficiencies.
Fidanka: The EBRD is not obligated by its policies to disclose information on revenues,
payments or contracts. Instead it delegates the disclosure responsibilities to its clients.
Accordingly, if requested to provide access to such information, the EBRD refers us to its
clients or their financial reports, as published on their web sites. Additional to this limited
disclosure, the
EBRD can decide to provide further confidentiality derogations from its policies to certain
projects. In fact the Public Information Policy of the EBRD is more concerned with
confidentiality than with transparency.
It should be mentioned in EBRD's favor that the bank promotes the EITI and encourages all its
clients from the Power &Energy and Natural Resources sectors to join the initiative, or even
declines to invest in cases when a country or a company is not willing to do so. For example
the
EBRD has declined proposals from Kazakhstan for investments in its oil and gas extraction,
however, it does still finance projects in the Transport or Manufacturing (chemicals) sectors
that are directly linked to oil and gas extraction.
(See http://bankwatch.org/publications/bankwatch-mail-48#Kazakhfossils)
Additional to lack of obligation for the EBRD to disclose financial information, there are
several practices that make its investments in Power & Energy and Natural Resources project
even more obscure. First of all, there is the problem with categorisation of EI projects, as socalled brown-field projects get a category B, which have lesser requirements on disclosure
and shorter periods for public consultation. The problem is that 'brown-field' projects are
usually associated with a legacy of heavy historic pollution and dodgy privatization
agreements, issues that raise significant public interest that is not matched by the level of
transparency provided for category
B investments.
Projects that BW has followed that are examples of the B categorization problem are:
Chelopech Mining (http://www.ebrd.com/english/pages/project/psd/2004/4468.shtml)
DPM Term Loan (http://www.ebrd.com/english/pages/project/psd/2010/36793.shtml),
Centerra Gold Revolver
(http://www.ebrd.com/english/pages/project/psd/2010/41543.shtml)
Additionally there are projects that we've spotted but not monitored closely:
Hambeldon Mining debt and equity, post controversial cyanide spill:
72
So for example as part of the Centerra gold revolving debt facility the EBRD provided a pot of
money for several of the company's activities in Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia, but it did not
provide information about the exact nature of the activities. When asked by Bankwatch, if any
money has been disbursed, the reply was 'check the client's website.' It is not always easy to
find or to understand financial reports of EI companies. And it should be fairly simple for the
EBRD to say 'yes, we did this much for this and that.' or 'no, we did not disburse any moneys
yet.' Once we saw that money has been disbursed we requested information about the exact
activities that the investment was covering, but instead of clear information we received a
Project Summary Document up-date. PSD up-dates are rare and very non-informative
especially if compared to project pages of the IFC for example.
Second there is the problem of setting the project area of influence. For example the bank may
choose an energy efficiency component of a dirty lignite mine project and may argue that
equipment purchased with the loan is limiting its responsibility to only a small area of the
mine, thus excluding from its area of responsibility developments of other fields of the mine,
carried out in serious clashes with local communities. A good example here is the Kolubara
lignite mine Environmental Improvement Project:
(http://www.ebrd.com/english/pages/project/psd/2011/41923.shtml)
Jonathan: Has EBRD been able to meet their own transparency requirements as laid out in their
policies? If not, when did this occur?
Fidanka: As mentioned above, the EBRD does not bind itself to very high requirements of
transparency, and furthermore it can relatively easily avail of the possibility to provide
derogation from its transparency requirements and declare project information as
'confidential'.
Attempts to access information, based on the EBRD's commitment to apply the Aarhus
Convention, on loan conditions that are considered non-commercial, but strictly
environmental and social conditionalities, have failed in the past. For example our recent
attempts to receive environmental and social information on the loan conditions for the
Nuclear Safety Upgrade project in Ukraine have failed completely.
Jonathan: Is there adequate recourse and response from the EBRD when information disclosure
issues have been brought to their attention?
Fidanka: Concerns with information disclosure are taken to the Secretary General of the
EBRD, who has never resolved any requests in our favor. Therefore Bankwatch is currently
preparing a complaint to the Project Complaints Mechanism on the above-mentioned Nuclear
Safety
Upgrade project in Ukraine, but otherwise we have not tested this option so far.
(Researcher Note: This PCM effort was abandoned, because the documents in question were
attained through other means. These means are explained in the 2nd interview)
Jonathan: Has the EBRD's Civil Society Engagement Unit been helpful and cooperative during
your interactions with them? Have they been readily available?
Fidanka: Yes, the CSO department has been mostly very helpful.
73
Email Interview Part 2

November 24, 2013
Jonathan: In the Mining and Energy policies, EBRD states that extractive project clients must:
...publicly disclose their material project payments to the host government (such as royalties,
taxes and profit-sharing) as a minimum revenue transparency obligation... I have a few
questions regarding this statement:
(a) Where is this information made public?
Fidanka: from my experience usually it is on their website in their quarterly or annual reports.
But this counts for companies listed on stock exchanges, like Centerra and Dundee Precious
Metals. For other companies it may be hard to get this kind of info.
(b) How does EBRD monitor its clients to ensure that this disclosure takes place?
Fidanka: Good question, but I am not really sure.
(c) Have you had any issues accessing this information for any projects? If yes, which ones?
Fidanka: As I said for companies that are not listed on stock exchanges it may be harder to get
this kind of information. For example for state owned energy giants like the Serbian EPS in
Kolubara, there have been several corruption scandals. And sometimes accessing the
information is not the problem, but understanding it, as in the case with Centerra where we
could see they have drawn from the EBRD revolver facility, but could not work out what
activities it was for exactly.
(d) What does EBRD do if this requirements is not met?
Fidanka: I am not sure. They often like to say that the point of giving most of the responsibility
to the client is to increase their capacity and to improve their CSR, and I guess it does work in
some cases - for example increasingly we see clients publishing ESIA or various operational
management plans, Env&Soc Action Plans, Stakeholder Engagement Plans - on their web sites.
But we do wonder - in general the impression is that if disclosure requirements are not met,
or ESAP implementation is not progressing, then the EBRD can use some carrots but not really
any sticks, even though ESAPs are part of the contract / loan agreement. (ESAP and SEPs can
include disclosure and consultation activities.) For example the Serbian EPS is not advancing
on the ESAP - not publishing a grievance mechanism for example - then there do not seem to
be any consequences, so we have to go to the Project Complaint Mechanism (2 cases not yet
resolved). In the past Arcelor Mittal has been a very stubborn client that was impossible to get
to disclose any kind of information, and the EBRD was not very successful making them do it.
(e) Are payments disaggregated in payments to national/local/municipal governments, or is it
all lumped together?
Fidanka: To be honest I have not looked into it.
74
Jonathan: Who is the CSO "Transparent World?" I've seen their name included on commentary
documents, but haven't been able to pull up any information on them on the web. Are you
familiar with this organization? If so, can you provide me with a document/link/description so
that I might learn more?
Fidanka: I have no idea who they are.
Jonathan: What information can you offer about the Secretary General? They seem to have a lot
of power over disclosure of information. Have they been a worthwhile advocacy avenue?
Fidanka: Yes, the Secretary General's office is in charge of PIP and its implementation currently in charge of PIP revision. Unfortunately they have not been a worthwhile avenue.
For example in the case with Centerra's revolving debt facility we complained several times
that the PSD was not updated after we figured that money has been drawn from the financial
reports published on-line. As a result the PSD was updated with some minimal and very
unclear information that still did not allow us to understand what activities exactly did the
money went towards. Such types of facilities are extremely obscure.
Jonathan: Are there any updates on your PCM exercise regarding the nuclear safety upgrade
project in Ukraine? Are there any documents you could send me which provide insight into the
proceedings?
Fidanka: So a solution was sought through the Secretary General's office, not through the
PCM. But at the end it was easier to get the document leaked from a friendly capital/treasury.
Once we got the document we did not continue pushing for disclosure. We have increasingly
directed more of our advocacy work to the capitals of some of the big shareholding countries
and it is paying off with some useful leaks - eg. drafts of policies, board documents.
Jonathan: What are your plans for the upcoming/current reviews on the policy documents?
Is there anything which you would like RWI to be aware of, or to work in collusion with,
regarding policy commentary proceedings?
Fidanka: On PIP in general we want to see less stress on confidentiality - it would require a bit
of a change of attitude as the bank is very stuck into its 'unique business-sensitive approach.'
We would like to see more accountability of Directors, especially of the EU ED - in short we
want more EDs to publish their votes and positions / elaborations on justification for a vote.
We would like to see disclosure of loan agreements or at least any environmental and social
conditionalities that are part of the contract. Then the new president of the bank is very keen
on having better understanding and communication of the real impact of projects, so we will
be pressing for more transparency on results from monitoring and evaluations, better and
more regular up-dates of PSDs.
Jonathan: Has the Civil Society dialogue exchange phase for policy revisions been made more
participatory, as per Bankwatch request? I saw in a letter from the president that you should
address the procedure's inadequacies in the upcoming PIP review. Have you/will you do this?
Is there anything you would like to see from RWI in this regard?
Fidanka: Sorry, I am not sure I understand the question. Can you give me the links, so I know
what it is about?
Jonathan: This Grant: http://www.revenuewatch.org/grants/training-journalists-mdbs-andebrd.
75
Did monitoring and evaluation of media sources find that EBRD was being more thoroughly
reported on? How was M & E conducted for this project? Did Bankwatch find the project
valuable in hindsight? Should RWI use its money on similar journalistic training, or are there
more effective uses of money?
Fidanka: Yes, this particular training was very successful. Journalists from the training did
publish pieces about the EBRD and projects in their countries. Also in Astana they were active
in attending the press events at the bank's AGM and raising questions with the chief
economics and the president. As a result of this training and of long-term media outreach in
the region the EBRD is well known and problems surrounding its projects are fairly well
reported. (But to be honest last year in Istanbul it was not as easy with journalists from the
bank's new region of operation - maybe because in Astana we had our Russian speaking team
that knew the region very well, while we still do not have wide contacts in the MENA region,
in-house Arab speakers etc. Also the EBRD is only starting there and we do not have a handful
of controversial projects to discuss with media in the region (as we do in the FSU), so I guess it
is just the beginning.) So I'd say that journalistic trainings are a good idea, but it really
depends on how they are organized, and if they are a part of a longer-term process of building
media contacts etc. As to alternative projects - in Bankwatch we are currently expanding our
work on tax justice, and we will be paying much more attention to contracts and revenue
disclosure than we have so far.
Jonathan: Has EBRD made any noteworthy progress towards greater transparency within the
last year? (even minor noteworthy examples are good)
Fidanka: Yes, as I mentioned above, more ESIA documentation can now be found on clients'
web sites. But we still have to rely on local communities and environmental groups, on media
reports, to spot problems. For example few weeks ago we heard from local activists in Turkey
about a coal plant that is part of the SOCAR Aegean Refinery in Turkey - neither PSD, not ESIA
documentation mentioned any such associated coal plant, and the consultants who did the
due diligence only degraded documentation provided by SOCAR, in spite of the fact that
information about public opposition to the coal plant is easy to find (esp. in Turkish language).
Jonathan: Have you seen the tribunal findings where the Natural Resources project
Senior-Banker was fired (after 14 years of employment) for embezzling money from a shady
"consultancy" firm, and put it in his sister's offshore bank account?
http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/integrity/2012-10-22-judgement.pdf.
Aside from being an entertaining story, do you find it useful from an advocacy standpoint? Did
this willingness to terminate veteran employees over corruption scandals raise your opinion of
EBRD, and does it hold any significance towards policies of information disclosure?
Should the judges who ruled against the banker be considered as potential partners for creation
of more transparent information and financial policies?
Fidanka: Unfortunately, we know very little about the case to be able to use it in any way.
9.3.7 EBRD Financed Extractive Industry Projects

Embebed file EBRD Financed Extractive Industry Projects:
76
9.4 Inter-American Development Bank

List of EI Project Funded by the Inter-American Development Bank 183
Year
Delba Drilling
International Cooperatie
GB Group S.A.
Delba Vessel
Amount of Financing
Provided
$488 million (IDB loan)
Distributeurs Nationaux S.A.
$10 million (ICC loan)
Refineria Oro Negro
Compaas Asociadas Petroleras S.A.
2012
Import-Export America
Russ Ltd
Compaas Asociadas
Petroleras S.A.
Chevron Caribbean
Gulfstram Petroleum Jamaica
$3.5 million (ICC loan)
2012
Chevron Caribbean
Marlin DR
$3.5 million (ICC loan)
2007
2009
2010
2010
Company
Title of Project
9.5 African Development Bank

Development Finance Power Map
9.5.1.1 Relevant stakeholders and decision makers
The stakeholders and decision makers are found across the entire continent of Africa. With
projects taking place in 53 countries, a board of governors, the Banks highest decisionmaking body, represents each member country. The Board of Governors elects a president
that is open to regional member countries and non-regional member countries.184 The AfDB
president, a major stakeholder, is responsible for the Banks management under supervision
of the Board of Directors and manages policies and guidelines issued by the board. Also, the
Banks constituent institutions the African Development Fund (ADF) and the Nigeria Trust
Fund have a stake in policy recommendations.
9.5.1.2 Relevant advocates and potential allies
The AfDB partners with the IFC to mimic the framework that the IFC has been so successful at
implementing. The AfDB also has a strong relationship with the United Nations. The AfDB has
adopted the Millennium Development Goals to help eradicate poverty and hunger, improve
maternal health, combat HIV/AIDS, promote gender equality, ensure environmental
sustainability, reduce child mortality and develop a global partnership for development.
9.5.1.3 Potential areas of influence
The African Development Bank is influenced by the African people to promote good
governance, transparency and accountability that builds trust with Africans and ensures
harmonization with other development finance institutions, stakeholders and project
planners. Additionally, the IFC is a great area of influence. The IFC is the AfDBs strongest
model. If they can use the IFC as a template for best practices, they will significantly improve
their capacity for transparency and accountability.
9.6 Asian Development Bank
Inter-American Investment Corporation. Oil, Gas, and Mining Projects. Inter-American Investment Corporation.
Web. November 12th, 2013.
184 Projects and Operations, AfDB, http://www.afdb.org/en/projects-and-operations/ (accessed November, 20,
2013)
183
77
Embedded file Annex 9.6 ADB Extractive Industry Projects:
9.7 Japan Bank for International Cooperation

FIGURE 1: STRUCTURE OF JBIC LOANS
Import Loans
Overseas Investment Loans
Source: Energy and Natural Resource Financing. JBIC, http://www.jbic.go.jp/en/finance/resource
78
FIGURE 2: MAJOR NATURAL RESOURCE PROJECTS OVER LAST 10 YEARS
Source: JBIC Annual Report 2013, http://www.jbic.go.jp/wpcontent/uploads/page/2013/09/15044/2013E_02.pdf
79
9.8 Overseas Private Investment Corporation

9.8.1 Power Map
In her paper, Hendrickson notes that the proportion of OPIC funding going towards extractive
industry projects changed significantly during each successive presidential administration
during the 1990s and 2000s.185 Therefore, although OPIC is currently giving a relatively small
proportion of its funding to extractive industry projects, it is possible that funding for
extractive industry projects would increase during future presidential administrations.
Therefore, I would argue that it is worth it for RWI to encourage OPIC to enforce its EITI
policy, and establish this as part of its organizational culture now, in view of the possibility
that extractive industry funding could increase during future presidential administrations.
In addition, the OPIC CEO is a presidential appointeecurrently Elizabeth Littlefield. Based
on Littlefields CV and the CVs of her immediate subordinates, I would guess that the current
administration would be receptive to arguments in favor of EITI compliance. This may not be
the case during future presidential administrations.
A variety of organizations have made comments on OPIC draft policy statements in the past,
and could be potential partners for RWI. Organizations that commented on the draft
Environmental and Social Policy Statement in 2010 include the Center for International
Environmental Law, Friends of the Earth, Pacific Environment, World Resources Institute, and
Accountability Counsel.186
9.8.2 OPIC Extractive Projects

Embeded file Annex 9.8.2 - Opic Extractive Projects:
185
186
Hendrickson, p. 79-80.
A full list of the organizations that commented on the OPIC ESPS can be found here:
http://www.opic.gov/doing-business-us/OPIC-policies/related-documents . Accessed Dec 9, 2013.
80
9.8.3 Communication with OPIC regarding Policy inquiry
81
82
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International Financial Institutions: Transparency and disclosure

requirements for the extractive sector

1.1 Extractive Sector Profile ....................................................................................................... 7

2 Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency .............................................................. 12

3 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development ......................................... 20

Financing in the Extractive Sector .................................................................................. 20

4 Inter-American Development Bank ............................................................................ 27

Financing in the Extractive Sector .................................................................................. 27

5 African Development Bank ............................................................................................. 30

Extractive Sector Profile .................................................................................................... 30

6 Asian Development Bank ................................................................................................ 36

7 Japan Bank for International Cooperation................................................................ 40

8 Overseas Private Investment Corporation................................................................ 43

9.5 African Development Bank ............................................................................................... 77

1 International Finance Corporation3

1.1 Extractive Sector Profile

Oil & Gas

FY13 Total Invested in All Extractive Industries: $389.34million

Source: IFC Annual Report 2013: Industry Results, www.ifc.org

1.2 Transparency in the Extractive Sector

1.3 Requirements Regarding Contract, Revenue, and Payment Disclosure

disclosure is made on a project basis or on a corporate basis, depending on what is most

1.3.2 Accessibility of disclosed revenue and payments:

Annual Report to disclose payments had a tendency to embed the information

Other projects were disaggregated by stages of project development. No payment

Candex Energy, Inc. Annual Report 2011, p27, 50

1.3.4 Accessibility of disclosed contract information:

1.3.5 Additional disclosed information

1.4 Enforcement and Compliance

BPZ Energy, Inc. 2011 Annual Report, p. 26-28

1.5 Gaps and weaknesses

Methodology, Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) www.ieg.worldbankgroup.org/methodology (accessed

2 Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency18

2.1 Extractive Sector Profile

Figure 2: MIGA Guarantees issued in FY 2013, by sector (by $ volume)

London Stock Exchange (LSE)

2.2 Transparency in the Extractive Sector

The Policy on Disclosure of Information also stipulates which information is publicly

Extractive industry-specific information is easily accessible on MIGAs website. Extractive

MIGAs Policy on Disclosure of Information, MIGA, October 1, 2007.

other stakeholders.29 Relevant project information is defined as (1) information on the

2.2.1 Comparison to IFC Sustainability Framework

Contract disclosure requirements in MIGAs Sustainability Policy only apply to

2.3 Requirements Regarding Contract, Revenue, and Payment Disclosure

extractive industries. The Sustainability Policy, and accompanying Performance Standards,

2.3.1 Revenue and payments disclosure

2.3.2 Contract disclosure

2.3.3 Additional disclosure requirements

2.4 Enforcement and Compliance

Email correspondence with Mallory Saleson, November 15, 2013

compensation payment or terminate guarantee coverage.44

2.5 Gaps and Weaknesses

Access to contract and revenue disclosure is limited. Neither are accessible on

The Policy on Disclosure of Information infers communities should have access to

None of MIGAs policy documents explicitly specify the necessary types of

While there is a surfeit of documentation on environmental and social impact,

Institutional Integrity, MIGA, http://www.miga.org/projects/index.cfm?stid=1824 (accessed December 6,

Standards on the MIGA site. Similarly, the Operational Regulations document is

Require clients development effectiveness indicators reports to be publicly

Enhance external accountability for decisions regarding disclosure50. MIGA should

Contract of Guarantee, p.41

3 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development51

3.1 Financing in the Extractive Sector

Natural Resources Sector. EBRD. Accessed Nov. 19th 2013

Development Finance Institutions & Extractive Industry

Development Finance Institutions & Extractive Industry