ALVAREZ VS GUINGONA

[252 SCRA 695]

national
legislature.

Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) should be included

in
the
computation of the average annual income of the
municipality.
If
you look at the criterion income, it has to be based
on
income
that
accrues to the general fund, that is therefore regularly
received
by
the LGU, so this excludes special funds, trust funds,
transfers
and
non-recurring income. IRA is regularly accruing to the
general
fund,
in fact, it is regularly released and automatically
released
to
the
LGus.
But under RA 9009, it is specifically provided that for
conversion
to
cities, the municipalitys income should not include the
IRA.

In sum, we find no reversible error in the RTC decision

enjoining
Mayor Cataquiz from enforcing or implementing the
Kapasiyahan
Blg. 508, T. 1995, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Laguna.
That
resolution expresses merely a policy statement of the
Laguna
provincial board. It possesses no binding legal force nor
requires
any
act of implementation. It provides no sufficient legal
basis
for
respondent mayor's refusal to issue the permit sought
by
private
respondent in connection with a legitimate business
activity
authorized by a law passed by Congress.

LINA VS PANO
[G.R. No. 129093, August 30, 2001]
Since Congress has allowed the PCSO to operate
lotteries
which
PCSO seeks to conduct in Laguna, pursuant to its
legislative
grant
of
authority, the provinces Sangguniang Panlalawigan
cannot
nullify
the exercise of said authority by preventing something
already
allowed by Congress.
Ours is still a unitary form of government, not a federal
state.
Being
so, any form of autonomy granted to local
governments
will
necessarily be limited and confined within the extent
allowed
by
the
central authority. Besides, the principle of local
autonomy
under
the
1987 Constitution simply means "decentralization". It
does
not
make
local governments sovereign within the state or an
"imperium
in
imperio".
To conclude our resolution of the first issue, respondent
mayor
of
San Pedro, cannot avail of Kapasiyahan Bilang 508,
Taon
1995,
of
the
Provincial Board of Laguna as justification to prohibit
lotto
in
his
municipality. For said resolution is nothing but an
expression
of
the
local legislative unit concerned. The Board's
enactment,
like
spring
water, could not rise above its source of power, the

LGUs and National Government in General: LGUs

are agents of
the State
MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS vs. PRYCE
PROPERTIES
CORPORATION, INC
[G.R. No. 111097. July 20, 1994.]
It is not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
CDO
City
to
enact Ordinance 3353 (prohibiting the use of buildings
for
the
operation of casinos), and Ordinance 3375-93,
(prohibiting
the
operation of casinos) since these are contrary to PD
1869
which
authorizes casino gambling.
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances
should
not
contravene
a
statute
is
obvious.
Municipal
governments
are
only
agents of the national government. Local councils
exercise
only
delegated legislative powers conferred on them by
Congress
as
the
national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be
superior
to
the
principal or exercise powers higher than those of the
latter.
It
is
a
heresy to suggest that the local government units can
undo
the
acts
of Congress, from which they have derived their power
in
the
first

place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of

the
statute.
This basic relationship between the national legislature
and
the
local
government units has not been enfeebled by the new
provisions
in
the Constitution strengthening the policy of local
autonomy.
Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here
confirm
that
Congress retains control of the local government units
although
in
significantly reduced degree now than under our
previous
Constitutions. The power to create still includes the
power
to
destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to
withhold
or
recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the
Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local
government
units of the power to tax, which cannot now be
withdrawn
by
mere
statute. By and large, however, the national legislature
is
still
the
principal of the local government units, which cannot
defy
its
will
or
modify or violate it.
We hold that the power of PAGCOR to centralize and
regulate
all
games of chance, including casinos on land and sea
within
the
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, remains
unimpaired.
P.D.
1869 has not been modified by the Local Government
Code,
which
empowers the local government units to prevent or
suppress
only
those forms of gambling prohibited by law.
Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This
decree
has
the
status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified
by
a
mere
ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the
Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance
No.
3353
prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a
casino
and
Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of
casinos.
For
all
their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are
contrary
to
P.D.
1869 and the public policy announced therein and are
therefore
ultra vires and void.

TATEL VS. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC

[207 SCRA 157; G.R. No. 40243; 11 March 1992]

SYLLABUS
1.ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS;
DEFINED.

It is a settled principle of law that municipal

corporations
are
agencies of the State for the promotion and
maintenance
of
local
self-government and as such are endowed with police
powers
in
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order to effectively accomplish and carry out the
declared
objects
of
their creation. Its authority emanates from the general
welfare
clause under the Administrative Code.
2.ID.; ID.; MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE; REQUISITES FOR
VALIDITY.

For
an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate
powers of the municipality to enact but must also be
passed
according to the procedure prescribed by law, and
must
be
in
consonance with certain well established and basic
principles
of
a
substantive nature. These principles require that a
municipal
ordinance
(1)
must
not
contravene
the
Constitution
or
any
statute
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not
be
partial
or
discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may
regulate
trade
(5)
must
be general and consistent with public policy, and
(6)
must
not
be
unreasonable. Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1952,
meets
these
criteria.
3.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; EQUAL
PROTECTION
OF
LAW; NOT VIOLATED IN CASE AT BAR. As to the
assignment
of
error, that warehouses similarly situated as that of
petitioner
were
not prosecuted, suffice it to say that the mere fact that
the
municipal authorities of Virac have not proceeded
against
other
warehouses in the municipality allegedly violating
Ordinance
No.
13
is no reason to claim that the ordinance is
discriminatory.
A
distinction must be made between the law itself and
the
manner
in
which said law is implemented by the agencies in
charge
with
its
administration and enforcement. There is no valid

reason
for
the
petitioner to complain, in the absence of proof that the
other
bodegas mentioned by him are operating in violation of
the
ordinance and that complaints have been lodged
against
the
bodegas concerned without the municipal authorities
doing
anything about it. The objections interposed by the
petitioner
to
the
validity of the ordinance have not been substantiated.
Its
purpose
is
well within the objectives of sound government. No
undue
restraint
is placed upon the petitioner or for anybody to engage
in
trade
but
merely a prohibition from storing inflammable products
in
the
warehouses because of the danger of fire to the lives
and
properties
of the people residing in the vicinity. As far as public
policy
is
concerned, there can be no better policy than what has
been
conceived by the municipal government.
4.REMEDIAL LAW; COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE; HAS
ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION FOR CIVIL SUIT FOR ABATEMENT OF
NUISANCE.

As
to petitioner's contention of want of jurisdiction by the
lower
court
we find no merit in the same. The case is a simple civil
suit
for
abatement of a nuisance, the original jurisdiction of
which
falls
under the then Court of First Instance.
FACTS:
Petitioner Celestino Tatel owns a warehouse in barrio
Sta.
Elena,
Municipality of Virac. Complaints were received by the
municipality
concerning the disturbance caused by the operation of
the
abaca
bailing machine inside petitioners warehouse. A
committee
was
then appointed by the municipal council, and it noted
from
its
investigation on the matter that an accidental fire
within
the
warehouse of the petitioner created a danger to the

lives
and
properties of the people in the neighborhood.
Resolution
No.
29
was
then passed by the Municipal council declaring said
warehouse
as
a
public nuisance within a purview of Article 694 of the
New
Civil
Code. According to respondent municipal officials,
petitioners
warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance
No.
13,
series
of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses
near
a
block
of
houses either in the poblacion or barrios without
maintaining
the
necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of
houses
to
avoid
loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. On the
other
hand,
petitioner contends that Ordinance No. 13 is
unconstitutional.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not petitioners warehouse is a nuisance
within
the
meaning
Article
694
of
the
Civil
Code
(2) Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 of
the
Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional and void.
HELD:
The storage of abaca and copra in petitioners
warehouse
is
a
nuisance under the provisions of Article 694 of the Civil
Code.
At
the
same time, Ordinance No. 13 was passed by the
Municipal
Council
of
Virac in the exercise of its police power.
It is valid because it meets
the criteria for a valid municipal ordinance:
1) must not contravene
the Constitution or any statute,
2) must not be unfair or oppressive,
3) must not be partial or discriminatory,
4) must not prohibit but
may regulate trade,
5) must be general and consistent with public
policy, and
6) must not be unreasonable.
The purpose of the said ordinance is to avoid the loss
of property and life in case of fire which is one of the
primordial obligation of government. The lower court
did not err in its decision.