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Introduction

People's Republic of China Pakistan relations refers to bilateral relationship that


began in 1949 when Pakistan was among the first countries to break relations with the
Republic of China on Taiwan and recognize the PRC. Following the 1962 Sino-Indian
War, Pakistan's relations with the PRC became stronger and extremely close; since
then, the two countries have regularly exchanged high-level visits resulting in a
variety of agreements. The PRC has provided economic, military and technical
assistance or aid to Pakistan and both of them consider as a strategic ally.
Bilateral relations have evolved from an initial Chinese policy of sympathy and
support for the creation of a independent homeland for the Muslims of South Asia in
1947 to an unusual partnership that links a small but militarily powerful Pakistan,
dependent on China for its economic and military strength, with China trying to
balance competing interests in the region. Diplomatic relations were established in
1950, military assistance began in 1966, a strategic alliance was formed in 1972 and
economic co-operation began in 1979.
The relationship has been described by Hu Jintao as "higher than the mountains and
deeper than oceans". Favourable relations with China have been a pillar of Pakistan's
foreign policy. China strongly supported Pakistan's opposition to Soviet Union
involvement in Afghanistan and was perceived by Pakistan as a regional
counterweight to India. China and Pakistan also share a close military relation, with
China supplying a range of modem armaments to the Pakistani defense forces. China
supports Pakistans stance on Kashmir while Pakistan supports China on the issues of
Xinjiang, Tibet, and Taiwan. Lately, military cooperation has deepened with joint
projects producing armaments ranging from fighter jets to guided missile frigates.
Chinese cooperation with Pakistan has reached high economic points with substantial

investment from China in Pakistani infrastructural expansion, including the noted


project in the Pakistani deep water port in Gwadar. Both Countries have an ongoing
free trade agreement. Pakistan has water port in Gwadar. Both Countries have an
ongoing free trade agreement. Pakistan has served as Chinas main bridge between
Muslim countries. Pakistan had earlier played a leading role in bridging the
communication gap between China and the West, through Henry Kissingers secret
visit before the 1972 Nixon visit to China.
Significance of the Research
The aim of this study is to analytically view the nature of the strategic, economic and
political relationship among China. Pakistan and China from 1960 to 2000. It
explores how much Indo-Pak relations have been influenced by the Sino-Pak growing
ties from the early 1960s. Shift in Chinas South Asia policy after Mao and
particularly in the post Cold war settings are the major areas of the concern. Chinese
pragmatic outlook toward the strategic equation between India-Pakistan has changed
in comparison to the emerging nature of geo-politics and it has had an impact on the
degree and nature of Chinese influence in the region. Present study is mainly focusing
on the transformation in the regional and international relations at the end of the cold
War to race out the impact on the regional and bilateral dynamics of the three States,
China, India and Pakistan. Scholars agree in their opinion that the post-cold war era
can be best described as a period of rapid power transitions. There is considerable
debate with regard to the direction and magnitude of these transitions. Among these
transitions the most significant is the emerging multiplicity with new power center.
In the wake of the modernization drive being pursued by China and Indian drive is to
liberalize their economics and the growing pursuit of normalization between India
and Pakistan in -comparison to Indo-Chinese efforts to accommodate each other, are a
reflection of divergent held by the major players in South Asia. The questions that
need to be examined in the contemporary India-Pakistan, Sino-India and Pak-China
relations are: Whether the nature of strategic relations will change between India and

China, in the backdrop of globalization trends? What is the nature of relationship


between India and China? Why and to what an extend India. consider China as a
threat and vice versa? What would be the spill over effects on Indo-China relations of
the growing possibilities of an Indo-Pakistan arms race? Will Pak-China relations
categorically be different in future or not? Will economic issues take precedence over
security issues in South Asia? Does Chilia continue a threat to India? How for is the
normalization processes likely to change and will it bring about changes in the
relations between the three States? Will Pak-China relations be mutually exclusive to
Pak-India relations or not? What will the future of Indo-China relations? What role is
to be played by Pakistan? What is the significance of China in the Indian threat
perception? How far a sustained level or equilibrium docs exist among India, Pakistan
and China strategic triangle?

Chapter 02
This period saw the disenchantment of Pakistan with the West and the increased
propensity of trouble from India. China was confronted during this period with a twopronged threat in its disenchantment with the Soviet Union and the start of troubled
relation with India over Tibet. In view of the changing relations and after the 1962
India China war.
The levels of aid and arms given to India during the China war were eye openers for
the strategic planers in Islamabad. In 1961, Pakistan and China had started
negotiation on the settlement of the boundary between the two states. There was some
progress towards a settlement in the initial years. However, after the 1962 IndiaChina war, the vigor and pace in the Pak-China negotiations increased. A border
agreement between Pakistan and China over the settlement of the boundary between
the two states was signed in 1963.
However in September 1965 hostilities broke out into a full-scale war on Pakistans
Western boearder, paving the way for 1965-Pak-India War. During the war the Soviet
Union maintained neutral stance. This was followed by a pledge of neutrality by the
US, which imposed arms embargo on both conflicting parties. This arm embargo hurt
Pakistan more than India, as it was the reception of the arms aid from the US and the
West and was dependent for the supply of spare parts on it. While the neutrality of the
super powers gave Pakistan a setback, Pak-China relations an era of warmth, the
Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi made a stop over to his counter part Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto of Pakistan for the discussion on stopped on September 4, 1965 on his way to
Mali to discuss the current Indo-Pak war situation. In the press conference during the
visit, Chinese Foreign Minister blamed India for the current situation and condemned

it for provocative of the cease-fire line in Kashmir and gave evidence that Beijing was
to support Pakistans just action in repelling the Indian attack.
During the 1971, War the Indo-Soviet alliance affected on the ground reality for
Pakistan. The war resulted in dismembering of Pakistan and the creation of
Bangladesh. The creation of Bangladesh and more sustained Indo-Soviet relationship
during the war had not been a positive development for both Pakistan and China.
Haung Hau, the permanent representative of the PRC in the United Nations strongly
condemned the role of Soviet Union and India in the dismemberment of Pakistan.
Beijing's limited ;respects in South Asia during early 1972 were well demonstrated
the visit of president Bhutto of Pakistan to China from January, 31 to February 2,
1972. Although Beijing afforded Bhutto's political support and offered some measure
of economic relief during the visit, yet there was an evident effort on both sides to let
the dust settle in the South Asia while bolstering Bhutto. Position during the post war
period. Bhutto was accorded full honors, being bested by Chou En-Lai and received
by Mao. The visiting delegation, with included the commanders of the Pakistani
armed services, held talks with Chou his leading, associates Yeh Chien-Ying and Li
Hsien-nien, and PRC defense and forth affairs officials. According to the
communiqu, the two sides were fully satisfied with the results of the talks, which
were relating to the Indian-Pakistani conflict and it's after math, major international
issues and bilateral relations. Despite the strong military representation in the visiting
delegation, the only reference in the communique to Chinese assistance was a
decision to help the development of the Pakistan's economy by converting four
outstanding loans into grants and deferring payment on a loan provided in 1970. :At a
banquet given by Chou on 1st February, Bhutto assured his host that Pakistan had no
attention of being a liability and burden on the PRC and that the delegation was
returning home "completely satisfied" with its visit. For its part, Beijing showed
concern no to take any political liability about Pakistan in the after math of the
Indian-Pakistani conflict. While it kept its support to generalized expressions of
support Of Pakistan's defense of "state sovereignty and territorial integrity", the

Chinese remained noncommittal about future relations. The communiqu registered


Bhutto's view that relations between "the two parts of Pakistan" should be established
through negotiations between the elected leaders and the other states should not in the
mean time take "any precipitate action" that would undermine this objective.
According to the communique, Chou went no further than to express "his
understanding of and respect for the above stand" of Pakistan. While seeking to cut its
losses following the defeat of its ally, Beijing sought to capitalize on the opprobrium
accrued by India and the Soviet Union for their power play in dismembering Pakistan.
The joint communiqu condemning India's "naked aggression" as a defiance of
international law, the UN charter, and the Bandung principle, called upon "the
international community to take serious note of the grave consequences that must
ensure for the world order" if a country imposes its will on a neighbor by a military.
The communiqu also "note with gratification that the members of the third world in
general and the Islamic countries in particular" had supported Pakistan in defense of
its territorial integrity. The Chinese muted their anti-Soviet polemic in deference to
Bhutto's interested and concentrated their fire on the Indians during his visit, of
January, 1972 and People's Daily editorial blistered the Soviets for supporting the
dismemberment of Pakistan in the name of national liberation. As for as the question
of Kashmir was covered. The Chinese joined their visitors in a joint communique
calling for withdrawal to positions "which respect the cease-fire line in Jammu and
Kashmir and Chou declared Chinese support for the people of Kashmir in their just
struggle for the right to national self-determination." By mid-1974, the agreement
between India and Pakistan to implement the UNT resolution on returning prisoner of
war and normalizing relations promoted expressions of great Chinese interest in
improved relations with India and Bangladesh. At the same time Beijing continue to
support Pakistan. Bhutto, now prime minister, retuned to Beijing from to 11-14 May
1974 and the Chinese gave him the same full honour, shown during his visit in early
1972.

Chinese public statement during Bhutto's visit, this time pointed to the need for
reconciliation in South Asia, while predicatively praising Pakistan's struggle to
sustain its sovereignty and independence. Teng Hsiao-Ping's banquet speech on May
12, 1974 offered formal Chinese approval for the final implementation of resolution
of 1971, stressing that these "new developments" had created "favorable conditions"
for normalizing relations among the countries in the Sub continent. Focusing on
Beijmg's own intentions, Teng went beyond the usual Chinese affirmation of
friendship with the "peoples" of the region, asserting that Beijing was now ready to
develop relations with the "countries" on the Subcontinent on the basis of the five
principles of peaceful co-existence.
In marked contrast to Chinese comment during Bhutto's 1972 visit, Chinese
Spokesman this time studiously avoided direct criticism of India's policies in South
Asia. They instead endeavored portray China as having a common anti. superpower
interest with South Asian states, stressing that these states should be particularly
vigilant against Soviet intensions. People's daily of May 11, 1974 that editorial warn
that Soviet were "threatening the security" of the area. Teng's others of May 12,
referring to 1971 war, placed-full blame on USSR for initiating the conflict while
avoiding any mention of India's role. The joint communiqu on the visit did contain
indirect criticism of India as well as Soviet Union, noting the need to maintain
vigilance against "tendencies toward hegemonism and expansionism" in South Asia
and also staling their opposition to "foreign" interference there. As Chou-En-Lai had
done during Bhutto's previous visit, Teng on 12 May affirmed Chinese support for
Kashmiris "self-determination". Beijing reiterated this stand in the joint communiqu.

Teng's avowal of PRC interest in improved relations with India was followed by ther
demonstrations of the Chinese interest in normalization. However, the process \A as
complicated by the China's negative response to India's atomic blast and its
annexation of Sikkh. Showing Beijing's cautious receptivity to improve relations with
India, Yeh Chienying on 13 June 1974 told a visiting Indian friendship delegation that
"the friendship between Chinese and Indian people has a long history," adding: "we
believe that the traditional friendship between the two peoples will surely be further
consolidated". On 3 September 1974 however, a 'People's daily' article under the
byline "commentator" offered an authoritative criticism of India's policy toward
Sikkim. It denounced the Indian government proposal of August 1974 for a
constitutional amendment to give Sikkim a status similar to that of an Indian state as a
"flagrant act of colonialist expansion," and alleged that reducing Sikkim to an Indiancolony was nearly part of India's long standing design to become a "supper power"
and to "lord it over South Asia". Making a rare reference to past Indian territorial
aggrandizement fostered by Nehru the article went on to accuse Indra Gandhi's
regime of going even further along the expansionist road citing its use of India's
atomic test earlier that year to engage in "nuclear blackmail".
During the next year, Beijing's suspicious about Indian expansionism in the region
were marked reduced as the New Delhi tried to cope with serious internal crises
caused by political scandals surrounding Mrs. Gandhi's leadership and dire economic
conditions in India. The August 1975 military coup in Bangladesh was also seen in
Beijing as a curb to Indian as well as Soviet ambitions. The new Bangladesh
leadership dropped the previous regime's stress on good relations with New Delhi and
Moscow, and aligned much more closely with Pakistan and conservative Islamic
states. In 1975-1976, the South Asian triangle began to show some changes. India
seemed to be getting unhappy over a lack of diplomatic options, during Nehru's hay
days; India had enjoyed an excellent diplomatic position: Both the superpowers
sought her friendship and India was the leader of the nonaligned countries. But after
the 1971 crisis her image in the Third Word was tarnished, even in Bangladesh, which

was her client state during 1972-1974, there was wide anti-Indian feeling culminating
in the overthrow of the pro-Indian government on August 15, 1975.More important
was India's relations with Washington that had not been cordial and relations with
Beijing remained frozen. So, India made bids to restore full diplomatic relations with
Beijing. India was still attaching great importance to Moscow's help, particularly of
its military supplies, and was not happy over Beijing continued support Beijing to
Pakistan. Yet, the Indian, as pointed out earlier, want wider diplomatic options. For
the Chinese, some dent in the Moscow-New Delhi entente would be a great
diplomatic feat. It was reported in the Indian parliament on August 20. 1 975 that
there had been no anti-Indian propaganda by the Chinese in the recent months.
Chinese scientists took a week-long study tour of different enterprises and research
and development centers in India in October 19 6. It was also reported in the Indian
parliament that India was exploring prospects for increased trade with China as
commerce between the two countries have been declined sharply since 1962. By this
time, China had emerged to the status of recognized participant in the global system,
having regained its permanent seat in the Security Council in 1971, in which Pakistan
played a major role. The US under President Nixon, sought a closer relationship with
Beijing to contain Soviet militancy. Though still hampered by the effects of the
Cultural Revolution which ended only in 1976. Yet China stepped up its diplomatic
activity paying special attention to the third world countries. .
Despite these manifestations and lack of mutual trust, the goal of improving relations
was not abandoned, and a significant step was taken in 1976, of exchanging
ambassadors by the both countries. At the same time, Sino-Pakistan relations
continued to flourish, with their cooperation expanding constantly in the political,
economic and military spheres.

CHINA AND SOUTH ASIA IN THE POST-MAO ERA


The passing away of Mao Zedong in 1976 led to the ascendancy of Deng Xiaoping,
following a brief interlude under Hau Guofeng that marked the transition. The
Dengist period, which is still continuing, has been characterized by two dominant
trends, which reflected the new leaders preoccupation with one fundamental of
objective: raise China from poverty and the result weakness to prosperity and
strength. This reflects the aspirations of the Chinese people to have a standard of
living comparable to that of the affluent countries of the West, and to see their
countries to the stature the Middle Kingdom enjoyed in its heydays in history.
The Dengist approach manifested itself in two ways:
a) Internally, the highest priory was given to the four modernizations i.e.
agriculture, industry, s cience, and technology, defense;
b) This produced two basic trends in Chinas foreign policy: opening to the
outside world, and promoted an international environment of peace and
stability, the latter goal impelling China to resolve its differences with other
countries through negotiations.
There was early realization by China that the Soviet Union was determined to
encircle and isolate it, as even the concept of Asian collective security advanced by
Moscow had the same objective. China, therefore, attached primacy to improving its
security situation vis--vis South Asia. Apart from strengthening relations with
Pakistan and other countries of the region, special efforts were made to improve

relations with India. The Indian Foreign Minister, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee was
invited to pay a visit to China, but the Chinese military action against Vietnam in the
wake of its occupation of Cambodia during February 1979 coincided with the period
of his sojourn in China.

He cut short his visit to return home, and thus, the move to normalize relations with
Indian was aborted. The end of the Mao era in China heralded the binning of a
pragmatic, non doctrine approach to the foreign relation. As ideology became a nonfactor in the foreign, policy, the Chinese set about reassuring the world that they were
quite prepared to make amends for the lost years of revolutionary frenzy. Among the
countries they sought to be friend again was India, albeit they made a cautious start to
bring the message home. It was in June 1981, that Chinese foreign minister Huang
Hua visited New Delhi to pave the way for opening Sino-Indian talks on
normalization of relations. The exercise came in December 1981 when the first round
of talks started in Beijing, followed by the other seven rounds of fruit-less
negotiations. The eighth round held in New Delhi in November 1987 proceeded by
Rajeev Gandhi's visit to China and was reported to have concluded on an optimistic
note. No progress was made to resolve the deadlocked boundary question, but a press
report suggested and indicated that two countries in future may elevate the dialogue
to a political level.
Zhao-Rajeev meeting in New York on October 1985 was reported to have set the tone
for a constructive agreement. After the meeting the pressmen were advised on behalf
of both leaders that the Sino-Indian dispute would settle at "a political as well as an
official level" and that effort would not be allowed bogged down in 'bureaucratic
hassles'. Some Indian press reports suggested that Chinese had in a secrete message to
prime minister Indra Gandhi in 1981 offered to "recognized China's claim to
McMahon line in the east in return for India's recognition of Chinese occupation of

Akasi Chin", but Indra Gandhi did not agreed to it. China's, 'package offered' to settle
She boundary dispute was constantly referred to in article and editorials appearing the
Indian press, albeit KuJdip. Nayar wrote Rajeev had advised the Indian delegation to
leaving for the sixth round of talks, in Beijing to keep the border dispute aside and try
to settle other problems.
While the eighth round of talks (1981-1987) broke no fresh ground, the exercise was
marked by highs and lows in the expectation level. For instance, a few months after
the seventh round the issue of conferring statehood to Arunachel Pardesh by the
Indian parliament raised a big occupation of Chinese territory through domestic
legislation and charged india with further complicating the Sino-Indian boundary
question. The Indian responded by rejecting the Chinese protest as clear interference
in the countries internal affairs. A war of words between the two countries continued
through the early part of 1987 while moves were a foot to hold the eighth rounds of
talks. Charges and counter-charges of border intrusions were made. An Indian
correspondence talked about troops build-up on the border and the possibility of wide
spread fighting in the summer, while an other warned China seemed set on teaching
Indiana lesson after the snow has melted on the north-east passes. Meanwhile,
Indias new defense minister K. C. Pant made an unscheduled stop over in Beijing on
his way back from North Korea, and external affairs minister N. D. Tiwari told Lok
Sabha that India was ready to have the eighth rounds of talks.

Chapter No. 04
Impact of The Afghanistan Crisis
During the period, china was seeking to promote an international environment
conducive to the pursuit of its economic goals; Mosco increased its expansionist
activity, from political support to pro-Soviet groups in Third World countries.

(Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen) to indirect military intervention in Cambodia


through Vietnam, and finally through direct military intervention in Afghanistan as
being a part of the Soviet strategy to isolate and regarded as a particularly provocative
move. In this context, the Chinese attitude towards the major countries of South Asia
was determined on the basis of their stance on the Afghanistan crisis.
Pakistan emerged as the most active and the resolute opponent on the Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan, and, as a result, the friendship and cooperation between
Beijing and Islamabad reached new heights. India's stance, reflecting the close
relations between New Delhi and Moscow, was to justify and defend the Soviet
intervention. The return to power of Mrs. Indra Gandhi in early 1980 saw a further
accentuation of the pro-Soviet tilt of the Indian government. This led the Soviet
government to increase the supply of sophisticated weapons to India at concessional
price.

Evidence of growing, Indo-Soviet cooperation led to overtures by China to


demonstrate its desire to have cordial relations with India, including the offer of a
"package deal" to India in June 1980, under which China would accept the McMohan
Line in the eastern sector. in exchange for India accepting Aksai chin as Chinese
territory. This not evoked positive response, since India was politically committed to
a settlement based on its full claim.
During the eighties, Pakistan remained a major cause of concern for India and the
pace of the normalization drive in the region. Indo-Pak relations had deteriorated
significantly due to the Kashmir conflict. As the Kashmir struggle movement gained
a new pace, India claimed that Pakistan was the primary concern in the regions and
was allegedly supporting terrorism in Kashmir and Punjab. In this context, Indian
launched an operation in Siachin in 1984 leading to re-escalation in Kashmir. In this

context, Indians were particularly over sensitive to Sino-Pak military relations, as


well as Pakistans status of a frontline state in the Afghan jihad. The main accusations
were that Pak-China-US were involved in anti India axis geared towards a decreased
or summarized role of India in the region. Pak-China relations were seen as a
significant reason for maintaining a freeze in Indo-Chinese and Indo-US relations
during this period. The issue of supply of sophisticated technology of missiles like M11 and M-9 by China to Pakistan became a major cause for a setback for the
normalization of the Sino-Indian relations. In addition, Indias concern over
Pakistans growing nuclear capacity was termed as a major source of concern for
Indo-US tensions, as well as Sino-Indian tensions.
Chinese military assistance to Pakistan in various projects, like the setting up on the
Heavy Rebuilding factory to overhaul. Type 59 tanks, F-6 rebuilding factory, and the
overhauling ability, in addition other projects like MBT-2000 Al-Khalid tank,
Karakoram-8 trainer. Super 7-fighter jets etc, were right timed and again projected as
a potent threat to India. The alleged Chinese assistance in nuclear and missile field
continued to be a sour point in the development of the Indo-Chinese relations. Were
China did go over a measure change in its policy stand on Kashmir dispute, during
the eighties, it stated, that both sides should settle the dispute in a peaceful manner
and in a bilateral framework. It denied changes of illicit military transfer to Pakistan,
and curtailed its military transaction with India. The projected signal was that China
was desirous normalization between India and China but not at expense of its
strategic equation with Pakistan, either in the military field or in the socio-economic
and political fields to the Indian requirements.

Chapter No. 05
SINO-INDIAN RAPPROCHEMENT
The visit of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to China in December 1988 marked
the first contact at the head of government level between the two countries
after 1960, when Premier Zhou En-Lai had visited India. This visit also
reflected "advice" by Gorbachev to India to mend its fences with China.
Rajiv Gandhi's visit materialized following of period when Sino-Indian
relations had deteriorated, over an accusation by India that China had intruded
into Indian control territory, while China had protested to India over the grant
of statehood to Arunchal Predsh, which mostly comprise territory claimed by
China. However, their was growing recognition in India of China's growing
international stature, of the economic strides it was making, and of the
consistent Chinese policy of improving relations with its southern neighbors.
The visit saw significant progress towards normalization through the signing of
a number of agreements, following the talks with the top Chinese leaders
a) A joint working group was established to settle the border issue with in
a time frame of two to three years.

b)

A second agreement covered cooperation in science and technology.


c) The third agreement provided for cultural exchange under a three-year
program.

A joint communique issued on December 23 contained an agreement that the


two countries would work actively to promote peace and stability in Asia and
the whole world. There was also a significant shift about Tibet was shown of
assurance of Prime Minister Gandhi that India regarded Tibet as an
"autonomous" region of China'. Notwithstanding this visit which was land
mark in Sino-Indian relations. China maintained its principle opposition to
India's hegemonic ambitions, as reflected in the Indra Doctrine, whereby India
had claimed the right to be concerted by foreign powers on matters pertaining
to South Asia.
Chapter No. 06
THE WORKING DYNAMICS OF THE STRATEGIC TRIANGLE:
1990s.
The end of the cold war brought about a noticeable de-escalation in the levels
of tension in numerous conflicts in the Third World. 18 the reduced presence of
the erstwhile Soviet Union and Russia had contributed to lowering of tensions
and the intensity of rivalry between the sub regional actors. International
security theorists argue that the traditional sources of securities and threat had
been replaced with non-traditional sources of security namely economic
development, environmental security and human development. Like wise, it is
proclaimed that the year 1990 marked the end of the political system and saw a
paradigm shift towards unipolarity. However, the 1990s or the end of the cold
war failed to bring any a structural change in the security paradigm of South
Asia as it still remained to the perceptional paradox of the Cold War era.

The states of inertia, which had marked the India-Pakistan relationship for the
last four decades till 1990s, saw a rapid increase of tensions and hostility with a
massive uprising in Kashmir's freedom struggle in 1989. The unprecedented
tension led to the nuclear crisis of 1990s, when both sides had reportedly
prepared their weapon systems for a possible exchange. South Asia's core
regional conflict is that which exists between India and Pakistan although it is
perceived by the India-China threat perception, which is structurally different
and does not relate to the same degree of interaction that characterize IndiaPakistan rivalry.49 India, on the contrary, claims that the South Asian security
parameters are greatly the dividends of India-China relations, which cannot be
viewed in isolations from the Pakistan-China axis or the India-Pakistan matrix.
There is widespread belief in the strategic community of New Delhi that the
Indian state is under threat from one or possibly other combinations- of Islam,

Western, Chinese and small regional powers.20 In this milieu however, the
degree of threat perceived emerging from Pakistan is higher than that any other
from regional state, though India continues to maintain that China is the
country from which it faces the highest degree of threat. The argument is based
on the set of assumptions that Pakistan is regional destabilizer and is involved
in conspiracies to cut India to size. The mode prescribed or the pursuit of a
policy of bleeding Indian polity internally through the instigation of anti-Indian
feeling in the minorities dissatisfied with the Union. North, South, East and
West of India. The post partitioned experiences, coupled with protracted
continued confrontation on Kashmir, and the signals of India reluctance to
accept and recognize the boundaries of Pakistan as an independent and
sovereign state has led to the argument in Islamabad that India had not
recognized to the reality of Pakistan. The root cause of conflict amid
perceptions and imminent threats from both sides remained the historical
legacy of the Kashmir dispute. During the landmark year of 1990, innumerable
skirmishes across the control line, increased infighting between the two
protagonists and the uprising in the Indian held Kashmir let to the Indian claim
that increased clashes in the Kashmir struggle were the result of Pakistani acts
of (alleged) subversion against India. At the cornerstone of these allegations
was what India claimed as irrefutable evidence that the primary actors were not
Kashmiri but are primary infiltrators sent across the border to spark a wave of
secessionist movements.21 Pakistan however, understood the movement on
Kashmir in its rason-de-etat, but was nevertheless concerned about the
happening in the valley and was inclined to extend her support to the Kashmiri
fighter on diplomatic and moral pretexts. The Indian argument thereby had no
basis in the eyes of the policy makers of Islamabad, as Pakistan had never
given up its claims on Kashmir.

Consequently, the concern shown by. Pakistan over the growing tension in the
valley was a sign of affinity, which the people of Pakistan held for their
Kashmiris brethren. However, in the historical background and due to the
working dimensions of the forces, between the two warring States, Kashmir
become the most explosive issue between India and Pakistan in the 1990s,
leading to possible nuclear standoff." Following the 1990s crisis, India and
Pakistan agreed to adopt measures to reduce the risk of war by stationing UN
monitors along the line of control in Kashmir to provide both sides information
on force deployment and movement. Nevertheless no attempt was made to
institutionalize the measures; Institutional communication mechanism1 between
the Indian and Pakistani military leadership had been in existence since
September 1971 albeit the 1990 crisis failed to see the effective use of
confidence building measures during the height of the conflict. 24 This indicates
that the bi-partisan rivalry that had characterized the relationship among the
two states during the cold war did not end with the demise of the Soviet Union.
The end of the Cold War and shift towards conflict resolutions and non-use of
force was still not a workable or viable strategy in South Asia. The year 1991
saw considerable development in the confidence building measures between
the two states. As in 1991, an agreement between Pakistan and India on
advance notice on, military exercises, maneuvers and troop maneuvers was
signed. The purpose was to prevent any crisis situation arising due to the
misreading of the other sides intentions. The agreement called for the
avoidance of holding of joint, air, naval and military exercises in close
proximity to each other's international borders.
This was followed by an agreement on prevention of air space violations also
signed in year 1991. In addition, the agreement on non-attack on each other's
nuclear facilities was also ratified in 1991.

In 1992, joint declaration on prohibition of chemical weapons was made.


Despite the declaration, it was revealed in 1997 that the Indian chemical
weapon program was larger than declared.23 While the establishment of the
hotline between the Indian and Pakistani air force came about in 1993, on the
test of the establishment of communication between the naval vessels and
aircraft of the two navies within each other's vicinity (May 1993). These
measures were aided by the goodwill measures of 1993 like the participation of
senior military and civilian officials in various seminars in each other's country.
Hence, not only moves were made in the military field but in the political field
to ease tensions by people inside but also outside the sub-continent between the
two neighbors. International pressure and domestic competition forced the two
States to re-open the Foreign Secretary talks. This move can be termed as the
first pro normalization move after the establishment of a joint commission to
promote bilateral co-operation primary in the Joint Ministerial Commission in
1982. Seven rounds of Foreign Secretary level talks took place from July 1990
to January 1994.26
The first round was held at Islamabad on July 17-18, 1990. In view of the
rising tensions in Kashmir, the main issue during the talks remained the
Kashmir dispute. Pakistan produced two non papers for creating a propitious
climate in Indian held Kashmir and the modalities for holding a plebiscite
there/ The Indian note including a total of six non papers, which pertained to
other issues like the line of control, Siachin, Sir Creek and Wullar Barrage.
None of Tie paper described or referred to the international situation in
Kashmir.
India on the other hand, claimed that the one point agenda of Islamabad was
not acceptable to New Delhi. Therefore start of the 1990s remained linked to
the past in the context of its understanding by both sides.

The reason for the deadlock arose out of each side's prioritization of the areas
of interest and focus. For Pakistan, Kashmir continued to remain at the top of
the agenda whereas for India Kashmir was the internal problems of ridding the
country from the Pakistani influence. Hence except from providing an
opportunity to discuss all bilateral issues the first round of Foreign Secretaries
level talks did not bring any break through in the impasse between the two
states. The failure of the first round of talks juxtaposed on the happening of the
dialogue indicated the following trends and influences and counter influences.
a)

During the period from 1988 to 1990s, Sino-Indian relationship had

entered a new phase in normalization. There was considerable easing of


tension between the two States, necessitating a marked shift from the cold war
policies.
b)

In contrast Pak-India relations witnessed an unprecedented increase in

tension from Brass-tacks to the Kashmiri uprising of 1989, and the 1990s
nuclear crisis.
c)

Similarly, despite the understanding and the realization of the high

stakes involved by both sides, the failure of the Foreign Secretaries level talks
proved that paradigm shifts had not been occurred in South Asia's political
thought. In the final analysis the rivalry was to remain the main stay between
the two states.
d)

The crisis was de-escalated and the move towards normalization was not

in direct response to the effect of Sino-Indian normalization. Rather the reason


for this move, sprung from the fear of nuclear escalation from both sides and
international pressure to solve the dispute through peaceful means.
After the second half of 14893 the situation in the Indian held Kashmir led to
serious deterioration of the climate of co-operation between the two states. In
order to confront the heightened level of tension within the valley, India moved

three divisions and large bodies of paramilitary forces into Kashmir in the
spring of 1990 Pakistan, which alarmed Pakistan and it took counter measures
as a possible defense against Indian aggression across the border. Increased
political tension between the two had given rise to fears of military
confrontation. A special US mission was carried out by Deputy National
Security Adviser, Robert Gates, to emphasis the de-escalation of the crisis. It is
thus a matter of debate whether de-escalation took place amid increasing
pressure on India and Pakistan from the world capitals to refrain from opting
for a full-scale war or the impact of the tri-angular development resulting from
Sino-Indian normalization or the strength of China-Pakistan relations. China
did of express course concern over the development in Kashmir and offer to
mediate more in its own capacity as a great regional power rather than as a
quid-pro quo of the Sino-Indian normalization.- * One of the prime reasons for
the developments during this period was violence in Indian occupied Kashmir.
Nevertheless, the success gained in the diplomatic field did not translate into
'de-escalation of the conflict in the case of the Kashmir uprising. In this
context, the most signification event that caused severe stains in Indo-Pak ties
was the Hazrat Bal Shrine desecration on March 1, 1992" preceded by the
Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front call to cross the line of control to the
Indian side. During this year Pakistan and China signed two accords on the
nuclear plants set up near Mianwali at Chashma.' 1' The accord signified that the
extent of relations between China and Pakistan was to be decided in Beijing
and Islamabad rather than Washington and New Delhi. High tension in the
context of India-Pakistan relations marked the year. This period could be
termed as a high water marked of the increased pace of Sino-Indian
normalization, culminating in the first concrete signing of the CBM agreement
Signed in 1993, between the two on the border issue. Similarly the early

nineties saw the same state of relations between Pakistan China despite
obvious international and US pressure on the redefining of the nature of
relations between the two states.
The Sino-Indian move towards normalization, therefore picked pace in this
phase. The deteriorating internal situation in India and the increased fighting in
Kashmir cast deep shadows on the efforts towards normalization in India and
Pakistan relations. Another factor contributing to this was the case of both the
countries and the internal security situation, which so for India warranted and
the focus of threat to directed towards external sources. The year thus saw a
more hard-line Indian approach on the Kashmir issue.
In June Narasimha Rao's government faced increasing communal riots in
Indian and with the possible desecration of Babari Mosque amidst the
increasing tension between the two states. India expressed its willingness to
talk on Kashmir within the framework of the Simla Agreement on June 14,
1992P Kashmir remained the single major hurdle in the way of normalization
of relations, as both sides failed to give each other a benefit of a doubt on the
cross border terrorism and alleged involvement in destabilizing their respective
political scenes. According to the. India .there was increased terrorism in
Indian held Kashmir allegedly sponsored by Pakistan. New Delhi's fears of the
situation getting, out of hands were also caused by the possibility of call for
Crossing the LOC. The Kashmir resistance movements in Kashmir based on
Pakistan's side of terrory were actually crossing over to the Indian occupied
side of valley. The sixth round of Foreign Secretaries level talks was held in
New Delhi from 16 to 19 August 1992; during the talks attempts were made by
Pakistan to break the impasse. The Foreign Secretary of Pakistan handed over a
letter of Pakistan's Prime Minister Mr. Nawaz Sharif addressed to his Indian
counterpart Mr. Narasimah Rao. The letter addressed the solution of the Jammu

and Kashmir problem. However, on August 17, the Indian Prime Minister
stated that Kashmir was an internal part of India and the matter was to be
treated as a "bottom line" issue as a policy of New Delhi.
Foreign Secretary talks of 1992, led to further deterioration in the situation of
Kashmir in the wake of the domestic turmoil of India. During the non-aligned
movement (NAM) summit in September, 1992. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif
presented a forceful case of Kashmiri's right of self-determination. The level of
antagonism became so high that the Indian Premier left the conference hall
during the speech of Nawaz Sharif While addressing a press conference during
the summit Pakistan's Prime Minister refuted Indian allegations of physical
interfering in occupied Kashmir by making an offer to appoint neutral
observers on the line of control/ This was seen in New Delhi as a deliberate
attempt by Pakistan to take advantages of Indian domestic problems.' 1'
However, despite strong positions on the issue, the leaders of both countries
consented to pursue peaceful endeavors to find a solution to the Kashmir
problem.
Pak-China relations did not show any sign of change. During Nawaz Sharif s
visit to Beijing on October 7, 1992, Pakistan and China expressed increasing
concern over the Kashmir situation on the basis of the UN resolutions not
Being honored j6. The visit further strengthened Pale-China ties. Nevertheless,
the relations on India-Pale relation were minimal or non-existent. In September
1993, India expressed the desire to normalize relations and showed interest in
the resumption of talks on the Kashmir issue under the Simla Agreement. The
Indian sentiments were contained in Indian External Minister Damesh Singh's
comments on the significance of the issue and the common trends and
approaches to the issue/ the reflection merely reflected the feeling of the need
to check the wave of violation in the Indian held Kashmir.

This period of intense diplomatic activity had been targeted towards


normalization in Sino-Indian relations, which did not apparently affect the
Situation towards efforts for normalizations during this phase. The dynamics of
the relationship were primarily based on the domestic compulsions, and the
impasse on the Kashmir dispute. Prioritization had to base on these dynamics
rather than anything else for the normalization process From December 1991 to
onwards till the BJP-led coalition rose to power in New Delhi in May 1998.
The process of normalization of relations between China and India was on
steady course. There were hardly any aberrations or irritants that could spoil
the atmosphere of understanding and cooperation. This was deliberately
underplayed while the 'Pakistan factor was given little attention as an alibi to
distrust the Chinese. Prime Minister Narasimah Rao's official visit to China in
September 1993 reaffirmed New Delhi's desire to build bridges with China.
Rao as foreign minister had accompanied Rajive Ghandhi to China in
December 1988 and was also the host of Prime Minister Li Peng in December
1991. Associated for a long time with the Congress government's foreign
policy establishment, he was quite comfortable pursuing the Rajive initiative
and ensuring continuity in New Delhi's China policy. He arrived in Beijing to a
red-carpet welcome and began talks on a note of optimism. Decks had Already
been cleared for signing a border peace accord. Which he did on September 7,
1993, along with three other agreements.
According to a Bangladeshi scholar, three factors led to normalization of SinoIndian relations: (i) changes in mutual perceptions; (ii) changes in international
environment, and (iii) economic factor. According to him, The Chinese, were
not any longer refer to India as a 'hegemonic' power in South Asia, and were
now counseling smaller countries of the region to settle the contentious issues
with India bilaterally and peacefully rather than trying to club them together to

contain Indian influence in the region. In the wake of 'Sino-Soviet hostility',


both China and India were under no foreign policy constraint to oppose each
other. In fact, Mikhail Gorbachev openly encouraged India to improve relations
with China. According to him, the economic front was the most substantive
area where relations could flower to the mutual benefit of both India and
China. The further raid 'Judging from the realities of the nineties, one may be
tempted to sound more optimistic then pessimistic about the prospects of the
Sino-Indian relations, he said. Nevertheless, he conceded that the territorial
problem would be a negative element and the nuclear issue another sticking
point, more so China's nuclear collaboration with Pakistan/
India's nuclear testing and the shaping up of Indo-US strategic partnership
signaled the beginning of a turn in tide in the Sino-India rapprochement
scenario. The task of introducing a new phase of tension in Sino-Indian ties
and reviving the marginalized contention syndrome was left to the Vajpayee
government, albeit China's response of restraint and maturity was largely
responsible for saving the normalization process from falling apart.
However, the two successive United Front governments between 1996 and
1998 had no reason to deviate from the course of seeking friendship and
cooperation with China charted during the Congress party rule. Prime Minister
Deve Gowda played host to
President Jiang Zemin of China in November 1996. Pledging to work toward a
long term' enduring relationship'. India and China concluded a confidencebuilding measures (CBM) agreement witch Plate form provided for a
negotiated mutual reduction in military and paramilitary strength along the line
of actual control, and prohibited any military activity that affected the other
country. Indian foreign secretary Salman Haider called the agreement as the
'principal outcome' of president Jiang Zemin's visit, while official on the both

sides where reported to have interpreted it as a 'no war pact in effect'. In a press
interview, President Jiang Zemin hailed the accord as a factor that would
enhance peace and security in the border areas and help in the ultimate
resolution of the boundary question. Foreign minister I.K. Gujral told
parliament that the Jiang Zemin's visit was a 'significant step forward' in the
process of steady improvement in bilateral relations. Nevertheless, BJP
president L.K. Advani was not impressed. 'We have not extracted much from
the talks', he said, as he raised apprehensions about China military and nuclear
cooperation with Pakistan.

CHAPTER NO. 07
Impacts of Nuclear Tests of May 1998
The formation of a BJP-led government in India following the elections of
March 1998 produced a significant change in New Delhi's perceptions and
goals. The militant Hindu leadership proceeded to implement its agenda; in
which open weaponisation of India's nuclear*capability was on top. In an
obvious move to garner Western approval to this move, Indian defense minister
George Fernandse in an interview with the BBC in April 1998 (within a month
of his assuming office) said that China posed a greater threat to Indian security
than Pakistan. Addressing a meet-the-press session in New Delhi, Fernandes
accused the Chinese of frequent intruding into Indian Territory and
constructing a helipad in Arunachel Pradesh. The Chinese foreign ministry
promptly lodged a complaint against what it called 'unfounded and extremely
irresponsible' charge by the Indian defense minister. And diluting his China
diatribe, Fernandes called for a 'concerted effort to raise the level of dialogue
with China'.
Fernandes did a good job in shifting the focus of security threat from Pakistan
to China. Even his reaction to Pakistan's test-firing of 'Ghauri' missile was
surprisingly low-key. In marked contrast to calls for a 'tit-for-tat' response to
Pakistan's provocation' he passed the buck to the Chinese whom he branded as
the 'mother of Ghauri', while he put across the message that India's 'Agni'
missile could take care of the Pakistani challenges. In a TV interview early
May, Fernandes spelt out his threat perception. China, he declared, was

potential threat number one with its military and naval involvement beginning
to encircle India along the border with Pakistan, Myanmar and Tibet'. As he
warned against 'underplaying to situation across the Himalayas, and a lingering
reluctance, to
'question the Chinese intentions', he drew attention to development, such as
Beijing's transfer of missile technology and nuclear know-how to Islamabad,
its stockpiling of nuclear weapon in Tibet, training and equipping the 450,000strong Myanmar army, and the fast expanding Chinese navy which he said
would be getting into the Indian Ocean fairly soon. The situation further
deteriorated and Vajpayee government was caught on the wrong foot, as the
contents of a 'confidential letter, written by Vajpayee to US president Bill
Clinton'was leaked to the press. In the letter, Mr. Vajpayee also recalled that
Indian had suffered Chinese aggression in 1962 and also had to contend with a
hostile Pakistan.
China's immediate response to India's nuclear test of 11 May had been
somewhat low-key, but when the contents of Mr. Vajpayee's letters-to the
Western leaders came to light, Beijing reacted strongly. The second series of
Indian tests-on 13 May led China to make four important points. Firstly, that
India's action reflected 'an outrageous contempt for the CTBT. Secondly, India
was using the 'China threat' as an excuse for the development of its own
nuclear weapon. Thirdly, India was seeking 'hegemony' in .South Asia. And
finally, the international community should adopt a common position by
strongly demanding India to immediately stop its nuclear development
programmed. Pakistans foreign secretary Shamshad Ahmad visited Beijing
immediately after the Indian tests, and on his return he indicated that China
.had not pressed Pakistan to avoid nuclear, but left it to Pakistan to decide what
was in its national interests.

The Chinese president, Jiang Zemin, firmly blamed India for the current
tension in South Asia, in his first direct reaction to the nuclear tests by India
and Pakistan on June 3, 1998. He accused India of targeting both china and
Pakistan, and pointed out that the nuclear cooperation between China and
Pakistan was strictly peaceful, in the area of technology of nuclear reactors,
and pointed out that all installations concerned were under the control-on the
International Atomic Energy Agency. On the same day, the official China
Daily criticized India for its ambition to become a world power, and warned
that the long running Indo-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir is like a sleeping
volcano beneath the nuclear threat'.
The post-nuclear situation in South Asia figured prominently in talks with
President Clinton during his visit to China between 25 June and 3 July 1998.
The joint communique condemned the nuclear tests by India by India and
Pakistan, called on them to sign the CTBT and NPT, and urge a peaceful
settlement of ^political problems including Kashmir, through dialogue. China
and the US agreed to work together to contain the danger likely to arise from
the nuclearization of South Asia.

CHAPTER NO. 08
The Kargil Conflict
*
Despite the signing of the Lahore Declaration during the visit of Prime
Minister A.B Vajpayee to Lahore on 21 February 1999, which committed the
two governments seeking an early solution of political issue between them,
notably that over Kashmir, no concrete step was taken. Vajpayee's government
was defeated in a confidence vote the following month and after failure of any
party to Significantly, Sartaj Aziz's visit was followed three days later by that
of the Indian foreign minister, Jaswant Singh, to China this visit though planed
much earlier reflected the role accorded by South Asian countries to China.
The result of the visit of Jaswant Singh were not considered to be very positive
on key issues though he tried to underline the commonality on challenges that
both India and China faced to limit tendencies towards dominance and
unilateralism and to move towards multi polarity and balance. In this context,
he recalled that the two countries had jointly evolved the principles of Panch
Sheel in the 1950s. He declared that 'there is no older and surer code of
international relations other than Pach Sheel, which reflects their common
approach to many global issues'. Leading Indian News papers noted that the
outcome of Jaswant Singh's visit to China had not produced movement on
issues that had be devilled relations between the two countries. The Hindustan
Time questioned Jaswant Singh's statement that India did not regard China as a
security threat' as there was still no transparency about 'China's strategic

relationship with Pakistan' and cautioned against claims of instant diplomatic


results. The Indian Express reported that China had adopted a neutral stance on
Kargil and President Jiang Zemin had called for a dialogue to ease the 'current
tense situation in Kashmir.
Prime Minister Mohammad Nawaz Sharif paid an official visit to China form
28 to 30 June 1999. Though arranged earlier, the visit assumed significances
regarding the tension along the line of control in Kashmir, with fighting in the
Kargil sector getting intensified. He held talks with Prime Minister Zhu Rongji,
National People's Congress chairman Lc Peng, and president Jiang Zemin. The
regional and global situation was discussed, with particular reference to the
conflict in Kashmir.
An impression was created that China adopted a stance over the Kargil crisis
that was less than supportive of Pakistan. However, the overall Chinese policy,
which sought to prevent a conflict in Kashmir and to encourage a meaning till
dialogue between India and Pakistan, was in full accord in Islamabad's
approach indeed, as
Washington manifested a title in favor of India, obviously motivated by the
long term aim of using New Delhi as a counterweight to Beijing, China's
longest established relationship with Pakistan assumed greater strategic
relevance for its political and security interests in Asia.
In variably, it is necessary to understand that the dynamics of Indio Pakistan
relations are effected by international actors which are primarily self
reinforcing and lies in the troubled partition of the two states and the legacy of
the Kashmir dispute. Resolution of the Kashmir dispute, on just and equitable
footing remained constant for a quid pro-quo in the normalization of the
relations between the two states Kashmir stands at the cross roads of each
state's quest for identity, its claim for existence. For Pakistan, it represents the

need to ensure Islamabad's support for the freedom struggle geared against
Indian occupation since 1947. Pakistani support is also necessitated from the
fact that Pakistan terms Kashmir as its Jugular vain and for Pakistan the
question of freedom struggled by the Kashmir is represents the very stand of its
existence as Pakistan was primarily created to safeguard Muslims in the
Subcontinent and it became essential for it to defend their lives and rights in
case of oppression and atrocities, on the other hand, it had become a self
fulfilling prophecy for the Indian polity not to submit to the secessionist
movement in India run on the basis of ethno religious demarcation. Any
compromise on Kashmir in terms of territory is viewed as a threat to Indian
secularism though it already lies in shatters amid the rise of Hindu
fundamentalism in India. More so the recognition of the Kashmir dispute
primarily on religious ground would mean that the differences between India
and Pakistan are merely a result of the choices of the ruling elite, signaling that
the division of the Indian population on the basis of the two nation theory
stand, justified. It would also prove that the division of 1947 was not the result
of the conspiracy but a fact of reality necessitated primarily by the public
opinion on the basis of religious division. In short, the translation of the dispute
to the popular sentiment on both side's public opinion will remain a
constraining element in the prospects of normalization of relations of the two
states. In the past, the concessions made by the political elite of either side
would be severely counter balanced and at times constrained by the domestic
political compulsions in the absence of an equitable solution of the Kashmir
dispute. Viewing the Indo-Pak normalization trends, since 1990s the fact,
which comes to bearing, is that prospects of normalization are not long lasting
although there have been periods of decreased tension due to Western
influence. The dynamics of the relations are independent of the external

demands for normalization per-se or other bilateral relations of the two states
as it is in case of Pale-China or Sino-Indian relations. Being derived more form
the internal polities and the Kashmir dispute and the international climate at the
base of conflict lies the clash of identities and reason of the two states rather
than the cross and collateral relations of the two states. With or without China
the enmity of India-Pak relations is likely to stay till the Kashmir dispute is
resolved. Though international actors and trends may influence the creation of
an atmosphere of stability it would remain marginal in the wake of rising
tension in the region.
Nevertheless, one cannot leave the margin in the improvement of relations to
the occurrence of extra ordinary events, like a realization in both capitals that
the Kashmir dispute is soon going to transcend the stage, where the conflict is
ripe for resolution, where a state would attain a dynamic of its own. This would
that necessitate prompt action from both sides to retard and at times handle the
conflict in such a manner that it doesn't get out of hands. Similarly, if at the
global level, international security relations are characterized by increasing
bilateral relations between China and the United Slates, South Asia may once
again become a region of interest, or an area where Sino-Indian relations may
become a determining factor, in the out look of other powers and protagonists'
stakes in the region.
In conclusion, India-Pak normalization can be brought to a sustained level only
as a result of enhanced international activity in the region, and increased cost
of maintaining the conflict for both sides. Lastly a combination of internal and
external security needs of India and Pakistan, characterized by-non-traditional
approaches to security, like economic development, environmental security etc.
China is concentrating on economic development and is following the policy of
promoting an international environment conducive to its goal. It stresses the

resolution of disputes through peaceful negotiations and believes in


strengthening the role on the UN in safeguarding peace and international
cooperation in promoting economic development.
Pakistan welcomes the positive impact of principled policies of China pursuing
in South Asia. These have resulted in a further strengthening of the stable and
all weather friendship between the two countries. The trust and confidence
built up over half a century is being translated into the expansions of economic
cooperation that would not only facilitate development but also cement a
relationship that contributes to peace and stability in Asia and the Word.
China also seeks to develop normal relations with the India, though not at the
expanse of its close and comprehensive friendship with Pakistan. It would
utilize whatever leverages it acquires with India in favor of a peaceful
settlement of political differences between Pakistan and Indian through
dialogue.
Some critics are of the opinion that Sino-India convergence will remain so long
as Indo-Paki rivalry is unmanaged and perceived as a security threat to its
existence in Islamabad. This will however, become Pivotal in the wake of a
sustained economic development of Pakistan and a just settlement of the
Kashmir dispute. Up till now China is the corner stone of Pakistan's foreign
policy in political, economic and military terms, despite all odds. In
conclusion, the coming decade would witness a sustained level of Pak-China
friendship despite apparent development in India-China relations. The issue of
Indian rivalry remains the inherent constraint in the South Asian balance of
power dynamics for both Pakistan and China. Though the levels and degrees of
the state of rivalry between China and India and Pakistan.

CHAPTER NO. 09
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this research was to view the impact-of the developments
within the ambit of relations amongst the three major players in the South
Asia, namely India, Pakistan and China from 1960 to 2000. China's
pragmatic approach in its foreign relations, Sine-Indian rapprochement
and end of Cold War was viewed as an era of transition, ultimately,
paving the way for future Global power configuration. Hence, the need
arose to analyze the effect of the movement on international relations.
In the face of the rapid changes in the international system, and
underlying emphasis on factors like globalization and free market
economy it was necessary to see, how far the international trends had
transcended the-mutual relations of Pakistan, India and China, a biproduct of super power policy of engagement and inter-state relations
and mix of regional power politics. Therefore in order to view the
impacts of cross border links on the state of inter-state relations of the
three major players in the region, the security perception of the three
states as well as the process of the normalization of their ties was taken
as a unit of analysis. Structurally the purpose of hypothesis was to see
whether Sino-Indian normalization was in turn affected by Pak- China
relations. Which had an impact on India-Pakistan relations? Hence, in

order to arrive at conclusion and especially to determine the impact of


these
changes on the foreign policy orientation of the three States, the process
and prospects of potential normalization in India-Pakistan relations were
examined in the back drop of the intertwined process of the normalization
in Sino-Indian ties and the Pakistan-China relations. The following
conclusions were reached.
Sino-Indian Normalization and Pak-China Relations
Pakistan's overall perspective on foreign policy has been determined by
the threat it had faced since independence from its much larger neighbor,
India. That threat, which derives from the hegemonic impulses of the
Second largest country in the world, and the rejection by its elite to the
very basis on which Pakistan emerged, compels Pakistan to pursue
policies designed, to safeguard its security and survival. In this context,
the foreign policy of China, the only great power that has borders with
South Asia, is of critical importance. Recognizing India as one of its
major strategic rivals, China has since 1963 aligned itself with Pakistan to
continue the 'common threat.' Critics argue that Beijing's policy towards
the sub continental rivals has been based on the classic threat perception
and strategic thinking. Despite china's efforts to justify its political and
military links with Pakistan as normal state-to-state relations, India
remains unconvinced, seeing them as 'hostile' and threatening in both
intent and character so as to tie India down south on the Himalayas. Since
China is effectively checkmated in East Asia by three great powersRussia. Japan and United States, Beijing has long seen South and
Southeast Asia as its spheres of influence and India as its main
competitor. Since China launched a campaign to normalize its relations

with India considerable improvements has taken place in the bilateral


relations of the two states. Although the boundary question has not been
settled and there has been no progress in the marathon talks between the
two countries, and Dalai Lama is still in India as the head of the Tibetan
government in exile. The Sino-Indian Relations have been restored to
normalcy, trade has increased many folds ($ 256 million in 1991 to $3596
million and S7600 million in 2003) and Chinese are interested to invest in
India. The improvement in Sino-Indian relations had not adversely
affected China's relations with Pakistan. Although there are quite a few
critics in Pakistan to say that the Chinese are no longer as sportive of
Pakistan as they used to be, in this regard two aspects are important. IS'
that the Chinese position on the Kashmir issue has changed from total
unqualified sport to the Pakistani stand to treating the issue bilaterally
between the India and Pakistan. This issue bilaterally between the India
and Pakistan, which the two countries settle through negotiations.2 nd the
China's collaboration in different treats including economic development,
defense production has not been effected. The Chinese have said quite
clearly that the desire to seek friendship with India will not change the
nature of there friendship with Pakistan. There are two .views about the
growing relationship between China and India; it is relevant to refer to a
proposal wooded by a former Russian Prime Minister Prama kov to once
suggest a trilateral axis between Russia, China and India. Some Chinese
scholars asserted that the purpose of cultivating India is to vein it away
from the US camp. The other view is that the Sino-Indian friendship had
many limitations; they are potential rivals of leadership and influence and
are likely to compete with each other, even if they do not resume
hostilities. It is also been said that, a strategic Indo-US partnership is in

the making and the Indian are likely to become an American ally, rather
than relaying on their friendship and co-operation with China, supporting
this view point some critics say that the American would at some stage
shift the focus of their co-operation from china to India and use or build
India as a counterweight to China. According to some observers another
limitation of the growing Sino-Indian ties is that the Chinese can not
afford to let India establish its hegemony in the entire region and
therefore to support Pakistan is in China's Strategic interest. Pakistan
remains vitally important to China's geostrategic security as it is located
in the threshold of South, West and Central Asia. The Chinese know that
Pakistan is their last and best bet' to prevent Indian dominance of
southern Asia from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca.
Pak-China Relations
Pak-China relations since their inception have been based on solid
foundations and are likely to remain poised in the future and all weather
relationship. The mutuality of interests is such that neither side can
forego the benefits of the relations to either state. From a Chinese
foreign policy perspective conflict and wars are counter-productive as
China's indulges into such an activity, at this time in history could and
can delay its rise to world as a great power. On the other hand an
improved state of Sino-lndian relations would and can also inadvertently
raise the stake for China amidst increasing Indo-US collaboration and
the potential of India to use China as a means to justify its own rise to
big power status. Hence, in the contemporary phase the relationship of
rivalry between the two states cannot be replaced by a relationship of an
increased state of friendship and strategic schism. In order to counter
balance the Indian movement and her leverage in Beijing's central

affairs. China requires a strong foothold in South Asia the only state,
which can provide China with enough cushions to retard Indian
development, will remain Pakistan. Therefore, in order to counter
balance the developing New Delhi-US axis, the Islamabad-Beijing's
stake on the South Asian front allows her to counter security threat from
India and Indian power in the region at a more sustained level than some
of Islamabad's earlier super power- relations. In the wake on increasing
Indo-US relations, Pak-China relations are likely to get strengthened are
to change only in the wake of the recession of threat form India to
Pakistan or China. This is about happening at least in the near future.
Nevertheless, like all inter state relationship, Pak-China relations are
also dynamic and will change in nuances, like China's stand on Kashmir
or non-proliferation, in the increasing demands on China as it is to play
an enhanced role in the emerging and existing international system.
However the change would be more in tune with China's bid to enter the
world arena as a responsible power rather than as a change in the nature
of the strategic relationship between Pakistan and China as remaining all
weather friendship. In addition, Beijing would welcome any
normalization attempts between Pakistan and India, as it is a great
believer in containing the specter of violence and inter State conflicts at
lower levels. Nevertheless, any improvement the India-Pak relations are
not likely to affect and will not affect Pak-China friendship or the deepseated state of relations between the two States.
India-Pak Relations
Last but not the least, India-Pak relations of enmity lies at the head of
the strategic triangle of China-India-Pakistan. The relations to a great
extent

are

completely

independent

of

either

the

Sino-Indian

normalization or Pak-China relations. The dynamics of the relations are


closely linked to the search for identity by the both sides on the
unresolved Kashmir issue. Each side views the Kashmir dispute in its
own light and the search for realization of repudiating internal security
concerns at the external security threats is likely to remain. The
relationship has a dynamic of its Awn. having its basis in the historical
occurrence, and after initial experiences reinforcing the essential
differences over religio-political problems in the two countries. This is
not likely to be effected by the emerging trends in international relations
as the root cause; through major powers may at time play a significant
role in expediting and originating normalization drives on both sides.
The conflicting relationship is likely to remain till the core issue
between the two sides is solved in a just or an equitable manner, giving a
face saving solution to either side, as the issue is central to the IndiaPakistan security matrix. Therefore a realization of peace in the subcontinent will remain unfulfilled till some concrete headway is made in
this direction. Over the period both sides by method of linkage politics
have locked themselves into the traditional security paradox and most
importantly the Kashmir dispute as a result of these factors has become
intrinsically linked to their political survival at the domestic political
seance. Hence, though normalization of India-Pakistan may make
considerable headway as a result and because offactors like South Asian
nuclearisation and the role of outsides powers and international trends.
Any such process in the wake of the sensitivities of both sides on the
Kashmir issue would at best remain uncertain and fragile and in need of
a continuous drive to sustain the effort, and consolidate the gain made in
earlier normalization attempts by both sides.

In short, it will remain a case of one step forward two steps backward.
The introductions of new factors like the upsurge in the Kashmiri
resistance movement and nuclearisation have changed the reality of the
state of relations of the two players in future resulting in an almost
unpredictable relationship. Present India Pakistan peace initiatives and
the realizations from the both sides to keep the peace process moving
can best be studied in the light of the nuclearisation of South Asia.
Critics from the both sides are of the opinion that dust of mistrust and
hatred will take some time to settle, continuation of peace process and a
true political will to solve all the confronting issues though talks is the
only way towards the solutions of the problems.

BIBLOGRAPHY
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NEWS PAPER
Ravi Rahkye, Chinese Build-up on the Border Times of India. April 14. 1987. Dawn. Karachi, 20 October 1962.
Morning News, Karachi, 23 Octoberl962.
Dawn, Karachi, 23 October 1962.
Nehru Statements, The Dawn Karachi. 15 January, and 6 February 1963. Dawn. Karachi, 3 March 1963.
Beijing Review, 10 September 1965.
Le Monde, (English Edition), Paris, 11 December 11 1971, p. 13.
Dawn, 14 September 1965.

New York Times, 11 September 1965.


The Times, London, 17 and 19 July 1971.
The New York Times, New York , 22 October 1971.
Washington Post, 26 November 1971.
Dawn, Karachi, 25 November 1971.
The Daily Telegraph, London 13 and 14 December 1971.
The Daily Telegraph, London, 10 January 1972.
The Observer. London. 12 December 1971.
The Telegraph, Calcutta, December 22. 1988.
The Hindu, Madras, December 22. 1998.
The Mirror, Singapore, 10 January 1972. p.3.
The Telegraph, Calcutta. December 22. 1998.
The Hindu, Madras, December 22 1998.
The Hindustan Times, March. 5. 1999.