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Lacson vs Lacson 24 SCRA 837

- Feb 14, 1953 when they got married
- Jan 9, 1963 when Carmen (respondent) left home in Bacolod to go to Manila
- March 12, 1963 Carmen filed a complaint for custody of children as well as support in
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila
o Before it pushed through though they reached a settlement where the two eldest kids
would go to petitioner Alfonso and the youngest would stay with Carmen
o This was affirmed by the CFI
- May 7, 1963 respondent filed a motion for the custody of all children be given to her in
JDRC since she said she only entered into agreement to gain custody of her younger children
and thus should be given custody of the older ones as well who are all below 7 years old.
- CA: ruled that compromise agreement as relating to custody of children should be declared
null and void and as such the execution of said judgment is void too.

ISSUE: Whether or Not support should be awarded to the wife

HELD: Yes, should have but was filed out of time

- NCC Art 363 - "No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age,
unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure."
o Older children at that time were 5 and 6 so agreement should have been declared null and
void since no compelling reasons were stated otherwise
o However the children are now 11 and 10 and thus The 11 year old may choose which
parent they want to live with (sec. 6, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, as long as above ten)
already 1968
o Court may also award custody to who they deem more fit through evidence.
Art 356 of the NCC - Every child:
(1) Is entitled to parental care;
(2) Shall receive at least elementary education;
(3) Shall be given moral and civic training by the parents or guardian;
(4) Has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive to his physical, moral and intellectual
- However even if custody should have been null and void, the rest of the agreement is valid
with respect to the separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership since it had judicial sanction. (art 190/191 of NCC)
Corroborated by already 5-year separation


GR No. L-17014, August 11, 1921
Plaintiff Mariano and defendant Dolores were married in 1910, and lived in Iloilo City. They lived
together with a few short intervals of separation. On July 4, 1920, defendant Dolores went away from
their common home and decided to live separately from plaintiff. She claimed that she was
compelled to leave on the basis of cruel treatment on the part of her husband. She in turn prayed for
a decree of separation, a liquidation of their conjugal partnership, and an allowance for counsel fees
and permanent separate maintenance.
CFI ruled in favor of the defendant and she was granted alimony amounting to P400, also other fees
Plaintiff then asked for a restitution of conjugal rights, and a permanent mandatory injunction
requiring the defendant to return to the conjugal home and live with him as his wife.
1. WON defendant had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home
2. WON plaintiff may be granted the restitution of conjugal rights or absolute order
or permanent mandatory injunction
1. The wife had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home. Cruelty done by plaintiff to defendant
was greatly exaggerated. The wife was inflicted with a disposition of jealousy towards her husband in
an aggravated degree. No sufficient cause was present.
Courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the
wife since this recognizes the de facto separation of the two parties. Continued cohabitation of the
pair must be seen as impossible, and separation must be necessary, stemming from the fault of the
husband. She is under obligation to return to the domicile.
When people understand that they must live togetherthey learn to soften by mutual
accommodation that yoke which they know they cannot shake off; they become good husbands and
wivesnecessity is a powerful master in teaching the duties which it imposes (Evans v. Evans)
2. On granting the restitution of conjugal rights. It is not within the province of the courts to compel
one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. In the case of property
rights, such an action may be maintained. Said order, at best, would have no other purpose than to
compel the spouses to live together. Other countries, such as England and Scotland have done this
with much criticism.
Plaintiff is entitled to a judicial declaration that the defendant absented herself without sufficient
cause and it is her duty to return. She is also not entitled to support.
Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda
35 Phil 252
G.R. No. 11263

Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda, respondent, were married on
January 7, 1915 and had a residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino Manila. They stayed together for a
month before petitioner returned to her parents home. Goitia filed a complaint against respondent
for support outside the conjugal home. It was alleged that respondent demanded her to perform
unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs. Petitioner refused to perform such acts and
demanded her husband other than the legal and valid cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on refusing,
respondent maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting injuries upon her lops, face and different
body parts. The trial court ruled in favor of respondent and stated that Goitia could not compel her
husband to support her except in the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting
her separation or divorce from respondent. Goitia filed motion for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal home.
The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in the act of
marriage. The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill the
obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option.
However, this option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the husband to evade or
terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal home because
of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of
the lewd designs and physical assault of the husband, she can therefore claim support from the
husband for separate maintenance even outside the conjugal home.

Quimiguing vs Icao
TITLE: Quimiguing vs Icao
Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were neighbors in Dapitan City
and had close and confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was married, he succeeded to
have carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times under force and intimidation and without her
consent. As a result, Carmen became pregnant despite drugs supplied by defendant and as a
consequence, Carmen stopped studying. Plaintiff claimed for support at P120 per month, damages
and attorneys fees. The complaint was dismissed by the lower court in Zamboanga del Norte on the
ground lack of cause of action. Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint that as a result of the
intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but the court ruled that no amendment was allowable since
the original complaint averred no cause of action.
ISSUE: Whether plaintiff has a right to claim damages.
Supreme Court held that a conceive child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional
personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. The conceive child may also receive donations and be accepted by those
persons who will legally represent them if they were already born as prescribed in Article 742.
Lower courts theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is an obligation of parents
and illegitimate children does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn violates article 40
Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man forced a woman not his
wife to yield to his lust and this constitutes a clear violation of Carmens rights. Thus, she is entitled
to claim compensation for the damage caused.
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to
the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix
Icao. So ordered.


On the 7th of February, 1875, Gabriel Fuster and Constanza Yaez were joined in a
Catholic or canonical marriage in the city of Malaga, Spain. In February of 1892, Gabriel
Fuster came to the Philippine Islands, settled, and acquired real and personal property.
Toward the middle of 1896, Constanza Yaez came to Manila, where her husband was
residing, and here lived with him in conjugal relations until the month of April, 1899. On
the 4th day of that month and year they made an agreement, in a public document, by
which they resolved to separate and live apart, both consenting to such separation, and
by virtue thereof the husband authorized the wife to move to Spain, there to reside in
such place as the said lady pleases. In the same document, the husband undertook to
send his wife the sum of 300 pesetas monthly for her support, payable in Madrid, Spain,
from the month of June of the said year 1899. The husband complied with this obligation
until August, 1899, after which time he ceased to make further payments.
In the beginning of March, 1909, the wife returned to the Philippines, but the husband
had absented himself therefrom in the early days of February of the same year. On the
11th of March, 1909, the wife commenced divorce proceedings against her husband,
alleging as cause of action the adultery committed by him in or about the year 1899 with
a certain woman that she named in the complaint and with whom he had lived and
cohabited and by whom he had had two children. She prayed that she be granted a
decree of divorce; that the court order the separation of the properties of the plaintiff and
the defendant, to date from the date of the said decree; that the conjugal society be
therefore liquidated, and after the amount of the conjugal property had been
determined, that one-half thereof be adjudicated to her; furthermore, as to the amount of
pension owing for her support but not paid to her, that the defendant be ordered to pay
her the sum of 36,000 Spanish pesetas, that is, 7,220 Spanish dollars, which, reduced
to Philippine currency at the rate of exchange on the date of the complaint, amounted to
In deciding the case, the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila held itself to have
jurisdiction, decreed the suspension of life in common between the plaintiff and
defendant, ordered the latter to pay the former P5,010.17, directed that the communal
property be divided between the parties, with costs against the defendant, and in event
that the parties could not agree to the division, it was to be effected by commissioners
according to law.

Both parties appealed from this judgment, but notwithstanding the appeal, the partition
of the property, by means of commissioners, was proceeded with. These latter, after
various vicissitudes, rendered their report and account of the partition to the court, who
then rendered final judgment, from which, also, both parties appealed.
Whether or not the Court of First Instance over the case and partition of property as
decided by the court should be affirmed.
The partition of property decreed in the judgment appealed from of the 9th of
September, 1911, should be and is hereby confirmed.
The two judgments appealed from are hereby affirmed, without special pronouncement
of costs in this instance.
The authority of jurisdictional power of courts to decree a divorce is not comprised within
the personal status of the husband and wife, simply because the whole theory of the
statutes and of the rights which belong to everyone does not go beyond the sphere of
private law, and the authority and jurisdiction of the courts are not a matter of the private
law of persons, but of the public or political law of the nation. The jurisdiction of courts
and other questions relating to procedure are considered to be of a public nature and
consequently are generally submitted to the territorial principle. . . . All persons that have
to demand justice in a case in which foreigners intervene, since they can gain nothing
by a simple declaration, should endeavor to apply to the tribunales of the state which
have coercive means (property situated in the territory) to enforce any decision they may
render. Otherwise, one would expose himself in the suit to making useless expenditures
which, although he won his case, would not contribute to secure his rights because of
the courts lack of means to enforce them. (Torres Campos, Elementos de Derecho
International Privado, p. 108.) Justice, says the same professor, is a principle
superior to that of nations, and it should therefore be administered without taking into
any account whatsoever the state to which the litigants belong. . . . In order to foster
their relations and develop their commerce, all civilized nations are interested in doing
justice, not alone to their own people, but to those foreigners who contract within the
country or outside of it juridical ties which in some manner effect their sovereignty. (Ibid,
p. 107.) Might its courts, in some cases, in suits between foreigners residing in its

territory, apply the personal law of the parties, but abdicate their jurisdiction, refrain from
administering justice because the personal law of the foreigner gave the jurisdiction of
the given case to some court that is not the territorial one of the nation? This has never
yet been claimed in any of the theories regarding the conflict of laws arising out of
questions of nationality and domicile; it would be equivalent to recognizing
extraterritorial law in favor of private persons. The provisions of article 80 of the Civil
Law of Spain is only binding within the dominions of Spain. It does not accompany the
persons of the Spanish subject wherever he may go. He could not successfully invoke it
if he resided in Japan, in China, in Hongkong or in any other territory not subject to the
dominion of Spain. Foreign Catholics domiciled in Spain, subject to the ecclesiastical
courts in actions for divorce according to the said article 80 of the Civil Code, could not
allege lack of jurisdiction by invoking, as the law of their personal statute, a law of their
nation which gives jurisdiction in such a case to territorial courts, or to a certain court
within or without the territory of their nation.
It is a question that has already been settled in two decisions of the Supreme Court
(Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil. Rep., 34, and Ibaez vs. Ortiz, 5 Phil. Rep., 325).
In the present action for divorce the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila did not
lack jurisdiction over the persons of the litigants, for, although Spanish Catholic subjects,
they were residents of this city and had their domicile herein.