EXECUTIVEORDERNO.

192June10,1987
PROVIDINGFORTHEREORGANIZATIONOFTHEDEPARTMENTOFENVIRONMENT,ENERGYAND
NATURALRESOURCESRENAMINGITASTHEDEPARTMENTOFENVIRONMENTANDNATURAL
RESOURCESANDFOROTHERPURPOSES
WHEREAS,ExecutiveOrderNo.131,datedJanuary30,1987,wassuspended
WHEREAS, a policy having been reached on energy, the reorganizationoftheDepartmentofNaturalResources
cannowbeeffected
WHEREAS, the environmentwill beeffectedbytheuse,development, management,renewal andconservationof
thecountry'snaturalresources
WHEREAS,thereisaneedtoprotectandenhancethequalityofthecountry'senvironment
WHEREAS, to attain this objective,environmentalconcerns andnaturalresourcesconcernshouldbegivenequal
attentionbytheDepartment
WHEREAS, under Article XVIII, Section 6, of the 1987 Constitution, the President shall continue to exercise
legislativepowersuntiltheFirstCongressisconvened
NOW, THEREFORE, I,CORAZONC.AQUINO,PresidentofthePhilippines,byvirtueofthepowersvestedin me
bytheConstitution,doherebyorder:
(Section1to32)
Sec.3. Effectivity.ThisExecutiveOrdershalltakeeffectimmediately.
APPROVED in the City of Manila, Philippines, this 10th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred
andeightyseven.

ENBANC
[G.R.No.110249.August21,1997]
ALFREDO TANO, BALDOMERO TANO, DANILO TANO,ROMUALDOTANO,TEOCENESMIDELLO,ANGEL
DE MESA, EULOGIO TREMOCHA, FELIPE ONGONION, JR., ANDRES LINIJAN, ROBERT LIM, VIRGINIA
LIM, FELIMONDEMESA,GENEROSOARAGON,TEODORICOANDRE,ROMULODELROSARIO,CHOLITO
ANDRE,ERICKMONTANO,ANDRESOLIVA,VITTORIO SALVADOR,LEOPOLDOARAGON,RAFAELRIBA,
ALEJANDRO LEONILA, JOSE DAMACINTO, RAMIRO MANAEG, RUBEN MARGATE, ROBERTO REYES,
DANILO PANGARUTAN, NOE GOLPAN,ESTANISLAO ROMERO, NICANOR DOMINGO,ROLDANTABANG,
PANGANIBAN, ADRIANO TABANG, FREDDIE SACAMAY, MIGUEL TRIMOCHA, PACENCIO LABABIT,
PABLO H. OMPAD, CELESTINO A. ABANO, ALLAN ALMODAL, BILLY D. BARTOLAY, ALBINO D. LIQUE,
MELCHOR J. LAYSON, MELANI AMANTE, CLARO E. YATOC, MERGELDO B. BALDEO, EDGAR M.
ALMASET A., JOSELITO MANAEG, LIBERATO ANDRADA, JR., ROBERTO BERRY, RONALD
VILLANUEVA, EDUARDO VALMORIA, WILDREDO MENDOZA, NAPOLEON BABANGA, ROBERTO
TADEPA, RUBEN ASINGUA, SILVERIO GABO, JERRY ROMERO, DAVID PANGAGARUTAN, DANIEL
PANGGARUTAN, ROMEO AGAWIN, FERNANDO EQUIZ, DITO LEQUIZ, RONILO ODERABLE,BENEDICTO
TORRES, ROSITO A. VALDEZ, CRESENCIO A. SAYANG, NICOMEDES S. ACOSTA, ERENEO A.
SEGARINO, JR., WILDREDO A. RAUTO, DIOSDADO A. ACOSTA, BONIFACIO G. SISMO, TACIO ALUBA,
DANIEL B. BATERZAL, ELISEO YBAEZ, DIOSDADO E. HANCHIC, EDDIE ESCALICAS, ELEAZAR B.
BATERZAL, DOMINADOR HALICHIC, ROOSEVELT RISMOAN, ROBERT C. MERCADER, TIRSO
ARESGADO, DANIEL CHAVEZ, DANILO CHAVEZ, VICTOR VILLAROEL, ERNESTO C. YABANEZ,
ARMANDO T. SANTILLAN, RUDY S. SANTILLAN, JODJEN ILUSTRISIMO, NESTOR SALANGRON,
ALBERTO SALANGRON, ROGER L. ROXAS, FRANCISCO T. ANTICANO, PASTOR SALANGRON,
BIENVENIDO SANTILLAN, GILBUENA LADDY, FIDEL BENJAMIN JOVELITO BELGANO, HONEY PARIOL,
ANTONIO SALANGRON, NICASIO SALANGRON, & AIRLINE SHIPPERS ASSOCIATION OF PALAWAN,
petitioners, vs
.
GOV. SALVADOR P. SOCRATES, MEMBERS OF SANGGUNIAN PANLALAWIGAN OF
PALAWAN, namely, VICEGOVERNOR JOEL T. REYES, JOSE D.ZABALA, ROSALINO R. ACOSTA,
JOSELITO A. CADLAON, ANDRES R. BAACO,NELSONP.PENEYRA,CIPRIANOC.BARROMA,CLAROE.
ORDINARIO, ERNESTO A. LLACUN, RODOLFO C. FLORDELIZA, GILBERT S. BAACO, WINSTON G.
ARZAGA, NAPOLEON F. ORDONEZ and GIL P.ACOSTA,CITYMAYOREDWARDHAGEDORN,MEMBERS
OF SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD NG PUERTO PRINCESA, ALL MEMBERS OF BANTAY DAGAT,
MEMBERS OF PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE OF PALAWAN, PROVINCIAL AND CITY PROSECUTORS
OF PALAWAN and PUERTO PRINCESA CITY, and ALL JUDGES OF PALAWAN, REGIONAL, MUNICIPAL
ANDMETROPOLITAN,
respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE,JR.,
J.
:

Petitioners caption theirpetitionasonefor

Certiorari,InjunctionWithPreliminaryMandatoryInjunction,withPrayer
for Temporary Restraining Order and pray that this Court: (1) declare as unconstitutional: (a) Ordinance No.
1592, dated 15 December 1992, of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa (b) Office Order No. 23,
Series of 1993, dated 22 January 1993, issued by Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero of Puerto Princesa City
and (c) Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, dated 19 February 1993, of the
Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Palawan (2) enjoin the enforcement thereof and (3) restrain respondents Provincial and City
[1]
Prosecutors of PalawanandPuertoPrincesaCity andJudgesofRegionalTrialCourts,MetropolitanTrialCourts

and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Palawan from assuming jurisdiction over and hearing cases concerning the
violationoftheOrdinancesandoftheOfficeOrder.
Moreappropriately,thepetitionis,andshallbetreatedas,aspecialcivilactionfor
certiorari
andprohibition.
Thefollowingispetitionerssummaryofthefactualantecedentsgivingrisetothepetition:
1.OnDecember15,1992,theSangguniangPanlungsodngPuertoPrincesaCityenactedOrdinanceNo.1592
whichtookeffectonJanuary1,1993entitled:ANORDINANCEBANNINGTHESHIPMENTOFALLLIVEFISH
ANDLOBSTEROUTSIDEPUERTOPRINCESACITYFROMJANUARY1,1993TOJANUARY1,1998AND
PROVIDINGEXEMPTIONS,PENALTIESANDFOROTHERPURPOSESTHEREOF,thefulltextofwhichreads
asfollows:
Section1.
TitleoftheOrdinance
.ThisOrdinanceisentitled:ANORDINANCEBANNINGTHESHIPMENTOF
ALLLIVEFISHANDLOBSTEROUTSIDEPUERTOPRINCESACITYFROMJANUARY1,1993TOJANUARY
1,1998ANDPROVIDINGEXEMPTIONS,PENALTIESANDFOROTHERPURPOSESTHEREOF.
Section2.
Purpose,ScopeandCoverage
.ToeffectivelyfreeourCitySeaWatersfromCyanideandother
Obnoxioussubstance,andshallcoverallpersonsand/orentitiesoperatingwithinandoutsidetheCityofPuerto
Princesawhoisare[sic]directlyorindirectlyinthebusinessorshipmentoflivefishandlobsteroutsidetheCity.
Section3.
Definitionofterms.
ForpurposeofthisOrdinancethefollowingareherebydefined:
A.
SEABASS
AkindoffishunderthefamilyofCentropomidae,betterknownasAPAHAP
B.
CATFISH
AkindoffishunderthefamilyofPlotosidae,betterknownasHITOHITO
C.
MUDFISH
AkindoffishunderthefamilyofOrphicaphalisaebetterknownasDALAG
D.
ALLLIVEFISH
Allalive,breathingnotnecessarilymovingofallspecie[s]useforfoodandforaquarium
purposes.
E.
LIVELOBSTER
Severalrelatively,largemarinecrustaceansofthegenusHomarusthatarealiveand
breathingnotnecessarilymoving.
Section4.Itshallbeunlawful[for]anypersonoranybusinessenterpriseorcompanytoshipoutfromPuerto
PrincesaCitytoanypointofdestinationeitherviaaircraftorseacraftofanylivefishandlobsterexceptSEA
BASS,CATFISH,MUDFISH,ANDMILKFISHFRIES.
Section5.
PenaltyClause
.Anyperson/sandorbusinessentityviolatingthisOrdinanceshallbepenalizedwitha
fineofnotmorethanP5,000.00orimprisonmentofnotmorethantwelve(12)months,cancellationoftheirpermit
todobusinessintheCityofPuertoPrincesaorallofthehereinstatedpenalties,uponthediscretionofthecourt.
Section6.Iftheownerand/oroperatoroftheestablishmentfoundvilatingtheprovisionsofthisordinanceisa
corporationorapartnership,thepenaltyprescribedinSection5hereofshallbeimposeduponitspresidentand/or
GeneralManagerorManagingPartnerand/orManager,asthecasemaybe[sic].
Section7.Anyexistingordinanceoranyprovisionofanyordinanceinconsistentto[sic]thisordinanceisdeemed
repealed.
Section8.ThisOrdinanceshalltakeeffectonJanuary1,1993.
SOORDAINED.
xxx
2.Toimplementsaidcityordinance,thenActingCityMayorAmadoL.LuceroissuedOfficeOrderNo.23,Series
of1993datedJanuary22,1993whichreadsasfollows:
IntheinterestofpublicserviceandforpurposesofCityOrdinanceNo.PD4261474,otherwiseknownasAN
ORDINANCEREQUIRINGANYPERSONENGAGEDORINTENDINGTOENGAGEINANYBUSINESS,
TRADE,OCCUPATION,CALLINGORPROFESSIONORHAVINGINHISPOSSESSIONANYOFTHE
ARTICLESFORWHICHAPERMITISREQUIREDTOBEHAD,TOOBTAINFIRSTAMAYORSPERMITand
CityOrdinanceNo.1592,ANORDINANCEBANNINGTHESHIPMENTOFALLLIVEFISHANDLOBSTER
OUTSIDEPUERTOPRINCESACITYFROMJANUARY1,1993TOJANUARY1,1998,youarehereby
authorizedanddirectedtocheckorconductnecessaryinspectionsoncargoescontaininglivefishandlobster
beingshippedoutfromthePuertoPrincesaAirport,PuertoPrincesaWharforatanyportwithinthejurisdictionof
theCitytoanypointofdestinations[sic]eitherviaaircraftorseacraft.
ThepurposeoftheinspectionistoascertainwhethertheshipperpossessedtherequiredMayorsPermitissued
bythisOfficeandtheshipmentiscoveredbyinvoiceorclearanceissuedbythelocalofficeoftheBureauof
FisheriesandAquaticResourcesandastocompliancewithallotherexistingrulesandregulationsonthematter.

Anycargocontaininglivefishandlobsterwithouttherequireddocumentsasstatedhereinmustbeheldforproper
disposition.
InthepursuitofthisOrder,youareherebyauthorizedtocoordinatewiththePALManager,thePPAManager,the
localPNPStationandotherofficesconcernedfortheneededsupportandcooperation.Further,thattheusual
courtesyanddiplomacymustbeobservedatalltimesintheconductoftheinspection.
Pleasebeguidedaccordingly.
xxx
3.OnFebruary19,1993,theSangguniangPanlalawigan,ProvincialGovernmentofPalawanenactedResolution
No.33entitled:ARESOLUTIONPROHIBITINGTHECATCHING,GATHERING,POSSESSING,BUYING,
SELLINGANDSHIPMENTOFLIVEMARINECORALDWELLINGAQUATICORGANISMS,TOWIT:FAMILY:
SCARIDAE
(MAMENG),
EPINEPHELUSFASCIATUS
(SUNO).
CROMILEPTESALTIVELIS
(PANTHEROR
SENORITA),LOBSTERBELOW200GRAMSANDSPAWNING,
TRADACNAGIGAS
(TAKLOBO),
PINCTADA
MARGARITEFERA
(MOTHERPEARL,OYSTERS,GIANTCLAMSANDOTHERSPECIES),
PENAEUS
MONODON
(TIGERPRAWNBREEDERSIZEORMOTHER),
EPINEPHELUSSUILLUS
(LOBAORGREEN
GROUPER)ANDFAMILY:
BALISTIDAE
(TROPICALAQUARIUMFISHES)FORAPERIODFIVE(5)YEARSIN
ANDCOMINGFROMPALAWANWATERS,thefulltextofwhichreadsasfollows:
WHEREAS,scientificandfactualresearches[sic]andstudiesdisclosethatonlyfive(5)percentofthecoralsof
ourprovinceremaintobeinexcellentconditionas[a]habitatofmarinecoraldwellingaquaticorganisms
WHEREAS,itcannotbegainsaidthatthedestructionanddevastationofthecoralsofourprovincewere
principallyduetoillegalfishingactivitieslikedynamitefishing,sodiumcyanidefishing,useofotherobnoxious
substancesandotherrelatedactivities
WHEREAS,thereisanimperativeandurgentneedtoprotectandpreservetheexistenceoftheremaining
excellentcoralsandallowthedevastatedonestoreinvigorateandregeneratethemselvesintovitalitywithinthe
spanoffive(5)years
WHEREAS,Sec.468,Par.1,SubPar.VIofthe[sic]R.A.7160otherwiseknownastheLocalGovernmentCode
of1991empowerstheSangguniangPanlalawigantoprotecttheenvironmentandimposeappropriatepenalties
[upon]actswhichendangertheenvironmentsuchasdynamitefishingandotherformsofdestructivefishing,
amongothers.
NOW,THEREFORE,onmotionbyKagawadNelsonP.Peneyraanduponunanimousdecisionofallthe
memberspresent
Beitresolvedasitisherebyresolved,toapproveResolutionNo.33,Seriesof1993oftheSangguniang
PanlalawiganandtoenactOrdinanceNo.2forthepurpose,towit:
ORDINANCENO.2
Seriesof1993
BEITORDAINEDBYTHESANGGUNIANGPANLALAWIGANINSESSIONASSEMBLED:
Section1.TITLEThisOrdinanceshallbeknownasanOrdinanceProhibitingthecatching,gathering,
possessing,buying,sellingandshipmentoflivemarinecoraldwellingaquaticorganisms,towit:1.Family:
Scaridae(Mameng),2.EpinephelusFasciatus(Suno),3.Cromileptesaltivelis(PantherorSenorita),lobsterbelow
200gramsandspawning),4.TridacnaGigas(Taklobo),5.PinctadaMargaretefera(MotherPearl,Oysters,Giant
Clamsandotherspecies),6.PenaeusMonodon(TigerPrawnbreedersizeormother),7.EpinephelusSuillus
(LobaorGreenGrouper)and8.Family:Balistidae(TopicalAquariumFishes)foraperiodoffive(5)yearsinand
comingfromPalawanWaters.
SectionII.PRELIMINARYCONSIDERATIONS
1.Sec.2A(Rep.Act7160).Itisherebydeclared,thepolicyofthestatethattheterritorialandpolitical
subdivisionsoftheStateshallenjoygenuineandmeaningfullocalautonomytoenablethemtoattaintheirfullest
developmentasselfreliantcommunitiesandmakethemmoreeffectivepartnersintheattainmentofnational
goals.Towardthisend,theStateshallprovidefor[a]moreresponsiveandaccountablelocalgovernment
structureinstitutedthroughasystemofdecentralizationwherebylocalgovernmentunitsshallbegivenmore
powers,authority,responsibilitiesandresources.
2.Sec.5A(R.A.7160).Anyprovisiononapowerof[a]localGovernmentUnitshallbeliberalyinterpretedinits
favor,andincaseofdoubt,anyquestionthereonshallberesolvedinfavorofdevolutionofpowersandofthe
lowergovernmentunits.Anyfairandreasonabledoubtsastotheexistenceofthepowershallbeinterpretedin
favoroftheLocalGovernmentUnitconcerned.
3.Sec.5C(R.A.7160).ThegeneralwelfareprovisionsinthisCodeshallbeliberallyinterpretedtogivemore
powerstolocalgovernmentunitsinacceleratingeconomicdevelopmentandupgradingthequalityoflifeforthe
peopleinthecommunity.

4.Sec.16(R.A.7160).GeneralWelfare.Everylocalgovernmentunitshallexercisethepowersexpressly
granted,thosenecessarilyimpliedtherefrom,aswellaspowersnecessary,appropriate,orincidentalforits
efficientandeffectivegovernanceandthosewhichareessentialtothepromotionofthegeneralwelfare.
SectionIII.DECLARATIONOFPOLICY.ItisherebydeclaredtobethepolicyoftheProvinceofPalawanto
protectandconservethemarineresourcesofPalawannotonlyforthegreatestgoodofthemajorityofthepresent
generationbutwith[the]properperspectiveandconsiderationof[sic]theirprosperity,andtoattainthisend,the
SangguniangPanlalawiganhenceforthdeclaresthatis[sic]shallbeunlawfulforanypersonoranybusinessentity
toengageincatching,gathering,possessing,buying,sellingandshipmentoflivemarinecoraldwellingaquatic
organismsasenumeratedinSection1hereofinandcomingoutofPalawanWatersforaperiodoffive(5)years
SectionIV.PENALTYCLAUSE.Anypersonand/orbusinessentityviolatingthisOrdinanceshallbepenalized
withafineofnotmorethanFiveThousandPesos(P5,000.00),PhilippineCurrency,and/orimprisonmentofsix
(6)monthstotwelve(12)monthsandconfiscationandforfeitureofparaphernalias[sic]andequipmentinfavorof
thegovernmentatthediscretionoftheCourt
SectionV.SEPARABILITYCLAUSE.Ifforanyreason,aSectionorprovisionofthisOrdinanceshallbeheldas
unconditional[sic]orinvalid,itshallnotaffecttheotherprovisionshereof.
SectionVI.REPEALINGCLAUSE.AnyexistingOrdinanceoraprovisionofanyordinanceinconsistentherewith
isdeemedmodified,amendedorrepealed.
SectionVII.EFFECTIVITY.ThisOrdinanceshalltakeeffectten(10)daysafteritspublication.
SOORDAINED.
xxx
4.Therespondentsimplementedthesaidordinances,AnnexesAandChereoftherebydeprivingallthe
fishermenofthewholeprovinceofPalawanandtheCityofPuertoPrincesaoftheironlymeansoflivelihoodand
thepetitionersAirlineShippersAssociationofPalawanandothermarinemerchantsfromperformingtheirlawful
occupationandtrade
5.PetitionersAlfredoTano,BaldomeroTano,TeocenesMidello,AngeldeMesa,EulogioTremocha,andFelipe
Ongonion,Jr.wereevenchargedcriminallyundercriminalcaseno.9305Cinthe1stMunicipalCircuitTrial
CourtofCuyoAgutayaMagsaysay,anoriginalcarboncopyofthecriminalcomplaintdatedApril12,1993is
heretoattachedasAnnexDwhilexeroxcopiesareattachedasAnnexDtothecopiesofthepetition
6.PetitionersRobertLimandVirginiaLim,ontheotherhand,werechargedbytherespondentPNPwiththe
respondentCityProsecutorofPuertoPrincesaCity,axeroxcopyofthecomplaintisheretoattachedasAnnexE
Without seeking redress from the concerned local government units, prosecutors office and courts, petitioners
directlyinvokedouroriginaljurisdictionbyfilingthispetitionon4June1993.Insum,petitionerscontendthat:
First, the Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the
practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987
Constitution.
Second, Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation nor condition under which the Mayors permit could be
granted or denied in other words, the Mayor had the absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue
permit.
Third, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan altogether prohibited the catching, gathering, possession,
buying, selling and shipping of live marinecoraldwellingorganisms,withoutanydistinction whetheritwascaught
or gathered through lawfulfishingmethod,theOrdinancetookawaytherightofpetitionersfishermentoearntheir
livelihood in lawful ways and insofar as petitionersmembers of Airline ShippersAssociationareconcerned,they
were unduly prevented from pursuing their vocation and entering intocontractswhichareproper,necessary,and
essentialtocarryouttheirbusinessendeavorstoasuccessfulconclusion.
Finally, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is null and void, the criminal cases based thereon
againstpetitionersTanoandtheothershavetobedismissed.
In the Resolution of 15 June 1993 we required respondents to comment on the petition,andfurnishedtheOffice
oftheSolicitorGeneralwithacopythereof.
In their comment filed on 13 August 1993, public respondents Governor Socrates and Members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan defended the validity of Ordinance No.2, Series of 1993, as a valid
exercise of the Provincial Governments power under the general welfare clause (Section 16 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 [hereafter, LGC]), and its specific power to protect the environment and impose
appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment, such as dynamite fishing and other forms of
destructive fishing under Section 447 (a) (1) (vi), Section 458 (a) (1)(vi),andSection468(a)(1)(vi),ofthe LGC.
They claimed that in the exercise of such powers, the Province of Palawan had the right and responsibilty to
insure that the remaining coral reefs, where fish dwells [sic], within its territory remain healthy for the future
generation. The Ordinance, theyfurtherasserted,coveredonly
livemarinecoraldwellingaquaticorganismswhich
were enumerated in theordinanceandexcludedotherkindsoflivemarineaquaticorganismsnotdwellingin coral

reefs besides the prohibition was for only five (5) yearstoprotectandpreservethepristinecoralandallow those
damagedtoregenerate.
Aforementioned respondents likewise maintained that there was no violation ofdueprocessandequalprotection
clauses of the Constitution. As to the former, public hearings were conducted before the enactment of the
Ordinance which, undoubtedly, had a lawful purpose and employed reasonable means while as to the latter, a
substantial distinction existed between a fisherman who catches live fish with the intention ofsellingitlive,anda
fisherman who catches live fish with no intention at all of sellingitlive,i.e.,theformerusessodiumcyanidewhile
thelatterdoesnot.Further,theOrdinanceappliedequallytoallthosebelongingtooneclass.
On 25 October 1993 petitioners filed an Urgent Plea for the Immediate Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order claiming that despite the pendencyofthiscase,Branch50oftheRegionalTrialCourtofPalawanwasbent
on proceeding with Criminal Case No. 11223 against petitioners Danilo Tano, Alfredo Tano, Eulogio Tremocha,
Romualdo Tano, Baldomero Tano, Andres Lemihan and Angel de Mesa for violation of Ordinance No. 2 of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan. Acting on said plea, we issued on 11 November 1993 a temporary
restraining order directing Judge Angel Miclat of said court to cease and desist from proceeding with the
arraignmentandpretrialofCriminalCaseNo.11223.
On 12 July 1994, we excused the Office of the Solicitor General from filing a comment, considering that as
claimedbysaidofficeinitsManifestationof28June1994,respondentswerealreadyrepresentedbycounsel.
Therestoftherespondentsdidnotfileanycommentonthepetition.
In the resolutionof15September1994,weresolvedtoconsiderthecommentonthepetitionastheAnswer,gave
[2]
duecoursetothepetitionandrequiredthepartiestosubmittheirrespectivememoranda.
On 22 April 1997 we ordered impleaded as party respondents the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and required the Office of the SolicitorGeneraltocommentontheirbehalf.But
in light of the latters motion of 9 July 1997 for an extension of timetofilethecommentwhichwouldonlyresultin
furtherdelay,wedispensedwithsaidcomment.
After due deliberation on the pleadings filed, we resolved to dismiss this petition for want of merit, on 22 July
1997,andassignedittothe
ponente
forthewritingoftheopinionoftheCourt.
I
There are actually two sets of petitioners in this case. The first is composed of Alfredo Tano, Baldomero Tano,
Danilo Tano, Romualdo Tano, Teocenes Midello, Angel de Mesa, Eulogio Tremocha, Felipe Ongonion, Jr.,
Andres Linijan, and Felimon de Mesa, who were criminally charged with violating
Sangguniang Panlalawigan
Resolution No. 33 and Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, of the Province of Palawan, in Criminal Case No.
st
[3]
9305C of the 1
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Palawan
and Robert Lim and Virginia Limwhowere
charged with violating City Ordinance No. 1592 of Puerto Princesa City and Ordinance No. 2,Seriesof1993,of
[4]
the Province of Palawan before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa.
All of them, with the
exception of Teocenes Midello, Felipe Ongonion, Jr., FelimondeMesa,RobertLimandVirginiaLim,arelikewise
the accused in Criminal Case No. 11223 for theviolationofOrdinanceNo.2ofthe
SangguniangPanlalawiganof
[5]
Palawan,pendingbeforeBranch50oftheRegionalTrialCourtofPalawan.
The second set of petitioners is composed of the rest of the petitioners numbering seventyseven (77), all of
whom, except the Airline Shippers Association of Palawan an alleged private association of several marine
merchantsarenaturalpersonswhoclaimtobefishermen.
The primary interest of the first set of petitioners is, of course, to prevent the prosecution,trialanddetermination
of the criminal cases until theconstitutionalityorlegalityoftheOrdinancestheyallegedlyviolatedshallhavebeen
resolved. The second set of petitioners merely claim that they being fishermen or marine merchants, they would
beadverselyaffectedbytheordinances.
As to the firstsetofpetitioners,thisspecialcivilfor
certiorarimust failon theground ofprematurityamounting toa
lack of cause of action. There is no showing that the said petitioners, as the accused inthecriminalcases,have
filed motions to quash the informations therein and that the same were denied. The ground available for such
motions is that the facts charged therein do not constitute an offense because the ordinances in question are
[6]
unconstitutional.
It cannot then be said that the lower courts acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion to justify recourse to the extraordinaryremedyof
certiorarior prohibition.Itmustfurther
be stressed that even if the petitioners didfile motionstoquash,thedenialthereofwouldnotforthwithgiveriseto
a cause of action under Rule65 oftheRulesofCourt.Thegeneralruleisthatwhereamotiontoquashisdenied,
the remedy therefrom is not
certiorari, but for the party aggrieved thereby to go to trial without prejudice to
reiterating special defenses involved in said motion, and if, after trial on the merits of adverse decision is
[7]
rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law.
And , even where in an exceptional
circumstance such denial may be the subject of a special civil action for
certiorari,
a motion for reconsideration
must have to be filed to allow the court concernedanopportunitytocorrectitserrors,unlesssuchmotionmaybe
[8]
dispensed with because of existing exceptional circumstances.
Finally, even if a motion forreconsiderationhas

been filed and denied, the remedy under Rule 65 is still unavailable absentanyshowing ofthegroundsprovided
[9]
for in Section 1 thereof.
For obvious reasons, the petition at bar does not, and could not have , alleged any of
suchgrounds.
As to the second set of petitioners, the instant petition is obviously one for DECLARATORY RELIEF,
i.e.
, for a
[10]
declarationthatthe Ordinancesinquestionareanullity...forbeingunconstitutional.
Assuch,their petitionmust
likewise fail, as this Court is not possessed of original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief even if only
[11]
questions of law are involved,
it being settled that the Court merely exercises appellate jurisdiction over such
[12]
petitions.
II
Even granting
arguendo
that the first set of petitioners have a cause of action ripe for the extraordinary writ of
certiorari
, there is here a clear disregard of the hierarchy of courts, and no special and important reason or
exceptional or compelling circumstancehasbeenadducedwhydirectrecoursetousshouldbeallowed.Whilewe
have concurrent jurisdiction with Regional Trial courts and with the Court of Appeals to issue writs of
certiorari,

prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus
and injunction, such concurrence gives petitioners no
[13]
unrestrictedfreedomofchoiceofcourtforum,soweheldinPeople
v
.Cuaresma:
Thisconcurrenceofjurisdictionisnottobetakenasaccordingtopartiesseekinganyofthewritsanabsolute
unrestrainedfreedomofchoiceofthecourttowhichapplicationthereforwillbedirected.Thereisafterall
hierarchyofcourts.Thathierarchyisdeterminativeofthevenueofappeals,andshouldalsoserveasageneral
determinantoftheappropriateforumforpetitionsfortheextraordinarywrits.Abecomingregardforthatjudicial
hierarchymostcertainlyindicatesthatpetitionsfortheissuanceofextraordinarywritsagainstfirstlevel(inferior)
courtsshouldbefiledwiththeRegionalTrialCourt,andthoseagainstthelatter,withtheCourtofAppeals.A
directinvocationoftheSupremeCourtsoriginaljurisdictiontoissuethesewritsshouldbeallowedonlywhenthere
arespecialandimportantreasonstherefor,clearlyandspecificallysetoutinthepetition.Thisisestablished
policy.ItisapolicynecessarytopreventinordinatedemandsupontheCourtstimeandattentionwhicharebetter
devotedtothosematterswithinitsexclusivejurisdiction,andtopreventfurtherovercrowdingoftheCourts
docket.
TheCourtfeelstheneedtoreaffirmthatpolicyatthistime,andtoenjoinstrictadherencetheretointhelightof
whatitperceivestobeagrowingtendencyonthepartoflitigantsandlawyerstohavetheirapplicationsforthe
socalledextraordinarywrits,andsometimeseventheirappeals,passeduponandadjudicateddirectlyand
immediatelybythehighesttribunaloftheland.
[14]
In Santiago
v
. Vasquez,
this Court forcefully expressed that the propensityoflitigants andlawyerstodisregard
the hierarchy of courts must be put to a halt, not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this
Court,butalsobecauseoftheinevitableandresultantdelay,intendedorotherwise,intheadjudicationofthe case
which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court, the proper forum under therulesofprocedure,or
as better equipped to resolvetheissuessincethisCourt isnotatrieroffacts.Wereiteratedthejudicialpolicythat
this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate
courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment ofaremedywithinand callingforthe
exerciseof[its]primaryjurisdiction.
III
Notwithstanding the foregoing procedural obstacles against the first set of petitioners,weopttoresolvethiscase
on its merits considering that the lifetime of the challenged Ordinances is about to end. Ordinance No. 1592 of
the City of Puerto Princesa is effective only up to 1 January 1998, while Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of
Palawan, enacted on 19 February 1993, is effective for only five (5) years. Besides, these Ordinances were
undoubtedly enacted in the exercise of powers under the new LGC relative to the protection and preservationof
the environment and are thus novel and of paramount importance. No further delay then may be allowed in the
resolutionoftheissuesraised.
It is of course settled thatlaws(includingordinancesenactedbylocalgovernmentunits)enjoythepresumptionof
[15]
constitutionality.
To overthrow this presumption, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative contradiction. In short,theconflictwiththe Constitutionmust
[16]
be shown beyond reasonable doubt.
Where doubt exists, even if well founded, there can be no finding of
[17]
unconstitutionality.Todoubtistosustain.
After a scrunity ofthechallengedOrdinancesandtheprovisionsoftheConstitutionpetitionersclaimtohavebeen
violated, we find petitioners contentions baselessandsoholdthattheformerdonotsuffer fromanyinfirmity,both
undertheConstitutionandapplicablelaws.
Petitioners specificallypointtoSection2,ArticleXIIandSections 2and7,ArticleXIIIoftheConstitutionas having
beentransgressedbytheOrdinances.
ThepertinentportionofSection2ofArticleXIIreads:
SEC.2.xxx

TheStateshallprotectthenation'smarinewealthinitsarchipelagicwaters,territorialsea,andexclusive
economiczone,andreserveitsuseandenjoymentexclusivelytoFilipinocitizens.
TheCongressmay,bylaw,allowsmallscaleutilizationofnaturalresourcesbyFilipinocitizens,aswellas
cooperativefishfarming,withprioritytosubsistencefishermenandfishworkersinrivers,lakes,bays,andlagoons.
Sections2and7ofArticleXIIIprovide:
Sec.2.Thepromotionofsocialjusticeshallincludethecommitmenttocreateeconomicopportunitiesbasedon
freedomofinitiativeandselfreliance.
xxx
SEC.7.TheStateshallprotecttherightsofsubsistencefishermen,especiallyoflocalcommunities,tothe
preferentialuseofthecommunalmarineandfishingresources,bothinlandandoffshore.Itshallprovidesupport
tosuchfishermenthroughappropriatetechnologyandresearch,adequatefinancial,production,andmarketing
assistance,andotherservices.TheStateshallalsoprotect,develop,andconservesuchresources.The
protectionshallextendtooffshorefishinggroundsofsubsistencefishermenagainstforeignintrusion.Fishworkers
shallreceiveajustsharefromtheirlaborintheutilizationofmarineandfishingresources.
Thereisabsolutelynoshowingthatanyofthepetitionersqualifiesasasubsistenceormarginalfisherman.Intheir
petition, petitioner Airline Shippers Association of Palawan is described as a private association composed of
Marine Merchants petitioners Robert Lim andVirginiaLim, asmerchants whiletherestofthepetitionersclaimto
befishermen,withoutanyqualification,however,astotheirstatus.
[18]
Since the Constitution does not specifically provide adefinitionofthetermssubsistenceormarginalfishermen,

they should be construed in their general and ordinary sense. A

marginal fisherman is an individual engaged in
fishing whose margin of return or reward in his harvest of fish as measured by existing price levels is barely
[19]
sufficient to yield a profit or cover the cost of gathering the fish,
while a
subsistence fisherman is one whose
[20]
catch yields but the irreducible minimum for hislivelihood.Section131(p)oftheLGC(R.A.No.7160)definesa
marginal farmer or fisherman as an individual engaged in subsistence farming or fishing whichshallbelimitedto
the sale, barter or exchange of agricultural or marine products produced by himself and his immediate family. It
bearsrepeatingthatnothingintherecordsupportsafindingthatanypetitionerfallswithinthesedefinitions.
Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any righttosubsistencefishermen,buttolaystress
on the duty of the State to protect the nations marine wealth. What the provision merely recognizes is that the
State may allow, by law, cooperative fish farming, with prioritytosubsistencefishermenandfishworkersinrivers,
lakes, bays, and lagoons. Our survey of the statute books reveals that the only provision of law which speaksof
thepreferentialrightofmarginalfishermenisSection149oftheLGCof1991whichpertinentlyprovides:
SEC.149.
FisheryRentals,FeesandCharges
.xxx
(b)Thesangguniangbayanmay:
(1)Grantfisheryprivilegestoerectfishcorrals,oyster,musselsorotheraquaticbedsorbangusfryareas,withina
definitezoneofthemunicipalwaters,asdeterminedbyit:
Provided
,
however,
Thatdulyregisteredorganizations
andcooperativesofmarginalfishermenshallhavepreferentialrighttosuchfisheryprivileges....
In a Joint Administrative Order No. 3, dated 25April1996,theSecretaryofthe DepartmentofAgricultureandthe
Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government prescribed the guidelines on the preferential
treatment of small fisherfolk relative to the fishery right mentioned in Section 149. This case, however, does not
involvesuchfisheryright.
Anent Section7ofArticleXIII,itspeaksnotonlyoftheuseofcommunalmarineandfishingresources,butoftheir
protection, development,andconservation.Ashereaftershown,theordinancesinquestionaremeantpreciselyto
protect and conserve our marine resources to the end that their enjoymentbythe peoplemaybe guaranteednot
onlyforthepresentgeneration,butalsoforthegenerationstocome.
The socalled preferential right of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all
absolute. In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the State, and, pursuant to the
first paragraphofSection 2,ArticleXIIoftheConstitution,theirexploration,developmentandutilization...shallbe
under the full control and supervision of the State. Moreover, their mandated protection, development, and
conservation as necessarily recognized by the framers of the Constitution, imply certain restrictions on whatever
right of enjoyment there may be in favor of anyone. Thus, as to the curtailment of the preferential treatment of
marginal fisherman, the following exchange between Commissioner Francisco Rodrigo and Commissioner Jose
F.S.Bengzon,Jr.,tookplaceattheplenarysessionoftheConstitutionalCommission:
MR.RODRIGO:
LetusdiscusstheimplementationofthisbecauseIwouldnotraisethehopesofourpeople,and
afterwardsfailintheimplementation.Howwillthisbeimplemented?Willtherebealicensingorgivingof
permitssothatgovernmentofficialswillknowthatoneisreallyamarginalfisherman?Orifpoliceman
saythatapersonisnotamarginalfisherman,hecanshowhispermit,toprovethatindeedheisone.
MR.BENGZON:

Certainly,therewillbesomemodeoflicensinginsofarasthisisconcernedandthisparticularquestion
couldbetackledwhenwediscusstheArticleonLocalGovernmentswhetherwewillleavetothelocal
governmentsortoCongressonhowthesethingswillbeimplemented.Butcertainly,Ithinkour
Congressmenandourlocalofficialswillnotbebereftofideasonhowtoimplementthismandate.
xxx
MR.RODRIGO:
So,onceoneislicensedasamarginalfisherman,hecangoanywhereinthePhilippinesandfishinany
fishinggrounds.
MR.BENGZON:
Subjecttowhateverrulesandregulationsandlocallawsthatmaybepassed
,
maybeexistingorwillbe
[21]
passed
.(underscoringsuppliedforemphasis).
What must likewise be borne in mind is the state policy enshrined in the Constitution regarding the duty of the
State to protect and advance therightofthepeopletoabalancedandhealthfulecologyinaccordwiththerhythm
[22]
[23]
andharmonyofnature.
Onthisscore,inOposa
v
.Factoran,

thisCourtdeclared:
WhiletherighttobalancedandhealthfulecologyistobefoundundertheDeclarationofPrinciplestheState
PoliciesandnotundertheBillofRights,itdoesnotfollowthatitislessimportantthananyofthecivilandpolitical
rightsenumeratedinthelatter.Sucharightbelongstoadifferentcategoryofrightsaltogetherforitconcerns
nothinglessthanselfpreservationandselfperpetuationaptlyandfittinglystressedbythepetitionersthe
advancementofwhichmayevenbesaidtopredateallgovernmentsandconstitutions.Asamatteroffact,these
basicrightsneednotevenbewrittenintheConstitutionfortheyareassumedtoexistfromtheinceptionof
humankind.Iftheyarenowexplicitlymentionedinthefundamentalcharter,itisbecauseofthewellfoundedfear
ofitsframersthatunlesstherightstoabalancedandhealthfulecologyandtohealtharemandatedasstate
policiesbytheConstitutionitself,therebyhighlightingtheircontinuingimportanceandimposinguponthestatea
solemnobligationtopreservethefirstandprotectandadvancethesecond,thedaywouldnotbetoofarwhenall
elsewouldbelostnotonlyforthepresentgeneration,butalsoforthosetocomegenerationswhichstandto
inheritnothingbutparchedearthincapableofsustaininglife.
Therighttoabalancedandhealthfulecologycarrieswithitacorrelativedutytorefrainfromimpairingthe
environment...
The LGC provisions invoked by private respondents merelyseektogivefleshandbloodtotherightofthepeople
toabalancedandhealthfulecology.Infact,theGeneralWelfareClause,expresslymentionsthisright:
SEC.16.
GeneralWelfare.
Everylocalgovernmentunitshallexercisethepowersexpresslygranted,those
necessarilyimpliedtherefrom,aswellaspowersnecessary,appropriate,orincidentalforitsefficientandeffective
governance,andthosewhichareessentialtothepromotionofthegeneralwelfare.Withintheirrespective
territorialjurisdictions,localgovernmentunitsshallensureandsupport,amongotherthings,thepreservationand
enrichmentofculture,promotehealthandsafety,
enhancetherightofthepeopletoabalancedecology,
encourageandsupportthedevelopmentofappropriateandselfreliantscientificandtechnologicalcapabilities,
improvepublicmorals,enhanceeconomicprosperityandsocialjustice,promotefullemploymentamongtheir
residents,maintainpeaceandorder,andpreservethecomfortandconvenienceoftheirinhabitants.
(underscoringsupplied).
Moreover, Section 5(c) of the LGC explicitly mandates that the general welfare provisions of the LGC shall be
liberally interpreted to give more powers tothelocalgovernmentunitsinacceleratingeconomicdevelopmentand
upgradingthequalityoflifeforthepeopleofthecommunity.
The LGC vests municipalities with the power togrant fisheryprivilegesinmunicipalwatersandtoimposerentals,
fees or charges therefor to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or poisonous
substances, electricity,
muroami
, and other deleterious methods of fishing and to prosecute any violation ofthe
[24]
provisions of applicable fishery laws.
Further, the
sangguniang bayan
, the sangguniang panlungsod and the
sangguniang panlalawigan
are
directed to enact ordinances for the general welfare of the municipality and its
inhabitants, which shall include,
inter alia,
ordinances that [p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate
penalties for acts whichendangertheenvironmentsuchas dynamitefishingandotherformsofdestructivefishing
... and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of
[25]
ecologicalimbalance.
[26]
[27]
Finally, the centerpiece of LGC is the system of decentralization
as expressly mandatedbytheConstitution.

Indispensable thereto is
devolution and the LGC expressly provides that [a]ny provision on a power of a local
government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be
resolved in favorofdevolutionofpowersandofthelowerlocalgovernment unit.Anyfairandreasonabledoubtas
[28]
to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local government unit concerned,
Devolution
refers to the act by which the National Government confers power and authority upon the various local
[29]
governmentunitstoperformspecificfunctionsandresponsibilities.

One of the devolved powers enumerated in the section of the LGC on devolution is the enforcement of fishery
[30]
laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves.
This necessarily includes enactment of
ordinancestoeffectivelycarryoutsuchfisherylawswithinthemunicipalwaters.
The term municipal waters, in turn, include not only streams, lakes, and tidal waters within the municipality, not
being the subject of private ownership and not comprised within the national parks, public forest, timber lands,
forest reserves, or fishery reserves, but also marine waters included between two lines drawn perpendicularly to
the general coastline from points wheretheboundarylinesofthemunicipalityorcitytouchtheseaatlowtideand
[31]
a third line parallel with the general coastline and fifteen kilometers from it.
Under P.D. No. 704, the marine
waters included in municipal waters is limited to three nautical miles from the general coastline using the above
perpendicularlinesandathirdparallelline.
These fishery laws which local government units may enforce under Section 17(b), (2), (i) in municipal waters
include: (1) P.D. No. 704 (2) P.D. No. 1015 which,
inter alia
, authorizes the establishment ofaclosedseasonin
any Philippine water if necessary for conservation or ecological purposes (3) P.D. No. 1219 which provides for
the exploration, exploitation, utilization, and conservation of coral resources (4) R.A. No. 5474, as amended by
B.P. Blg. 58, which makes it unlawful for any person, association, or corporation to catch or cause to becaught,
sell, offer to sell, purchase, or have in possession any of the fish specie called
gobiidae or
ipon during closed
season and (5) R.A. No. 6451 which prohibits and punishes electrofishing, as well as various issuances of the
BFAR.
To those specifically devolved insofar as the control and regulation of fishing in municipal waters and the
protectionofitsmarineenvironmentareconcerned,mustbeaddedthefollowing:
1.Issuanceofpermitstoconstructfishcageswithinmunicipalwaters
2.Issuanceofpermitstogatheraquariumfisheswithinmunicipalwaters
3.Issuanceofpermitstogatherkapisshellswithinmunicipalwaters
4.Issuanceofpermitstogather/cultureshelledmolluskswithinmunicipalwaters
5.Issuanceoflicensestoestablishseaweedfarmswithinmunicipalwaters
6.Issuanceoflicensestoestablishculturepearlswithinmunicipalwaters
7.Issuanceofauxiliaryinvoicetotransportfishandfisheryproductsand
8.Establishmentofclosedseasoninmunicipalwaters.
These functions are covered in the Memorandum of Agreement of 5 April 1994 between the Department of
AgricultureandtheDepartmentofInteriorandLocalGovernment.
In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted to
local government units under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause), and under Sections 149, 447 (a)(1)(vi),
458 (a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi), which unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity ofthe
questionedOrdinancescannotbedoubted.
Parenthetically, we wish to add that these Ordinances find full support under R.A. No.7611,otherwiseknownas
the Strategic Environmental Plan (SEP) for Palawan Act, approved on 19 July 1992. This statute adopts a
comprehensive framework for the sustainable developmentofPalawancompatiblewithprotectingand enhancing
the natural resources and endangered environment of the province, which shall serve to guide the local
government of Palawan and the government agencies concerned intheformulationandimplementationof plans,
[32]
programsandprojectsaffectingsaidprovince.
At this time then, it would be appropriate to determine the relation between the assailed Ordinances and the
aforesaid powers of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Puerto Princesa and the
Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the Province of Palawan to protect the environment. To begin, we ascertain the purpose of the
Ordinancesassetforthinthestatementofpurposesordeclarationofpoliciesquotedearlier.
It is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have two principal objectives or purposes: (1) to establish a closed
season for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of five years,and(2) toprotect the
corals of the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further destruction
duetoillegalfishingactivities.
The accomplishment of the first objective is well within the devolved power to enforce fishery laws in municipal
waters, such as P.D. No. 1015, which allows the establishment of closedseasons.Thedevolutionofsuchpower
has been expressly confirmed in the Memorandum of Agreement of 5 April 1994 between the Department of
AgricultureandtheDepartmentofInteriorandLocalGovernment.
The realization of the second objective falls within both the general welfare clause of the LGC and the express
mandate thereunder to cities and provinces to protect the environment and imposeappropriatepenaltiesforacts
[33]
whichendangertheenvironment.
The destruction of the coral reefs results in serious, if not irreparable, ecological imbalance, for coral reefs are
[34]
among the natureslifesupportsystems.
Theycollect,retain,andrecyclenutrientsforadjacentnearshoreareas
such as mangroves, seagrass beds, and reef flats provide food for marine plants and animals and serve as a

[35]
protective shelter foraquaticorganisms.
Itissaidthat[e]cologically,thereefsaretotheoceanswhatforestsare
[36]
tocontinents:theyareshelterandbreedinggroundsforfishandplantspeciesthatwilldisappearwithoutthem.
The prohibition against catching live fish stems, in part, from the modern phenomenon of livefish trade which
entails the catching of socalled exotic tropical species of fish not only for aquarium use in the West,butalsofor
[37]
themarketforlivebanquetfish[which]isvirtuallyinsatiableinevermoreaffluentAsia.
Theseexotic speciesare
coraldwellers, and fishermen catch them by diving in shallow water with corraline habitats and squirting sodium
cyanide poison at passing fish directly or onto coral crevices once affected the fish are immobilized [merely
[38]
stunned] and then scooped by hand.
The diver then surfaces and dumps his catch into a submerged net
attached to the skiff . Twenty minutes later, the fish can swim normally.Backonshore,theyareplacedinholding
pens, andwithinafewweeks,theyexpelthecyanidefromtheirsystemandareready tobehauled.Then theyare
placed in saltwater tanks or packaged in plastic bags filled with seawater for shipment by air freight to major
[39]
markets for live food fish.
While the fish are meant to survive, the opposite holds true fortheirformerhomeas
[a]fter the fisherman squirts the cyanide, the first thing to perish is the reef algae, on which fish feed. Dayslater,
the livingcoral startstoexpire.Soonthereeflosesitsfunctionashabitatforthefish,whicheatboththealgaeand
invertebrates that cling to the coral. The reef becomes an underwater graveyard, its skeletal remains brittle,
[40]
bleached of all color and vulnerable to erosion from the pounding of the waves.
It hasbeenfoundthatcyanide
[41]
fishingkillsmosthardandsoftcoralswithinthreemonthsofrepeatedapplication.
The nexus then between the activities barred by Ordinance No. 1592 of the City of Puerto Princesa and the
prohibited acts providedinOrdinanceNo.2, Seriesof1993oftheProvince ofPalawan,ononehand,andtheuse
of sodium cyanide, on the other, is painfully obvious. In sum, the public purpose and reasonableness of the
Ordinancesmaynotthenbecontroverted.
As to Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993, issued by Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero of the City of Puerto
Princesa, we find nothing therein violative of any constitutional or statutory provision. The Order refers to the
implementationofthechallengedordinanceandisnottheMayorsPermit.
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo relies upon the lack of authority on the part of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa to enact Ordinance No. 15, Series of 1992, on the theory that the
subject thereof is within the jurisdiction and responsibility of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
(BFAR) under P.D. No. 704, otherwise known as the Fisheries Decree of 1975 and that, in any event, the
Ordinance is unenforceable for lack of approval by the Secretaryof theDepartmentofNaturalResources(DNR),
likewiseinaccordancewithP.D.No.704.
The majority is unable to accommodate this view. The jurisdiction and responsibility of theBFARunderP.D.no.
704, over the management, conservation, development, protection, utilization and disposition of all fishery and
aquatic resources of the country is not allencompassing. First, Section 4 thereof excludes from suchjurisdiction
and responsibility municipal waters, which shall be under the municipal or city government concerned, except
insofar as fishpens and seaweed culture in municipal in municipal centers are concerned. This section provides,
however, that all municipal or city ordinances and resolutions affecting fishing and fisheries and any disposition
thereunder shall be submitted to theSecretaryoftheDepartmentofNaturalResourcesforappropriateactionand
[42]
shallhavefullforceandeffectonlyuponhisapproval.
Second, it must at once be pointed out that the BFAR is no longer under the Department of Natural Resources
(now Department of Environment and Natural Resources). Executive Order No. 967 of 30 June1984transferred
the BFAR from the control and supervision of the Minister (formerly Secretary) of Natural Resources to the
Ministry of Agriculture and Food (MAF) and converted it into a merestaffagencythereof,integratingitsfunctions
withtheregionalofficesoftheMAF.
In Executive Order No. 116 of 30 January 1987, which reorganized the MAF, the BFAR was retained as an
[43]
attached agency of the MAF. And under the Administrative Code of 1987,
the BFAR is placed under the Title
[44]
concerningtheDepartmentofAgriculture.
Therefore, it is incorrect to say that the challenged Ordinance of the City of Puerto Princesa is invalid or
unenforceable because it was not approved by the Secretary of the DENR. If at all, the approval that should be
sought would be that of the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture (not DENR) of municipal ordinances
affectingfishingandfisheriesinmunicipalwatershasbeendispensedwithinviewofthefollowingreasons:
[45]
(1) Section 534 (RepealingClause)oftheLGCexpresslyrepealsoramends Section16and29ofP.D.No.704

insofarthattheyareinconsistentwiththeprovisionsoftheLGC.
(2) As discussed earlier, under the general welfare clause of the LGC, local government units have the power,
inter alia
, to enact ordinances to enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology. It likewise specifically
vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters, and impose rentals, fees or
charges therefor topenalize,byappropriateordinances,theuseofexplosives,noxiousorpoisonoussubstances,
electricity,
muroami
, and other deleterious methods of fishing and to prosecute other methods offishingandto
[46]
prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable fishing laws.
Finally, it imposes upon the
sangguniang

bayan,
the
sangguniang panlungsod,
and the
sangguniang panlalawigan thedutytoenactordinancesto[p]rotect
the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite
fishing and other forms of destructive fishing and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of
[47]
eutrophicationofriversandlakesorofecologicalimbalance.
In closing, we commend the
Sangguniang Panlungsod
of the City of Puerto Princesa and
Sangguniang
Panlalawigan
of the Province of Palawan for exercising the requisite political will to enact urgently needed
legislation to protect and enhance the marine environment, thereby sharing in the herculeantaskofarrestingthe
tide of ecological destruction. We hope that other local government units shall now be rousedfromtheirlethargy
and adopt a more vigilant stand in the battle against the decimation of our legacy to future generations. At this
time,therepercussionsofanyfurtherdelayintheirresponsemayprovedisastrous,ifnot,irreversible.
WHEREFORE
, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the temporary restraining orderissuedon
11November1993isLIFTED.
Nopronouncementastocosts.
SOORDERED.
Narvasa,C.J.,Padilla,Vitug,Panganiban,a
nd
Torres,Jr.,JJ
.,concur.
Romero,Melo,Puno,
and
Francisco,JJ.,
joinedtheponenciasofJusticesDavideandMendoza.
Bellosillo,J.,
seedissentingopinion.
Kapunan
and
Hermosisima,Jr
.,
JJ
.,joinJusticeBellosilloinhisdissentingopinion.
Mendoza,
seeconcurringopinion.
Regalado,J.,
onofficialleave.

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
SECONDDIVISION
G.R.No.40243
March11,1992
CELESTINOTATEL,
petitioner,
vs.
MUNICIPALITYOFVIRAC,SALVADORA.SURTIDA,inhiscapacityasMayorofVirac,Catanduanes
GAVINOV.GUERRERO,inhiscapacityasViceMayorofVirac,CatanduanesJOSET.BUEBOS,inhis
capacityasCouncilorofVirac,CatanduanesANGELESTABLIZO,inhiscapacityasCouncilorofVirac,
CatanduanesELPIDIOT.ZAFE,inhiscapacityasCouncilorofVirac,CatanduanesMARIANOALBERTO,
inhiscapacityasCouncilorofVirac,CatanduanesJULIAA.GARCIA,inhercapacityasCouncilorof
Virac,CatanduanesandPEDROA.GUERRERO,inhiscapacityasCouncilorofVirac,
Catanduanes,
respondents.

NOCON,
J.:
This is aPetitionforProhibitionwithPreliminaryInjunctionwiththeCourtofFirstInstanceofCatanduanesfiledby
appellant, Celestino Tatel, a businessman engaged in the import and exportofabacaandotherproductsagainst
the Municipal Council of Virac, Catanduanes and its municipal officials enjoining them from enforcing Resolution
No 29 1
of the Council, declaring the warehouse of petitioner in barrioSta.Elena ofthesaidmunicipalityapublicnuisance
within the purview of Article 694 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and directing thepetitioner to removeand transfer said
warehousetoamoresuitableplacewithintwo(2)monthsfromreceiptofthesaidresolution.

It appears from the records that on the basis of complaints received from the residents of barrio Sta. Elena on
March 18, 1966 against the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside the
warehouseofpetitionerwhichaffectedthepeaceandtranquilityof theneighborhoodduetothesmoke,obnoxious
odor and dust emitted bythemachine,acommitteewasappointedby themunicipalcouncilofViractoinvestigate
the matter. The committee noted the crowded nature of the neighborhoodwithnarrowroadsandthesurrounding
residential houses, so much so that an accidental fire within the warehouse of the petitioner occasioned by the
continuance of the activity inside the warehouse and the storingofinflammablematerialscreatedadangertothe
livesandpropertiesofthepeoplewithintheneighborhood.
Resultantly, Resolution No. 29 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac on April 22, 1966 declaring the
warehouse owned and operated by petitioner a public nuisance within the purview of Article694oftheNewCivil
2
Code.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Municipal Council of Virac, petitioner instituted the
presentpetitionforprohibitionwithpreliminaryinjunction.

Respondent municipal officials contend that petitioner's warehouse was constructedinviolation ofOrdinanceNo.
13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or
barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block ofhousesto avoidlossoflives
andpropertiesbyaccidentalfire.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that said ordinance is unconstitutional, contrary to the due process and
equalprotectionclauseoftheConstitutionandnullandvoidfornothavingbeenpassedinaccordancewithlaw.
The issue then boils down on whether petitioner's warehouse is a nuisance within the meaning of Article 694 of
theCivilCodeandwhetherOrdinanceNo.13,S.1952oftheMunicipalityofViracisunconstitutionalandvoid.
InadecisiondatedSeptember18,1969,thecourt
aquo
ruledasfollows:
1.
The warehouse inquestionwaslegallyconstructedunderavalidpermitissuedbythemunicipalityofVirac
inaccordancewithexistingregulationsandmaynotbedestroyedorremovedfromitspresentlocation
2.
Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, is a legitimate and valid exercise of police power by the Municipal
CouncilofViracisnot(
sic
)unconstitutionalandvoidasclaimedbythepetitioner
3.
The storage by the petitioner of abacaandcoprainthewarehouseisnotonlyinviolationoftheprovisions
of the ordinance but poses a grave danger to the safety of the lives and properties of the residents of the
neighborhood due to accidental fire and constitutes a public nuisance under the provisions of Article 694 of the
NewCivilcodeofthePhilippinesandmaybeabated
4.
Accordingly, the petitioner is hereby directed to remove from thesaidwarehouseallabacaandcopraand
other inflammable articles stored therein which are prohibited under the provisions of Ordinance No. 13,withina
period of two (2) months from the time this decision becomes final and that henceforth, thepetitioneris enjoined
fromstoringsuchprohibitedarticlesinthewarehouse.Withcostsagainstpetitioner.
Seekingappellatereview,petitionerraisedaserrorsofthecourt
aquo:
1.
In holding that Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952,oftheMunicipalityofVirac,Catanduanes,isalegitimate
andvalidexerciseofpolicepoweroftheMunicipalCouncil,andtherefore,constitutional
2.
Ingiving theordinanceameaningotherthananddifferentfromwhatitprovided
bydeclaringthatpetitioner
violated the same by using the warehouse for storage of abacaandcoprawhenwhatisprohibited andpenalized
bytheordinanceistheconstructionofwarehouses.
3.
In refusing to take judicial notice of the fact that in the municipality, there are numerous establishments
similarlysituatedasappellants'warehousesbutwhicharenotprosecuted.
WefindnomeritinthePetition.
Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police
power. It is a settled principle of law that municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and
maintenance of local selfgovernment and as such are endowed with the police powers in order to effectively
accomplish and carry out the declaredobjectsoftheircreation.3
Itsauthorityemanatesfromthegeneralwelfareclause
undertheAdministrativeCode,whichreads:

The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall
seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals,
peace, good order, comfortandconvenience ofthemunicipalityandthe inhabitantsthereof,and fortheprotection
4
ofpropertytherein.

For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only bewithin thecorporatepowersofthemunicipalitytoenactbutmust

also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, and must be in consonance with certain well
established and basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles require that a municipal ordinance (1)
must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) mustnotbeunfairoroppressive(3)mustnotbepartialor
discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent with publicpolicy,
5
and(6)mustnotbeunreasonable.
OrdinanceNo.13,Seriesof1952,meetsthesecriteria.

As to the petitioner's second assignment of error, the trial court did not givetheordinanceinquestion ameaning
other than what it says. Ordinance No. 13 passed by the Municipal Council of Virac on December 29, 1952,
6

reads:

AN ORDINANCE STRICTLY PROHIBITING THE CONSTRUCTION OF WAREHOUSE IN ANY FORM NEAR A

BLOCK OF HOUSES EITHER INPOBLACIONORBARRIOWITHNECESSARYDISTANCETOAVOIDGREAT
LOSSESOFPROPERTYANDLIVESBYFIREACCIDENT.
Section1provides:
It is strictly prohibited to construct warehouses in any form to any person, persons, entity, corporation or
merchants, wherein to keep or storecopra,hemp,gasoline,petroleum,alcohol,crudeoil,oilofturpentineandthe
like products or materials if not withinthedistanceof200 metersfromablockofhouseseitherin thepoblacionor
barriostoavoidgreatlossesofpropertiesinclusivelivesbyfireaccident.

7
Section2provides:

Owners of warehouses in any form, are hereby given advice to remove their said warehouses this ordinance by
the Municipal Council, provided
however, that if those warehouses now in existence should no longerbeutilized
as such warehouse for the abovedescribed productsinSection1ofthisordinanceaftera lapse ofthetimegiven
for the removal of the said warehouses now in existence, same warehouses shall be exempted fromthespiritof
the provision of section 1 of this ordinance,
provided
further, that these warehouses now inexistence,shallinthe
futurebeconvertedintononinflammableproductsandmaterialswarehouses.
In spite of its fractured syntax, basically, what is regulated by the ordinance is the construction of warehouses
wherein inflammable materials are stored where suchwarehousesarelocatedatadistanceof200metersfroma
block of houses and not the construction per se of a warehouse. The purpose is to avoid the loss of life and
propertyincaseoffirewhichisoneoftheprimordialobligationofthegovernment.
Thiswasalsotheobservationofthetrialcourt:
A casual glance of the ordinance at once reveals a manifest disregard of the elemental rules of syntax.
Experience, however, will show that this is not uncommon in law making bodies in small towns where local
authorities and in particular the persons charged with the drafting and preparation of municipal resolutions and
ordinances lack sufficient education and training and are not well grounded even on the basic and fundamental
elements of the English language commonly used throughout the country in such matters. Nevertheless, if one
scrutinizes the terms of the ordinance, it is clear that what is prohibited is theconstructionof warehousesbyany
person, entity or corporationwhereincopra,hemp,gasolineandother inflammable productsmentionedinSection
1 may be stored unlessatadistanceofnotlessthan200metersfromablockof houseseitherinthepoblacionor
barrios in order to avoid loss of property andlifeduetofire.UnderSection2,existingwarehousesforthestorage
of the prohibited articles were given one yearaftertheapprovaloftheordinancewithin whichtoremovethembut
wereallowedtoremaininoperationiftheyhadceasedtostoresuchprohibitedarticles.
The ambiguity therefore is more apparent than real andspringsfromsimpleerroringrammaticalconstructionbut
otherwise, the meaning and intent is clear that what is prohibited is the construction or maintenance of
warehouses for the storage of inflammable articles at a distance within 200 meters from ablockofhouseseither
in the poblacion or in the barrios. And the purpose of the ordinance is toavoidloss oflifeandpropertyincaseof
accidentalfirewhichisoneoftheprimordialandbasicobligationofanygovernment.
8
Clearly, the lower court did NOT add meaning other than ordifferrentfromwhatwasprovidedintheordinancein
question.Itmerelystatedthepurposeoftheordinanceandwhatitintendstoprohibittoaccomplishitspurpose.
As to the third assignment of error, that warehouses similarly situated as that of the petitioner were not
prosecuted, suffice it to say that the mere fact that the municipal authorities of Virachavenotproceeded against
other warehouses in the municipalityallegedlyviolatingOrdinanceNo.13isnoreasontoclaimthattheordinance
is discriminatory. A distinction must be made between the law itself and the manner in which said law is
implemented by the agencies in charge with its administration and enforcement. There is no valid reason forthe
petitioner to complain, in the absence of proof that theotherbodegas mentionedbyhimareoperatinginviolation
of the ordinance and that the complaints have been lodgedagainstthebodegasconcernedwithoutthemunicipal
authoritiesdoinganythingaboutit.
The objections interposed by the petitioner to the validity of the ordinance have not been substantiated. Its
purpose is well within the objectives of sound government. No undue restraintisplaceduponthepetitionerorfor
anybody to engage in trade butmerelyaprohibitionfromstoringinflammableproductsinthewarehousebecause
of the danger of fire to the lives and properties of the people residing in the vicinity. As far as public policy is
concerned,therecanbenobetterpolicythanwhathasbeenconceivedbythemunicipalgovernment.
As to petitioner's contention of want of jurisdiction by the lower court we find no merit in the same.Thecaseisa
simple civil suit for abatement of a nuisance, the original jurisdiction of which falls under the then Court of First
Instance.
WHEREFORE,forlackofmerit,thepetitionisherebyDISMISSED.Costsagainstpetitioner.
SOORDERED.
MelencioHerrera,Paras,PadillaandRegalado,JJ.,concur.