Kohli, Atul (1987), The State and Poverty in India: The Politics of Economic Reform,

Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

The Book
The present book is a study of state intervention in a developing society, which analyses the
impact of authority structures and regime types on patterns of socio-economic development.
In particular, the study discusses Indian state intervention for alleviating poverty among its
lower classes focussing on the conditions under which public authorities of a developing
society can effectively pursue redistributive reforms. Reinterpreting some of the major
themes in Indias political economy, the study focuses attention on the political roots of
redistributive failures in India. It argues that the failure of the Indian State to facilitate social
reform has resulted from an alliance of domination between a weakly organised
nationalist political elite and the commercially oriented propertied class who are in a
position to stimulate economic growth. Emphasising the political and socio-structural
characteristics as crucial for understanding the redistributive outcomes in India, the author
argues that the loose and heterogeneous nature of the ruling coalition has made it difficult for
the political authorities to intervene in a rigid, hierarchical society so as to benefit the poor.
He further argues that as socio-structural constraints are not likely to vary significantly
in the short run, poverty conditions will only alter with changing regime types and
policies. This, however, is a strong claim the validity of which remains to be verified and
established by further empirical research.
The significance of the book lies in the fact that it focuses attention on the nature of
ruling political parties as an important factor influencing the success or failure of
redistributive and welfare politics in a democratic capitalistic setting. The study makes a
comparative political analysis of three Indian state governments such as: Communist Party of
India (Marxist) regime in West Bengal (1977-83); the Congress (I) government under Devraj
Urs in Karnataka (1974-80); and the short-lived Janata Party rule in Uttar Pradesh (1977-80).
The author specifically chooses these three states on the ground that ruled by different
political parties within a federal polity, these three states provide some similarities and some
differences regarding regime ideology and organisation on the one hand, and the
effectiveness of anti-poverty programmes on the other. Comparing these in terms of their
success in three policy areas: land reforms, support of small farmers and efforts to improve
the wage and employment prospects for the rural poor, the author argues that well-organised,
left-of-centre parties in government- like in West Bengal- are the most effective in
implementing reform.
Approaches/Theoretical Framework
While discussions on Government of Indias failure to alleviate poverty and the conditions
under which it can be alleviated have rested mainly on two positions: (1) that poverty can
only be alleviated in the long run when national wealth grows or (2) that revolutionary
changes need to be made for meaningful redistribution, the author observes that the more
sophisticated policy-oriented literature proposing policy-packages to alleviate poverty
suffers from political naivete based on the belief that failure to adopt appropriate policies has
been mainly due to the absence of political will (p.3). He, therefore, takes a different
approach to focus the study on the conditions that broadens the states reformist scope within
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a democratic-capitalist model of development. In other words, it analyses the conditions

under which a Third World regime is likely to posses a degree of autonomy from social
constraints so as to facilitate economic gains for the lower classes.
Taking cognisance of the fact that an alliance of a nationalist elite with the
entrepreneurial classes (with a balance clearly in favour of the propertied classes) would not
automatically preclude redistributive concessions, the author argues that the lower-class gains
remain solely a function of the pattern of state intervention in the economy. The pattern of
state intervention is, in turn, largely determined by the ideology, organisation, and class basis
of the regime that controls state power. The author argues that as the ideology, organisation
and pattern of class alliances underlying a regime can vary within a democraticcapitalist
model of development, so can regime capacities to facilitate the lower-class redistributive
gains (p. 9).
Conceptualising the state and society as being in mutual interaction, the author adopts
a state-society focus to analyse the role of state in development partially as being conditioned
by socio-economic conditions and partially as reflecting autonomous choices made by
political authorities. Focussing attention on the centrality of the states role in development
within a statist framework, the author develops a theoretical framework by conceptualising
state, state autonomy and regime type to analyse the performance of state intervention under
different regime types. In fact, the concepts of state, state autonomy, and regime type have
been structured in such a manner that leads to the conceptualisation of authority structures as
a potentially significant force in socio-economic development.
Conceiving state as an institutional arrangement, i.e. a set of administrative and
coercive institutions headed by an executive authority, the author discuses the Third World
states and their potentials and weaknesses by characterising them as developmental capitalist
states as distinguished from the communist and advanced capitalist states. He then elaborates
state autonomy and regime types, which constitute the two main building blocs of his
theoretical framework.
Describing state autonomy as the states relationship with the society specifically
referring to the states capacity to restructure social relations and mobilise societal resources,
the author observes that the clearest cases of state autonomy from society are revolutionary
communist states, which retain the power to transform social structures fundamentally.
According to the author, state autonomy refers to a macro-political-sociological condition
whereby state authorities can (1) insulate themselves from social demands in general, but
specifically from the demands of propertied classes, and (2) utilise state power to consciously
alter socio-economic relations. An autonomous state thus contrasts with a reflexive or a
captured state, where state actions are largely controlled by social forces.
Patterns of
leadership and ideology, and the organisation of the state power, as well as control over
productive property, are some of the important varying conditions and resources that affect
the states capacity to act autonomously vis--vis society. As these variables are all
continuous and vary in degree, so does its autonomy. However, the author observes that
compared to communist cases, state autonomy in class societies is always a relative matter.
Explaining state autonomy within a capitalist setting largely as a function of the type
of regime wielding power, the author discusses varying types of regimes that control state
power within the Third World. While regime types refer to how political rule is organised
(e.g. patterns of legislative-executive relations) and the relationship of the rulers to the ruled
2

(e.g. involving democratic participation or not), the author says that as the leadership,
ideology, organisation, and class alliances underlying specific regimes vary, so does the
capacity of political authorities to define and implement state goals (p. 29). He contends
that the regime attributes (mentioned above) count for redistributive effectiveness and are
significant from the point of view of explaining varying reformist capacities. Citing the
concrete example of left-of-centre parties like CPI (M) led communist regime of West
Bengal, the author observes that: (a) regime attributes such as ideology, organisation, and the
class basis of the power holders make the institutional penetration of the society possible; (b)
facilitate the degree of regime autonomy from the propertied class; (c) the organisational
characteristics of such regimes create a degree of separation between political and social
power; and (d) this margin of autonomous political power can be utilised to manipulate state
intervention in the interest of the lower classes.
He, thus, analyses the distributive role of Indian states (on the basis of the empirical
information collected from the three different states run by different political regimes)
following the above theoretical framework.
Politics of Policy Formulation
Each of the three case studies (regimes) examined in this book are run by different political
parties with their respective ideologies, party organisation, pattern of leadership, and
decision-making style. Based on definite class support and the factors mentioned above
determine their regime type, which had a decisive impact on their performance with
regard to their redistributive reform.
As far as policy formulation is concerned, because of its class composition, the CPI
(M) led West Bengal government could bring in well thought out redistributive reform
policies like tenancy reform in a very strategic way without affecting the interest of any class
lending support to the party. Rather, the particular reform helped in increasing its support
base as large number of sharecroppers was obliged to CPI (M). Further, in case of giving
tickets to persons for contesting elections to panchayats, in a strategic move the party
preferred giving tickets to party sympathisers than party workers. While this served their
political purpose of increasing their party base, the local level party workers were put in
charge of supervisory role for the smooth functioning of the panchayats. This helped the
party to penetrate into the countryside without being captured by the propertied class. As
regards not going in for land reforms, i.e. distribution of ceiling surplus land, initially, while
there were a number of problems involved in the process, the party chose to adopt a
pragmatic compromise approach and postponed it, though it was very much committed to
land reforms. On the other hand, the Karnataka Government led by Devraj Urs of Congress
Party by contrast was not committed to this goal. With landlord dominated local
governments and no-party organisation, the Urs regime was certainly not in a position to the
policy of appropriating surplus land for redistribution. It is because; pursuit of a policy of
distribution of ceiling surplus land implies nothing less than a frontal attack by the state
authorities on the rural class structure. And the Urs regime could not have been able to afford
that as many of its party members belonged to the land-owning class. Though Urs populist
regime had some commitment to redistribution, it was only within the framework of the
existing class structure. Not surprisingly, the Janata government in UP eliminated the
objective of land reform from its agenda. This was mainly because unlike West Bengal, it
consisted of members representing land-owning peasantry coming from the middle castes.
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Politics of Implementation
While two out of three case studies examined in this book involved implementation of some
kind of poverty alleviation programmes, the Uttar Pradesh Government ruled by Janata Party
did not implement any specific antipoverty programme. Characterised by shifting alliances
and political instability and fragmented leadership, a party committed to the land owning
peasantry could do nothing for the rural poor. While land reforms were eliminated from its
policy agenda, in spite of the rhetorical rural tilt, the small and marginal farmers remained
neglected and ignored. Not only did the government fail to act on their behalf, but also the
power of the state was occasionally turned against the poor to reinforce the already powerful
land-owning groups. In fact, despite Janatas rhetoric of new beginning, decentralisation,
rural tilt, and concern for the small man, in practice, the Janata government in UP failed
miserably as far as attacking rural poverty is concerned.
As far as the government of West Bengal ruled by CPI (M) is concerned, it made a
concerted attack on rural poverty through programmes like (1) land reforms (especially
tenancy reforms); (2) programmes for small farmers (mainly providing credit to the newly
registered sharecroppers); and (3) employment and wage schemes for the land-less labourers.
With a very clear-cut strategy, the party implemented its redistributive reform policies
through the creation of red panchayats, registration of sharecroppers, facilitation of
credit for small landholders, and by mobilising the landless labourers for higher wages
through unionisation. This was all done with an aim to securing political position by
improving the conditions of the lower classes.
The politicisation of panchayats or red panchayats, as they were otherwise called,
constituted an important strategy in its implementation of antipoverty programmes as it
played a crucial role not only in ensuring the successful implementation of programmes, but
also in mobilisation of the poor for their personal gains indirectly leading to the penetration
of the party deep into the remote rural areas. After coming to power in 1977, the CPI (M)
was looking for consolidating its rural power base further. As such, in an attempt to
incorporate the rural classes institutionally, it brought in the institutional innovation by
allowing political parties to compete for the local government institutions. While this well
calculated decision of the party leaders resulted in the return of around 80 per cent of
candidates contesting on CPI (M) tickets, these newly created red panchayats played a
catalytic role in CPI (M)s over all political and developmental strategy.
Like any other political party, CPM too wanted to consolidate power and as such
intended to accomplish this political goal by building its power base primarily on the lower
and lower-middle classes. While this necessitated involving these groups in the political
processes as well as transferring some of the benefits of power to them, in a well calculated
move CPM decided to file party-sympathisers for panchayat elections by reserving the party
cadres to play a crucial role in the supervision and monitoring of implementation of
antipoverty programmes.
As catalytic agents, the panchayat members and presidents played a crucial role in
each and every policy that the party implemented for the benefit of the poor. While the
government placed the bureaucrats/administrators under the control of the political
functionaries at each level of administration (i.e. state, district, block, and village) by treating
them as executive arms of the government, they were devolved with the power to identify the
targeted beneficiaries, i.e. identifying the sharecroppers for registration, identifying and
4

assessing the crop area of the sharecroppers for enabling them to obtain bank loans at a lower
interest, identifying the landless labourers for FWP and NREP programmes for providing
wage employment, unionising the landless agricultural labourers for higher agricultural
wages, etc. The panchayats also decided the projects to be undertaken under the FWP/NREP
programme, location of the project and the people to be employed for administration of the
project.
As the sharecroppers got themselves registered and their right to cultivate certain
portion of land was fixed, this increased their involvement in the crop production. While the
bank loan received with lower rates of interest (4%) through government mediation and the
local panchayats further increased their productivity resulting in a perceptible improvement
in their standard of living, they owed their obligation to the panchayats in particular and the
CPM in general serving the political purpose.
Since most of the antipoverty programmes like FWP and NREP were implemented by
the panchayats in conjunction with the local party cadres, the projects chosen fit better into
the felt needs of the community than those selected in the past, which was based on the
narrow preference of the village elites. While the projects implemented included building of
roads connecting isolated villages to main roads, cleaning and fixing of village tanks, and the
drainage and the cleaningup of canals used by many members of the village community,
compared to the past practices they benefited a broader population. Of course corruption was
there, but not to the extent it was during the Congress regime earlier. The new red panchayats
reduced corruption and class bias and were considerably more effective in facilitating massoriented rural development than the past institutional arrangements. Reducing corruption and
class bias, the local panchayats proved to be more effective in facilitating the hitherto
mythical development from below.
The question that arises here is that entrusted with so much of power, whether or not
the panchayat representatives misused their power? The fact that as new political elites, who
had just displaced the traditional local elites, the panchayat members owed their position and
power to the party. Since their sharing of the benefits of power depended on the continuance
of CPM in power, which in turn depended on its clean and effective administration of
antipoverty programmes, their compliance with the central directives was very likely to be
maintained. Another important factor with regard to the implementation of redistributive
programmes is that had the members been from large land-owning backgrounds, the
prospects of implementing programmes through them would not have been very good. They
could have opposed it. But since majority of the representatives had come form lower-middle
class background (as they were given the party tickets selectively), the possibility of their
opposing the redistributive programmes did not arise. This is because; many of these
programs did not directly affect the socio-economic interests of the panchayat members. On
the contrary, it helped in effective implementation of redistributive programmes.
In addition to the above programmes, the CPM also attempted to unionise the landless
labourers with a purpose to building organised political support and conducting wage
struggles. In this political task, rather than state and local governments, the party and the
Kishan Sabha (an important organ of the party) played an important role in forcing the
landlords to increase the wages for the landless agricultural labourers.

Compared to the tenancy reforms in Wet Bengal which was achieved successfully
through the involvement of local panchayats, the tenancy reform in Karnataka pursued
through the passing of a series of amendments to the existing land reform legislations under
the Devraj Urs regime was not that successful. It was rather a piecemeal success. Regarding
who is or is not a sharecropper, while the tenancy reform legislation of West Bengal had put
the onus of proof on the landlord, in Karnataka, the tenancy reform legislations had left the
burden with the poor tenants who had to prove their own right to land. This, in fact, proved
to be an important problem in the process of implementation.
To facilitate the implementation of tenancy reform, the Urs regime had created a large
number of land tribunals (at least one or more in each Taluka) with the power of receiving
applications from the tenants, checking them for their validity, listening to conflicting
evidence (without allowing any professional lawyer), making field visits for verification of
necessary and arriving at final decisions regarding tenants occupancy rights. These tribunals
consisted of five members with one bureaucrat as the chairperson and four other political
appointees including the local MLA and a member from the backward classes. While this
allowed Devraj Urs to pack most of the tribunals with his loyal supporters, most of the
political appointees were landlords (owning more than 25 acres of land), and they belonged
to middle and upper-rural class Congressman loyal to Devraj Urs. In fact, the land tribunals
created by Urs for facilitating the implementation of tenancy reforms became an instrument
in Karnatakas large network of patronage and spoils supporting the Urs regime.
Rather than facilitating the smooth implementation of tenancy reforms like that of the
panchayats in West Bengal, the organisational arrangement created by Urs interfered in the
smooth implementation of the law by creating bottlenecks in the process. It provided an
opportunity to the powerful local landlords, especially those who had personal relationship
with the tribunal members, to evade the tenancy law. While the landlords close to Urs or
Congress (I) often did not lose their lands, the other propertied factions, i.e. landlords
belonging to the opposition party lost their lands. As the later constituted bulk of the
landlords, they opposed the program. The opposition to the tenancy reform programme,
therefore, took a factional rather than a class form. Labelling those opponents as antipeople and reactionaries Urs succeeded in presenting himself as a peoples man without
alienating the landed groups that lent him crucial support. As a result, the programme
achieved piecemeal success. The half of the tenanted lands, which legally changed hands,
was because of this factional pattern of implementation.
Apart from the land reforms policy, which had only limited success, the Urs regime in
Karnataka also introduced Small Farmers Development Agency (SFDA) programme with a
purpose to channelling the agricultural inputs like credit, irrigation, and scientific inputs to
the small farmers for making them economically viable and bringing improvement in their
standard of living. Since the Urs regime did not have an organisational framework like that
of CPM in West Bengal that linked the power centre to the lower classes and excluded the
propertied from institutional participation, the programme ended in failure as larger
landowners and those associated with the ruling faction went away with most of the benefits
offered by the programme. In contrast to the case of West Bengal, the Urs regime made no
efforts to bargain with the commercial banks. Without an organisational framework such as
the red panchayats of West Bengal, Urs regime had nothing to offer to the banks that might
induce them to become substantially involved in small rural loans. Mentioned must be made
of the fact that when commercial banks in West Bengal were not willing to enter into the rural
market in a large scale as wanted by the CPM, the government led by CPM entered into an
6

agreement with the Banks for implementing the programme of subsidised credit (indirect
subsidies to the Bank in the form of labour cost required for survey and verification, and
direct subsidies to the sharecroppers to cover interest rates). As per the agreement, the local
panchayats prepared the list of sharecroppers in their areas, identified their anticipated share
of the yearly crop and passed on this information to the banks. Using this information, the
banks decided who is eligible for loan and for what amount. While the sharecroppers were
asked to pay only 4 per cent interest, the remaining was paid to the banks by the government.
Moreover, if the sharecroppers could pay back their entire loan by 31 st march of the next year,
the loans were interest free; the total interest being paid by the government. But this was not
the case in Karnataka.
As regards wage and employment schemes for the landless labourers, the
implementation of Employment Affirmation Scheme (EAS), which in West Bengal was
implemented as FWP, was not that effective as it was in West Bengal. The major problem
was organisational which resulted I charges of corruption. Without any organisational
framework, the Urs regime tried to implement the scheme through the already overloaded
bureaucracy. Since the schemes were to be operated in selected taluks, it involved the role of
the chairman of the Taluka Development Board, the Block Development Officer, and the
local MLA. Since the taluk office and the taluk committee was already represented by
people who were part of various patronage-corruption networks, entrusting decision-making
power to the taluk committee for the for selection and location of the project, and the
administration of funds and release of grain for EAS made the programme fail as it was very
unlikely to cater to the genuine needs of the poor. In the absence of any organisational
network, the Congress could not unionise the rural landless labourers for increased wage.
Political Mobilisation
The implementation of antipoverty programmes by different regimes had different mobilising
impact on the people. While on the one hand, the implementation of land reform policies
(tenancy reform) by the Devraj Urs government of Karnataka, which selectively favoured the
landlords either close to Urs or belonging to Congress I, resulted in the mobilisation of
landlords (who lost their lands) belonging to the opposition faction, on the other hand it did
have a positive impact in terms of the sharecroppers who without any party organisation like
that of West Bengal came forward with their applications in large numbers to stake their
claim for registration as sharecroppers. Though the Janata regime in UP failed to bring about
any redistributive reform, its failure to do so on the one hand, and the repression of the
scheduled castes and the poor peasantry by the propertied class (to which the Janata rulers
turned a blind eye) resulted in the mobilisation of the poor peasants and the scheduled castes
leading to the emergence of backward castes as a dominant political force in the state. The
Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) led by Kansi Ram is nothing but a manifestation of the
organisation of those backward scheduled castes once repressed by the land-owning big
farmers.
Compared to the above two states, where the mobilisation of masses took place
mostly as reaction to the policies pursued by the ruling political parties, the mobilising impact
of the policies pursued by the CPM led West Bengal government was highly positive and
overwhelming. Starting with the creation of red panchayats to the registration of
sharecroppers till the unionisation of rural landless agricultural labourers, its policies had a
positive impact. While it succeeded to a large extent in fulfilling the felt needs and
requirements of the lower class, it also served the political purpose of CPM as the lower class
7

was mobilised around CPM. While, the organisational network of the CPM particularly the
panchayats played a major role in the mobilisation of the small farmers, sharecroppers, and
landless labourers, the Kishan Sabha was instrumental in unionising the landless labourers for
increase in agricultural wages.
Making a comparison of the performance of three different regimes on the
implementation of redistributive reforms, the author comments that while the failure of the
Janata regime in UP to carry out the redistributive reforms was a consequence of its political
and class characteristics, the success of CPI (M) led government in West Bengal can be
attributed mainly to its political organisation and coherent leadership. Ideologically, when
CPI (M) was committed to alleviating rural poverty in West Bengal, the situation in UP was
quite confused. Even within that confusion, there was a discernible commitment to the
commercial farmers and a concurrent neglect of the lower peasantry. On the leadership front,
when CPI (M) regime had a coherent leadership with clear policies, the Janata regime was
fragmented. As far as organisation is concerned, the CPM and Janata regimes differed in
terms of both structure and membership. As a tightly organised party, the CPI (M) could
systematically penetrate into the countryside without being captured by the land-owning
groups, which allowed the CPI (M) to reach the lower classes directly and mobilise them
occasionally to facilitate the reformist goals. The Janata regime, on the other hand, had no
such organisational framework. The Janata party had little rural presence and that was
confined to the land-owning middle castes. Hence, the contrasting patterns of regime
leadership, ideology, and organisation contributed to their differential performance in
redistributive reforms.
Comparing the UP Janata regime with the Urs regime in Karnataka, the author brings
out some similarities as well as differences. The author says that on the organisational
dimension, while both were similar, i.e. they shared a weak organisation based on landowning groups, this put a constraint on the reformist thrusts of both the regimes.
Ideologically, while the populist regime of Urs in Karnataka was committed to the rural poor,
the Janata was not. From leadership angle, when Janata regime was fragmented and guided
by factional groups, Devraj Urs offered a strong leadership to Karnataka for nearly a decade
and this allowed him to take long-range overview of the political situation. In his
calculations, while he perceived that some rewards to the lower classes were politically
beneficial, by virtue of his strong leadership, he could push through a modicum of reformism
born out of calculations of political necessity.
By contrast, the fictionalised situation in UP led each faction within the Janata to
protect its narrow interests against competitors which made governance impossible. The
prominent role of Bharatiya Lok Dal (BLD) within the fictionalised political situation further
allowed the interests of the land-owning peasantry to be pursued at the expense of the rural
poor. The author observed that in contrast to the parliamentarycommunist regime in West
Bengal and the populist regime in Karnataka, the Janata regime based on fragmented
leadership and middle-peasant interests had neither reasons nor the capacity to undertake
redistributive reforms (p. 222).
Personal Comments
As mentioned above, this is a study of state intervention in redistributive reforms in India
carried out in three different states during the year 1979-83. The failure of Indian state to
improve the living conditions of vast mass of Indian population even after three decades of
8

democratically guided planned economic development raises the crucial question: Why?
And, more importantly, under what conditions is Indias poverty likely to be alleviated?
While neither the liberal nor the Marxist worldviews provide a satisfactory answer to the
question of why Indias mass rural poverty has not been mitigated, the author makes an
interesting and excellent analysis of Indian situation by emphasising on the twin and
interrelated impacts of regime type (political organisation of the ruling party) and social
structure. The author raises a number of questions like: What kind of difference does the
varying pattern of political rule (regime) make on the effectiveness of redistributive policies?
Whether a particular type of regime can pursue antipoverty programmes for the poor people
more effectively than other type of regimes? And, if so, what are the defining features of
these regimes and what account for their relative success?
While these are very important questions from the point of view of successful
implementation of redistributive and anti-poverty programmes in West Bengal when other
states of the Indian union have more or less failed to do so, in this book, the author has made
an attempt to seek answer to the above questions by focusing on the conditions that broaden
the states reformist scope within a democratic-capitalist model of development. Based on
the fieldwork carried out in three different states ruled by different regimes, the author comes
out with ample evidence to suggest that the well-organised left-of-centre parties in
government like the CPI (M) in West Bengal are the most effective in implementing
redistributive reform for the lower classes. The CPI (M)s coherent leadership with clear-cut
policies, ideology, class composition and commitment, and organisational network enhanced
its capacity to penetrate the countryside without being co-opted by the landed class. This
facilitated the controlled mobilisation of the lower classes to buttress state power for carrying
out redistributive reforms more successfully than others.
While Kohlis framework of regime type and its impact on redistributive reforms is
certainly an important contribution to the literature of comparative politics and can possibly
be applied to independent states with more or less similar social structure, it is doubtful if the
same framework could be applied to analyse the performance of states with regard to reforms
in the economy, industrial or some other sectors which are in no way less important than the
former, particularly in the context of the ongoing economic reforms in India or elsewhere. In
fact, CPI (M)s reluctance to carry out the land reform programmes pertaining to the
redistribution of ceiling surplus land justifies the doubts. While the CPI (M) finds it easy to
implement the redistributive programmes that serves the interests of the farmer and the lower
class, it may not find it that easy to bring in reform in the industrial sector or other sectors of
the economy as it might go against lower classes and antagonise them.
Stretching the imagination a bit far, it appears that while Kohlis framework of regime
type and its impact on redistributive performance can very well be applied to study the
implementation of poverty alleviation programmes in the United States of America and the
Indian States of Maharashtra and West Bengal (the study carried out by John Echeverri Gent),
probably it wont be possible to carry out a study of present type by applying Gents
Organisational Environmental Perspective based on the resource dependence model. Though
gents model looks very similar to that of Kohlis framework of analysis, it falls short of
explaining the impact of different regimes on redistributive reform.