RamirezvsCourtofAppeals

G.R.No.93833 September28,1995

Facts:
1. A civil case damages was filed by petitioner SocorroD. Ramirezin the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia,allegedlyvexed,insultedandhumiliatedherina
"hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignityand personality," contrary to
morals,goodcustomsandpublicpolicy."
2. SocorroRamirezwasscoldedbyEsterGarciainsideGarciasoffice.
3. Ramirez taped the conversation and later filed charges against Garcia for insulting and humiliating her,
usingasevidencethetranscriptoftheconversation,basedonthetaperecording.
4. Ramirez sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of
P610,000.00,inadditiontocosts,interestsandotherreliefsawardableatthetrialcourt'sdiscretion.
5. Garcia filed criminal charges against Ramirez for violating the Antiwiretapping act, because it was done
withoutherknowledgeandconsent.
6. Ramirez claimed that what the law forbids is for other parties, who are not part of the conversation, to
record it using theinstruments enumeratedinthelaw(therewasanearliercasethatwasdismissedbecause
theinstrumentusedwasnotmentionedinthelaw).
7. Thetrialcourt ruledinfavorof Ramirez,grantingamotiontoquash onthegroundthatthefactscharged do
notconstituteanoffense,buttheCourtofAppealsreversedit.

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " AnAct to Prohibit and Penalized Wiretapping and Other Related Violationsof
PrivateCommunicationandOtherPurposes,"provides:
Sec.1. It shall be unlawful for any person, notbeing authorizedbyallthepartiestoanyprivatecommunicationor
spoken word, to tap any wire or cable,orby using any other deviceorarrangement,tosecretlyoverhear,intercept,
or record such communication or spokenwordbyusingadevicecommonlyknownasadictaphoneor dictagraphor
detectaphoneorwalkietalkieortaperecorder,orhoweverotherwisedescribed.

Issue:
1. WhetherornottheAntiWiretappingActappliesinrecordingsbyoneofthepartiesintheconversation.

Ratio:
1. Yes.
Section 1of R.A. 4200provides it shall beunlawful forany person,not being authorizedbyallthe
partiestotapanywireorcable.
2. The court noted that the provision makes it clear that it is illegal for any person to secretly record a
conversation, unless authorized by all parties involved. The law makes no distinctionas to whether the
party sought to bepenalizedbythe statuteoughttobea partyotherthanordifferentfromthoseinvolvedin
theprivatecommunication.
3. Thecongressional records alsoshowed that theintent was that permission must besoughtfromall parties
in theconversation. Thisis acompleteban ontaperecordedconversationstakenwithouttheauthorization
ofalltheparties,Sen.Tanadasaidduringthedeliberations.
4. Theprovision seeks to penalizeeven those privy to the private communications. Wherethelawmakesno
distinctions,onedoesnotdistinguish.
5. Thenatureoftheconversationsis immaterialtoa violationofthestatute.Itheld that:Thesubstanceofthe
same need not be specifically alleged in theinformation.WhatR.A.4200penalizesare theacts ofsecretly
overhearing,interceptingorrecordingprivatecommunicationsbymeansofthedevicesenumeratedtherein.
Themere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication bymeansofa
tape recorder would suffice to constitute anoffenseunder Section1ofR.A.4200.Asthe SolicitorGeneral
pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: Nowhere(in the said law) is it requiredthat
before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as wellasitscommunicationtoa
thirdpersonshouldbeprofessed.
6. Petitioners contentionthatthe phraseprivatecommunication inSection1 ofR.A.4200doesnotinclude
private conversations narrows the ordinary meaning of the word communication to a point of
absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word
communicare
, meaning to share or to

impart. In its ordinary signification,communicationconnotestheactofsharingorimpartingsignification,

communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting,as ina
conversation
, orsignifies theprocessby
which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as
languagesignsorgestures)
Petitiondenied.DecisionofCAaffirmed.CostsagainstRamirez.

7.

FelicitoBasbaciovs.OfficeoftheSecretary,DepartmentofJustice,FranklinDrilon
G.R.No.109445 November7,1994

Facts:
1. This case presents for determination the scope of the State's liability under Rep. Act No. 7309, which
among otherthingsprovidescompensationforpersonswhoareunjustlyaccused,convictedandimprisoned
butonappealareacquittedandorderedreleased.c
2. Petitioner Felicito Basbacio andhis soninlaw, WilfredoBalderrama,wereconvictedoffrustratedmurder
and of two counts of frustrated murder for thekilling of Federico Boyonand the wounding ofthe latter's
wifeFloridaandhissonTirso,atPalo,Calanuga,RapuRapu,Albay,onthenightofJune26,1988.
3. Themotive for the killing was apparently alanddisputebetweentheBoyonsandpetitioner.Petitioner and
his soninlaw were sentenced to imprisonment and ordered immediately detained after their bonds had
beencancelled.
4. Petitioner and his soninlaw appealed. Only petitioner's appeal proceeded to judgment, however, as the
appealoftheotheraccusedwasdismissedforfailuretofilehisbrief.
5. On June 22, 1992 the Court of Appeals rendered a decision acquittingpetitioner on the ground that the
prosecution failed to prove conspiracy between him and his soninlaw. He had been pointed to by a
daughter of Federico Boyon as the companion of Balderrama when the latter barged into their hut and
without warning started shooting, but the appellate court ruled that because petitioner didnothing more,
petitioner'spresenceatthesceneofthecrimewasinsufficienttoshowconspiracy.
6. Based on his acquittal,petitioner filed a claimunder Rep. Act No.7309,Sec.3(a),whichprovides forthe
payment of compensation to any person who was unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but
subsequently released by virtueof ajudgment of acquittal.
The claim was filedwiththeBoardofClaims
of the Department of Justice, buttheclaimwasdeniedon theground that whilepetitionerspresenceatthe
scene of the killing was not sufficient to find him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, yet, considering that
there was bad blood between him and the deceased as a result of a land dispute and the fact that the
convictedmurdererishissoninlaw,therewasbasisforfindingthathewasprobablyguilty.
7. Petitioner brought this petition for review on
certiorari asaspecialcivilactionunderRule65oftheRules
ofCourt.

Issue:
1. WhetherornotpetitionerisentitledoftheclaimunderR.A.No.7309.

Ruling:
1. NO.Petitionerscontentionhasnomerit.
2. It would require that every time an accused is acquitted on appeal hemust be given compensation on the
theory that he was "unjustly convicted" by the trial court. Such a reading of sec. 3(a) is contrary to
petitioner'sprofessed canon ofconstruction that whenthelanguageofthestatuteisclearitshouldbegiven
its natural meaning. It leaves out of the provision in question the qualifyingword "unjustly" sothatthe
provision wouldsimply read: "The following may file claims forcompensationbeforethe Board: (a) any
person who was accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of
acquittal."
3. Sec. 3(a) requires that the claimant be "
unjustly accused, convicted [and] imprisoned." The fact that his
conviction is reversed and the accused is acquitted is not itself proof that the previous conviction was
"unjust." An accused may be acquittedfor a number of reasons and hisconviction by the trial courtmay,
for any of these reasons, be set aside.For example,he may be acquittednotbecause heisinnocentofthe
crime charged but because of reasonable doubt, in which case he may be found civilly liable to the

complainant, because while the evidence against him does not satisfy thequantum of proof requiredfor
conviction,itmaynonethelessbesufficienttosustainacivilactionfordamages.
4. Theaccused is presumedto be innocent in order toplaceontheprosecutiontheburdenofprovingbeyond
reasonable doubt that theaccused isguilty. It is quite another thing to say that he is innocentand if heis
convictedthathehasbeen"unjustlyconvicted."
5. To say then that an accused has been unjustly convicted has to do with the
manner of his conviction
rather than with his innocence. An accused may on appeal be acquitted because he did not commit the
crime,butthatdoes not necessarily mean that he isentitledtocompensationfor havingbeenthevictimof
anunjustconviction.
6. If his convictionwas dueto anerror in the appreciation of the evidence the convictionwhileerroneousis
not unjust. That is why itis not, on the other hand, correct to say as does respondent, that under the law
liabilityforcompensationdependsentirelyontheinnocenceoftheaccused.
7. Sec. 3(a) does not refer solely to an unjust conviction as a result of which the accused is unjustly
imprisoned, but, in addition, to an unjust accusation. The accused must have been "unjustlyaccused, in
consequenceofwhichheisunjustlyconvictedandthenimprisoned.
8. The Court of Appeals ruled there was no conspiracyonly because there was no proof that hedidor say
anythingontheoccasion.Eyewitnesstestimoniesfailedtoprove.
9. One may take issue withthis ruling because precisely conspiracy may be shown by concertof actionand
other circumstances. Why was petitioner withhis soninlaw? Whydidtheyapparentlyfleetogether?And
what about the fact that there was bad blood between petitioner and thevictim Federico Boyon? These
questions may no longer be passed upon in view of the acquittal of petitioner but they are relevant in
evaluating his claimthathe had beenunjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned before he was released
becauseofhisacquittalonappeal.
10. We hold that in view of these circumstances respondent Secretary of Justiceand the Boardof Claims did
not commit a grave abuse ofits discretion in disallowing petitioner's claimfor compensation underRep.
ActNo.7309.

Verbalegisnonestrecedendum
fromthewordsofastatutethereshouldbenodeparture.

ManuelT.deGuia,inhiscapacityasCounciloroftheMunicipalityofParaaque,MetroManila,
petitioner,
vs.
HON.COMMISSIONONELECTIONS
G.R.No.104712May6,1992

Facts:
1. Congress passed R.A. 7166, signed into law by the President on November 26, 1991. It is "An Act
Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing
AppropriationsTherefor,andforOtherPurposes."
2. Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 2313, adopting rules and
guidelines in the apportionment, by district, of the number of elective members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan in provinces with only one (1) legislative district and the Sangguniang Bayan of
municipalities in the MetroManilaAreaforthepreparationoftheProjectofDistrictApportionment bythe
Provincial Election Supervisors and Election Registrars, Resolution No. 2379, approving the Project of
District Apportionment submitted pursuant to Resolution No.2313,and ResolutionUND.92010 holding
that pars. (a),(b) and (c), and the first sentence of par. (d), all of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, apply totheMay11,
1992elections.
3. Apetition for certiorariand prohibition assailing the validity and enforcementofComelecResolutionNo.
2313
4. Petitioner is an incumbent member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Paranaque, Metro
Manila,havingbeenelectedintheJanuary1988localelections.
5. The Court observes that petitioner does not allege that heis running for reelection, much less, that he is
prejudicedbytheelection,bydistrict,inParaaque.
6. PetitionerimputesgraveabuseofdiscretiontoCOMELECinpromulgatingtheaforementionedresolutions,
andmaintainedthatelectionofSanggunianmembersbeatlargeinsteadofbydistrict.

7.

He prays,forreversalof thepositionofrespondentinsofarasitaffectsthemunicipalityofParanaqueandall
othermunicipalitiesintheMetroManilaArea.

Issue:
1. WONthepetitionerhaslocusstanditoraisethequestion.
No
2. WON petitioners interpretation of Sec.3 of R.A. 7166 is correct in assailing the aforementioned
COMELECResolutions.
No

Ruling:
1. The petitioner has no locus standi since the petitionerlacked personal orsubstantialinterest and did not
allege any legal right that has been violated by the respondent. In his petition, hedidnot state that he is
running for reelection, much less, that he isprejudiced by the election,bydistrict,inParanaque.Assuch,
the Court ruled that petitioner does not appear to have a locus standi, apersonal or substantial interest.
However, the Court resolved that they would brush aside the questionof procedural technicalities due to
the importance of the issue. The issue being brought upon the Court is important since it concerns the
general public, specifically the political exercise ofqualifiedvotersaffectedbytheapportionment. Despite
the lack of legal standingof the petitioner, theCourt decided to tackletheissuespresentedbecauseissues
presentedconcernsmattersofpublicinterest.
2. The reason for the promulgation of R.A. 7166 is shown in the explanatory note of Senate Bill No. 1861
whichstatesinpart:
This bill proposes to set the national and local elections for May11, 1992, andprovide for the necessary
implementing details. It also endorses reforms and measurestoensuretheconductoffree,orderly,honest,
peaceful and credible elections. Specifically,itseeksto:(1)Reducethenumberofpositionstobevotedfor
by providing therein that the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and
SangguniangBayanbeelectednotatlarge,butbydistrict.

Ifthestatuteneedsconstruction,themostdominantinthatprocessisthepurposeoftheact.

Statutesshouldbeconstrued:

1.Inthelightoftheobjecttobeachieved

2.Theevilandmischieftobesuppressed

3. Finding no abuse of discretion much less grave, onthe partofrespondent, andforlack ofmerit,theinstant
petitionisdismissedwasdismissedbytheSupremeCourt.Nocost

ELENASALENILLASANDBERNARDINOSALENILLAS
vs.
HONORABLECOURTOFAPPEALS
G.R.No.78687January31,1989

Facts:
1. Theproperty subjectmatterof the case wasformerly covered by Original Certificate ofTitleNo.P1248,
issued byvirtueofFree PatentApplicationNo.192765,infavorofthe spouses,FlorenciaH.deEnciso and
Miguel Enciso. The said original certificate oftitlewas inscribedintheRegistrationBookfortheProvince
ofCamarinesNorteonDecember10,1961.
2. On February 28, 1970, thepatentees,the Encisospouses,byan AbsoluteDeedofSale,soldthepropertyin
favor of the petitioners, the spouses Elena Salenillas and Bernardino Salenillas for a consideration of
P900.00.
3. Petitioner Elena Salenillas is a daughter of the Enciso's. As aresult of theaforementioned sale, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T8104 of the Register of Deeds ofCamarinesNortewasissuedinthename ofthe
Salenillas,cancellingOriginalCertificateofTitleNo.P1248.
4. The petitioners mortgaged the property For failure of the petitioners to pay their loan, extrajudicial
foreclosure proceeding, pursuant to Act No.3135,was instituted by the Philippine National Bank against
themortgageandthepropertywassoldatapublicauctionheldonFebruary27,1981.
5. When the deputy sheriff of Camarines Norte however, attempted on November 17, 1983, to place the
property in the possession of the private respondent, the petitioners refused to vacate and surrender the
possessionofthesameandinsteadofferedtorepurchaseitunderSection119ofthePublicLandAct.

6.
7.

Thepetitionersmovedforareconsiderationoftheorderbuttheirmotionwasdenied.
The petitioners elevated the case to the respondent Court of Appeals by way of a petition for
certiorari
claimingthattherespondenttrialcourtjudgeactedwithgraveabuse ofdiscretioninissuingtheorderdated
October 12, 1984 granting the writ of possession, and the order dated October 22, 1984, denying their
motionforreconsiderconsideration.

Issue:
WON petitioners have right to repurchase the contested property under Section119 ofthe Public Land Act and
assumingtheanswertothequestionisintheaffirmative,WONtheirrighttorepurchasehadalreadyprescribed.

Ruling:
1. We ruleforthepetitioners.Theyaregrantedby thelawtheright torepurchasetheirpropertyandtheirright
todososubsists.
2. Thestatuteisexplicitthatonlythreeclassesofpersonsarebestowedtherighttorepurchase
Applicantpantentees
Hiswidow
otherlegalheirs.
3. Elena,being the daughter of Encisos, is a legal heir. Her act of buying the landfromherparentsdoes not
disqualify her from being a legalheir mentionedin Sec. 119 ofthe PublicLandAct,inspeakingof"legal
heirs,"makesnodistinction.

Ubelexnondistinguitnecnosdistingueredebemos.
4. Moreover, to indorse the distinction would contravene the very purpose of the statute whichistogivethe
homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his family the land that the state had
gratuitouslygivenhim.
5. There is no gainsaying that allowingElena and her husbandto repurchase the property would be more in
keepingwiththespiritofthelaw.THEMAXIM.

LydiaO.Chua
vs.
TheCivilServiceCommission
G.R.No.88979 February7,1992

1. In line with the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy, R.A.6683 (2 December 1988)
wasenacted to provide for the early retirementand voluntary separation of government employees aswell
asinvoluntary resignationtothoseaffectedduetoreorganization.Thosewhomay availwereregular,casual,
temporaryandemergencyemployees,withrenderedserviceminimumoftwoyears.

Sec. 2. This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the National Government,
including governmentowned or controlled corporations withoriginal charters, as well as the personnelof
all local government units. The benefitsauthorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary,
casual and emergencyemployees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2)
consecutiveyears of government service as of the date of separation. Uniformed personnelof theArmed
ForcesofthePhilippinesincludingthoseofthePCINPareexcludedfromthecoverageofthisAct
2. Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired by the National Irrigation Administration Authoruty (NIA) for over
15yearsasacoterminousemployeeof4successiveNIAprojects.
3. Believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefitsof the program, filed an application on 30 January
1989withrespondentNationalIrrigationAdministration(NIA)which,however,deniedthesame
4. She wasoffered separation benefits equivalentto one half (1/2) month basic payforeveryyearofservice
commencingfrom1980.
a)coterminouswiththeproject
When the appointment is coexistent with the duration of a particular project for which purpose
employmentwasmadeorsubjecttotheavailabilityoffundsforthesame.

Issue:Whetherornotpetitionerwasentitledtoavailoftheearlyretirementbenefitasacoterminousemployee.

Held:It was stated that a coterminous employee is a noncareer civilservant likecasualandemergencyemployees,

because of that they are entitled to the same benefits as long as they complied with the requirementsof the law,

which in this case, was done by Linda Chua. On that note, the court believes thatthe denial of petitioners
application for early retirement benefits bythe NIAand CSC is unreasonable,unjustifiedandoppressiveduetothe
fact that sheisentitled to the benefits of thesamelawbecausesheservedthegovernmentnotonlyfortwo(2)years
which is the minimum requirement under the law but for fifteen (15) years. In four (4) governmental
projects.Wherefore,thepetitionisgranted