ANCHETA, Milagros Ramona Valerie D.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs VERGARA ET AL.

FACTS:
On July 4, 1992, a team composed of deputized Fish Warden and
President of the Leyte Fish Warden Association Jesus Bindoy, police
officers of the Palo PNP Station, Leyte, and fish wardens of the Department
of Agriculture were on board "Bantay-Dagat," a pumpboat on "preventive
patrol" along the municipal waters fronting barangays Baras and Candahug
of Palo, Leyte. They chanced upon a fishing boat manned by appellant
Vergara and his three co-accused Cuesta, Dagao and Cuesta, Jr. The
team saw Vergara throw into the sea a bottle known in the locality as
"badil" containing ammonium nitrate and having a blasting cap on top
which, when ignited and thrown into the water, could explode. The
explosion would indiscriminately kill schools and various species of fish
within a certain radius. Three seconds after Vergara had thrown the "badil"
into the sea, the explosion occurred. Vergara and Cuesta dove into the sea
with their gear while Dagao and Cuesta, Jr., stayed on board to tend to
the air hose for the divers. The team approached the fishing boat and
moments later, Vergara and Cuesta surfaced, each carrying a fishnet or
"sibot" filled with about a kilo of "bolinao" fish scooped from under the
water. The four accused were apprehended and taken by the patrol team to
the "Bantay-Dagat" station at Baras, and later to the police station in Palo,
Leyte. The fishing boat and its paraphernalia, as well as the two fishnets of
"bolinao," were impounded.
Vergara alone was arraigned and brought to trial as the other coaccused escaped and remained at large. On trial, he claimed that it was
another unidentified group of fishermen who threw the bottle of explosives
at a school of "bolinao" fish. However, the lower court convicted the
accused, hence the appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether Vergara and co-accused are guilty of violation of Sections
33 and 38 of P.D. No. 704, as amended by P.D. No. 1058.

ANCHETA, Milagros Ramona Valerie D.

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court is convinced that the trial court has acted
correctly in finding accused-appellant guilty of the offense charged.
Sections 33 and 38 of P.D. No. 704, as amended by P.D. No. 1058, read:
Sec. 33. Illegal fishing; illegal possession of explosives
intended for illegal fishing; dealing in illegally caught fish or
fishery/aquatic products. It shall be unlawful for any person
to catch, take or gather or cause to be caught, taken or
gathered fish or fishery/aquatic products in Philippine waters
with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance,
or by the use of electricity as defined in paragraphs (1), (m) and
(d), respectively, of section 3 hereof: Provided, That mere
possession of such explosives with intent to use the same for
illegal fishing as herein defined shall be punishable as
hereinafter provided: Provided, That the Secretary may, upon
recommendation of the Director and subject to such safeguards
and conditions he deems necessary, allow for research,
educational or scientific purposes only, the use of explosives,
obnoxious or poisonous substance or electricity to catch, take
or gather fish or fishery/aquatic products in specified
area: Provided further, That the use of chemicals to eradicate
predators in fishponds in accordance with accepted scientific
fishery practices without causing deleterious effects in
neighboring waters shall not be construed as the use of
obnoxious or poisonous substance within the meaning of this
section: Provided, finally, That the use of mechanical bombs for
killing whales, crocodiles, sharks or other large dangerous
fishes, may be allowed, subject to the approval of the Secretary.
Sec. 38. (1) By the penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve
(12) years to twenty-five (25) years in the case of mere
possession of explosives intended for illegal fishing; by
imprisonment ranging from twenty (20) years to life
imprisonment, if the explosive is actually used: Provided, That if
the use of the explosive results in 1) physical injury to any
person, the penalty shall be imprisonment ranging from twentyfive (25) years to life imprisonment, or 2) in the loss of human
life, then the penalty shall be life imprisonment to death.

ANCHETA, Milagros Ramona Valerie D.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs

COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL JN. SERAPIO, HON. MACARIO
A. ASISTIO, JR., and/or THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN

FACTS:
The City Government of Caloocan disposed of approximately 350
tons of garbage daily in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin against the wishes
of local residents, who were concerned about the environmental and health
impact of the dumpsite. In March 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite
of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish filed a complaint with the Laguna Lake
Development Authority (LLDA). The complaint sought to end the operation
of the dumpsite, because of the dumpsites harmful effects on the health of
the residents and the possibility of pollution of the water content of the
surrounding area. An LLDA investigation found that the City Government
of Caloocan was maintaining the dumpsite without a legally required
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC). Subsenquently, the LLDA
issued a Cease and Desist Order tothe City Government of Caloocan,
asking them, the Metropolitan Manila Authority, and any contractors or
other entities to stop operating the Camarin dumpsite. The dumping
stopped for a few months, but resumed again in August 1992. The LLDA
filed another Cease and Desist Order that month, and in September went
so far as to prohibit entry of all garbage dump trucks into Tala Estate. In
September of 1992, The City Government of Caloocan filed a petition

ANCHETA, Milagros Ramona Valerie D.

seeking to be declared the sole authority empowered to promote the

health and safety and enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a
balanced ecology within its territorial jurisdiction. This order would render
any LLDA Cease and Desist Orders against the City Government of
Caloocan null and void. The trial court and the Court of Appeal granted the
City Government of Caloocan this order and ruled that the Lake Laguna
Development Authority had no power and authority to issue a cease and
desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage. The LLDA appealed to the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the LLDA has the authority to entertain the complaint
against the dumping of garbage in the open dumpsite in Barangay Camarin
authorized by the City Government of Caloocan.

RULING:
Yes. The matter of determining whether there is such pollution of the
environment that requires control, if not prohibition, of the operation of a
business establishment is essentially addressed to the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR. A Pollution Adjudication Board
(PAB) under the Office of the DENR Secretary now assumes the powers
and functions of the National Pollution Control Commission with respect to
adjudication of pollution cases.
As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally
pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where
the special law provides for another forum. It must be recognized in this
regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically
mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry
out and make effective the declared national policy of promoting and
accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake
area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of
San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with due regard and
adequate provisions for environmental management and control,
preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the
prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution.
Under such a broad grant and power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of
its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants

ANCHETA, Milagros Ramona Valerie D.

of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants

emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas. In
carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA is mandated,
among others, to pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans,
programs, and projects proposed by local government offices/agencies
within the region, public corporations, and private persons or enterprises
where such plans, programs and/or projects are related to those of the
LLDA for the development of the region.
In the instant case, when the complainant Task Force Camarin
Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan
City, filed its letter-complaint before the LLDA, the latter's jurisdiction under
its charter was validly invoked by complainant on the basis of its allegation
that the open dumpsite project of the City Government of Caloocan in
Barangay Camarin was undertaken without a clearance from the LLDA, as
required under Section 4, par. (d), of Republic Act. No. 4850, as amended
by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927. While there is also an
allegation that the said project was without an Environmental Compliance
Certificate from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the
DENR, the primary jurisdiction of the LLDA over this case was recognized
by the EMB of the DENR when the latter acted as intermediary at the
meeting among the representatives of the City Government of Caloocan,
Task Force Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA sometime in July 1992 to discuss
the possibility of re-opening the open dumpsite.
HIZON vs COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Accused crew members and fishermen of F/B Robinson owned by
First Fishermen Fishing Industries, Inc., represented by the owner, Richard
Hizon, were caught fishing with the use of sodium cyanide of more or less 1
tom of live fish at Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. PNP Task Force Bantay
Dagat caught the accused. In the course of their inspection, the police saw
two foreigners in the captains deck. They examined their passports and
found them to be mere photocopies. The police also discovered a large
aquarium full of live lapu-lapu and assorted fish weighing approximately
one ton at the bottom of the boat. They checked the license of the boat and
its fishermen and found them to be in order. The accused were charged
with violation under Sec. 33 PD No. 704, also known as the Fisheries

ANCHETA, Milagros Ramona Valerie D.

Decree of 1975. The accused were arraigned and pleaded not guilty of
charged. They claimed that they caught fish using hook and line method
and not the alleged sodium cyanide. The RTC found the accused guilty. On
appeal, CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision of the RTC and CA is proper that the
accused were guilty of illegal fishing using obnoxious and poisonous
substances.

RULING:
The SC reversed the decision of RTC and CA and held that the
accused are not guilty of charged. The PNP failed to explain contradictory
findings that the fish samples raise a reasonable doubt that the one ton of
fish was caught with the use of sodium cyanide. Moreover, SC contended
that the authorities found nothing on the boat that would have indicted the
accused of any form of illegal fishing and that it was only after the fish
specimens were tested, albeit under suspicious circumstances, that the
accused were charged with illegal fishing with the use of poisonous
substances.

HEIRS OF NAVARRO vs INTERMEDIATE APELLATE COURT

ANCHETA, Milagros Ramona Valerie D.

FACTS:
On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual, filed an application for
foreshore lease covering a tract of foreshore land in Bataan having an area
of approximately seventeen (17) hectares. This application was denied as
well as his motion for reconsideration. Subsequently, petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest, Emiliano Navarro, filed a fishpond application with
the Bureau of Fisheries covering twenty five (25) hectares of foreshore land
also in Bataan. The application was denied by the Director of Fisheries on
the ground that the property formed part of the public domain. Upon
motion for reconsideration, the Director of Fisheries gave due course to his
application but only to the extent of seven (7) hectares of the property as
may be certified by the Bureau of Forestry as suitable for fishpond
purposes.
The Municipal Council of Balanga, Bataan, had opposed Emiliano
Navarro's application. Aggrieved by the decision of the Director of
Fisheries, it appealed to the Secretary of Natural Resources who, however,
affirmed the grant. The then Executive Secretary, acting in behalf of the
President of the Philippines, similarly affirmed the grant. On the other hand,
Sinforoso Pascual filed an application to register and confirm his title to a
parcel of land. Pascual claimed that this land is an accretion to his property.
He claimed the accretion as the riparian owner.
On March 25, 1960, the Director of Lands, represented by the
Assistant Solicitor General, filed an opposition thereto stating that neither
Pascual nor his predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the
subject property, the same being a portion of the public domain and,
therefore, it belongs to the Republic of the Philippines. The Director of
Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal, similarly opposed Pascual's
application for the same reason as that advanced by the Director of Lands.
Later on, however, the Director of Lands withdrew his opposition. The
Director of Forestry become the sole oppositor.
Navarro thereupon filed an opposition to Pascual's
application. Navarro claimed that the land sought to be registered has
always been part of the public domain, it being a part of the foreshore of
Manila Bay; that he was a lessee and in possession of a part of the subject
property by virtue of a fishpond permit issued by the Bureau of Fisheries
and confirmed by the Office of the President; and that he had already
converted the area covered by the lease into a fishpond. The case was
decided adversely against Pascual. Thus, Pascual appealed to the IAC
(CA). On appeal, the respondent court reversed the findings of the court a

ANCHETA, Milagros Ramona Valerie D.

quo and granted the petition for registration of the subject property but
excluding therefrom fifty (50) meters from corner 2 towards corner 1; and
fifty meters (50) meters from corner 5 towards corner 6 of the Psu-175181.
Pursuant to the aforecited decision, the respondent appellate court ordered
the issuance of the corresponding decree of registration in the name of
private respondents and the reversion to private respondents of the
possession of the portion of the subject property included in Navarro's
fishpond permit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners can rightfully claim the land under the
principle of accretion.

RULING:
Private respondents' claim of ownership over the disputed property
under the principle of accretion is misplaced.
First, the title of private respondents' own tract of land reveals its
northeastern boundary to be Manila Bay. Private respondents' land,
therefore, used to adjoin, border or front the Manila Bay and not any of the
two rivers whose torrential action, private respondents insist, is to account
for the accretion on their land. In fact, one of the private respondents,
Sulpicio Pascual, testified in open court that the waves of Manila Bay used
to hit the disputed land being part of the bay's foreshore but, after he had
planted palapat and bakawan trees thereon in 1948, the land began to rise.
Moreover, there is no dispute as to the location of: (a) the disputed land;
(b) private respondents' own tract of land; (c) the Manila Bay; and, (d) the
Talisay and Bulacan Rivers. Private respondents' own land lies between the
Talisay and Bulacan Rivers; in front of their land on the northern side lies
now the disputed land where before 1948, there lay the Manila Bay. If the
accretion were to be attributed to the action of either or both of the Talisay
and Bulacan Rivers, the alluvium should have been deposited on either or
both of the eastern and western boundaries of private respondents' own
tract of land, not on the northern portion thereof which is adjacent to the
Manila Bay. Clearly lacking, thus, is the third requisite of accretion, which
is, that the alluvium is deposited on the portion of claimant's land which is
adjacent to the river bank.

ANCHETA, Milagros Ramona Valerie D.

Second, there is no dispute as to the fact that private respondents' own

tract of land adjoins the Manila Bay. Manila Bay is obviously not a river,
and jurisprudence is already settled as to what kind of body of water the
Manila Bay is.
The decision of the IAC is reversed and set aside.

FRANCISCO CHAVEZ vs NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY

FACTS:
In 1998, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Memorandum
Order No. (MO) 161 approving and directing the implementation of the
Comprehensive and Integrated Metropolitan Manila Waste Management
Plan (the Plan). During this time, Smokey Mountain, a wasteland in Tondo,
Manila, are being made residence of many Filipinos living in a subhuman
state.
Fifteen various government departments and offices were tasked to
implement the Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project
(SMDRP). Specifically, respondent NHA was ordered to conduct feasibility
studies and develop low-cost housing projects at the dumpsite and absorb
scavengers in NHA resettlement/low-cost housing projects. On the other
hand, the DENR was tasked to review and evaluate proposed projects
under the Plan with regard to their environmental impact, conduct regular
monitoring of activities of the Plan to ensure compliance with environmental
standards and assist DOH in the conduct of the study on hospital waste
management.
DENR was directed to (1) facilitate titling of Smokey Mountain and of
the area to be reclaimed and (2) assist in the technical evaluation of
proposals regarding environmental impact statements.
Notices of public bidding to become NHAs venture partner for
SMDRP were published in newspapers in 1992, from which R-II Builders,
Inc. (RBI) won the bidding process. Then-President Ramos authorized
NHA to enter into a Joint Venture Agreement with RBI.
The SMDRP shall consist of Phase I and Phase II. Phase I of the
project involves clearing, leveling-off the dumpsite, and construction of
temporary housing units for the current residents on the cleared and

ANCHETA, Milagros Ramona Valerie D.

leveled site. Phase II involves the construction of a fenced incineration

area for the on-site disposal of the garbage at the dumpsite.
As a preliminary step in the project implementation, consultations and
dialogues were conducted with the settlers of the Smokey Mountain
Dumpsite Area. At the same time, DENR started processing the application
for the Environmental Clearance Certificate (ECC) of the SMDRP. As a
result however of the consultative dialogues, public hearings, the report on
the on-site field conditions, the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
published on April 29 and May 12, 1993 as required by the Environmental
Management Bureau of DENR, the evaluation of the DENR, and the
recommendations from other government agencies, it was discovered that
design changes and additional work have to be undertaken to successfully
implement the Project.
On June 23, 1994, the Clean Air Act was passed. The Act made the
establishment of an incinerator illegal and effectively barred the
implementation of the planned incinerator project under Phase II making
the off-site disposal of the garbage at the Smokey Mountain became
necessary.
On August 1, 1998, the project was suspended, to be later
reconstituted by President Estrada in MO No. 33.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents NHA and RBI were given the power
and authority by DENR to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands.

RULING:
Notwithstanding the need for DENR permission, the DENR is
deemed to have granted the authority to reclaim in the Smokey Mountain
Project for the DENR is one of the members of the EXECOM which
provides reviews for the project. ECCs and Special Patent Orders were
given by the DENR which are exercises of its power of supervision over the
project. Furthermore, it was the President via the abovementioned MOs
that originally authorized the reclamation. It must be noted that the
reclamation of lands of public domain is reposed first in the Philippine
President.

ANCHETA, Milagros Ramona Valerie D.

ANCHETA, Milagros Ramona Valerie D.

GREATER METROPOLITAN MANILA SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT

COMMITTE AND METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY
vs
JANCOM ENVIRONMENTAL CORPORATION

FACTS:
Then President Fidel V. Ramos created an Executive Committee to
oversee and develop waste-to-energy projects for the waste disposal sites
in San Mateo, Rizal and Carmona, Cavite under the Build-Operate-Transfer
(BOT) scheme. Pursuant to this scheme, JANCOM participated in the
bidding and won. Thereafter, a Contract for BOT implementation of the
Solid Waste Management Project for the San Mateo, Rizal Waste Disposal
Site was entered into by the Republic of the Philippines and JANCOM. The
contract was submitted for approval to President Ramos who subsequently
endorsed it to then incoming President Joseph E. Estrada. However, owing
to the clamor of the residents of Rizal, the Estrada administration ordered
the closure of the San Mateo landfill. GMMSWMC thereupon adopted a
Resolution not to pursue the contract with JANCOM, citing the passage of
Republic Act 8749, otherwise known as the Clean Air Act of 1999, the nonavailability of the San Mateo site, and costly tipping fees as reasons
therefor. JANCOM then filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC, asserting
that the GMMSWMC Resolution is illegal and void. The RTC and the CA
both ruled in favor of JANCOM, saying that there is a valid and perfected
contract between the parties. GMMSWMC then filed a petition for review
before the Supreme Court which, in its decision, affirmed the ruling of the
CA and declared that the contract entered into was indeed valid and
perfected, albeit ineffective and unimplementable pending approval by the
President.
Not long thereafter, GMMSWMC and JANCOM entered into
negotiations to modify certain provisions of the contract. However,
JANCOM, relying on the said decision of the SC, filed an Omnibus Motion
before the RTC, praying that petitioners must be prohibited and enjoined
from calling for, accepting, evaluating, approving, awarding, negotiating or
implementing all bids, awards and contracts involving other Metro Manila
waste management projects. The RTC and CA once more ruled in favor of
JANCOM, hence this petition for review filed with the Supreme Court.
GMMSWMC contends that the new contract is still ineffective and

ANCHETA, Milagros Ramona Valerie D.

unimplementable until the same is approved by the President.

ISSUE:
Whether or not GMMSWMC and MMDA may be compelled to
execute the terms of their contract with JANCOM.

RULING:
No, although the Court stated in the previous decision that there is a
perfected contract, the petitioners still may not be compelled to execute its
terms because of the absence of the approval by the President. Article 19
of the contract provides that This Contract shall become effective upon
approval by the President of the Republic of [the] Philippines pursuant to
existing Laws subject to condition precedent in Article 18.
Regarding the modified contract that the parties entered into, the
parties did not get past the negotiation stage because no meeting of minds
was established. While it is true that there was an initial offer made, there
was no acceptance. The rule is that only an absolute or unqualified
acceptance of a definite offer manifests the consent necessary to perfect a
contract. In light of this discussion, petitioners GMMSWMC and MMDA are
correct in not executing the contract because of the absence of the
approval of the President.

ANCHETA, Milagros Ramona Valerie D.

HILARION M. HENARES, JR. vs LTFRB and DOTC

FACTS:
Petitioners require PUVs to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as
alternative fuel through a challenge to the Higher Court to issue a writ of
mandamus to respondents because of a statistical data that allege that
particulate matters (PM) which is a complex mixtures of dust, dirt, smoke,
and liquid droplets, varying in sizes and compositions emitted into the air
from various engine combustions from diesel-powered vehicles have
caused detrimental effects on health, productivity, infrastructure, and overall

ANCHETA, Milagros Ramona Valerie D.

quality of life. The fuel emissions from engine combustions also cause
retardation and leaf bleaching in plants, can disrupt the necessary oxygen
in blood, and can be lethal to people with weak hearts. Petitioners refer to
the study of the Philippine Environment Monitor 2002, stating that in four of
the countrys major cities such as Metro Manila, Davao, Cebu, and Baguio,
the exposure to PM10 causes serious health problems. Furthermore,
studies from the University of the Philippines also show that vehicular
emissions in Metro Manila have resulted to the prevalence of chronic
obstructive pulmonary diseases (COPD) among jeepney drivers. Hence,
the petitioners propose the use of CNG, a natural gas comprised mostly of
methane which is colorless and odorless and considered the cleanest fossil
fuel than coal and petroleum. Petitioners asserted their right to clean air
and contend that the bases for their petition for a writ of mandamus to order
respondents LTFRB to require the use of CNG.
The Solicitor General notes that nothing in Rep. Act No. 8749 that
petitioners invoke prohibits the use of gasoline and diesel by owners of
motor vehicles. Rep. Act No. 8749 does not even mention the existence of
CNG as alternative fuel and avers that unless this law is amended to
provide CNG as alternative fuel for PUVs, the respondents cannot propose
that PUVs use CNG as alternative fuel.
The Solicitor General also adds that it is the DENR that is tasked to
implement Rep. Act No. 8749 and not the LTFRB nor the DOTC. Moreover,
he says, it is the Department of Energy (DOE), under Section 26 of Rep.
Act No. 8749 that is required to set the specifications for all types of fuel
and fuel-related products to improve fuel compositions for improved
efficiency and reduced emissions. He adds that under Section 21 of the
cited Republic Act, the DOTC is limited to implementing the emission
standards for motor vehicles, and the herein respondents cannot alter,
change or modify the emission standards. Petitioners, insist that the
respondents possess the administrative and regulatory powers to
implement measures in accordance with the policies and principles
mandated by Rep. Act No. 8749.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent can be compelled to require public
utility vehicles to use compressed natural gas through a writ of mandamus?

ANCHETA, Milagros Ramona Valerie D.

RULING:
In this petition the legal right which is sought to be recognized and
enforced hinges on a constitutional and a statutory policy already
articulated in operational terms, e.g. In Rep. Act No. 8749, the Philippine
Clean Air Act of 1999. Paragraph (a), Section 21 of the Act specifically
provides that when PUVs are concerned, the responsibility of implementing
the policy falls on respondent DOTC. It provides as follows:
SEC 21. Pollution from Motor Vehicles. - a) The DOTC shall
implement the emission standards for motor vehicles set pursuant to
and as provided in this Act. To further improve the emission
standards, the Department [DENR] shall review, revise and publish
the standards every two (2) years, or as the need arises. It shall
consider the maximum limits for all major pollutants to ensure
substantial improvement in air quality for the health, safety and
welfare of the general public.
Paragraph (b) states:
B) The Department [DENR] in collaboration with the DOTC, DTI and
LGUs, shall develop an action plan for the control and management
of air pollution from motor vehicles consistent with the Integrated Air
Quality Framework . . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
There is no dispute that under the Clean Air Act it is the DENR that is
tasked to set the emission standards for fuel use and the task of developing
an action plan. As far as motor vehicles are concerned, it devolves upon
the DOTC and the line agency whose mandate is to oversee that motor
vehicles prepare an action plan and implement the emission standards for
motor vehicles, namely the LTFRB.
It is the firm belief of this Court that in this case, it is timely to reaffirm
the premium we have placed on the protection of the environment in the
landmark case of Oposa. Yet, as serious as the statistics are on air
pollution, with the present fuels deemed toxic as they are to the
environment, as fatal as these pollutants are to the health of the citizens,
and urgently requiring resort to drastic measures to reduce air pollutants
emitted by motor vehicles, we must admit in particular that petitioners are
unable to pinpoint the law that imposes an indubitable legal duty on
respondents that will justify a grant of the writ of mandamus compelling the
use of CNG for public utility vehicles. It appears to us that more properly,
the legislature should provide first the specific statutory remedy to the
complex environmental problems bared by herein petitioners before any

ANCHETA, Milagros Ramona Valerie D.

judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.

ANCHETA, Milagros Ramona Valerie D.

AZUCENA O. SALALIMA vs EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION

COMMISSION and SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM

FACTS:
The case at bar is about the denial of the Employees Compensation
Commission to petitioners claim for compensation benefits resulting from
the death of her husband, Juancho Salalima, under Presidential Decree
No. 626, as amended. Juancho S. Salalima (husband), was employed for
29 years as a route helper and subsequently as route salesman for the
Meycauayan Plant of Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Incorporated. In an annual
company medical examination, he was diagnosed with minimal pulmonary
tuberculosis and through series of test then he was diagnosed to have
pneumonia. On February 14, 1995, he was confined at the Makati Medical
Center and died two days later on February 16, 1995 due to

ANCHETA, Milagros Ramona Valerie D.

"Adenocarcinoma of the Lungs with widespread metastasis to Neck, Brain,

Peritoneal Cavity, Paracaval Lymph Nodes, Abscen; Acute Renal Failure;
Septicemia; Upper Gastrointestinal Bleeding".
A claim for compensation benefits under P.D. 626 as amended was
filed by his surviving wife, Azucena with the Social Security System (SSS).
SSS Branch Manager Elnora Montenegro and Senior Physicians Corazon
Bondoc and Annabelle Bonifacio recommended the denial of petitioners
claim on the ground that Adenocarcinoma of the Lungs (Cancer of the
Lungs) had no causal relationship with Juanchos job as a route
salesman. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, she
brought the case to the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC),
which affirmed the decision of the SSS.
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals arguing that
Juanchos route as a salesman exposed him to all kinds of pollutants, not
to mention the daily hazards and fatigue that came with his tasks. She
pointed out that the SSS and the ECC disregarded Juanchos medical
history and the fact that the risk of contracting Juanchos ailment was
increased by the nature of his work. Petitioner cited Republic Act No. 8749,
otherwise known as the Clean Air Act. Petitioner stated that the Act
provides for a comprehensive pollution control policy that mainly
concentrates on the prohibition of leaded gasoline due to its scientifically
proven deleterious effect on the health of individuals. In its decision, CA
affirmed the decision of the ECC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of petitioners husband is due to his work
environment which is susceptible for pollutants that could cause cancer of
the lungs

RULING:
Yes. Petitioner claims that the judgment of the Court of Appeals was

ANCHETA, Milagros Ramona Valerie D.

premised upon a misapprehension of the relevant facts of the case at bar.

She anchors her petition on the fact that while the cause of her husband
Juanchos death was Adenocarcinoma of the lungs, he nonetheless
suffered from two listed occupational diseases, namely pulmonary
tuberculosis and pneumonia, prior to his untimely demise, which she insists
justifies her claim for death benefits.
The Court agreed with petitioner that the respondent government
agencies failed to take into consideration Juanchos medical history in their
assessment of the claim for benefits filed by petitioner. For a considerable
stretch of Juanchos stay at Coca-Cola, he was found to be suffering from
pulmonary tuberculosis. Several months before his demise, he was
diagnosed with Adenocarcinoma of the lungs. A little over two weeks before
his death, Juancho was afflicted with pneumonia. The degree of proof
required under P.D. No. 626 is merely substantial evidence, which means,
"such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion." What the law requires is a reasonable workconnection and not a direct causal relation. It is enough that the hypothesis
on which the workmen's claim is based is probable. Medical opinion to the
contrary can be disregarded especially where there is some basis in the
facts for inferring a work-connection. Probability, not certainty, is the
touchstone. In Juanchos case, we believe that this probability exists.
Juanchos job required long hours on the streets as well as his carrying of
cases of soft drinks during sales calls. The combination of fatigue and the
pollutants that abound in his work environment verily contributed to the
worsening of his already weak respiratory system. His continuous exposure
to these factors may have led to the development of his cancer of the
lungs.

ANCHETA, Milagros Ramona Valerie D.

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) vs HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR

FACTS:
Petitioners seek to compel respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr.,
mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 which was
enacted pursuant to the police power delegated to LGUs. Section 1 and 3
of said Ordinance states that:
SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning and
ensuring health, public safety, and general welfare of the residents of
Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas, the land use of
[those] portions of land bounded by the Pasig River in the north, PNR
Railroad Track in the east, Beata St. In the south, Palumpong St. In
the southwest, and Estero de Pancacan in the west[,] PNR Railroad
in the northwest area, Estero de Pandacan in the [n]ortheast, Pasig
River in the southeast and Dr. M.L. Carreon in the southwest. The
area of Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino
Obrero St., Mayo 28 St., and F. Manalo Street, are hereby
reclassified from Industrial II to Commercial I.
Xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other businesses, the
operation of which are no longer permitted under Section 1 hereof,
are hereby given a period of six (6) months from the date of effectivity
of this Ordinance within which to cease and desist from the operation
of businesses which are hereby in consequence, disallowed.
Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from
industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of
businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating
their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the
ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called
"Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc.,
Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.
However, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE)
entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil
companies in which they agreed that "the scaling down of the Pandacan
Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option but they did not

ANCHETA, Milagros Ramona Valerie D.

stop their operation. Petitioners filed for mandamus in SC urging the city to
implement Ordinance 8027. Respondents defense is that Ordinance No.
8027 has been superseded by the MOU and the resolutions and that the
MOU was more of a guideline to Ordinance No. 8027. Respondent insists
that the ordinance remains valid and in full force and effect and that the
MOU did not in any way prevent him from enforcing and implementing it.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals, and

RULING:
Yes. Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, a petition
for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or
station. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that is employed to compel the
performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty that is already imposed on
the respondent and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. The petitioner should have a well-defined, clear
and certain legal right to the performance of the act and it must be the clear
and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done. When
a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to compel
a public duty, the people who are interested in the execution of the laws are
regarded as the real parties in interest and they need not show any specific
interest. Besides, as residents of Manila, petitioners have a direct interest
in the enforcement of the citys ordinances. Respondent never questioned
the right of petitioners to institute this proceeding.
On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon
respondent the duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all laws and ordinances
relative to the governance of the city." One of these is Ordinance No. 8027.
As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No.
8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by
the courts. Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted with the objective to protect
the residents of Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely
occur in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. No reason
exists why such a protective measure should be delayed.

ANCHETA, Milagros Ramona Valerie D.

MMDA ET AL. vs CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY

FACTS:
On January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila
Bay filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite
against several government agencies, among them the petitioners, for the
cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay, and to submit to
the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.
The complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had
fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, which was confirmed
by DENRs Water Quality Management Chief, Renato T. Cruz that water
samples collected from different beaches around the Manila Bay showed
that the amount of fecal coliform content ranged from 50,000 to 80,000
most probable number (MPN)/ml which is beyond the standard 200
MPN/100ml or the SB level under DENR Administrative Order No. 34-90.
The reckless, wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of omission
or commission [of the defendants] resulting in the clear and present danger
to public health and in the depletion and contamination of the marine life of
Manila Bay, the RTC held petitioners liable and ordered to clean up and
rehabilitate Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B waters fit
for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation. [3]

ANCHETA, Milagros Ramona Valerie D.

Herein petitioners appealed before the Court of Appeals contending

that the pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only
to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in
general. They also asserted that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a
ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus.
The CA sustained RTCs decision stressing that petitioners were not
required to do tasks outside of their basic functions under existing laws,
hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

(1)Whether or not Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the

headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and Clean-up Operations,
envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited only to the
cleanup of specific pollution incidents;
(2)Whether or not petitioners be compelled by mandamus to clean up
and rehabilitate the Manila Bay.

RULING:
Supreme Court held that the cleaning up and rehabilitating Manila
Bay is a ministerial in nature and can be compelled by mandamus.
Sec. 3(c) of R.A. No. 7924 (the law creating MMDA) states that the
MMDA is mandated to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill
and solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage
disposal systems. SC also noted that MMDAs duty in the area of solid
waste disposal is set forth not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and
RA 9003, but also in its charter, therefore, it is ministerial in nature and can
be compelled by mandamus.
A perusal of other petitioners respective charters or like enabling

ANCHETA, Milagros Ramona Valerie D.

statutes and pertinent laws would yield this conclusion: these government
agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to perform
certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the clean up, rehabilitation,
protection, and preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from
choosing not to perform these duties. So, their functions being ministerial
in nature can be compelled by mandamus.

As regard to Secs. 17 & 20 of P.D. 1152, the Court ruled that

Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.Where the quality of
water has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely
affect its best usage, the government agencies concerned shall
take such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the
quality of such water to meet the prescribed water quality
standards.

Section 20. Clean-up Operations.It shall be the responsibility

of the polluter to contain, remove and clean-up water pollution
incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the
government agencies concerned shall undertake containment,
removal and clean-up operations and expenses incurred in said
operations shall be charged against the persons and/or entities
responsible for such pollution.

When the Clean Water Act (RA 9275) took effect, its Sec. 16 on the
subject, Cleanup Operations, amended the counterpart provision (Sec. 20)
of the Environment Code (PD 1152). Sec. 17 of PD 1152 continues,
however, to be operational.