Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
a. Requisite
The requisites for the suspension are:
(1) There must be an invasion or rebellion, and
(2) The public safety requires the suspension.
Duration: Not to exceed 60 days unless extended by
Congress.
1.
5. Pardon vs Amnesty
2. Kinds of Pardon
Classification of Pardon
1. Plenary- Extinguishes all the penalties
imposed upon the offender, including
accessory disabilities.
2. Partial-Does not extinguish all the
penalties.
3. Absolute- One extended without any
strings attached.
4. Conditional- One under which the convict
is required to comply with certain
requirements.
a.Pardonee may reject conditional
pardon. Where the pardon is conditional,
the offender has the right to reject the
same since he may feel that the condition
imposed is more onerous than the penalty
sought to be remitted
b. Condition, lawful. It is necessary
that the condition should not be contrary
to any provision of law.
c.Condition, co-extensive. The
condition of the pardon shall be coextensive
with the penalty remitted.
Hence, if the condition is violated after the
expiration of the remitted penalty, there
can no longer be violation of the
conditional pardon.
d. When the condition is that the
recipient of the pardon should not violate
any of the penal laws, who determines
whether penal laws have been violated?
Must the recipient of pardon undergo trial
and be convicted for the new offenses?
The rule that is followed is that the
acceptance of the conditions of the
pardon imports the acceptance of the
condition that the President will also
determine whether the condition has been
violated. (Torres v. Gonzales, 152 SCRA
272 (1987)) (1997, 2005 Bar Question)
3. Pardon vs Probation
Probation - disposition where a defendant after
conviction
and sentence is released subject to (1) conditions
imposed
by the court and (2) supervision of a probation officer.
(PD
No. 968, sec. 3[a])
4. Pardon vs Parole
Parole- suspension of the sentence of a convict granted
by
a Parole Board after serving the minimum term of the
indeterminate sentence penalty, without granting a
pardon, prescribing the terms upon which the sentence
shall be suspended. (REYES)
__________________
CASE DIGESTS
__________________
De Castro vs JBC GR No 191002, April 20, 2010
In Re Appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela
and Hon. Placido Vallarta[A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC,
November 9, 1998]
Facts:
1. Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments
signed by the President dated March 30, 1998 of
Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as
judges of the RTC of Bago City and CabanatuanCity,
respectively.
2. These appointments appear prima facie
, at least, to be expressly prohibited by Sec. 15, Art.
VII of the Constitution. The said constitutional
provision prohibits the President from making any
appointments two months immediately before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
Issue:
Whether or not, during the period of the ban on
appointments imposed by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the
Constitution, the President is nonetheless required to
fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Secs. 4 (1)
and 9 of Art. VIII
Held:
During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII of the
Constitution two months immediately before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term the President is neither required to make
appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and
FACTS:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration on the March 17, 2010
decision of the Court. The said decision directs the Judicial
and Bar Council to resume its proceedings for the
nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy created by the
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by
May 17, 2010, and to prepare the short list of nominees
and submit it to the incumbent President. Movants argue
that the disputed constitutional provision, Art. VII, Sec. 15
and Art. VIII, Sec. 4(1), clearly intended the ban on
midnight appointments to cover the members of the
Judiciary, and they contended that the principle of stare
decisis is controlling, and insisted that the Court erred in
disobeying or abandoning the Valenzuela ruling.
ISSUE (Section 4):
Did the Constitutional Commission extend to the Judiciary
the ban on presidential appointments during the period
stated in Sec. 15, Article VII?
RULING:
The Constitutional Commission did not extend to the
Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments during the
period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII. The deliberations that the
dissent of Justice Carpio Morales quoted from the records
of the Constitutional Commission did not concern either
Sec. 15, Art. VII or Sec. 4(1), Art. VIII, but only Sec. 13, Art.
VII, a provision on nepotism.
Election ban on appointments does not extend to the
Supreme Court. The Court upheld its March 17, 2010
decision ruling that the prohibition under Art. VII, Sec. 15 of
the Constitution against presidential appointments
immediately before the next presidential elections and up
Issue:
Whether or not Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987
Constitution applies to appointments in LGU.
Held:
Constitutional prohibition on so-called midnight
appointments, specifically those made within two (2)
months immediately prior to the next presidential
elections, applies only to the President or Acting
President.
In the absence of any showing that these alleged
midnight appointments were defective in form and in
substance, nor is there evidence presented to show
that subject appointments were issued in
contravention of law or rules, these appointments are
deemed valid and in effect.
IBP VS ZAMORA
G.R. No. 141284 August 15 2000 [Judicial Review;
Civilian supremacy clause]
FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under
Sec 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President
RULING:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section
1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:
Issue:
1.) Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No.
1017 is unconstitutional?
2.) Whether or not the petitioners have a legal
standing in questioning the constitutionality of the
proclamation?
3.) Whether or not the concurrence of Congress is
necessary whenever the alarming powers incident to
Martial Law are used?
Held:
1.) The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is
constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the
President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence whenever becomes necessary as prescribe
under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.
2.) This Court adopted the direct injury test in our
jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person
who impugns the validity of a statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that
he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a
result. Therefore, the court ruled that the petitioners
have a locus standi (right to be heard in court), for
they suffered direct injury resulting from illegal
arrest and unlawful search committed by police
operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
3.) Under Article XII Section 17 of the 1987
Philippine Constitution, in times of national
emergency, when the public interest so requires, the
President may temporarily take over a privately
owned public utility or business affected with public
interest only if there is congressional authority or
approval. There must enactment of appropriate
legislation prescribing the terms and conditions under
which the President may exercise the powers that will
serves as the best assurance that due process of law
would be observed.
Kulayan vs Tan GR 187298 July 3, 2012
Facts:
Three members from the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped in the vicinity
of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu. Andres
Notter, Eugenio Vagni, and Marie Jean Lacaba, were
purportedly inspecting a water sanitation project for
the Sulu Provincial Jail when they were seized by
FACTS:
In 1979, Olaguer and some others were
detained by military personnel and they
were placed in Camp Bagong Diwa.
Ologauer and his group are all civilians.
They were charged with (1) unlawful
possession of explosives and incendiary
devices; (2) conspiracy to assassinate
President and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy
to assassinate cabinet members Juan
Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente
Paterno; (4) conspiracy to assassinate
Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose Roo and
Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings;
(6) attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo
Perez, Teodoro Valencia and Generals
Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and (7)
conspiracy and proposal to commit
rebellion, and inciting to rebellion.
Issue:
Held:
Yes. The President, as Commander-inChief, has a sequence of graduated
power[s]. From the most to the least
benign, these are: the calling out power,
the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, and the power to
declare martial law. In the exercise of the
latter two powers, the Constitution
requires the concurrence of two
conditions, namely, an actual invasion or
rebellion, and that public safety requires
the exercise of such power. These
conditions are not required in the exercise
Issue:
Whether or not the court abused its discretion in
granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on
the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the
finality of judgment has already been rendered that
by granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in
effect granted reprieve which is an executive
function.
ISSUE :
Whether or not absolute pardon granted by Chief
Executive entitles Monsanto reinstatement to her
former position without the need of a new
appointment.
Held:
No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision
is simply the source of power of the President to
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit
fines and forfeitures after conviction by final
judgment. The provision, however, cannot be
interpreted as denying the power of courts to control
the enforcement of their decisions after their finality.
The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the
Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not
exclude each other for the simple reason that there is
no higher right than the right to life. For the public
respondents therefore to contend that only the
Executive can protect the right to life of an accused
after his final conviction is to violate the principle of
co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches
of our government.
Monsanto vs Factoran 170 SCRA 190
FACTS
In 1983, Salvacion Monsanto, the petitioner, who
was assistant treasurer of Calbayog City was
convicted by the Sandiganbayan for the complex
crime of estafa and was sentenced for imprisonment.
Monsanto appealed her conviction to the Supreme
Court which affirmed the same. She then filed a
motion for reconsideration which during the
pendency of that motion, she was extended pardon by
then President Marcos absolute pardon which she
accepted on December 21, 1984. By reason of the
said pardon, Monsanto requested the Ministry of
Finance that she be restored to her former post, being
vacant and stressing that the absolute pardon has
wiped out the crime implying that her service to the
government has never been interrupted thus entitling
her to reinstatement from the date of her preventive
HELD :
The Ministry of Finance referred the request of
Monsanto to the Office of the President which gave a
statement through its Deputy Executive Secretary
that it is only during an acquittal, not absolute
pardon, as the only ground for reinstatement of
previous position and entitlement of salary payment
of a public officer. The petitioner, being convicted
for the crime of estafa with a penalty of prision
correccional carries with it the accessory penalty of
suspension from public office. The Supreme Court
affirmed the resolution of Deputy Executive
Secretary stating that the pardon granted to the
petitioner has resulted in removing her
disqualification from holding public employment but
that cannot go beyond it. That to regain her former
post, she must reapply and undergo the usual
procedure required for a new appointment. That in
considering her qualifications and suitability for the
public post, the facts constituting her offense must be
and should be evaluated and taken into account to
determine ultimately whether she can once again be
entrusted with public funds.
Garcia vs Chairman GR 75025 September 14,
1993
Effects of Presidential Pardon
VICENTE GARCIA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION
ON AUDIT, THE HONORABLE MINISTER,
LAND TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS, THE REGIONAL
DIRECTOR, TELECOM REGIONAL OFFICE NO.
IV, respondents.
Facts:
Herein petitioner Vicente Garcia was employed as a
Supervising lineman at the Bureau of
Telecommunications in Lucena City. He was accused
NATURE:
These are petitions including:
1) a Petition for Certiorari filed by Atty. Alicia
Risos-Vidal, which essentially prays for the
issuance of the writ of certiorari annulling and
setting aside the April 1, 2013 and April 23,
2013 Resolutions of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), Second Division and En
banc, respectively.
(2) a Petition-in-Intervention[ filed by Alfredo S.
Lim praying to be declared the 2013 winning
candidate for Mayor of the City of Manila in
view of private respondent former President
Joseph Ejercito Estradas) disqualification to
run for and hold public office
FACTS:
On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan
convicted former President Estrada, a former
President of the Republic of the Philippines, for
the crime of plunder and was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil
interdiction during the period of sentence and
perpetual absolute disqualification.
On October 25, 2007, however, former
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended
executive clemency, by way of pardon, to
former President Estrada explicitly states
that He is hereby restored to his civil and
political rights.
On November 30, 2009, former President
Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy [7] for
the position of President but was opposed by
three petitions seeking for his disqualification.
None of the cases prospered and MRs were
denied by Comelec En Banc. Estrada only
managed to garner the second highest
number of votes on the May 10, 2010
synchronized elections.
On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada
once more ventured into the political arena,
and filed a Certificate of Candidacy, [10] this
time vying for a local elective post, that of the
Mayor of the City of Manila.
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for
Disqualification against former President
Estrada before the COMELEC because of
Estradas Conviction for Plunder by the
Sandiganbayan Sentencing Him to Suffer the
FACTS :
This a petition for certiorari and prohibition to set
aside and nullify Res. No. PJHL-A-04-012 dated
May 27, 2004 issued by the Bids and Action
Committee (BAC) of the DPWH. This resolution
recommended the award to private respondent China
Road and Bridge Corporation of the contract which
consist of the improvement and rehabilitation of a
79.818-km road in the island of Catanduanes.
Based on an Exchange of Notes, Japan and the
Philippines have reached an understanding that
Japanese loans are to be extended to the country with
the aim of promoting economic stabilization and
development efforts.
In accordance with the established prequalification
criteria, eight contractors were evaluated or
considered eligible to bid as concurred by the JBIC.
Prior to the opening of the respective bid proposals, it
was announced that the Approved Budget for the
Contract (ABC) was in the amount of
P738,710,563.67. Consequently, the bid goes to
private respondent in the amount of P952,564,821.71
(with a variance of 25.98% from the ABC). Hence
this petition on the contention that it violates Sec. 31
of RA 9184 which provides that :
ISSUE :
RULING :
The petition is dismissed. Under the fundamental
principle of international law of pacta sunt servanda,
which is in fact, embodied is Section 4 of RA9184,
any treaty or international or executive agreement
affecting the subject matter of this Act to which the
Philippine government is a signatory, shall be
observed. The DPWH, as the executing agency of
the project financed by the Loan Agreement
rightfully awarded the contract to private respondent
China Road and Bridge Corporation.
The Loan Agreement was executed and declared that
it was so entered by the parties in the light of the
contents of the Exchange of Notes between the
government of Japan and the government of the
Philippines dated Dec. 27, 1999. Under the
circumstances, the JBIC may well be considered an
adjunct of the Japanese government. The JBIC
procurement guidelines absolutely prohibits the
imposition of ceilings and bids.