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ObravsSSS:147745:April9,2003:J.Puno:ThirdDivision:Decision

THIRDDIVISION

[G.R.No.147745.April9,2003]

MARIA BUENA OBRA, petitioner, vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (Jollar


IndustrialSalesandServicesInc.),respondents.
DECISION
PUNO,J.:

On appeal is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 60704 dated
September 27, 2000 sustaining the Decision[2] of the Employees Compensation Commission
dated April 13, 2000, as well as its subsequent Resolution[3] dated March 6, 2001 denying
petitionersMotionforReconsideration.
Thefactsofthecaseareasfollows:
Juanito Buena Obra, husband of petitioner, worked as a driver for twentyfour (24) years
and five (5) months. His first and second employers were logging companies. Thereafter, he
wasemployedatJollarIndustrialSalesandServicesInc.asadumptruckdriverfromJanuary
1980toJune1988.Hewasassignedtothefollowingprojects:[4]
1.January1980toDecember1981F.F.CruzProject,Nabua,CamarinesSurhauling/deliveryoffilling
materialsfromquarrytojobsite
2.January1982toDecember1983F.F.Cruz,300MWCoalFireThermalPlant,Calaca,Bacunganand
MakbanGeothermalPlant,LosBaos,Lagunahauling/deliveryoffillingmaterialsfromquarrytojobsite
3.January1984toDecember1985DizonCopperSilverMines,Pili,SanMarcelino,Zambales
hauling/deliveryfillingmaterialsfromquarrytojobsite
4.January1986toJune1988MetroManilaHaulingProject
On27June1988,Juanitosufferedaheartattackwhiledrivingadumptruckinsidethework
compound,anddiedshortlythereafter.IntheReportofDeath[5]submitted by his employer to
the Social Security System (SSS), Juanito expired at the Worker's Quarters at 10:30 a.m., of
MyocardialInfarction.
PetitionerMariaM.BuenaobraimmediatelyfiledherclaimfordeathbenefitsundertheSSS
law.ShestartedreceivingherpensioninNovember1988.Petitionerwas,however,unawareof
theothercompensationbenefitsdueherunderPresidentialDecreeNo.626,asamended,or
theLawonEmployeesCompensation.In September 1998, or more than ten (10) years after
the death of her husband, that she learned of the benefits under P.D. No. 626 through the
television program of then broadcaster Ted Failon who informed that one may claim for
EmployeesCompensationCommission(ECC)benefitsifthespousediedwhileworkingforthe
company.PetitionerpreparedthedocumentstosupportherclaimforECCbenefits.On23April
1999, she filed with the SSS her claim for funeral benefits under P.D. No. 626, as amended,
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whichwasdocketedasSSS#0400893260.[6]
On28July1999,theSSSdeniedtheclaimofpetitionerforfuneralbenefitsrulingthatthe
cause of death of Juanito was not workconnected, absent a causal relationship between the
illness and the job. Caridad R. Borja, Assistant VicePresident National Capital Region (AVP
NCR)CentraloftheSSSMemberAssistanceCenterinQuezonCitywrote:
PleasebeinformedthatfuneralclaimundertheEmployeesCompensationisherebydenied.Permedical
evaluation,causeofdeathofsubjectmembers(sic)cannotbeconsideredworkconnectedsincethereis
nocausalrelationshipbetweentheillnessandthejob.
On 8 October 1999, petitioner wrote to Atty. Teofilo E. Hebron, Executive Director of the
ECC, appealing the denial of her claim. On 11 November 1999, Atty. Hebron ordered Dr.
SimeonZ.Gonzales,AssistantVicePresident(AVP)oftheMedicalServicesGroupoftheSSS
toreviewtheclaimofpetitioner.
On23November1999,theMedicalServicesGroupthroughDr.PerlaA.Taday,AVPfor
MedicalOperations,concludeditsreevaluationandaffirmedthedenialofpetitionersclaim. It
reiteratedthatthereisnocausalrelationshipbetweenthecauseofdeath/illnessandmembers
jobasdumptruckdriver.[7]PursuanttoSection5,RuleXVIIIoftheImplementingRulesofPD
626,therecordsofthedeceasedJuanitowereelevatedtotheCommission.
On 13 April 2000, the Commission rendered a decision, dismissing the appeal.[8] It ruled
thatpetitionerfailedtoshowbysubstantialevidencethatherhusbandscauseofdeathwasdue
to, or the risk of contracting his ailment was increased by his occupation and working
conditions, as per Section 1(b), Rule III of P.D. No. 626, as amended. In addition, the
Commission declared that petitioners claim has prescribed, citing ECC Resolution No. 9308
0068.
PetitionerappealedtotheCourtofAppeals.Sheallegedthathercauseofactionhadnot
prescribed because the filing of her claim for SSS benefits shortly after Juanitos death
suspendedtherunningoftheprescriptiveperiodforfilingECclaims,asperItemNo.IIIofECC
ResolutionNo.90030022dated23March1990.Theappellatecourtdismissedthepetition.It
ruled that petitioner's filing of her claim for SSS benefits shortly after Juanitos death did not
suspend the running of the prescriptive period for filing EC claims. It interpreted the
aforementionedECCResolutionstomeanthataclaimantmustindicatethekindofclaimfiled
beforetherunningoftheprescriptiveperiodforfilingECclaimsmaybeinterrupted.Inthecase
at bar, petitioner indeed filed a claim with SSS. In fact, she has been receiving her pension
sinceNovember1988.However,shefailedtospecifywhetherthebasisofherclaimwasany
contingencywhichmaybeheldcompensableundertheECProgram.[9]
Inaddition,theCourtofAppealscitedP.D.No.626whichstatesthatacontingencymaybe
heldcompensableiflistedinAnnex"A"oftheRulesImplementingEmployees'Compensation
asanoccupationaldisease,andsatisfyingallconditionssetforththereinorifnotlistedasan
occupationaldisease,orlistedbuthasnotsatisfiedtheconditionssetforththerein,itmustbe
provenbysubstantialevidencethattheriskofcontractingthediseasewhichcausedthedeath
ofthemember,wasincreasedbythemember'sworkingconditions.[10]
Theappellatecourtlikewiseheldthatthethreeyearprescriptiveperioddoesnotapplyin
theinstantcase.Instead,itappliedArt.1142(2)oftheCivilCodewhichreads:
Art.1144.Thefollowingactionsmustbebroughtwithinten(10)yearsfromthetimetherightofaction
accrues:
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(1)Uponawrittencontract
(2)Uponanobligationcreatedbylaw
(3)Uponajudgment.[Emphasissupplied.]
The appellate court then held that the petitioner's cause of action has prescribed.
Petitioner'shusbanddiedon27June1988.ShefiledherclaimforfuneralbenefitsunderP.D.
No.626ortheLawonEmployees'Compensationonlyon23April1999,ormorethanten(10)
yearsfromhisdeath.
Lastly, the appellate court ruled that even assuming petitioner's cause of action has not
prescribed, her claim for Employees' Compensation benefits cannot prosper because of her
failure to prove by substantial evidence that her husband's working conditions increased the
riskofcontractingthemyocardialinfarctionthatcausedhisdeath.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration dated 27 September 2000 was denied by the
appellatecourtinaResolutionpromulgatedon6March2001.
Hence,thispetition.Thefollowingissuesareraised:[11]
(1)WHETHER,INDEED,THECLAIMOFPETITIONER,HADPRESCRIBED.
(2)WHETHERORNOTTHEILLNESSOFPETITIONERSHUSBAND,MYOCARDIAL
INFARCTION,ISWORKRELATED.
On the first issue, we rule that the claim of petitioner for funeral benefits under P.D. No.
626,asamended,hasnotyetprescribed.
The issue of prescription in the case at bar is governed by P.D. No. 626, or the Law on
Employees'Compensation.Art.201ofP.D.No.626andSec.6,RuleVIIofthe1987Amended
RulesonEmployees'Compensationbothreadasfollows:
NoclaimforcompensationshallbegivenduecourseunlesssaidclaimisfiledwiththeSystemwithin
threeyearsfromthetimethecauseofactionaccrued.
This is the general rule.The exceptions are found in Board Resolution 93080068 and ECC
Rules of Procedure for the Filing and Disposition of Employees Compensation Claims.Board
Resolution93080068issuedon5August1993,states:
Aclaimforemployee'scompensationmustbefiledwithSystem(SSS/GSIS)withinthree(3)yearsfrom
thetimethecauseofactionaccrued,providedhowever,thatanyclaimfiledwithintheSystemfor
anycontingencythatmaybeheldcompensableundertheEmployee'sCompensationProgram
(ECP)shallbeconsideredastheECclaimitself.Thethreeyearprescriptiveperiodshallbereckoned
fromtheonsetofdisability,ordateofdeath.Incaseofpresumptivedeath,thethree(3)yearslimitation
shallbecountedfromthedatethemissingpersonwasofficiallydeclaredtobepresumptivelydead.
(emphasissupplied)
In addition, Section 4(b), Rule 3 of the ECC Rules of Procedure for the Filing and
DispositionofEmployeesCompensationClaims,reads:
RULE3.FILINGOFCLAIM
Section4.Whentofile.
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(a)BenefitclaimsshallbefiledwiththeGSISortheSSSwithinthree(3)yearsfromthedateofthe
occurrenceofthecontingency(sickness,injury,disabilityordeath).
(b)Claimsfiledbeyondthe3yearprescriptiveperiodmaystillbegivenduecourse,providedthat:
1.AclaimwasfiledforMedicare,retirementwithdisability,burial,deathclaims,orlife(disability)
insurance,withtheGSISwithinthree(3)yearsfromtheoccurrenceofthecontingency.
2.Inthecaseoftheprivatesectoremployees,aclaimforMedicare,sickness,burial,disabilityor
deathwasfiledwithinthree(3)yearsfromtheoccurrenceofthecontingency.
3.Inanyoftheforegoingcases,theemployeescompensationclaimshallbefiledwiththeGSISorthe
SSSwithinareasonabletimeasprovidedbylaw.[Emphasissupplied.]
WeagreewiththepetitionerthatherclaimfordeathbenefitsundertheSSSlawshouldbe
considered as the Employees Compensation claim itself. This is but logical and reasonable
becausetheclaimfordeathbenefitswhichpetitionerfiledwiththeSSSisofthesamenature
asherclaimbeforetheECC.Furthermore,theSSSisthesameagencywithwhichEmployees
Compensation claims are filed. As correctly contended by the petitioner, when she filed her
claimfordeathbenefitswiththeSSSundertheSSSlaw,shehadalreadynotifiedtheSSSof
heremployeescompensationclaim,becausetheSSSistheverysameagencywhereclaims
forpaymentofsickness/disability/deathbenefitsunderP.D.No.626arefiled.
Section4(b)(2),Rule3oftheECCRulesofProcedurefortheFilingandDispositionofthe
Employees Compensation Claims, quoted above, also provides for the conditions when EC
claims filed beyond the threeyear prescriptive period may still be given due course. Section
4(b)(2) states the condition for private sector employees, requiring that a claim for Medicare,
sickness,burial,disabilityordeathshouldbefiledwithinthree(3)yearsfromtheoccurrenceof
thecontingency.Intheinstantcase,thepetitionerwasabletofileherclaimfordeathbenefits
under the SSS law within the threeyear prescriptive period. In fact, she has been receiving
herpensionundertheSSSlawsinceNovember1988.
Itistruethatundertheproviso,theemployeescompensationclaimshallbefiledwiththe
GSIS/SSSwithinareasonabletimeasprovidedbylaw.Itshouldbenotedthatneitherstatute
nor jurisprudence has defined the limits of reasonable time. Thus, what is reasonable time
dependsuponthepeculiarfactsandcircumstancesofeachcase.[12]Inthecaseatbar,wealso
findpetitionersclaimtohavebeenfiledwithinareasonabletimeconsideringthesituationand
condition of the petitioner. We have ruled that when the petitioner filed her claim for death
benefits under the SSS law, her claim for the same benefits under the Employees
CompensationLawshouldbeconsideredasfiled.TheevidenceshowsthattheSystemfailed
toprocesshercompensationclaim.Underthecircumstances,thepetitionercannotbemadeto
sufferforthelapsecommittedbytheSystem.ItistheavowedpolicyoftheStatetoconstrue
sociallegislationsliberallyinfavorofthebeneficiaries.[13]Thiscourthastimeandagainupheld
thepolicyofliberalityofthelawinfavoroflabor.PresidentialDecreeNo.626itself,initsArt.
166reads:
ART.166.Policy.TheStateshallpromoteanddevelopataxexemptemployees'compensationprogram
wherebyemployeesandtheirdependents,intheeventofworkconnecteddisabilityordeath,may
promptlysecureadequateincomebenefit,andmedicalorrelatedbenefits.(emphasissupplied)
Furthermore,Art.4ofP.D.No.442,asamended,otherwiseknownastheLaborCodeofthe
Philippines,whichP.D.No.626formsapartof,readsasfollows:
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ART.4.Constructioninfavoroflabor.Alldoubtsintheimplementationandinterpretationofthe
provisionsofthisCode,includingitsimplementingrulesandregulations,shallberesolvedinfavorof
labor.
Particularly,thepolicyofliberalityindecidingclaimsforcompensabilitywasgivenemphasisby
thiscourtinthecaseofEmployeesCompensationCommissionvs.CourtofAppeals,[14]where
itheldthat:
...theliberalityoflawinfavoroftheworkingmanandwomanstillprevailsandtheofficialagency
chargedbylawtoimplementtheconstitutionalguaranteeofsocialjusticeshouldadoptaliberalattitude
infavoroftheemployeeindecidingclaimsforcompensability,especiallyinlightofcompassionate
policytowardslaborwhichthe1987Constitutionvivifiesandenhances.Elsewisestated,ahumanitarian
impulse,dictatedbynolessthantheConstitutionitselfunderthesocialjusticepolicy,callsforaliberal
andsympatheticapproachtolegitimateappealsofdisabledpublicservantsorthatalldoubtstotheright
tocompensationmustberesolvedinfavoroftheemployeeorlaborer.Verilythepolicyistoextendthe
applicabilityofthelawonemployeescompensationtoasmanyemployeeswhocanavailofthebenefits
thereunder.
ClaimsfallingundertheEmployeesCompensationActshouldbeliberallyresolvedtofulfillits
essenceasasociallegislationdesignedtoaffordrelieftotheworkingmanandwomaninour
society.[15]
Thesecondissueofwhetherornottheillnessofpetitionershusband,myocardialinfarction
which was the cause of his death is workrelated, must likewise be resolved in favor of the
petitioner.
Under the law on employees compensation, death is compensable only when it results
fromaworkconnectedinjuryorsickness.Intheinstantcase,thecauseofpetitionershusbands
deathwasmyocardialinfarctionanditmustbeconsideredworkconnected.Whileitistruethat
myocardial infarction is not among the occupational diseases listed under Annex A of the
Amended Rules on Employees Compensation, the Commission, under ECC Resolution No.
432 dated July 20, 1977, laid down the conditions under which cardiovascular or heart
diseasescanbeconsideredasworkrelatedandthuscompensable,viz:
(a)Iftheheartdiseasewasknowntohavebeenpresentduringemployment,theremustbeproof
thatanacuteexacerbationwasclearlyprecipitatedbytheunusualstrainbyreasonsofthe
natureofhis/her/herwork.
(b)Thestrainofworkthatbringsaboutanacuteattackmustbeofsufficientseverityandmust
befollowedwithin24hoursbytheclinicalsignsofacardiacinsulttoconstitutecausal
relationship.
(c)Ifapersonwhowasapparentlyasymptomaticbeforebeingsubjectedtostrainatwork
showedsignsandsymptomsofcardiacinjuryduringtheperformanceofhis/herworkand
suchsymptomsandsignspersisted,itisreasonabletoclaimacausalrelationship.
Myocardialinfarctionisalsoknownasheartattack.Itresultsinpermanentheartdamageor
death. A heart attack is called myocardial infarction because part of the heart muscle
(myocardium) may literally die (infarction). This occurs when a blood clot blocks one of the
coronary arteries (the blood vessels that bring blood and oxygen to the heart muscle). When
the heart muscle does not obtain the oxygenrich blood that it needs, it will begin to die. The
severityofaheartattackusuallydependsonhowmuchoftheheartmuscleisinjuredordies
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duringtheheartattack.Heartattackaccountsfor1outofevery5deaths.Itisamajorcauseof
suddendeathinadults.Heavyexertionoremotionalstresscantriggeraheartattack.[16]
Inthecaseatbar,thepetitionershusbandsheartdiseasefallsunderthesecondcondition
ofECCResolutionNo.432datedJuly20,1977whichstatesthatthestrainofworkthatbrought
abouttheacuteattackmustbeofsufficientseverityandmustbefollowedwithin24hoursby
theclinicalsignsofacardiacinsulttoconstitutecausalrelationship.Petitioners husband was
drivingadumptruckwithinthecompanypremiseswheretheywerestackinggravelandsand
whenhesufferedtheheartattack.Hehadtobetakendownfromthetruckandbroughttothe
workers quarters where he expired at 10:30 a.m., just a few minutes after the heart attack,
which is much less than the 24 hours required by ECC Resolution No. 432. This is a clear
indicationthatseverestrainofworkbroughtabouttheacuteattackthatcausedhisdeath.
Professionaldrivers,especiallytruckdriverslikethedecedentintheinstantcase,carrythe
burdenofbeingmoreexposedandsubjectedtothestressandstrainofeverydaytraffic,and
the greater physical exertion brought about by driving a large and heavy vehicle. In addition,
accordingtothepetitioner,herhusbandwasunderalotofstressintheworkplace.Hewasa
modelworkerandhisemployerhighlydependedonhim.Hebecametheobjectofenvyofhis
coworkerswhichcausedhimmuchemotionalstress.Addtothisthefactthathehasbeena
truck driver for more than twentyfour (24) years.Due to the combination of emotional stress
andvigorousphysicalexertion,itwaseasyforhimtosuccumbtotheheartailment.We hold
that the illness of the decedent which caused his death is workconnected, and thus
compensablebyvirtueofECCResolutionNo.432dated20July1977.
Asafinalnote,wefinditnecessarytoreiteratethatP.D.No.626,asamended,isasocial
legislation whose primordial purpose is to provide meaningful protection to the working class
againstthehazardsofdisability,illnessandothercontingenciesresultinginthelossofincome.
Thus, as the official agents charged by law to implement social justice guaranteed by the
Constitution,theECCandtheSSSshouldadoptaliberalattitudeinfavoroftheemployeein
decidingclaimsforcompensabilityespeciallywherethereissomebasisinthefactsforinferring
a work connection with the illness or injury, as the case may be. It is only this kind of
interpretation that can give meaning and substance to the compassionate spirit of the law as
embodiedinArticle4oftheNewLaborCodewhichstatesthatalldoubtsintheimplementation
and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and
regulationsshouldberesolvedinfavoroflabor.[17]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CAG.R.SPNo.60704dated27September2000anditsResolutiondated06March2001are
hereby SET ASIDE. The SSS is hereby directed to pay herein petitioner the death/funeral
benefitsduehimundertheexistinglaw.
SOORDERED.
Panganiban,SandovalGutierrez,Corona,andCarpioMorales,JJ.,concur.
[1]Rollo,pp.121128.
[2]Id.at110117.
[3]Id.at189.
[4]CARollo,p.26.
[5]Id.at33.
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