Preliminary Titles (Articles 1-18)

Taada v. Tuvera
Gonzaga v. de David (L-14858, 29 December 1960)
Rural Bank v. Court of Appeals (L-32116, 21 April 1981)
People v. Que Po Lay (94 Phil. 640)
D.M. Consunji v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 137873, 20 April 2001)
Cui v. Arellano University (2 SCRA 205)
Floresca v. Philex Mining Corporation (L-30642, 30 April 1985, 136 SCRA 141)
Miciano v. Brimo (50 Phil. 867)
Yao Kee vs. Sy
NAMARCO vs. Tecson
Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358)
Aznar vs. Garcia

Human Relations
Articles 19-26
Albenson Enterprises v. Court of Appeals (217 SCRA 16)
Nikko Hotel Manila v. Reyes (G.R. No. 154259, 28 February 2005)
Spouses Quisumbing v. MERALCO (G.R. No. 142943, 3 April 2002)
University of the East v. Jader (G.R. No. 132344, 7 February 2000)
Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. v. Court of Appeals (176 SCRA 778
St. Louis Realty Corp. v Court of Appeals (133 SCRA 179)

Cases on Breach of Promise to Marry

Gashem Shookat Baksh v. Court of Appeals (219 SCRA 115)
Pe v. Pe (5 SCRA 200)
Wassmer v. Velez (12 SCRA 648)
Hermosisima v. Court of Appeals (109 Phil. 629)
Constantino v. Mendez (209 SCRA 18)
Tenchavez v. Escano (122 Phil. 752)
Prejudicial Questions
Article 36 and Rule 111 (Section 7) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
Dreamwork Constructions Inc. vs. Janiola (G.R. No. 184861, June 30, 2009)
Pimentel vs. Pimentel (G.R. 172060, September 13, 2010)
Yap vs. Paras (G.R. 101236, January 30, 1992)

Civil Personality
Articles 37-41
Quimiguing v. Icao (34 SCRA 132)
Geluz v. Court of Appeals (2 SCRA 801)
De Jesus v. Syquia (58 Phil. 866)
Continental Steel Manufacturing Corp. v Montao (G.R. No. 182836, October 13, 2009)
Article 43
Limjuco v. Estate of Pedro Fragante (45 O.G. No. 9, p. 397)
Dumlao v. Quality Plastics (G.R. No. L-27956, 30 April 1976)

FAMILY CODE
Requisites of Marriage
Article 1
PT&T v. NLRC (272 SCRA 596)
Goitia v. Campos-Rueda (35 Phil. 252)
Balogbog v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 83598, 7 March 1997)
Articles 2-6
Cosca v. Palaypayon (237 SCRA 249)

Enriquez v. Velez (185 SCRA 45)

Wassmer v. Velez (12 SCRA 648)
Alcantara v. Alcantara (G.R. No. 167746, August 28, 2007)
Articles 7-10
Navarro v. Domagtoy (A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088, 19 July 1996)
Aranas v. Judge Occiano (A.M. No. MTJ-02-1309, 11 April 2002)
Laxamana v. Baltazar (92 Phil. 32)
Article 22
Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete (66 SCRA 425)
Vda. De Chua v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 116835, 5 March 1998)
Article 25
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Castro (G.R. No. 103047, 12 September 1994)
Article 26

(Correlate with Articles 15-18, Civil Code)

Garcia v. Recio (G.R. No. 138322, 2 October 2002)
Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera (174 SCRA 653)
Van Dorn v. Romillo (139 SCRA 139)
Cang v. Court of Appeals (296 SCRA 128)
Tenchavez v. Escano (122 Phil. 752)
Republic v. Orbecido (G.R. No. 154380, 5 October 2005)
Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas (G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010)
Fujiki s. Marinay (G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013)

Marriages Exempt from the License Requirement

Articles 27-34
Ninal v. Bayadog (328 SCRA 122)
Manzano v. Sanchez (A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329, 8 March 2001)
Cosca v. Palaypayon (237 SCRA 249)
Mariategui v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 57062, 24 January 1992)
Republic v. Dayot (G.R. No. 175581, March 28, 2008)

Void and Voidable Marriages (Articles 35-54)

Article 34
Domingo v. Court of Appeals (226 SCRA 572)
Ninal v. Bayadog (328 SCRA 122)
Article 36
Republic v. Molina (G.R. No. 108763, 13 February 1997)
Louel Santos v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995)
Marcos vs. Marcos (G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000)
Republic v. Quintero-Hamano (G.R. No. 149498, 20 May 2004)
Choa v. Choa (H.R. No. 1473376, 26 November 2002)
Antonio v. Reyes (G.R. No. 155800, 10 March 2006)
Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 119190, 16 January 1997)
Armida Ferraris v. Brix Ferraris (G.R. No. 162368, 17 July 2006)
Navarro v. Navarro (G.R. No. 162049, 13 April 2007)
Te v. Te (G.R. No. 161793, 13 February 2009)
Tenebro v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004)
Article 40
Morigo v. People (G.R. No. 145226, 6 February 2004)
Weigel v. Sempio-Dy (143 SCRA 449)
Terre v. Terre (211 SCRA 6)
Valdes v. RTC (260 SCRA 221)
People v. Aragon (100 Phil. 1033)
Mercado v. Mercado (337 SCRA 122)
Bobis v. Bobis (G.R. No. 138509, July 31, 2000)
Cario v. Cario, 403 Phil. 861 (2001)
De Castro v. De Castro (G.R. No. 160172, February 13, 2008)
Articles 41-42 and Absence
(Correlate with Civil Code, Articles 381-396)
Republic v. Nolasco (220 SCRA 20)

Lukban v. Republic (L-8492, 29 February 1956)

In Re Gue (G.R. No. L-14058, March 24, 1960)
Armas v. Calisterio (G.R. No. 136467, 6 April 2000)
Republic v. Callejo (G.R. No. 159614, 9 December 2005)
SSS v. Bailon (G.R. No. 165545, March 24, 2006) 485 SCRA 376
Valdez v. Republic (G.R. No. 180863, September 8, 2009)
Article 45-46
Anaya v. Palaroan (36 SCRA 97)
Buccat v. Buccat (72 Phil. 19)
Aquino v. Delizo (109 Phil. 21)
Jimenez v. Canizares (L-12790, 31 August 1960)
Almelor v. RTC (G.R. No. 179620, 26 August 2008)
Article 48-49
Sin v. Sin (G.R. No. 137590, 26 March 2001)
Ocampo v. Florenciano (107 Phil. 35)
Tuason v. Court of Appeals (256 SCRA 168)
Padilla-Rumbasa v. Rumbasa (G.R. No. 166738, August 14, 2009)

Legal Separation
Articles 55-67
Lapuz-Sy v. Eufemio (43 SCRA 177)
Gandionco v. Penaranda (G.R. No. L-7294, 27 November 1987)
Bugayong v. Ginez (G.R. No. L-10033, 28 December 1956)
Brown v. Yambao (102 Phil. 168)
Article 58
Pacete v. Carriaga (231 SCRA 321)
Article 63
Macadandang v. Court of Appeals (108 SCRA 314)

Rights and Obligations Between Husband and Wife

Articles 68-73
Article 68
Potenciano v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 139789, 139808, 19 July 2001)
Goitia v. Campo-Rueda (35 Phil. 252)
Ty v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 127406, 27 November 2000)
Ilusorio v. Bildner (G.R. No. 139789, 12 May 2000)
Article 73
Ayala Investments v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 118305, 12 February 1998)

Property Relations
Article 87
Agapay v. Palang (276 SCRA 341)
Arcaba v. Tabancura Vda. De Batocael (G.R. No. 146683, 22 November 2001)
San Luis v. San Luis (G.R. No. 133743, 6 February 2007)
Malang v. Moson (G.R. No. 119064, 22 August 2000)
Articles 94-96
Uy v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 109557, 29 November 2000)
De Leon v. De Leon (G.R. No. 185063, July 23, 2009)
Article 101
Dela Cruz v. Dela Cruz (130 Phil. 324)
Partosa-Jo v. Court of Appeals (216 SCRA 692)
Article 102
BA Finance Corp. v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 61464, 28 May 1988)
Johnson & Johnson v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 102692, 23 September 1996)
Article 109
Spouses Laperal v. Spouses Katigbak (90 Phil. 77)
Villanueva v. Intermediate Appellate Court (192 SCRA 21)

Article 115-116
Bank of Philippine Islands v. Posadas (56 Phil. 215)
Wong v. Intermediate Appellate Court (200 SCRA 792)
Article 121-122
Ayala Investments v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 118305, 12 February 1998)
Carlos v. Abelardo (G.R. No. 146504, 4 April 2002)
Mariano v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 51283, June 7, 1989, 174 SCRA 59)
Ching v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 124642, February 23, 2004)
Buado v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 145222, April 24, 2009)
Property Regime of Unions without Marriage
Article 147
Mallilin v. Castro (G.R. No. 136803, 16 June 2000)
Valdes v. RTC (260 SCRA 221)
Francisco v. Master Iron Works Construction Corp. (G.R. No. 151967, 16 February 2005)
Abing v. Waeyan (G.R. No. 146294, July 31, 2006)
Article 148
Agapay v. Palang (276 SCRA 341)
Juaniza v. Jose (89 SCRA 306)
Tumlos v. Fernandez (G.R. No. 137650, 12 April 2000)

The Family as an Institution

Article 149
Docena v. Lapesura (G.R. No. 140153, 28 March 2001)
Article 150
Martinez v. Martinez (G.R. No. 162084, 28 June 2005)
Hontiveros v. RTC (G.R. No. 125465, 19 June 1999)
Article 151
Manalo v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 129242, 16 January 2001)
Albano v. Gapusan (A.M. No. 1022-MJ, 7 May 1976)

The Family Home

Articles 152-162
Modequillo v. Breva (185 SCRA 766)
Manacop v. Court of Appeals (277 SCRA 941)
Arriola v. Arriola (G.R. No. 177703, January 28, 2008)

Paternity and Filiation

Article 164-166
Angeles v. Maglaya (G.R. No. 153798, September 2, 2005)
Andal v. Macaraig (89 Phil. 165)
Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 105625, 24 January 1994)
Article 167
Concepcion v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 123450, 31 August 2005)
Articles 170-171
Liyao v. Liyao (G.R. No. 138961, 7 March 2002)
Article 172
Eceta v. Eceta (G.R. No. 157037, 20 May 2004)
Constantino v. Mendez (209 SCRA 18)
Bernabe v. Alejo (G.R. No. 140500, 21 January 2002)
Jison v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 124853, 24 February 1998)
De la Cruz v. Garcia (G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009)
Article 173
Conde v. Abaya (13 Phil. 249)
Article 176

Marquino v. Intermediate Appellate Court (G.R. No. 72078, 27 June 1994)

Articles 177-180
Angeles v. Tabiliran (249 SCRA 447)

Adoption
Rep. Act No. 8552 Domestic Adoption Law
Rep. Act No. 8043 The Law on Inter-Country Adoption
Teotico v. Del Val (249 SCRA 447)
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Bobiles (205 SCRA 356)
Tamargo v. Court of Appeals (209 SCRA 518)
Landingin v. Republic (G.R. No. 164948, June 27, 2006)
In re Lim (G.R. No. 168992-93, 21 May 2009)

Support
Articles 194-208
Javier v. Lucero (94 Phil. 634)
Goitia v. Capos-Rueda (35 Phil. 252)
De Asis v. De Asis (303 SCRA 176)
Parental Authority (Articles 209-233)
Salientes v. Abanilla (G.R. No. 162734, August 29, 2006)
Espiritu v. Court of Appeals (242 SCRA 362)
Amadora v. Court of Appeals (160 SCRA 697)
Ylarde v. Aquino (163 SCRA 697)
St. Marys Academy v. Carpetanos (G.R. No. 143363, 6 February 2002)
Tamargo v. Court of Appeals (209 SCRA 518)
Libi v. Intermediate Appellate Court (209 SCRA 518)

Final Civil Code Provisions

Use of Surnames
Articles 364-380
Laperal v. Republic (G.R. No. L-18008, 30 October 1962)
Llaneta v. Agrava (G.R. No. L-32054, 15 May 1974)

Civil Registrar
Arts. 407-413
Rep. Act. No. 9048, as amended - Clerical errors
Rule 108, Rules of Court
Rommel Silverio vs. Republic of the Philippines (G.R. 174689, October 22, 2007)
Republic v. Cagandahan (G.R. No. 166676, 12 September 2008)
Fujiki vs. Marinay ( G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013)

Preliminary Titles (Articles 1-18)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
[MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the
President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive
Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as
Director, Malacaang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his
capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right
recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as
the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official
Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus
to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the
Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative
orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200,
234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368,
404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566,
573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923,
935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250,
1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840,
1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150,
153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213,
215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349,
357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486,
488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612,

615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940,
964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529,
1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600,
1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734,
1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797,
1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832,
1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866,
1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966,
1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507,
509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712786, 788-852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 8081, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed
outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to
bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing
that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged
non-publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are
without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they
are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from
the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there
is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be
done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by
the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.

Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition
concerns a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty,
they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino
vs. Governor General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of
mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he
has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to
be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is
for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be
subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the
question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest
and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show
that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that
he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High,
Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private
individual, as a proper party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the
Governor General to call a special election for the position of municipal president in
the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T.
Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition
that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right
is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think
that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always
dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the
reason for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for
the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule
may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by
counsel for the respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are
different from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper
party to these proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not
the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and represent the people in
cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in
the aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right
sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less
than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this
proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate

the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally
empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in
this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine
qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide
for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential
issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take
effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity.
The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of
said article. In a long line of decisions, 4 this Court has ruled that publication in the
Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not
provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for
determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its
publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into
effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the
effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other
statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said
Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette,
even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important
legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines;
[2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have
no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance
to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required
so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the
President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general
applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct
as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of
injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of
which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the
publication of laws taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have
bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature.
While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and
deliberations in the Batasan Pambansaand for the diligent ones, ready access to
the legislative recordsno such publicity accompanies the law-making process of
the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what
presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of
informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the
Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se
comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y
Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de
su potestad. 5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be
published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon
respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the
Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to
be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be
published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with
no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such
publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for
fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the
people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other
presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons
such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the
assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public
nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of
law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs.
COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form
part of the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law
demand that the Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate
and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people
may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application,
which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of

the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision
might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees
which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the
question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had
been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too
familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and
realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having
been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring
no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged
decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v.
Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as
to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with
qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The
past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with
respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to
have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and
acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute
and of its previous application, demand examination. These questions are among
the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and
federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of
a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained
the right of a party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his
favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their
publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have
consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by
a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the
presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette,
only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939,
inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of
these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever
their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs
has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs.
Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is
necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the

said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding
is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in
their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from
prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in
the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws
provide that they shall take effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette
all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless
so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
Relova, J., concurs.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):

There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably
written opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it
would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for
unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect.
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question
would arise if made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the
existence of any legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law. My
point is that such publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette.
From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to
certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do so
would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential
decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding
force and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a
pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or
presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official
Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly

pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential
issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any
possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to
be impressed with binding force or effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice
Plana. Its first paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine
applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require the
publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions
elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice
of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not
necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that
precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in
the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become
effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary
fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by
publication in the Official Gazette. 2
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the
government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It
would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice
Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential.
What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official
Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of
determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the
question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not
so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence
could have conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal
consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then
serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential
Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be inquired
into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision.
Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal
prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil
cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect.
There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged
presidential decree or executive act was issued under the police power, the nonimpairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked.
There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in
such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise
then a question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to
affirm that publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act
of a general application. I am not in agreement with the view that such publication

must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly
recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception,
"unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative
enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a
constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and
effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice
Escolin that presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in
the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my
opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable
consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a
pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay
concur in this separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of
Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published
and ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not
subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has
consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a
reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are
commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation, 1 citing the
settled principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the
public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or
circular must first be published and the people officially and specially informed of
said contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil
Code and the Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification
for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that
the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository
where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that
"only laws which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the
Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and

meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso
perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic
constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil
Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one
year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that
"most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason,
publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to
nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential requirement
of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for
immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the
completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by
the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date
of effectivity, it has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with
that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the
decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official
Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of
effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the
retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite
for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though
that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected parties before
they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the
Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the
publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite
for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously
does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect.
Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period
for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may
prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.

Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition
that for their effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law
is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the
Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official
Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines
the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates what
shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts
and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all
executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no
general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be
published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature."
Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is
essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal
and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general
application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the
operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and
how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that
role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before
laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This
is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such
notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:
I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity
of such publication being in the Official Gazette.
DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:
I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a
public nature or general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.

Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably
written opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it
would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for
unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect.

I shall explain why.

1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question
would arise if made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the
existence of any legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law. My
point is that such publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette.
From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to
certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do so
would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential
decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding
force and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a
pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or
presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official
Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly
pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential
issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any
possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to
be impressed with binding force or effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice
Plana. Its first paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine
applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require the
publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions
elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice
of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not
necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that
precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in
the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become
effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary
fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by
publication in the Official Gazette. 2
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the
government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It
would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice
Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential.
What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official
Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of
determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the
question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not
so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence
could have conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal
consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then
serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential
Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be inquired

into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision.
Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal
prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil
cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect.
There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged
presidential decree or executive act was issued under the police power, the nonimpairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked.
There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in
such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise
then a question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to
affirm that publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act
of a general application. I am not in agreement with the view that such publication
must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly
recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception,
"unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative
enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a
constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and
effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice
Escolin that presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in
the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my
opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable
consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a
pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay
concur in this separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of
Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published
and ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not
subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has
consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a
reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are
commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation, 1 citing the
settled principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the

public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or
circular must first be published and the people officially and specially informed of
said contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil
Code and the Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification
for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that
the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository
where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that
"only laws which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the
Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and
meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso
perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic
constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil
Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one
year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that
"most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason,
publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to
nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential requirement
of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for
immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the
completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by
the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date
of effectivity, it has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with
that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the
decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official
Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of
effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the
retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite
for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though
that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected parties before
they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the
Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the
publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite
for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously
does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect.
Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period
for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may
prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition
that for their effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law
is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the
Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official
Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines
the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates what
shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts
and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all
executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no
general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be
published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature."
Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is
essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal
and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general
application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the
operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and
how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that
role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before
laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This
is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such
notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity

of such publication being in the Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a
public nature or general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14858

December 29, 1960

MARIANO S. GONZAGA, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
AUGUSTO CE DAVID, as Registrar of the Motor Vehicles Office of
Cagayan, respondent-appellant.
Office of the Asst. Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor E. D. Ignacio for
appellant.
Ventura V. Perez for appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

The essential antecedents of this case are not disputed. On February, 1957, Mariano
Gonzaga, as owner, registered with the Motor Vehicles Office a cargo truck and a
passenger bus, paying the first installment for registration fees due on said vehicles
for 1957. To cover the second installment for registration fees, Gonzaga remitted to
the Provincial Treasurer of Cagayan, by registered mail, P500.00, under postal
money orders Nos. 18553, 18554 and 18555, purchased from and issued by the
Post Office of Camalaniugan, Cagayan. The postal cancellation mark on the
envelope containing the remittance of Gonzaga bears the date August 31, 1957; so
does the postal cancellation mark on the face of the money orders.
The Registrar of the Motor Vehicles Office of Cagayan ruled that pursuant to Section
8 (1), Act 3992, otherwise known as the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, the second
installment for registration fees was payable on or before the last working day of

August; that the last working day of August, 1957 was Friday, August 30, 1957; that
consequently, the remittance of Gonzaga bearing postal cancellation mark dated
August 31, 1957 was made beyond the time fixed by law. Accordingly, said official
sought to impose a 50% delinquency penalty, or otherwise, threatened to confiscate
the certificate of registration for the two trucks (Annexes "B" & "C").lawphil.net
Gonzaga brought this action in the Court of First Instance, which, upon a stipulation
of facts, rendered judgment, the dispositive part reading
POR TANTO, el Juzgado dicta decision declarando, como por la presente declara,
que el pago hecho con los giros postales Nos. 18553, 18554 y 18555, por el
recurrente, se ha hecho dentro del plazo fijado por ley; y, por tanto, el recurrente no
ha incurrido con morosidad en cuanto a dicho pago.
Se ordena al recurrido, sus agentes y representantes, que se abstengan de
confiscar el certificado de registro de los dos trucks del recurrente, por la alegada
morosidad del citado pago.
Sin costas.
ASI SE ORDENA.
The only issue in this appeal is whether the remittance of petitioner-appellee
covering the second installment of registration fees for 1957, made by registered
mail with postal cancellation dated August 31, 1957, was within the time fixed by
law.
The following are the pertinent provisions of Act 3992 as amended
Sec. 8 (I) ". . . The registration fees provided in this Act for trucks may be payable in
two equal installments, the first to be paid on or before the last working day of
February, and the second to be paid on or before the last working day of August.
(Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 6 (b) "The date of cancellation of the postage stamps of envelopes containing
money orders, checks, or cash shall be considered as the date of
application. . . .
In support of its contention that August 30, and not August 31, was the last working
day of August, 1957, respondent-appellant invokes Republic Act No. 1880, otherwise
known as the "40-Hour Week Law", pursuant to which government offices are to
hold office from Monday to Friday only, unless one of those expressly exempted
therefrom.
As correctly held by the court below, the fact that pursuant to Republic Act 1880,
the Motor Vehicles Office in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, had no office on Saturday, Aug.
31, 1957, is immaterial in the case. The last working day contemplated in Sec. 8(I)

of Act 3992 as amended should not necessarily mean the last working day for Motor
Vehicle Office. Under Sec. 6(b) of said Act, providing for payment of registration fees
by mail, the date of cancellation of the postage stamps of the envelope containing
the remittance is considered the date of application. Consequently, where the
manner of payment falls under said Section 6(b), the law, in recognizing the date of
cancellation as the date of application, impliedly permits of a remittance or
payment within that last day of August that the Post Office may still effect
cancellation; and the remittance, in fact, bears a postal cancellation, dated August
31, 1957. Moreover, it is not pretended by respondent-appellant that the Post Office
ceased or has ceased to transact business and discharge its functions on Saturdays
by reason alone of Republic Act No. 1880. Clearly, therefore,the remittance by
petitioner-appellee was within the by law, as provided in Section 8 (I), in connection
with Section 6 (b) of Act 3992, as amended.lawphil.net
The fact that August 31, 1957 was declared a special public holiday by Proclamation
No. 437 (dated August 21, 1957) of the President of the Philippines did not have the
effect of making the preceding day, August 30, the last day for paying registration
fees without penalty. On the contrary, Section 31 of the Revised Administrative
Code provides
Sec. 31. Pretermission of holiday. Where the day, or the last day, for doing any
act required or permitted by law falls on a holiday, the act may be done the next
succeeding business day.
In Calano vs. Cruz, 91 Phil., 247, we ruled as follows:
The complaint filed by the petitioner herein was presented in the court a quo on
November 23, 1951, exactly on the eight day after the proclamation of the
respondent as duly elected councilor for the Municipality of Orion, Bataan. It
happens, however, that November 22, 1951, the last day of the seven-day period
prescribed by Section 173 of the Revised Election Code, was declared a "Special
Public Holiday For National Thanksgiving" by Proclamation No. 290, series of 1951,
of the President of the Philippines. The trial court held that the provisions of Section
1 of Rule 28 of the Rules of Court could not be applied to the case at bar because it
is an election case (Rule 132, Rules of Court), and declared that the complaint was
filed outside of the period provided for by law. Assuming that Section 1 of Rule 28 of
the Rules of Court is not applicable, the law applicable is Section 31 of the Revised
Administrative Code, which provides that "Where the day, or the last day, for doing
any act required or permitted by law falls on a holiday, the act may be done on the
next succeeding business day." The court a quo, therefore, committed an error in
declaring that the complaint was filed out of time.
The ruling is on all fours on the issue before us, and against respondent-appellant.
The decision appealed from is affirmed. Without costs..

Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Gutierrez David,

Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-32116 April 2l, 1981
RURAL BANK OF CALOOCAN, INC. and JOSE O. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and MAXIMA CASTRO, respondents.

DE CASTRO, * J.:
This is a petition for review by way of certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 39760-R entitled "Maxima Castro, plaintiff-appellee, versus
Severino Valencia, et al., defendants; Rural Bank of Caloocan, Inc., Jose Desiderio, Jr.
and Arsenio Reyes, defendants-appellants," which affirmed in toto the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Manila in favor of plaintiff- appellee, the herein private
respondent Maxima Castro.
On December 7, 1959, respondent Maxima Castro, accompanied by Severino
Valencia, went to the Rural Bank of Caloocan to apply for an industrial loan. It was
Severino Valencia who arranged everything about the loan with the bank and who
supplied to the latter the personal data required for Castro's loan application. On
December 11, 1959, after the bank approved the loan for the amount of P3,000.00,
Castro, accompanied by the Valencia spouses, signed a promissory note
corresponding to her loan in favor of the bank.
On the same day, December 11, 1959, the Valencia spouses obtained from the bank
an equal amount of loan for P3,000.00. They signed a promissory note (Exhibit "2")
corresponding to their loan in favor of the bank and had Castro affixed thereon her
signature as co-maker.
The two loans were secured by a real-estate mortgage (Exhibit "6") on Castro's
house and lot of 150 square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7419
of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Manila.
On February 13, 1961, the sheriff of Manila, thru Acting Chief Deputy Sheriff Basilio
Magsambol, sent a notice of sheriff's sale addressed to Castro, announcing that her
property covered by T.C.T. No. 7419 would be sold at public auction on March 10,

1961 to satisfy the obligation covering the two promissory notes plus interest and
attorney's fees.
Upon request by Castro and the Valencias and with conformity of the bank, the
auction sale that was scheduled for March 10, 1961 was postponed for April 10,
1961. But when April 10, 1961 was subsequently declared a special holiday, the
sheriff of Manila sold the property covered by T.C.T. No. 7419 at a public auction
sale that was held on April 11, 1961, which was the next succeeding business day
following the special holiday.
Castro alleged that it was only when she received the letter from the Acting Deputy
Sheriff on February 13, 1961, when she learned for the first time that the mortgage
contract (Exhibit "6") which was an encumbrance on her property was for P6.000.00
and not for P3,000.00 and that she was made to sign as co-maker of the promissory
note (Exhibit "2") without her being informed of this.
On April 4, 1961, Castro filed a suit denominated "Re: Sum of Money," against
petitioners Bank and Desiderio, the Spouses Valencia, Basilio Magsambol and
Arsenio Reyes as defendants in Civil Case No. 46698 before the Court of First
Instance of Manila upon the charge, amongst others, that thru mistake on her part
or fraud on the part of Valencias she was induced to sign as co-maker of a
promissory note (Exhibit "2") and to constitute a mortgage on her house and lot to
secure the questioned note. At the time of filing her complaint, respondent Castro
deposited the amount of P3,383.00 with the court a quo in full payment of her
personal loan plus interest.
In her amended complaint, Castro prayed, amongst other, for the annulment as far
as she is concerned of the promissory note (Exhibit "2") and mortgage (Exhibit "6")
insofar as it exceeds P3,000.00; for the discharge of her personal obligation with the
bank by reason of a deposit of P3,383.00 with the court a quo upon the filing of her
complaint; for the annulment of the foreclosure sale of her property covered by
T.C.T. No. 7419 in favor of Arsenio Reyes; and for the award in her favor of
attorney's fees, damages and cost.
In their answers, petitioners interposed counterclaims and prayed for the dismissal
of said complaint, with damages, attorney's fees and costs. 2
The pertinent facts arrived from the stipulation of facts entered into by the parties
as stated by respondent Court of Appeals are as follows:
Spawning the present litigation are the facts contained in the following stipulation of
facts submitted by the parties themselves:
1. That the capacity and addresses of all the parties in this case are admitted .
2. That the plaintiff was the registered owner of a residential house and lot located
at Nos. 1268-1270 Carola Street, Sampaloc, Manila, containing an area of one

hundred fifty (150) square meters, more or less, covered by T.C.T. No. 7419 of the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Manila;
3. That the signatures of the plaintiff appearing on the following documents are
genuine:
a) Application for Industrial Loan with the Rural Bank of Caloocan, dated December
7, 1959 in the amount of P3,000.00 attached as Annex A of this partial stipulation of
facts;
b) Promissory Note dated December 11, 1959 signed by the plaintiff in favor of the
Rural Bank of Caloocan for the amount of P3,000.00 as per Annex B of this partial
stipulation of facts;
c) Application for Industrial Loan with the Rural Bank of Caloocan, dated December
11, 1959, signed only by the defendants, Severino Valencia and Catalina Valencia,
attached as Annex C, of this partial stipulation of facts;
d) Promissory note in favor of the Rural Bank of Caloocan, dated December 11, 1959
for the amount of P3000.00, signed by the spouses Severino Valencia and Catalina
Valencia as borrowers, and plaintiff Maxima Castro, as a co-maker, attached as
Annex D of this partial stipulation of facts;
e) Real estate mortgage dated December 11, 1959 executed by plaintiff Maxima
Castro, in favor of the Rural Bank of Caloocan, to secure the obligation of P6,000.00
attached herein as Annex E of this partial stipulation of facts;
All the parties herein expressly reserved their right to present any evidence they
may desire on the circumstances regarding the execution of the above-mentioned
documents.
4. That the sheriff of Manila, thru Acting Chief Deputy Sheriff, Basilio Magsambol,
sent a notice of sheriff's sale, address to the plaintiff, dated February 13, 1961,
announcing that plaintiff's property covered by TCT No. 7419 of the Register of
Deeds of the City of Manila, would be sold at public auction on March 10, 1961 to
satisfy the total obligation of P5,728.50, plus interest, attorney's fees, etc., as
evidenced by the Notice of Sheriff's Sale and Notice of Extrajudicial Auction Sale of
the Mortgaged property, attached herewith as Annexes F and F-1, respectively, of
this stipulation of facts;
5. That upon the request of the plaintiff and defendants-spouses Severino Valencia
and Catalina Valencia, and with the conformity of the Rural Bank of Caloocan, the
Sheriff of Manila postponed the auction sale scheduled for March 10, 1961 for thirty
(30) days and the sheriff re-set the auction sale for April 10, 1961;
6. That April 10, 1961 was declared a special public holiday; (Note: No. 7 is omitted
upon agreement of the parties.)

8. That on April 11, 1961, the Sheriff of Manila, sold at public auction plaintiff's
property covered by T.C.T. No. 7419 and defendant, Arsenio Reyes, was the highest
bidder and the corresponding certificate of sale was issued to him as per Annex G of
this partial stipulation of facts;
9. That on April 16, 1962, the defendant Arsenio Reyes, executed an Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership, a copy of which is hereto attached as Annex H of this
partial stipulation of facts;
10. That on May 9, 1962, the Rural Bank of Caloocan Incorporated executed the
final deed of sale in favor of the defendant, Arsenio Reyes, in the amount of
P7,000.00, a copy of which is attached as Annex I of this partial stipulation of facts;
11. That the Register of Deeds of the City of Manila issued the Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 67297 in favor of the defendant, Arsenio Reyes, in lieu of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 7419 which was in the name of plaintiff, Maxima Castro,
which was cancelled;
12. That after defendant, Arsenio Reyes, had consolidated his title to the property
as per T.C.T. No. 67299, plaintiff filed a notice of lis pendens with the Register of
Deeds of Manila and the same was annotated in the back of T.C.T. No. 67299 as per
Annex J of this partial stipulation of facts; and
13. That the parties hereby reserved their rights to present additional evidence on
matters not covered by this partial stipulation of facts.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the foregoing partial stipulation of facts
be approved and admitted by this Honorable Court.
As for the evidence presented during the trial, We quote from the decision of the
Court of Appeals the statement thereof, as follows:
In addition to the foregoing stipulation of facts, plaintiff claims she is a 70-year old
widow who cannot read and write the English language; that she can speak the
Pampango dialect only; that she has only finished second grade (t.s.n., p. 4,
December 11, 1964); that in December 1959, she needed money in the amount of
P3,000.00 to invest in the business of the defendant spouses Valencia, who
accompanied her to the defendant bank for the purpose of securing a loan of
P3,000.00; that while at the defendant bank, an employee handed to her several
forms already prepared which she was asked to sign on the places indicated, with
no one explaining to her the nature and contents of the documents; that she did not
even receive a copy thereof; that she was given a check in the amount of P2,882.85
which she delivered to defendant spouses; that sometime in February 1961, she
received a letter from the Acting Deputy Sheriff of Manila, regarding the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale of her property; that it was then when she learned for
the first time that the mortgage indebtedness secured by the mortgage on her

property was P6,000.00 and not P3,000.00; that upon investigation of her lawyer, it
was found that the papers she was made to sign were:
(a) Application for a loan of P3,000.00 dated December 7, 1959 (Exh. B-1 and Exh.
1);
(b) Promissory note dated December 11, 1959 for the said loan of P3,000.00 (ExhB-2);
(c) Promissory note dated December 11, 1959 for P3,000.00 with the defendants
Valencia spouses as borrowers and appellee as co-maker (Exh. B-4 or Exh. 2).
The auction sale set for March 10, 1961 was postponed co April 10, 1961 upon the
request of defendant spouses Valencia who needed more time within which to pay
their loan of P3,000.00 with the defendant bank; plaintiff claims that when she filed
the complaint she deposited with the Clerk of Court the sum of P3,383.00 in full
payment of her loan of P3,000.00 with the defendant bank, plus interest at the rate
of 12% per annum up to April 3, 1961 (Exh. D).
As additional evidence for the defendant bank, its manager declared that sometime
in December, 1959, plaintiff was brought to the Office of the Bank by an employee(t.s.n., p 4, January 27, 1966). She wept, there to inquire if she could get a loan from
the bank. The claims he asked the amount and the purpose of the loan and the
security to he given and plaintiff said she would need P3.000.00 to be invested in a
drugstore in which she was a partner (t.s.n., p. 811. She offered as security for the
loan her lot and house at Carola St., Sampaloc, Manila, which was promptly
investigated by the defendant bank's inspector. Then a few days later, plaintiff
came back to the bank with the wife of defendant Valencia A date was allegedly set
for plaintiff and the defendant spouses for the processing of their application, but on
the day fixed, plaintiff came without the defendant spouses. She signed the
application and the other papers pertinent to the loan after she was interviewed by
the manager of the defendant. After the application of plaintiff was made,
defendant spouses had their application for a loan also prepared and signed (see
Exh. 13). In his interview of plaintiff and defendant spouses, the manager of the
bank was able to gather that plaintiff was in joint venture with the defendant
spouses wherein she agreed to invest P3,000.00 as additional capital in the
laboratory owned by said spouses (t.s.n., pp. 16-17) 3
The Court of Appeals, upon evaluation of the evidence, affirmed in toto the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Manila, the dispositive portion of which reads:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court renders judgment and:
(1) Declares that the promissory note, Exhibit '2', is invalid as against plaintiff
herein;

(2) Declares that the contract of mortgage, Exhibit '6', is null and void, in so far as
the amount thereof exceeds the sum of P3,000.00 representing the principal
obligation of plaintiff, plus the interest thereon at 12% per annum;
(3) Annuls the extrajudicial foreclosure sale at public auction of the mortgaged
property held on April 11, 1961, as well as all the process and actuations made in
pursuance of or in implementation thereto;
(4) Holds that the total unpaid obligation of plaintiff to defendant Rural Bank of
Caloocan, Inc., is only the amount of P3,000.00, plus the interest thereon at 12%
per annum, as of April 3, 1961, and orders that plaintiff's deposit of P3,383.00 in the
Office of the Clerk of Court be applied to the payment thereof;
(5) Orders defendant Rural Bank of Caloocan, Inc. to return to defendant Arsenio
Reyes the purchase price the latter paid for the mortgaged property at the public
auction, as well as reimburse him of all the expenses he has incurred relative to the
sale thereof;
(6) Orders defendants spouses Severino D. Valencia and Catalina Valencia to pay
defendant Rural Bank of Caloocan, Inc. the amount of P3,000.00 plus the
corresponding 12% interest thereon per annum from December 11, 1960 until fully
paid; and
Orders defendants Rural Bank of Caloocan, Inc., Jose Desiderio, Jr. and spouses
Severino D. Valencia and Catalina Valencia to pay plaintiff, jointly and severally, the
sum of P600.00 by way of attorney's fees, as well as costs.
In view of the conclusion that the court has thus reached, the counterclaims of
defendant Rural Bank of Caloocan, Inc., Jose Desiderio, Jr. and Arsenio Reyes are
hereby dismissed, as a corollary
The Court further denies the motion of defendant Arsenio Reyes for an Order
requiring Maxima Castro to deposit rentals filed on November 16, 1963, resolution
of which was held in abeyance pending final determination of the case on the
merits, also as a consequence of the conclusion aforesaid. 4
Petitioners Bank and Jose Desiderio moved for the reconsideration 5 of respondent
court's decision. The motion having been denied, 6 they now come before this Court
in the instant petition, with the following Assignment of Errors, to wit:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE PARTIAL ANNULMENT OF THE
PROMISSORY NOTE, EXHIBIT 2, AND THE MORTGAGE, EXHIBIT 6, INSOFAR AS THEY
AFFECT RESPONDENT MAXIMA CASTRO VIS-A-VIS PETITIONER BANK DESPITE THE
TOTAL ABSENCE OF EITHER ALLEGATION IN THE COMPLAINT OR COMPETENT PROOF
IN THE EVIDENCE OF ANY FRAUD OR OTHER UNLAWFUL CONDUCT COMMITTED OR

PARTICIPATED IN BY PETITIONERS IN PROCURING THE EXECUTION OF SAID

CONTRACTS FROM RESPONDENT CASTRO.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IMPUTING UPON AND CONSIDERING
PREJUDICIALLY AGAINST PETITIONERS, AS BASIS FOR THE PARTIAL ANNULMENT OF
THE CONTRACTS AFORESAID ITS FINDING OF FRAUD PERPETRATED BY THE
VALENCIA SPOUSES UPON RESPONDENT CASTRO IN UTTER VIOLATION OF THE RES
INTER ALIOS ACTA RULE.
III
THE COURT OF APPEAL ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT, UNDER THE FACTS FOUND BY
IT, RESPONDENT CASTRO IS UNDER ESTOPPEL TO IMPUGN THE REGULARITY AND
VALIDITY OF HER QUESTIONED TRANSACTION WITH PETITIONER BANK.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT, BETWEEN PETITIONERS AND
RESPONDENT CASTRO, THE LATTER SHOULD SUFFER THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE
FRAUD PERPETRATED BY THE VALENCIA SPOUSES, IN AS MUCH AS IT WAS THRU
RESPONDENT CASTRO'S NEGLIGENCE OR ACQUIESCENSE IF NOT ACTUAL
CONNIVANCE THAT THE PERPETRATION OF SAID FRAUD WAS MADE POSSIBLE.
V
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE DEPOSIT BY
RESPONDENT CASTRO OF P3,383.00 WITH THE COURT BELOW AS A TENDER AND
CONSIGNATION OF PAYMENT SUFFICIENT TO DISCHARGE SAID RESPONDENT FROM
HER OBLIGATION WITH PETITIONER BANK.
VI
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS VALID AND BINDING UPON
RESPONDENT CASTRO THE HOLDING OF THE SALE ON FORECLOSURE ON THE
BUSINESS DAY NEXT FOLLOWING THE ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED DATE THEREFOR
WHICH WAS DECLARED A HOLIDAY WITHOUT NECESSITY OF FURTHER NOTICE
THEREOF.
The issue raised in the first three (3) assignment of errors is whether or not
respondent court correctly affirmed the lower court in declaring the promissory note
(Exhibit 2) invalid insofar as they affect respondent Castro vis-a-vis petitioner bank,
and the mortgage contract (Exhibit 6) valid up to the amount of P3,000.00 only.
Respondent court declared that the consent of Castro to the promissory note
(Exhibit 2) where she signed as co-maker with the Valencias as principal borrowers
and her acquiescence to the mortgage contract (Exhibit 6) where she encumbered

her property to secure the amount of P6,000.00 was obtained by fraud perpetrated
on her by the Valencias who had abused her confidence, taking advantage of her
old age and ignorance of her financial need. Respondent court added that "the
mandate of fair play decrees that she should be relieved of her obligation under the
contract" pursuant to Articles 24 7 and 1332 8 of the Civil Code.
The decision in effect relieved Castro of any liability to the promissory note (Exhibit
2) and the mortgage contract (Exhibit 6) was deemed valid up to the amount of
P3,000.00 only which was equivalent to her personal loan to the bank.
Petitioners argued that since the Valencias were solely declared in the decision to
be responsible for the fraud against Castro, in the light of the res inter alios
acta rule, a finding of fraud perpetrated by the spouses against Castro cannot be
taken to operate prejudicially against the bank. Petitioners concluded that
respondent court erred in not giving effect to the promissory note (Exhibit 2) insofar
as they affect Castro and the bank and in declaring that the mortgage contract
(Exhibit 6) was valid only to the extent of Castro's personal loan of P3,000.00.
The records of the case reveal that respondent court's findings of fraud against the
Valencias is well supported by evidence. Moreover, the findings of fact by
respondent court in the matter is deemed final. 9 The decision declared the
Valencias solely responsible for the defraudation of Castro. Petitioners' contention
that the decision was silent regarding the participation of the bank in the fraud is,
therefore, correct.
We cannot agree with the contention of petitioners that the bank was defrauded by
the Valencias. For one, no claim was made on this in the lower court. For another,
petitioners did not submit proof to support its contention.
At any rate, We observe that while the Valencias defrauded Castro by making her
sign the promissory note (Exhibit 2) and the mortgage contract (Exhibit 6), they also
misrepresented to the bank Castro's personal qualifications in order to secure its
consent to the loan. This must be the reason which prompted the bank to contend
that it was defrauded by the Valencias. But to reiterate, We cannot agree with the
contention for reasons above-mentioned. However, if the contention deserves any
consideration at all, it is in indicating the admission of petitioners that the bank
committed mistake in giving its consent to the contracts.
Thus, as a result of the fraud upon Castro and the misrepresentation to the bank
inflicted by the Valencias both Castro and the bank committed mistake in giving
their consents to the contracts. In other words, substantial mistake vitiated their
consents given. For if Castro had been aware of what she signed and the bank of
the true qualifications of the loan applicants, it is evident that they would not have
given their consents to the contracts.
Pursuant to Article 1342 of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 1342. Misrepresentation by a third person does not vitiate consent, unless such
misrepresentation has created substantial mistake and the same is mutual.
We cannot declare the promissory note (Exhibit 2) valid between the bank and
Castro and the mortgage contract (Exhibit 6) binding on Castro beyond the amount
of P3,000.00, for while the contracts may not be invalidated insofar as they affect
the bank and Castro on the ground of fraud because the bank was not a participant
thereto, such may however be invalidated on the ground of substantial mistake
mutually committed by them as a consequence of the fraud and misrepresentation
inflicted by the Valencias. Thus, in the case of Hill vs. Veloso, 10this Court declared
that a contract may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent if deceit by a
third person, even without connivance or complicity with one of the contracting
parties, resulted in mutual error on the part of the parties to the contract.
Petitioners argued that the amended complaint fails to contain even a general
averment of fraud or mistake, and its mention in the prayer is definitely not a
substantial compliance with the requirement of Section 5, Rule 8 of the Rules of
Court. The records of the case, however, will show that the amended complaint
contained a particular averment of fraud against the Valencias in full compliance
with the provision of the Rules of Court. Although, the amended complaint made no
mention of mistake being incurred in by the bank and Castro, such mention is not
essential in order that the promissory note (Exhibit 2) may be declared of no binding
effect between them and the mortgage (Exhibit 6) valid up to the amount of
P3,000.00 only. The reason is that the mistake they mutually suffered was a mere
consequence of the fraud perpetrated by the Valencias against them. Thus, the
fraud particularly averred in the complaint, having been proven, is deemed
sufficient basis for the declaration of the promissory note (Exhibit 2) invalid insofar
as it affects Castro vis-a-vis the bank, and the mortgage contract (Exhibit 6) valid
only up to the amount of P3,000.00.
The second issue raised in the fourth assignment of errors is who between Castro
and the bank should suffer the consequences of the fraud perpetrated by the
Valencias.
In attributing to Castro an consequences of the loss, petitioners argue that it was
her negligence or acquiescence if not her actual connivance that made the fraud
possible.
Petitioners' argument utterly disregards the findings of respondent Court of Appeals
wherein petitioners' negligence in the contracts has been aptly demonstrated, to
wit:
A witness for the defendant bank, Rodolfo Desiderio claims he had subjected the
plaintiff-appellee to several interviews. If this were true why is it that her age was
placed at 61 instead of 70; why was she described in the application (Exh. B-1-9) as
drug manufacturer when in fact she was not; why was it placed in the application

that she has income of P20,000.00 when according to plaintiff-appellee, she his not
even given such kind of information -the true fact being that she was being paid
P1.20 per picul of the sugarcane production in her hacienda and 500 cavans on the
palay production. 11
From the foregoing, it is evident that the bank was as much , guilty as Castro was,
of negligence in giving its consent to the contracts. It apparently relied on
representations made by the Valencia spouses when it should have directly
obtained the needed data from Castro who was the acknowledged owner of the
property offered as collateral. Moreover, considering Castro's personal
circumstances her lack of education, ignorance and old age she cannot be
considered utterly neglectful for having been defrauded. On the contrary, it is
demanded of petitioners to exercise the highest order of care and prudence in its
business dealings with the Valencias considering that it is engaged in a banking
business a business affected with public interest. It should have ascertained
Castro's awareness of what she was signing or made her understand what
obligations she was assuming, considering that she was giving accommodation to,
without any consideration from the Valencia spouses.
Petitioners further argue that Castro's act of holding the Valencias as her agent led
the bank to believe that they were authorized to speak and bind her. She cannot
now be permitted to deny the authority of the Valencias to act as her agent for one
who clothes another with apparent authority as her agent is not permitted to deny
such authority.
The authority of the Valencias was only to follow-up Castro's loan application with
the bank. They were not authorized to borrow for her. This is apparent from the fact
that Castro went to the Bank to sign the promissory note for her loan of P3,000.00.
If her act had been understood by the Bank to be a grant of an authority to the
Valencia to borrow in her behalf, it should have required a special power of attorney
executed by Castro in their favor. Since the bank did not, We can rightly assume
that it did not entertain the notion, that the Valencia spouses were in any manner
acting as an agent of Castro.
When the Valencias borrowed from the Bank a personal loan of P3,000.00 evidenced
by a promissory note (Exhibit 2) and mortgaged (Exhibit 6) Castro's property to
secure said loan, the Valencias acted for their own behalf. Considering however that
for the loan in which the Valencias appeared as principal borrowers, it was the
property of Castro that was being mortgaged to secure said loan, the Bank should
have exercised due care and prudence by making proper inquiry if Castro's consent
to the mortgage was without any taint or defect. The possibility of her not knowing
that she signed the promissory note (Exhibit 2) as co-maker with the Valencias and
that her property was mortgaged to secure the two loans instead of her own
personal loan only, in view of her personal circumstances ignorance, lack of
education and old age should have placed the Bank on prudent inquiry to protect

its interest and that of the public it serves. With the recent occurrence of events
that have supposedly affected adversely our banking system, attributable to laxity
in the conduct of bank business by its officials, the need of extreme caution and
prudence by said officials and employees in the discharge of their functions cannot
be over-emphasized.
Question is, likewise, raised as to the propriety of respondent court's decision which
declared that Castro's consignation in court of the amount of P3,383.00 was validly
made. It is contended that the consignation was made without prior offer or tender
of payment to the Bank, and it therefore, not valid. In holding that there is a
substantial compliance with the provision of Article 1256 of the Civil Code,
respondent court considered the fact that the Bank was holding Castro liable for the
sum of P6,000.00 plus 12% interest per annum, while the amount consigned was
only P3,000.00 plus 12% interest; that at the time of consignation, the Bank had
long foreclosed the mortgage extrajudicially and the sale of the mortgage property
had already been scheduled for April 10, 1961 for non-payment of the obligation,
and that despite the fact that the Bank already knew of the deposit made by Castro
because the receipt of the deposit was attached to the record of the case, said Bank
had not made any claim of such deposit, and that therefore, Castro was right in
thinking that it was futile and useless for her to make previous offer and tender of
payment directly to the Bank only in the aforesaid amount of P3,000.00 plus 12%
interest. Under the foregoing circumstances, the consignation made by Castro was
valid. if not under the strict provision of the law, under the more liberal
considerations of equity.
The final issue raised is the validity or invalidity of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale
at public auction of the mortgaged property that was held on April 11, 1961.
Petitioners contended that the public auction sale that was held on April 11, 1961
which was the next business day after the scheduled date of the sale on April 10,
1961, a special public holiday, was permissible and valid pursuant to the provisions
of Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code which ordains:
Pretermission of holiday. Where the day, or the last day, for doing any act required
or permitted by law falls on a holiday, the act may be done on the next succeeding
business day.
Respondent court ruled that the aforesaid sale is null and void, it not having been
carried out in accordance with Section 9 of Act No. 3135, which provides:
Section 9. Notice shall be given by posting notices of the sale for not less than
twenty days in at least three public places of the municipality or city where the
property is situated, and if such property is worth more than four hundred pesos,
such notice shall also be published once a week for at least three consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality or city.

We agree with respondent court. The pretermission of a holiday applies only "where
the day, or the last day for doing any act required or permitted by law falls on a
holiday," or when the last day of a given period for doing an act falls on a holiday. It
does not apply to a day fixed by an office or officer of the government for an act to
be done, as distinguished from a period of time within which an act should be done,
which may be on any day within that specified period. For example, if a party is
required by law to file his answer to a complaint within fifteen (15) days from receipt
of the summons and the last day falls on a holiday, the last day is deemed moved to
the next succeeding business day. But, if the court fixes the trial of a case on a
certain day but the said date is subsequently declared a public holiday, the trial
thereof is not automatically transferred to the next succeeding business day. Since
April 10, 1961 was not the day or the last day set by law for the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale, nor the last day of a given period but a date fixed by the deputy
sheriff, the aforesaid sale cannot legally be made on the next succeeding business
day without the notices of the sale on that day being posted as prescribed in
Section 9, Act No. 3135.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the judgment under review, We affirm
the same in toto. No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Acting, C.J.) Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.,
concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6791

March 29, 1954

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
QUE PO LAY, defendant-appellant.
Prudencio de Guzman for appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Lauro G. Marquez
for appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Que Po Lay is appealing from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
finding him guilty of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with
section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, and sentencing him to suffer six months
imprisonment, to pay a fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The charge was that the appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange
consisting of U.S. dollars, U.S. checks and U.S. money orders amounting to about
$7,000 failed to sell the same to the Central Bank through its agents within one day
following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by Circular No. 20. the
appeal is based on the claim that said circular No. 20 was not published in the
Official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to the appellant, and that
consequently, said circular had no force and effect. It is contended that
Commonwealth Act. No., 638 and Act 2930 both require said circular to be published
in the Official Gazette, it being an order or notice of general applicability. The
Solicitor General answering this contention says that Commonwealth Act. No. 638
and 2930 do not require the publication in the Official Gazette of said circular issued
for the implementation of a law in order to have force and effect.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the laws in question do not require the
publication of the circulars, regulations and notices therein mentioned in order to
become binding and effective. All that said two laws provide is that laws,
resolutions, decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, notices and
documents required by law to be of no force and effect. In other words, said two
Acts merely enumerate and make a list of what should be published in the Official

Gazette, presumably, for the guidance of the different branches of the Government
issuing same, and of the Bureau of Printing.
However, section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that statutes
passed by Congress shall, in the absence of special provision, take effect at the
beginning of the fifteenth day after the completion of the publication of the statute
in the Official Gazette. Article 2 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) equally
provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. It is true that
Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or law but being issued for the
implementation of the law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law
according to settled jurisprudence. (See U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil., 119 and
authorities cited therein.) Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations especially
like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question which prescribes a penalty
for its violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the general
principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its
penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people
officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.
Our Old Civil code, ( Spanish Civil Code of 1889) has a similar provision about the
effectivity of laws, (Article 1 thereof), namely, that laws shall be binding twenty
days after their promulgation, and that their promulgation shall be understood as
made on the day of the termination of the publication of the laws in the Gazette.
Manresa, commenting on this article is of the opinion that the word "laws" include
regulations and circulars issued in accordance with the same. He says:
El Tribunal Supremo, ha interpretado el articulo 1. del codigo Civil en Sentencia de
22 de Junio de 1910, en el sentido de que bajo la denominacion generica de leyes,
se comprenden tambien los Reglamentos, Reales decretos,
Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordenes dictadas de conformidad con las mismas
por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. Tambien el poder ejecutivo lo ha venido
entendiendo asi, como lo prueba el hecho de que muchas de sus disposiciones
contienen la advertencia de que empiezan a regir el mismo dia de su publicacion en
la Gaceta, advertencia que seria perfectamente inutil si no fuera de aplicacion al
caso el articulo 1.o del Codigo Civil. (Manresa, Codigo Civil Espaol, Vol. I. p. 52).
In the present case, although circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the
year 1949, it was not published until November 1951, that is, about 3 months after
appellant's conviction of its violation. It is clear that said circular, particularly its
penal provision, did not have any legal effect and bound no one until its publication
in the Official Gazzette or after November 1951. In other words, appellant could not
be held liable for its violation, for it was not binding at the time he was found to
have failed to sell the foreign exchange in his possession thereof.

But the Solicitor General also contends that this question of non-publication of the
Circular is being raised for the first time on appeal in this Court, which cannot be
done by appellant. Ordinarily, one may raise on appeal any question of law or fact
that has been raised in the court below and which is within the issues made by the
parties in their pleadings. (Section 19, Rule 48 of the Rules of Court). But the
question of non-publication is fundamental and decisive. If as a matter of fact
Circular No. 20 had not been published as required by law before its violation, then
in the eyes of the law there was no such circular to be violated and consequently
appellant committed no violation of the circular or committed any offense, and the
trial court may be said to have had no jurisdiction. This question may be raised at
any stage of the proceeding whether or not raised in the court below.
In view of the foregoing, we reverse the decision appealed from and acquit the
appellant, with costs de oficio.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and
Diokno, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 137873

April 20, 2001

D. M. CONSUNJI, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M.
Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death.
PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and
filed a report dated November 25, 1990, stating that:
x x x. [The] [v]ictim was rushed to [the] Rizal Medical Center in Pasig, Metro Manila
where he was pronounced dead on arrival (DOA) by the attending physician, Dr.
Errol de Yzo[,] at around 2:15 p.m. of the same date.
Investigation disclosed that at the given time, date and place, while victim Jose A.
Juego together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo [were] performing their work as
carpenter[s] at the elevator core of the 14th floor of the Tower D, Renaissance Tower
Building on board a [p]latform made of channel beam (steel) measuring 4.8 meters
by 2 meters wide with pinulid plywood flooring and cable wires attached to its four

corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain block, when suddenly, the bolt or pin which
was merely inserted to connect the chain block with the [p]latform, got loose xxx
causing the whole [p]latform assembly and the victim to fall down to the basement
of the elevator core, Tower D of the building under construction thereby crushing
the victim of death, save his two (2) companions who luckily jumped out for safety.
It is thus manifest that Jose A. Juego was crushed to death when the [p]latform he
was then on board and performing work, fell. And the falling of the [p]latform was
due to the removal or getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to the
connecting points of the chain block and [p]latform but without a safety lock. 1
On May 9, 1991, Jose Juegos widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceaseds employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc.
The employer raised, among other defenses, the widows prior availment of the
benefits from the State Insurance Fund.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. The
dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff, as
follows:
1. P50,000.00 for the death of Jose A. Juego.
2. P10,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages.
3. P464,000.00 for the loss of Jose A. Juegos earning capacity.
4. P100,000.00 as moral damages.
5. P20,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.2
On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the
RTC in toto.
D. M. Consunji now seeks the reversal of the CA decision on the following grounds:

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE POLICE REPORT WAS
ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE OF THE ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE OF PETITIONER.

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA
LOQUITOR[sic] IS APPLICABLE TO PROVE NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF
PETITIONER.

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER IS PRESUMED

NEGLIGENT UNDER ARTICLE 2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE, AND

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT IS NOT

PRECLUDED FROM RECOVERING DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE.3

Petitioner maintains that the police report reproduced above is hearsay and,
therefore, inadmissible. The CA ruled otherwise. It held that said report, being an
entry in official records, is an exception to the hearsay rule.
The Rules of Court provide that a witness can testify only to those facts which he
knows of his personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from his perception. 4 A
witness, therefore, may not testify as what he merely learned from others either
because he was told or read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered
hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned. 5 This
is known as the hearsay rule.
Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the general rule that
excludes hearsay as evidence applies to written, as well as oral statements. 6
The theory of the hearsay rule is that the many possible deficiencies, suppressions,
sources of error and untrustworthiness, which lie underneath the bare untested
assertion of a witness, may be best brought to light and exposed by the test of
cross-examiantion.7 The hearsay rule, therefore, excludes evidence that cannot be
tested by cross-examination.8
The Rules of Court allow several exceptions to the rule, 9 among which are entries in
official records. Section 44, Rule 130 provides:
Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law areprima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated.
In Africa, et al. vs. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., et al.,10 this Court, citing the work of Chief
Justice Moran, enumerated the requisites for admissibility under the above rule:
(a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially
enjoined by law to do so;
(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by
such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by
him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official
information.
The CA held that the police report meets all these requisites. Petitioner contends
that the last requisite is not present.

The Court notes that PO3 Villanueva, who signed the report in question, also
testified before the trial court. InRodriguez vs. Court of Appeals,11 which involved a
Fire Investigation Report, the officer who signed the fire report also testified before
the trial court. This Court held that the report was inadmissible for the purpose of
proving the truth of the statements contained in the report but admissible insofar as
it constitutes part of the testimony of the officer who executed the report.
x x x. Since Major Enriquez himself took the witness stand and was available for
cross-examination, the portions of the report which were of his personal knowledge
or which consisted of his perceptions and conclusions were not hearsay. The rest of
the report, such as the summary of the statements of the parties based on their
sworn statements (which were annexed to the Report) as well as the latter, having
been included in the first purpose of the offer [as part of the testimony of Major
Enriquez], may then be considered as independently relevant statements which
were gathered in the course of the investigation and may thus be admitted as such,
but not necessarily to prove the truth thereof. It has been said that:
"Where regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, the fact that it has been
made is relevant, the hearsay rule does not apply, but the statement may be
shown. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary,
for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue, or be circumstantially
relevant as to the existence of such a fact."
When Major Enriquez took the witness stand, testified for petitioners on his Report
and made himself available for cross-examination by the adverse party, the Report,
insofar as it proved that certain utterances were made (but not their truth), was
effectively removed from the ambit of the aforementioned Section 44 of Rule 130.
Properly understood, this section does away with the testimony in open court of the
officer who made the official record, considers the matter as an exception to the
hearsay rule and makes the entries in said official record admissible in evidence
as prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The underlying reasons for this
exceptionary rule are necessity and trustworthiness, as explained in Antillon v.
Barcelon.
The litigation is unlimited in which testimony by officials is daily needed; the
occasions in which the officials would be summoned from his ordinary duties to
declare as a witness are numberless. The public officers are few in whose daily work
something is not done in which testimony is not needed from official sources. Were
there no exception for official statements, hosts of officials would be found devoting
the greater part of their time to attending as witnesses in court or delivering
deposition before an officer. The work of administration of government and the
interest of the public having business with officials would alike suffer in
consequence. For these reasons, and for many others, a certain verity is accorded
such documents, which is not extended to private documents. (3 Wigmore on
Evidence, Sec. 1631).

The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it presumes they will
discharge their several trusts with accuracy and fidelity; and, therefore, whatever
acts they do in discharge of their duty may be given in evidence and shall be taken
to be true under such a degree of caution as to the nature and circumstances of
each case may appear to require.
It would have been an entirely different matter if Major Enriquez was not presented
to testify on his report. In that case the applicability of Section 44 of Rule 143 would
have been ripe for determination, and this Court would have agreed with the Court
of Appeals that said report was inadmissible since the aforementioned third
requisite was not satisfied. The statements given by the sources of information of
Major Enriquez failed to qualify as "official information," there being no showing
that, at the very least, they were under a duty to give the statements for record.
Similarly, the police report in this case is inadmissible for the purpose of proving the
truth of the statements contained therein but is admissible insofar as it constitutes
part of the testimony of PO3 Villanueva.
In any case, the Court holds that portions of PO3 Villanuevas testimony which were
of his personal knowledge suffice to prove that Jose Juego indeed died as a result of
the elevator crash. PO3 Villanueva had seen Juegos remains at the
morgue,12 making the latters death beyond dispute. PO3 Villanueva also conducted
an ocular inspection of the premises of the building the day after the incident 13 and
saw the platform for himself.14 He observed that the platform was crushed15 and that
it was totally damaged.16 PO3 Villanueva also required Garcia and Fabro to bring the
chain block to the police headquarters. Upon inspection, he noticed that the chain
was detached from the lifting machine, without any pin or bolt. 17
What petitioner takes particular exception to is PO3 Villanuevas testimony that the
cause of the fall of the platform was the loosening of the bolt from the chain block.
It is claimed that such portion of the testimony is mere opinion. Subject to certain
exceptions,18 the opinion of a witness is generally not admissible. 19
Petitioners contention, however, loses relevance in the face of the application
of res ipsa loquitur by the CA. The effect of the doctrine is to warrant a presumption
or inference that the mere fall of the elevator was a result of the person having
charge of the instrumentality was negligent. As a rule of evidence, the doctrine
of res ipsa loquituris peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima
facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute
for specific proof of negligence.20
The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise:
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere
happening of an accident or injury will not generally give rise to an inference or
presumption that it was due to negligence on defendants part, under the doctrine

of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the thing or transaction speaks for itself,
or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality speaks for itself, the facts or
circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a presumption, or at
least permit an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant, or some other
person who is charged with negligence.
x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury
complained of was under the control or management of the defendant, and that the
occurrence resulting in the injury was such as in the ordinary course of things would
not happen if those who had its control or management used proper care, there is
sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the absence of
explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose from or was caused by the
defendants want of care.21
One of the theoretical based for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e., that necessary
evidence is absent or not available.22
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in
charge of the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the
accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no
such knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege negligence in general terms
and to rely upon the proof of the happening of the accident in order to establish
negligence. The inference which the doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact that
the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically
accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured person.
It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur furnishes a bridge by which a
plaintiff, without knowledge of the cause, reaches over to defendant who knows or
should know the cause, for any explanation of care exercised by the defendant in
respect of the matter of which the plaintiff complains. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine,
another court has said, is a rule of necessity, in that it proceeds on the theory that
under the peculiar circumstances in which the doctrine is applicable, it is within the
power of the defendant to show that there was no negligence on his part, and direct
proof of defendants negligence is beyond plaintiffs power. Accordingly, some court
add to the three prerequisites for the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine the
further requirement that for the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to apply, it must appear
that the injured party had no knowledge or means of knowledge as to the cause of
the accident, or that the party to be charged with negligence has superior
knowledge or opportunity for explanation of the accident. 23
The CA held that all the requisites of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar:
There is no dispute that appellees husband fell down from the 14 th floor of a
building to the basement while he was working with appellants construction
project, resulting to his death. The construction site is within the exclusive control
and management of appellant. It has a safety engineer, a project superintendent, a

carpenter leadman and others who are in complete control of the situation therein.
The circumstances of any accident that would occur therein are peculiarly within the
knowledge of the appellant or its employees. On the other hand, the appellee is not
in a position to know what caused the accident. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of
necessity and it applies where evidence is absent or not readily available, provided
the following requisites are present: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not
ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency
which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with
negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution on the part of the person injured. x x x.
No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while
performing work in a construction site unless someone is negligent[;] thus, the first
requisite for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur is present. As explained
earlier, the construction site with all its paraphernalia and human resources that
likely caused the injury is under the exclusive control and management of
appellant[;] thus[,] the second requisite is also present. No contributory negligence
was attributed to the appellees deceased husband[;] thus[,] the last requisite is
also present. All the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are
present, thus a reasonable presumption or inference of appellants negligence
arises. x x x.24
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the requisites for the application of res
ipsa loquitur, but argues that the presumption or inference that it was negligent did
not arise since it "proved that it exercised due care to avoid the accident which
befell respondents husband."
Petitioner apparently misapprehends the procedural effect of the doctrine. As stated
earlier, the defendants negligence is presumed or inferred 25 when the plaintiff
establishes the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur. Once the plaintiff
makes out a prima facie case of all the elements, the burden then shifts to
defendant to explain.26 The presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome
by other evidence and, under appropriate circumstances disputable presumption,
such as that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the inference. 27 It is not for the
defendant to explain or prove its defense to prevent the presumption or inference
from arising. Evidence by the defendant of say, due care, comes into play only after
the circumstances for the application of the doctrine has been
established.1wphi1.nt
In any case, petitioner cites the sworn statement of its leadman Ferdinand Fabro
executed before the police investigator as evidence of its due care. According to
Fabros sworn statement, the company enacted rules and regulations for the safety
and security of its workers. Moreover, the leadman and the bodegero inspect the
chain block before allowing its use.

It is ironic that petitioner relies on Fabros sworn statement as proof of its due care
but, in arguing that private respondent failed to prove negligence on the part of
petitioners employees, also assails the same statement for being hearsay.
Petitioner is correct. Fabros sworn statement is hearsay and inadmissible. Affidavits
are inadmissible as evidence under the hearsay rule, unless the affiant is placed on
the witness stand to testify thereon. 28 The inadmissibility of this sort of evidence is
based not only on the lack of opportunity on the part of the adverse party to crossexamine the affiant, but also on the commonly known fact that, generally, an
affidavit is not prepared by the affiant himself but by another who uses his own
language in writing the affiants statements which may either be omitted or
misunderstood by the one writing them.29 Petitioner, therefore, cannot use said
statement as proof of its due care any more than private respondent can use it to
prove the cause of her husbands death. Regrettably, petitioner does not cite any
other evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of negligence arising from the
application of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the incident.
Next, petitioner argues that private respondent had previously availed of the death
benefits provided under the Labor Code and is, therefore, precluded from claiming
from the deceaseds employer damages under the Civil Code.
Article 173 of the Labor Code states:
Article 173. Extent of liability. Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State
Insurance Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities
of the employer to the employee, his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to
receive damages on behalf of the employee or his dependents. The payment of
compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for
in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, Republic Act Numbered Eleven
hundred sixty-one, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Six hundred ten, as
amended, Republic Act Numbered Forty-eight hundred sixty-four as amended, and
other laws whose benefits are administered by the System or by other agencies of
the government.
The precursor of Article 173 of the Labor Code, Section 5 of the Workmens
Compensation Act, provided that:
Section 5. Exclusive right to compensation. The rights and remedies granted by
this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation
shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal
representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil
Code and other laws because of said injury x x x.
Whether Section 5 of the Workmens Compensation Act allowed recovery under said
Act as well as under the Civil Code used to be the subject of conflicting decisions.
The Court finally settled the matter in Floresca vs.Philex Mining Corporation,30 which

involved a cave-in resulting in the death of the employees of the Philex Mining
Corporation. Alleging that the mining corporation, in violation of government rules
and regulations, failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the
employees, the heirs of the deceased employees filed a complaint against Philex
Mining in the Court of First Instance (CFI). Upon motion of Philex Mining, the CFI
dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The heirs sought relief from this
Court.
Addressing the issue of whether the heirs had a choice of remedies, majority of the
Court En Banc,31 following the rule in Pacaa vs. Cebu Autobus Company, held in the
affirmative.
WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in
case of death have a right of selection or choice of action between availing
themselves of the workers right under the Workmens Compensation Act and suing
in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and
exemplary) from the employers by virtue of the negligence or fault of the employers
or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the
limited compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act and sue in addition
for damages in the regular courts.
In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacaa vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 32
SCRA 442, ruled thatan injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the
employer the fixed amounts set by the Workmens Compensation Act or to
prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for higher damages but he
cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously. [Underscoring supplied.]
Nevertheless, the Court allowed some of the petitioners in said case to proceed with
their suit under the Civil Code despite having availed of the benefits provided under
the Workmens Compensation Act. The Court reasoned:
With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in its motion to dismiss
dated May 14, 1968 before the court a quo, that the heirs of the deceased
employees, namely Emerito Obra, Larry Villar, Jr., Aurelio Lanuza, Lorenzo Isla and
Saturnino submitted notices and claims for compensation to the Regional Office No.
1 of the then Department of Labor and all of them have been paid in full as of
August 25, 1967, except Saturnino Martinez whose heirs decided that they be paid
in installments x x x. Such allegation was admitted by herein petitioners in their
opposition to the motion to dismiss dated may 27, 1968 x x x in the lower court, but
they set up the defense that the claims were filed under the Workmens
Compensation Act before they learned of the official report of the committee
created to investigate the accident which established the criminal negligence and
violation of law by Philex, and which report was forwarded by the Director of Mines
to then Executive Secretary Rafael Salas in a letter dated October 19, 1967 only x x
x.

WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the
Workmens Compensation Act, such my not preclude them from bringing an action
before the regular court because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has
been remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners only after
receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of said violation
of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they would not
have sought redress under the Workmens Compensation Commission which
awarded a lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy was
based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an
intelligent choice. The case should therefore be remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings. However, should the petitioners be successful in their bid
before the lower court, the payments made under the Workmens Compensation Act
should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor.
[Underscoring supplied.]
The ruling in Floresca providing the claimant a choice of remedies was reiterated
in Ysmael Maritime Corporation vs. Avelino,32 Vda. De Severo vs. FelicianoGo,33 and Marcopper Mining Corp. vs. Abeleda.34 In the last case, the Court again
recognized that a claimant who had been paid under the Act could still sue under
the Civil Code. The Court said:
In the Robles case, it was held that claims for damages sustained by workers in the
course of their employment could be filed only under the Workmens Compensation
Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under other laws. In Floresca, this doctrine
was abrogated in favor of the new rule that the claimants may invoke either the
Workmens Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil Code, subject to the
consequence that the choice of one remedy will exclude the other and that the
acceptance of compensation under the remedy chosen will preclude a claim for
additional benefits under the other remedy. The exception is where a claimant who
has already been paid under the Workmens Compensation Act may still sue for
damages under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening facts or developments
occurring after he opted for the first remedy. (Underscoring supplied.)
Here, the CA held that private respondents case came under the exception because
private respondent was unaware of petitioners negligence when she filed her claim
for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Private respondent filed the civil
complaint for damages after she received a copy of the police investigation report
and the Prosecutors Memorandum dismissing the criminal complaint against
petitioners personnel. While stating that there was no negligence attributable to
the respondents in the complaint, the prosecutor nevertheless noted in the
Memorandum that, "if at all," the "case is civil in nature." The CA thus applied the
exception in Floresca:
x x x We do not agree that appellee has knowledge of the alleged negligence of
appellant as early as November 25, 1990, the date of the police investigators

report. The appellee merely executed her sworn statement before the police
investigator concerning her personal circumstances, her relation to the victim, and
her knowledge of the accident. She did not file the complaint for "Simple Negligence
Resulting to Homicide" against appellants employees. It was the investigator who
recommended the filing of said case and his supervisor referred the same to the
prosecutors office. This is a standard operating procedure for police investigators
which appellee may not have even known. This may explain why no complainant is
mentioned in the preliminary statement of the public prosecutor in her
memorandum dated February 6, 1991, to wit: "Respondent Ferdinand Fabro x x x
are being charged by complainant of "Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide." It
is also possible that the appellee did not have a chance to appear before the public
prosecutor as can be inferred from the following statement in said memorandum:
"Respondents who were notified pursuant to Law waived their rights to present
controverting evidence," thus there was no reason for the public prosecutor to
summon the appellee. Hence, notice of appellants negligence cannot be imputed
on appellee before she applied for death benefits under ECC or before she received
the first payment therefrom. Her using the police investigation report to support her
complaint filed on May 9, 1991 may just be an afterthought after receiving a copy of
the February 6, 1991 Memorandum of the Prosecutors Office dismissing the
criminal complaint for insufficiency of evidence, stating therein that: "The death of
the victim is not attributable to any negligence on the part of the respondents. If at
all and as shown by the records this case is civil in nature." (Underscoring supplied.)
Considering the foregoing, We are more inclined to believe appellees allegation
that she learned about appellants negligence only after she applied for and
received the benefits under ECC. This is a mistake of fact that will make this case
fall under the exception held in the Floresca ruling.35
The CA further held that not only was private respondent ignorant of the facts, but
of her rights as well:
x x x. Appellee [Maria Juego] testified that she has reached only elementary school
for her educational attainment; that she did not know what damages could be
recovered from the death of her husband; and that she did not know that she may
also recover more from the Civil Code than from the ECC. x x x.36
Petitioner impugns the foregoing rulings. It contends that private respondent "failed
to allege in her complaint that her application and receipt of benefits from the ECC
were attended by ignorance or mistake of fact. Not being an issue submitted during
the trial, the trial court had no authority to hear or adjudicate that issue."
Petitioner also claims that private respondent could not have been ignorant of the
facts because as early as November 28, 1990, private respondent was the
complainant in a criminal complaint for "Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide"
against petitioners employees. On February 6, 1991, two months before the filing of
the action in the lower court, Prosecutor Lorna Lee issued a resolution finding that,

although there was insufficient evidence against petitioners employees, the case
was "civil in nature." These purportedly show that prior to her receipt of death
benefits from the ECC on January 2, 1991 and every month thereafter, private
respondent also knew of the two choices of remedies available to her and yet she
chose to claim and receive the benefits from the ECC.
When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election between
inconsistent remedies, the election is final and bars any action, suit, or proceeding
inconsistent with the elected remedy, in the absence of fraud by the other party.
The first act of election acts as a bar.37 Equitable in nature, the doctrine of election
of remedies is designed to mitigate possible unfairness to both parties. It rests on
the moral premise that it is fair to hold people responsible for their choices. The
purpose of the doctrine is not to prevent any recourse to any remedy, but to
prevent a double redress for a single wrong. 38
The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by
election. Hence, the rule in Florescathat a claimant cannot simultaneously pursue
recovery under the Labor Code and prosecute an ordinary course of action under
the Civil Code. The claimant, by his choice of one remedy, is deemed to have
waived the other.
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.39
[It] is an act of understanding that presupposes that a party has knowledge of its
rights, but chooses not to assert them. It must be generally shown by the party
claiming a waiver that the person against whom the waiver is asserted had at the
time knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of the partys rights or of
all material facts upon which they depended. Where one lacks knowledge of a right,
there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact
negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a
mistake or misapprehension of fact.
A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that person knows that a
right exists and has adequate knowledge upon which to make an intelligent
decision.
Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right waived,
with an awareness of its consequences. That a waiver is made knowingly and
intelligently must be illustrated on the record or by the evidence. 40
That lack of knowledge of a fact that nullifies the election of a remedy is the basis
for the exception in Floresca.
It is in light of the foregoing principles that we address petitioners contentions.
Waiver is a defense, and it was not incumbent upon private respondent, as plaintiff,
to allege in her complaint that she had availed of benefits from the ECC. It is, thus,

erroneous for petitioner to burden private respondent with raising waiver as an

issue. On the contrary, it is the defendant who ought to plead waiver, as petitioner
did in pages 2-3 of its Answer;41 otherwise, the defense is waived. It is, therefore,
perplexing for petitioner to now contend that the trial court had no jurisdiction over
the issue when petitioner itself pleaded waiver in the proceedings before the trial
court.
Does the evidence show that private respondent knew of the facts that led to her
husbands death and the rights pertaining to a choice of remedies?
It bears stressing that what negates waiver is lack of knowledge or a mistake
of fact. In this case, the "fact" that served as a basis for nullifying the waiver is
the negligence of petitioners employees, of which private respondent purportedly
learned only after the prosecutor issued a resolution stating that there may be civil
liability. InFloresca, it was the negligence of the mining corporation and its violation
of government rules and regulations. Negligence, or violation of government rules
and regulations, for that matter, however, is not a fact, but aconclusion of law, over
which only the courts have the final say. Such a conclusion binds no one until the
courts have decreed so. It appears, therefore, that the principle that ignorance or
mistake of fact nullifies a waiver has been misapplied in Floresca and in the case at
bar.
In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew that her husband died
in the elevator crash when on November 15, 1990 she accomplished her application
for benefits from the ECC. The police investigation report is dated November 25,
1990, 10 days after the accomplishment of the form. Petitioner filed the application
in her behalf on November 27, 1990.
There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to
her when the claim before the ECC was filed. On the contrary, private respondent
testified that she was not aware of her rights.
Petitioner, though, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance of the
law excuses no one from compliance therewith. As judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of the Philippine legal system
(Article 8, Civil Code), private respondent cannot claim ignorance of this Courts
ruling inFloresca allowing a choice of remedies.
The argument has no merit. The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and
prohibitory laws.42 This may be deduced from the language of the provision, which,
notwithstanding a persons ignorance, does not excuse his or her compliance with
the laws. The rule in Floresca allowing private respondent a choice of remedies is
neither mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof cannot be
held against her.

Finally, the Court modifies the affirmance of the award of damages. The records do
not indicate the total amount private respondent ought to receive from the ECC,
although it appears from Exhibit "K"43 that she received P3,581.85 as initial payment
representing the accrued pension from November 1990 to March 1991. Her initial
monthly pension, according to the same Exhibit "K," was P596.97 and present total
monthly pension was P716.40. Whether the total amount she will eventually receive
from the ECC is less than the sum of P644,000.00 in total damages awarded by the
trial court is subject to speculation, and the case is remanded to the trial court for
such determination. Should the trial court find that its award is greater than that of
the ECC, payments already received by private respondent under the Labor Code
shall be deducted from the trial court' award of damages. Consistent with our ruling
in Floresca, this adjudication aims to prevent double compensation.
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City to
determine whether the award decreed in its decision is more than that of the ECC.
Should the award decreed by the trial court be greater than that awarded by the
ECC, payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code
shall be deducted therefrom. In all other respects, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15127

May 30, 1961

EMETERIO CUI, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, defendant-appellee.
G.A.S. Sipin, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.
E. Voltaire Garcia for defendant-appellee.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal by plaintiff Emeterio Cui from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, absolving defendant Arellano University from plaintiff's complaint, with costs
against the plaintiff, and dismissing defendant's counter claim, for insufficiency of
proof thereon.
In the language of the decision appealed from:
The essential facts of this case are short and undisputed. As established by the
agreement of facts Exhibits X and by the respective oral and documentary evidence
introduced by the parties, it appears conclusive that plaintiff, before the school year
1948-1949 took up preparatory law course in the defendant University. After
finishing his preparatory law course plaintiff enrolled in the College of Law of the
defendant from the school year 1948-1949. Plaintiff finished his law studies in the
defendant university up to and including the first semester of the fourth year.
During all the school years in which plaintiff was studying law in defendant law
college, Francisco R. Capistrano, brother of the mother of plaintiff, was the dean of
the College of Law and legal counsel of the defendant university. Plaintiff enrolled
for the last semester of his law studies in the defendant university but failed to pay
his tuition fees because his uncle Dean Francisco R. Capistrano having severed his
connection with defendant and having accepted the deanship and chancellorship of
the College of Law of Abad Santos University, plaintiff left the defendant's law
college and enrolled for the last semester of his fourth year law in the college of law
of the Abad Santos University graduating from the college of law of the latter
university. Plaintiff, during all the time he was studying law in defendant university
was awarded scholarship grants, for scholastic merit, so that his semestral tuition
fees were returned to him after the ends of semester and when his scholarship
grants were awarded to him. The whole amount of tuition fees paid by plaintiff to
defendant and refunded to him by the latter from the first semester up to and
including the first semester of his last year in the college of law or the fourth year, is
in total P1,033.87. After graduating in law from Abad Santos University he applied to
take the bar examination. To secure permission to take the bar he needed the
transcripts of his records in defendant Arellano University. Plaintiff petitioned the
latter to issue to him the needed transcripts. The defendant refused until after he
had paid back the P1,033 87 which defendant refunded to him as above stated. As
he could not take the bar examination without those transcripts, plaintiff paid to

defendant the said sum under protest. This is the sum which plaintiff seeks to
recover from defendant in this case.
Before defendant awarded to plaintiff the scholarship grants as above stated, he
was made to sign the following contract covenant and agreement:
"In consideration of the scholarship granted to me by the University, I hereby waive
my right to transfer to another school without having refunded to the University
(defendant) the equivalent of my scholarship cash.
(Sgd.) Emeterio Cui".
It is admitted that, on August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued
Memorandum No. 38, series of 1949, on the subject of "Scholarship," addressed to
"All heads of private schools, colleges and universities," reading:
1. School catalogs and prospectuses submitted to this, Bureau show that some
schools offer full or partial scholarships to deserving students for excellence in
scholarship or for leadership in extra-curricular activities. Such inducements to poor
but gifted students should be encouraged. But to stipulate the condition that such
scholarships are good only if the students concerned continue in the same school
nullifies the principle of merit in the award of these scholarships.
2. When students are given full or partial scholarships, it is understood that such
scholarships are merited and earned. The amount in tuition and other fees
corresponding to these scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the
recipient students when they decide to quit school or to transfer to another
institution. Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and keep students
in a school.
3. Several complaints have actually been received from students who have enjoyed
scholarships, full or partial, to the effect that they could not transfer to other
schools since their credentials would not be released unless they would pay the fees
corresponding to the period of the scholarships. Where the Bureau believes that the
right of the student to transfer is being denied on this ground, it reserves the right
to authorize such transfer.
that defendant herein received a copy of this memorandum; that plaintiff asked the
Bureau of Private Schools to pass upon the issue on his right to secure the transcript
of his record in defendant University, without being required to refund the sum of
P1,033.87; that the Bureau of Private Schools upheld the position taken by the
plaintiff and so advised the defendant; and that, this notwithstanding, the latter
refused to issue said transcript of records, unless said refund were made, and even
recommended to said Bureau that it issue a written order directing the defendant to
release said transcript of record, "so that the case may be presented to the court for
judicial action." As above stated, plaintiff was, accordingly, constrained to pay, and

did pay under protest, said sum of P1,033.87, in order that he could take the bar
examination in 1953. Subsequently, he brought this action for the recovery of said
amount, aside from P2,000 as moral damages, P500 as exemplary damages, P2,000
as attorney's fees, and P500 as expenses of litigation.
In its answer, defendant reiterated the stand it took, vis-a-vis the Bureau of Private
Schools, namely, that the provisions of its contract with plaintiff are valid and
binding and that the memorandum above-referred to is null and void. It, likewise,
set up a counterclaim for P10,000.00 as damages, and P3,000 as attorney's fees.
The issue in this case is whether the above quoted provision of the contract
between plaintiff and the defendant, whereby the former waived his right to transfer
to another school without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his scholarships
in cash, is valid or not. The lower court resolved this question in the affirmative,
upon the ground that the aforementioned memorandum of the Director of Private
Schools is not a law; that the provisions thereof are advisory, not mandatory in
nature; and that, although the contractual provision "may be unethical, yet it was
more unethical for plaintiff to quit studying with the defendant without good reasons
and simply because he wanted to follow the example of his uncle." Moreover,
defendant maintains in its brief that the aforementioned memorandum of the
Director of Private Schools is null and void because said officer had no authority to
issue it, and because it had been neither approved by the corresponding
department head nor published in the official gazette.
We do not deem it necessary or advisable to consider as the lower court did, the
question whether plaintiff had sufficient reasons or not to transfer from defendant
University to the Abad Santos University. The nature of the issue before us, and its
far reaching effects, transcend personal equations and demand a determination of
the case from a high impersonal plane. Neither do we deem it essential to pass
upon the validity of said Memorandum No. 38, for, regardless of the same, we are of
the opinion that the stipulation in question is contrary to public policy and, hence,
null and void. The aforesaid memorandum merely incorporates a sound principle of
public policy. As the Director of Private Schools correctly pointed, out in his letter,
Exhibit B, to the defendant,
There is one more point that merits refutation and that is whether or not the
contract entered into between Cui and Arellano University on September 10, 1951
was void as against public policy. In the case of Zeigel vs. Illinois Trust and Savings
Bank, 245 Ill. 180, 19 Ann. Case 127, the court said: 'In determining a public policy
of the state, courts are limited to a consideration of the Constitution, the judicial
decisions, the statutes, and the practice of government officers.' It might take more
than a government bureau or office to lay down or establish a public policy, as
alleged in your communication, but courts consider the practices of government
officials as one of the four factors in determining a public policy of the state. It has
been consistently held in America that under the principles relating to the doctrine

of public policy, as applied to the law of contracts, courts of justice will not
recognize or uphold a transaction which its object, operation, or tendency is
calculated to be prejudicial to the public welfare, to sound morality or to civic
honesty (Ritter vs. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 U.S. 139; Heding vs. Gallaghere 64
L.R.A. 811; Veazy vs. Allen, 173 N.Y. 359). If Arellano University understood clearly
the real essence of scholarships and the motives which prompted this office to issue
Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949, it should have not entered into a contract of waiver
with Cui on September 10, 1951, which is a direct violation of our Memorandum and
an open challenge to the authority of the Director of Private Schools because the
contract was repugnant to sound morality and civic honesty. And finally, in Gabriel
vs. Monte de Piedad, Off. Gazette Supp. Dec. 6, 1941, p. 67 we read: 'In order to
declare a contract void as against public policy, a court must find that the contract
as to consideration or the thing to be done, contravenes some established interest
of society, or is inconsistent with sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to
undermine the security of individual rights. The policy enunciated in Memorandum
No. 38, s. 1949 is sound policy. Scholarship are awarded in recognition of merit not
to keep outstanding students in school to bolster its prestige. In the understanding
of that university scholarships award is a business scheme designed to increase the
business potential of an education institution. Thus conceived it is not only
inconsistent with sound policy but also good morals. But what is morals? Manresa
has this definition. It is good customs; those generally accepted principles of
morality which have received some kind of social and practical confirmation. The
practice of awarding scholarships to attract students and keep them in school is not
good customs nor has it received some kind of social and practical confirmation
except in some private institutions as in Arellano University. The University of the
Philippines which implements Section 5 of Article XIV of the Constitution with
reference to the giving of free scholarships to gifted children, does not require
scholars to reimburse the corresponding value of the scholarships if they transfer to
other schools. So also with the leading colleges and universities of the United States
after which our educational practices or policies are patterned. In these institutions
scholarships are granted not to attract and to keep brilliant students in school for
their propaganda mine but to reward merit or help gifted students in whom society
has an established interest or a first lien. (Emphasis supplied.)
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one shall
be entered sentencing the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P1,033.87,
with interest thereon at the legal rate from September 1, 1954, date of the
institution of this case, as well as the costs, and dismissing defendant's
counterclaim. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Parades, Dizon, De Leon and
Natividad, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., reserves his vote.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-30642 April 30, 1985
PERFECTO S. FLORESCA, in his own behalf and on behalf of the minors
ROMULO and NESTOR S. FLORESCA; and ERLINDA FLORESCA-GABUYO,
PEDRO S. FLORESCA, JR., CELSO S. FLORESCA, MELBA S. FLORESCA,
JUDITH S. FLORESCA and CARMEN S. FLORESCA;
LYDIA CARAMAT VDA. DE MARTINEZ in her own behalf and on behalf of her
minor children LINDA, ROMEO, ANTONIO JEAN and ELY, all surnamed
Martinez; and DANIEL MARTINEZ and TOMAS MARTINEZ;
SALUSTIANA ASPIRAS VDA. DE OBRA, in her own behalf and on behalf of
her minor children JOSE, ESTELA, JULITA SALUD and DANILO, all surnamed
OBRA;
LYDIA CULBENGAN VDA. DE VILLAR, in her own behalf and on behalf of her
minor children EDNA, GEORGE and LARRY III, all surnamed VILLAR;
DOLORES LOLITA ADER VDA. DE LANUZA, in her own behalf and on behalf
of her minor children EDITHA, ELIZABETH, DIVINA, RAYMUNDO, NESTOR
and AURELIO, JR. all surnamed LANUZA;
EMERENCIANA JOSE VDA. DE ISLA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her
minor children JOSE, LORENZO, JR., MARIA, VENUS and FELIX, all surnamed
ISLA, petitioners,
vs.
PHILEX MINING CORPORATION and HON. JESUS P. MORFE, Presiding Judge
of Branch XIII, Court of First Instance of Manila, respondents.
Rodolfo C. Pacampara for petitioners.

Tito M. Villaluna for respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:
This is a petition to review the order of the former Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch XIII, dated December 16, 1968 dismissing petitioners' complaint for
damages on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation
(hereinafter referred to as Philex), who, while working at its copper mines
underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the
cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. Specifically, the complaint
alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and regulations, negligently and
deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the lives of
its men working underground. Portion of the complaint reads:
xxx xxx xxx
9. That for sometime prior and up to June 28,1967, the defendant PHILEX, with
gross and reckless negligence and imprudence and deliberate failure to take the
required precautions for the due protection of the lives of its men working
underground at the time, and in utter violation of the laws and the rules and
regulations duly promulgated by the Government pursuant thereto, allowed great
amount of water and mud to accumulate in an open pit area at the mine above
Block 43-S-1 which seeped through and saturated the 600 ft. column of broken ore
and rock below it, thereby exerting tremendous pressure on the working spaces at
its 4300 level, with the result that, on the said date, at about 4 o'clock in the
afternoon, with the collapse of all underground supports due to such enormous
pressure, approximately 500,000 cubic feet of broken ores rocks, mud and water,
accompanied by surface boulders, blasted through the tunnels and flowed out and
filled in, in a matter of approximately five (5) minutes, the underground workings,
ripped timber supports and carried off materials, machines and equipment which
blocked all avenues of exit, thereby trapping within its tunnels of all its men above
referred to, including those named in the next preceding paragraph, represented by
the plaintiffs herein;
10. That out of the 48 mine workers who were then working at defendant PHILEX's
mine on the said date, five (5) were able to escape from the terrifying holocaust; 22
were rescued within the next 7 days; and the rest, 21 in number, including those
referred to in paragraph 7 hereinabove, were left mercilessly to their fate,
notwithstanding the fact that up to then, a great many of them were still alive,
entombed in the tunnels of the mine, but were not rescued due to defendant
PHILEX's decision to abandon rescue operations, in utter disregard of its bounden
legal and moral duties in the premises;

xxx xxx xxx

13. That defendant PHILEX not only violated the law and the rules and regulations
duly promulgated by the duly constituted authorities as set out by the Special
Committee above referred to, in their Report of investigation, pages 7-13, Annex 'B'
hereof, but also failed completely to provide its men working underground the
necessary security for the protection of their lives notwithstanding the fact that it
had vast financial resources, it having made, during the year 1966 alone, a total
operating income of P 38,220,254.00, or net earnings, after taxes of
P19,117,394.00, as per its llth Annual Report for the year ended December 31,
1966, and with aggregate assets totalling P 45,794,103.00 as of December 31,
1966;
xxx xxx xxx
(pp. 42-44, rec.)
A motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 was filed by Philex alleging that the causes
of action of petitioners based on an industrial accident are covered by the
provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 3428, as amended by RA 772)
and that the former Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioners filed an opposition dated May 27, 1968 to the said motion to dismiss
claiming that the causes of action are not based on the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act but on the provisions of the Civil Code allowing the award of
actual, moral and exemplary damages, particularly:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre- existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2178. The provisions of articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasidelict.
(b) Art. 1173The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows
bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2 shall apply.
Art. 2201. x x x x x x x x x
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be
responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the nonperformance of the obligation.
Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant
acted with gross negligence.

After a reply and a rejoinder thereto were filed, respondent Judge issued an order
dated June 27, 1968 dismissing the case on the ground that it falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Workmen's Compensation Commission. On petitioners'
motion for reconsideration of the said order, respondent Judge, on September 23,
1968, reconsidered and set aside his order of June 27, 1968 and allowed Philex to
file an answer to the complaint. Philex moved to reconsider the aforesaid order
which was opposed by petitioners.
On December 16, 1968, respondent Judge dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction
and ruled that in accordance with the established jurisprudence, the Workmen's
Compensation Commission has exclusive original jurisdiction over damage or
compensation claims for work-connected deaths or injuries of workmen or
employees, irrespective of whether or not the employer was negligent, adding that
if the employer's negligence results in work-connected deaths or injuries, the
employer shall, pursuant to Section 4-A of the Workmen's Compensation Act, pay
additional compensation equal to 50% of the compensation fixed in the Act.
Petitioners thus filed the present petition.
In their brief, petitioners raised the following assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PLAINTIFFS- PETITIONERS'
COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE CLEAR DISTINCTION
BETWEEN CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE AND CLAIMS FOR
COMPENSATION UNDER THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT.
A
In the first assignment of error, petitioners argue that the lower court has
jurisdiction over the cause of action since the complaint is based on the provisions
of the Civil Code on damages, particularly Articles 2176, 2178, 1173, 2201 and
2231, and not on the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. They point out
that the complaint alleges gross and brazen negligence on the part of Philex in
failing to take the necessary security for the protection of the lives of its employees
working underground. They also assert that since Philex opted to file a motion to
dismiss in the court a quo, the allegations in their complaint including those
contained in the annexes are deemed admitted.
In the second assignment of error, petitioners asseverate that respondent Judge
failed to see the distinction between the claims for compensation under the
Workmen's Compensation Act and the claims for damages based on gross

negligence of Philex under the Civil Code. They point out that workmen's
compensation refers to liability for compensation for loss resulting from injury,
disability or death of the working man through industrial accident or disease,
without regard to the fault or negligence of the employer, while the claim for
damages under the Civil Code which petitioners pursued in the regular court, refers
to the employer's liability for reckless and wanton negligence resulting in the death
of the employees and for which the regular court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the
same.
On the other hand, Philex asserts that work-connected injuries are compensable
exclusively under the provisions of Sections 5 and 46 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, which read:
SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.The rights and remedies granted by this
Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation
shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal
representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil
Code and other laws because of said injury ...
SEC. 46. Jurisdiction. The Workmen's Compensation Commissioner shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for compensation under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, subject to appeal to the Supreme Court, ...
Philex cites the case of Manalo vs. Foster Wheeler (98 Phil. 855 [1956]) where it was
held that "all claims of workmen against their employer for damages due to
accident suffered in the course of employment shall be investigated and
adjudicated by the Workmen's Compensation Commission," subject to appeal to the
Supreme Court.
Philex maintains that the fact that an employer was negligent, does not remove the
case from the exclusive character of recoveries under the Workmen's Compensation
Act; because Section 4-A of the Act provides an additional compensation in case the
employer fails to comply with the requirements of safety as imposed by law to
prevent accidents. In fact, it points out that Philex voluntarily paid the compensation
due the petitioners and all the payments have been accepted in behalf of the
deceased miners, except the heirs of Nazarito Floresca who insisted that they are
entitled to a greater amount of damages under the Civil Code.
In the hearing of this case, then Undersecretary of Labor Israel Bocobo, then Atty.
Edgardo Angara, now President of the University of the Philippines, Justice Manuel
Lazaro, as corporate counsel and Assistant General Manager of the GSIS Legal
Affairs Department, and Commissioner on Elections, formerly UP Law Center
Director Froilan Bacungan, appeared as amici curiae and thereafter, submitted their
respective memoranda.
The issue to be resolved as WE stated in the resolution of November 26, 1976, is:

Whether the action of an injured employee or worker or that of his heirs in case of
his death under the Workmen's Compensation Act is exclusive, selective or
cumulative, that is to say, whether his or his heirs' action is exclusively restricted to
seeking the limited compensation provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act
or whether they have a right of selection or choice of action between availing of the
worker's right under the Workmen's Compensation Act and suing in the regular
courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and/or exemplary)
from the employer by virtue of negligence (or fault) of the employer or of his other
employees or whether they may avail cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the
limited compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and sue in addition
for damages in the regular courts.
There are divergent opinions in this case. Justice Lazaro is of the opinion that an
injured employee or worker, or the heirs in case of his death, may initiate a
complaint to recover damages (not compensation under the Workmen's
Compensation Act) with the regular court on the basis of negligence of an employer
pursuant to the Civil Code provisions. Atty. Angara believes otherwise. He submits
that the remedy of an injured employee for work-connected injury or accident is
exclusive in accordance with Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, while
Atty. Bacungan's position is that the action is selective. He opines that the heirs of
the employee in case of his death have a right of choice to avail themselves of the
benefits provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act or to sue in the regular
court under the Civil Code for higher damages from the employer by virtue of
negligence of the latter. Atty. Bocobo's stand is the same as that of Atty. Bacungan
and adds that once the heirs elect the remedy provided for under the Act, they are
no longer entitled to avail themselves of the remedy provided for under the Civil
Code by filing an action for higher damages in the regular court, and vice versa.
On August 3, 1978, petitioners-heirs of deceased employee Nazarito Floresca filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that they have amicably settled their claim with
respondent Philex. In the resolution of September 7, 1978, WE dismissed the
petition only insofar as the aforesaid petitioners are connected, it appearing that
there are other petitioners in this case.
WE hold that the former Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to try the case,
It should be underscored that petitioners' complaint is not for compensation based
on the Workmen's Compensation Act but a complaint for damages (actual,
exemplary and moral) in the total amount of eight hundred twenty-five thousand
(P825,000.00) pesos. Petitioners did not invoke the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act to entitle them to compensation thereunder. In fact, no allegation
appeared in the complaint that the employees died from accident arising out of and
in the course of their employments. The complaint instead alleges gross and
reckless negligence and deliberate failure on the part of Philex to protect the lives of
its workers as a consequence of which a cave-in occurred resulting in the death of

the employees working underground. Settled is the rule that in ascertaining whether
or not the cause of action is in the nature of workmen's compensation claim or a
claim for damages pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code, the test is the
averments or allegations in the complaint (Belandres vs. Lopez Sugar Mill, Co., Inc.,
97 Phil. 100).
In the present case, there exists between Philex and the deceased employees a
contractual relationship. The alleged gross and reckless negligence and deliberate
failure that amount to bad faith on the part of Philex, constitute a breach of contract
for which it may be held liable for damages. The provisions of the Civil Code on
cases of breach of contract when there is fraud or bad faith, read:
Art. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary
damages if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or
malevolent manner.
Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who
acted in good faith is able shall be those that are the natural and probable
consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen
or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.
In cases of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be
responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the nonperformance of the obligation.
Furthermore, Articles 2216 et seq., Civil Code, allow the payment of all kinds of
damages, as assessed by the court.
The rationale in awarding compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act
differs from that in giving damages under the Civil Code. The compensation acts are
based on a theory of compensation distinct from the existing theories of damages,
payments under the acts being made as compensation and not as damages (99
C.J.S. 53). Compensation is given to mitigate the harshness and insecurity of
industrial life for the workman and his family. Hence, an employer is liable whether
negligence exists or not since liability is created by law. Recovery under the Act is
not based on any theory of actionable wrong on the part of the employer (99 C.J.S.
36).
In other words, under the compensation acts, the employer is liable to pay
compensation benefits for loss of income, as long as the death, sickness or injury is
work-connected or work-aggravated, even if the death or injury is not due to the
fault of the employer (Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689). On the other hand,
damages are awarded to one as a vindication of the wrongful invasion of his rights.
It is the indemnity recoverable by a person who has sustained injury either in his
person, property or relative rights, through the act or default of another (25 C.J.S.
452).

The claimant for damages under the Civil Code has the burden of proving the causal
relation between the defendant's negligence and the resulting injury as well as the
damages suffered. While under the Workmen's Compensation Act, there is a
presumption in favor of the deceased or injured employee that the death or injury is
work-connected or work-aggravated; and the employer has the burden to prove
otherwise (De los Angeles vs. GSIS, 94 SCRA 308; Carino vs. WCC, 93 SCRA 551;
Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corp. vs. WCC, 60 SCRA 228).
The claim of petitioners that the case is not cognizable by the Workmen's
Compensation Commission then, now Employees Compensation Commission, is
strengthened by the fact that unlike in the Civil Code, the Workmen's Compensation
Act did not contain any provision for an award of actual, moral and exemplary
damages. What the Act provided was merely the right of the heirs to claim limited
compensation for the death in the amount of six thousand (P6,000.00) pesos plus
burial expenses of two hundred (P200.00) pesos, and medical expenses when
incurred (Sections 8, 12 and 13, Workmen's Compensation Act), and an additional
compensation of only 50% if the complaint alleges failure on the part of the
employer to "install and maintain safety appliances or to take other precautions for
the prevention of accident or occupational disease" (Section 4-A, Ibid.). In the case
at bar, the amount sought to be recovered is over and above that which was
provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act and which cannot be granted by
the Commission.
Moreover, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, compensation benefits should
be paid to an employee who suffered an accident not due to the facilities or lack of
facilities in the industry of his employer but caused by factors outside the industrial
plant of his employer. Under the Civil Code, the liability of the employer, depends on
breach of contract or tort. The Workmen's Compensation Act was specifically
enacted to afford protection to the employees or workmen. It is a social legislation
designed to give relief to the workman who has been the victim of an accident
causing his death or ailment or injury in the pursuit of his employment (Abong vs.
WCC, 54 SCRA 379).
WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in
case of death have a right of selection or choice of action between availing
themselves of the worker's right under the Workmen's Compensation Act and suing
in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and
exemplary) from the employers by virtue of that negligence or fault of the
employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions, i.e.,
collect the limited compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and sue in
addition for damages in the regular courts.
In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 32
SCRA 442, ruled that an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the
employer the fixed amounts set by the Workmen's Compensation Act or to

prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for higher damages but he
cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously.
In Pacaa WE said:
In the analogous case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma, involving the application of
Section 6 of the Workmen's Compensation Act on the injured workers' right to sue
third- party tortfeasors in the regular courts, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, again speaking
for the Court, pointed out that the injured worker has the choice of remedies but
cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously and thus balanced the relative
advantage of recourse under the Workmen's Compensation Act as against an
ordinary action.
As applied to this case, petitioner Esguerra cannot maintain his action for damages
against the respondents (defendants below), because he has elected to seek
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Law, and his claim (case No.
44549 of the Compensation Commission) was being processed at the time he filed
this action in the Court of First Instance. It is argued for petitioner that as the
damages recoverable under the Civil Code are much more extensive than the
amounts that may be awarded under the Workmen's Compensation Act, they should
not be deemed incompatible. As already indicated, the injured laborer was initially
free to choose either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set by the
Compensation Law or else, to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the
tortfeasor for higher damages. While perhaps not as profitable, the smaller
indemnity obtainable by the first course is balanced by the claimant's being relieved
of the burden of proving the causal connection between the defendant's negligence
and the resulting injury, and of having to establish the extent of the damage
suffered; issues that are apt to be troublesome to establish satisfactorily. Having
staked his fortunes on a particular remedy, petitioner is precluded from pursuing
the alternate course, at least until the prior claim is rejected by the Compensation
Commission. Anyway, under the proviso of Section 6 aforequoted, if the employer
Franklin Baker Company recovers, by derivative action against the alleged
tortfeasors, a sum greater than the compensation he may have paid the herein
petitioner, the excess accrues to the latter.
Although the doctrine in the case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma (104 Phil. 582),
applies to third-party tortfeasor, said rule should likewise apply to the employertortfeasor.
Insofar as the heirs of Nazarito Floresca are concerned, as already stated, the
petition has been dismissed in the resolution of September 7, 1978 in view of the
amicable settlement reached by Philex and the said heirs.
With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in its motion to dismiss
dated May 14, 1968 before the court a quo, that the heirs of the deceased
employees, namely Emerito Obra, Larry Villar, Jr., Aurelio Lanuza, Lorenzo Isla and

Saturnino Martinez submitted notices and claims for compensation to the Regional
Office No. 1 of the then Department of Labor and all of them have been paid in full
as of August 25, 1967, except Saturnino Martinez whose heirs decided that they be
paid in installments (pp. 106-107, rec.). Such allegation was admitted by herein
petitioners in their opposition to the motion to dismiss dated May 27, 1968 (pp. 121122, rec.) in the lower court, but they set up the defense that the claims were filed
under the Workmen's Compensation Act before they learned of the official report of
the committee created to investigate the accident which established the criminal
negligence and violation of law by Philex, and which report was forwarded by the
Director of Mines to the then Executive Secretary Rafael Salas in a letter dated
October 19, 1967 only (p. 76, rec.).
WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an action
before the regular court because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has
been remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners only after
receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of said violation
of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they would not
have sought redress under the Workmen's Compensation Commission which
awarded a lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy was
based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an
intelligent choice. The case should therefore be remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings. However, should the petitioners be successful in their bid
before the lower court, the payments made under the Workmen's Compensation Act
should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor.
B
Contrary to the perception of the dissenting opinion, the Court does not legislate in
the instant case. The Court merely applies and gives effect to the constitutional
guarantees of social justice then secured by Section 5 of Article 11 and Section 6 of
Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, and now by Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Article 11 of
the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES of the 1973 Constitution, as
amended, and as implemented by Articles 2176, 2177, 2178, 1173, 2201, 2216,
2231 and 2232 of the New Civil Code of 1950.
To emphasize, the 1935 Constitution declares that:
Sec. 5. The promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all the people should be the concern of the State (Art. II).
Sec. 6. The State shall afford protection to labor, especially to working women, and
minors, and shall regulate the relations between landowner and tenant, and
between labor and capital in industry and in agriculture. The State may provide for
compulsory arbitration (Art. XIV).

The 1973 Constitution likewise commands the State to "promote social justice to
insure the dignity, welfare, and security of all the people "... regulate the use ... and
disposition of private property and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits
"establish, maintain and ensure adequate social services in, the field
of education, health, housing, employment, welfare and social security to guarantee
the enjoyment by the people of a decent standard of living" (Sections 6 and 7, Art.
II, 1973 Constitution); "... afford protection to labor, ... and regulate the relations
between workers and employers ..., and assure the rights of workers to ... just and
humane conditions of work"(Sec. 9, Art. II, 1973 Constitution, emphasis supplied).
The foregoing constitutional guarantees in favor of labor institutionalized in Section
9 of Article 11 of the 1973 Constitution and re-stated as a declaration of basic policy
in Article 3 of the New Labor Code, thus:
Art. 3. Declaration of basic policy.The State shall afford protection to labor,
promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race
or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers. The State
shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security
of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. (emphasis supplied).
The aforestated constitutional principles as implemented by the aforementioned
articles of the New Civil Code cannot be impliedly repealed by the restrictive
provisions of Article 173 of the New Labor Code. Section 5 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act (before it was amended by R.A. No. 772 on June 20, 1952),
predecessor of Article 173 of the New Labor Code, has been superseded by the
aforestated provisions of the New Civil Code, a subsequent law, which took effect on
August 30, 1950, which obey the constitutional mandates of social justice
enhancing as they do the rights of the workers as against their employers. Article
173 of the New Labor Code seems to diminish the rights of the workers and
therefore collides with the social justice guarantee of the Constitution and the
liberal provisions of the New Civil Code.
The guarantees of social justice embodied in Sections 6, 7 and 9 of Article II of the
1973 Constitution are statements of legal principles to be applied and enforced by
the courts. Mr. Justice Robert Jackson in the case of West Virginia State Board of
Education vs. Barnette, with characteristic eloquence, enunciated:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities
and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.
One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of
worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote;
they depend on the outcome of no elections (319 U.S. 625, 638, 87 L.ed. 1638,
emphasis supplied).

In case of any doubt which may be engendered by Article 173 of the New Labor
Code, both the New Labor Code and the Civil Code direct that the doubts should be
resolved in favor of the workers and employees.
Thus, Article 4 of the New Labor Code, otherwise known as Presidential Decree No.
442, as amended, promulgated on May 1, 1974, but which took effect six months
thereafter, provides that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the
provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be
resolved in favor of labor" (Art. 2, Labor Code).
Article 10 of the New Civil Code states: "In case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is presumed that the law-making body intended right and
justice to prevail. "
More specifically, Article 1702 of the New Civil Code likewise directs that. "In case of
doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the
safety and decent living of the laborer."
Before it was amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, Section 5
of the Workmen's Compensation Act provided:
Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.- The rights and remedies granted by this
Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation
shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal
representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil
Code and other laws, because of said injury (emphasis supplied).
Employers contracting laborecsrs in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same
may stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall
apply exclusively to injuries received outside the Islands through accidents
happening in and during the performance of the duties of the employment; and all
service contracts made in the manner prescribed in this section shall be presumed
to include such agreement.
Only the second paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act No.
3428, was amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, thus:
Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.- The rights and remedies granted by this
Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation
shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal
representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil
Code and other laws, because of said injury.
Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same
shall stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall
apply to injuries received outside the Island through accidents happening in and
during the performance of the duties of the employment. Such stipulation shall not

prejudice the right of the laborers to the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation
Law of the place where the accident occurs, should such law be more favorable to
them (As amended by section 5 of Republic Act No. 772).
Article 173 of the New Labor Code does not repeal expressly nor impliedly the
applicable provisions of the New Civil Code, because said Article 173 provides:
Art. 173. Exclusiveness of liability.- Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the
State Insurance Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other
liabilities of the employer to the employee, his dependents or anyone otherwise
entitled to receive damages on behalf of the employee or his dependents. The
payment of compensation under this Title shall bar the recovery of benefits as
provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, Republic Act
Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-one, as amended, Commonwealth Act Numbered
One hundred eighty- six, as amended, Commonwealth Act Numbered Six hundred
ten, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Forty-eight hundred Sixty-four, as
amended, and other laws whose benefits are administered by the System during the
period of such payment for the same disability or death, and conversely (emphasis
supplied).
As above-quoted, Article 173 of the New Labor Code expressly repealed only
Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, R.A. No. 1161, as amended, C.A.
No. 186, as amended, R.A. No. 610, as amended, R.A. No. 4864, as amended, and
all other laws whose benefits are administered by the System (referring to the GSIS
or SSS).
Unlike Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act as aforequoted, Article 173 of
the New Labor Code does not even remotely, much less expressly, repeal the New
Civil Code provisions heretofore quoted.
It is patent, therefore, that recovery under the New Civil Code for damages arising
from negligence, is not barred by Article 173 of the New Labor Code. And the
damages recoverable under the New Civil Code are not administered by the System
provided for by the New Labor Code, which defines the "System" as referring to the
Government Service Insurance System or the Social Security System (Art. 167 [c],
[d] and [e] of the New Labor Code).
Furthermore, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, decisions of the Supreme Court
form part of the law of the land.
Article 8 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
The Court, through the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, in People vs. Licera ruled:

Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions applying
or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal
system. These decisions, although in themselves not laws, constitute evidence of
what the laws mean. The application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a
law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the
Court's application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect" (65 SCRA 270,
272-273 [1975]).
WE ruled that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as
the statute itself (Caltex vs. Palomer, 18 SCRA 247; 124 Phil. 763).
The aforequoted provisions of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, before
and after it was amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, limited
the right of recovery in favor of the deceased, ailing or injured employee to the
compensation provided for therein. Said Section 5 was not accorded controlling
application by the Supreme Court in the 1970 case of Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus
Company (32 SCRA 442) when WE ruled that an injured worker has a choice of
either to recover from the employer the fixed amount set by the Workmen's
Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for
greater damages; but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously. Said
Pacana case penned by Mr. Justice Teehankee, applied Article 1711 of the Civil Code
as against the Workmen's Compensation Act, reiterating the 1969 ruling in the case
of Valencia vs. Manila Yacht Club (28 SCRA 724, June 30,1969) and the 1958 case of
Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma (104 Phil. 582), both penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes. Said
Pacana case was concurred in by Justices J.B.L. Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Castro, Fernando and Villamor.
Since the first sentence of Article 173 of the New Labor Code is merely a restatement of the first paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act,
as amended, and does not even refer, neither expressly nor impliedly, to the Civil
Code as Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act did, with greater reason said
Article 173 must be subject to the same interpretation adopted in the cases of
Pacana, Valencia and Esguerra aforementioned as the doctrine in the aforesaid
three (3) cases is faithful to and advances the social justice guarantees enshrined in
both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
It should be stressed likewise that there is no similar provision on social justice in
the American Federal Constitution, nor in the various state constitutions of the
American Union. Consequently, the restrictive nature of the American decisions on
the Workmen's Compensation Act cannot limit the range and compass of OUR
interpretation of our own laws, especially Article 1711 of the New Civil Code, vis-avis Article 173 of the New Labor Code, in relation to Section 5 of Article II and
Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution then, and now Sections 6, 7 and 9

of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies of Article II of the 1973

Constitution.
The dissent seems to subordinate the life of the laborer to the property rights of the
employer. The right to life is guaranteed specifically by the due process clause of
the Constitution. To relieve the employer from liability for the death of his workers
arising from his gross or wanton fault or failure to provide safety devices for the
protection of his employees or workers against the dangers which are inherent in
underground mining, is to deprive the deceased worker and his heirs of the right to
recover indemnity for the loss of the life of the worker and the consequent loss to
his family without due process of law. The dissent in effect condones and therefore
encourages such gross or wanton neglect on the part of the employer to comply
with his legal obligation to provide safety measures for the protection of the life,
limb and health of his worker. Even from the moral viewpoint alone, such attitude is
un-Christian.
It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of the
Constitution, as implemented by the provisions of the New Civil Code, is not an
exercise of the power of law-making, but is rendering obedience to the mandates of
the fundamental law and the implementing legislation aforementioned.
The Court, to repeat, is not legislating in the instant case.
It is axiomatic that no ordinary statute can override a constitutional provision.
The words of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and of Article 173 of the
New Labor Code subvert the rights of the petitioners as surviving heirs of the
deceased mining employees. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and
Article 173 of the New Labor Code are retrogressive; because they are a throwback
to the obsolete laissez-faire doctrine of Adam Smith enunciated in 1776 in his
treatise Wealth of Nations (Collier's Encyclopedia, Vol. 21, p. 93, 1964), which has
been discarded soon after the close of the 18th century due to the Industrial
Revolution that generated the machines and other mechanical devices (beginning
with Eli Whitney's cotton gin of 1793 and Robert Fulton's steamboat of 1807) for
production and transportation which are dangerous to life, limb and health. The old
socio-political-economic philosophy of live-and-let-live is now superdesed by the
benign Christian shibboleth of live-and-help others to live. Those who profess to be
Christians should not adhere to Cain's selfish affirmation that he is not his brother's
keeper. In this our civilization, each one of us is our brother's keeper. No man is an
island. To assert otherwise is to be as atavistic and ante-deluvian as the 1837 case
of Prisley vs. Fowler (3 MN 1,150 reprint 1030) invoked by the dissent, The Prisley
case was decided in 1837 during the era of economic royalists and robber barons of
America. Only ruthless, unfeeling capitalistics and egoistic reactionaries continue to
pay obeisance to such un-Christian doctrine. The Prisley rule humiliates man and
debases him; because the decision derisively refers to the lowly worker as "servant"

and utilizes with aristocratic arrogance "master" for "employer." It robs man of his
inherent dignity and dehumanizes him. To stress this affront to human dignity, WE
only have to restate the quotation from Prisley, thus: "The mere relation of the
master and the servant never can imply an obligation on the part of the master to
take more care of the servant than he may reasonably be expected to do himself."
This is the very selfish doctrine that provoked the American Civil War which
generated so much hatred and drew so much precious blood on American plains
and valleys from 1861 to 1864.
"Idolatrous reverence" for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit
of the law insures man's survival and ennobles him. In the words of Shakespeare,
"the letter of the law killeth; its spirit giveth life."
C
It is curious that the dissenting opinion clings to the myth that the courts cannot
legislate.
That myth had been exploded by Article 9 of the New Civil Code, which provides
that "No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence,
obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. "
Hence, even the legislator himself, through Article 9 of the New Civil Code,
recognizes that in certain instances, the court, in the language of Justice Holmes,
"do and must legislate" to fill in the gaps in the law; because the mind of the
legislator, like all human beings, is finite and therefore cannot envisage all possible
cases to which the law may apply Nor has the human mind the infinite capacity to
anticipate all situations.
But about two centuries before Article 9 of the New Civil Code, the founding fathers
of the American Constitution foresaw and recognized the eventuality that the courts
may have to legislate to supply the omissions or to clarify the ambiguities in the
American Constitution and the statutes.
'Thus, Alexander Hamilton pragmatically admits that judicial legislation may be
justified but denies that the power of the Judiciary to nullify statutes may give rise
to Judicial tyranny (The Federalist, Modern Library, pp. 503-511, 1937 ed.). Thomas
Jefferson went farther to concede that the court is even independent of the Nation
itself (A.F.L. vs. American Sash Company, 1949 335 US 538).
Many of the great expounders of the American Constitution likewise share the same
view. Chief Justice Marshall pronounced: "It is emphatically the province and duty of
the Judicial department to say what the law is (Marbury vs. Madison I Cranch 127
1803), which was re-stated by Chief Justice Hughes when he said that "the
Constitution is what the judge says it is (Address on May 3, 1907, quoted by
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt on March 9, 1937). This was reiterated by

Justice Cardozo who pronounced that "No doubt the limits for the judge are
narrower. He legislates only between gaps. He fills the open spaces in the law. "
(The Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 113). In the language of Chief Justice Harlan F.
Stone, "The only limit to the judicial legislation is the restraint of the judge" (U.S. vs.
Butler 297 U.S. 1 Dissenting Opinion, p. 79), which view is also entertained by
Justice Frankfurter and Justice Robert Jackson. In the rhetoric of Justice Frankfurter,
"the courts breathe life, feeble or strong, into the inert pages of the Constitution and
all statute books."
It should be stressed that the liability of the employer under Section 5 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act or Article 173 of the New Labor Code is limited to
death, ailment or injury caused by the nature of the work, without any fault on the
part of the employers. It is correctly termed no fault liability. Section 5 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, or Article 173 of the New Labor Code,
does not cover the tortious liability of the employer occasioned by his fault or
culpable negligence in failing to provide the safety devices required by the law for
the protection of the life, limb and health of the workers. Under either Section 5 or
Article 173, the employer remains liable to pay compensation benefits to the
employee whose death, ailment or injury is work-connected, even if the employer
has faithfully and diligently furnished all the safety measures and contrivances
decreed by the law to protect the employee.
The written word is no longer the "sovereign talisman." In the epigrammatic
language of Mr. Justice Cardozo, "the law has outgrown its primitive stage of
formalism when the precise word was the sovereign talisman, and every slip was
fatal" (Wood vs. Duff Gordon 222 NW 88; Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process
100). Justice Cardozo warned that: "Sometimes the conservatism of judges has
threatened for an interval to rob the legislation of its efficacy. ... Precedents
established in those items exert an unhappy influence even now" (citing Pound,
Common Law and Legislation 21 Harvard Law Review 383, 387).
Finally, Justice Holmes delivered the coup de grace when he pragmatically admitted,
although with a cautionary undertone: "that judges do and must legislate, but they
can do so only interstitially they are confined from molar to molecular motions"
(Southern Pacific Company vs. Jensen, 244 US 204 1917). And in the subsequent
case of Springer vs. Government (277 US 188, 210-212, 72 L.ed. 845, 852- 853),
Justice Holmes pronounced:
The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black
and white. Even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra
shading gradually from one extreme to the other. x x x. When we come to the
fundamental distinctions it is still more obvious that they must be received with a
certain latitude or our government could not go on.

To make a rule of conduct applicable to an individual who but for such action would
be free from it is to legislate yet it is what the judges do whenever they determine
which of two competing principles of policy shall prevail.
xxx xxx xxx
It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by
veiling words we do not and cannot carry out the distinction between legislative and
executive action with mathematical precision and divide the branches into
waterlight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so, which I am far from
believing that it is, or that the Constitution requires.
True, there are jurists and legal writers who affirm that judges should not legislate,
but grudgingly concede that in certain cases judges do legislate. They criticize the
assumption by the courts of such law-making power as dangerous for it may
degenerate into Judicial tyranny. They include Blackstone, Jeremy Bentham, Justice
Black, Justice Harlan, Justice Roberts, Justice David Brewer, Ronald Dworkin, Rolf
Sartorious, Macklin Fleming and Beryl Harold Levy. But said Justices, jurists or legal
commentators, who either deny the power of the courts to legislate in-between
gaps of the law, or decry the exercise of such power, have not pointed to examples
of the exercise by the courts of such law-making authority in the interpretation and
application of the laws in specific cases that gave rise to judicial tyranny or
oppression or that such judicial legislation has not protected public interest or
individual welfare, particularly the lowly workers or the underprivileged.
On the other hand, there are numerous decisions interpreting the Bill of Rights and
statutory enactments expanding the scope of such provisions to protect human
rights. Foremost among them is the doctrine in the cases of Miranda vs. Arizona
(384 US 436 1964), Gideon vs. Wainright (372 US 335), Escubedo vs. Illinois (378 US
478), which guaranteed the accused under custodial investigation his rights to
remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights as even as it protects
him against the use of force or intimidation to extort confession from him. These
rights are not found in the American Bill of Rights. These rights are now
institutionalized in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. Only the peaceand-order adherents were critical of the activism of the American Supreme Court led
by Chief Justice Earl Warren.
Even the definition of Identical offenses for purposes of the double jeopardy
provision was developed by American judicial decisions, not by amendment to the
Bill of Rights on double jeopardy (see Justice Laurel in People vs. Tarok, 73 Phil. 260,
261-268). And these judicial decisions have been re-stated in Section 7 of Rule 117
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as well as in Section 9 of Rule 117 of the
1964 Revised Rules of Court. In both provisions, the second offense is the same as
the first offense if the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or frustration
thereof or necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first offense.

The requisites of double jeopardy are not spelled out in the Bill of Rights. They were
also developed by judicial decisions in the United States and in the Philippines even
before people vs. Ylagan (58 Phil. 851-853).
Again, the equal protection clause was interpreted in the case of Plessy vs. Ferguson
(163 US 537) as securing to the Negroes equal but separate facilities, which
doctrine was revoked in the case of Brown vs. Maryland Board of Education (349 US
294), holding that the equal protection clause means that the Negroes are entitled
to attend the same schools attended by the whites-equal facilities in the same
school-which was extended to public parks and public buses.
De-segregation, not segregation, is now the governing principle.
Among other examples, the due process clause was interpreted in the case of
People vs. Pomar (46 Phil. 440) by a conservative, capitalistic court to invalidate a
law granting maternity leave to working women-according primacy to property
rights over human rights. The case of People vs. Pomar is no longer the rule.
As early as 1904, in the case of Lochner vs. New York (198 US 45, 76, 49 L. ed. 937,
949), Justice Holmes had been railing against the conservatism of Judges perverting
the guarantee of due process to protect property rights as against human rights or
social justice for the working man. The law fixing maximum hours of labor was
invalidated. Justice Holmes was vindicated finally in 1936 in the case of West Coast
Hotel vs. Parish (300 US 377-79; 81 L. ed. 703) where the American Supreme Court
upheld the rights of workers to social justice in the form of guaranteed minimum
wage for women and minors, working hours not exceeding eight (8) daily, and
maternity leave for women employees.
The power of judicial review and the principle of separation of powers as well as the
rule on political questions have been evolved and grafted into the American
Constitution by judicial decisions (Marbury vs. Madison, supra Coleman vs. Miller,
307 US 433, 83 L. ed. 1385; Springer vs. Government, 277 US 210-212, 72 L. ed.
852, 853).
It is noteworthy that Justice Black, who seems to be against judicial legislation,
penned a separate concurring opinion in the case of Coleman vs. Miller, supra,
affirming the doctrine of political question as beyond the ambit of judicial review.
There is nothing in both the American and Philippine Constitutions expressly
providing that the power of the courts is limited by the principle of separation of
powers and the doctrine on political questions. There are numerous cases in
Philippine jurisprudence applying the doctrines of separation of powers and political
questions and invoking American precedents.
Unlike the American Constitution, both the 1935 and 1973 Philippine Constitutions
expressly vest in the Supreme Court the power to review the validity or
constitutionality of any legislative enactment or executive act.

WHEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS HEREBY REVERSED AND

SET ASIDE AND THE CASE IS REMANDED TO IT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
SHOULD A GREATER AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BE DECREED IN FAVOR OF HEREIN
PETITIONERS, THE PAYMENTS ALREADY MADE TO THEM PURSUANT TO THE
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT SHALL BE DEDUCTED. NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Plana, Escolin, De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay JJ.,
concur.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
Abad Santos and Relova, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

A
This case involves a complaint for damages for the death of five employees of
PHILEX Mining Corporation under the general provisions of the Civil Code. The Civil
Code itself, however, provides for its non-applicability to the complaint. It is
specifically provided in Article 2196 of the Code, found in Title XVIII-Damages that:
COMPENSATION FOR WORKMEN AND OTHER EMPLOYEES IN CASE OF DEATH, INJURY
OR ILLNESS IS REGULATED BY SPECIAL LAWS.
Compensation and damages are synonymous. In Esguerra vs. Muoz Palma, etc., et
al., 104 Phil. 582, 586, Justice J.B.L. Reyes had said:
Petitioner also avers that compensation is not damages. This argument is but a play
on words. The term compensation' is used in the law (Act 3812 and Republic Act
772) in the sense of indemnity for damages suffered, being awarded for a personal
injury caused or aggravated by or in the course of employment. ...
By the very provisions of the Civil Code, it is a "special law", not the Code itself,
which has to apply to the complaint involved in the instant case. That "special law",
in reference to the complaint, can be no other than the Workmen's Compensation
Even assuming, without conceding, that an employee is entitled to an election of
remedies, as the majority rules, both options cannot be exercised simultaneously,

and the exercise of one will preclude the exercise of the other. The petitioners had
already exercised their option to come under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and
they have already received compensation payable to them under that Act. Stated
differently, the remedy under the Workmen's Compensation Act had already
become a "finished transaction".
There are two considerations why it is believed petitioners should no longer be
allowed to exercise the option to sue under the Civil Code. In the first place, the
proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act have already become the law
in regards to" the "election of remedies", because those proceedings had become a
"finished transaction".
In the second place, it should be plainly equitable that, if a person entitled to an
"election of remedies" makes a first election and accepts the benefits thereof, he
should no longer be allowed to avail himself of the second option. At the very least,
if he wants to make a second election, in disregard of the first election he has made,
when he makes the second election he should surrender the benefits he had
obtained under the first election, This was not done in the case before the Court.
B.
'There is full concurrence on my part with the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Gutierrez upholding "the exclusory provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act." I
may further add:
1. The Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 3428) was approved on December 10,
1927 and took effect on June 10, 1928. It was patterned from Minnesota and Hawaii
statutes.
Act No. 3428 was adopted by the Philippine legislature, in Spanish and some
sections of the law were taken from the statutes of Minnesota and Hawaii, (Chapter
209 of the Revised Laws of Hawaii, 1925). [Morabe & Inton, Workmen's
Compensation Act, p. 2]
Under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Hawaii, when the Act is applicable, the
remedy under the Act is exclusive The following is stated in 1 Schneider Workmen's
Compensation Text, pp. 266, 267.
Sec. 112. Hawaii
Statutory Synopsis. The act is compulsory as to employees in 'all industrial
employment' and employees of the territory and its political subdivisions. (Sections
7480-7481, S.S., Vol. 1, p. 713.)
Compensation is not payable when injury is due to employee's willful intention to
injure himself or another or to his intoxication. (Sec. 7482, S.S., p. 713.)

When the act is applicable the remedy thereunder is exclusive (Sec. 7483, S.S., p.
714.)
2. In providing for exclusiveness of the remedy under our Workmen's Compensation
Act, the Philippine Legislature worded the first paragraph of Section 5 of the Act as
follows:
SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.-The rights and remedies granted by this
Act to an employee
by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation
shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal
representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer
under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said injury (Paragraphing and
emphasis supplied)
In regards to the intent of the Legislature under the foregoing provision:
A cardinal rule in the interpretation of statutes is that the meaning and intention of
the law-making body must be sought, first of all in the words of the statute itself,
read and considered in their natural, ordinary, commonly-accepted and most
obvious significations, according to good and approved usage and without resorting
to forced or subtle construction Courts, therefore, as a rule, cannot presume that
the law-making body does not know the meaning of words and the rules of
grammar. Consequently, the grammatical reading of a statute must be presumed to
yield its correct sense. (Espino vs. Cleofe 52 SCRA 92, 98) [Italics supplied]
3. The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided:
Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same
shall stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall
apply exclusively to injuries received outside the Islands through accidents
happening in and during the performance of the duties of the employment. (Italics
supplied)
The use of the word "exclusively is a further confirmation of the exclusory provision
of the Act, subject only to exceptions which may be provided in the Act itself.
4. It might be mentioned that, within the Act itself, provision is made for remedies
other than within the Act itself. Thus, Section 6, in part, provides:
SEC. 6. Liability of third parties.-In case an employee suffers an injury for which
compensation is due under this Act by any other person besides his employer, it
shall be optional with such injured employee either to claim compensation from his
employer, under this Act, or sue such other person for damages, in accordance with
law; ... (Emphasis supplied)

If the legislative intent under the first paragraph of Section 5 were to allow the
injured employee to sue his employer under the Civil Code, the legislator could very
easily have formulated the said first paragraph of Section 5 according to the pattern
of Section 6. That that was not done shows the legislative intent not to allow any
option to an employee to sue the employer under the Civil Code for injuries
compensable under the Act.
5. There should be no question but that the original first paragraph of Section 5 of
the Workmen's Compensation Act, formulated in 1927, provided that an injured
worker or employee, or his heirs, if entitled to compensation under the Act, cannot
have independent recourse neither to the Civil Code nor to any other law relative to
the liability of the employer. After 1927, there were occasions when the legislator
had the opportunity to amend the first paragraph of Section 5 such that the
remedies under the Act would not be exclusive; yet, the legislator refrained from
doing so. That shows the legislatives continuing intent to maintain the exclusory
provision of the first paragraph of Section 5 unless otherwise provided in the Act
itself.
(a) The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided:
Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same
shall stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall
apply (exclusively) to injuries received outside the Islands through accidents
happening in and during the performance of the duties of the employment (and all
service contracts made in the manner prescribed in this section be presumed to
include such agreement).
On June 20, 1952, through RA 772, the foregoing second paragraph was amended
with the elimination of the underlined words in parentheses, and the addition of this
sentence at the end of the paragraph:
Such stipulation shall not prejudice the right of the laborers to the benefits of the
Workmen's Compensation Law of the place where the accident occurs, should such
law be more favorable to them. (Emphasis supplied)
It will be seen that, within the Act itself, the exclusory character of the Act was
amended. At that time, if he had so desired, the legislator could have amended the
first paragraph of Section 5 so that the employee would have the option to sue the
employer under the Act, or under the Civil Code, should the latter be more favorable
to him.
(b) The Workmen's Compensation Act, which took effect in 1927, grants
compensation to an injured employee without regard to the presence or absence of
negligence on the part of the employer. The compensation is deemed an expense
chargeable to the industry (Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689 [1938]).

In time, it must have been thought that it was inequitable to have the amount of
compensation, caused by negligence on the part of the employer, to be the same
amount payable when the employer was not negligent. Based on that thinking,
Section 4-A 1 was included into the Act, on June 20, 1952, through RA 772. Said
Section 4-A increased the compensation payable by 50% in case there was
negligence on the part of the employer. That additional section evidenced the intent
of the legislator not to give an option to an employee, injured with negligence on
the part of the employer, to sue the latter under the provisions of the Civil Code.
On June 20, 1964, Section 4-A was amended (insubstantially) by RA 4119. The
legislator was again given the opportunity to provide, but he did not, the option to
an employee to sue under the Act or under the Civil Code.
When a Court gives effect to a statute not in accordance with the intent of the lawmaker, the Court is unjustifiably legislating.
It is in view of the foregoing that I vote for affirmation of the trial Court's dismissal
of the Complaint.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
To grant the petition and allow the victims of industrial accidents to file damages
suits based on torts would be a radical innovation not only contrary to the express
provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act but a departure from the principles
evolved in the long history of workmen's compensation. At the very least, it should
be the legislature and not this Court which should remove the exclusory provision of
the Workmen's Compensation Act, a provision reiterated in the present Labor Code
on employees' compensation.
Workmen's compensation evolved to remedy the evils associated with the situation
in the early years of the industrial revolution when injured workingmen had to rely
on damage suits to get recompense.
Before workmen's compensation, an injured worker seeking damages would have to
prove in a tort suit that his employer was either negligent or in bad faith, that his
injury was caused by the employer and not a fellow worker, and that he was not
guilty of contributory negligence. The employer could employ not only his wealth in
defeating the claim for damages but a host of common law defenses available to
him as well. The worker was supposed to know what he entered into when he
accepted employment. As stated in the leading case of Priestley u. Fowler (3 M. &
W. 1, 150 Reprint 1030) decided in 1837 "the mere relation of the master and the
servant never can imply an obligation on the part of the master to take more care of
the servant than he may reasonably be expected to do of himself." By entering into
a contract of employment, the worker was deemed to accept the risks of
employment that he should discover and guard against himself.

The problems associated with the application of the fellow servant rule, the
assumption of risk doctrine, the principle of contributory negligence, and the many
other defenses so easily raised in protracted damage suits illustrated the need for a
system whereby workers had only to prove the fact of covered employment and the
fact of injury arising from employment in order to be compensated.
The need for a compensation scheme where liability is created solely by statute and
made compulsory and where the element of fault-either the fault of the employer or
the fault of the employee-disregarded became obvious. Another objective was to
have simplified, expeditious, inexpensive, and non-litigious procedures so that
victims of industrial accidents could more readily, if not automatically, receive
compensation for work-related injuries.
Inspite of common law defenses to defeat a claim being recognized, employers'
liability acts were a major step in the desired direction. However, employers liability
legislation proved inadequate. Legislative reform led to the workmen's
compensation.
I cite the above familiar background because workmen's compensation represents a
compromise. In return for the near certainty of receiving a sum of money fixed by
law, the injured worker gives up the right to subject the employer to a tort suit for
huge amounts of damages. Thus, liability not only disregards the element of fault
but it is also a pre- determined amount based on the wages of the injured worker
and in certain cases, the actual cost of rehabilitation. The worker does not receive
the total damages for his pain and suffering which he could otherwise claim in a civil
suit. The employer is required to act swiftly on compensation claims. An
administrative agency supervises the program. And because the overwhelming
mass of workingmen are benefited by the compensation system, individual workers
who may want to sue for big amounts of damages must yield to the interests of
their entire working class.
The nature of the compensation principle is explained as follows:
An appreciation of the nature of the compensation principle is essential to an
understanding of the acts and the cases interpreting them.
By the turn of the century it was apparent that the toll of industrial accidents of
both the avoidable and unavoidable variety had become enormous, and
government was faced with the problem of who was to pay for the human wreckage
wrought by the dangers of modern industry. If the accident was avoidable and could
be attributed to the carelessness of the employer, existing tort principles offered
some measure of redress. Even here, however, the woeful inadequacy of the fault
principle was manifest. The uncertainty of the outcome of torts litigation in court
placed the employee at a substantial disadvantage. So long as liability depended on
fault there could be no recovery until the finger of blame had been pointed officially
at the employer or his agents. In most cases both the facts and the law were

uncertain. The witnesses, who were usually fellow workers of the victim, were torn
between friendship or loyalty to their class, on the one hand, and fear of reprisal by
the employer, on the other. The expense and delay of litigation often prompted the
injured employee to accept a compromise settlement for a fraction of the full value
of his claim. Even if suit were successfully prosecuted, a large share of the proceeds
of the judgment were exacted as contingent fees by counsel. Thus the employer
against whom judgment was cast often paid a substantial damage bill, while only a
part of this enured to the benefit of the injured employee or his dependents. The
employee's judgment was nearly always too little and too late.
xxx xxx xxx
Workmen's Compensation rests upon the economic principle that those persons who
enjoy the product of a business- whether it be in the form of goods or servicesshould ultimately bear the cost of the injuries or deaths that are incident to the
manufacture, preparation and distribution of the product. ...
xxx xxx xxx
Under this approach the element of personal fault either disappears entirely or is
subordinated to broader economic considerations. The employer absorbs the cost of
accident loss only initially; it is expected that this cost will eventually pass down the
stream of commerce in the form of increase price until it is spread in dilution among
the ultimate consumers. So long as each competing unit in a given industry is
uniformly affected, no producer can gain any substantial competitive advantage or
suffer any appreciable loss by reason of the general adoption of the compensation
principle.
In order that the compensation principle may operate properly and with fairness to
all parties it is essential that the anticipated accident cost be predictable and that it
be fixed at a figure that will not disrupt too violently the traffic in the product of the
industry affected. Thus predictability and moderateness of cost are necessary from
the broad economic viewpoint. ....
Compensation, then, differs from the conventional damage suit in two important
respects: Fault on the part of either employer or employee is eliminated; and
compensation payable according to a definitely limited schedule is substituted for
damages. All compensation acts alike work these two major changes, irrespective of
how they may differ in other particulars.
Compensation, when regarded from the viewpoint of employer and employee
represents a compromise in which each party surrenders certain advantages in
order to gain others which are of more importance both to him and to society. The
employer gives up the immunity he otherwise would enjoy in cases where he is not
at fault, and the employee surrenders his former right to full damages and accepts
instead a more modest claim for bare essentials, represented by compensation.

The importance of the compromise character of compensation cannot be

overemphasized. The statutes vary a great deal with reference to the proper point
of balance. The amount of weekly compensation payments and the length of the
period during which compensation is to be paid are matters concerning which the
acts differ considerably. The interpretation of any compensation statute will be
influenced greatly by the court's reaction to the basic point of compromise
established in the Act. If the court feels that the basic compromise unduly favors the
employer, it will be tempted to restore what it regards as a proper balance by
adopting an interpretation that favors the worker. In this way, a compensation act
drawn in a spirit of extreme conservatism may be transformed by a sympathetic
court into a fairly liberal instrument; and conversely, an act that greatly favors the
laborer may be so interpreted by the courts that employers can have little reason to
complain. Much of the unevenness and apparent conflict in compensation decisions
throughout the various jurisdictions must be attributed to this." (Malone & Plant,
Workmen's Compensation American Casebook Series, pp. 63-65).
The schedule of compensation, the rates of payments, the compensable injuries and
diseases, the premiums paid by employers to the present system, the actuarial
stability of the trust fund and many other interrelated parts have all been carefully
studied before the integrated scheme was enacted in to law. We have a system
whose parts must mesh harmonious with one another if it is to succeed. The basic
theory has to be followed.
If this Court disregards this totality of the scheme and in a spirit of generosity
recasts some parts of the system without touching the related others, the entire
structure is endangered. For instance, I am personally against stretching the law
and allowing payment of compensation for contingencies never envisioned to be
compensable when the law was formulated. Certainly, only harmful results to the
principle of workmen's compensation can arise if workmen, whom the law allows to
receive employment compensation, can still elect to file damage suits for industrial
accidents. It was precisely for this reason that Section 5 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, which reads:
SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.-The rights and remedies granted by this
Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation
shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal
representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil
Code and other laws because of said injury. ...
Article 173 of the labor Code also provides:
ART. 173. Exclusivenesss of liability.Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the
State Insurance Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other
liabilities of the employer to the employee his dependents or anyone otherwise
entitled to receive damages on behalf of the employee or his dependents.

I am against the Court assuming the role of legislator in a matter calling for
actuarial studies and public hearings. If employers already required to contribute to
the State Insurance Fund will still have to bear the cost of damage suits or get
insurance for that purpose, a major study will be necessary. The issue before us is
more far reaching than the interests of the poor victims and their families. All
workers covered by workmen's compensation and all employers who employ
covered employees are affected. Even as I have deepest sympathies for the victims,
I regret that I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion.

Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

A
This case involves a complaint for damages for the death of five employees of
PHILEX Mining Corporation under the general provisions of the Civil Code. The Civil
Code itself, however, provides for its non-applicability to the complaint. It is
specifically provided in Article 2196 of the Code, found in Title XVIII-Damages that:
COMPENSATION FOR WORKMEN AND OTHER EMPLOYEES IN CASE OF DEATH, INJURY
OR ILLNESS IS REGULATED BY SPECIAL LAWS.
Compensation and damages are synonymous. In Esguerra vs. Muoz Palma, etc., et
al., 104 Phil. 582, 586, Justice J.B.L. Reyes had said:
Petitioner also avers that compensation is not damages. This argument is but a play
on words. The term compensation' is used in the law (Act 3812 and Republic Act
772) in the sense of indemnity for damages suffered, being awarded for a personal
injury caused or aggravated by or in the course of employment. ...
By the very provisions of the Civil Code, it is a "special law", not the Code itself,
which has to apply to the complaint involved in the instant case. That "special law",
in reference to the complaint, can be no other than the Workmen's Compensation
Even assuming, without conceding, that an employee is entitled to an election of
remedies, as the majority rules, both options cannot be exercised simultaneously,
and the exercise of one will preclude the exercise of the other. The petitioners had
already exercised their option to come under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and
they have already received compensation payable to them under that Act. Stated
differently, the remedy under the Workmen's Compensation Act had already
become a "finished transaction".

There are two considerations why it is believed petitioners should no longer be

allowed to exercise the option to sue under the Civil Code. In the first place, the
proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act have already become the law
in regards to" the "election of remedies", because those proceedings had become a
"finished transaction".
In the second place, it should be plainly equitable that, if a person entitled to an
"election of remedies" makes a first election and accepts the benefits thereof, he
should no longer be allowed to avail himself of the second option. At the very least,
if he wants to make a second election, in disregard of the first election he has made,
when he makes the second election he should surrender the benefits he had
obtained under the first election, This was not done in the case before the Court.
B.
'There is full concurrence on my part with the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Gutierrez upholding "the exclusory provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act." I
may further add:
1. The Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 3428) was approved on December 10,
1927 and took effect on June 10, 1928. It was patterned from Minnesota and Hawaii
statutes.
Act No. 3428 was adopted by the Philippine legislature, in Spanish and some
sections of the law were taken from the statutes of Minnesota and Hawaii, (Chapter
209 of the Revised Laws of Hawaii, 1925). [Morabe & Inton, Workmen's
Compensation Act, p. 2]
Under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Hawaii, when the Act is applicable, the
remedy under the Act is exclusive The following is stated in 1 Schneider Workmen's
Compensation Text, pp. 266, 267.
Sec. 112. Hawaii
Statutory Synopsis. The act is compulsory as to employees in 'all industrial
employment' and employees of the territory and its political subdivisions. (Sections
7480-7481, S.S., Vol. 1, p. 713.)
Compensation is not payable when injury is due to employee's willful intention to
injure himself or another or to his intoxication. (Sec. 7482, S.S., p. 713.)
When the act is applicable the remedy thereunder is exclusive (Sec. 7483, S.S., p.
714.)
2. In providing for exclusiveness of the remedy under our Workmen's Compensation
Act, the Philippine Legislature worded the first paragraph of Section 5 of the Act as
follows:

SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.-The rights and remedies granted by this

Act to an employee
by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation
shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal
representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer
under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said injury (Paragraphing and
emphasis supplied)
In regards to the intent of the Legislature under the foregoing provision:
A cardinal rule in the interpretation of statutes is that the meaning and intention of
the law-making body must be sought, first of all in the words of the statute itself,
read and considered in their natural, ordinary, commonly-accepted and most
obvious significations, according to good and approved usage and without resorting
to forced or subtle construction Courts, therefore, as a rule, cannot presume that
the law-making body does not know the meaning of words and the rules of
grammar. Consequently, the grammatical reading of a statute must be presumed to
yield its correct sense. (Espino vs. Cleofe 52 SCRA 92, 98) [Italics supplied]
3. The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided:
Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same
shall stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall
apply exclusively to injuries received outside the Islands through accidents
happening in and during the performance of the duties of the employment. (Italics
supplied)
The use of the word "exclusively is a further confirmation of the exclusory provision
of the Act, subject only to exceptions which may be provided in the Act itself.
4. It might be mentioned that, within the Act itself, provision is made for remedies
other than within the Act itself. Thus, Section 6, in part, provides:
SEC. 6. Liability of third parties.-In case an employee suffers an injury for which
compensation is due under this Act by any other person besides his employer, it
shall be optional with such injured employee either to claim compensation from his
employer, under this Act, or sue such other person for damages, in accordance with
law; ... (Emphasis supplied)
If the legislative intent under the first paragraph of Section 5 were to allow the
injured employee to sue his employer under the Civil Code, the legislator could very
easily have formulated the said first paragraph of Section 5 according to the pattern
of Section 6. That that was not done shows the legislative intent not to allow any

option to an employee to sue the employer under the Civil Code for injuries
compensable under the Act.
5. There should be no question but that the original first paragraph of Section 5 of
the Workmen's Compensation Act, formulated in 1927, provided that an injured
worker or employee, or his heirs, if entitled to compensation under the Act, cannot
have independent recourse neither to the Civil Code nor to any other law relative to
the liability of the employer. After 1927, there were occasions when the legislator
had the opportunity to amend the first paragraph of Section 5 such that the
remedies under the Act would not be exclusive; yet, the legislator refrained from
doing so. That shows the legislatives continuing intent to maintain the exclusory
provision of the first paragraph of Section 5 unless otherwise provided in the Act
itself.
(a) The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided:
Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same
shall stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall
apply (exclusively) to injuries received outside the Islands through accidents
happening in and during the performance of the duties of the employment (and all
service contracts made in the manner prescribed in this section be presumed to
include such agreement).
On June 20, 1952, through RA 772, the foregoing second paragraph was amended
with the elimination of the underlined words in parentheses, and the addition of this
sentence at the end of the paragraph:
Such stipulation shall not prejudice the right of the laborers to the benefits of the
Workmen's Compensation Law of the place where the accident occurs, should such
law be more favorable to them. (Emphasis supplied)
It will be seen that, within the Act itself, the exclusory character of the Act was
amended. At that time, if he had so desired, the legislator could have amended the
first paragraph of Section 5 so that the employee would have the option to sue the
employer under the Act, or under the Civil Code, should the latter be more favorable
to him.
(b) The Workmen's Compensation Act, which took effect in 1927, grants
compensation to an injured employee without regard to the presence or absence of
negligence on the part of the employer. The compensation is deemed an expense
chargeable to the industry (Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689 [1938]).
In time, it must have been thought that it was inequitable to have the amount of
compensation, caused by negligence on the part of the employer, to be the same
amount payable when the employer was not negligent. Based on that thinking,
Section 4-A 1 was included into the Act, on June 20, 1952, through RA 772. Said

Section 4-A increased the compensation payable by 50% in case there was
negligence on the part of the employer. That additional section evidenced the intent
of the legislator not to give an option to an employee, injured with negligence on
the part of the employer, to sue the latter under the provisions of the Civil Code.
On June 20, 1964, Section 4-A was amended (insubstantially) by RA 4119. The
legislator was again given the opportunity to provide, but he did not, the option to
an employee to sue under the Act or under the Civil Code.
When a Court gives effect to a statute not in accordance with the intent of the lawmaker, the Court is unjustifiably legislating.
It is in view of the foregoing that I vote for affirmation of the trial Court's dismissal
of the Complaint.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
To grant the petition and allow the victims of industrial accidents to file damages
suits based on torts would be a radical innovation not only contrary to the express
provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act but a departure from the principles
evolved in the long history of workmen's compensation. At the very least, it should
be the legislature and not this Court which should remove the exclusory provision of
the Workmen's Compensation Act, a provision reiterated in the present Labor Code
on employees' compensation.
Workmen's compensation evolved to remedy the evils associated with the situation
in the early years of the industrial revolution when injured workingmen had to rely
on damage suits to get recompense.
Before workmen's compensation, an injured worker seeking damages would have to
prove in a tort suit that his employer was either negligent or in bad faith, that his
injury was caused by the employer and not a fellow worker, and that he was not
guilty of contributory negligence. The employer could employ not only his wealth in
defeating the claim for damages but a host of common law defenses available to
him as well. The worker was supposed to know what he entered into when he
accepted employment. As stated in the leading case of Priestley u. Fowler (3 M. &
W. 1, 150 Reprint 1030) decided in 1837 "the mere relation of the master and the
servant never can imply an obligation on the part of the master to take more care of
the servant than he may reasonably be expected to do of himself." By entering into
a contract of employment, the worker was deemed to accept the risks of
employment that he should discover and guard against himself.
The problems associated with the application of the fellow servant rule, the
assumption of risk doctrine, the principle of contributory negligence, and the many
other defenses so easily raised in protracted damage suits illustrated the need for a

system whereby workers had only to prove the fact of covered employment and the
fact of injury arising from employment in order to be compensated.
The need for a compensation scheme where liability is created solely by statute and
made compulsory and where the element of fault-either the fault of the employer or
the fault of the employee-disregarded became obvious. Another objective was to
have simplified, expeditious, inexpensive, and non-litigious procedures so that
victims of industrial accidents could more readily, if not automatically, receive
compensation for work-related injuries.
Inspite of common law defenses to defeat a claim being recognized, employers'
liability acts were a major step in the desired direction. However, employers liability
legislation proved inadequate. Legislative reform led to the workmen's
compensation.
I cite the above familiar background because workmen's compensation represents a
compromise. In return for the near certainty of receiving a sum of money fixed by
law, the injured worker gives up the right to subject the employer to a tort suit for
huge amounts of damages. Thus, liability not only disregards the element of fault
but it is also a pre- determined amount based on the wages of the injured worker
and in certain cases, the actual cost of rehabilitation. The worker does not receive
the total damages for his pain and suffering which he could otherwise claim in a civil
suit. The employer is required to act swiftly on compensation claims. An
administrative agency supervises the program. And because the overwhelming
mass of workingmen are benefited by the compensation system, individual workers
who may want to sue for big amounts of damages must yield to the interests of
their entire working class.
The nature of the compensation principle is explained as follows:
An appreciation of the nature of the compensation principle is essential to an
understanding of the acts and the cases interpreting them.
By the turn of the century it was apparent that the toll of industrial accidents of
both the avoidable and unavoidable variety had become enormous, and
government was faced with the problem of who was to pay for the human wreckage
wrought by the dangers of modern industry. If the accident was avoidable and could
be attributed to the carelessness of the employer, existing tort principles offered
some measure of redress. Even here, however, the woeful inadequacy of the fault
principle was manifest. The uncertainty of the outcome of torts litigation in court
placed the employee at a substantial disadvantage. So long as liability depended on
fault there could be no recovery until the finger of blame had been pointed officially
at the employer or his agents. In most cases both the facts and the law were
uncertain. The witnesses, who were usually fellow workers of the victim, were torn
between friendship or loyalty to their class, on the one hand, and fear of reprisal by
the employer, on the other. The expense and delay of litigation often prompted the

injured employee to accept a compromise settlement for a fraction of the full value
of his claim. Even if suit were successfully prosecuted, a large share of the proceeds
of the judgment were exacted as contingent fees by counsel. Thus the employer
against whom judgment was cast often paid a substantial damage bill, while only a
part of this enured to the benefit of the injured employee or his dependents. The
employee's judgment was nearly always too little and too late.
xxx xxx xxx
Workmen's Compensation rests upon the economic principle that those persons who
enjoy the product of a business- whether it be in the form of goods or servicesshould ultimately bear the cost of the injuries or deaths that are incident to the
manufacture, preparation and distribution of the product. ...
xxx xxx xxx
Under this approach the element of personal fault either disappears entirely or is
subordinated to broader economic considerations. The employer absorbs the cost of
accident loss only initially; it is expected that this cost will eventually pass down the
stream of commerce in the form of increase price until it is spread in dilution among
the ultimate consumers. So long as each competing unit in a given industry is
uniformly affected, no producer can gain any substantial competitive advantage or
suffer any appreciable loss by reason of the general adoption of the compensation
principle.
In order that the compensation principle may operate properly and with fairness to
all parties it is essential that the anticipated accident cost be predictable and that it
be fixed at a figure that will not disrupt too violently the traffic in the product of the
industry affected. Thus predictability and moderateness of cost are necessary from
the broad economic viewpoint. ....
Compensation, then, differs from the conventional damage suit in two important
respects: Fault on the part of either employer or employee is eliminated; and
compensation payable according to a definitely limited schedule is substituted for
damages. All compensation acts alike work these two major changes, irrespective of
how they may differ in other particulars.
Compensation, when regarded from the viewpoint of employer and employee
represents a compromise in which each party surrenders certain advantages in
order to gain others which are of more importance both to him and to society. The
employer gives up the immunity he otherwise would enjoy in cases where he is not
at fault, and the employee surrenders his former right to full damages and accepts
instead a more modest claim for bare essentials, represented by compensation.
The importance of the compromise character of compensation cannot be
overemphasized. The statutes vary a great deal with reference to the proper point

of balance. The amount of weekly compensation payments and the length of the
period during which compensation is to be paid are matters concerning which the
acts differ considerably. The interpretation of any compensation statute will be
influenced greatly by the court's reaction to the basic point of compromise
established in the Act. If the court feels that the basic compromise unduly favors the
employer, it will be tempted to restore what it regards as a proper balance by
adopting an interpretation that favors the worker. In this way, a compensation act
drawn in a spirit of extreme conservatism may be transformed by a sympathetic
court into a fairly liberal instrument; and conversely, an act that greatly favors the
laborer may be so interpreted by the courts that employers can have little reason to
complain. Much of the unevenness and apparent conflict in compensation decisions
throughout the various jurisdictions must be attributed to this." (Malone & Plant,
Workmen's Compensation American Casebook Series, pp. 63-65).
The schedule of compensation, the rates of payments, the compensable injuries and
diseases, the premiums paid by employers to the present system, the actuarial
stability of the trust fund and many other interrelated parts have all been carefully
studied before the integrated scheme was enacted in to law. We have a system
whose parts must mesh harmonious with one another if it is to succeed. The basic
theory has to be followed.
If this Court disregards this totality of the scheme and in a spirit of generosity
recasts some parts of the system without touching the related others, the entire
structure is endangered. For instance, I am personally against stretching the law
and allowing payment of compensation for contingencies never envisioned to be
compensable when the law was formulated. Certainly, only harmful results to the
principle of workmen's compensation can arise if workmen, whom the law allows to
receive employment compensation, can still elect to file damage suits for industrial
accidents. It was precisely for this reason that Section 5 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, which reads:
SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.-The rights and remedies granted by this
Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation
shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal
representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil
Code and other laws because of said injury. ...
Article 173 of the labor Code also provides:
ART. 173. Exclusivenesss of liability.Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the
State Insurance Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other
liabilities of the employer to the employee his dependents or anyone otherwise
entitled to receive damages on behalf of the employee or his dependents.
I am against the Court assuming the role of legislator in a matter calling for
actuarial studies and public hearings. If employers already required to contribute to

the State Insurance Fund will still have to bear the cost of damage suits or get
insurance for that purpose, a major study will be necessary. The issue before us is
more far reaching than the interests of the poor victims and their families. All
workers covered by workmen's compensation and all employers who employ
covered employees are affected. Even as I have deepest sympathies for the victims,
I regret that I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion.
Footnotes
1 SEC. 4-A. Right to additional compensation.- In case of the employee's death,
injury or sickness due to the failure of the to comply with any law, or with any order,
rule or regulation of the Workmen's Compensation Commission or the Bureau of
Labor Standards or should the employer violate the provisions of Republic Act
Numbered Six hundred seventy-nine and its amendments or fail to install and
maintain safety appliances, or take other precautions for the prevention of
accidents or occupational disease, he shall be liable to pay an additional
compensation equal to fifty per centum of the compensation fixed in this Act.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22595

November 1, 1927

Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitionerappellee,

vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.
Camus and Delgado for appellee.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this
case.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo,
one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the
inheritance; (3) the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order approving
the partition; (4) the approval of the purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the
deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said business; and (5) the
declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to
postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's
business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference
to the Turkish laws.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts
into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with
the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in
violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which, among other things, provides the
following:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of
succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic
validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the
country in which it may be situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions
are not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any
evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of
evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the
Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)

It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself,
acknowledges it when he desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on
this point; so much so that he assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred
the approval of the scheme of partition until the receipt of certain testimony
requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not
constitute an error. It is discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into
consideration that the oppositor was granted ample opportunity to introduce
competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this
particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the
testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question
which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and
executed. lawphil.net
Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.
In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the
herein appellant as a legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as
such in will, it must be taken into consideration that such exclusion is based on the
last part of the second clause of the will, which says:
Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this
citizenship having been conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor
by nationality and, on the other hand, having resided for a considerable length of
time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that
I now possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my property and everything in
connection with this, my will, be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws
in force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish,
otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in this will
favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply with this request.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the
instituted legatees must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in
accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the
Philippines.
If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to
comply with it, as the herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has
not respected the will of the testator, as expressed, is prevented from receiving his
legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article
792 of the civil Code provides the following:

Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered
as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner
whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's
national law when, according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such
national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered
unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and
consequently valid and effective even as to the herein oppositor.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which
shall govern it, and to the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void,
being contrary to law.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are
perfectly valid and effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the
testator's national law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the
distribution of this estate be made in such a manner as to include the herein
appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of partition
submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects, without any
pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.
Street, Malcolm, Avancea, Villamor and Ostrand, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988
YAO KEE, SZE SOOK WAH, SZE LAI CHO, and SY CHUN YEN, petitioners,
vs.
AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE, RODOLFO SY, and
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Montesa, Albon, & Associates for petitioners.
De Lapa, Salonga, Fulgencio & De Lunas for respondents.

CORTES, J.:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national. died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City where he was
then residing, leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines
worth P300,000.00 more or less.
Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a
petition for the grant of letters of administration docketed as Special Proceedings
Case No. C-699 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XXXIII, Caloocan
City. In said petition they alleged among others that (a) they are the children of the
deceased with Asuncion Gillego; (b) to their knowledge Sy Mat died intestate; (c)
they do not recognize Sy Kiat's marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children
to him; and, (d) they nominate Aida Sy-Gonzales for appointment as administratrix
of the intestate estate of the deceased [Record on Appeal, pp. 4-9; Rollo, p. 107.]
The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Chen
who alleged that: (a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married on
January 19, 1931 in China; (b) the other oppositors are the legitimate children of the
deceased with Yao Kee; and, (c) Sze Sook Wah is the eldest among them and is
competent, willing and desirous to become the administratrix of the estate of Sy
Kiat [Record on Appeal, pp. 12-13; Rollo, p. 107.] After hearing, the probate court,
finding among others that:

(1) Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee [CFI decision, pp. 12-27; Rollo, pp. 49-64;]
(2) Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sze Chun Yen are the legitimate children of Yao
Kee with Sy Mat [CFI decision, pp. 28-31; Rollo. pp. 65-68;] and,
(3) Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy are the
acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego [CFI decision,
pp. 27-28; Rollo, pp. 64- 65.]
held if favor of the oppositors (petitioners herein) and appointed Sze Sook Wah as
the administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased [CFI decision, pp. 68-69;
Rollo, pp. 105-106.]
On appeal the Court of Appeals rendered a decision modifying that of the probate
court, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the lower Court is hereby MODIFIED
and SET ASIDE and a new judgment rendered as follows:
(1) Declaring petitioners Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy- Bernabe and
Rodolfo Sy acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat with Asuncion
Gillego, an unmarried woman with whom he lived as husband and wife without
benefit of marriage for many years:
(2) Declaring oppositors Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu and Sze Chun Yen, the
acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat with his Chinese wife Yao
Kee, also known as Yui Yip, since the legality of the alleged marriage of Sy Mat to
Yao Kee in China had not been proven to be valid to the laws of the Chinese People's
Republic of China (sic);
(3) Declaring the deed of sale executed by Sy Kiat on December 7, 1976 in favor of
Tomas Sy (Exhibit "G-1", English translation of Exhibit "G") of the Avenue Tractor and
Diesel Parts Supply to be valid and accordingly, said property should be excluded
from the estate of the deceased Sy Kiat; and
(4) Affirming the appointment by the lower court of Sze Sook Wah as judicial
administratrix of the estate of the deceased. [CA decision, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 3637.]
From said decision both parties moved for partial reconsideration, which was
however denied by respondent court. They thus interposed their respective appeals
to this Court.
Private respondents filed a petition with this Court docketed as G.R. No. 56045
entitled "Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy v. Court
of Appeals, Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen" questioning
paragraphs (3) and (4) of the dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' decision.

The Supreme Court however resolved to deny the petition and the motion for
reconsideration. Thus on March 8, 1982 entry of judgment was made in G.R. No.
56045. **
The instant petition, on the other hand, questions paragraphs (1) and (2) of the
dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals. This petition was initially
denied by the Supreme Court on June 22, 1981. Upon motion of the petitioners the
Court in a resolution dated September 16, 1981 reconsidered the denial and
decided to give due course to this petition. Herein petitioners assign the following
as errors:
I. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECLARING THE
MARRIAGE OF SY KIAT TO YAO YEE AS NOT HAVE (sic) BEEN PROVEN VALID IN
ACCORDANCE WITH LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
II. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING AIDA SYGONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE AND RODOLFO SY AS NATURAL
CHILDREN OF SY KIAT WITH ASUNCION GILLEGO. [Petition, p. 2; Rollo, p. 6.]
I. Petitioners argue that the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in accordance with
Chinese law and custom was conclusively proven. To buttress this argument they
rely on the following testimonial and documentary evidence.
First, the testimony of Yao Kee summarized by the trial court as follows:
Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kiat on January 19, 1931 in Fookien,
China; that she does not have a marriage certificate because the practice during
that time was for elders to agree upon the betrothal of their children, and in her
case, her elder brother was the one who contracted or entered into [an] agreement
with the parents of her husband; that the agreement was that she and Sy Mat would
be married, the wedding date was set, and invitations were sent out; that the said
agreement was complied with; that she has five children with Sy Kiat, but two of
them died; that those who are alive are Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho, and Sze Chun
Yen, the eldest being Sze Sook Wah who is already 38 years old; that Sze Sook Wah
was born on November 7, 1939; that she and her husband, Sy Mat, have been living
in FooKien, China before he went to the Philippines on several occasions; that the
practice during the time of her marriage was a written document [is exchanged] just
between the parents of the bride and the parents of the groom, or any elder for that
matter; that in China, the custom is that there is a go- between, a sort of marriage
broker who is known to both parties who would talk to the parents of the bride-tobe; that if the parents of the bride-to-be agree to have the groom-to-be their son inlaw, then they agree on a date as an engagement day; that on engagement day,
the parents of the groom would bring some pieces of jewelry to the parents of the
bride-to-be, and then one month after that, a date would be set for the wedding,
which in her case, the wedding date to Sy Kiat was set on January 19, 1931; that
during the wedding the bridegroom brings with him a couch (sic) where the bride

would ride and on that same day, the parents of the bride would give the dowry for
her daughter and then the document would be signed by the parties but there is no
solemnizing officer as is known in the Philippines; that during the wedding day, the
document is signed only by the parents of the bridegroom as well as by the parents
of the bride; that the parties themselves do not sign the document; that the bride
would then be placed in a carriage where she would be brought to the town of the
bridegroom and before departure the bride would be covered with a sort of a veil;
that upon reaching the town of the bridegroom, the bridegroom takes away the veil;
that during her wedding to Sy Kiat (according to said Chinese custom), there were
many persons present; that after Sy Kiat opened the door of the carriage, two old
ladies helped her go down the carriage and brought her inside the house of Sy Mat;
that during her wedding, Sy Chick, the eldest brother of Sy Kiat, signed the
document with her mother; that as to the whereabouts of that document, she and
Sy Mat were married for 46 years already and the document was left in China and
she doubt if that document can still be found now; that it was left in the possession
of Sy Kiat's family; that right now, she does not know the whereabouts of that
document because of the lapse of many years and because they left it in a certain
place and it was already eaten by the termites; that after her wedding with Sy Kiat,
they lived immediately together as husband and wife, and from then on, they lived
together; that Sy Kiat went to the Philippines sometime in March or April in the
same year they were married; that she went to the Philippines in 1970, and then
came back to China; that again she went back to the Philippines and lived with Sy
Mat as husband and wife; that she begot her children with Sy Kiat during the several
trips by Sy Kiat made back to China. [CFI decision, pp. 13-15; Rollo, pp. 50-52.]
Second, the testimony of Gan Ching, a younger brother of Yao Kee who stated that
he was among the many people who attended the wedding of his sister with Sy Kiat
and that no marriage certificate is issued by the Chinese government, a document
signed by the parents or elders of the parties being sufficient [CFI decision, pp. 1516; Rollo, pp.
52-53.]
Third, the statements made by Asuncion Gillego when she testified before the trial
court to the effect that (a) Sy Mat was married to Yao Kee according to Chinese
custom; and, (b) Sy Kiat's admission to her that he has a Chinese wife whom he
married according to Chinese custom [CFI decision, p. 17; Rollo, p. 54.]
Fourth, Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien issued in Caloocan City on October
3, 1972 where the following entries are found: "Marital statusMarried"; "If married
give name of spousesYao Kee"; "Address-China; "Date of marriage1931"; and
"Place of marriageChina" [Exhibit "SS-1".]
Fifth, Sy Kiat's Alien Certificate of Registration issued in Manila on January 12, 1968
where the following entries are likewise found: "Civil statusMarried"; and, 'If

married, state name and address of spouseYao Kee Chingkang, China" [Exhibit
"4".]
And lastly, the certification issued in Manila on October 28, 1977 by the Embassy of
the People's Republic of China to the effect that "according to the information
available at the Embassy Mr. Sy Kiat a Chinese national and Mrs. Yao Kee alias Yui
Yip also Chinese were married on January 19, 1931 in Fukien, the People's Republic
of China" [Exhibit "5".]
These evidence may very well prove the fact of marriage between Yao Kee and Sy
Kiat. However, the same do not suffice to establish the validity of said marriage in
accordance with Chinese law or custom.
Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly
observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory" [In the Matter
of the Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name "Ozaeta, Romulo, de
Leon, Mabanta and Reyes", July 30, 1979, SCRA 3, 12 citing JBL Reyes & RC Puno,
Outline of Phil. Civil Law, Fourth Ed., Vol. 1, p. 7.] The law requires that "a custom
must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence" [Article 12, Civil Code.]
On this score the Court had occasion to state that "a local custom as a source of
right can not be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly
established by competent evidence like any other fact" [Patriarca v. Orate, 7 Phil.
390, 395 (1907).] The same evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be
required of a foreign custom.
The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the Civil Code which states
that:
Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws
in force in the country where they were performed and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except bigamous, Polygamous, or incestuous
marriages, as determined by Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied.) ***
Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish a valid foreign
marriage two things must be proven, namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as
a question of fact; and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence
[Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 49 (1922).]
In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of Court. With respect
to an unwritten foreign law, Rule 130 section 45 states that:
SEC. 45. Unwritten law.The oral testimony of witnesses, skilled therein, is
admissible as evidence of the unwritten law of a foreign country, as are also printed
and published books of reports of decisions of the courts of the foreign country, if
proved to be commonly admitted in such courts.

Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for under Rule 132
section 25, thus:
SEC. 25. Proof of public or official record.An official record or an entry therein,
when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record,
or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with
a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept
is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in
the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his office.
The Court has interpreted section 25 to include competent evidence like the
testimony of a witness to prove the existence of a written foreign law [Collector of
Internal Revenue v. Fisher 110 Phil. 686, 700-701 (1961) citing Willamette Iron and
Steel Works v. Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471 (1935).]
In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to
the law and custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching
cannot be considered as proof of China's law or custom on marriage not only
because they are
self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are
competent to testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign law or
custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance with said law
or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this
jurisdiction.
Petitioners contend that contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling they are not duty
bound to prove the Chinese law on marriage as judicial notice thereof had been
taken by this Court in the case of Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia [16 Phil. 137 (1910).]
This contention is erroneous. Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that
Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged
and proved as any other fact [Yam Ka Lim v. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46, 48
(1915); Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 (1930).]
Moreover a reading of said case would show that the party alleging the foreign
marriage presented a witness, one Li Ung Bieng, to prove that matrimonial letters
mutually exchanged by the contracting parties constitute the essential requisite for
a marriage to be considered duly solemnized in China. Based on his testimony,
which as found by the Court is uniformly corroborated by authors on the subject of
Chinese marriage, what was left to be decided was the issue of whether or not
the fact of marriage in accordance with Chinese law was duly proven [Sy Joc Lieng v.
Sy Quia, supra., at p. 160.]

Further, even assuming for the sake of argument that the Court has indeed taken
judicial notice of the law of China on marriage in the aforecited case, petitioners
however have not shown any proof that the Chinese law or custom obtaining at the
time the Sy Joc Lieng marriage was celebrated in 1847 was still the law when the
alleged marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee took place in 1931 or eighty-four (84) years
later.
Petitioners moreover cite the case of U.S. v. Memoracion [34 Phil. 633 (1916)] as
being applicable to the instant case. They aver that the judicial pronouncement in
the Memoracion case, that the testimony of one of the contracting parties is
competent evidence to show the fact of marriage, holds true in this case.
The Memoracion case however is not applicable to the case at bar as said case did
not concern a foreign marriage and the issue posed was whether or not the oral
testimony of a spouse is competent evidence to prove the fact of marriage in a
complaint for adultery.
Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be
presumed that it is the same as ours *** [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21076,
March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 552, 555.] Since Yao Kee admitted in her testimony that
there was no solemnizing officer as is known here in the Philippines [See Article 56,
Civil Code] when her alleged marriage to Sy Mat was celebrated [CFI decision, p. 14;
Rollo, p. 51], it therefore follows that her marriage to Sy Kiat, even if true, cannot be
recognized in this jurisdiction [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, supra., pp. 555-556.]
II. The second issue raised by petitioners concerns the status of private
respondents.
Respondent court found the following evidence of petitioners' filiation:
(1) Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien where the following are entered:
"Children if any: give number of childrenFour"; and, "NameAll living in China"
[Exhibit "SS-1";]
(2) the testimony of their mother Yao Kee who stated that she had five children with
Sy Kiat, only three of whom are alive namely, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu and Sze
Chin Yan [TSN, December 12, 1977, pp. 9-11;] and,
(3) an affidavit executed on March 22,1961 by Sy Kiat for presentation to the Local
Civil Registrar of Manila to support Sze Sook Wah's application for a marriage
license, wherein Sy Kiat expressly stated that she is his daughter [Exhibit "3".]
Likewise on the record is the testimony of Asuncion Gillego that Sy Kiat told her he
has three daughters with his Chinese wife, two of whomSook Wah and Sze Kai Cho
she knows, and one adopted son [TSN, December 6,1977, pp. 87-88.]

However, as petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy Mat
according to the laws of China, they cannot be accorded the status of legitimate
children but only that of acknowledged natural children. Petitioners are natural
children, it appearing that at the time of their conception Yao Kee and Sy Kiat were
not disqualified by any impediment to marry one another [See Art. 269, Civil Code.]
And they are acknowledged children of the deceased because of Sy Kiat's
recognition of Sze Sook Wah [Exhibit "3"] and its extension to Sze Lai Cho and Sy
Chun Yen who are her sisters of the full blood [See Art. 271, Civil Code.]
Private respondents on the other hand are also the deceased's acknowledged
natural children with Asuncion Gillego, a Filipina with whom he lived for twenty-five
(25) years without the benefit of marriage. They have in their favor their father's
acknowledgment, evidenced by a compromise agreement entered into by and
between their parents and approved by the Court of First Instance on February 12,
1974 wherein Sy Kiat not only acknowleged them as his children by Asuncion
Gillego but likewise made provisions for their support and future inheritance, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
2. The parties also acknowledge that they are common-law husband and wife and
that out of such relationship, which they have likewise decided to definitely and
finally terminate effective immediately, they begot five children, namely: Aida Sy,
born on May 30, 1950; Manuel Sy, born on July 1, 1953; Teresita Sy, born on January
28, 1955; Ricardo Sy now deceased, born on December 14, 1956; and Rodolfo Sy,
born on May 7, 1958.
3. With respect to the AVENUE TRACTOR AND DIESEL PARTS SUPPLY ... , the parties
mutually agree and covenant that
(a) The stocks and merchandize and the furniture and equipments ..., shall be
divided into two equal shares between, and distributed to, Sy Kiat who shall own
one-half of the total and the other half to Asuncion Gillego who shall transfer the
same to their children, namely, Aida Sy, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy, and Rodolfo Sy.
(b) the business name and premises ... shall be retained by Sy Kiat. However, it
shall be his obligation to give to the aforenamed children an amount of One
Thousand Pesos ( Pl,000.00 ) monthly out of the rental of the two doors of the same
building now occupied by Everett Construction.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) With respect to the acquisition, during the existence of the
common-law husband-and-wife relationship between the parties, of the real estates
and properties registered and/or appearing in the name of Asuncion Gillego ... , the
parties mutually agree and covenant that the said real estates and properties shall
be transferred in equal shares to their children, namely, Aida Sy, Manuel Sy, Teresita

Sy, and Rodolfo Sy, but to be administered by Asuncion Gillego during her lifetime ...
[Exhibit "D".] (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
This compromise agreement constitutes a statement before a court of record by
which a child may be voluntarily acknowledged [See Art. 278, Civil Code.]
Petitioners further argue that the questions on the validity of Sy Mat's marriage to
Yao Kee and the paternity and filiation of the parties should have been ventilated in
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.
Specifically, petitioners rely on the following provision of Republic Act No. 5502,
entitled "An Act Revising Rep. Act No. 3278, otherwise known as the Charter of the
City of Caloocan', with regard to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court:
SEC. 91-A. Creation and Jurisdiction of the Court.
xxx xxx xxx
The provisions of the Judiciary Act to the contrary notwithstanding, the court shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Cases involving custody, guardianship, adoption, revocation of adoption,
paternity and acknowledgment;
(3) Annulment of marriages, relief from marital obligations, legal separation of
spouses, and actions for support;
(4) Proceedings brought under the provisions of title six and title seven, chapters
one to three of the civil code;
xxx xxx xxx
and the ruling in the case of Bartolome v. Bartolome [G.R. No. L-23661, 21 SCRA
1324] reiterated in Divinagracia v. Rovira [G.R. No. L-42615, 72 SCRA 307.]
With the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts were
abolished. Their functions and jurisdiction are now vested with the Regional Trial
Courts [See Section 19 (7), B.P. Blg. 129 and Divinagracia v. Belosillo, G.R. No. L47407, August 12, 1986, 143 SCRA 356, 360] hence it is no longer necessary to
pass upon the issue of jurisdiction raised by petitioners.
Moreover, even without the exactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 we find in Rep.
Act No. 5502 sec. 91-A last paragraph that:

xxx xxx xxx

If any question involving any of the above matters should arise as an incident in any
case pending in the ordinary court, said incident shall be determined in the main
case.
xxx xxx xxx
As held in the case of Divinagracia v. Rovira [G.R. No. L42615. August 10, 1976, 72
SCRA 307]:
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that under the aforequoted section 1 of Republic Act No. 4834 **** a case
involving paternity and acknowledgment may be ventilated as an incident in the
intestate or testate proceeding (See Baluyot vs. Ines Luciano, L-42215, July 13,
1976). But that legal provision presupposes that such an administration proceeding
is pending or existing and has not been terminated. [at pp. 313-314.] (Emphasis
supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
The reason for ths rule is not only "to obviate the rendition of conflicting rulings on
the same issue by the Court of First Instance and the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court" [Vda. de Baluyut v. Luciano, G.R. No. L-42215, July 13, 1976, 72
SCRA 52, 63] but more importantly to prevent multiplicity of suits. Accordingly, this
Court finds no reversible error committed by respondent court.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
* The petition for review in G.R. No. 56045 was denied for lack of merit on March 9,
1981, Counsel for the petitioners then filed a Motion for Consolidation and for
Extension of Time to File Motion for Reconsideration which was granted on July 8,
1981. On February 17, 1982, however, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the
resolution of March 9, 1981 was denied.
** Other than the exceptions contained in this article, this provision of law is derived
from Section 19, Act No. 3613 and Section IV, General Order No. 68.
*** The presumption that, in the absence of proof, the foreign law is the same as
the law of the forum, is known as processual presumption which has been applied
by this Court in the cases of Lim v. The Insular Collector of Customs, 36 Phil, 472

(1917); International Harvester Co. in Russia v. Hamburg-American Line, 42 Phil. 845

(1918); Miciano v. Brimo, 60 Phil, 867 (1924); and Rayray v. Chae Kyung Lee, G.R.
No. L-18176, October 26, 1966,18 SCRA 450.
**** Rep. Act 4834 created the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Iloilo.
Section 1 of said Act is the exact copy of section 19-A of Rep. Act 5502.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-29131

August 27, 1969

NATIONAL MARKETING CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
MIGUEL D. TECSON, ET AL., defendants,
MIGUEL D. TECSON, defendant-appellee,
THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER, petitioner.
Government Corporate Counsel Leopoldo M. Abellera and Trial Atty. Antonio M.
Brillantes for plaintiff-appellant.
Antonio T. Lacdan for defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
This appeal has been certified to us by the Court of Appeals only one question of
law being involved therein.
On November 14, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment, in
Civil Case No. 20520 thereof, entitled "Price Stabilization Corporation vs. Miguel D.
Tecson and Alto Surety and Insurance Co., Inc.," the dispositive part of which reads
as follows:
For the foregoing consideration, the Court decides this case:
(a) Ordering the defendants Miguel D. Tecson and Alto Surety Insurance Co., Inc. to
pay jointly and severally plaintiff PRATRA the sum of P7,200.00 plus 7% interest
from May 25, 1960 until the amount is fully paid, plus P500.00 for attorney's fees,
and plus costs;

(b) ordering defendant Miguel D. Tecson to indemnify his co-defendant Alto Surety &
Insurance Co., Inc. on the cross-claim for all the amounts it would be made to pay in
this decision, in case defendant Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. pay the amount
adjudged to plaintiff in this decision. From the date of such payment defendant
Miguel D. Tecson would pay the Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., interest at 12%
per annum until Miguel D. Tecson has fully reimbursed plaintiff of the said amount.
Copy of this decision was, on November 21, 1955, served upon the defendants in
said case. On December 21, 1965, the National Marketing Corporation, as successor
to all the properties, assets, rights, and choses in action of the Price Stabilization
Corporation, as plaintiff in that case and judgment creditor therein, filed, with the
same court, a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 63701 thereof, against the
same defendants, for the revival of the judgment rendered in said Case No. 20520.
Defendant Miguel D. Tecson moved to dismiss said complaint, upon the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof and prescription of action. Acting
upon the motion and plaintiff's opposition thereto, said Court issued, on February
14, 1966, an order reading:
Defendant Miguel Tecson seeks the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction and prescription. As for lack of jurisdiction, as the amount involved is
less than P10,000 as actually these proceedings are a revival of a decision issued by
this same court, the matter of jurisdiction must be admitted. But as for prescription.
Plaintiffs admit the decision of this Court became final on December 21, 1955. This
case was filed exactly on December 21, 1965 but more than ten years have
passed a year is a period of 365 days (Art. 13, CCP). Plaintiff forgot that 1960, 1964
were both leap years so that when this present case was filed it was filed two days
too late.
The complaint insofar as Miguel Tecson is concerned is, therefore, dismissed as
having prescribed.1wph1.t
The National Marketing Corporation appealed from such order to the Court of
Appeals, which, on March 20, 1969t certified the case to this Court, upon the ground
that the only question therein raised is one of law, namely, whether or not the
present action for the revival of a judgment is barred by the statute of limitations.
Pursuant to Art. 1144(3) of our Civil Code, an action upon a judgment "must be
brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues," which, in the
language of Art. 1152 of the same Code, "commences from the time the judgment
sought to be revived has become final." This, in turn, took place on December 21,
1955, or thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment which was received by the
defendants herein on November 21, 1955 no appeal having been taken
therefrom. 1 The issue is thus confined to the date on which ten (10) years from
December 21, 1955 expired.

Plaintiff-appellant alleges that it was December 21, 1965, but appellee Tecson
maintains otherwise, because "when the laws speak of years ... it shall be
understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each" according to Art.
13 of our Civil Code and, 1960 and 1964 being leap years, the month of February
in both had 29 days, so that ten (10) years of 365 days each, or an aggregate of
3,650 days, from December 21, 1955, expired on December 19, 1965. The lower
court accepted this view in its appealed order of dismissal.
Plaintiff-appellant insists that the same "is erroneous, because a year means
a calendar year (Statutory Construction, Interpretation of Laws, by Crawford, p. 383)
and since what is being computed here is the number of years, a calendar year
should be used as the basis of computation. There is no question that when it is not
a leap year, December 21 to December 21 of the following year is one year. If the
extra day in a leap year is not a day of the year, because it is the 366th day, then to
what year does it belong? Certainly, it must belong to the year where it falls and,
therefore, that the 366 days constitute one year." 2
The very conclusion thus reached by appellant shows that its theory contravenes
the explicit provision of Art. 13 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, limiting the
connotation of each "year" as the term is used in our laws to 365 days.
Indeed, prior to the approval of the Civil Code of Spain, the Supreme Court thereof
had held, on March 30, 1887, that, when the law spoke of months, it meant a
"natural" month or "solar" month, in the absence of express provision to the
contrary. Such provision was incorporated into the Civil Code of Spain, subsequently
promulgated. Hence, the same Supreme Court declared 3 that, pursuant to Art. 7 of
said Code, "whenever months ... are referred to in the law, it shall be understood
that the months are of 30 days," not the "natural," or "solar" or "calendar" months,
unless they are "designated by name," in which case "they shall be computed by
the actual number of days they have. This concept was later, modified in the
Philippines, by Section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code, Pursuant to which,
"month shall be understood to refer to a calendar month." 4 In the language of this
Court, in People vs. Del Rosario, 5 with the approval of the Civil Code of the
Philippines (Republic Act 386) ... we have reverted to the provisions of the Spanish
Civil Code in accordance with which a month is to be considered as the regular 30day month ... and not the solar or civil month," with the particularity that, whereas
the Spanish Code merely mentioned "months, days or nights," ours has added
thereto the term "years" and explicitly ordains that "it shall be understood that
years are of three hundred sixty-five days."
Although some members of the Court are inclined to think that this legislation is not
realistic, for failure to conform with ordinary experience or practice, the theory of
plaintiff-appellant herein cannot be upheld without ignoring, if not nullifying, Art. 13
of our Civil Code, and reviving Section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code,
thereby engaging in judicial legislation, and, in effect, repealing an act of Congress.
If public interest demands a reversion to the policy embodied in the Revised

Administrative Code, this may be done through legislative process, not by judicial
decree.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed, without
costs. It is so ordered.
Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo,
JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., and Zaldivar, JJ., are on leave.
Footnotes
1

Sec. 1, Rule 39, in relation to Sec. 3, Rule 31, Rules of Court.

Emphasis ours.

Decision of April 6, 1895.

Guzman v. Lichauco, 42 Phil. 292; Gutierrez v. Carpio, 53 Phil. 334, 335-336.

97 Phil. 70-71.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23678

June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.

PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the
Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of
partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1wph1.t
The facts of the case are as follows:

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United
States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate
children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry
A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet
Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter
S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos
Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he
directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid
for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and
manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his
three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis,
or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the
remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives,
namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman,
Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1wph1.t
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio,
Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila
on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests
therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary
E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in
satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released
from time to time according as the lower court approved and allowed the various
motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account
of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor
submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and
Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of
Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00,
and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in
the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition,
the executor pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and
Testament divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit
of the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their
respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were
deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs
of the deceased.

Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of
which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the
executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings,
the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and
approving the executor's final account, report and administration and project of
partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the
decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court
on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of
which law must apply Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine
of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31,
1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one
country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the
decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his
death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the
domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in
a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae)
calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated,
renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In
the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not
be presumed different from ours. 3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the
doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their
arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil
Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law
of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items:
(a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic
validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide
that
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code,
stating that
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have
for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not
correct. Precisely, Congressdeleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of
this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil
Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change
the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must
have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific
provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As
further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under
Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national
law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved
in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia,
the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific
provisions must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills one to
govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate arguing from this that
he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was
the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter
the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a
foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance
with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national
law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 now Article 16
of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of
Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or
legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the
amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine
law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs
against appellants. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and
Castro, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1

He later filed a motion praying that as a legal heir he be included in this case as
one of the oppositors-appellants; to file or adopt the opposition of his sisters to the
project of partition; to submit his brief after paying his proportionate share in the
expenses incurred in the printing of the record on appeal; or to allow him to adopt
the briefs filed by his sisters but this Court resolved to deny the motion.
2

San Antonio, Texas was his legal residence.

Lim vs. Collector, 36 Phil. 472; In re Testate Estate of Suntay, 95 Phil. 500.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16749

January 31, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN,

DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the
deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon.
Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated
September 14, 1949, approving among things the final accounts of the executor,
directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600
paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy
Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime,
and in case of death without issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs.
Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will of the

testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951
and contains the following provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now
Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago,
and who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except
my above named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx

xxx

xxx

7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to
Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that
she was baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has she been at
any time adopted by me, and who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit,
Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS
(P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria
Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid
to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per month
until the principal thereof as well as any interest which may have accrued thereon,
is exhausted..
xxx

xxx

xxx

12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid
at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from
the rest, remainder, and residue of my property and estate, real, personal and/or
mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may
be possessed at my death and which may have come to me from any source
whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final
account and project of partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen
Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his
daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen
Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural
child, she having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged
natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of
opposition are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the laws of the
Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it
denies to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of

the estate in full ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged
that the law that should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not
be the internal law of California alone, but the entire law thereof because several
foreign elements are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case
were decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires
that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was also
alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an acknowledged
natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes legitimate from the
time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United
States and of the State of California at the time of his death, the successional rights
and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of
California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose of his
property in the way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his
property is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176
P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record
on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various
motions for reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE
SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD
E. CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN
THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE
THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING
FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF
THE TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF

DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE
LAWS.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN
FULL OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States
and of the State of California at the time of his death. But there is also no question
that at the time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the
following facts admitted by the executor himself in appellee's brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show that
the deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New York
City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher,
was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of
Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He stayed
in the Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed there
for the following nine years until 1913, during which time he resided in, and was
teaching school in Sacramento, California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913.
However, in 1928, he again departed the Philippines for the United States and came
back here the following year, 1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he again
returned to his own country, and came back to the Philippines the following year,
1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of
facts. 1wph1.t
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese Military
Forces in the Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left
for the United States but returned to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees
Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CCDaney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly after
the making of his last will and testament (now in question herein) which he
executed at his lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's
Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)

In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we
are persuaded by the fact that he was born in New York, migrated to California and
resided there for nine years, and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he
returned to California very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and
considering that he appears never to have owned or acquired a home or properties
in that state, which would indicate that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines
and make home in the State of California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere
temporary presence to the most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to
denote something more than mere physical presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws,
p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in
California when he resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never
lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United States
(not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a
citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he declared
that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to
abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion is in
accordance with the following principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of
Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same thing,
a place of permanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a
technical meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a place where he has never been.
And he may reside in a place where he has no domicile. The man with two homes,
between which he divides his time, certainly resides in each one, while living in it.
But if he went on business which would require his presence for several weeks or
months, he might properly be said to have sufficient connection with the place to be
called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he treated his settlement as continuing
only for the particular business in hand, not giving up his former "home," he could
not be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the
exercise of intention as well as physical presence. "Residence simply requires bodily
presence of an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence
in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile." Residence, however,
is a term used with many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence
to the most permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et the
only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in
Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the
meaning of the term "national law" is used therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in
the United States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to
its citizens only and in force only within the state. The "national law" indicated in
Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply
to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the
State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of
personal property? The decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the
executor-appellee that under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of
his property by will in the form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of
McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions
of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it
is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his
domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied.
We have checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other
hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the
case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as the
deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the internal law
thereof, which is that given in the abovecited case, should govern the determination
of the validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in
force in the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the
other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance
therewith and following the doctrine of therenvoi, the question of the validity of the
testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of the
decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the
forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the
purely internal rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign
law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"

On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the
renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter
back to Michigan law. But once having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle
is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference back should not have
been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the "endless chain of
references" which has so often been criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the
renvoi would have looked merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the
renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems no compelling logical reason why the
original reference should be the internal law rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule.
It is true that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but those who have
accepted the renvoitheory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the
second reference and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of
the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule
of reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead that
greater uniformity will result from adoption of their respective views. And still more
strange is the fact that the only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law
problem is if in the dispute the two states whose laws form the legal basis of the
litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or
both accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation will vary with the choice of the
forum. In the case stated above, had the Michigan court rejected the renvoi,
judgment would have been against the woman; if the suit had been brought in the
Illinois courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the woman.
The same result would happen, though the courts would switch with respect to
which would hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to land
is in question, and where the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In these
cases the Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties
in the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any further reference goes only to
the internal law. Thus, a person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will be
recognized by every court; and every divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties,
will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving movable
property in Massachusetts, England, and France. The question arises as to how this
property is to be distributed among X's next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the
conflict of laws as to intestate succession to movables calls for an application of the
law of the deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was
France, the natural thing for the Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to
French statute of distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and
decree a distribution accordingly. An examination of French law, however, would

show that if a French court were called upon to determine how this property should
be distributed, it would refer the distribution to the national law of the deceased,
thus applying the Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on the surface of things
the Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action: (a) either to
apply the French law is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French
court and apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that
this is what a French court would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoidoctrine, it will
follow the latter course, thus applying its own law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule
of the forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers
the matter back again to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense.
The German term for this judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law
Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as
governing a particular case, the further question may arise: Are the rules as to the
conflict of laws contained in such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a
question which, while it has been considered by the courts in but a few instances,
has been the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the
doctrine involved has been descriptively designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to
send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung", since an
affirmative answer to the question postulated and the operation of the adoption of
the foreign law in toto would in many cases result in returning the main controversy
to be decided according to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory
of the doctrine of renvoiis that the court of the forum, in determining the question
before it, must take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its
rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the actual question which the
rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The
doctrine of therenvoi has generally been repudiated by the American authorities. (2
Am. Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its
application in a country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law
Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are
quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are
to be understood as incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign
state or country, but its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory
'the law of a country' means the whole of its law.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, at
Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of
foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals
abroad as regards their personal statute, and desires that said personal statute shall
be determined by the law of the domicile, or even by the law of the place where the
act in question occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that
one of them is necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the determination
of a question to the same system of law.
xxx

xxx

xxx

If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of
an Englishman who has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his
domicile, he must first inquire whether the law of Belgium would distribute personal
property upon death in accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the
Belgian law would make the distribution in accordance with the law of nationality
that is the English law he must accept this reference back to his own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while
the rule applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession
and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own
intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to
citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are
not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting
to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element
involved is in accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary
law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a will
directing the manner of distribution of the property, the law of the state where he
was domiciled at the time of his death will be looked to in deciding legal questions
about the will, almost as completely as the law of situs is consulted in questions
about the devise of land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary rules control
devolution of the personal estate in case of intestate succession, the same rules
should determine the validity of an attempted testamentary dispostion of the
property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of
the domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling by the
Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property, and the reason for the recognition as in

the case of intestate succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine. The
New York court has said on the point: 'The general principle that a dispostiton of a
personal property, valid at the domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of
the universal application. It had its origin in that international comity which was one
of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when business intercourse and the
process of accumulating property take but little notice of boundary lines, the
practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than ever. (Goodrich,
Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out
as the national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws
of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents
therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that
We should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing
therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we
must enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in
Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in
accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply
the internal law for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled
abroad.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in
the place where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code
refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the
contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national law of
the deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained in
the various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our
Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946,
which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's
domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely
refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of
his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and
should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue
incapable of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back
and forth between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a
citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law
as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question
has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California
provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil
Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of
the parent recognizing them.
The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40
Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52
Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the

decision can not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e.,
the subject in each case does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United
States but with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that
there exists in the state of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical
with Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of
California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his
acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the Philippine
Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the
internal law of California..
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned
to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law
on succession provides. Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and
Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.

Human Relations
Articles 19-26

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 88694 January 11, 1993

ALBENSON ENTERPRISES CORP., JESSE YAP, AND BENJAMIN
MENDIONA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND EUGENIO S. BALTAO, respondents.
Puruganan, Chato, Chato & Tan for petitioners.
Lino M. Patajo, Francisco Ma. Chanco, Ananiano Desierto and Segundo Mangohig for
private respondent.

BIDIN, J.:
This petition assails the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in
CA-GR CV No. 14948 entitled "Eugenio S. Baltao, plaintiff-appellee vs. Albenson
Enterprises Corporation, et al, defendants-appellants", which modified the judgment
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch XCVIII in Civil Case No. Q-40920
and ordered petitioner to pay private respondent, among others, the sum of
P500,000.00 as moral damages and attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00.
The facts are not disputed.
In September, October, and November 1980, petitioner Albenson Enterprises
Corporation (Albenson for short) delivered to Guaranteed Industries, Inc.
(Guaranteed for short) located at 3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, the mild
steel plates which the latter ordered. As part payment thereof, Albenson was given
Pacific Banking Corporation Check No. 136361 in the amount of P2,575.00 and
drawn against the account of E.L. Woodworks (Rollo, p. 148).
When presented for payment, the check was dishonored for the reason "Account
Closed." Thereafter, petitioner Albenson, through counsel, traced the origin of the
dishonored check. From the records of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), Albenson discovered that the president of Guaranteed, the recipient of the
unpaid mild steel plates, was one "Eugenio S. Baltao." Upon further inquiry,
Albenson was informed by the Ministry of Trade and Industry that E.L. Woodworks, a
single proprietorship business, was registered in the name of one "Eugenio Baltao".
In addition, upon verification with the drawee bank, Pacific Banking Corporation,

Albenson was advised that the signature appearing on the subject check belonged
to one "Eugenio Baltao."
After obtaining the foregoing information, Albenson, through counsel, made an
extrajudicial demand upon private respondent Eugenio S. Baltao, president of
Guaranteed, to replace and/or make good the dishonored check.
Respondent Baltao, through counsel, denied that he issued the check, or that the
signature appearing thereon is his. He further alleged that Guaranteed was a
defunct entity and hence, could not have transacted business with Albenson.
On February 14, 1983, Albenson filed with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal
a complaint against Eugenio S. Baltao for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.
Submitted to support said charges was an affidavit of petitioner Benjamin
Mendiona, an employee of Albenson. In said affidavit, the above-mentioned
circumstances were stated.
It appears, however, that private respondent has a namesake, his son Eugenio
Baltao III, who manages a business establishment, E.L. Woodworks, on the ground
floor of the Baltao Building, 3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, the very same
business address of Guaranteed.
On September 5, 1983, Assistant Fiscal Ricardo Sumaway filed an information
against Eugenio S. Baltao for Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. In filing said
information, Fiscal Sumaway claimed that he had given Eugenio S. Baltao
opportunity to submit controverting evidence, but the latter failed to do so and
therefore, was deemed to have waived his right.
Respondent Baltao, claiming ignorance of the complaint against him, immediately
filed with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a motion for reinvestigation, alleging that it
was not true that he had been given an opportunity to be heard in the preliminary
investigation conducted by Fiscal Sumaway, and that he never had any dealings
with Albenson or Benjamin Mendiona, consequently, the check for which he has
been accused of having issued without funds was not issued by him and the
signature in said check was not his.
On January 30, 1984, Provincial Fiscal Mauro M. Castro of Rizal reversed the finding
of Fiscal Sumaway and exonerated respondent Baltao. He also instructed the Trial
Fiscal to move for dismissal of the information filed against Eugenio S. Baltao. Fiscal
Castro found that the signature in PBC Check No. 136361 is not the signature of
Eugenio S. Baltao. He also found that there is no showing in the records of the
preliminary investigation that Eugenio S. Baltao actually received notice of the said
investigation. Fiscal Castro then castigated Fiscal Sumaway for failing to exercise
care and prudence in the performance of his duties, thereby causing injustice to
respondent who was not properly notified of the complaint against him and of the
requirement to submit his counter evidence.

Because of the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case against him for allegedly
issuing a check which bounced in violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 for a
measly amount of P2,575.00, respondent Baltao filed before the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City a complaint for damages against herein petitioners Albenson
Enterprises, Jesse Yap, its owner, and Benjamin Mendiona, its employee.
In its decision, the lower court observed that "the check is drawn against the
account of "E.L. Woodworks," not of Guaranteed Industries of which plaintiff used to
be President. Guaranteed Industries had been inactive and had ceased to exist as a
corporation since 1975. . . . . The possibility is that it was with Gene Baltao or
Eugenio Baltao III, a son of plaintiff who had a business on the ground floor of Baltao
Building located on V. Mapa Street, that the defendants may have been dealing with
. . . ." (Rollo, pp. 41-42).
The dispositive portion of the trial court 's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against
defendants ordering the latter to pay plaintiff jointly and severally:
1. actual or compensatory damages of P133,350.00;
2. moral damages of P1,000,000.00 (1 million pesos);
3. exemplary damages of P200,000.00;
4. attorney's fees of P100,000.00;
5 costs.
Defendants' counterclaim against plaintiff and claim for damages against Mercantile
Insurance Co. on the bond for the issuance of the writ of attachment at the instance
of plaintiff are hereby dismissed for lack of merit. (Rollo, pp. 38-39).
On appeal, respondent court modified the trial court's decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED by reducing the moral
damages awarded therein from P1,000,000.00 to P500,000.00 and the attorney's
fees from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00, said decision being hereby affirmed in all its
other aspects. With costs against appellants. (Rollo, pp. 50-51)
Dissatisfied with the above ruling, petitioners Albenson Enterprises Corp., Jesse Yap,
and Benjamin Mendiona filed the instant Petition, alleging that the appellate court
erred in:
1. Concluding that private respondent's cause of action is not one based on
malicious prosecution but one for abuse of rights under Article 21 of the Civil Code
notwithstanding the fact that the basis of a civil action for malicious prosecution is
Article 2219 in relation to Article 21 or Article 2176 of the Civil Code . . . .

2. Concluding that "hitting at and in effect maligning (private respondent) with an

unjust criminal case was, without more, a plain case of abuse of rights by
misdirection" and "was therefore, actionable by itself," and which "became
inordinately blatant and grossly aggravated when . . . (private respondent) was
deprived of his basic right to notice and a fair hearing in the so-called preliminary
investigation . . . . "
3. Concluding that petitioner's "actuations in this case were coldly deliberate and
calculated", no evidence having been adduced to support such a sweeping
statement.
4. Holding the petitioner corporation, petitioner Yap and petitioner Mendiona jointly
and severally liable without sufficient basis in law and in fact.
5. Awarding respondents
5.1. P133,350.00 as actual or compensatory damages, even in the absence of
sufficient evidence to show that such was actually suffered.
5.2. P500,000.00 as moral damages considering that the evidence in this
connection merely involved private respondent's alleged celebrated status as a
businessman, there being no showing that the act complained of adversely affected
private respondent's reputation or that it resulted to material loss.
5.3. P200,000.00 as exemplary damages despite the fact that petitioners were duly
advised by counsel of their legal recourse.
5.4. P50,000.00 as attorney's fees, no evidence having been adduced to justify such
an award (Rollo, pp. 4-6).
Petitioners contend that the civil case filed in the lower court was one for malicious
prosecution. Citing the case ofMadera vs. Lopez (102 SCRA 700 [1981]), they assert
that the absence of malice on their part absolves them from any liability for
malicious prosecution. Private respondent, on the other hand, anchored his
complaint for Damages on Articles 19, 20, and 21 ** of the Civil Code.
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse
of rights, sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of
one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the
following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and
good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that
in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be
observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as
such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article
19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which
the wrongdoer must be held responsible. Although the requirements of each

provision is different, these three (3) articles are all related to each other. As the
eminent Civilist Senator Arturo Tolentino puts it: "With this article (Article 21),
combined with articles 19 and 20, the scope of our law on civil wrongs has been
very greatly broadened; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the
Anglo-American law on torts. It is now difficult to conceive of any malevolent
exercise of a right which could not be checked by the application of these articles"
(Tolentino, 1 Civil Code of the Philippines 72).
There is however, no hard and fast rule which can be applied to determine whether
or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked. The question of whether or
not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated, resulting in damages under
Articles 20 and 21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the
circumstances of each case. (Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation vs. Court
of Appeals, 176 SCRA 778 [1989]).
The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a
legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other
provisions of law which do not especially provide for their own sanction
(Tolentino, supra, p. 71). Thus, anyone who, whether willfully or negligently, in the
exercise of his legal right or duty, causes damage to another, shall indemnify his
victim for injuries suffered thereby. Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores,
and has the following elements: 1) There is an act which is legal; 2) but which is
contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; 3) and it is done
with intent to injure.
Thus, under any of these three (3) provisions of law, an act which causes injury to
another may be made the basis for an award of damages.
There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act must be
intentional. However, Article 20 does not distinguish: the act may be done either
"willfully", or "negligently". The trial court as well as the respondent appellate court
mistakenly lumped these three (3) articles together, and cited the same as the
bases for the award of damages in the civil complaint filed against petitioners, thus:
With the foregoing legal provisions (Articles 19, 20, and 21) in focus, there is not
much difficulty in ascertaining the means by which appellants' first assigned error
should be resolved, given the admitted fact that when there was an attempt to
collect the amount of P2,575.00, the defendants were explicitly warned that plaintiff
Eugenio S. Baltao is not the Eugenio Baltao defendants had been dealing with
(supra, p. 5). When the defendants nevertheless insisted and persisted in filing a
case a criminal case no less against plaintiff, said defendants ran afoul of the
legal provisions (Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code) cited by the lower court
and heretofore quoted (supra).

Defendants, not having been paid the amount of P2,575.00, certainly had the right
to complain. But that right is limited by certain constraints. Beyond that limit is the
area of excess, of abuse of rights. (Rollo, pp.
44-45).
Assuming, arguendo, that all the three (3) articles, together and not independently
of each one, could be validly made the bases for an award of damages based on the
principle of "abuse of right", under the circumstances, We see no cogent reason for
such an award of damages to be made in favor of private respondent.
Certainly, petitioners could not be said to have violated the aforestated principle of
abuse of right. What prompted petitioners to file the case for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 against private respondent was their failure to collect the
amount of P2,575.00 due on a bounced check which they honestly believed was
issued to them by private respondent. Petitioners had conducted inquiries regarding
the origin of the check, and yielded the following results: from the records of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, it was discovered that the President of
Guaranteed (the recipient of the unpaid mild steel plates), was one "Eugenio S.
Baltao"; an inquiry with the Ministry of Trade and Industry revealed that E.L.
Woodworks, against whose account the check was drawn, was registered in the
name of one "Eugenio Baltao"; verification with the drawee bank, the Pacific
Banking Corporation, revealed that the signature appearing on the check belonged
to one "Eugenio Baltao".
In a letter dated December 16, 1983, counsel for petitioners wrote private
respondent demanding that he make good the amount of the check. Counsel for
private respondent wrote back and denied, among others, that private respondent
ever transacted business with Albenson Enterprises Corporation; that he ever issued
the check in question. Private respondent's counsel even went further: he made a
warning to defendants to check the veracity of their claim. It is pivotal to note at
this juncture that in this same letter, if indeed private respondent wanted to clear
himself from the baseless accusation made against his person, he should have
made mention of the fact that there are three (3) persons with the same name, i.e.:
Eugenio Baltao, Sr., Eugenio S. Baltao, Jr. (private respondent), and Eugenio Baltao
III (private respondent's son, who as it turned out later, was the issuer of the check).
He, however, failed to do this. The last two Baltaos were doing business in the same
building Baltao Building located at 3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila. The
mild steel plates were ordered in the name of Guaranteed of which respondent
Eugenio S. Baltao is the president and delivered to Guaranteed at Baltao building.
Thus, petitioners had every reason to believe that the Eugenio Baltao who issued
the bouncing check is respondent Eugenio S. Baltao when their counsel wrote
respondent to make good the amount of the check and upon refusal, filed the
complaint for violation of BP Blg. 22.

Private respondent, however, did nothing to clarify the case of mistaken identity at
first hand. Instead, private respondent waited in ambush and thereafter pounced on
the hapless petitioners at a time he thought was propitious by filing an action for
damages. The Court will not countenance this devious scheme.
The criminal complaint filed against private respondent after the latter refused to
make good the amount of the bouncing check despite demand was a sincere
attempt on the part of petitioners to find the best possible means by which they
could collect the sum of money due them. A person who has not been paid an
obligation owed to him will naturally seek ways to compel the debtor to pay him. It
was normal for petitioners to find means to make the issuer of the check pay the
amount thereof. In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad
faith, moral damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse result of an action
does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of
damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to
litigate (Rubio vs. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488 [1986]).
In the case at bar, private respondent does not deny that the mild steel plates were
ordered by and delivered to Guaranteed at Baltao building and as part payment
thereof, the bouncing check was issued by one Eugenio Baltao. Neither had private
respondent conveyed to petitioner that there are two Eugenio Baltaos conducting
business in the same building he and his son Eugenio Baltao III. Considering that
Guaranteed, which received the goods in payment of which the bouncing check was
issued is owned by respondent, petitioner acted in good faith and probable cause in
filing the complaint before the provincial fiscal.
To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was
prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was
initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and
groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for
prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution. (Manila Gas
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 602 [1980]). Still, private respondent
argues that liability under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code is so
encompassing that it likewise includes liability for damages for malicious
prosecution under Article 2219 (8). True, a civil action for damages for malicious
prosecution is allowed under the New Civil Code, more specifically Articles 19, 20,
26, 29, 32, 33, 35, and 2219 (8) thereof. In order that such a case can prosper,
however, the following three (3) elements must be present, to wit: (1) The fact of
the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor,
and that the action was finally terminated with an acquittal; (2) That in bringing the
action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; (3) The prosecutor was
actuated or impelled by legal malice (Lao vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 58,
[1991]).

Thus, a party injured by the filing of a court case against him, even if he is later on
absolved, may file a case for damages grounded either on the principle of abuse of
rights, or on malicious prosecution. As earlier stated, a complaint for damages
based on malicious prosecution will prosper only if the three (3) elements aforecited
are shown to exist. In the case at bar, the second and third elements were not
shown to exist. It is well-settled that one cannot be held liable for maliciously
instituting a prosecution where one has acted with probable cause. "Probable cause
is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that
the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. In other
words, a suit will lie only in cases where a legal prosecution has been carried on
without probable cause. The reason for this rule is that it would be a very great
discouragement to public justice, if prosecutors, who had tolerable ground of
suspicion, were liable to be sued at law when their indictment miscarried" (Que vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 169 SCRA 137 [1989]).
The presence of probable cause signifies, as a legal consequence, the absence of
malice. In the instant case, it is evident that petitioners were not motivated by
malicious intent or by sinister design to unduly harass private respondent, but only
by a well-founded anxiety to protect their rights when they filed the criminal
complaint against private respondent.
To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was
prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, that it was initiated
deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless.
Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution
does not make one liable for malicious prosecution. Proof and motive that the
institution of the action was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a
person must be clearly and preponderantly established to entitle the victims to
damages (Ibid.).
In the case at bar, there is no proof of a sinister design on the part of petitioners to
vex or humiliate private respondent by instituting the criminal case against him.
While petitioners may have been negligent to some extent in determining the
liability of private respondent for the dishonored check, the same is not so gross or
reckless as to amount to bad faith warranting an award of damages.
The root of the controversy in this case is founded on a case of mistaken identity. It
is possible that with a more assiduous investigation, petitioners would have
eventually discovered that private respondent Eugenio S. Baltao is not the "Eugenio
Baltao" responsible for the dishonored check. However, the record shows that
petitioners did exert considerable effort in order to determine the liability of private
respondent. Their investigation pointed to private respondent as the "Eugenio
Baltao" who issued and signed the dishonored check as the president of the debtorcorporation Guaranteed Enterprises. Their error in proceeding against the wrong

individual was obviously in the nature of an innocent mistake, and cannot be

characterized as having been committed in bad faith. This error could have been
discovered if respondent had submitted his counter-affidavit before investigating
fiscal Sumaway and was immediately rectified by Provincial Fiscal Mauro Castro
upon discovery thereof, i.e., during the reinvestigation resulting in the dismissal of
the complaint.
Furthermore, the adverse result of an action does not per se make the act wrongful
and subject the actor to the payment of moral damages. The law could not have
meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate, such right is so precious that
moral damages may not be charged on those who may even exercise it erroneously.
And an adverse decision does not ipso facto justify the award of attorney's fees to
the winning party (Garcia vs. Gonzales, 183 SCRA 72 [1990]).
Thus, an award of damages and attorney's fees is unwarranted where the action
was filed in good faith. If damage results from a person's exercising his legal rights,
it is damnum absque injuria (Ilocos Norte Electric Company vs. Court of Appeals,
179 SCRA 5 [1989]).
Coming now to the claim of private respondent for actual or compensatory
damages, the records show that the same was based solely on his allegations
without proof to substantiate the same. He did not present proof of the cost of the
medical treatment which he claimed to have undergone as a result of the nervous
breakdown he suffered, nor did he present proof of the actual loss to his business
caused by the unjust litigation against him. In determining actual damages, the
court cannot rely on speculation, conjectures or guesswork as to the amount.
Without the actual proof of loss, the award of actual damages becomes erroneous
(Guilatco vs. City of Dagupan, 171 SCRA 382 [1989]).
Actual and compensatory damages are those recoverable because of pecuniary loss
in business, trade, property, profession, job or occupation and the same must
be proved, otherwise, if the proof is flimsy and unsubstantiated, no damages will be
given (Rubio vs. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488 [1986]). For these reasons, it was
gravely erroneous for respondent court to have affirmed the award of actual
damages in favor of private respondent in the absence of proof thereof.
Where there is no evidence of the other party having acted in wanton, fraudulent or
reckless, or oppressive manner, neither may exemplary damages be awarded (Dee
Hua Liong Electrical Equipment Corporation vs. Reyes, 145 SCRA 488 [1986]).
As to the award of attorney's fees, it is well-settled that the same is the exception
rather than the general rule. Needless to say, the award of attorney's fees must be
disallowed where the award of exemplary damages is eliminated (Article 2208, Civil
Code; Agustin vs. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 375 [1990]). Moreover, in view of the
fact that there was no malicious prosecution against private respondent, attorney's
fees cannot be awarded him on that ground.

In the final analysis, there is no proof or showing that petitioners acted maliciously
or in bad faith in the filing of the case against private respondent. Consequently, in
the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith committed by petitioners, they cannot
be held liable for damages (Escritor, Jr. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA
577 [1987]). No damages can be awarded in the instant case, whether based on the
principle of abuse of rights, or for malicious prosecution. The questioned judgment
in the instant case attests to the propensity of trial judges to award damages
without basis. Lower courts are hereby cautioned anew against awarding
unconscionable sums as damages without bases therefor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in
C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 14948 dated May 13, 1989, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Costs against respondent Baltao.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

# Footnotes
** "Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance
of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.
"Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage
to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
"Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.

[G.R. No. 154259. February 28, 2005]

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners, vs. ROBERTO
REYES, a.k.a. AMAY BISAYA, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila Garden (Hotel
Nikko)[1] and Ruby Lim assail the Decision [2] of the Court of Appeals dated 26
November 2001 reversing the Decision [3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon

City, Branch 104, as well as the Resolution [4] of the Court of Appeals dated 09 July
2002 which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The cause of action before the trial court was one for damages brought under the
human relations provisions of the New Civil Code. Plaintiff thereat (respondent
herein) Roberto Reyes, more popularly known by the screen name Amay Bisaya,
alleged that at around 6:00 oclock in the evening of 13 October 1994, while he was
having coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko, [5] he was spotted by his friend of several
years, Dr. Violeta Filart, who then approached him. [6] Mrs. Filart invited him to join
her in a party at the hotels penthouse in celebration of the natal day of the hotels
manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka.[7] Mr. Reyes asked if she could vouch for him for
which she replied: of course. [8] Mr. Reyes then went up with the party of Dr. Filart
carrying the basket of fruits which was the latters present for the celebrant. [9] At the
penthouse, they first had their picture taken with the celebrant after which Mr.
Reyes sat with the party of Dr. Filart.[10]After a couple of hours, when the buffet
dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the buffet table but, to his great shock,
shame and embarrassment, he was stopped by petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who
claimed to speak for Hotel Nikko as Executive Secretary thereof. [11] In a loud voice
and within the presence and hearing of the other guests who were making a queue
at the buffet table, Ruby Lim told him to leave the party (huwag ka nang kumain,
hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na lang).[12] Mr. Reyes tried to explain that he was
invited by Dr. Filart.[13] Dr. Filart, who was within hearing distance, however,
completely ignored him thus adding to his shame and humiliation. [14] Not long after,
while he was still recovering from the traumatic experience, a Makati policeman
approached and asked him to step out of the hotel. [15] Like a common criminal, he
was escorted out of the party by the policeman. [16] Claiming damages, Mr. Reyes
asked for One Million Pesos actual damages, One Million Pesos moral and/or
exemplary damages and Two Hundred Thousand Pesos attorneys fees. [17]
Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not
under the ignominious circumstance painted by the latter. Ms. Lim narrated that she
was the Hotels Executive Secretary for the past twenty (20) years. [18] One of her
functions included organizing the birthday party of the hotels former General
Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka.[19] The year 1994 was no different. For Mr. Tsuruokas party,
Ms. Lim generated an exclusive guest list and extended invitations accordingly.
[20]
The guest list was limited to approximately sixty (60) of Mr. Tsuruokas closest
friends and some hotel employees and that Mr. Reyes was not one of those invited.
[21]
At the party, Ms. Lim first noticed Mr. Reyes at the bar counter ordering a drink.
[22]
Mindful of Mr. Tsuruokas wishes to keep the party intimate, Ms. Lim approached
Mr. Boy Miller, the captain waiter, to inquire as to the presence of Mr. Reyes who
was not invited.[23] Mr. Miller replied that he saw Mr. Reyes with the group of Dr.
Filart.[24] As Dr. Filart was engaged in conversation with another guest and as Ms.
Lim did not want to interrupt, she inquired instead from the sister of Dr. Filart, Ms.
Zenaida Fruto, who told her that Dr. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes. [25] Ms. Lim then

requested Ms. Fruto to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited. [26] Mr.
Reyes, however, lingered prompting Ms. Lim to inquire from Ms. Fruto who said that
Mr. Reyes did not want to leave.[27] When Ms. Lim turned around, she saw Mr. Reyes
conversing with a Captain Batung whom she later approached. [28] Believing that
Captain Batung and Mr. Reyes knew each other, Ms. Lim requested from him the
same favor from Ms. Fruto, i.e., for Captain Batung to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the
party as he was not invited.[29] Still, Mr. Reyes lingered. When Ms. Lim spotted Mr.
Reyes by the buffet table, she decided to speak to him herself as there were no
other guests in the immediate vicinity.[30] However, as Mr. Reyes was already helping
himself to the food, she decided to wait. [31] When Mr. Reyes went to a corner and
started to eat, Ms. Lim approached him and said: alam ninyo, hindo ho kayo dapat
nandito. Pero total nakakuha na ho kayo ng pagkain, ubusin na lang ninyo at
pagkatapos kung pwede lang po umalis na kayo.[32] She then turned around trusting
that Mr. Reyes would show enough decency to leave, but to her surprise, he began
screaming and making a big scene, and even threatened to dump food on her. [33]
Dr. Violeta Filart, the third defendant in the complaint before the lower court, also
gave her version of the story to the effect that she never invited Mr. Reyes to the
party.[34] According to her, it was Mr. Reyes who volunteered to carry the basket of
fruits intended for the celebrant as he was likewise going to take the elevator, not to
the penthouse but to Altitude 49.[35] When they reached the penthouse, she
reminded Mr. Reyes to go down as he was not properly dressed and was not invited.
[36]
All the while, she thought that Mr. Reyes already left the place, but she later saw
him at the bar talking to Col. Batung.[37] Then there was a commotion and she saw
Mr. Reyes shouting.[38] She ignored Mr. Reyes.[39] She was embarrassed and did not
want the celebrant to think that she invited him. [40]
After trial on the merits, the court a quo dismissed the complaint,[41] giving more
credence to the testimony of Ms. Lim that she was discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to
leave the party. The trial court likewise ratiocinated that Mr. Reyes assumed the risk
of being thrown out of the party as he was uninvited:
Plaintiff had no business being at the party because he was not a guest of Mr.
Tsuruoka, the birthday celebrant. He assumed the risk of being asked to leave for
attending a party to which he was not invited by the host. Damages are pecuniary
consequences which the law imposes for the breach of some duty or the violation of
some right. Thus, no recovery can be had against defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby
Lim because he himself was at fault (Garciano v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 436).
He knew that it was not the party of defendant Violeta Filart even if she allowed him
to join her and took responsibility for his attendance at the party. His action against
defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim must therefore fail. [42]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court as it found
more commanding of belief the testimony of Mr. Reyes that Ms. Lim ordered him to
leave in a loud voice within hearing distance of several guests:

In putting appellant in a very embarrassing situation, telling him that he should not
finish his food and to leave the place within the hearing distance of other guests is
an act which is contrary to morals, good customs . . ., for which appellees should
compensate the appellant for the damage suffered by the latter as a consequence
therefore (Art. 21, New Civil Code). The liability arises from the acts which are in
themselves legal or not prohibited, but contrary to morals or good customs.
Conversely, even in the exercise of a formal right, [one] cannot with impunity
intentionally cause damage to another in a manner contrary to morals or good
customs.[43]
The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that the actuation of Ms. Lim in approaching
several people to inquire into the presence of Mr. Reyes exposed the latter to
ridicule and was uncalled for as she should have approached Dr. Filart first and both
of them should have talked to Mr. Reyes in private:
Said acts of appellee Lim are uncalled for. What should have been done by appellee
Lim was to approach appellee Mrs. Filart and together they should have told
appellant Reyes in private that the latter should leave the party as the celebrant
only wanted close friends around. It is necessary that Mrs. Filart be the one to
approach appellant because it was she who invited appellant in that occasion. Were
it not for Mrs. Filarts invitation, appellant could not have suffered such humiliation.
For that, appellee Filart is equally liable.
...
The acts of [appellee] Lim are causes of action which are predicated upon mere
rudeness or lack of consideration of one person, which calls not only protection of
human dignity but respect of such dignity. Under Article 20 of the Civil Code, every
person who violates this duty becomes liable for damages, especially if said acts
were attended by malice or bad faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad
judgment or simple negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty to some motive
or interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of fraud (Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA, et al.,
309 SCRA 603).[44]
Consequently, the Court of Appeals imposed upon Hotel Nikko, Ruby Lim and Dr.
Violeta Filart the solidary obligation to pay Mr. Reyes (1) exemplary damages in the
amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); (2) moral damages in the
amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); and (3) attorneys fees in the
amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000).[45] On motion for reconsideration, the
Court of Appeals affirmed its earlier decision as the argument raised in the motion
had been amply discussed and passed upon in the decision sought to be
reconsidered.[46]
Thus, the instant petition for review. Hotel Nikko and Ruby Lim contend that the
Court of Appeals seriously erred in

I.

II.

III.

NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF VOLENTI NON FIT

INJURIA CONSIDERING THAT BY ITS OWN FINDINGS, AMAY BISAYA
WAS A GATE-CRASHER
HOLDING HOTEL NIKKO AND RUBY LIM JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY
LIABLE WITH DR. FILART FOR DAMAGES SINCE BY ITS OWN RULING,
AMAY BISAYA COULD NOT HAVE SUFFERED SUCH HUMILIATION,
WERE IT NOT FOR DR. FILARTS INVITATION
DEPARTING FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT AS
REGARDS THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ALLEGEDLY CAUSED THE
HUMILIATION OF AMAY BISAYA

IV. IN CONCLUDING THAT AMAY BISAYA WAS TREATED UNJUSTLY BECAUSE OF HIS
POVERTY, CONSIDERING THAT THIS WAS NEVER AN ISSUE AND NO EVIDENCE WAS
PRESENTED IN THIS REGARD
IV.

IN FAILING TO PASS UPON THE ISSUE ON THE DEFECTS OF THE

APPELLANTS BRIEF, THEREBY DEPARTING FROM THE ACCEPTED
AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non
fit injuria, they cannot be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed
the risk of being asked to leave (and being embarrassed and humiliated in the
process) as he was a gate-crasher.
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (to which a person assents is not esteemed in
law as injury[47]) refers to self-inflicted injury[48] or to the consent to injury[49] which
precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily
exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so. [50] As formulated
by petitioners, however, this doctrine does not find application to the case at bar
because even if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the
party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still under
obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and
shame.
Thus, the threshold issue is whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking
Roberto Reyes, a.k.a. Amay Bisaya, to leave the party where he was not invited by
the celebrant thereof thereby becoming liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil
Code. Parenthetically, and if Ruby Lim were so liable, whether or not Hotel Nikko, as
her employer, is solidarily liable with her.
As the trial court and the appellate court reached divergent and irreconcilable
conclusions concerning the same facts and evidence of the case, this Court is left
without choice but to use its latent power to review such findings of facts. Indeed,
the general rule is that we are not a trier of facts as our jurisdiction is limited to
reviewing and revising errors of law. [51] One of the exceptions to this general rule,
however, obtains herein as the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to

those of the trial court.[52] The lower court ruled that Ms. Lim did not abuse her right
to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party as she talked to him politely and discreetly. The
appellate court, on the other hand, held that Ms. Lim is liable for damages as she
needlessly embarrassed Mr. Reyes by telling him not to finish his food and to leave
the place within hearing distance of the other guests. Both courts, however, were in
agreement that it was Dr. Filarts invitation that brought Mr. Reyes to the party.
The consequential question then is: Which version is credible?
From an in depth review of the evidence, we find more credible the lower courts
findings of fact.
First, let us put things in the proper perspective.
We are dealing with a formal party in a posh, five-star hotel, [53] for-invitation-only,
thrown for the hotels former Manager, a Japanese national. Then came a person
who was clearly uninvited (by the celebrant) [54] and who could not just disappear
into the crowd as his face is known by many, being an actor. While he was already
spotted by the organizer of the party, Ms. Lim, the very person who generated the
guest list, it did not yet appear that the celebrant was aware of his presence. Ms.
Lim, mindful of the celebrants instruction to keep the party intimate, would
naturally want to get rid of the gate-crasher in the most hush-hush manner in order
not to call attention to a glitch in an otherwise seamless affair and, in the process,
risk the displeasure of the celebrant, her former boss. To unnecessarily call attention
to the presence of Mr. Reyes would certainly reflect badly on Ms. Lims ability to
follow the instructions of the celebrant to invite only his close friends and some of
the hotels personnel. Mr. Reyes, upon whom the burden rests to prove that indeed
Ms. Lim loudly and rudely ordered him to leave, could not offer any satisfactory
explanation why Ms. Lim would do that and risk ruining a formal and intimate affair.
On the contrary, Mr. Reyes, on cross-examination, had unwittingly sealed his fate by
admitting that when Ms. Lim talked to him, she was very close. Close enough for
him to kiss:
Q: And, Mr. Reyes, you testified that Miss Lim approached you while you were at the
buffet table? How close was she when she approached you?
A: Very close because we nearly kissed each other.
Q: And yet, she shouted for you to go down? She was that close and she shouted?
A: Yes. She said, wag kang kumain, hindi ka imbitado dito, bumaba ka na lang.
Q: So, you are testifying that she did this in a loud voice?
...
A: Yes. If it is not loud, it will not be heard by many. [55]

In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes
and expose him to ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at
him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel business for
twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the
testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not inspire belief and is
indeed incredible. Thus, the lower court was correct in observing that
Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the
latter to leave the party was made such that they nearly kissed each other, the
request was meant to be heard by him only and there could have been no intention
on her part to cause embarrassment to him. It was plaintiffs reaction to the request
that must have made the other guests aware of what transpired between them. . .
Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no need for the police to
take him out.[56]
Moreover, another problem with Mr. Reyess version of the story is that it is
unsupported. It is a basic rule in civil cases that he who alleges proves. Mr. Reyes,
however, had not presented any witness to back his story up. All his witnesses
Danny Rodinas, Pepito Guerrero and Alexander Silva - proved only that it was Dr.
Filart who invited him to the party. [57]
Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he
was not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21
of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable
as its liability springs from that of its employee. [58]
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse
of rights,[59] is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances. Article 19
states:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.
Elsewhere, we explained that when a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a
legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible.
[60]
The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards which must be
observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones
duties.[61] These standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due
and observe honesty and good faith.[62] Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act
evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a
legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another. [63] When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages
is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages

arising from a violation of law[64] which does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was
perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21, on the other hand,
states:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.
Article 21[65] refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1)
There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom,
public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure.[66]
A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, [67] and that is, the act
complained of must be intentional.[68]
As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms.
Lim was driven by animosity against him. These two people did not know each other
personally before the evening of 13 October 1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had nothing to
offer for an explanation for Ms. Lims alleged abusive conduct except the statement
that Ms. Lim, being single at 44 years old, had a very strong bias and prejudice
against (Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced by her associates in her work at the hotel
with foreign businessmen.[69] The lameness of this argument need not be belabored.
Suffice it to say that a complaint based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code must
necessarily fail if it has nothing to recommend it but innuendos and conjectures.
Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was likewise
acceptable and humane under the circumstances. In this regard, we cannot put our
imprimatur on the appellate courts declaration that Ms. Lims act of personally
approaching Mr. Reyes (without first verifying from Mrs. Filart if indeed she invited
Mr. Reyes) gave rise to a cause of action predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of
consideration of one person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but
respect of such dignity.[70] Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lims act of
by-passing Mrs. Filart cannot amount to abusive conduct especially because she did
inquire from Mrs. Filarts companion who told her that Mrs. Filart did not invite Mr.
Reyes.[71] If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of bad judgment which, if done with good
intentions, cannot amount to bad faith.
Not being liable for both actual and moral damages, neither can petitioners Lim and
Hotel Nikko be made answerable for exemplary damages [72] especially for the
reason stated by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held
Not a few of the rich people treat the poor with contempt because of the latters
lowly station in life. This has to be limited somewhere. In a democracy, such a limit
must be established. Social equality is not sought by the legal provisions under
consideration, but due regard for decency and propriety (Code Commission, pp. 33-

34). And by way of example or correction for public good and to avert further
commission of such acts, exemplary damages should be imposed upon appellees. [73]
The fundamental fallacy in the above-quoted findings is that it runs counter with the
very facts of the case and the evidence on hand. It is not disputed that at the time
of the incident in question, Mr. Reyes was an actor of long standing; a co-host of a
radio program over DZRH; a Board Member of the Music Singer Composer (MUSICO)
chaired by popular singer Imelda Papin; a showbiz Coordinator of Citizen Crime
Watch; and 1992 official candidate of the KBL Party for Governor of Bohol; and an
awardee of a number of humanitarian organizations of the Philippines. [74] During his
direct examination on rebuttal, Mr. Reyes stressed that he had income [75] and
nowhere did he say otherwise. On the other hand, the records are bereft of any
information as to the social and economic standing of petitioner Ruby Lim.
Consequently, the conclusion reached by the appellate court cannot withstand
scrutiny as it is without basis.
All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any damage which Mr.
Reyes might have suffered through Ms. Lims exercise of a legitimate right done
within the bounds of propriety and good faith, must be his to bear alone.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel
Manila Garden is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26
November 2001 and its Resolution dated 09 July 2002 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104,
dated 26 April 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED. Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga,
JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 142943. April 3, 2002]
Spouses ANTONIO and LORNA QUISUMBING, petitioners, vs. MANILA
ELECTRIC COMPANY (MERALCO), respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Under the law, the Manila Electric Company (Meralco) may immediately disconnect
electric service on the ground of alleged meter tampering, but only if the discovery
of the cause is personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or by a
duly authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board.

The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
February 1, 2000 Decision[1] and the April 10, 2000 Resolution[2] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 49022. The decretal portion of the said Decision reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision in Civil Case No. Q-95-23219 is hereby SET
ASIDE and the complaint against defendant-appellant MERALCO is
hereby DISMISSED. Plaintiffs-appellees are hereby ORDERED to pay defendantappellant MERALCO the differential billing of P193,332.00 representing the value of
used but unregistered electrical consumption. [3]
The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts of the case are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this wise:
Defendant-appellant Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a private corporation,
authorized by law to charge all persons, including the government, for the
consumption of electric power at rates duly authorized and approved by the Board
of Energy (now the Energy Regulatory Board).
Plaintiffs-appellees Spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are owners of a house
and lot located at No. 94 Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City, which they bought
on April 7, 1994 from Ms. Carmina Serapio Santos. They alleged to be business
entrepreneurs engaged in the export of furnitures under the business name Loran
Industries and recipient of the 1993 Agora Award and 1994 Golden Shell Award.Mrs.
Quisumbing is a member of the Innerwheel Club while Mr. Quisumbing is a member
of the Rotary Club, Chairman of Cebu Chamber of Commerce, and Director of
Chamber of Furniture.
On March 3, 1995 at around 9:00 a.m., defendant-appellants inspectors headed by
Emmanuel C. Orlino were assigned to conduct a routine-on-the-spot inspection of all
single phase meters at Greenmeadows Avenue. House no. 94 of Block 8, Lot 19
Greenmeadows Avenue owned by plaintiffs-appellees was inspected after observing
a standard operating procedure of asking permission from plaintiffs-appellees,
through their secretary which was granted. The secretary witnessed the
inspection. After the inspection, defendant-appellants inspectors discovered that the
terminal seal of the meter was missing; the meter cover seal was deformed; the
meter dials of the meter was mis-aligned and there were scratches on the meter
base plate. Defendant-appellants inspectors relayed the matter to plaintiffsappellees secretary, who in turn relayed the same to plaintiff-appellee, Lorna
Quisumbing, who was outraged of the result of the inspection and denied liability as
to the tampering of the meter. Plaintiffs-appellees were advised by defendant-

appellants inspectors that they had to detach the meter and bring it to their
laboratory for verification/confirmation of their findings. In the event the meter
turned out to be tampered, defendant-appellant had to temporarily disconnect the
electric services of plaintiffs-appellees. The laboratory testing conducted on the
meter has the following findings to wit:
1. Terminal seal was missing.
2. Lead cover seals (90 ERB 1-Meralco 21) were tampered by forcibly pulling out
from the sealing wire.
3. The 1000th, 100th and 10th dial pointers of the register were found out of
alignment and with circular scratches at the face of the register which indicates that
the meter had been opened to manipulate the said dial pointers and set manually to
the desired reading. In addition to this, the meter terminal blades were found full of
scratches.
After an hour, defendant-appellants head inspector, E. Orlina returned to the
residence of plaintiffs-appellees and informed them that the meter had been
tampered and unless they pay the amount ofP178,875.01 representing the
differential billing, their electric supply would be disconnected. Orlina informed
plaintiffs-appellees that they were just following their standard operating
procedure. Plaintiffs-appellees were further advised that questions relative to the
results of the inspection as well as the disconnection of her electrical services for
Violation of Contract (VOC) may be settled with Mr. M. Manuson of the Special
Accounts, Legal Service Department. However, on the same day at around 2:00
oclock in the afternoon defendant-appellants officer through a two-way radio
instructed its service inspector headed by Mr. Orlino to reconnect plaintiffsappellees electric service which the latter faithfully complied.
On March 6, 1995, plaintiffs-appellees filed a complaint for damages with prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, despite the immediate
reconnection, to order defendant-appellant to furnish electricity to the plaintiffsappellees alleging that defendant-appellant acted with wanton, capricious,
malicious and malevolent manner in disconnecting their power supply which was
done without due process, and without due regard for their rights, feelings, peace of
mind, social and business reputation.
In its Answer, defendant-appellant admitted disconnecting the electric service at
the plaintiffs-appellees house but denied liability citing the Terms and Conditions of
Service, and Republic Act No. 7832 otherwise known as Anti-Electricity and Electric
Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994.
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered judgment, ruling in favor of
plaintiffs-appellees.[4] (Citations omitted)

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court held that Meralco (herein respondent) should have given the
Quisumbing spouses (herein petitioners) ample opportunity to dispute the alleged
meter tampering.
It held that respondent had acted summarily and without procedural due process in
immediately disconnecting the electric service of petitioners. Respondents action,
ruled the RTC, constituted a quasi delict.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals overturned the trial courts ruling and dismissed the
Complaint. It held that respondents representatives had acted in good faith when
they disconnected petitioners electric service. Citing testimonial and documentary
evidence, it ruled that the disconnection was made only after observing due
process. Further, it noted that petitioners had not been able to prove their claim for
damages. The appellate court likewise upheld respondents counterclaim for the
billing differential in the amount of P193,332[5] representing the value of petitioners
used but unregistered electrical consumption, which had been established without
being controverted.
Hence, this Petition.[6]
The Issues
In their Memorandum,[7] petitioners submit the following issues for our
consideration:
4.1 Whether a prima facie presumption of tampering of electrical meter enumerated
under Sec. 4 (a) iv of RA 7832 (Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission
Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994) may be had despite the absence of an ERB
representative or an officer of the law?
4.2 Whether the enumeration of instances to establish a prima facie presumption of
tampering of electrical meter enumerated under Sec. 4 (a) iv of RA 7832 (AntiElectricity and Electric Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994) is
exclusive?
4.3 What constitutes notice prior to disconnection of electricity service? Corollarily,
whether the definition of notice under Meralco v. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 243)
applies to the case at bar?
4.4 Whether a prima facie presumption may contradict logic?
4.5 Whether documentary proof is pre-requisite for award of damages? [8]

In sum, this Petition raises three (3) main issues which this Court will address: (1)
whether respondent observed the requisites of law when it disconnected the
electrical supply of petitioners, (2) whether such disconnection entitled petitioners
to damages, and (3) whether petitioners are liable for the billing differential
computed by respondent.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Compliance with Requisites of Law
Petitioners contend that the immediate disconnection of electrical service was not
validly effected because of respondents noncompliance with the relevant provisions
of RA 7832, the Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage
Act of 1994. They insist that the immediate disconnection of electrical supply may
only be validly effected only when there is prima facie evidence of its illegal use. To
constitute prima facie evidence, the discovery of the illegal use must be personally
witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or a duly authorized
representative of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB).
Respondent, on the other hand, points out that the issue raised by petitioners is a
question of fact which this Court cannot pass upon. It argues further that this issue,
which was not raised in the court below, can no longer be taken up for the first time
on appeal. Assuming arguendo that the issue was raised below, it also contends
that petitioners were not able to specifically prove the absence of an officer of the
law or a duly authorized representative of the ERB when the discovery was made.
Prima facie Evidence of Illegal Use of Electricity
We agree with petitioners. Section 4 of RA 7832 states:
(a) The presence of any of the following circumstances shall constitute prima
facie evidence of illegal use of electricity, as defined in this Act, by the person
benefited thereby, and shall be the basis for: (1) the immediate disconnection by
the electric utility to such person after due notice, x x x
xxxxxxxxx
(viii) x x x Provided, however, That the discovery of any of the foregoing
circumstances, in order to constitute prima facie evidence, must be personally
witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or a duly authorized
representative of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB).[9] (Italics supplied)
Under the above provision, the prima facie presumption that will authorize
immediate disconnection will arise only upon the satisfaction of certain

requisites. One of these requisites is the personal witnessing and attestation by an

officer of the law or by an authorized ERB representative when the discovery was
made.
As a rule, this Court reviews only questions of law, not of facts. However, it may
pass upon the evidence when the factual findings of the trial court are different
from those of the Court of Appeals, as in this case. [10]
A careful review of the evidence on record negates the appellate courts holding that
the actions of defendant-appellants service inspectors were all in accord with the
requirement of the law.[11]
Respondents own witnesses provided the evidence on who were actually present
when the inspection was made. Emmanuel C. Orlino, the head of the Meralco team,
testified:
Q When you were conducting this inspection, and you discovered these findings you
testified earlier, who was present?
A The secretary, sir.[12]
ATTY. REYES - Who else were the members of your team that conducted this
inspection at Greenmeadows Avenue on that day, March 3, 1995?
A The composition of the team, sir?
Q Yes.
A Including me, we are about four (4) inspectors, sir.
Q You were four (4)?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who is the head of this team?
A I was the head of the team, sir.[13]
Further, Catalino A. Macaraig, the area head of the Orlino team, stated that only
Meralco personnel had been present during the inspection:
Q By the way you were not there at Green Meadows on that day, right?
A Yes, sir.
Q Only Mr. Orlino and who else were there?
A Two or three of his men.
Q All members of the inspection team?

A Yes, sir.[14]
These testimonies clearly show that at the time the alleged meter tampering was
discovered, only the Meralco inspection team and petitioners secretary were
present. Plainly, there was no officer of the law or ERB representative at that
time. Because of the absence of government representatives, the prima facie
authority to disconnect, granted to Meralco by RA 7832, cannot apply.
Neither can respondent find solace in the fact that petitioners secretary was present
at the time the inspection was made. The law clearly states that for the prima facie
evidence to apply, the discovery must be personally witnessed and attested to by
an officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory
Board (ERB).[15] Had the law intended the presence of the owner or his/her
representative to suffice, then it should have said so. Embedded in our
jurisprudence is the rule that courts may not construe a statute that is free from
doubt.[16] Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly
what it says, and courts have no choice but to see to it that the mandate is obeyed.
[17]

In fact, during the Senate deliberations on RA 7832, Senator John H. Osmea, its
author, stressed the need for the presence of government officers during
inspections of electric meters.He said:
Mr. President, if a utility like MERALCO finds certain circumstances or situations
which are listed in Section 2 of this bill to be prima facie evidence, I think they
should be prudent enough to bring in competent authority, either the police or the
NBI, to verify or substantiate their finding. If they were to summarily proceed to
disconnect on the basis of their findings and later on there would be a court case
and the customer or the user would deny the existence of what is listed in Section
2, then they could be in a lot of trouble. [18] (Italics supplied)
Neither can we accept respondents argument that when the alleged tampered
meter was brought to Meralcos laboratory for testing, there was already an ERB
representative present.
The law says that before immediate disconnection may be allowed, the discovery of
the illegal use of electricity must have been personally witnessed and attested to by
an officer of the law or by an authorized ERB representative. In this case, the
disconnection was effected immediately after the discovery of the alleged meter
tampering, which was witnessed only by Meralcos employees. That the ERB
representative was allegedly present when the meter was examined in the Meralco
laboratory will not cure the defect.
It is undisputed that after members of the Meralco team conducted their inspection
and found alleged meter tampering, they immediately disconnected petitioners
electrical supply.Again, this verity is culled from the testimony of Meralcos Orlina:

A When she went inside then she came out together with Mrs. Lourdes
Quis[u]mbing at that time. We did tell our findings regarding the meter and the
consequence with it. And she was very angry with me.
Q When you say consequence of your findings, what exactly did you tell Mrs.
Quisumbing?
A We told her that the service will be temporarily disconnected and that we are
referring to our Legal Department so could know the violation, sir. [19]
A Yes, sir. At that time, I referred her to Mr. Macaraig, sir.
Q What is the first name of this supervisor?
A Mr. Catalino Macara[i]g, sir.
Q Then after talking to Mr. Catalino Macara[i]g, this is over the telephone, what
happened?
A The supervisor advised her that the service will be temporarily disconnected and
she has to go to our Legal Department where she could settle the VOC, sir.
Q You are talking of VOC, what is this all about Mr. Orlino?
A VOC is violation of contract, sir.[20]
As to respondents argument that the presence of an authorized ERB representative
had not been raised below, it is clear, however, that the issue of due process was
brought up by petitioners as a valid issue in the CA. The presence of government
agents who may authorize immediate disconnections go into the essence of due
process. Indeed, we cannot allow respondent to act virtually as prosecutor and
judge in imposing the penalty of disconnection due to alleged meter
tampering. That would not sit well in a democratic country. After all, Meralco is a
monopoly that derives its power from the government. Clothing it with unilateral
authority to disconnect would be equivalent to giving it a license to tyrannize its
hapless customers.
Besides, even if not specifically raised, this Court has already ruled that [w]here the
issues already raised also rest on other issues not specifically presented, as long as
the latter issues bear relevance and close relation to the former and as long as they
arise from matters on record, the Court has the authority to include them in its
discussion of the controversy as well as to pass upon them. [21]
Contractual Right to Disconnect
Electrical Service

Neither may respondent rely on its alleged contractual right to disconnect electrical
service based on Exhibits 10[22] and 11,[23] or on Decisions of the Board of Energy
(now the Energy Regulatory Board). The relevant portion of these documents
concerns discontinuance of service. It provides:
The Company reserves the right to discontinue service in case the Customer is in
arrears in the payment of bills or for failure to pay the adjusted bills in those cases
where the meter stopped or failed to register the correct amount of energy
consumed, or for failure to comply with any of these terms and conditions, or in
case of or to prevent fraud upon the Company. Before disconnection is made in case
of or to prevent fraud, the Company may adjust the bill of said Customer
accordingly and if the adjusted bill is not paid, the Company may disconnect the
same. In case of disconnection, the provisions of Revised Order No. 1 of the former
Public Service Commission (now the Board of Energy) shall be observed. Any such
suspension of service shall not terminate the contract between the Company and
the Customer.[24]
Petitioners situation can fall under disconnection only in case of or to prevent fraud
upon the Company. However, this too has requisites before a disconnection may be
made. An adjusted bill shall be prepared, and only upon failure to pay it may the
company discontinue service. This is also true in regard to the provisions of Revised
Order No. 1 of the former Public Service Commission, which requires a 48-hour
written notice before a disconnection may be justified. In the instant case, these
requisites were obviously not complied with.
Second Issue
Damages
Having ruled that the immediate disconnection effected by Meralco lacks legal,
factual or contractual basis, we will now pass upon on the right of petitioners to
recover damages for the improper disconnection.
Petitioners are asking for the reinstatement of the RTC Decision, which awarded
them actual, moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees. All these
were overturned by the CA.
As to actual damages, we agree with the CA that competent proof is necessary
before our award may be made. The appellate court ruled as follows:
Considering further, it is a settled rule that in order for damages to be recovered,
the best evidence obtainable by the injured party must be presented. Actual and
compensatory damages cannot be presumed but must be duly proved and proved
with reasonable degree and certainty. A court cannot rely on speculation, conjecture
or guess work as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend upon

competent proof that they have been suffered and on evidence of actual amount
thereof. If the proof is flimsy and unsubstantial, no damages will be awarded. [25]
Actual damages are compensation for an injury that will put the injured party in the
position where it was before it was injured. [26] They pertain to such injuries or losses
that are actually sustained and susceptible of measurement. [27] Except as provided
by law or by stipulation, a party is entitled to an adequate compensation only for
such pecuniary loss as it has duly proven. [28]
Basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, not only must the amount of loss
be capable of proof; it must also be actually proven with a reasonable degree of
certainty, premised upon competent proof or the best evidence obtainable. [29]
Petitioners claim for actual damages was premised only upon Lorna Quisumbings
bare testimony as follows:
A Actually that da[y] I was really scheduled to go to that furniture exhibit. That
furniture exhibit is only once a year.
Q What is this furniture exhibit?
A The SITEM, that is a government agency that takes care of exporters and
exclusive marketing of our products around the world. We always have that once a
year and thats the time when all our buyers are here for us to show what we had
that was exhibited to go around. So, my husband had to [fly] from Cebu to Manila
just for this occasion. So we have an appointment with our people and our buyers
with SITEM and also that evening we will have to treat them [to] dinner.
Q Whereat?
A At our residence, we were supposed to have a dinner at our residence.
Q What happened to this occasion?
A So when they disconnected our electric power we had to get in touch with them
and change the venue.
Q Which venue did you transfer your dinner for your buyers?
A We brought them in a restaurant in Makati at Seasons Restaurant. But it was very
embar[r]assing for us because we faxed them ahead of time before they came to
Manila.
Q Now as a result of this change of your schedule because of the disconnection of
the electric power on that day, Friday, what damage did you suffer?
A I cancelled the catering service and that is so much of a h[a]ssle it was so
embarras[s]ing for us.

Q Can you tell us how much amount?

A Approximately P50,000.00.[30]
No other evidence has been proffered to substantiate her bare statements. She has
not shown how she arrived at the amount of P50,000; it is, at best, speculative. Her
self-serving testimonial evidence, if it may be called such, is insufficient to support
alleged actual damages.
While respondent does not rebut this testimony on the expenses incurred by the
spouses in moving the dinner out of their residence due to the disconnection, no
receipts covering such expenditures have been adduced in evidence. Neither is the
testimony corroborated. To reiterate, actual or compensatory damages cannot be
presumed, but must be duly proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. It is
dependent upon competent proof of damages that petitioners have suffered and of
the actual amount thereof.[31] The award must be based on the evidence presented,
not on the personal knowledge of the court; and certainly not on flimsy, remote,
speculative and unsubstantial proof.[32] Consequently, we uphold the CA ruling
denying the grant of actual damages.
Having said that, we agree with the trial court, however, that petitioners are entitled
to moral damages, albeit in a reduced amount.
The RTC opined as follows:
This Court agrees with the defendant regarding [its] right by law and equity to
protect itself from any fraud. However, such right should not be exercised arbitrarily
but with great caution and with due regard to the rights of the consumers. Meralco
having a virtual monopoly of the supply of electric power should refrain from taking
drastic actions against the consumers without observing due process. Even
assuming that the subject meter has had history of meter tampering, defendant
cannot simply assume that the present occupants are the ones responsible for such
tampering. Neither does it serve as a license to deprive the plaintiffs of their right to
due process. Defendant should have given the plaintiffs simple opportunity to
dispute the electric charges brought about by the alleged meter-tampering, which
were not included in the bill rendered them. Procedural due process requires
reasonable notice to pay the bill and reasonable notice to discontinue
supply. Absent due process the defendant may be held liable for damages. While
this Court is aware of the practice of unscrupulous individuals of stealing electric
curre[n]t which causes thousands if not millions of pesos in lost revenue to electric
companies, this does not give the defendant the right to trample upon the rights of
the consumers by denying them due process. [33]
Article 2219 of the Civil Code lists the instances when moral damages may be
recovered. One such case[34] is when the rights of individuals, including the right
against deprivation of property without due process of law, are violated. [35]

Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and
similar injury.[36]Although incapable of pecuniary computation, such damages may
be recovered if they are the proximate results of the defendants wrongful act or
omission.[37]
Case law establishes the following requisites for the award of moral damages: (1)
there is an injury -- whether physical, mental or psychological -- clearly sustained by
the claimant; (2) there is a culpable act or omission factually established; (3) the
wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury
sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award of damages is predicated on any of
the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. [38]
To reiterate, respondent had no legal right to immediately disconnect petitioners
electrical supply without observing the requisites of law which, in turn, are akin to
due process. Had respondent been more circumspect and prudent, petitioners could
have been given the opportunity to controvert the initial finding of alleged meter
tampering. Said the RTC:
More seriously, the action of the defendant in maliciously disconnecting the electric
service constitutes a breach of public policy. For public utilities, broad as their
powers are, have a clear duty to see to it that they do not violate nor transgress the
rights of the consumers. Any act on their part that militates against the ordinary
norms of justice and fair play is considered an infraction that gives rise to an action
for damages. Such is the case at bar.[39]
Indeed, the Supreme Court has ruled in Meralco v. CA[40] that respondent is required
to give notice of disconnection to an alleged delinquent customer. The Court said:
x x x One can not deny the vital role which a public utility such as MERALCO, having
a monopoly of the supply of electrical power in Metro Manila and some nearby
municipalities, plays in the life of people living in such areas. Electricity has become
a necessity to most people in these areas, justifying the exercise by the State of its
regulatory power over the business of supplying electrical service to the public, in
which petitioner MERALCO is engaged. Thus, the state may regulate, as it has done
through Section 97 of the Revised Order No. 1 of the Public Service Commission, the
conditions under which and the manner by which a public utility such as MERALCO
may effect a disconnection of service to a delinquent customer. Among others, a
prior written notice to the customer is required before disconnection of the
service. Failure to give such prior notice amounts to a tort. [41]
Observance of the rights of our people is sacred in our society. We cannot allow
such rights to be trifled with or trivialized. Although the Court sympathizes with
respondents efforts to stamp out the illegal use of electricity, such action must be
done only with strict observance of the rights of our people. As has been we

succinctly said: there is a right way to do the right thing at the right time for the
right reason.[42]
However, the amount of moral damages, which is left largely to the sound discretion
of the courts, should be granted in reasonable amounts, considering the attendant
facts and circumstances.[43] Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary
estimation, are designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and
not to impose a penalty.[44] Moral damages are not intended to enrich a plaintiff at
the expense of the defendant.[45] They are awarded only to obtain a means, a
diversion or an amusement that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering the
injured party has undergone by reason of the defendants culpable action. [46] They
must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. [47]
It is clear from the records that respondent was able to restore the electrical supply
of petitioners on the same day. Verily, the inconvenience and anxiety they suffered
as a result of the disconnection was thereafter corrected. Thus, we reduce the RTCs
grant of moral damages to the more equitable amount of P100,000.
Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages.[48] It is not given to enrich one party and impoverish
another, but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to socially
deleterious actions.[49] In this case, to serve an example -- that before a
disconnection of electrical supply can be effected by a public utility like Meralco, the
requisites of law must be faithfully complied with -- we award the amount
of P50,000 to petitioners.
Finally, with the award of exemplary damages, the award of attorneys fees is
likewise granted.[50] It is readily apparent that petitioners needed the services of a
lawyer to argue their cause, even to the extent of elevating the matter to this Court;
[51]
thus, an award of P50,000 is considered sufficient.
Final Issue:
Billing Differential
Finally, this Court holds that despite the basis for the award of damages -- the lack
of due process in immediately disconnecting petitioners electrical supply -respondents counterclaim for the billing differential is still proper. We agree with the
CA that respondent should be given what it rightfully deserves. The evidence it
presented, both documentary and testimonial, sufficiently proved the amount of the
differential.
Not only did respondent show how the meter examination had been conducted by
its experts, but it also established the amount of P193,332.96 that petitioners owed
respondent. The procedure through which this amount was arrived at was testified

to by Meralcos Senior Billing Computer Enrique Katipunan. His testimony was

corroborated by documentary evidence showing the accounts billing history and the
corresponding computations. Neither do we doubt the documents of inspections and
examinations presented by respondent to prove that, indeed there had been meter
tampering that resulted in unrecorded and unpaid electrical consumption.
The mere presentation by petitioners of a Contract to Sell with Assumption of
Mortgage[52] does not necessarily mean that they are no longer liable for the billing
differential. There was no sufficient evidence to show that they had not been
actually residing in the house before the date of the said document. Lorna
Quisumbing herself admitted[53] that they did not have any contract for electrical
service in their own name. Hence, petitioners effectively assumed the bills of the
former occupants of the premises.
Finally, the CA was correct in ruling that the convincing documentary and
testimonial evidence presented by respondent, was not controverted by petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed CA Decision
is MODIFIED as follows: petitioners are ORDERED to pay respondent the billing
differential ofP193,332.96; while respondent is ordered to pay petitioners P100,000
as moral damages, P50,000 as exemplary damages, and P50,000 as attorneys
fees. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., abroad on official business.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 132344

February 17, 2000

UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, petitioner,

vs.
ROMEO A. JADER, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May an educational institution be held liable for damages for misleading a student into believing that
the latter had satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not the case? This is the

issue in the instant petition for review premised on the following undisputed facts as summarized by
the trial court and adopted by the Court of Appeals (CA),1 to wit:
Plaintiff was enrolled in the defendants' College of Law from 1984 up to 1988. In the first
semester of his last year (School year 1987-1988), he failed to take the regular final
examination in Practice Court I for which he was given an incomplete grade (Exhibits "2",
also Exhibit "H"). He enrolled for the second semester as fourth year law student (Exhibit
"A") and on February 1, 1988 he filed an application for the removal of the incomplete grade
given him by Professor Carlos Ortega (Exhibits "H-2", also Exhibit "2") which was approved
by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after payment of the required fee. He took the examination on
March 28, 1988. On May 30, 1988, Professor Carlos Ortega submitted his grade. It was a
grade of five (5). (Exhibits "H-4", also Exhibits "2-L", "2-N").
1wphi1.nt

In the meantime, the Dean and the Faculty Members of the College of Law met to deliberate
on who among the fourth year students should be allowed to graduate. The plaintiff's name
appeared in the Tentative List of Candidates for graduation for the Degree of Bachelor of
Laws (LL.B) as of Second Semester (1987-1988) with the following annotation:
JADER ROMEO A.
Def. Conflict of Laws x-1-87-88, Practice Court I Inc., 1-87-88 C-1 to submit transcript with
S.O. (Exhibits "3", "3-C-1", "3-C-2").
The 35th Investitures & Commencement Ceremonies for the candidates of Bachelor of Laws
was scheduled on the 16th of April 1988 at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, and in the invitation
for that occasion the name of the plaintiff appeared as one of the candidates. (Exhibits "B",
"B-6", "B-6-A"). At the foot of the list of the names of the candidates there appeared however
the following annotation:
This is a tentative list Degrees will be conferred upon these candidates who
satisfactorily complete requirements as stated in the University Bulletin and as
approved of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (Exhibit "B-7-A").
The plaintiff attended the investiture ceremonies at F. dela Cruz Quadrangle, U.E., Recto
Campus, during the program of which he went up the stage when his name was called,
escorted by her (sic) mother and his eldest brother who assisted in placing the Hood, and his
Tassel was turned from left to right, and he was thereafter handed by Dean Celedonio a
rolled white sheet of paper symbolical of the Law Diploma. His relatives took pictures of the
occasion (Exhibits "C" to "C-6", "D-3" to "D-11").
He tendered a blow-out that evening which was attended by neighbors, friends and relatives
who wished him good luck in the forthcoming bar examination. There were pictures taken too
during the blow-out (Exhibits "D" to "D-1").
He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination. He took a leave of absence without
pay from his job from April 20, 1988 to September 30, 1988 (Exhibit "G") and enrolled at the
pre-bar review class in Far Eastern University. (Exhibits "F" to "F-2"). Having learned of the
deficiency he dropped his review class and was not able to take the bar examination. 2
Consequently, respondent sued petitioner for damages alleging that he suffered moral shock, mental
anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights when he

was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations arising from the latter's negligence. He prayed for an
award of moral and exemplary damages, unrealized income, attorney's fees, and costs of suit.
In its answer with counterclaim, petitioner denied liability arguing mainly that it never led respondent
to believe that he completed the requirements for a Bachelor of Laws degree when his name was
included in the tentative list of graduating students. After trial, the lower court rendered judgment as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendant ordering the latter to pay plaintiff the sum of THIRTY FIVE
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY PESOS (P35,470.00) with legal rate of interest
from the filing of the complaint until fully paid, the amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P5,000.00) as attorney's fees and the cost of suit.
Defendant's counterclaim is, for lack of merit, hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.3
which on appeal by both parties was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) with modification. The
dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the lower Court's Decision is hereby AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that defendant-appellee, in addition to the sum adjudged by the
lower court in favor of plaintiff-appellant, is also ORDERED to pay plaintiff-appellant the
amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS for moral damages. Costs against
defendant-appellee.
SO ORDERED.4
Upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner UE elevated the case to this Court on a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, arguing that it has no liability to respondent
Romeo A. Jader, considering that the proximate and immediate cause of the alleged damages
incurred by the latter arose out of his own negligence in not verifying from the professor concerned
the result of his removal exam.
The petition lacks merit.
When a student is enrolled in any educational or learning institution, a contract of education is
entered into between said institution and the student. The professors, teachers or instructors hired
by the school are considered merely as agents and administrators tasked to perform the school's
commitment under the contract. Since the contracting parties are the school and the student, the
latter is not duty-bound to deal with the former's agents, such as the professors with respect to the
status or result of his grades, although nothing prevents either professors or students from sharing
with each other such information. The Court takes judicial notice of the traditional practice in
educational institutions wherein the professor directly furnishes his/her students their grades. It is the
contractual obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to
each and every student as to whether he or she had already complied with all the requirements for
the conferment of a degree or whether they would be included among those who will graduate.
Although commencement exercises are but a formal ceremony, it nonetheless is not an ordinary
occasion, since such ceremony is the educational institution's way of announcing to the whole world
that the students included in the list of those who will be conferred a degree during the

baccalaureate ceremony have satisfied all the requirements for such degree. Prior or subsequent to
the ceremony, the school has the obligation to promptly inform the student of any problem involving
the latter's grades and performance and also most importantly, of the procedures for remedying the
same.
Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal examination, particularly at
a time when he had already commenced preparing for the bar exams, cannot be said to have acted
in good faith. Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by
the aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith connotes
an honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even though the forms and
technicalities of the law, together with the absence of all information or belief of facts, would render
the transaction unconscientious.5 It is the school that has access to those information and it is only
the school that can compel its professors to act and comply with its rules, regulations and policies
with respect to the computation and the prompt submission of grades. Students do not exercise
control, much less influence, over the way an educational institution should run its affairs, particularly
in disciplining its professors and teachers and ensuring their compliance with the school's rules and
orders. Being the party that hired them, it is the school that exercises general supervision and
exclusive control over the professors with respect to the submission of reports involving the students'
standing. Exclusive control means that no other person or entity had any control over the
instrumentality which caused the damage or injury.6
The college dean is the senior officer responsible for the operation of an academic program,
enforcement of rules and regulations, and the supervision of faculty and student services. 7 He must
see to it that his own professors and teachers, regardless of their status or position outside of the
university, must comply with the rules set by the latter. The negligent act of a professor who fails to
observe the rules of the school, for instance by not promptly submitting a student's grade, is not only
imputable to the professor but is an act of the school, being his employer.
Considering further, that the institution of learning involved herein is a university which is engaged in
legal education, it should have practiced what it inculcates in its students, more specifically the
principle of good dealings enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code which states:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Art. 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory
law.8 In civilized society, men must be able to assume that others will do them no intended injury
that others will commit no internal aggressions upon them; that their fellowmen, when they act
affirmatively will do so with due care which the ordinary understanding and moral sense of the
community exacts and that those with whom they deal in the general course of society will act in
good faith. The ultimate thing in the theory of liability is justifiable reliance under conditions of
civilized society.9 Schools and professors cannot just take students for granted and be indifferent to
them, for without the latter, the former are useless.
Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not wait
for the latter to inquire from the former. The conscious indifference of a person to the rights or
welfare of the person/persons who may be affected by his act or omission can support a claim for
damages.10 Want of care to the conscious disregard of civil obligations coupled with a conscious

knowledge of the cause naturally calculated to produce them would make the erring party
liable.11 Petitioner ought to have known that time was of the essence in the performance of its
obligation to inform respondent of his grade. It cannot feign ignorance that respondent will not
prepare himself for the bar exams since that is precisely the immediate concern after graduation of
an LL.B. graduate. It failed to act seasonably. Petitioner cannot just give out its student's grades at
any time because a student has to comply with certain deadlines set by the Supreme Court on the
submission of requirements for taking the bar. Petitioner's liability arose from its failure to promptly
inform respondent of the result of an examination and in misleading the latter into believing that he
had satisfied all requirements for the course. Worth quoting is the following disquisition of the
respondent court:
It is apparent from the testimony of Dean Tiongson that defendant-appellee University had
been informed during the deliberation that the professor in Practice Court I gave plaintiffappellant a failing grade. Yet, defendant-appellee still did not inform plaintiff-appellant of his
failure to complete the requirements for the degree nor did they remove his name from the
tentative list of candidates for graduation. Worse, defendant-appellee university, despite the
knowledge that plaintiff-appellant failed in Practice Court I, againincluded plaintiff-appellant's
name in the "tentative list of candidates for graduation which was prepared after the
deliberation and which became the basis for the commencement rites program. Dean
Tiongson reasons out that plaintiff-appellant's name was allowed to remain in the tentative
list of candidates for graduation in the hope that the latter would still be able to remedy the
situation in the remaining few days before graduation day. Dean Tiongson, however, did not
explain how plaintiff appellant Jader could have done something to complete his deficiency if
defendant-appellee university did not exert any effort to inform plaintiff-appellant of his failing
grade in Practice Court I.12
Petitioner cannot pass on its blame to the professors to justify its own negligence that led to the
delayed relay of information to respondent. When one of two innocent parties must suffer, he
through whose agency the loss occurred must bear it.13 The modern tendency is to grant indemnity
for damages in cases where there is abuse of right, even when the act is not illicit. 14 If mere fault or
negligence in one's acts can make him liable for damages for injury caused thereby, with more
reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable. A person should be protected only when he acts
in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith, but not
when he acts with negligence or abuse.15
However, while petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable to respondent for the latter's actual
damages, we hold that respondent should not have been awarded moral damages. We do not agree
with the Court of Appeals' findings that respondent suffered shock, trauma and pain when he was
informed that he could not graduate and will not be allowed to take the bar examinations. At the very
least, it behooved on respondent to verify for himself whether he has completed all necessary
requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations. As a senior law student, respondent should
have been responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs, specifically those pertaining to his
academic achievement, are in order. Given these considerations, we fail to see how respondent
could have suffered untold embarrassment in attending the graduation rites, enrolling in the bar
review classes and not being able to take the bar exams. If respondent was indeed humiliated by his
failure to take the bar, he brought this upon himself by not verifying if he has satisfied all the
requirements including his school records, before preparing himself for the bar examination.
Certainly, taking the bar examinations does not only entail a mental preparation on the subjects
thereof; there are also prerequisites of documentation and submission of requirements which the
prospective examinee must meet.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Petitioner is ORDERED to PAY respondent the sum of Thirty-five Thousand Four Hundred Seventy
Pesos (P35,470.00), with legal interest of 6% per annum computed from the date of filing of the
complaint until fully paid; the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney's fees; and
the costs of the suit. The award of moral damages is DELEIED.
1wphi1.nt

SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Puno, J., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 81262 August 25, 1989
GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C. HENDRY, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS, respondents.
Atencia & Arias Law Offices for petitioners.
Romulo C. Felizmena for private respondent.

CORTES, J.:
Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay Cable and Radio
Corporation (GLOBE MACKAY) in a dual capacity as a purchasing agent and administrative
assistant to the engineering operations manager. In 1972, GLOBE MACKAY discovered fictitious
purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it lost several thousands of pesos.
According to private respondent it was he who actually discovered the anomalies and reported them
on November 10, 1972 to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to petitioner Herbert C.
Hendry who was then the Executive Vice-President and General Manager of GLOBE MACKAY.
On November 11, 1972, one day after private respondent Tobias made the report, petitioner Hendry
confronted him by stating that he was the number one suspect, and ordered him to take a one week
forced leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave the
office keys.
On November 20, 1972, when private respondent Tobias returned to work after the forced leave,
petitioner Hendry went up to him and called him a "crook" and a "swindler." Tobias was then ordered
to take a lie detector test. He was also instructed to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature,
and initials for examination by the police investigators to determine his complicity in the anomalies.
On December 6,1972, the Manila police investigators submitted a laboratory crime report (Exh. "A")
clearing private respondent of participation in the anomalies.

Not satisfied with the police report, petitioners hired a private investigator, retired Col. Jose G.
Fernandez, who on December 10, 1972, submitted a report (Exh. "2") finding Tobias guilty. This
report however expressly stated that further investigation was still to be conducted.
Nevertheless, on December 12, 1972, petitioner Hendry issued a memorandum suspending Tobias
from work preparatory to the filing of criminal charges against him.
On December 19,1972, Lt. Dioscoro V. Tagle, Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner, after
investigating other documents pertaining to the alleged anomalous transactions, submitted a second
laboratory crime report (Exh. "B") reiterating his previous finding that the handwritings, signatures,
and initials appearing in the checks and other documents involved in the fraudulent transactions
were not those of Tobias. The lie detector tests conducted on Tobias also yielded negative results.
Notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from the anomalies and the fact that the
report of the private investigator, was, by its own terms, not yet complete, petitioners filed with the
City Fiscal of Manila a complaint for estafa through falsification of commercial documents, later
amended to just estafa. Subsequently five other criminal complaints were filed against Tobias, four of
which were for estafa through Falsification of commercial document while the fifth was for of Article
290 of' the Revised Penal Code (Discovering Secrets Through Seizure of Correspondence). Two of
these complaints were refiled with the Judge Advocate General's Office, which however, remanded
them to the fiscal's office. All of the six criminal complaints were dismissed by the fiscal. Petitioners
appealed four of the fiscal's resolutions dismissing the criminal complaints with the Secretary of
Justice, who, however, affirmed their dismissal.
lwph1.t

In the meantime, on January 17, 1973, Tobias received a notice (Exh. "F") from petitioners that his
employment has been terminated effective December 13, 1972. Whereupon, Tobias filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal. The labor arbiter dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the labor arbiter's decision. However, the Secretary of
Labor, acting on petitioners' appeal from the NLRC ruling, reinstated the labor arbiter's decision.
Tobias appealed the Secretary of Labor's order with the Office of the President. During the pendency
of the appeal with said office, petitioners and private respondent Tobias entered into a compromise
agreement regarding the latter's complaint for illegal dismissal.
Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO).
However, petitioner Hendry, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that
Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty.
Private respondent Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious,
oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. Petitioner Hendry, claiming illness, did not testify during
the hearings. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch IX, through Judge Manuel T. Reyes
rendered judgment in favor of private respondent by ordering petitioners to pay him eighty thousand
pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages, two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral
damages, twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00) as attorney's fees, and costs. Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the Court of
Appeals. On the other hand, Tobias appealed as to the amount of damages. However, the Court of
Appeals, an a decision dated August 31, 1987 affirmed the RTC decision in toto. Petitioners' motion
for reconsideration having been denied, the instant petition for review on certiorari was filed.
The main issue in this case is whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private
respondent.

Petitioners contend that they could not be made liable for damages in the lawful exercise of their
right to dismiss private respondent.
On the other hand, private respondent contends that because of petitioners' abusive manner in
dismissing him as well as for the inhuman treatment he got from them, the Petitioners must
indemnify him for the damage that he had suffered.
One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some basic
principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the
stability of the social order." [REPORT ON THE CODE COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED CIVIL
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers of the Code, seeking to remedy the defect of the
old Code which merely stated the effects of the law, but failed to draw out its spirit, incorporated
certain fundamental precepts which were "designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the
fountain of good conscience" and which were also meant to serve as "guides for human conduct
[that] should run as golden threads through society, to the end that law may approach its supreme
ideal, which is the sway and dominance of justice" (Id.) Foremost among these principles is that
pronounced in Article 19 which provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets
certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the
performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone
his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation
on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be
observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may
nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which
does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19
lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social
order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either
Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.
Article 20, which pertains to damage arising from a violation of law, provides that:
Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not violate any provision of law since they
were merely exercising their legal right to dismiss private respondent. This does not, however, leave
private respondent with no relief because Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that:
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
This article, adopted to remedy the "countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of
moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury" [Id.]
should "vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is
impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes" [Id. it p. 40; See also PNB v.
CA, G.R. No. L-27155, May 18,1978, 83 SCRA 237, 247].

In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked, there is no rigid test
which can be applied. While the Court has not hesitated to apply Article 19 whether the legal and
factual circumstances called for its application [See for e.g., Velayo v. Shell Co. of the Phil., Ltd., 100
Phil. 186 (1956); PNB v. CA, supra;Grand Union Supermarket, Inc. v. Espino, Jr., G.R. No. L-48250,
December 28, 1979, 94 SCRA 953; PAL v. CA, G.R. No. L-46558, July 31,1981,106 SCRA 391;
United General Industries, Inc, v. Paler G.R. No. L-30205, March 15,1982,112 SCRA 404; Rubio v.
CA, G.R. No. 50911, August 21, 1987, 153 SCRA 183] the question of whether or not the principle of
abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 or other
applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. And in the instant case, the
Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant circumstances, finds that all
petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to private respondent
and for which the latter must now be indemnified.
The trial court made a finding that notwithstanding the fact that it was private respondent Tobias who
reported the possible existence of anomalous transactions, petitioner Hendry "showed belligerence
and told plaintiff (private respondent herein) that he was the number one suspect and to take a one
week vacation leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to
leave his keys to said defendant (petitioner Hendry)" [RTC Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 232]. This,
petitioners do not dispute. But regardless of whether or not it was private respondent Tobias who
reported the anomalies to petitioners, the latter's reaction towards the former upon uncovering the
anomalies was less than civil. An employer who harbors suspicions that an employee has committed
dishonesty might be justified in taking the appropriate action such as ordering an investigation and
directing the employee to go on a leave. Firmness and the resolve to uncover the truth would also be
expected from such employer. But the high-handed treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was
certainly uncalled for. And this reprehensible attitude of petitioners was to continue when private
respondent returned to work on November 20, 1972 after his one week forced leave. Upon reporting
for work, Tobias was confronted by Hendry who said. "Tobby, you are the crook and swindler in this
company." Considering that the first report made by the police investigators was submitted only on
December 10, 1972 [See Exh. A] the statement made by petitioner Hendry was baseless. The
imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias
transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has
already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the
manner in which the right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done
abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to the employee [Quisaba v. Sta. Ines-Melale
Veneer and Plywood Inc., G.R. No. L-38088, August 30, 1974, 58 SCRA 771; See also Philippine
Refining Co., Inc. v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-21871, September 27,1966, 18 SCRA 107] Under the
circumstances of the instant case, the petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a legitimate manner
their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to recover damages under Article 19 in relation
to Article 21 of the Civil Code.
But petitioners were not content with just dismissing Tobias. Several other tortious acts were
committed by petitioners against Tobias after the latter's termination from work. Towards the latter
part of January, 1973, after the filing of the first of six criminal complaints against Tobias, the latter
talked to Hendry to protest the actions taken against him. In response, Hendry cut short Tobias'
protestations by telling him to just confess or else the company would file a hundred more cases
against him until he landed in jail. Hendry added that, "You Filipinos cannot be trusted." The threat
unmasked petitioner's bad faith in the various actions taken against Tobias. On the other hand, the
scornful remark about Filipinos as well as Hendry's earlier statements about Tobias being a "crook"
and "swindler" are clear violations of 'Tobias' personal dignity [See Article 26, Civil Code].
The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the writing of a letter to RETELCO sometime in
October 1974, stating that Tobias had been dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty.
Because of the letter, Tobias failed to gain employment with RETELCO and as a result of which,

Tobias remained unemployed for a longer period of time. For this further damage suffered by Tobias,
petitioners must likewise be held liable for damages consistent with Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
Petitioners, however, contend that they have a "moral, if not legal, duty to forewarn other employers
of the kind of employee the plaintiff (private respondent herein) was." [Petition, p. 14; Rollo, p. 15].
Petitioners further claim that "it is the accepted moral and societal obligation of every man to advise
or warn his fellowmen of any threat or danger to the latter's life, honor or property. And this includes
warning one's brethren of the possible dangers involved in dealing with, or accepting into
confidence, a man whose honesty and integrity is suspect" [Id.]. These arguments, rather than justify
petitioners' act, reveal a seeming obsession to prevent Tobias from getting a job, even after almost
two years from the time Tobias was dismissed.
Finally, there is the matter of the filing by petitioners of six criminal complaints against Tobias.
Petitioners contend that there is no case against them for malicious prosecution and that they cannot
be "penalized for exercising their right and prerogative of seeking justice by filing criminal complaints
against an employee who was their principal suspect in the commission of forgeries and in the
perpetration of anomalous transactions which defrauded them of substantial sums of money"
[Petition, p. 10, Rollo, p. 11].
While sound principles of justice and public policy dictate that persons shall have free resort to the
courts for redress of wrongs and vindication of their rights [Buenaventura v. Sto. Domingo, 103 Phil.
239 (1958)], the right to institute criminal prosecutions can not be exercised maliciously and in bad
faith [Ventura v. Bernabe, G.R. No. L-26760, April 30, 1971, 38 SCRA 5871.] Hence, in Yutuk V.
Manila Electric Co., G.R. No. L-13016, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 337, the Court held that the right to
file criminal complaints should not be used as a weapon to force an alleged debtor to pay an
indebtedness. To do so would be a clear perversion of the function of the criminal processes and of
the courts of justice. And in Hawpia CA, G.R. No. L-20047, June 30, 1967. 20 SCRA 536 the Court
upheld the judgment against the petitioner for actual and moral damages and attorney's fees after
making a finding that petitioner, with persistence, filed at least six criminal complaints against
respondent, all of which were dismissed.
To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a
design to vex and humiliate a person and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing
that the charges were false and groundless [Manila Gas Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. L-44190,
October 30,1980, 100 SCRA 602]. Concededly, the filing of a suit by itself, does not render a person
liable for malicious prosecution [Inhelder Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 52358, May 301983122 SCRA
576]. The mere dismissal by the fiscal of the criminal complaint is not a ground for an award of
damages for malicious prosecution if there is no competent evidence to show that the complainant
had acted in bad faith [Sison v. David, G.R. No. L-11268, January 28,1961, 1 SCRA 60].
In the instant case, however, the trial court made a finding that petitioners acted in bad faith in filing
the criminal complaints against Tobias, observing that:
xxx
Defendants (petitioners herein) filed with the Fiscal's Office of Manila a total of six (6)
criminal cases, five (5) of which were for estafa thru falsification of commercial
document and one for violation of Art. 290 of the Revised Penal Code "discovering
secrets thru seizure of correspondence," and all were dismissed for insufficiency or
lack of evidence." The dismissal of four (4) of the cases was appealed to the Ministry
of Justice, but said Ministry invariably sustained the dismissal of the cases. As above
adverted to, two of these cases were refiled with the Judge Advocate General's
Office of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to railroad plaintiffs arrest and detention

in the military stockade, but this was frustrated by a presidential decree transferring
criminal cases involving civilians to the civil courts.
xxx
To be sure, when despite the two (2) police reports embodying the findings of Lt.
Dioscoro Tagle, Chief Document Examiner of the Manila Police Department, clearing
plaintiff of participation or involvement in the fraudulent transactions complained of,
despite the negative results of the lie detector tests which defendants compelled
plaintiff to undergo, and although the police investigation was "still under follow-up
and a supplementary report will be submitted after all the evidence has been
gathered," defendants hastily filed six (6) criminal cases with the city Fiscal's Office
of Manila, five (5) for estafa thru falsification of commercial document and one (1) for
violation of Art. 290 of the Revised Penal Code, so much so that as was to be
expected, all six (6) cases were dismissed, with one of the investigating fiscals, Asst.
Fiscal de Guia, commenting in one case that, "Indeed, the haphazard way this case
was investigated is evident. Evident likewise is the flurry and haste in the filing of this
case against respondent Tobias," there can be no mistaking that defendants would
not but be motivated by malicious and unlawful intent to harass, oppress, and cause
damage to plaintiff.
xxx
[RTC Decision, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 235-236].
In addition to the observations made by the trial court, the Court finds it significant that the criminal
complaints were filed during the pendency of the illegal dismissal case filed by Tobias against
petitioners. This explains the haste in which the complaints were filed, which the trial court earlier
noted. But petitioners, to prove their good faith, point to the fact that only six complaints were filed
against Tobias when they could have allegedly filed one hundred cases, considering the number of
anomalous transactions committed against GLOBE MACKAY. However, petitioners' good faith is
belied by the threat made by Hendry after the filing of the first complaint that one hundred more
cases would be filed against Tobias. In effect, the possible filing of one hundred more cases was
made to hang like the sword of Damocles over the head of Tobias. In fine, considering the haste in
which the criminal complaints were filed, the fact that they were filed during the pendency of the
illegal dismissal case against petitioners, the threat made by Hendry, the fact that the cases were
filed notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from involvement in the anomalies
committed against GLOBE MACKAY, coupled by the eventual dismissal of all the cases, the Court is
led into no other conclusion than that petitioners were motivated by malicious intent in filing the six
criminal complaints against Tobias.
Petitioners next contend that the award of damages was excessive. In the complaint filed against
petitioners, Tobias prayed for the following: one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) as actual
damages; fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages; eight hundred thousand pesos
(P800,000.00) as moral damages; fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as attorney's fees; and costs.
The trial court, after making a computation of the damages incurred by Tobias [See RTC Decision,
pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 154-1551, awarded him the following: eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as
actual damages; two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages; twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages; thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees;
and, costs. It must be underscored that petitioners have been guilty of committing several actionable
tortious acts, i.e., the abusive manner in which they dismissed Tobias from work including the
baseless imputation of guilt and the harassment during the investigations; the defamatory language

heaped on Tobias as well as the scornful remark on Filipinos; the poison letter sent to RETELCO
which resulted in Tobias' loss of possible employment; and, the malicious filing of the criminal
complaints. Considering the extent of the damage wrought on Tobias, the Court finds that, contrary
to petitioners' contention, the amount of damages awarded to Tobias was reasonable under the
circumstances.
Yet, petitioners still insist that the award of damages was improper, invoking the principle of damnum
absqueinjuria. It is argued that "[t]he only probable actual damage that plaintiff (private respondent
herein) could have suffered was a direct result of his having been dismissed from his employment,
which was a valid and legal act of the defendants-appellants (petitioners herein). " [Petition, p. 17;
Rollo, p. 18].
lwph1.t

According to the principle of damnum absque injuria, damage or loss which does not constitute a
violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong is not actionable [Escano v. CA, G.R. No. L47207, September 25, 1980, 100 SCRA 197; See also Gilchrist v. Cuddy 29 Phil, 542 (1915); The
Board of Liquidators v. Kalaw, G.R. No. L-18805, August 14, 1967, 20 SCRA 987]. This principle
finds no application in this case. It bears repeating that even granting that petitioners might have had
the right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive manner in which that right was exercised
amounted to a legal wrong for which petitioners must now be held liable. Moreover, the damage
incurred by Tobias was not only in connection with the abusive manner in which he was dismissed
but was also the result of several other quasi-delictual acts committed by petitioners.
Petitioners next question the award of moral damages. However, the Court has already ruled
in Wassmer v. Velez, G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964, 12 SCRA 648, 653, that [p]er express
provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases
mentioned in Article 21 of said Code." Hence, the Court of Appeals committed no error in awarding
moral damages to Tobias.
Lastly, the award of exemplary damages is impugned by petitioners. Although Article 2231 of the
Civil Code provides that "[i]n quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant
acted with gross negligence," the Court, in Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., G.R. No. L28589, January 8, 1973, 49 SCRA 1, ruled that if gross negligence warrants the award of exemplary
damages, with more reason is its imposition justified when the act performed is deliberate, malicious
and tainted with bad faith. As in the Zuluetacase, the nature of the wrongful acts shown to have been
committed by petitioners against Tobias is sufficient basis for the award of exemplary damages to
the latter.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 09055 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr. and Bidin, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., took no part.
Footnotes
** Penned by Justice Jorge R. Coquia and concurred in be Justice Josue N. Bellosillo
and Justice Venancio D. Aldecoa Jr.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-46061 November 14, 1984
ST. LOUIS REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CONRADO J. ARAMIL, respondents.
Romeo Z. Comia for petitioner.
Roman R. Bersamin for private respondent.

AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the recovery of damages for a wrongful advertisement in the Sunday
Times where Saint Louis Realty Corporation misrepresented that the house of Doctor Conrado J.
Aramil belonged to Arcadio S. Arcadio.
St. Louis Realty caused to be published with the permission of Arcadio S. Arcadio (but without
permission of Doctor Aramil) in the issue of the Sunday Times of December 15, 1968 an
advertisement with the heading "WHERE THE HEART IS". Below that heading was the photograph
of the residence of Doctor Aramil and theArcadio family and then below the photograph was the
following write-up:
Home is where the heart is. And the hearts of MR. AND MRS. ARCADIO S.
ARCADIO and their family have been captured by BROOKSIDE HILLS. They used to
rent a small 2-bedroom house in a cramped neighborhood, sadly inadequate and
unwholesome for the needs of a large family. They dream(ed) of a more pleasant
place free from the din and dust of city life yet near all facilities. Plans took shape
when they heard of BROOKSIDE HILLS. With thrift and determination, they bought a
lot and built their dream house ... for P31,000. The Arcadios are now part of the
friendly, thriving community of BROOKSIDE HILLS... a beautiful first-class
subdivision planned for wholesome family living.
The same advertisement appeared in the Sunday Times dated January 5, 1969. Doctor Aramil a
neuropsychiatrist and a member of the faculty of the U. E. Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Hospital,
noticed the mistake. On that same date, he wrote St. Louis Realty the following letter of protest:
Dear Sirs:

This is anent to your advertisements appearing in the December 15, 1968 and
January 5, 1969 issues of the Sunday Times which boldly depicted my house at the
above-mentioned address and implying that it belonged to another person. I am not
aware of any permission or authority on my partfor the use of my house for such
publicity.
This unauthorized use of my house for your promotional gain and much more the
apparent distortions therein are I believe not only transgression to my private
property but also damaging to my prestige in the medical profession I have had
invited in several occasions numerous medical colleagues, medical students and
friends to my house and after reading your December 15 advertisement some of
them have uttered some remarks purporting doubts as to my professional and
personal integrity. Such sly remarks although in light vein as "it looks like your
house," "how much are you renting from the Arcadios?", " like your wife portrayed in
the papers as belonging to another husband," etc., have resulted in no little mental
anguish on my part.
I have referred this matter to the Legal Panel of the Philippine Medical Association
and their final advice is pending upon my submission of supporting ownership
papers.
I will therefore be constrained to pursue court action against your corporation unless
you could satisfactorily explain this matter within a week upon receipt of this letter.
The letter was received by Ernesto Magtoto, an officer of St. Louis Realty in charge of advertising.
He stopped publication of the advertisement. He contacted Doctor Aramil and offered his apologies.
However, no rectification or apology was published.
On February 20, 1969, Aramil's counsel demanded from St. Louis Realty actual, moral and
exemplary damages of P110,000 (Exh. D). In its answer dated March 10, St. Louis Realty claimed
that there was an honest mistake and that if Aramil so desired, rectification would be published in
the Manila Times (Exh. 3).
It published in the issue of the Manila Times of March 18, 1969 a new advertisement with the
Arcadio family and their real house. But it did not publish any apology to Doctor Aramil and an
explanation of the error.
On March 29, Aramil filed his complaint for damages. St. Louis Realty published in the issue of
the Manila Timesof April 15, 1969 the following "NOTICE OF RECTIFICATION" in a space 4 by 3
inches:
This will serve as a notice that our print ad 'Where the Heart is' which appeared in
the Manila Timesissue of March 18, 1969 is a rectification of the same ad that
appeared in the Manila Times issues rectification of the same ad that appeal of
December 15, 1968 and January 5, 1969 wherein a photo of the house of another
Brookside Homeowner (Dr. Aramil-private respondent) was mistakenly used as a
background for the featured homeowner's the Arcadio family.
The ad of March 18, 1969 shows the Arcadio family with their real house in the
background, as was intended all along.

Judge Jose M. Leuterio observed that St. Louis Realty should have immediately published a
rectification and apology. He found that as a result of St. Louis Realty's mistake, magnified by its
utter lack of sincerity, Doctor Aramil suffered mental anguish and his income was reduced by about
P1,000 to P1,500 a month. Moreover, there was violation of Aramil's right to privacy (Art. 26, Civil
Code).
The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000
as attorney's fees. St. Louis Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Appellate Court affirmed that judgment, with Acting Presiding Justice Magno S. Gatmaitan
as ponente, and Justices Sixto A. Domondon and Samuel F. Reyes concurring.
The Appellate Court reasoned out that St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasi-delict under
articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code because the questioned advertisements pictured a beautiful
house which did not belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who, naturally, was annoyed by that
contretemps.
In this appeal, St. Louis Realty contends that the Appellate Court ignored certain facts and resorted
to surmises and conjectures. This contention is unwarranted. The Appellate Court adopted the facts
found by the trial court. Those factual findings are binding on this Court.
St. Louis Realty also contends that the decision is contrary to law and that the case was decided in a
way not in conformity with the rulings of this Court. It argues that the case is not covered by article
26 which provides that "every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of
mind of his neighbors and other persons". "Prying into the privacy of another's residence" and
"meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another" and "similar acts", "though
they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention
and other relief".
The damages fixed by Judge Leuterio are sanctioned by Articles 2200, 2208 and 2219 of the Civil
Code. Article 2219 allows moral damages for acts and actions mentioned in Article 26. As lengthily
explained by Justice Gatmaitan, the acts and omissions of the firm fan under Article 26.
St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the Aramil and Arcadio residences in
a widely circulated publication like the Sunday Times. To suit its purpose, it never made any written
apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification ".
Persons, who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused by the distorted, lingering
impression that he was renting his residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it from him.
Either way, his private life was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution of
income and mental anguish.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Escolin and Cuevas, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review and set aside
the Decision 1of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in toto the 16
October 1939 Decision of Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil
Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of
promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid
trial court a complaint 2 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to
get married. She alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a
pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner, on the
other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an
exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before
20 August 1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that
they would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after the end of the school semester, which
was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in Baaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced
her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him; a week
before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and
threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during a confrontation with
a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner
repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is
already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering
the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual
expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and
remedies as may be just and equitable. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.
In his Answer with Counterclaim, 3 petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of the parties as
averred in the complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information

sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged as his Special
and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married
with the private respondent; he neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to
live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his place because he
discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and passport; and finally, no confrontation
took place with a representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the complaint
is baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into court and
compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation, he prayed for
an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.

After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order 4 embodying
the stipulated facts which the parties had agreed upon, to wit:
1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan,
while the defendant is single, Iranian citizen and resident (sic) of Lozano Apartment,
Guilig, Dagupan City since September 1, 1987 up to the present;
2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern, Dagupan City,
College of Medicine, second year medicine proper;
3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette , Fernandez
Avenue, Dagupan City since July, 1986 up to the present and a (sic) high school
graduate;
4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of the Mabuhay
Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino introduced the defendant to the plaintiff on August 3,
1986.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16
October 1989 a decision 5 favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the
latter damages and attorney's fees; the dispositive portion of the decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand
(P20,000.00) pesos as moral damages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of three thousand
(P3,000.00) pesos as atty's fees and two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos at (sic)
litigation expenses and to pay the costs.
3. All other claims are denied. 6
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private
respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable
virtue who readily submits to sexual advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false
pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, d) because of his persuasive promise to marry
her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that deceitful promise, private
respondent and her parents in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions made some
preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and
chickens, inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his

promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused
Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The
trial court gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony because, inter alia, she would not
have had the temerity and courage to come to court and expose her honor and reputation to public
scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false. 7
The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the evidence for the
private respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by the respondent Court as follows:
According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that she
never had a boyfriend before, defendant started courting her just a few days after
they first met. He later proposed marriage to her several times and she accepted his
love as well as his proposal of marriage on August 20, 1987, on which same day he
went with her to her hometown of Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to
meet her parents and inform them of their relationship and their intention to get
married. The photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their submarkings) of defendant with
members of plaintiff's family or with plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on that
occasion, defendant told plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters that he intended
to marry her during the semestral break in October, 1987, and because plaintiff's
parents thought he was good and trusted him, they agreed to his proposal for him to
marry their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to stay in their house and sleep
with plaintiff during the few days that they were in Bugallon. When plaintiff and
defendant later returned to Dagupan City, they continued to live together in
defendant's apartment. However, in the early days of October, 1987, defendant
would tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he went to school, and he even gave her
medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made her sleep the whole day and night
until the following day. As a result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff became
pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to abort the fetus. Still plaintiff
continued to live with defendant and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her
until he told her that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in
Bacolod City. That was the time plaintiff left defendant, went home to her parents,
and thereafter consulted a lawyer who accompanied her to the barangay captain in
Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother, and a barangay tanod sent by the
barangay captain went to talk to defendant to still convince him to marry plaintiff, but
defendant insisted that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl
in Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial, is that
defendant is still single.
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had informed them
of his desire to marry Marilou, he already looked for sponsors for the wedding,
started preparing for the reception by looking for pigs and chickens, and even
already invited many relatives and friends to the forthcoming wedding. 8
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which docketed the
case as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief, 9 he contended that the trial court erred (a) in not
dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral damages,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision 10 affirming in toto the
trial court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining the trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court
made the following analysis:

First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who was already
29 years old at the time, does not appear to be a girl of loose morals. It is
uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior to her unfortunate experience with
defendant and never had boyfriend. She is, as described by the lower court, a barrio
lass "not used and accustomed to trend of modern urban life", and certainly would
(sic) not have allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive promise made
by the defendant to marry her." In fact, we agree with the lower court that plaintiff and
defendant must have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff must have thought because
of the deception of defendant, for otherwise, she would not have allowed herself to
be photographed with defendant in public in so (sic) loving and tender poses as
those depicted in the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot believe, therefore,
defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to him except a waitress at the
restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact admitted that he went to plaintiff's
hometown of Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta
on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic) a beach party together with
the manager and employees of the Mabuhay Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50,
tsn id.), and on April 1, 1987 when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told
him to marry her daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left Dagupan
City where he was involved in the serious study of medicine to go to plaintiff's
hometown in Baaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some kind of special
relationship between them? And this special relationship must indeed have led to
defendant's insincere proposal of marriage to plaintiff, communicated not only to her
but also to her parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of the restaurant where
plaintiff was working and where defendant first proposed marriage to her, also knew
of this love affair and defendant's proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she
declared was the reason why plaintiff resigned from her job at the restaurant after
she had accepted defendant's proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral character
and must think so low and have so little respect and regard for Filipino women that
he openly admitted that when he studied in Bacolod City for several years where he
finished his B.S. Biology before he came to Dagupan City to study medicine, he had
a common-law wife in Bacolod City. In other words, he also lived with another woman
in Bacolod City but did not marry that woman, just like what he did to plaintiff. It is not
surprising, then, that he felt so little compunction or remorse in pretending to love
and promising to marry plaintiff, a young, innocent, trustful country girl, in order to
satisfy his lust on her. 11
and then concluded:
In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-appellant's
fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that
made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the
honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these
(sic) fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to
their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage. And as
these acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against morals, good customs,
and public policy, and are even gravely and deeply derogatory and insulting to our
women, coming as they do from a foreigner who has been enjoying the hospitality of
our people and taking advantage of the opportunity to study in one of our institutions
of learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be made, under Art. 21 of the Civil

Code of the Philippines, to compensate for the moral damages and injury that he had
caused plaintiff, as the lower court ordered him to do in its decision in this case. 12
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March 1991; he raises
therein the single issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. 13
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any moral
wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public policy; he has not professed love or proposed
marriage to the private respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for
liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a
foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian
Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had made a
promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable because of his
Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to take
four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not
posses good moral character. Moreover, his controversial "common law life" is now his legal wife as
their marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful
cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be pinned
on him for the live-in relationship, the private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an
illicit arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he
had professed his love to the private respondent and had also promised to marry her, such acts
would not be actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case. The mere breach of
promise is not actionable. 14
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the petition and the
petitioner had filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the
parties to submit their respective Memoranda, which they subsequently complied with.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in support of his
thesis, it is clear that questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the credibility of witnesses,
are also raised. It is the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's
findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter court having heard the witnesses and having had
the opportunity to observe closely their deportment and manner of testifying, unless the trial court
had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which, if considered, might affect the result of the
case. 15
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had overlooked
any fact of substance or values which could alter the result of the case.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or
weigh all over again the evidence introduced by the parties before the lower court. There are,
however, recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, inMedina vs. Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court took the time,
again, to enumerate these exceptions:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made
is manifestly mistaken, absurb or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3)
Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4)
When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing,

L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v.
Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its
findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellate and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance
Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia
v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593
[1986]); (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition
as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised
on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record
(Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).
Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the above quoted exceptions
in this case. Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts must be respected.
And now to the legal issue.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. 17 Congress
deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so.
The reason therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from
which We quote:
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not
actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. 18 The
history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in England has shown that no
other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous
men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of rights of action in the so-called
Heart Balm suits in many of the American states. . . . 19
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the
concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and
punish in the statute books. 20
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or
determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the
statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they
have actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed it
necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the
following rule:
Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the
nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been made,
or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no

crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of age. Neither can any civil action for
breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong
has been committed, and though the girl and family have suffered incalculable moral
damage, she and her parents cannot bring action for damages. But under the
proposed article, she and her parents would have such a right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would vouchsafe
adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible
for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. 21
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there
is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and
is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or
intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept
while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa
aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but international criminal acts as well such
as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the
Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil
Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the
Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of
the Civil Code. 22 In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence
of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even
postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly
broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable
than the Anglo-American law on torts. 23
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that
where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a
woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the
giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying
her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to
accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant
to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and
the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that
such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and
womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's
parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In
short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina,
not because of lust but because of moral seduction the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its
example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under
either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was above
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.

Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to
marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of
Appeals, 25 this Court denied recovery of damages to the woman because:
. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not
only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant
who was around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former
high school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be when she
became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because the
court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner
because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him by having a
fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if there had
been moral seduction, recovery was eventually denied because We were not convinced that such
seduction existed. The following enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made in the said case:
The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth in the
Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who had
been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere
sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the
idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the
seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S.
vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient
promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the
promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust
and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43
Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56) She must be induced to depart from
the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and
wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that effect, and
which result in her person to ultimately submitting her person to the
sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement,
persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere
proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of
sexual desire of curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely
affords her the needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It
has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases
would tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and would be a
reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be
swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662)
xxx xxx xxx

Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one whole year,
from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintain intimate
sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is
incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and
mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered
exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she
would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without
exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut
short all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his
defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude that no case is
made under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged,
no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint. 27
In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently retired from
this Court, opined that in a breach of promise to marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral
damages may be recovered:
. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due to
mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra
vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan.
29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE be the promise to marry, and the EFFECT
be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance that there was criminal or moral
seduction, hence recovery of moral damages will prosper. If it be the other way
around, there can be no recovery of moral damages, because here mutual lust has
intervened). . . .
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for the
wedding presentations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:
It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still subsists, notwithstanding the
incorporation of the present article 31 in the Code. The example given by the Code
Commission is correct, if there wasseduction, not necessarily in the legal sense, but in
the vulgar sense of deception. But when the sexual act is accomplished without any
deceit or qualifying circumstance of abuse of authority or influence, but the woman,
already of age, has knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot be said that there is an
injury which can be the basis for indemnity.
But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic), the action
lies. The court, however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive
the woman under the circumstances, because an act which would deceive a girl
sixteen years of age may not constitute deceit as to an experienced woman thirty
years of age. But so long as there is a wrongful act and a resulting injury, there
should be civil liability, even if the act is not punishable under the criminal law and
there should have been an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for that reason.
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that granting, for
argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also
at fault. According to him, both parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the
Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs. Marcos, 32 the private respondent cannot recover

damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes as far as stating that if the private respondent had
"sustained any injury or damage in their relationship, it is primarily because of her own doing, 33 for:

. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor sooner
or later. Take notice that she is a plain high school graduate and a mere
employee . . . (Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988) in a
luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a man who can give her economic
security. Her family is in dire need of financial assistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18,
1988). And this predicament prompted her to accept a proposition that may have
been offered by the petitioner. 34
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a
condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the latter's ignoble
birth, inferior educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment.
Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all moved by good faith and an honest
motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstances could not have even remotely occurred to him.
Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe,
entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and would want
her to be his life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who
honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able
to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and
brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the
petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which
directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in
the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his obligations.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may not
have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual
congress not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms
of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found out that the petitioner was not going
to marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari
delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." 35 At most, it
could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.
Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his
transgression has been brought about by the imposition of undue influence of the
party on whom the burden of the original wrong principally rests, or where his
consent to the transaction was itself procured by
fraud. 36
In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:
Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no action
by one against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule, however, has been
interpreted as applicable only where the fault on both sides is, more or less,
equivalent. It does not apply where one party is literate or intelligent and the other
one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209).
We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said that this
Court condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the petitioner stay together

in the same room in their house after giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of
parents to protect the honor of their daughters and infuse upon them the higher values of morality
and dignity.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
May 30, 1962
G.R. No. L-17396
CECILIO PE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ALFONSO PE, defendant-appellee.
Cecilio L. Pe for and in his own behalf as plaintiff-appellant.
Leodegario L. Mogol for defendant-appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Plaintiffs brought this action before the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover
moral, compensatory, exemplary and corrective damages in the amount of
P94,000.00 exclusive of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
Defendant, after denying some allegations contained in the complaint, set up as a
defense that the facts alleged therein, even if true, do not constitute a valid cause
of action.
After trial, the lower court, after finding that defendant had carried on a love affair
with one Lolita Pe, an unmarried woman, being a married man himself, declared
that defendant cannot be held liable for moral damages it appearing that plaintiffs
failed to prove that defendant, being aware of his marital status, deliberately and in
bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection. So it rendered decision dismissing the
complaint.

Plaintiffs brought this case on appeal before this Court on the ground that the issues
involved are purely of law.
The facts as found by the trial court are: Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and
sisters of one Lolita Pe. At the time of her disappearance on April 14, 1957, Lolita
was 24 years old and unmarried. Defendant is a married man and works as agent of
the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory. He used to stay in the town of Gasan,
Marinduque, in connection with his aforesaid occupation. Lolita was staying with her
parents in the same town. Defendant was an adopted son of a Chinaman named Pe
Beco, a collateral relative of Lolita's father. Because of such fact and the similarity in
their family name, defendant became close to the plaintiffs who regarded him as a
member of their family. Sometime in 1952, defendant frequented the house of Lolita
on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. The two
eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine trysts not only in
the town of Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school.
They exchanged love notes with each other the contents of which reveal not only
their infatuation for each other but also the extent to which they had carried their
relationship. The rumors about their love affairs reached the ears of Lolita's parents
sometime, in 1955, and since then defendant was forbidden from going to their
house and from further seeing Lolita. The plaintiffs even filed deportation
proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national. The affair between
defendant and Lolita continued nonetheless.
Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was staying with her brothers and sisters at their
residence at 54-B Espaa Extension, Quezon City. On April 14, 1957, Lolita
disappeared from said house. After she left, her brothers and sisters checked up her
thing and found that Lolita's clothes were gone. However, plaintiffs found a note on
a crumpled piece of paper inside Lolita's aparador. Said note, written on a small slip
of paper approximately 4" by 3" in size, was in a handwriting recognized to be that
of defendant's. In English it reads:
Honey, suppose I leave here on Sunday night, and that's 13th of this month and we
will have a date on the 14th, that's Monday morning at 10 a.m.
Reply
Love
The disappearance of Lolita was reported to the police authorities and the NBI but
up to the present there is no news or trace of her whereabouts.
The present action is based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner which is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.

There is no doubt that the claim of plaintiffs for damages is based on the fact that
defendant, being a married man, carried on a love affair with Lolita Pe thereby
causing plaintiffs injury in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public
policy. But in spite of the fact that plaintiffs have clearly established that in illicit
affair was carried on between defendant and Lolita which caused great damage to
the name and reputation of plaintiffs who are her parents, brothers and sisters, the
trial court considered their complaint not actionable for the reason that they failed
to prove that defendant deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection
Thus, the trial court said: "In the absence of proof on this point, the court may not
presume that it was the defendant who deliberately induced such relationship. We
cannot be unmindful of the uncertainties and sometimes inexplicable mysteries of
the human emotions. It is a possibility that the defendant and Lolita simply fell in
love with each other, not only without any desire on their part, but also against their
better judgment and in full consciousness of what it will bring to both of them. This
is specially so with respect to Lolita, being an unmarried woman, falling in love with
defendant who is a married man."
We disagree with this view. The circumstances under which defendant tried to win
Lolita's affection cannot lead, to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru
an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall
in love with him. This is shown by the fact that defendant frequented the house of
Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary.
Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter's family who was allowed free
access because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her
family, the two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine
love affairs not only in Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio
school. When the rumors about their illicit affairs reached the knowledge of her
parents, defendant was forbidden from going to their house and even from seeing
Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a
Chinese national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until
she disappeared from the parental home. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn
from this chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a
clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent
of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is
indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has
committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs
and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby
sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as
attorney's fees and expenses of litigations. Costs against appellee.
Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-20089

December 26, 1964

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jamir for defendant-appellant.
Samson S. Alcantara for plaintiff-appellee.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed by appropriate
planning and serious endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is worse, complete public
humiliation.
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get
married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his
bride-to-be:
Dear Bet
Will have to postpone wedding My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair
today.
Please do not ask too many people about the reason why That would only create
a scandal.
Paquing
But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE
MAMA PAPA LOVE .
PAKING
Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. Plaintiff adduced
evidence before the clerk of court as commissioner, and on April 29, 1955, judgment was rendered
ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the costs.

On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings and
motion for new trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it cut. But the court, on August 2,
1955, ordered the parties and their attorneys to appear before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at
this stage of the proceedings the possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement." It added that
should any of them fail to appear "the petition for relief and the opposition thereto will be deemed
submitted for resolution."
On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court. Instead, on the following day his
counsel filed a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendants petition for relief. The
counsel stated that he would confer with defendant in Cagayan de Oro City the latter's residence
on the possibility of an amicable element. The court granted two weeks counted from August 25,
1955.
Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the court had expired on
September 8, 1955 but that defendant and his counsel had failed to appear.
Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order of July 6, 1956 calling the
parties and their attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956. This time. however, defendant's counsel
informed the court that chances of settling the case amicably were nil.
On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's aforesaid petition. Defendant has
appealed to this Court. In his petition of June 21, 1955 in the court a quo defendant alleged
excusable negligence as ground to set aside the judgment by default. Specifically, it was stated that
defendant filed no answer in the belief that an amicable settlement was being negotiated.
A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence,
must be duly supported by an affidavit of merits stating facts constituting a valid defense. (Sec. 3,
Rule 38, Rules of Court.) Defendant's affidavit of merits attached to his petition of June 21, 1955
stated: "That he has a good and valid defense against plaintiff's cause of action, his failure to marry
the plaintiff as scheduled having been due to fortuitous event and/or circumstances beyond his
control." An affidavit of merits like this stating mere conclusions or opinions instead of facts is not
valid. (Cortes vs. Co Bun Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani vs. P. Tarrachand Bros., L-15800,
December 29, 1960.)
Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in fact unnecessary, or a mere
surplusage, because the judgment sought to be set aside was null and void, it having been based on
evidence adduced before the clerk of court. In Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519, October
30, 1962, this Court pointed out that the procedure of designating the clerk of court as commissioner
to receive evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of the Rules of Court. Now as to
defendant's consent to said procedure, the same did not have to be obtained for he was declared in
default and thus had no standing in court (Velez vs. Ramas, 40 Phil. 787; Alano vs. Court of First
Instance, L-14557, October 30, 1959).
In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts that the judgment is
contrary to law. The reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an
action for breach of promise to marry. Indeed, our ruling in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L14628, Sept. 30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa vs. Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere
breach of a promise to marry" is not an actionable wrong. We pointed out that Congress deliberately
eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code the provisions that would have it so.
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be
perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who

wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract
marriage, which was subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was set for September 4,
1954. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh.
C). The bride-to-be's trousseau, party drsrses and other apparel for the important occasion were
purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A
matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received (Tsn.,
6; Exh. E). And then, with but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old,:
simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding My mother opposes it ... " He
enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired
plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning soon." But he never returned and was never heard
from again.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to
marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the abovedescribed preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be
solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which
defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages awarded were excessive. No question
is raised as to the award of actual damages. What defendant would really assert hereunder is that
the award of moral and exemplary damages, in the amount of P25,000.00, should be totally
eliminated.
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in
the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages, defendant contends that
the same could not be adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the
condition precedent is that "the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or
malevolent manner." The argument is devoid of merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of
this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton ... , reckless [and] oppressive manner." This Court's
opinion, however, is that considering the particular circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral
and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the lower court's judgment is
hereby affirmed, with costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, and
Zaldivar, JJ.,concur.

Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, et al., No. L-14628, 109 Phil. 629 ,
September 30, 1960
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14628

September 30, 1960

FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.
Regino Hermosisima for petitioner.
F.P. Gabriel, Jr. for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
An appeal by certiorari, taken by petitioner Francisco Hermosisima, from a
decision of Court of Appeals modifying that of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.
On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred to as complaint,
filed with said of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child and moral damages
for alleged breach of promise. Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and
expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied having ever promised to
marry the complainant. Upon her motion, said court ordered petitioner, on October
27, 1954, to pay, by way of alimonypendente lite, P50.00 a month, which was, on
February 16, 1955, reduced to P30.00 a month. In due course, later on, said court
rendered a decision the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the child, Chris
Hermosisima, as the natural daughter of defendant, and confirming the
orderpendente lite, ordering defendant to pay to the said child, through plaintiff, the
sum of thirty pesos (P30.00), payable on or before the fifth day of every month
sentencing defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of FOUR THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS (P4,500.00) for actual and compensatory damages; the sum of
FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as moral damages; and the further sum of FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) as attorney's fees for plaintiff, with costs against
defendant.
On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision,
except as to the actual and compensatory damages and the moral damages, which
were increased to P5,614.25 and P7,000.00, respectively.
The main issue before us is whether moral damages are recoverable, under
our laws, for breach of promise to marry. The pertinent facts are:
Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950, Soledad
then a teacher in the Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu, and petitioner, who
was almost ten (10) years younger than she, used to go around together and were
regarded as engaged, although he had made no promise of marriage prior thereto.
In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a life insurance underwriter in the City
of Cebu, where intimacy developed among her and the petitioner, since one
evening in 1953, when after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in
his cabin on board M/V "Escao," to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot.

In February 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was in the family way,
whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on
June 17, 1954, in a private maternity and clinic. However, subsequently, or on July
24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez. Hence, the present action, which
was commenced on or about October 4, 1954.
Referring now to the issue above referred to, it will be noted that the Civil
Code of Spain permitted the recovery of damages for breach to marry. Article 43
and 44 of said Code provides:
ART. 43. A mutual promise of marriage shall not give rise to an obligation to
contract marriage. No court shall entertain any complaint by which the enforcement
of such promise is sought.
ART. 44. If the promise has been in a public or private instrument by an adult,
or by a minor with the concurrence of the person whose consent is necessary for
the celebration of the marriage, or if the banns have been published, the one who
without just cause refuses to marry shall be obliged to reimburse the other for the
expenses which he or she may have incurred by reason of the promised marriage.
The action for reimbursement of expenses to which the foregoing article
refers must be brought within one year, computed from the day of the refusal to
celebrate the marriage.
Inasmuch as these articles were never in force in the Philippines, this Court
ruled inDe Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil., 866), that "the action for breach of promises to
marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or
property advanced . . . upon the faith of such promise". The Code Commission
charged with the drafting of the Proposed Civil Code of the Philippines deem it best,
however, to change the law thereon. We quote from the report of the Code
Commission on said Proposed Civil Code:
Articles 43 and 44 the Civil Code of 1889 refer to the promise of marriage. But
these articles are not enforced in the Philippines. The subject is regulated in the
Proposed Civil Code not only as to the aspect treated of in said articles but also in
other particulars. It is advisable to furnish legislative solutions to some questions
that might arise relative to betrothal. Among the provisions proposed are: That
authorizing the adjudication of moral damages, in case of breach of promise of
marriage, and that creating liability for causing a marriage engagement to be
broken.1awphl.nt
Accordingly, the following provisions were inserted in said Proposed Civil
Code, under Chapter I, Title III, Book I thereof:
Art. 56. A mutual promise to marry may be made expressly or impliedly.

Art. 57. An engagement to be married must be agreed directly by the future

spouses.
Art. 58. A contract for a future marriage cannot, without the consent of the parent
or guardian, be entered into by a male between the ages of sixteen and twenty
years or by a female between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years. Without such
consent of the parents or guardian, the engagement to marry cannot be the basis of
a civil action for damages in case of breach of the promise.
Art. 59. A promise to marry when made by a female under the age of fourteen years
is not civilly actionable, even though approved by the parent or guardian.
Art. 60. In cases referred to in the proceeding articles, the criminal and civil
responsibility of a male for seduction shall not be affected.
Art. 61. No action for specific performance of a mutual promise to marry may be
brought.
Art. 62. An action for breach of promise to marry may be brought by the aggrieved
party even though a minor without the assistance of his parent or guardian. Should
the minor refuse to bring suit, the parent or guardian may institute the action.
Art. 63. Damages for breach of promise to marry shall include not only material and
pecuniary losses but also compensation for mental and moral suffering.
Art. 64. Any person, other than a rival, the parents, guardians and grandparents, of
the affianced parties, who cause a marriage engagement to be broken shall be
liable for damages, both material and moral, to the engaged person who is rejected.
Art. 65. In case of breach of promise to marry, the party breaking the engagement
shall be obliged to return what he or she has received from the other as gift on
account of the promise of the marriage.
These article were, however, eliminated in Congress. The reason therefor are
set forth in the report of the corresponding Senate Committee, from which we
quote:
The elimination of this Chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry
is not actionable has been definitely decide in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia, 58
Phil., 866. The history of breach of promise suit in the United States and in England
has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing
women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of
the rights of action in the so-called Balm suit in many of the American States.
See statutes of:
Florida 1945 pp. 1342 1344
Maryland 1945 pp. 1759 1762

Nevada 1943 p. 75
Maine 1941 pp. 140 141
New Hampshire 1941 p. 223
California 1939 p. 1245
Massachusetts 1938 p. 326
Indiana 1936 p. 1009
Michigan 1935 p. 201
New York 1935
Pennsylvania p. 450
The Commission perhaps though that it has followed the more progression
trend in legislation when it provided for breach of promise to marry suits. But it is
clear that the creation of such causes of action at a time when so many States, in
consequence of years of experience are doing away with them, may well prove to
be a step in the wrong direction. (Congressional Record, Vol. IV, No. 79, Thursday,
May 19, 1949, p. 2352.)
The views thus expressed were accepted by both houses of Congress. In the
light of the clear and manifest intent of our law making body not to sanction actions
for breach of promise to marry, the award of moral damages made by the lower
courts is, accordingly, untenable. The Court of Appeals said award:
Moreover, it appearing that because of defendant-appellant's seduction
power, plaintiff-appellee, overwhelmed by her love for him finally yielded to his
sexual desires in spite of her age and self-control, she being a woman after all, we
hold that said defendant-appellant is liable for seduction and, therefore, moral
damages may be recovered from him under the provision of Article 2219, paragraph
3, of the new Civil Code.
Apart from the fact that the general tenor of said Article 2219, particularly the
paragraphs preceding and those following the one cited by the Court of Appeals,
and the language used in said paragraph strongly indicates that the "seduction"
therein contemplated is the crime punished as such in Article as such in Article 337
and 338 of the Revised Penal Code, which admittedly does not exist in the present
case, we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction,
not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant
who around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former
high school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be when she
became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because,
the court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to
petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" "by
having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy."
The court of first instance sentenced petitioner to pay the following: (1) a
monthly pension of P30.00 for the support of the child: (2) P4,500, representing the

income that complainant had allegedly failed to earn during her pregnancy and
shortly after the birth of the child, as actual and compensation damages; (3)
P5,000, as moral damages; and (4) P500.00, as attorney's fees. The Court of
Appeals added to the second item the sum of P1,114.25 consisting of P144.20,
for hospitalization and medical attendance, in connection with the parturiation, and
the balance representing expenses incurred to support the child and increased
the moral damages to P7,000.00.
With the elimination of this award for damages, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby affirmed, therefore, in all other respects, without special
pronouncement as to cost in this instance. It is so ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera,
Gutierrez David, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 57227 May 14, 1992

AMELITA CONSTANTINO and MICHAEL CONSTANTINO, the latter represented herein by the former, his
mother and natural guardian, petitioners,
vs.
IVAN MENDEZ and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Roberto M. Sarenas for petitioners.
Bienvinido D. Cariaga for private respondent.

BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari questioning the decision 1 dated April 30, 1981 of the Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. No. 61552-R which dismissed petitioner's complaint and set aside the resolution 2 dated October
21, 1976 of the then Court of First Instance of Davao, 16th Judicial District, amending the dispositive
portion of its decision dated June 21, 1976 and ordering private respondent Ivan Mendez: (1) to
acknowledge the minor Michael Constantino as his illegitimate child; (2) to give a monthly support of
P300.00 to the minor child; (3) to pay complainant Amelita Constantino the sum of P8,200.00 as actual
and moral damages; and (4) to pay attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000 plus costs.
It appears on record that on June 5, 1975, petitioner Amelita Constantino filed an action for acknowledgment, support
and damages against private respondent Ivan Mendez. The case was filed with the then CFI of Davao, 10th Judicial
District and docketed as Civil Case No. 8881. In her complaint, Amelita Constantino alleges, among others, that
sometime in the month of August, 1974, she met Ivan Mendez at Tony's Restaurant located at Sta. Cruz, Manila,
where she worked as a waitress; that the day following their first meeting, Ivan invited Amelita to dine with him at

Hotel Enrico where he was billeted; that while dining, Ivan professed his love and courted Amelita; that Amelita asked
for time to think about Ivan's proposal; that at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, Amelita asked Ivan to bring her
home to which the latter agreed, that on the pretext of getting something, Ivan brought Amelita inside his hotel room
and through a promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with the latter; that after the sexual
contact, Ivan confessed to Amelita that he is a married man; that they repeated their sexual contact in the months of
September and November, 1974, whenever Ivan is in Manila, as a result of which Amelita got pregnant; that her pleas
for help and support fell on deaf ears; that Amelita had no sexual relations with any other man except Ivan who is the
father of the child yet to be born at the time of the filing of the complaint; that because of her pregnancy, Amelita was
forced to leave her work as a waitress; that Ivan is a prosperous businessman of Davao City with a monthly income
of P5,000 to P8,000. As relief, Amelita prayed for the recognition of the unborn child, the payment of actual, moral
and exemplary damages, attorney's fees plus costs.
In his answer dated August 5, 1975, Ivan admitted that he met Amelita at Tony's Cocktail Lounge but denied having
sexual knowledge or illicit relations with her. He prayed for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action.
By way of counterclaim, he further prayed for the payment of exemplary damages and litigation expense including
attorney's fees for the filing of the malicious complaint.
On September 1, 1975, Amelita Constantino filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint impleading as co-plaintiff
her son Michael Constantino who was born on August 3, 1975. In its order dated September 4, 1975, the trial court
admitted the amended complaint.
On September 11, 1975, Ivan Mendez filed his answer to the amended complaint reiterating his previous answer
denying that Michael Constantino is his illegitimate son.
After hearing, the trial court rendered a decision dated June 21, 1976, the dispositive portion of which reads, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Amelita
Constantino and against defendant Ivan Mendez, ordering the latter to pay Amelita Constantino the
sum of P8,000.00 by way of actual and moral damages; and, the sum of P3,000.00, as and by way
of attorney's fees. The defendant shall pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.
From the above decision, both parties filed their separate motion for reconsideration. Ivan Mendez anchored his
motion on the ground that the award of damages was not supported by evidence. Amelita Constantino, on the other
hand, sought the recognition and support of her son Michael Constantino as the illegitimate son of Ivan Mendez.
In its resolution dated October 21, 1976, the trial court granted Amelita Constantino's motion for reconsideration, and
amended the dispositive portion of its decision dated June 21, 1976 to read as follows, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Amelita
Constantino and plaintiff-minor Michael Constantino, and against defendant Ivan Mendez ordering
the latter to pay Amelita Constantino the sum of P8,000.00 by way of actual and moral damages
and the sum of P200.00 as and by way of payment of the hospital and medical bills incurred during
the delivery of plaintiff-minor Michael Constantino; to recognize as his own illegitimate child the
plaintiff-minor Michael Constantino who shall be entitled to all the rights, privileges and benefits
appertaining to a child of such status; to give a permanent monthly support in favor of plaintiff
Michael Constantino the amount of P300.00; and the sum of P5,000.00 as and by way of attorney's
fees. The defendant shall pay the costs of this suit.
Let this Order form part of the decision dated June 21, 1976.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the above amended decision was set aside and the complaint was dismissed.
Hence, this petition for review.

Basically, the issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible
error in setting aside the decision of the trial court and in dismissing the complaint.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the factual findings of the trial and in not affirming the
decision of the trial court. They also pointed out that the appellate court committed a misapprehension of facts when it
concluded that Ivan did not have sexual access with Amelita during the first or second week of November, 1976
(should be 1974), the time of the conception of the child.
It must be stressed at the outset that factual findings of the trial court have only a persuasive and not a conclusive
effect on the Court of Appeals. In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, it is the duty of the Court of Appeals to
review the factual findings of the trial court and rectify the errors it committed as may have been properly assigned
and as could be established by a re-examination of the evidence on record. It is the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals, not those of the trial court, that as a rule are considered final and conclusive even on this Court (Hermo v.
Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., 155 SCRA 24 [1987]). This being a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, this Court will review only errors of law committed by the Court of Appeals. It is not the function of this Court to
re-examine all over again the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties unless the findings of facts of
the Court of Appeals is not supported by the evidence on record or the judgment is based on misapprehension of
facts (Remalante v. Tibe, et al., 158 SCRA 138 [1988]; Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, et al., 149 SCRA 97 [1987]).
It is the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, based on the evidence on record, that Amelita Constantino has not
proved by clear and convincing evidence her claim that Ivan Mendez is the father of her son Michael Constantino.
Such conclusion based on the evaluation of the evidence on record is controlling on this Court as the same is
supported by the evidence on record. Even the trial court initially entertained such posture. It ordered the recognition
of Michael as the illegitimate son of Ivan only when acting on the motions for reconsideration, it reconsidered, on
October 21, 1976, its earlier decision dated June 21, 1976. Amelita's testimony on cross-examination that she had
sexual contact with Ivan in Manila in the first or second week of November, 1974 (TSN, December 8, 1975, p. 108) is
inconsistent with her response that she could not remember the date of their last sexual intercourse in November,
1974 (Ibid, p. 106). Sexual contact of Ivan and Amelita in the first or second week of November, 1974 is the crucial
point that was not even established on direct examination as she merely testified that she had sexual intercourse with
Ivan in the months of September, October and November, 1974.
Michael Constantino is a full-term baby born on August 3, 1975 (Exhibit 6) so that as correctly pointed out by private
respondent's counsel, citing medical science (Williams Obstetrics, Tenth Ed., p. 198) to the effect that "the mean
duration of actual pregnancy, counting from the day of conception must be close to 267 days", the conception of the
child (Michael) must have taken place about 267 days before August 3, 1975 or sometime in the second week of
November, 1974. While Amelita testified that she had sexual contact with Ivan in November, 1974, nevertheless said
testimony is contradicted by her own evidence (Exh. F), the letter dated February 11, 1975, addressed to Ivan
Mendez requesting for a conference, prepared by her own counsel Atty. Roberto Sarenas to whom she must have
confided the attendant circumstances of her pregnancy while still fresh in her memory, informing Ivan that Amelita is
four (4) months pregnant so that applying the period of the duration of actual pregnancy, the child was conceived on
or about October 11, 1974.
Petitioner's assertion that Ivan is her first and only boyfriend (TSN, December 8, 1975, p. 65) is belied by Exhibit 2,
her own letter addressed to Mrs. Mendez where she revealed the reason for her attachment to Ivan who possessed
certain traits not possessed by her boyfriend. She also confided that she had a quarrel with her boyfriend because of
gossips so she left her work. An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome atmosphere or may
be an irritant in the family or lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by
clear and convincing evidence. The burden of proof is on Amelita to establish her affirmative allegations that Ivan is
the father of her son. Consequently, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence establishing paternity or filiation,
the complaint must be dismissed.
As regards Amelita's claim for damages which is based on Articles 19 3 & 21 4 of the Civil Code on the theory that

through Ivan's promise of marriage, she surrendered her virginity, we cannot but agree with the Court of
Appeals that more sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis for recovery. Damages could only be
awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product of voluntariness and mutual desire. At the time she met
Ivan at Tony's Restaurant, Amelita was already 28 years old and she admitted that she was attracted to
Ivan (TSN, December 3, 1975, p. 83). Her attraction to Ivan is the reason why she surrendered her
womanhood. Had she been induced or deceived because of a promise of marriage, she could have
immediately severed her relation with Ivan when she was informed after their first sexual contact

sometime in August, 1974, that he was a married man. Her declaration that in the months of September,
October and November, 1974, they repeated their sexual intercourse only indicates that passion and not
the alleged promise of marriage was the moving force that made her submit herself to Ivan.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is Dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Penned by Association Justice Simeon Gopengco and concurred in by Associate Justices Oscar
Victoriano and Jose Melo.
2 Issued by Judge Antonio M. Martinez.
3 Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
4 Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages.
The Lawphil Project Arel

Pastor Tenchaves vs. Vicenta Escao

November 29, 1965 122 SCRA 752
Ponente: Justice Reyes
Facts: Vicenta Escao, 27 years of age exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez,
32 years of age, without the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain. The
marriage was the culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered with the local
civil register. Mamerto Escao was handed by a maid, whose name he claims he does not
remember, a letter purportedly coming from San Carlos college students and disclosing an
amorous relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the
letter to her father, and thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta was not
allowed to see Pastor and therefore they became estranged, Vicenta then went to Misamis
Occidental and later on went abroad and somehow had lived there and where she file an
absolute divorce against her husband. Tenchaves filed in Cebu RTC for relief and even
accusing the parents of his wife of alienating the affection of his wife which caused the
separation between the couple.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage of Vicenta and Pastor valid?
Whether or not damages may be recovered of the aggrieved party?

Held: The Court held that Pastor and Vincentas marriage was valid because the essential
requisites for marriage was duly complied with by both parties although the circumstances
that had occurred prevented their union as husband and wife. Therefore, it must concluded
that under Philippine laws the divorce filed by Vicenta was of no value and thus her second
marriage become bigamous and is not valid in our jurisdiction. The Court afforded for the
plaintiff a decree of legal separation is but a rightful remedy, the filing of the defendant a
divorce is an evidence of their subsisting marriage. While on the issue of damages, the
defendant has a right to recover damages from the defendant but the parents of the
defendant must be absolved for they were not participative of the acts committed by their
daughter, they were even the ones who would want a recelebration of marriage.
Posted by ayelaxing at 7:20 AM
lano Law Foundation
Prejudicial Questions
Article 36 and Rule 111 (Section 7) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

DREAMWORK G.R. No. 184861

CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Petitioner, Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
CLEOFE S. JANIOLA and Promulgated:

HON. ARTHUR A. FAMINI,

Respondents. June 30, 2009
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Petitioner Dreamwork Construction, Inc. seeks the reversal of the August 26, 2008
Decision[1] in SCA No. 08-0005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 253 in Las
Pias City. The Decision affirmed the Orders dated October 16, 2007 [2] and March 12,
2008[3] in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC),
Branch 79 in Las Pias City.
The Facts
On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its President, Roberto S. Concepcion, and
Vice-President for Finance and Marketing, Normandy P. Amora, filed a Complaint
Affidavit dated October 5, 2004[4] for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22)
against private respondent Cleofe S. Janiola with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Las Pias City. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 04-2526-33. Correspondingly,
petitioner filed a criminal information for violation of BP 22 against private
respondent with the MTC on February 2, 2005 docketed as Criminal Case Nos.
55554-61, entitled People of the Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola.
On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joined by her husband, instituted a
civil complaint against petitioner by filing a Complaint dated August 2006 [5] for the
rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for
damages. The case was filed with the RTC, Branch 197 in Las Pias City and docketed
as Civil Case No. LP-06-0197. Notably, the checks, subject of the criminal cases
before the MTC, were issued in consideration of the construction agreement.
Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings dated July 24, 2007[6] in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, alleging that the
civil and criminal cases involved facts and issues similar or intimately related such
that in the resolution of the issues in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined. In other words, private respondent
claimed that the civil case posed a prejudicial question as against the criminal
cases.
Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases in an
undated Comment/Opposition to Accuseds Motion to Suspend Proceedings based on
Prejudicial Question[7] on the grounds that: (1) there is no prejudicial question in this

case as the rescission of the contract upon which the bouncing checks were issued
is a separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether private respondent
violated BP 22; and (2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of
the elements of a prejudicial question is that the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the subsequent criminal action; thus, this element is missing in this case, the
criminal case having preceded the civil case.
Later, the MTC issued its Order dated October 16, 2007, granting the Motion to
Suspend Proceedings, and reasoned that:
Should the trial court declare the rescission of contract and the nullification of the
checks issued as the same are without consideration, then the instant criminal
cases for alleged violation of BP 22 must be dismissed. The belated filing of the civil
case by the herein accused did not detract from the correctness of her cause, since
a motion for suspension of a criminal action may be filed at any time before the
prosecution rests (Section 6, Rule 111, Revised Rules of Court). [8]
In an Order dated March 12, 2008,[9] the MTC denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration dated November 29, 2007.
Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC with a Petition dated May 13, 2008.
Thereafter, the RTC issued the assailed decision dated August 26, 2008, denying the
petition. On the issue of the existence of a prejudicial question, the RTC ruled:
Additionally, it must be stressed that the requirement of a previously filed civil case
is intended merely to obviate delays in the conduct of the criminal proceedings.
Incidentally, no clear evidence of any intent to delay by private respondent was
shown. The criminal proceedings are still in their initial stages when the civil action
was instituted. And, the fact that the civil action was filed after the criminal action
was instituted does not render the issues in the civil action any less prejudicial in
character.[10]
Hence, we have this petition under Rule 45.
The Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT PERCEIVING GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE INFERIOR COURT, WHEN THE LATTER
RULED TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS IN CRIM. CASE NOS. 55554-61 ON THE BASIS OF
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IN CIVIL CASE NO. LP-06-0197.[11]
The Courts Ruling
This petition must be granted.
The Civil Action Must Precede the Filing of the

Criminal Action for a Prejudicial Question to Exist

Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended by Supreme Court
Resolutions dated June 17, 1988 and July 7, 1988, the elements of a prejudicial
question are contained in Rule 111, Sec. 5, which states:
SEC. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. The two (2) essential elements of a
prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Thus, the Court has held in numerous cases [12] that the elements of a prejudicial
question, as stated in the above-quoted provision and in Beltran v. People,[13] are:
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar
or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution
of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
On December 1, 2000, the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, however, became
effective and the above provision was amended by Sec. 7 of Rule 111, which applies
here and now provides:
SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.The elements of a prejudicial question are:
(a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution
of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner interprets Sec. 7(a) to mean that in order for a civil case to create a
prejudicial question and, thus, suspend a criminal case, it must first be established
that the civil case was filed previous to the filing of the criminal case. This,
petitioner argues, is specifically to guard against the situation wherein a party
would belatedly file a civil action that is related to a pending criminal action in order
to delay the proceedings in the latter.
On the other hand, private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil Code which
provides:
Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any criminal
prosecution may be instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by rules of
court which the Supreme Court shall promulgate and which shall not be in conflict
with the provisions of this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Private respondent argues that the phrase before any criminal prosecution may be
instituted or may proceed must be interpreted to mean that a prejudicial question
exists when the civil action is filed either before the institution of the criminal action

or during the pendency of the criminal action. Private respondent concludes that
there is an apparent conflict in the provisions of the Rules of Court and the Civil
Code in that the latter considers a civil case to have presented a prejudicial
question even if the criminal case preceded the filing of the civil case.
We cannot agree with private respondent.
First off, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a change in phraseology
by amendment of a provision of law indicates a legislative intent to change the
meaning of the provision from that it originally had. [14] In the instant case, the
phrase, previously instituted, was inserted to qualify the nature of the civil action
involved in a prejudicial question in relation to the criminal action. This
interpretation is further buttressed by the insertion of subsequent directly before
the term criminal action. There is no other logical explanation for the amendments
except to qualify the relationship of the civil and criminal actions, that the civil
action must precede the criminal action.
Thus, this Court ruled in Torres v. Garchitorena[15] that:
Even if we ignored petitioners procedural lapse and resolved their petition on the
merits, we hold that Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying their omnibus motion for the suspension of
the proceedings pending final judgment in Civil Case No. 7160. Section 6, Rule lll of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, reads:
Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A petition for suspension of
the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil
action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the
preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial,
the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before
the prosecution rests.
Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. - The elements of a prejudicial question
are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution
of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that
which must precede the criminal action and which requires a decision
before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with which
said question is closely connected. The civil action must be instituted prior
to the institution of the criminal action. In this case, the Information was filed
with the Sandiganbayan ahead of the complaint in Civil Case No. 7160 filed by the
State with the RTC in Civil Case No. 7160. Thus, no prejudicial question exists.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Additionally, it is a principle in statutory construction that a statute should be

construed not only to be consistent with itself but also to harmonize with other laws
on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible
system.[16] This principle is consistent with the maxim, interpretare et concordare
leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus or every statute must be so
construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence.[17]
In other words, every effort must be made to harmonize seemingly conflicting laws.
It is only when harmonization is impossible that resort must be made to choosing
which law to apply.
In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court are susceptible of an interpretation that would harmonize both provisions of
law. The phrase previously instituted civil action in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly
worded and is not susceptible of alternative interpretations. The clause before any
criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed in Art. 36 of the Civil Code
may, however, be interpreted to mean that the motion to suspend the criminal
action may be filed during the preliminary investigation with the public prosecutor
or court conducting the investigation, or during the trial with the court hearing the
case.
This interpretation would harmonize Art. 36 of the Civil Code with Sec. 7 of Rule 111
of the Rules of Court but also with Sec. 6 of Rule 111 of the Civil Code, which
provides for the situations when the motion to suspend the criminal action during
the preliminary investigation or during the trial may be filed. Sec. 6 provides:
SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.A petition for suspension of the
criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action
may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary
investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition
to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the
prosecution rests.
Thus, under the principles of statutory construction, it is this interpretation of Art.
36 of the Civil Code that should govern in order to give effect to all the relevant
provisions of law.
It bears pointing out that the circumstances present in the instant case indicate that
the filing of the civil action and the subsequent move to suspend the criminal
proceedings by reason of the presence of a prejudicial question were a mere
afterthought and instituted to delay the criminal proceedings.
In Sabandal v. Tongco,[18] we found no prejudicial question existed involving a civil
action for specific performance, overpayment, and damages, and a criminal
complaint for BP 22, as the resolution of the civil action would not determine the

guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In resolving the case, we
said:
Furthermore, the peculiar circumstances of the case clearly indicate that the filing of
the civil case was a ploy to delay the resolution of the criminal cases. Petitioner filed
the civil case three years after the institution of the criminal charges against him.
Apparently, the civil action was instituted as an afterthought to delay the
proceedings in the criminal cases.[19]
Here, the civil case was filed two (2) years after the institution of the criminal
complaint and from the time that private respondent allegedly withdrew its
equipment from the job site. Also, it is worth noting that the civil case was instituted
more than two and a half (2 ) years from the time that private respondent allegedly
stopped construction of the proposed building for no valid reason. More importantly,
the civil case praying for the rescission of the construction agreement for lack of
consideration was filed more than three (3) years from the execution of the
construction agreement.
Evidently, as in Sabandal, the circumstances surrounding the filing of the cases
involved here show that the filing of the civil action was a mere afterthought on the
part of private respondent and interposed for delay. And as correctly argued by
petitioner, it is this scenario that Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court seeks to
prevent. Thus, private respondents positions cannot be left to stand
The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not
Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action
In any event, even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the criminal action,
there is, still, no prejudicial question to speak of that would justify the suspension of
the proceedings in the criminal case.
To reiterate, the elements of a prejudicial question under Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court are: (1) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar
or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and (2)
the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
Petitioner argues that the second element of a prejudicial question, as provided in
Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules, is absent in this case. Thus, such rule cannot apply
to the present controversy.

Private respondent, on the other hand, claims that if the construction agreement
between the parties is declared null and void for want of consideration, the checks

issued in consideration of such contract would become mere scraps of paper and
cannot be the basis of a criminal prosecution.
We find for petitioner.
It must be remembered that the elements of the crime punishable under BP 22 are
as follows:
(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for
value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there are
no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check
in full upon its presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit, or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any
valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. [20]
Undeniably, the fact that there exists a valid contract or agreement to support the
issuance of the check/s or that the checks were issued for valuable consideration
does not make up the elements of the crime. Thus, this Court has held in a long line
of cases[21] that the agreement surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is
irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of BP 22. In Mejia v. People,[22] we ruled:
It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the offense charge is the issuance of a
bad check. The purpose for which the check was issued, the terms and conditions
relating to its issuance, or any agreement surrounding such issuance are irrelevant
to the prosecution and conviction of petitioner. To determine the reason for which
checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode
the faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as
currency substitutes, and bring havoc in trade and in banking communities. The
clear intention of the framers of B.P. 22 is to make the mere act of issuing a
worthless check malum prohibitum.
Lee v. Court of Appeals[23] is even more poignant. In that case, we ruled that the
issue of lack of valuable consideration for the issuance of checks which were later
on dishonored for insufficient funds is immaterial to the success of a prosecution for
violation of BP 22, to wit:
Third issue. Whether or not the check was issued on account or for value.
Petitioners claim is not feasible. We have held that upon issuance of a check, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the same was issued for
valuable consideration. Valuable consideration, in turn, may consist either in some
right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the party who makes the contract, or
some forbearance, detriment, loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or service

given, suffered or undertaken by the other side. It is an obligation to do, or not to do

in favor of the party who makes the contract, such as the maker or indorser.
In this case, petitioner himself testified that he signed several checks in blank, the
subject check included, in exchange for 2.5% interest from the proceeds of loans
that will be made from said account. This is a valuable consideration for which the
check was issued. That there was neither a pre-existing obligation nor an obligation
incurred on the part of petitioner when the subject check was given by Bautista to
private complainant on July 24, 1993 because petitioner was no longer connected
with Unlad or Bautista starting July 1989, cannot be given merit since, as earlier
discussed, petitioner failed to adequately prove that he has severed his relationship
with Bautista or Unlad.
At any rate, we have held that what the law punishes is the mere act of
issuing a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued nor the
terms and conditions relating to its issuance. This is because the thrust of
the law is to prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them
into circulation.[24] (Emphasis supplied.)
Verily, even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the construction
agreement between the parties is void for lack of consideration, this would not
affect the prosecution of private respondent in the criminal case. The fact of the
matter is that private respondent indeed issued checks which were subsequently
dishonored for insufficient funds. It is this fact that is subject of prosecution under
BP 22.
Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the existence of a
prejudicial question, that the resolution of the issue in the civil action would
determine whether the criminal action may proceed, is absent in the instant case.
Thus, no prejudicial question exists and the rules on it are inapplicable to the case
before us.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT this petition. We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the
August 26, 2008 Decision in SCA No. 08-0005 of the RTC, Branch 253 in Las Pias City
and the Orders dated October 16, 2007 and March 12, 2008 in Criminal Case Nos.
55554-61 of the MTC, Branch 79 in Las Pias City. We order the MTC to continue with
the proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 with dispatch.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

SECOND DIVISION
JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, G.R. No. 172060
Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
- versus - PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,*

ABAD, and
VILLARAMA, JR.,** JJ.
MARIA CHRYSANTINE
L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE Promulgated:
OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. September 13, 2010
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the Decision[2] of the Court of
Appeals, promulgated on 20 March 2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.
The Antecedent Facts
The facts are stated in the Court of Appeals decision:
On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private
respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel
(petitioner), docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415, before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, which was raffled to Branch 223 (RTC Quezon City).
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional
Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial and trial of
Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito
Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family
Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings
before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial
question.Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the

victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would
have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.
The Decision of the Trial Court
The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 2005[3] holding that the
pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that
warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it. The RTC Quezon City held
that the issues in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 are the injuries sustained by
respondent and whether the case could be tried even if the validity of petitioners
marriage with respondent is in question. The RTC Quezon City ruled:

WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Motion to Suspend

Proceedings On the [Ground] of the Existence of a Prejudicial Question
is, for lack of merit, DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[4]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 August 2005 Order,[5] the
RTC Quezon City denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals,
assailing the 13 May 2005 and 22 August 2005 Orders of the RTC Quezon City.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The
Court of Appeals ruled that in the criminal case for frustrated parricide, the issue is
whether the offender commenced the commission of the crime of parricide directly
by overt acts and did not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause
or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. On the other hand, the issue
in the civil action for annulment of marriage is whether petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The
Court of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and

respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal

case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the
crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed. The Court of Appeals
ruled that all that is required for the charge of frustrated parricide is that at the time
of the commission of the crime, the marriage is still subsisting.
Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the Court of
Appeals decision.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the action for annulment of
marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case
for frustrated parricide against petitioner.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Civil Case Must be Instituted
Before the Criminal Case
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure[6] provides:
Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a
prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves
an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent
criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the criminal action may proceed.

The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the
criminal action. In this case, the Information[7] for Frustrated Parricide was dated
30 August 2004. It was raffled to RTC Quezon City on 25 October 2004 as per the
stamped date of receipt on the Information. The RTC Quezon City set Criminal
Case No. Q-04-130415 for pre-trial and trial on 14 February 2005. Petitioner was
served summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7 February 2005. [8] Respondents

petition[9] in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November 2004 and was filed on
5 November 2004. Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of
the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7,
Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil
action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question
in Criminal Case for Parricide
Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would
warrant the suspension of the criminal action.
There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both
pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively
resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue
raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case.[10] A prejudicial question is defined
as:
x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the
criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the
civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.[11]

The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime
of parricide,[12] which punishes any person who shall kill his father, mother, or
child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants,
or his spouse.[13] The relationship between the offender and the victim distinguishes
the crime of parricide from murder[14] or homicide.[15] However, the issue in the
annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the

criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the
victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused
killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated
parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would
have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce
it by reason of causes independent of petitioners will. [16] At the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The
subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 047392 is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the
time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between
petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable
since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to
respondent.

We cannot accept petitioners reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals[17] that the

judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as
the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x. First, the issue in Tenebro is
the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There
was no issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled
in Tenebro that [t]here is x x x a recognition written into the law itself that such a
marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences.[18] In fact,
the Court declared in that case that a declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment
insofar as the States penal laws are concerned.[19]
In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the Court of
Appeals. The trial in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 may proceed as the
resolution of the issue in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is not determinative of the guilt
or innocence of petitioner in the criminal case.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20 March 2006

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.
SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant

to

Section

13,

Article

VIII

of

the

Constitution,

and

the

Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above

Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

GR. No. 101236 January 30, 1992

JULIANA P. YAP, petitioner,
vs.
MARTIN PARAS and ALFREDO D. BARCELONA, SR., Judge of the 3rd MTC of Glan
Malapatan, South Cotabato, respondents.
Mariano C. Alegarbes for petitioner.
Public Attorney's Office for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:
This is still another dispute between brother and sister over a piece of property they inherited from
their parents. The case is complicated by the circumstance that the private respondent's counsel in
this petition is the son of the judge, the other respondent, whose action is being questioned.
Petitioner Juliana P. Yap was the sister of private respondent Martin Paras.*
On October 31, 1971, according to Yap, Paras sold to her his share in the intestate estate for
P300.00. The sale was evidenced by a private document. Nineteen years later, on May 2, 1990,
Paras sold the same property to Santiago Saya-ang for P5,000.00. This was evidenced by a
notarized Deed of Absolute Sale.
When Yap learned of the second sale, she filed a complaint for estafa against Paras and Saya-ang
with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of General Santos City. 1 On the same date, she filed a
complaint for the nullification of the said sale with the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City. 2
After investigation, the Provincial Prosecutor instituted a criminal complaint for estafa against Paras
with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Glan-Malapatan, South Cotabato, presided by Judge Alfredo
D. Barcelona, Sr.
On April 17, 1991, before arraignment of the accused, the trial judge motu proprio issued an order
dismissing the criminal case on the ground that:
. . . after a careful scrutiny of the statements of complainant, Juliana P. Yap and of
the respondent Martin Paras and his witnesses, the Court holds and maintained (sic)
that there is a prejudicial question to a civil action, which must be ventilated in the
proper civil court. In the case of Ras vs.Rasul, 100 SCRA 125, the Supreme Court
had already made a pronouncement that "a criminal action for Estafa for alleged
double sale of property is a prejudicial question to a civil action for nullity of the
alleged Deed of Sale and defense of the alleged vendors of forgeries of their
signatures to the Deed." 3
The Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied on April 30, 1990. She then came to this
Court for relief in this special civil action for certiorari.

The Court could have referred this petition to the Court of Appeals, which has concurrent jurisdiction
under BP 129, but decided to resolve the case directly in view of the peculiar circumstances
involved.
The petitioner's contention is that where there is a prejudicial question in a civil case, the criminal
action may not be dismissed but only suspended. Moreover, this suspension may not be done motu
proprio by the judge trying the criminal case but only upon petition of the defendant in accordance
with the Rules of Court. It is also stressed that a reversal of the order of dismissal would not bar the
prosecution of the accused under the double jeopardy rule because he has not yet been arraigned.
The Court notes that the counsel for private respondent Paras who filed the comment in his behalf is
the son and namesake of Judge Barcelona. Atty. Alfredo L. Barcelona, Jr. is employed in the Public
Attorney's Office. He has made it of record that he was not the counsel of Paras at the time the
questioned order of dismissal was issued by his father. He thus impliedly rejects the charge of bias
against his father.
Perhaps out of filial loyalty, Atty. Barcelona suggests there may have been a basis for the order in
view of the alleged double sale of the property which was being litigated in the regional trial court. He
concedes, however, that the order may have been premature and that it could not have been
issued motu proprio. Agreeing that double jeopardy would not attach because of the lack of
arraignment, he asks that his Comment be considered a motion for the suspension of the criminal
action on the ground of prejudicial question.
The Court has deliberated on the issues and finds that the respondent judge did indeed commit
grave abuse of discretion in motu proprio issuing the order of dismissal.
Section 6, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended by this Court on July 7,
1988, provides as follows:
Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A petition for suspension of
the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action
may be filed in the office of the fiscal or the court conducting the preliminary
investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to
suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution
rests.
Judge Barcelona's precipitate action is intriguing, to say the least, in light of the clear provision of the
above-quoted rule. The rule is not even new, being only a rewording of the original provision in the
Rules of Court before they were amended. It plainly says that the suspension may be made only
upon petition and not at the instance of the judge alone, and it also says suspension, and not
dismissal. One also wonders if the person who notarized the disputed second sale, Notary Public
Alexander C. Barcelona, might be related to the respondent judge.
But more important than the preceding considerations is the trial judge's misapprehension of the
concept of a prejudicial question.
Section 5, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended provides:
Sec. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. The two (2) essential elements of a
prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately

related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the congnizance of which pertains to another tribunal.
The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try
and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. 4 It is a question based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused. 5
We have held that "for a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the
suspension of the criminal action pending the determination of the civil action, it must appear not
only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution is based, but
also that the resolution of the issues raised in said civil action would be necessarily determinative of
the guilt or innocence of the accused". 6
It is the issue in the civil action that is prejudicial to the continuation of the criminal action, not the
criminal action that is prejudicial to the civil action.
The excerpt quoted by the respondent judge in his Order does not appear anywhere in the decision
of Ras v.Rasul. 7 Worse, he has not only misquoted the decision but also wrongly applied it. The facts of
that case are not analogous to those in the case at bar.
In that case, Ras allegedly sold to Pichel a parcel of land which he later also sold to Martin. Pichel
brought a civil action for nullification of the second sale and asked that the sale made by Ras in his
favor be declared valid. Ras's defense was that he never sold the property to Pichel and his
purported signatures appearing in the first deed of sale were forgeries. Later, an information for
estafa was filed against Ras based on the same double sale that was the subject of the civil action.
Ras filed a "Motion for Suspension of Action" (that is, the criminal case), claiming that the resolution
of the issues in the civil case would necessarily be determinative of his guilt or innocence.
Through then Associate Justice Claudio Teehankee, this Court ruled that a suspension of the
criminal action was in order because:
On the basis of the issues raised in both the criminal and civil cases against
petitioner and in the light of the foregoing concepts of a prejudicial question, there
indeed appears to be a prejudicial question in the case at bar, considering that
petitioner Alejandro Ras' defense (as defendant) in Civil Case No. 73 of the nullity
and forgery of the alleged prior deed of sale in favor of Luis Pichel (plaintiff in the civil
case and complaining witnesses in the criminal case) is based on the very same
facts which would be necessarily determinative of petitioner Ras' guilt or innocence
as accused in the criminal case. If the first alleged sale in favor of Pichel is void or
fictitious, then there would be no double sale and petitioner would be innocent of the
offense charged. A conviction in the criminal case (if it were allowed to proceed
ahead) would be a gross injustice and would have to be set aside if it were finally
decided in the civil action that indeed the alleged prior deed of sale was a forgery
and spurious.
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner Alejandro Ras claims in his answer to the complaint in Civil Case No.
73 that he had never sold the property in litigation to the plaintiff (Luis Pichel) and

that his signatures in the alleged deed of sale and that of his wife were forged by the
plaintiff. It is, therefore, necessary that the truth or falsity of such claim be first
determined because if his claim is true, then he did not sell his property twice and no
estafa was committed. The question of nullity of the sale is distinct and separate from
the crime of estafa (alleged double sale) but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of herein petitioner in the criminal action.
In the Ras case, there was a motion to suspend the criminal action on the ground that the defense in
the civil case forgery of his signature in the first deed of sale had to be threshed out first.
Resolution of that question would necessarily resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case. By contrast, there was no motion for suspension in the case at bar; and no less
importantly, the respondent judge had not been informed of the defense Paras was raising in the civil
action. Judge Barcelona could not have ascertained then if the issue raised in the civil action would
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.
It is worth remarking that not every defense raised in the civil action will raise a prejudicial question
to justify suspension of the criminal action. The defense must involve an issue similar or intimately
related to the same issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution should determine whether or
not the latter action may proceed.
The order dismissing the criminal action without a motion for suspension in accordance with Rule
111, Section 6, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended, and even without the accused
indicating his defense in the civil case for the annulment of the second sale, suggests not only
ignorance of the law but also bias on the part of the respondent judge.
Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr. is sternly reminded that under the Code of Judicial Conduct, "a
judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence" and "should administer
justice impartially." He is hereby reprimanded for his questionable conduct in the case at bar, with
the warning that commission of similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order issued by Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr.
dated April 17, 1991, dismissing Criminal Case No. 1902-G, and the Order dated April 30, 1991,
denying the motion for reconsideration, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 1902-G
is ordered REINSTATED for further proceedings, but to be assigned to a different judge.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
* She died pendente lite on September 2, 1991, and was by resolution of the Court
dated January 13, 1991, substituted by her children, Ruperto, Rustico, Ignacio,
Rogelio, Arsenio, Jr., all surnamed Yap, Rainilda Yap Breta, and the children of the
deceased Teodora Yap Cuaycong.
1 Rollo, p. 8.
2 Ibid., p. 13.

3 Id., pp. 30-31.

4 People vs. Aragon, 94 Phil. 357; Merced vs. Diez, 109 Phil. 155; Zapanta vs.
Montesa, 114 Phil. 428; Fortich-Celdran vs. Celdran, 19 SCRA 502.
5 De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202; Mendiola vs. Macadaeg, 1 SCRA 593.
6 Ras vs. Rasul, 100 SCRA 125; Mendiola vs. Macadaeg, supra.
7 Supra.

Civil Personality
Articles 37-41

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970
CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and JACOBA
CABILIN,plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee.
Torcuato L. Galon for plaintiffs-appellants.
Godardo Jacinto for defendant-appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal on points of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte (Judge
Onofre Sison Abalos, presiding), in its Civil Case No. 1590, dismissing a complaint for support and
damages, and another order denying amendment of the same pleading.
The events in the court of origin can be summarized as follows:
Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in the court below. In her
complaint it was averred that the parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and
confidential relations; that defendant Icao, although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse
with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation, and without her consent; that as a result she
became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had to stop studying.
Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's fees.
Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did
not allege that the child had been born; and after hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained
defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint.
Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse,
plaintiff had later given birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that
no amendment was allowable, since the original complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore,
the plaintiff appealed directly to this Court.
We find the appealed orders of the court below to be untenable. A conceived child, although as yet
unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as
explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a
right to support from its progenitors, particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose paternity is
deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the said child is only "en ventre
de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed
by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in
preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child
should be born after the death of the testator Article 854, Civil Code).
ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn children may be accepted by
those persons who would legally represent them if they were already born.
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in
the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the
death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies
shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be
effectual, without prejudice to the right of 'representation.
It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that support is
an obligation of parents and illegitimate children "does not contemplate support to children as yet
unborn," violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the text
of Article 291. It is true that Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered born
for all purposes that are favorable to it" adds further "provided it be born later with the conditions
specified in the following article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered
from the mother's womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent to the right of the
conceived child; for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would become entirely useless and
ineffective. Manresa, in his Commentaries (5th Ed.) to the corresponding Article 29 of the Spanish
Civil Code, clearly points this out:
Los derechos atribuidos al nasciturus no son simples expectativas, ni aun en el
sentido tecnico que la moderna doctrina da a esta figura juridica sino que
constituyen un caso de los propiamente Ilamados 'derechos en estado de
pendenci'; el nacimiento del sujeto en las condiciones previstas por el art. 30, no
determina el nacimiento de aquellos derechos (que ya existian de antemano), sino
que se trata de un hecho que tiene efectos declarativos. (1 Manresa, Op. cit., page
271)
A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to force a woman
not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint in this case) constitutes a clear
violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused.
Says Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:
ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts:
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28 ....
Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she was carrying, plaintiff herself had a cause
of action for damages under the terms of the complaint; and the order dismissing it for failure to state
a cause of action was doubly in error.
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to
the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix
Icao. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor,
JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16439

July 20, 1961

ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.
Mariano H. de Joya for petitioner.
A.P. Salvador for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the husband of a woman, who
voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from physician who caused the same.
The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondent Oscar Lazo,
the of Nita Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician. Convinced of the merits of the
complaint upon the evidence adduced, the trial court rendered judgment favor of plaintiff Lazo and
against defendant Geluz, ordering the latter to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 attorney's fees
and the costs of the suit. On appeal, Court of Appeals, in a special division of five, sustained the
award by a majority vote of three justices as against two, who rendered a separate dissenting
opinion.
The facts are set forth in the majority opinion as follows:
Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948
through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband
before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and
acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by the defendant. After her
marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the
Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself
aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again
became pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the
latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P.
Gomez streets in Manila, where the three met the defendant and his wife. Nita was again
aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine
currency. The plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his
election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion.
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of
damages. Upon application of the defendant Geluz we granted certiorari.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages in the sum of P3,000.06
upon the provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. This

we believe to be error, for the said article, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a
person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality. Under the
system of our Civil Code, "la criatura abortiva no alcanza la categoria de persona natural y en
consscuencia es un ser no nacido a la vida del Derecho" (Casso-Cervera, "Diccionario de Derecho
Privado", Vol. 1, p. 49), being incapable of having rights and obligations.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to
the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of
the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively
accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn
child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take
place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to
act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato
habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such
provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive:
"provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following article". In the present case,
there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.
The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is generally held that recovery
can not had for the death of an unborn child (Stafford vs. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555;
Dietrich vs. Northampton, 52 Am. Rep. 242; and numerous cases collated in the editorial note, 10
ALR, (2d) 639).
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages
must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of
the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents can not expect either help,
support or services from an unborn child, they would normally be limited to moral damages for the
illegal arrest of the normal development of thespes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of
distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations (Civ.
Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art.
2230). But in the case before us, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any
basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference to the previous
abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned
with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections. The lower court expressly found, and the
majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not contradict it, that the appellee was aware of the
second abortion; and the probabilities are that he was likewise aware of the first. Yet despite the
suspicious repetition of the event, he appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the
causes thereof, and secure the punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after learning of the
third abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal
cases against the appellant. His only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from the
doctor a large money payment, since he sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's
fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances of record, was clearly exaggerated.
The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that:
It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband who righteously feels outraged by the
abortion which his wife has deliberately sought at the hands of a physician would be
highminded rather than mercenary; and that his primary concern would be to see to it that
the medical profession was purged of an unworthy member rather than turn his wife's
indiscretion to personal profit, and with that idea in mind to press either the administrative or
the criminal cases he had filed, or both, instead of abandoning them in favor of a civil action
for damages of which not only he, but also his wife, would be the beneficiaries.

It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of appellee's wife, without
medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible act, that can not be too
severely condemned; and the consent of the woman or that of her husband does not excuse it. But
the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of damage that, under the
circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed. Without costs.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Department of Justice and the Board of Medical
Examiners for their information and such investigation and action against the appellee Antonio Geluz
as the facts may warrant.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Natividad, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, J., took no part.
De Leon, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-39110

November 28, 1933

ANTONIA L. DE JESUS, ET AL., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
CESAR SYQUIA, defendant-appellant.
Jose Sotelo for plaintiffs-appellants.
Vicente J. Francisco for defendant-appellant.

STREET, J.:
This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila by Antonia Loanco de Jesus in her
own right and by her mother, Pilar Marquez, as next friend and representative of Ismael and Pacita
Loanco, infants, children of the first-named plaintiff, for the purpose of recovering from the
defendant, Cesar Syquia, the sum of thirty thousand pesos as damages resulting to the first-named
plaintiff from breach of a marriage promise, to compel the defendant to recognize Ismael and Pacita
as natural children begotten by him with Antonia, and to pay for the maintenance of the three the
amount of five hundred pesos per month, together with costs. Upon hearing the cause, after answer
of the defendant, the trial court erred a decree requiring the defendant to recognize Ismael Loanco
as his natural child and to pay maintenance for him at the rate of fifty pesos per month, with costs,
dismissing the action in other respects. From this judgment both parties appealed, the plaintiffs from
so much of the decision as denied part of the relief sought by them, and the defendant from that
feature of the decision which required him to recognize Ismael Loanco and to pay for his
maintenance.

At the time with which we are here concerned, the defendant, Cesar Syquia was of the age of
twenty-three years, and an unmarried scion of the prominent family in Manila, being possessed of a
considerable property in his own right. His brother-in-law, Vicente Mendoza is the owner of a barber
shop in Tondo, where the defendant was accustomed to go for tonsorial attention. In the month of
June Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl of the age of twenty years, was taken on as cashier in
this barber shop. Syquia was not long in making her acquaintance and amorous relations resulted,
as a consequence of which Antonia was gotten with child and a baby boy was born on June 17,
1931. The defendant was a constant visitor at the home of Antonia in the early months of her
pregnancy, and in February, 1931, he wrote and placed in her hands a note directed to
the padre who has expected to christen the baby. This note was as follows:
Saturday, 1:30 p. m.
February 14, 1931
Rev. FATHER,
The baby due in June is mine and I should like for my name to be given to it.
CESAR SYQUIA
The occasion for writing this note was that the defendant was on the eve of his departure on a trip to
China and Japan; and while he was abroad on this visit he wrote several letters to Antonia showing a
paternal interest in the situation that had developed with her, and cautioning her to keep in good
condition in order that "junior" (meaning the baby to be, "Syquia, Jr.") might be strong, and promising
to return to them soon. The baby arrived at the time expected, and all necessary anticipatory
preparations were made by the defendant. To this he employed his friend Dr. Crescenciano Talavera
to attend at the birth, and made arrangements for the hospitalization of the mother in Saint Joseph's
Hospital of the City of Manila, where she was cared for during confinement.
When Antonio was able to leave the hospital, Syquia took her, with her mother and the baby, to a
house at No. 551 Camarines Street, Manila, where they lived together for about a year in regular
family style, all household expenses, including gas and electric light, being defrayed by Syquia. In
course of time, however, the defendant's ardor abated and, when Antonia began to show signs of a
second pregnancy the defendant decamped, and he is now married to another woman. A point that
should here be noted is that when the time came for christening the child, the defendant, who had
charge of the arrangement for this ceremony, caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given to him,
instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr., as was at first planned.
The first question that is presented in the case is whether the note to the padre, quoted above, in
connection with the letters written by the defendant to the mother during pregnancy, proves an
acknowledgment of paternity, within the meaning of subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code.
Upon this point we have no hesitancy in holding that the acknowledgment thus shown is sufficient. It
is a universal rule of jurisprudence that a child, upon being conceived, becomes a bearer of legal
rights and capable of being dealt with as a living person. The fact that it is yet unborn is no
impediment to the acquisition of rights. The problem here presented of the recognition of unborn
child is really not different from that presented in the ordinary case of the recognition of a child
already born and bearing a specific name. Only the means and resources of identification are
different. Even a bequest to a living child requires oral evidence to connect the particular individual
intended with the name used.
It is contended however, in the present case that the words of description used in the writings before
us are not legally sufficient to indemnify the child now suing as Ismael Loanco. This contention is

not, in our opinion, well founded. The words of recognition contained in the note to the padre are not
capable of two constructions. They refer to a baby then conceived which was expected to be born in
June and which would thereafter be presented for christening. The baby came, and though it was in
the end given the name of Ismael Loanco instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr., its identity as the child which
the defendant intended to acknowledge is clear. Any doubt that might arise on this point is removed
by the letters Exhibit F, G, H, and J. In these letters the defendant makes repeated reference
to junior as the baby which Antonia, to whom the letters were addressed, was then carrying in her
womb, and the writer urged Antonia to eat with good appetite in order that junior might be vigorous.
In the last letter (Exhibit J) written only a few days before the birth of the child, the defendant urged
her to take good care of herself and of junior also.
It seems to us that the only legal question that can here arise as to the sufficiency of
acknowledgment is whether the acknowledgment contemplated in subsection 1 of article 135 of the
Civil Code must be made in a single document or may be made in more than one document, of
indubitable authenticity, written by the recognizing father. Upon this point we are of the opinion that
the recognition can be made out by putting together the admissions of more than one document,
supplementing the admission made in one letter by an admission or admissions made in another. In
the case before us the admission of paternity is contained in the note to the padreand the other
letters suffice to connect that admission with the child then being carried by Antonia L. de Jesus.
There is no requirement in the law that the writing shall be addressed to one, or any particular
individual. It is merely required that the writing shall be indubitable.
The second question that presents itself in this case is whether the trial court erred in holding that
Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child, justified by
the conduct of the father himself, and that as a consequence, the defendant in this case should be
compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco, under No. 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code. The
facts already stated are sufficient, in our opinion, to justify the conclusion of the trial court on this
point, and we may add here that our conclusion upon the first branch of the case that the defendant
had acknowledged this child in writings above referred to must be taken in connection with the facts
found by the court upon the second point. It is undeniable that from the birth of this child the
defendant supplied a home for it and the mother, in which they lived together with the defendant.
This situation continued for about a year, and until Antonia became enciente a second time, when
the idea entered the defendant's head of abandoning her. The law fixes no period during which a
child must be in the continuous possession of the status of a natural child; and the period in this
case was long enough to evince the father's resolution to concede the status. The circumstance that
he abandoned the mother and child shortly before this action was started is unimportant. The word
"continuous" in subsection 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code does not mean that the concession of
status shall continue forever, but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it
continues.
What has been said disposes of the principal feature of the defendant's appeal. With respect to the
appeal of the plaintiffs, we are of the opinion that the trial court was right in refusing to give damages
to the plaintiff, Antonia Loanco, for supposed breach of promise to marry. Such promise is not
satisfactorily proved, and we may add that the action for breach of promise to marry has no standing
in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the
faith of such promise. This case exhibits none of the features necessary to maintain such an action.
Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to
recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco.
Finally, we see no necessity or propriety in modifying the judgment as to the amount of the
maintenance which the trial court allowed to Ismael Loanco. And in this connection we merely point

out that, as conditions change, the Court of First Instance will have jurisdiction to modify the order as
to the amount of the pension as circumstances will require.
The judgment appealed from is in all respects affirmed, without costs. So ordered.
Malcolm, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, and butte, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

VILLA-REAL, J., dissenting:

The majority opinion is predicated on two grounds: First, that the defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia
has expressly acknowledged his paternity of the child Ismael Loanco in an indubitable writing of his;
and secondly, that said child has enjoyed the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural son
of said defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia, justified by his acts, as required by article 135 of the Civil
Code.
The first conclusion is drawn from Exhibits C, F, G, H, and J.
Exhibit C, which is in the handwriting of any signed by the defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia, reads
as follows:
Sabado, 1.30 p. m. 14 febrero, 1931
Rev. PADRE:
La criatura que vendra el junio es mio y que yo quisiera mi nombre que se de a la criatura.
(Fdo.) CESAR SYQUIA
Exhibit F, G, H, and j, which are letters written by the said defendant-appellant Cesar Syquia to
plaintiff-appellee Antonia L. de Jesus prior to the birth of the child contain the following expressions:
Exhibit F, Feb. 18, 1931: "No hagas nada malo; ni manches mi nombre y el de junior tambien no lo
manches. A cuerdate muy bien Toni que es por ti y por junior volvere alli pronto. ..."
Exhibit G. Feb. 24, 1931: "Toni por favor cuida bien a junior eh? . ..."
Exhibit H, March 25, 1931: "Toni, cuida tu bien a junior y cuidate bien, y come tu mucho. ... ."
Exhibit J, June 1, 1931: "Cuidate bien y junior tambien . ..."

Article 135, number 1, provides as follows:

ART. 135. The father may be compelled to acknowledge his natural child in the following
cases:
1. When an indisputable paper written by him, expressly acknowledging his paternity, is in
existence.
Maresa (Codigo Civil, Vol. 1, page 596, 4th ed.) commenting on said article, says:
Con arreglo al articulo que comentamos, no puede haber cuestion acerca de si es posible
admitir por otro medio la prueba de la paternidad natural. Entendemos que no, porquel el
articulo es terminante y la intencion de la ley mas terminante aun. Se establecio en la base
5.a que "no se admitira investigacion de la paternidad sino en los casos de delito, o cuando exista escrito del padre en el que
conste su voluntad indubitada de reconocer por suyo al hijo, deliberadamente expresada con ese fin, o cuando medie posesion
de estado", y esto mismo es lo que se ordena en el presente articulo.

No puede, pues, prosperar la demanda para obligar al padre al reconocimiento de un hijo

natural, aunque solo se limite a pedir alimentos, si no se funda en el reconocimiento expreso
del padre hecho por escrito, en la posesion constante de estado de hijo natural o en
sentencia firme recaida en causa por de delito violacin, estupro o rapto. El escrito y la
sentencia habran de acompaarse a la demandada, y no puede admitirse otra prueba que la
conducente a justificar que el escrito es indubitadamente del padre que en el reconozca su
paternidad, o la relativa a los actos directos del mismo padre o de su familia, que
demuestren la posesion continua de dicho estado. Para la prueba de estos dos hechos
podran utilizarse todos los medios que permite la Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil, debiendo el
juez rechazar la que por cualquier otro concepto se dirija a la investigacion de la paternidad.
xxx

xxx

xxx

En cuanto al otro requisito de ser expreso el reconocimiento, tengase presente que no basta
hacerlo por incidencia; es indespensable que se consigne en el escrito la voluntad
indubitada, clara y terminante del padre, de reconocer por suyo al hijo, deliberadamente
expresada con este fin, como se ordena an la base 5.a antes citada, de las aprobadas por la Ley de 11 de
mayo de 1888; de suerte que el escrito, aunque contenga otros particulares, como sucede en los testamentos, ha de tener por
objecto el reconocimiento deliberado y expreso del hijo natural. No llena, pues, ese objecto la manifestacion que incidentalmente
haga el padre de ser hijo natural suyo la persona a quien se refiera, y mucho menos el dar a una persona el titulo y tratamiento
de hijo en cartas familiares. Sin embrago, en cada caso decidiran los un modo suficientemente expresivo la paternidad, servira de
base para acreditar, en union con otros datos, la posesion contante del estado del hijo a los efectos de este articulo, y con arreglo
a su numero 2.

Let it first be noted that the law prohibits the investigation of paternity (Borres and Barza vs.
Municipality of Panay, 42 Phil., 643; Donado vs. Menendez Donado, 55 Phil., 861). The only
exceptions to this rule are those established in article 135 of the Civil Code quoted above, the first of
which is that the father may be compelled to acknowledge his paternity, "When an indubitable writing
of his exists in which he expressly acknowledge his paternity." The writing that is required by said
provision must be complete in itself and by itself, and must contain all the statements that are
necessary to constitute a full and clear acknowledgment by a father of his paternity of a child, in
order that it may serve as a basis for compelling him to acknowledge said child should be afterwards
deny his paternity. If several writings put together, each not being complete in itself, should be
necessary in order to obtain a full and complete expression of acknowledgment by a father of his
paternity of a child, the general prohibition to investigate paternity would be violated.

By the mere reading of all said letters, the one addressed to a priest and the others to the herein
plaintiff-appellee, Antonia L. de Jesus, the reader cannot ascertain which is the "creature that is
coming on June", which the defendant- appellant, Cesar Syquia, says in the said letter addressed to
the priest is his, nor who is the "junior" that he recommends to said Antonia L. de Jesus to take good
care of, as there is nothing in anyone of said letters from which it may be inferred that Antonia L. de
Jesus was enciente at the time, that the "junior" was the being she was carrying in her womb, and
that it was the "creature that is coming in June." To connect all these facts it was necessary to prove
that Cesar Syquia had had illicit relations with Antonia L. de Jesus, that as a result of such relations
the woman became pregnant, and that she gave birth to a boy in June 1931. All this certainly
constitutes an investigation of the paternity of Cesar Syquia of said child outside of the documents,
which is prohibited by law.
Either taken alone therefore, or in connection with Exhibits F, G, H, and J, Exhibit C is insufficient to
constitute a "indubitable writing of Cesar Syquia, in which he expressly acknowledges his paternity
of the child Ismael Loanco," as required by number 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code.
As to the second ground of the decision of the majority, number 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code
provides:
ART. 135. The father may be compelled to acknowledge his natural child in the following
cases:
xxx

xxx

xxx

2. When the child has been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child of
the defendant father, justified by the conduct of the father himself or that of his family.
The majority decision bases its connection on the second point on Exhibits C, F, G, H, and J and the
following facts, as found by the lower court in its decision:
Cuando la demandante Antonia L. de Jesus estaba para dar a luz, el demandado Cesar
Syquia llamo a su comprovinciano Dr. Crescenciano Talavera, medico que entonces ejercia
su profesion en la Ciudad de Manila, para que asistiera a aquella en su parto y a ese efecto
llevo a la demandante Antonia L. de Jesus acompaado del Dr. Talavera al Hospital San
Jose, de esta Ciudad, donde ella dio a luz el 17 de junio de 1931 asistida por dicho Dr.
Talavera, que firmo el certificado de necimiento Exhibit E.
Despues del nacimiento del demandante Ismael Loanco, el demandado estuvo viviendo con
este y con la demandante Antonio L. de Jesus en la casa No. 551 de la Calle Camarines,
Manila, entregando a dicha demandante el dinero para los gastos de casa y el pago del
consumo de gas y luz electrica, habiendo firmado el contrato para el suministro del fluido
electrico en dicha casa.
Exhibit, C, F, G, H, and J, are inadmissible in evidence the purpose of showing that Ismael Loanco
has enjoyed the continuous possession of the status of a natural child, because being of prior date
to the birth of said child they can not be considered as direct acts of Cesar Syquia showing
possession of the status of natural child, as no human being can enjoy such possession until he be
born with legal capacity for acquiring civil rights (Infante vs. Figueras, 4 Phil., 738; Granados vs.
Leynes, G.R. No. 31224, promulgated September 9, 1929, not reported).

It must also be stated that Cesar Syquia refused to allow his name to be given to the child Ismael
when it was baptized, so that the name of its mother, Loanco, had to be given to it.
The facts which were found by the court below to have been proved by the testimony of the
witnesses during the trial, are not sufficient to constitute the uninterrupted possession of the status of
Ismael Loanco as natural child of said Cesar Syquia, in the light of the following authorities:
In the case of Buenaventura vs. Urbano (5 Phil., 1, 9), this court said:
. . . Confining ourselves to the acts proved to have been performed by Don Telesforo, we find
that he visited the mother of the plaintiff; that he paid money for her support; that he paid
money for the support of the plaintiff; that he hold one witness that the plaintiff was his son;
that the plaintiff called him "Papa," and that Don Telesforo answered to this designation; that
when the plaintiff visited Don Telesforo he kissed his hand; that Don Telesforo wrote letters to
him; that he paid his fees for instruction in school, and secured him a position in a
commercial house.
xxx

xxx

xxx

All these facts taken together are not sufficient to show that plaintiff possesses continuously
the status of a natural child. They may have a tendency to show that Don Telesforo was the
father of the child, but that it is not sufficient. It is not sufficient that the father recognize the
child as his. By the express terms of article 135 that recognition must appear either in writing,
made by the father, or it must appear in acts which show that the son has possessed
continuously the status of a natural child. No recognition by the father of the child which
comes short of the requirements of these two paragraphs is sufficient. It must appear that it
was the intention of the father to recognize the child as to give him that status, and that the
acts performed by him were done with that intention.
Manresa (Codigo Civil, Vol. 1, page 602, 4th ed.) in citing some decisions of the Supreme Court of
Spain says:
En la sentencia de 5 de junio de 1906 declarase que para justificar la posesion de estado de
hijo natural se requiere que los actos sean de tal naturaleza que revelen, a la vez que el
convencimiento de la paternidad, la voluntad ostensible de tener y tratar al hijo como tal en
las relaciones sociales y de la vida, y esto no accidentalmente, sino continuedamente,
porque en tal supuesto los actos tiene el mismo valor que el reconocimiento expreso.
lawphil.net

En el mismo criterio restrictivo se inspira la de 12 de octubre de 1907, que estima que el

hecho de que dos nodrizas criaron a otros tantos nios, sufragando el gasto el demandado,
quien ademas iba a casa de la demandante, los besada, los llamaba hijos y encargaba para
los mismos el mayor cuidado; el de que subvenia a las necesidades de la madre y de los
seis hijos que la nacieron, el primero de los cuales se llamaba como el padre; y el de que los
porteros de la casa donde vivio la actora sabian que el finado visitaba a esta, se lamentaba
de la mucha familia que tenia y era tenido en el concepto publico como padre de los
menores, no son suficientes para fundar la declaracion de paternidad, pues no es legal
confundir actos que puedan revelar mas o menos la presuncion o convencimiento en que
una persona este de su paternidad con relacion a hijos naturales, con los que demuestren
su proposito de poner a estos hijos en la posesion de tal estado.
It will thus be seen from the foregoing discussion and authorities that the herein defendant-appellant
Cesar Syquia cannot be compelled to acknowledge the child Ismael Loanco as his natural son

because there exists not an indubitable writing of his in which he expressly acknowledges his
paternity of said child, and because the said child has not enjoyed the uninterrupted possession of
the status of a natural child of the said
defendant-appellant, justified by his own conduct or that of his family, as required by article 135 of
the Civil Code.
The decision appealed from should, therefore, be reversed and the complaint dismissed.

Avancea, C.J. and Imperial, J., concur.

THIRD DIVISION
CONTINENTAL
MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
- versus -

STEEL

G.R. No. 182836

Present:
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

HON.
ACCREDITED
VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR
ALLAN S. MONTAO and
NAGKAKAISANG
MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO
STEEL
CORPORATIONSOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN
Promulgated:
THE
PHILIPPINES
FOR
EMPOWERMENT
AND
REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER),
Respondents.
October 13, 2009
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, assailing the Decision[1] dated 27 February 2008 and the
Resolution[2] dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
101697, affirming the Resolution[3] dated 20 November 2007 of respondent
Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montao (Montao) granting
bereavement leave and other death benefits to Rolando P. Hortillano (Hortillano),
grounded on the death of his unborn child.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing
Corporation (Continental Steel) and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang
Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the
Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed on 9 January 2006, a
claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance
for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded
between Continental and the Union, which reads:
ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE
xxxx
Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVEThe Company agrees to grant a
bereavement leave with pay to any employee in case of death of the employees
legitimate dependent (parents, spouse, children, brothers and sisters) based on the
following:
2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao, Bulacan - 7 days
2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila - 11 days
xxxx
ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS
xxxx

Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCEThe Company shall

grant death and accidental insurance to the employee or his family in the
following manner:
xxxx
4.3 DEPENDENTSEleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos
(Php11,550.00) in case of death of the employees legitimate dependents (parents,
spouse, and children). In case the employee is single, this benefit covers the
legitimate parents, brothers and sisters only with proper legal document to be
presented (e.g. death certificate).[4]

The claim was based on the death of Hortillanos unborn child. Hortillanos
wife, Marife V. Hortillano, had a premature delivery on 5 January 2006 while she
was in the 38thweek of pregnancy.[5] According to the Certificate of Fetal Death
dated 7 January 2006, the female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia
secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency.[6]
Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillanos claim for paternity leave
but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of
the death and accident insurance.[7]
Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel of Hortillanos claims
for bereavement and other death benefits, the Union resorted to the grievance
machinery provided in the CBA. Despite the series of conferences held, the parties
still failed to settle their dispute, [8] prompting the Union to file a Notice to Arbitrate
before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE), National Capital Region (NCR). [9] In a
Submission Agreement dated 9 October 2006, the Union and Continental Steel
submitted for voluntary arbitration the sole issue of whether Hortillano was entitled
to bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to Article X, Section 2
and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA. [10] The parties mutually chose Atty.
Montao, an Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, to resolve said issue.[11]
When the preliminary conferences again proved futile in amicably settling
the dispute, the parties proceeded to submit their respective Position
Papers, [12] Replies,[13]and Rejoinders[14] to Atty. Montao.

The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and
other death benefits pursuant to the CBA. The Union maintained that Article X,
Section 2 and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA did not specifically state that
the dependent should have first been born alive or must have acquired juridical
personality so that his/her subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death
benefits. The Union cited cases wherein employees of MKK Steel Corporation
(MKK Steel) and Mayer Steel Pipe Corporation (Mayer Steel), sister companies of
Continental Steel, in similar situations as Hortillano were able to receive death
benefits under similar provisions of their CBAs.
The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve L. Dugan (Dugan), an
employee of Mayer Steel, whose wife also prematurely delivered a fetus, which
had already died prior to the delivery. Dugan was able to receive paternity leave,
bereavement leave, and voluntary contribution under the CBA between his union
and Mayer Steel.[15]Dugans child was only 24 weeks in the womb and died before
labor, as opposed to Hortillanos child who was already 37-38 weeks in the womb
and only died during labor.
The Union called attention to the fact that MKK Steel and Mayer Steel are
located in the same compound as Continental Steel; and the representatives of
MKK Steel and Mayer Steel who signed the CBA with their respective employees
unions were the same as the representatives of Continental Steel who signed the
existing CBA with the Union.
Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which provides
that all doubts in labor legislations and labor contracts shall be construed in favor
of the safety of and decent living for the laborer.
On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express provision of the
CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal
personality. It claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement to the
benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of which
existed in Hortillanos case.Continental Steel, relying on Articles 40, 41 and
42[16] of the Civil Code, contended that only one with civil personality could
die. Hence, the unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical
personality. Proceeding from the same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned
that a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a person at
all. Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired
juridical personality. A fetus that was delivered dead could not be considered

adependent, since it never needed any support, nor did it ever acquire the right to
be supported.
Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was clear and
unambiguous. Since neither of the parties qualified the terms used in the CBA, the
legally accepted definitions thereof were deemed automatically accepted by both
parties. The failure of the Union to have unborn child included in the definition
of dependent, as used in the CBA the death of whom would have qualified the
parent-employee for bereavement leave and other death benefits bound the Union
to the legally accepted definition of the latter term.
Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases involving the employees
of its sister companies, MKK Steel and Mayer Steel, referred to by the Union, were
irrelevant and incompetent evidence, given the separate and distinct personalities
of the companies. Neither could the Union sustain its claim that the grant of
bereavement leave and other death benefits to the parent-employee for the loss of
an unborn child constituted company practice.
On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montao, the appointed Accredited Voluntary
Arbitrator, issued a Resolution[17] ruling that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement
leave with pay and death benefits.
Atty. Montao identified the elements for entitlement to said benefits, thus:
This Office declares that for the entitlement of the benefit of bereavement leave
with pay by the covered employees as provided under Article X, Section 2 of the
parties CBA, three (3) indispensable elements must be present: (1) there is death;
(2) such death must be of employees dependent; and (3) such dependent must be
legitimate.
On the otherhand, for the entitlement to benefit for death and accident
insurance as provided under Article XVIII, Section 4, paragraph (4.3) of the
parties CBA, four (4) indispensable elements must be present: (a) there is death;
(b) such death must be of employees dependent; (c) such dependent must be
legitimate; and (d) proper legal document to be presented.[18]

Atty. Montao found that there was no dispute that the death of an employees
legitimate dependent occurred. The fetus had the right to be supported by the
parents from the very moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely on
another for support; he/she could not have existed or sustained himself/herself

without the power or aid of someone else, specifically, his/her mother. Therefore,
the fetus was already a dependent, although he/she died during the labor or
delivery. There was also no question that Hortillano and his wife were lawfully
married, making their dependent, unborn child, legitimate.
In the end, Atty. Montao decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a resolution is hereby rendered
ORDERING [herein petitioner Continental Steel] to pay Rolando P. Hortillano the
amount of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00),
representing his bereavement leave pay and the amount of Eleven Thousand Five
Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00) representing death benefits, or a total amount
of P16,489.00
The complaint against Manuel Sy, however, is ORDERED DISMISSED
for lack of merit.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Further, parties are hereby ORDERED to faithfully abide with the herein
dispositions.

Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Review on Certiorari,[19] under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 101697.
Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montao erred in granting Hortillanos
claims for bereavement leave with pay and other death benefits because
no death of an employees dependent had occurred. The death of a fetus, at
whatever stage of pregnancy, was excluded from the coverage of the CBA since
what was contemplated by the CBA was the death of a legal person, and not that of
a fetus, which did not acquire any juridical personality. Continental Steel pointed
out that its contention was bolstered by the fact that the term death was qualified
by the phrase legitimate dependent. It asserted that the status of a child could only
be determined upon said childs birth, otherwise, no such appellation can be
had. Hence, the conditions sine qua non for Hortillanos entitlement to bereavement
leave and other death benefits under the CBA were lacking.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 February 2008, affirmed Atty.
Montaos Resolution dated 20 November 2007. The appellate court
interpreted death to mean as follows:

[Herein petitioner Continental Steels] exposition on the legal sense in

which the term death is used in the CBA fails to impress the Court, and the same
is irrelevant for ascertaining the purpose, which the grant of bereavement leave
and death benefits thereunder, is intended to serve. While there is no arguing with
[Continental Steel] that the acquisition of civil personality of a child or fetus is
conditioned on being born alive upon delivery, it does not follow that such event
of premature delivery of a fetus could never be contemplated as a death as to be
covered by the CBA provision, undoubtedly an event causing loss and grief to the
affected employee, with whom the dead fetus stands in a legitimate
relation. [Continental Steel] has proposed a narrow and technical significance to
the term death of a legitimate dependent as condition for granting bereavement
leave and death benefits under the CBA. Following [Continental Steels] theory,
there can be no experience of death to speak of. The Court, however, does not
share this view. A dead fetus simply cannot be equated with anything less than
loss of human life, especially for the expectant parents. In this light, bereavement
leave and death benefits are meant to assuage the employee and the latters
immediate family, extend to them solace and support, rather than an act conferring
legal status or personality upon the unborn child. [Continental Steels] insistence
that the certificate of fetal death is for statistical purposes only sadly misses this
crucial point.[20]

Accordingly, the fallo of the 27 February 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolution dated November 20, 2007 of
Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montao is hereby AFFIRMED and
UPHELD.
With costs against [herein petitioner Continental Steel].[21]

In a Resolution[22] dated 9 May 2008, the Court of Appeals denied the

Motion for Reconsideration[23] of Continental Steel.
Hence, this Petition, in which Continental Steel persistently argues that the CBA is
clear and unambiguous, so that the literal and legal meaning of death should be
applied. Only one with juridical personality can die and a dead fetus never
acquired a juridical personality.
We are not persuaded.

As Atty. Montao identified, the elements for bereavement leave under Article X,
Section 2 of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, i.e.,
parent, spouse, child, brother, or sister, of an employee; and (3) legitimate relations
of the dependent to the employee. The requisites for death and accident insurance
under Article XVIII, Section 4(3) of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be
of a dependent, who could be a parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or a
parent, brother, or sister of a single employee; and (4) presentation of the proper
legal document to prove such death, e.g., death certificate.
It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion of Continental Steel
that the provisions of the CBA are clear and unambiguous, its fundamental
argument for denying Hortillanos claim for bereavement leave and other death
benefits rests on the purportedly proper interpretation of the terms death and
dependent as used in the CBA. If the provisions of the CBA are indeed clear and
unambiguous, then there is no need to resort to the interpretation or construction of
the same. Moreover, Continental Steel itself admitted that neither management nor
the Union sought to define the pertinent terms for bereavement leave and other
death benefits during the negotiation of the CBA.
The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code
for the legal definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived
child acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child
is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by
death.
First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and
42 of the Civil Code on natural persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37 of
the same Code, the very first of the general provisions on civil personality, which
reads:
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal
relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through
death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired
and may be lost.

We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her
juridical capacity and capacity to act as a person are not in issue. It is not a
question before us whether the unborn child acquired any rights or incurred any
obligations prior to his/her death that were passed on to or assumed by the childs

parents. The rights to bereavement leave and other death benefits in the instant
case pertain directly to the parents of the unborn child upon the latters death.
Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a
definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil
personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only
those who have acquired juridical personality could die.
And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life.[24] Life is not
synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first
before he/she could die.Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than
the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception,[25] that the
State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life,
then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies
as death.
Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As
Continental Steel itself defines, a dependent is one who relies on another for
support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself without the power or aid of
someone else. Under said general definition,[26] even an unborn child is
a dependent of its parents. Hortillanos child could not have reached 38-39 weeks of
its gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillanos wife, for
sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA provisions in question that
the dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or the
parent, brother, or sister of a single employee. The CBA did not provide a
qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or
must have acquired civil personality, as Continental Steel avers. Without such
qualification, thenchild shall be understood in its more general sense, which
includes the unborn fetus in the mothers womb.
The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent childs status in relation
to his/her parents. In Angeles v. Maglaya,[27] we have expounded on who is a
legitimate child,viz:
A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and
lawful marriage. Remove the element of lawful union and there is
strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of
the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter:
Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are
legitimate. (Emphasis ours.)

Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel,[28] we identified an illegitimate child to be

as follows:
The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate
children have been eliminated in the Family Code. Now, there are only
two classes of children -- legitimate (and those who, like the legally
adopted, have the rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All
children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate,
unless the law itself gives them legitimate status. (Emphasis ours.)

It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited

jurisprudence, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child attaches upon his/her
conception. In the present case, it was not disputed that Hortillano and his wife
were validly married and that their child was conceived during said marriage,
hence, making said child legitimate upon her conception.
Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to comply with the fourth
element entitling him to death and accident insurance under the CBA, i.e.,
presentation of the death certificate of his unborn child.
Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and other death
benefits under the CBA, Hortillanos claims for the same should have been granted
by Continental Steel.
We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an
employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and
his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents
grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in this
case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than
that of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently.
Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave and
other death benefits should be interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions
thereof. Time and again, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in case of
doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor, such should be

interpreted in favor of labor.[29] In the same way, the CBA and CBA provisions
should be interpreted in favor of labor. In Marcopper Mining v. National Labor
Relations Commission,[30] we pronounced:
Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the Labor
Arbiter in the assailed decision that "when the pendulum of judgment
swings to and fro and the forces are equal on both sides, the same must
be stilled in favor of labor." While petitioner acknowledges that all
doubts in the interpretation of the Labor Code shall be resolved in favor
of labor, it insists that what is involved-here is the amended CBA which
is essentially a contract between private persons. What petitioner has lost
sight of is the avowed policy of the State, enshrined in our Constitution,
to accord utmost protection and justice to labor, a policy, we are,
likewise, sworn to uphold.
In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v. NLRC [183 SCRA
451 (1990)], we categorically stated that:
When conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be
weighed on the scales of social justice, the heavier influence of the
latter should be counter-balanced by sympathy and compassion the
law must accord the underprivileged worker.
Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199
SCRA 265 (1991)], we declared:
Any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be
resolved in its favor pursuant to the social justice policy.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 27

February 2008 and Resolution dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution dated 20 November 2007 of
Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montao, which granted to Rolando
P. Hortillano bereavement leave pay and other death benefits in the amounts of
Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00) and Eleven Thousand
Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00), respectively, grounded on the death of his
unborn child, are AFFIRMED. Costs against Continental Steel Manufacturing
Corporation.
SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice

Article 43

TITLE: Limjuco vs. The Estate of Pedro Fragante

CITATION: 45 OG No. 9, p.397

FACTS:
Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of
public convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. His
intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service. The
Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to Intestate
Estate of the deceased, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its special or
Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to
maintain and operate the said plant. Petitioner claims that the granting of
certificate applied to the estate is a contravention of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial judicial
personality.
HELD:
The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial judicial personality because
under the Civil Code, estate of a dead person could be considered as artificial
juridical person for the purpose of the settlement and distribution of his
properties. It should be noted that the exercise of juridical administration includes
those rights and fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which survived after his death.

One of those surviving rights involved the pending application for public
convenience before the Public Service Commission.
Supreme Court is of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said
case No. 4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the
personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended, within
the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the
constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-770

April 27, 1948

ANGEL T. LIMJOCO, petitioner,

vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE, deceased, respondent.
Angel Limjoco, Jr. and Delfin L. Gonzales for petitioner.
Bienvenido A. Tan for respondent.
HILADO, J.:
Under date of May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission, through Deputy Commissioner Fidel
Ibaez, rendered its decision in case No. 4572 of Pedro O. Fragante, as applicant for a certificate of
public convenience to install, maintain and operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal, whereby said
commission held that the evidence therein showed that the public interest and convenience will be
promoted in a proper and suitable manner "by authorizing the operation and maintenance of another
ice plant of two and one-half (2-) tons in the municipality of San Juan; that the original applicant
Pedro O. Fragante was a Filipino Citizen at the time of his death; and that his intestate estate is
financially capable of maintaining the proposed service". The commission, therefore, overruled the
opposition filed in the case and ordered "that under the provisions of section 15 of Commonwealth
Act No. 146, as amended a certificate of public convenience be issued to the Intestate Estate of the
deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its Special or Judicial
Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice
plant with a daily productive capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan
and to sell the ice produced from said plant in the said Municipality of San Juan and in the
Municipality of Mandaluyong, Rizal, and in Quezon City", subject to the conditions therein set forth in
detail (petitioner's brief, pp. 33-34).
Petitioner makes four assignments of error in his brief as follows:
1. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not in accordance with law.
2. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not reasonably supported by evidence.

3. The Public Service Commission erred in not giving petitioner and the Ice and Cold Storage
Industries of the Philippines, Inc., as existing operators, a reasonable opportunity to meet the
increased demand.
4. The decision of the Public Service Commission is an unwarranted departure from its
announced policy with respect to the establishment and operation of ice plant. (Pp. 1-2,
petitioner's brief.)
In his argument petitioner contends that it was error on the part of the commission to allow the
substitution of the legal representative of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as party
applicant in the case then pending before the commission, and in subsequently granting to said
estate the certificate applied for, which is said to be in contravention of law.
If Pedro O. Fragante had not died, there can be no question that he would have had the right to
prosecute his application before the commission to its final conclusion. No one would have denied
him that right. As declared by the commission in its decision, he had invested in the ice plant in
question P 35,000, and from what the commission said regarding his other properties and business,
he would certainly have been financially able to maintain and operate said plant had he not died. His
transportation business alone was netting him about P1,440 a month. He was a Filipino citizen and
continued to be such till his demise. The commission declared in its decision, in view of the evidence
before it, that his estate was financially able to maintain and operate the ice plant. The aforesaid
right of Pedro O. Fragante to prosecute said application to its conclusion was one which by its nature
did not lapse through his death. Hence, it constitutes a part of the assets of his estate, for which a
right was property despite the possibility that in the end the commission might have denied
application, although under the facts of the case, the commission granted the application in view of
the financial ability of the estate to maintain and operate the ice plant. Petitioner, in his memorandum
of March 19, 1947, admits (page 3) that the certificate of public convenience once granted "as a rule,
should descend to his estate as an asset". Such certificate would certainly be property, and the right
to acquire such a certificate, by complying with the requisites of the law, belonged to the decedent in
his lifetime, and survived to his estate and judicial administrator after his death.
If Pedro O. Fragrante had in his lifetime secured an option to buy a piece of land and during the life
of the option he died, if the option had been given him in the ordinary course of business and not out
of special consideration for his person, there would be no doubt that said option and the right to
exercise it would have survived to his estate and legal representatives. In such a case there would
also be the possibility of failure to acquire the property should he or his estate or legal representative
fail to comply with the conditions of the option. In the case at bar Pedro O. Fragrante's undoubted
right to apply for and acquire the desired certificate of public convenience the evidence
established that the public needed the ice plant was under the law conditioned only upon the
requisite citizenship and economic ability to maintain and operate the service. Of course, such right
to acquire or obtain such certificate of public convenience was subject to failure to secure its
objective through nonfulfillment of the legal conditions, but the situation here is no different from the
legal standpoint from that of the option in the illustration just given.
Rule 88, section 2, provides that the executor or administrator may bring or defend actions, among
other cases, for the protection of the property or rights of the deceased which survive, and it says
that such actions may be brought or defended "in the right of the deceased".
Rule 82, section 1, paragraph (a), mentions among the duties of the executor or administrator, the
making of an inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which shall
come to his possession or knowledge, or to the possession of any other person for him.

In his commentaries on the Rules of Court (Volume II, 2nd ed., pages 366, 367) the present chief
Justice of this Court draws the following conclusion from the decisions cited by him:
Therefore, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, any action affecting the property
or rights(emphasis supplied) of a deceased person which may be brought by or against him
if he were alive, may likewise be instituted and prosecuted by or against the administrator,
unless the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, or unless, by its very
nature, it cannot survive, because death extinguishes the right . . . .
It is true that a proceeding upon the application for a certificate of public convenience before the
Public Service Commission is not an "action". But the foregoing provisions and citations go to prove
that the decedent's rights which by their nature are not extinguished by death go to make up a part
and parcel of the assets of his estate which, being placed under the control and management of the
executor or administrator, can not be exercised but by him in representation of the estate for the
benefit of the creditors, devisees or legatees, if any, and the heirs of the decedent. And if the right
involved happens to consist in the prosecution of an unfinished proceeding upon an application for a
certificate of public convenience of the deceased before the Public Service Commission, it is but
logical that the legal representative be empowered and entitled in behalf of the estate to make the
right effective in that proceeding.
Manresa (Vol. III, 6th ed., p. 11) says that No. 10 of article 334 and article 336 of the Civil Code,
respectively, consider as immovable and movable things rights which are not material. The same
eminent commentator says in the cited volume (p. 45) that article 336 of the Civil Code has been
deficiently drafted in that it is not sufficiently expressive of all incorporeal rights which are
also property for juridical purposes.
Corpus Juris (Vol. 50, p. 737) states that in the broad sense of the term, property includes, among
other things, "an option", and "the certificate of the railroad commission permitting the operation of a
bus line", and on page 748 of the same volume we read:
However, these terms (real property, as estate or interest) have also been declared to
include every species of title, inchoate or complete, and embrace rights which lie in contract,
whether executory or executed. (Emphasis supplied.)
Another important question raised by petitioner is whether the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is a
"person" within the meaning of the Public Service Act.
Words and Phrases, First Series, (Vol. 6, p, 5325), states the following doctrine in the jurisdiction of
the State of Indiana:
As the estate of the decedent is in law regarded as a person, a forgery committed after the
death of the man whose name purports to be signed to the instrument may be prosecuted as
with the intent to defraud the estate. Billings vs. State, 107 Ind., 54, 55, 6 N. E. 914, 7 N. E.
763, 57 Am. Rep. 77.
The Supreme Court of Indiana in the decision cited above had before it a case of forgery committed
after the death of one Morgan for the purpose of defrauding his estate. The objection was urged that
the information did not aver that the forgery was committed with the intent to defraud any person.
The Court, per Elliott, J., disposed of this objection as follows:

. . . The reason advanced in support of this proposition is that the law does not regard the
estate of a decedent as a person. This intention (contention) cannot prevail. The estate of
the decedent is a person in legal contemplation. "The word "person" says Mr. Abbot, "in its
legal signification, is a generic term, and includes artificial as well as natural persons," 2 Abb.
Dict. 271; Douglas vs. Pacific, etc. Co., 4 Cal. 304; Planters', etc., Bank vs. Andrews, 8 Port.
(Ala.) 404. It said in another work that 'persons are of two kinds: natural and artificial. A
natural person is a human being. Artificial persons include (1) a collection or succession of
natural persons forming a corporation; (2) a collection of property to which the law attributes
the capacity of having rights and duties. The latter class of artificial persons is recognized
only to a limited extent in our law. "Examples are the estate of a bankrupt or deceased
person." 2 Rapalje & L. Law Dict. 954. Our own cases inferentially recognize the correctness
of the definition given by the authors from whom we have quoted, for they declare that it is
sufficient, in pleading a claim against a decedent's estate, to designate the defendant as the
estate of the deceased person, naming him. Ginn vs. Collins, 43 Ind. 271. Unless we accept
this definition as correct, there would be a failure of justice in cases where, as here, the
forgery is committed after the death of a person whose name is forged; and this is a result to
be avoided if it can be done consistent with principle. We perceive no difficulty in avoiding
such a result; for, to our minds, it seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be
regarded as an artificial person. It is the creation of law for the purpose of enabling a
disposition of the assets to be properly made, and, although natural persons as heirs,
devises, or creditors, have an interest in the property, the artificial creature is a distinct legal
entity. The interest which natural persons have in it is not complete until there has been a
due administration; and one who forges the name of the decedent to an instrument
purporting to be a promissory note must be regarded as having intended to defraud the
estate of the decedent, and not the natural persons having diverse interests in it, since ha
cannot be presumed to have known who those persons were, or what was the nature of their
respective interest. The fraudulent intent is against the artificial person, the estate and
not the natural persons who have direct or contingent interest in it. (107 Ind. 54, 55, 6 N.E.
914-915.)
In the instant case there would also be a failure of justice unless the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is
considered a "person", for quashing of the proceedings for no other reason than his death would
entail prejudicial results to his investment amounting to P35,000.00 as found by the commission, not
counting the expenses and disbursements which the proceeding can be presumed to have
occasioned him during his lifetime, let alone those defrayed by the estate thereafter. In this
jurisdiction there are ample precedents to show that the estate of a deceased person is also
considered as having legal personality independent of their heirs. Among the most recent cases may
be mentioned that of "Estate of Mota vs. Concepcion, 56 Phil., 712, 717, wherein the principal
plaintiff was the estate of the deceased Lazaro Mota, and this Court gave judgment in favor of said
estate along with the other plaintiffs in these words:
. . . the judgment appealed from must be affirmed so far as it holds that defendants
Concepcion and Whitaker are indebted to he plaintiffs in the amount of P245,804.69 . . . .
Under the regime of the Civil Code and before the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, the
heirs of a deceased person were considered in contemplation of law as the continuation of his
personality by virtue of the provision of article 661 of the first Code that the heirs succeed to all the
rights and obligations of the decedent by the mere fact of his death. It was so held by this Court
in Barrios vs. Dolor, 2 Phil., 44, 46. However, after the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure,
article 661 of the Civil Code was abrogated, as held in Suiliong & Co. vs. Chio-Taysan, 12 Phil., 13,
22. In that case, as well as in many others decided by this Court after the innovations introduced by
the Code of Civil Procedure in the matter of estates of deceased persons, it has been the constant
doctrine that it is the estate or the mass of property, rights and assets left by the decedent, instead of

the heirs directly, that becomes vested and charged with his rights and obligations which survive
after his demise.
The heirs were formerly considered as the continuation of the decedent's personality simply by legal
fiction, for they might not have been flesh and blood the reason was one in the nature of a legal
exigency derived from the principle that the heirs succeeded to the rights and obligations of the
decedent. Under the present legal system, such rights and obligations as survive after death have to
be exercised and fulfilled only by the estate of the deceased. And if the same legal fiction were not
indulged, there would be no juridical basis for the estate, represented by the executor or
administrator, to exercise those rights and to fulfill those obligations of the deceased. The reason
and purpose for indulging the fiction is identical and the same in both cases. This is why according to
the Supreme Court of Indiana in Billings vs. State, supra, citing 2 Rapalje & L. Dictionary, 954,
among the artificial persons recognized by law figures "a collection of property to which the law
attributes the capacity of having rights and duties", as for instance, the estate of a bankrupt or
deceased person.
Petitioner raises the decisive question of whether or not the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante can be
considered a "citizen of the Philippines" within the meaning of section 16 of the Public Service Act,
as amended, particularly the proviso thereof expressly and categorically limiting the power of the
commission to issue certificates of public convenience or certificates of public convenience and
necessity "only to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States or to corporations,
copartnerships, associations, or joint-stock companies constituted and organized under the laws of
the Philippines", and the further proviso that sixty per centum of the stock or paid-up capital of such
entities must belong entirely to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States.
Within the Philosophy of the present legal system, the underlying reason for the legal fiction by
which, for certain purposes, the estate of the deceased person is considered a "person" is the
avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights and
fulfilling such legal obligations of the decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is
indulged. Substantially the same reason is assigned to support the same rule in the jurisdiction of
the State of Indiana, as announced in Billings vs. State, supra, when the Supreme Court of said
State said:
. . . It seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be regarded as an artificial
person. it is the creation of law for the purpose of enabling a disposition of the assets to be
properly made . . . .
Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself, to cite just one example, under the bill
of rights it seems clear that while the civil rights guaranteed therein in the majority of cases relate to
natural persons, the term "person" used in section 1 (1) and (2) must be deemed to include artificial
or juridical persons, for otherwise these latter would be without the constitutional guarantee against
being deprived of property without due process of law, or the immunity from unreasonable searches
and seizures. We take it that it was the intendment of the framers to include artificial or juridical, no
less than natural, persons in these constitutional immunities and in others of similar nature. Among
these artificial or juridical persons figure estates of deceased persons. Hence, we hold that within the
framework of the Constitution, the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered an artificial or
juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, of course,
include the exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of
those obligations of his which survived after his death. One of those rights was the one involved in
his pending application before the Public Service Commission in the instant case, consisting in the
prosecution of said application to its final conclusion. As stated above, an injustice would ensue from
the opposite course.

How about the point of citizenship? If by legal fiction his personality is considered extended so that
any debts or obligations left by, and surviving, him may be paid, and any surviving rights may be
exercised for the benefit of his creditors and heirs, respectively, we find no sound and cogent reason
for denying the application of the same fiction to his citizenship, and for not considering it as likewise
extended for the purposes of the aforesaid unfinished proceeding before the Public Service
Commission. The outcome of said proceeding, if successful, would in the end inure to the benefit of
the same creditors and the heirs. Even in that event petitioner could not allege any prejudice in the
legal sense, any more than he could have done if Fragrante had lived longer and obtained the
desired certificate. The fiction of such extension of his citizenship is grounded upon the same
principle, and motivated by the same reason, as the fiction of the extension of personality. The fiction
is made necessary to avoid the injustice of subjecting his estate, creditors and heirs, solely by
reason of his death to the loss of the investment amounting to P35,000, which he has already made
in the ice plant, not counting the other expenses occasioned by the instant proceeding, from the
Public Service Commission of this Court.
We can perceive no valid reason for holding that within the intent of the constitution (Article IV), its
provisions on Philippine citizenship exclude the legal principle of extension above adverted to. If for
reasons already stated our law indulges the fiction of extension of personality, if for such reasons the
estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person herein, we can find
no justification for refusing to declare a like fiction as to the extension of his citizenship for the
purposes of this proceeding.
Pedro O. Fragrante was a Filipino citizen, and as such, if he had lived, in view of the evidence of
record, he would have obtained from the commission the certificate for which he was applying. The
situation has suffered but one change, and that is, his death. His estate was that of a Filipino citizen.
And its economic ability to appropriately and adequately operate and maintain the service of an ice
plant was the same that it received from the decedent himself. In the absence of a contrary showing,
which does not exist here, his heirs may be assumed to be also Filipino citizens; and if they are not,
there is the simple expedient of revoking the certificate or enjoining them from inheriting it.
Upon the whole, we are of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No. 4572
of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and citizenship of
Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public Service
Act, as amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed.
Decision affirmed, without costs. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla and Tuason, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., I hereby certify that Mr. Justice Feria voted with the majority.

Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
Commonwealth Act No. 146 reserves to Filipino citizens the right to obtain a certificate of public
convenience to operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal. The limitation is in accordance with section 8
of Article XIV of the Constitution which provides

No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility
shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or other entities
organized under the laws of the Philippines, sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned
by citizens of the Philippines, nor such franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive in
character or for a longer period than fifty years. No franchise granted to any individual, firm
or corporation, except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration,
or repeal by Congress when the public interest so requires.
The main question in this case is whether the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante fulfills the citizenship
requirement. To our mind, the question can be restated by asking whether the heirs of Pedro O.
Fragrante fulfill the citizenship requirement of the law.
The estate is an abstract entity. As such, its legal value depends on what it represents. It is a device
by which the law gives a kind of personality and unity to undetermined tangible persons, the heirs.
They inherit and replace the deceased at the very moment of his death. As there are procedural
requisites for their identification and determination that need time for their compliance, a legal fiction
has been devised to represent them. That legal fiction is the estate, a liquid condition in process of
solidification.
The estate, therefore, has only a representative value. What the law calls estate is, a matter of fact,
intended to designate the heirs of the deceased. The question, therefore, in this case, boils down to
the citizenship of the heirs of Fragrante.
There is nothing in the record to show conclusively the citizenship of the heirs of Fragrante. If they
are Filipino citizens, the action taken by the Public Service Commission should be affirmed. If they
are not, it should be reversed.
Petitioner alleges that the estate is just a front or dummy for aliens to go around the citizenship
constitutional provision. It is alleged that Gaw Suy, the special administrator of the estate, is an alien.
We are of the opinion that the citizenship of the heirs of Fragrante should be determined by the
Commission upon evidence that the party should be present. It should also determine the dummy
question raised by the petitioner.
We are of opinion and so vote that the decision of the Public Service Commission of May 21, 1946,
be set aside and that the Commission be instructed to receive evidence of the above factual
questions and render a new decision accordingly.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-27956 April 30, 1976
DIONISIO DUMLAO, in his own behalf and in his capacity as Administrator
of the Testate Estate of the late Pedro Oria; FAUSTA DUMLAO, AMADO
DUMLAO, and BENJAMIN DUMLAO, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
QUALITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, INC., defendant-appellee.
Castillo & Castillo for appellants.
Eugenio T. Estavillo for appellee.

AQUINO, J.:p
On February 28, 1962 the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in Civil Case No.
T-662 rendered a judgment ordering defendants Vicente Soliven, Pedro Oria,
Santiago Laurencio, Marcelino Sumalbag and Juana Darang to pay solidarity Quality
Plastic Products, Inc. the sum of P3,667.03 plus the legal rate of interest from
November, 1958. The lower court directed that in case the defendants failed to pay
the said amount before its decision became final, then Quality Plastic Products, Inc.
"is hereby authorized to foreclose the bond, Exhibit A, in accordance with law, for
the satisfaction of the judgment". (Under that bond the four sureties bound
themselves to answer solidarity for the obligations of the principal, Vicente Soliven
and certain real properties of the sureties were "given as security for" their
undertaking).
Upon defendants' failure to pay the amount of the judgment and after the decision
had become final, the lower court, on motion of Quality Plastic Products, Inc.,
ordered the "foreclosure" of the surety bond and the sale at public auction of the
land of Pedro Oria which he had given as security under the bond. Oria's land, which
was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 28732 and has an area of nine and
six-tenths hectares, was levied upon and sold by the sheriff at public auction on
September 24, 1962. The sale was confirmed by the lower court in its order of
November 20, 1962.
It turned out that Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960 when the
action was filed. Oria's death was not known to Quality Plastic Products, Inc. Nor
were the representatives of Quality Plastic Products, Inc. aware that in the same
Tayug court Special Proceeding No. T-212, Testate Estate of the deceased Pedro
Oria, was pending.
The summons and copies of the complaint for the five defendants in Civil Case No.
T-662 had been personally served on June 24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff on Soliven,
the principal in the bond, who acknowledged such service by signing on the back of
the original summons in his own behalf and again signing for his co-defendants.
On March 1, 1963 Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and
all testamentary heirs in Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products,
Inc., also in the Tayug court for the annulment of the judgment against Oria and the

execution against his land. (Dionisio Dumlao also sued in his capacity as
administrator of Oria's testate estate).
The ground for annulment was lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased
Oria (Civil Case No. T- 873). It was only when Quality Plastic Products, Inc. received
the summons in Civil Case No. T-873 that it learned that Oria was already dead at
the time the prior case, Civil Case No. T-662, was filed.
Quality Plastic Products, Inc. in its answer alleged that Oria's heirs were aware of
the suit against Soliven and his sureties and that the said heirs were estopped to
question the court's jurisdiction over Oria.
After hearing the lower court held that it acquired jurisdiction over Soliven and the
other defendants in Civil Case No. T-662 by reason of their voluntary appearance. It
reasoned out that Soliven acted in bad faith because he did not apprise the court
that Oria was dead. It specifically ruled that "it had acquired jurisdiction over the
person" of Oria and that the judgment was valid as to him. From that decision the
plaintiffs appealed.
The four assignments of error of appellants Dumlao may be boiled down to the issue
as to the validity of the lower court's judgment against the deceased Pedro Oria
who, being already in the other world, was never served with summons.
There is no difficulty in resolving that issue. Since no jurisdiction was acquired over
Oria, the judgment against him is a patent nullity (Ang Lam vs. Rosillosa and
Santiago, 86 Phil. 447; Asuncion vs. Nieto, 4 Phil. 97; Gorostiaga vs. Sarte, 68 Phil.
4).
As far as Oria was concerned, the lower court's judgment against him in Civil Case
No. T-662 is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could
not have been, validly served with summons. He had no more civil personality. His
juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, was lost
through death. (Arts. 37 and 42, Civil Code).
The lower court erred in ruling that since Soliven's counsel also appeared as counsel
for Oria, there was a voluntary appearance which enabled the court to acquire
jurisdiction over Oria, as contemplated in section 23, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Soliven's counsel could not have validly appeared for a dead co-defendant.
Estoppel has no application to this case.
But from the fact that appellants Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastic Products, Inc. in
order to annul the judgment against Oria, it does not follow that they are entitled to
claim attorney's fees against that corporation. The parties herein agreed in their
stipulation of facts that Quality Plastic Products, Inc. was unaware of Oria's death.
Appellants Dumlao in effect conceded that the appellee acted in good faith in
joining Oria as a co-defendant.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. Its judgment in
Civil Case No. T-662 against Pedro Oria is declared void for lack of jurisdiction. The
execution sale of Oria's land covered by OCT No. 28732 is also void. No costs.
SO ORDERED. Fernando, Barredo, Antonio and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.

FAMILY CODE
Requisites of Marriage
Article 1

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 118978. May 23, 1997]

PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANY, petitioner,

vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and GRACE
DE GUZMAN,respondents.
*

DECISION
REGALADO, J.:

Seeking relief through the extraordinary writ of certiorari, petitioner Philippine

Telegraph and Telephone Company (hereafter, PT&T) invokes the alleged concealment
of civil status and defalcation of company funds as grounds to terminate the services of
an employee. That employee, herein private respondent Grace de Guzman, contrarily
argues that what really motivated PT&T to terminate her services was her having
contracted marriage during her employment, which is prohibited by petitioner in its
company policies. She thus claims that she was discriminated against in gross violation
of law, such a proscription by an employer being outlawed by Article 136 of the Labor
Code.
Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a reliever, specifically as a
Supernumerary Project Worker, for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April
20, 1991 vice one C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. Under the Reliever
Agreement which she signed with petitioner company, her employment was to be
immediately terminated upon expiration of the agreed period. Thereafter, from June 10,
1991 to July 1, 1991, and from July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991, private respondents
services as reliever were again engaged by petitioner, this time in replacement of one
Erlinda F. Dizon who went on leave during both periods. After August 8, 1991, and
pursuant to their Reliever Agreement, her services were terminated.
[1]

[2]

On September 2, 1991, private respondent was once more asked to join petitioner
company as a probationary employee, the probationary period to cover 150 days. In the
job application form that was furnished her to be filled up for the purpose, she indicated
in the portion for civil status therein that she was single although she had contracted
marriage a few months earlier, that is, on May 26, 1991.
[3]

It now appears that private respondent had made the same representation in the
two successive reliever agreements which she signed on June 10, 1991 and July 8,
1991. When petitioner supposedly learned about the same later, its branch supervisor in
Baguio City, Delia M. Oficial, sent to private respondent a memorandum dated January
15, 1992 requiring her to explain the discrepancy. In that memorandum, she was
reminded about the companys policy of not accepting married women for employment.
[4]

In her reply letter dated January 17, 1992, private respondent stated that she was
not aware of PT&Ts policy regarding married women at the time, and that all along she
had not deliberately hidden her true civil status. Petitioner nonetheless remained
unconvinced by her explanations. Private respondent was dismissed from the company
effective January 29, 1992, which she readily contested by initiating a complaint for
illegal dismissal, coupled with a claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances
(COLA), before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission in Baguio City.
[5]

[6]

At the preliminary conference conducted in connection therewith, private

respondent volunteered the information, and this was incorporated in the stipulation of
facts between the parties, that she had failed to remit the amount of P2,380.75 of her
collections. She then executed a promissory note for that amount in favor of petitioner.
All of these took place in a formal proceeding and with the agreement of the parties
and/or their counsel.
[7]

On November 23, 1993, Labor Arbiter Irenarco R. Rimando handed down a

decision declaring that private respondent, who had already gained the status of a
regular employee, was illegally dismissed by petitioner. Her reinstatement, plus
payment of the corresponding back wages and COLA, was correspondingly ordered,
the labor arbiter being of the firmly expressed view that the ground relied upon by
petitioner in dismissing private respondent was clearly insufficient, and that it was
apparent that she had been discriminated against on account of her having contracted
marriage in violation of company rules.
On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), said public
respondent upheld the labor arbiter and, in its decision dated April 29, 1994, it ruled that
private respondent had indeed been the subject of an unjust and unlawful discrimination
by her employer, PT&T. However, the decision of the labor arbiter was modified with the
qualification that Grace de Guzman deserved to be suspended for three months in view
of the dishonest nature of her acts which should not be condoned. In all other respects,
the NLRC affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter, including the order for the
reinstatement of private respondent in her employment with PT&T.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was rebuffed by
respondent NLRC in its resolution of November 9, 1994, hence this special civil action

assailing the aforestated decisions of the labor arbiter and respondent NLRC, as well as
the denial resolution of the latter.
1. Decreed in the Bible itself is the universal norm that women should be regarded
with love and respect but, through the ages, men have responded to that injunction with
indifference, on the hubristic conceit that women constitute the inferior sex. Nowhere
has that prejudice against womankind been so pervasive as in the field of labor,
especially on the matter of equal employment opportunities and standards. In the
Philippine setting, women have traditionally been considered as falling within the
vulnerable groups or types of workers who must be safeguarded with preventive and
remedial social legislation against discriminatory and exploitative practices in hiring,
training, benefits, promotion and retention.
The Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights between men and women in
almost all phases of social and political life, provides a gamut of protective
provisions. To cite a few of the primordial ones, Section 14, Article II on the Declaration
of Principles and State Policies, expressly recognizes the role of women in nationbuilding and commands the State to ensure, at all times, the fundamental equality
before the law of women and men. Corollary thereto, Section 3 of Article XIII (the
progenitor whereof dates back to both the 1935 and 1973 Constitution) pointedly
requires the State to afford full protection to labor and to promote full employment and
equality of employment opportunities for all, including an assurance of entitlement to
tenurial security of all workers. Similarly, Section 14 of Article XIII mandates that the
State shall protect working women through provisions for opportunities that would
enable them to reach their full potential.
[8]

[9]

[10]

2. Corrective labor and social laws on gender inequality have emerged with more
frequency in the years since the Labor Code was enacted on May 1, 1974 as
Presidential Decree No. 442, largely due to our countrys commitment as a signatory to
the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW).
[11]

Principal among these laws are Republic Act No. 6727 which explicitly prohibits
discrimination against women with respect to terms and conditions of employment,
promotion, and training opportunities; Republic Act No. 6955 which bans the mailorder-bride practice for a fee and the export of female labor to countries that cannot
guarantee protection to the rights of women workers; Republic Act No. 7192, also
known as the Women in Development and Nation Building Act, which affords women
equal opportunities with men to act and to enter into contracts, and for appointment,
admission, training, graduation, and commissioning in all military or similar schools of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police; Republic Act No.
7322 increasing the maternity benefits granted to women in the private sector;
Republic Act No. 7877 which outlaws and punishes sexual harassment in the
workplace and in the education and training environment; and Republic Act No. 8042,
or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, which prescribes as a
matter of policy,inter alia, the deployment of migrant workers, with emphasis on women,
only in countries where their rights are secure. Likewise, it would not be amiss to point
[12]

[13]

[14]

[15]

[16]

[17]

out that in the Family Code, womens rights in the field of civil law have been greatly
enhanced and expanded.
[18]

In the Labor Code, provisions governing the rights of women workers are found in
Articles 130 to 138 thereof. Article 130 involves the right against particular kinds of night
work while Article 132 ensures the right of women to be provided with facilities and
standards which the Secretary of Labor may establish to ensure their health and
safety. For purposes of labor and social legislation, a woman working in a nightclub,
cocktail lounge, massage clinic, bar or other similar establishments shall be considered
as an employee under Article 138. Article 135, on the other hand, recognizes a womans
right against discrimination with respect to terms and conditions of employment on
account simply of sex. Finally, and this brings us to the issue at hand, Article 136
explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of the marriage of a female
employee.
3. Acknowledged as paramount in the due process scheme is the constitutional
guarantee of protection to labor and security of tenure. Thus, an employer is required,
as a conditionsine qua non prior to severance of the employment ties of an individual
under his employ, to convincingly establish, through substantial evidence, the existence
of a valid and just cause in dispensing with the services of such employee, ones labor
being regarded as constitutionally protected property.
On the other hand, it is recognized that regulation of manpower by the company
falls within the so-called management prerogatives, which prescriptions encompass the
matter of hiring, supervision of workers, work assignments, working methods and
assignments, as well as regulations on the transfer of employees, lay-off of workers,
and the discipline, dismissal, and recall of employees. As put in a case, an employer is
free to regulate, according to his discretion and best business judgment, all aspects of
employment, from hiring to firing, except in cases of unlawful discrimination or those
which may be provided by law.
[19]

[20]

In the case at bar, petitioners policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified

from work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the
right against, discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no
less than the Constitution. Contrary to petitioners assertion that it dismissed private
respondent from employment on account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly
that her ties with the company were dissolved principally because of the companys
policy that married women are not qualified for employment in PT&T, and not merely
because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.
That it was so can easily be seen from the memorandum sent to private respondent
by Delia M. Oficial, the branch supervisor of the company, with the reminder, in the
words of the latter, that youre fully aware that the company is not accepting married
women employee (sic), as it was verbally instructed to you. Again, in the termination
notice sent to her by the same branch supervisor, private respondent was made to
understand that her severance from the service was not only by reason of her
concealment of her married status but, over and on top of that, was her violation of the
companys policy against marriage (and even told you that married women employees
are not applicable [sic] or accepted in our company.) Parenthetically, this seems to be
[21]

[22]

the curious reason why it was made to appear in the initiatory pleadings that petitioner
was represented in this case only by its said supervisor and not by its highest ranking
officers who would otherwise be solidarily liable with the corporation.
[23]

Verily, private respondents act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T
could not be properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the
way she did mainly because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable
company. In other words, she was practically forced by that very same illegal company
policy into misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being disqualified from work. While
loss of confidence is a just cause for termination of employment, it should not be
simulated. It must rest on an actual breach of duty committed by the employee and not
on the employers caprices. Furthermore, it should never be used as a subterfuge for
causes which are improper, illegal, or unjustified.
[24]

[25]

[26]

In the present controversy, petitioners expostulations that it dismissed private

respondent, not because the latter got married but because she concealed that fact,
does have a hollow ring. Her concealment, so it is claimed, bespeaks dishonesty hence
the consequent loss of confidence in her which justified her dismissal. Petitioner would
asseverate, therefore, that while it has nothing against marriage, it nonetheless takes
umbrage over the concealment of that fact. This improbable reasoning, with interstitial
distinctions, perturbs the Court since private respondent may well be minded to claim
that the imputation of dishonesty should be the other way around.
Petitioner would have the Court believe that although private respondent defied its
policy against its female employees contracting marriage, what could be an act of
insubordination was inconsequential. What it submits as unforgivable is her
concealment of that marriage yet, at the same time, declaring that marriage as a trivial
matter to which it supposedly has no objection. In other words, PT&T says it gives its
blessings to its female employees contracting marriage, despite the maternity leaves
and other benefits it would consequently respond for and which obviously it would have
wanted to avoid. If that employee confesses such fact of marriage, there will be no
sanction; but if such employee conceals the same instead of proceeding to the
confessional, she will be dismissed. This line of reasoning does not impress us as
reflecting its true management policy or that we are being regaled with responsible
advocacy.
This Court should be spared the ennui of strained reasoning and the tedium of
propositions which confuse through less than candid arguments. Indeed, petitioner
glosses over the fact that it was its unlawful policy against married women, both on the
aspects of qualification and retention, which compelled private respondent to conceal
her supervenient marriage. It was, however, that very policy alone which was the cause
of private respondents secretive conduct now complained of. It is then apropos to recall
the familiar saying that he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.
Finally, petitioners collateral insistence on the admission of private respondent that
she supposedly misappropriated company funds, as an additional ground to dismiss her
from employment, is somewhat insincere and self-serving. Concededly, private
respondent admitted in the course of the proceedings that she failed to remit some of
her collections, but that is an altogether different story. The fact is that she was

dismissed solely because of her concealment of her marital status, and not on the basis
of that supposed defalcation of company funds. That the labor arbiter would thus
consider petitioners submissions on this supposed dishonesty as a mere afterthought,
just to bolster its case for dismissal, is a perceptive conclusion born of experience in
labor cases. For, there was no showing that private respondent deliberately
misappropriated the amount or whether her failure to remit the same was through
negligence and, if so, whether the negligence was in nature simple or grave. In fact, it
was merely agreed that private respondent execute a promissory note to refund the
same, which she did, and the matter was deemed settled as a peripheral issue in the
labor case.
Private respondent, it must be observed, had gained regular status at the time of
her dismissal. When she was served her walking papers on January 29, 1992, she was
about to complete the probationary period of 150 days as she was contracted as a
probationary employee on September 2, 1991. That her dismissal would be effected just
when her probationary period was winding down clearly raises the plausible conclusion
that it was done in order to prevent her from earning security of tenure. On the other
hand, her earlier stints with the company as reliever were undoubtedly those of a
regular employee, even if the same were for fixed periods, as she performed activities
which were essential or necessary in the usual trade and business of PT&T. The
primary standard of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection
between the activity performed by the employee in relation to the business or trade of
the employer.
[27]

[28]

[29]

As an employee who had therefore gained regular status, and as she had been
dismissed without just cause, she is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges and to full back wages, inclusive of allowances and other
benefits or their monetary equivalent. However, as she had undeniably committed an
act of dishonesty in concealing her status, albeit under the compulsion of an unlawful
imposition of petitioner, the three-month suspension imposed by respondent NLRC
must be upheld to obviate the impression or inference that such act should be
condoned. It would be unfair to the employer if she were to return to its fold without any
sanction whatsoever for her act which was not totally justified.Thus, her entitlement to
back wages, which shall be computed from the time her compensation was withheld up
to the time of her actual reinstatement, shall be reduced by deducting therefrom the
amount corresponding to her three months suspension.
[30]

4. The government, to repeat, abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature of that
adopted by petitioner PT&T. The Labor Code states, in no uncertain terms, as follows:

ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. - It shall be unlawful for an employer to

require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman
shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a
woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss,
discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason
of marriage.

This provision had a studied history for its origin can be traced to Section 8 of
Presidential Decree No. 148, better known as the Women and Child Labor Law, which
amended paragraph (c), Section 12 of Republic Act No. 679, entitled An Act to
Regulate the Employment of Women and Children, to Provide Penalties for Violations
Thereof, and for Other Purposes. The forerunner to Republic Act No. 679, on the other
hand, was Act No. 3071 which became law on March 16, 1923 and which regulated the
employment of women and children in shops, factories, industrial, agricultural, and
mercantile establishments and other places of labor in the then Philippine Islands.
[31]

[32]

It would be worthwhile to reflect upon and adopt here the rationalization in Zialcita,
et al. vs. Philippine Air Lines, a decision that emanated from the Office of the
President. There, a policy of Philippine Air Lines requiring that prospective flight
attendants must be single and that they will be automatically separated from the service
once they marry was declared void, it being violative of the clear mandate in Article 136
of the Labor Code with regard to discrimination against married women. Thus:
[33]

Of first impression is the incompatibility of the respondents policy or regulation with

the codal provision of law. Respondent is resolute in its contention that Article 136 of
the Labor Code applies only to women employed in ordinary occupations and that the
prohibition against marriage of women engaged in extraordinary occupations, like
flight attendants, is fair and reasonable, considering the pecularities of their chosen
profession.
We cannot subscribe to the line of reasoning pursued by respondent. All along, it
knew that the controverted policy has already met its doom as early as March 13,
1973 when Presidential Decree No. 148, otherwise known as the Women and Child
Labor Law, was promulgated. But for the timidity of those affected or their labor
unions in challenging the validity of the policy, the same was able to obtain a
momentary reprieve. A close look at Section 8 of said decree, which amended
paragraph (c) of Section 12 of Republic Act No. 679, reveals that it is exactly the
same provision reproduced verbatim in Article 136 of the Labor Code, which was
promulgated on May 1, 1974 to take effect six (6) months later, or on November 1,
1974.
It cannot be gainsaid that, with the reiteration of the same provision in the new Labor
Code, all policies and acts against it are deemed illegal and therefore abrogated. True,
Article 132 enjoins the Secretary of Labor to establish standards that will ensure the
safety and health of women employees and in appropriate cases shall by regulation
require employers to determine appropriate minimum standards for termination in
special occupations, such as those of flight attendants, but that is precisely the factor
that militates against the policy of respondent. The standards have not yet been
established as set forth in the first paragraph, nor has the Secretary of Labor issued
any regulation affecting flight attendants.

It is logical to presume that, in the absence of said standards or regulations which are
as yet to be established, the policy of respondent against marriage is patently
illegal. This finds support in Section 9 of the New Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 9. The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and
equality in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or
creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employees. The State shall
assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of
tenure, and just and humane conditions of work x x x.
Moreover, we cannot agree to the respondents proposition that termination from
employment of flight attendants on account of marriage is a fair and reasonable
standard designed for their own health, safety, protection and welfare, as no basis has
been laid therefor. Actually, respondent claims that its concern is not so much against
the continued employment of the flight attendant merely by reason of marriage as
observed by the Secretary of Labor, but rather on the consequence of marriagepregnancy. Respondent discussed at length in the instant appeal the supposed ill
effects of pregnancy on flight attendants in the course of their employment. We feel
that this needs no further discussion as it had been adequately explained by the
Secretary of Labor in his decision of May 2, 1976.
In a vain attempt to give meaning to its position, respondent went as far as invoking
the provisions of Articles 52 and 216 of the New Civil Code on the preservation of
marriage as an inviolable social institution and the family as a basic social institution,
respectively, as bases for its policy of non-marriage. In both instances, respondent
predicates absence of a flight attendant from her home for long periods of time as
contributory to an unhappy married life. This is pure conjecture not based on actual
conditions, considering that, in this modern world, sophisticated technology has
narrowed the distance from one place to another. Moreover, respondent overlooked
the fact that married flight attendants can program their lives to adapt to prevailing
circumstances and events.
Article 136 is not intended to apply only to women employed in ordinary occupations,
or it should have categorically expressed so. The sweeping intendment of the law, be
it on special or ordinary occupations, is reflected in the whole text and supported by
Article 135 that speaks of non-discrimination on the employment of women.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals in Gualberto, et al. vs. Marinduque Mining &
Industrial Corporation considered as void a policy of the same nature. In said case,
respondent, in dismissing from the service the complainant, invoked a policy of the firm
to consider female employees in the project it was undertaking as separated the
moment they get married due to lack of facilities for married women. Respondent further
[34]

claimed that complainant was employed in the project with an oral understanding that
her services would be terminated when she gets married. Branding the policy of the
employer as an example of discriminatory chauvinism tantamount to denying equal
employment opportunities to women simply on account of their sex, the appellate court
struck down said employer policy as unlawful in view of its repugnance to the Civil
Code, Presidential Decree No. 148 and the Constitution.
Under American jurisprudence, job requirements which establish employer
preference or conditions relating to the marital status of an employee are categorized as
a sex-plus discrimination where it is imposed on one sex and not on the other. Further,
the same should be evenly applied and must not inflict adverse effects on a racial or
sexual group which is protected by federal job discrimination laws. Employment rules
that forbid or restrict the employment of married women, but do not apply to married
men, have been held to violate Title VII of the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
main federal statute prohibiting job discrimination against employees and applicants on
the basis of, among other things, sex.
[35]

Further, it is not relevant that the rule is not directed against all women but just
against married women. And, where the employer discriminates against married
women, but not against married men, the variable is sex and the discrimination is
unlawful. Upon the other hand, a requirement that a woman employee must remain
unmarried could be justified as a bona fide occupational qualification, or BFOQ, where
the particular requirements of the job would justify the same, but not on the ground of a
general principle, such as the desirability of spreading work in the workplace. A
requirement of that nature would be valid provided it reflects an inherent quality
reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance. Thus, in one case, a nomarriage rule applicable to both male and female flight attendants, was regarded as
unlawful since the restriction was not related to the job performance of the flight
attendants.
[36]

[37]

5. Petitioners policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the
Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against
marriage in connection with her employment, but it likewise assaults good morals and
public policy, tending as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her
status, a privilege that by all accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible and
inalienable right. Hence, while it is true that the parties to a contract may establish any
agreements, terms, and conditions that they may deem convenient, the same should
not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Carried to
its logical consequences, it may even be said that petitioners policy against legitimate
marital bonds would encourage illicit or common-law relations and subvert the
sacrament of marriage.
[38]

[39]

Parenthetically, the Civil Code provisions on the contract of labor state that the
relations between the parties, that is, of capital and labor, are not merely contractual,
impressed as they are with so much public interest that the same should yield to the
common good. It goes on to intone that neither capital nor labor should visit acts of
oppression against the other, nor impair the interest or convenience of the public. In
the final reckoning, the danger of just such a policy against marriage followed by
[40]

[41]

petitioner PT&T is that it strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as
an inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of the family as the foundation of the
nation. That it must be effectively interdicted here in all its indirect, disguised or
dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land is not
only in order but imperatively required.
[42]

ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the petition of Philippine Telegraph and

Telephone Company is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, with double costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

The phrase herein represented by DELIA M. OFICIAL, added hereto in the title of this case as stated in
the petition, has been deleted for being unnecessary and violative of the rules on pleadings, and is
commented upon in the text of this opinion.
*

[1]

Rollo, 42; Annex D.

[2]

Ibid., 44-45; Annexes F and G.

[3]

Ibid., 46-48; Annexes H and I.

[4]

Ibid., 49; Annex J.

[5]

Id., 50 Annex K.

[6]

Id., 51; Annex L.

[7]

Id., 53; Annex N.

[8]

The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality
before the law of women and men (Sec. 14, Art. II).

The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized or unorganized, and
promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
[9]

It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and
peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be
entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also
participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be
provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the
preferential use of voluntary modes of settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce
their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its
just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on
investment, and to expansion and growth (Sec. 3, Art. XIII).
[10]

The State shall protect working women by providing safe and healthful working conditions, taking into
account their maternal functions, and such facilities and opportunities that will enhance their
welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the service of the nation (Sec. 14, Art.
XIII).

Adopted in 1979 by the UN General Assembly, it is regarded as the most comprehensive international
treaty governing the rights of women. The Philippines became a signatory thereto a year after its adoption
by the UN and in 1981, the country ratified it.
[11]

The Philippines had likewise been an active participant in all the four U.N. World Conferences on Women,
namely those held in Mexico in 1975, Copenhagen in 1980, Nairobi in 1985, and Beijing in 1995.
Other relevant international laws to which the Philippines adheres as a member of the international
community include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights.
[12]

Approved, June 9, 1989.

[13]

Approved, June 13, 1990.

[14]

Approved, February 12, 1992.

[15]

Approved, March 30, 1992.

[16]

Approved, February 14, 1995.

[17]

Approved, June 7, 1995.

[18]

Effective August 3, 1988.

[19]

Caltex Refinery Employees Association (CREA) vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R.
No. 102993, July 14, 1995, 246 SCRA 271; Oriental Mindoro Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs.
National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 111905, July 31, 1995, 246 SCRA 794;
Nuez vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 107574, December 28, 1994,
239 SCRA 518; San Miguel Corporation vs. Ubaldo, et al., G.R. No. 92859, February 1, 1993,
218 SCRA 293.

[20]

NAFLU vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 90739, October 3, 1991, 202 SCRA
346.

[21]

Quoted in the Decision of the Third Division, NLRC, in NLRC Case No. RAB-CAR-02-0042-92, Annex
B of petition; Rollo, 35. See also Annex J, supra, Fn. 4.

[22]

Annex L, id.; Rollo, 51.

[23]

Art. 289, Labor Code; see AC Ransom Labor Union-CCLU vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, et al., G.R. No. 69494, June 10, 1986, 142 SCRA 269; Chua vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 81450, February 15, 1990, 182 SCRA 353.

[24]

Mapalo vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 107940, June 17, 1994, 233 SCRA
266; PNOC-Energy Development Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.,
G.R. No. 79182, September 11, 1991, 201 SCRA 487.

[25]

San Antonio vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 100829, November 21, 1995,
250 SCRA 359; Labor vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 110388, September
14, 1995, 248 SCRA 183.

[26]

Hospicio de San Jose de Basili vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 75997,
August 18, 1988, 164 SCRA 516.

[27]

Cielo vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 78693, January 28, 1991, 193 SCRA
410; Brent School, Inc. vs. Zamora, et al., G.R. No. 48494, February 5, 1990, 181 SCRA 702.

[28]

Art. 280, Labor Code; see PLDT vs. Montemayor, et al., G.R. No. 88626, October 12, 1990, 190 SCRA
427.

[29]

De Leon vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 70705, August 21, 1989, 176 SCRA
615.

[30]

Molave Tours Corp. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 112909, November 24,
1995, 250 SCRA 325; see Art. 279, Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6715.

[31]

Promulgated on March 13, 1973.

[32]

Approved on April 15, 1952. It was later amended by Republic Act No. 1131, which in turn was
approved on June 16, 1954.

[33]

Case No. RO4-3-3398-76; February 20, 1977.

[34]

CA-G.R. No. 52753-R, June 28, 1978.

[35]

45A Am. Jur. 2d, Job Discrimination, Sec. 506, p. 486.

[36]

Ibid., id., id..

[37]

Ibid., id., Sec. 507.

[38]

Tolentino, A., Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. III, 1979 ed., 235; see Art. 874, Civil Code.

[39]

Art. 1306, Civil Code.

[40]

Art. 1700, Civil Code; see Macleod & Co. of the Philippines vs. Progressive Federation of Labor, 97
Phil. 205 (1955).

[41]

Art. 1701, Civil Code.

[42]

The 1987 Constitution provides:

The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. x x x (Sec. 15, Art. II).
The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total development (Sec. 1, Art. XV).
Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State (Sec. 2, Art. XV).

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 11263

November 2, 1916

ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA, defendant-appellee.
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide and Felix Socias for appellant.
Sanz, Opisso and Luzuriaga for appellee.

TRENT, J.:

This is an action by the wife against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile. From
a judgment sustaining the defendant's demurrer upon the ground that the facts alleged in the
complaint do not state a cause of action, followed by an order dismissing the case after the plaintiff
declined to amend, the latter appealed.
It was urged in the first instance, and the court so held, that the defendant cannot be compelled to
support the plaintiff, except in his own house, unless it be by virtue of a judicial decree granting her a
divorce or separation from the defendant.
The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7, 1915, and immediately thereafter
established their residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together for about a month,
when the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents. The pertinent allegations of the complaint are
as follows:
That the defendant, one month after he had contracted marriage with the plaintiff, demanded
of her that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs; that the plaintiff
spurned the obscene demands of the defendant and refused to perform any act other than
legal and valid cohabitation; that the defendant, since that date had continually on other
successive dates, made similar lewd and indecorous demands on his wife, the plaintiff, who
always spurned them, which just refusals of the plaintiff exasperated the defendant and
induce him to maltreat her by word and deed and inflict injuries upon her lips, her face and
different parts of her body; and that, as the plaintiff was unable by any means to induce the
defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease from maltreating her, she was
obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her parents.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is a contract entered into in the manner and with the solemnities
established by General Orders No. 68, in so far as its civil effects are concerned requiring the
consent of the parties. (Garcia vs. Montague, 12 Phil. Rep., 480, citing article 1261 of Civil Code.)
Upon the termination of the marriage ceremony, a conjugal partnership is formed between the
parties. (Sy Joc Lieng vs. Encarnacion, 16 Phil. Rep., 137.) To this extent a marriage partakes of the
nature of an ordinary contract. But it is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the
rights, duties, and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the
general law which defines and prescribes those rights, duties, and obligations .Marriage is an
institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested. It is a relation for
life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any contract they may
make .The reciprocal rights arising from this relation, so long as it continues, are such as the law
determines from time to time, and none other. When the legal existence of the parties is merged into
one by marriage, the new relation is regulated and controlled by the state or government upon
principles of public policy for the benefit of society as well as the parties. And when the object of a
marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of
no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. With these principles to
guide us, we will inquire into the status of the law touching and governing the question under
consideration.
Articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code are not in force in the Philippine Islands (Benedicto vs. De la
Rama, 3 Phil .Rep., 34). Articles 44 to 78 of the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870, in force in the
Peninsula, were extended to the Philippine Islands by royal decree on April 13, 1883 (Ebreo vs.
Sichon, 4 Phil. Rep., 705). Articles 44, 45, and 48 of this law read:
ART. 44. The spouses are obliged to be faithful to each other and to mutually assist each
other.

ART. 45. The husband must live with and protect his wife. (The second paragraph deals with
the management of the wife's property.)
ART. 48. The wife must obey her husband, live with him, and follow him when he charges his
domicile or residence.
Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing paragraph, the court may for just cause
relieve her from this duty when the husband removes his residence to a foreign country.
And articles 143 and 149 of the Civil Code are as follows:
ART. 143. The following are obliged to support each other reciprocally to the whole extent
specified in the preceding article.
1. The consorts.
xxx

xxx

xxx

ART. (149) 49. The person obliged to give support may, at his option, satisfy it, either by
paying the pension that may be fixed or by receiving and maintaining in his own home the
person having the right to the same.
Article 152 of the Civil Code gives the instances when the obligation to give support shall cease. The
failure of the wife to live with her husband is not one of them.
The above quoted provisions of the Law of Civil Marriage and the Civil Code fix the duties and
obligations of the spouses. The spouses must be faithful to, assist, and support each other. The
husband must live with and protect his wife. The wife must obey and live with her husband and
follow him when he changes his domicile or residence, except when he removes to a foreign
country. But the husband who is obliged to support his wife may, at his option, do so by paying her a
fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining her in his own home. May the husband, on account of
his conduct toward his wife, lose this option and be compelled to pay the pension? Is the rule
established by article 149 of the Civil Code absolute? The supreme court of Spain in its decision of
December 5, 1903, held:.
That in accordance with the ruling of the supreme court of Spain in its decisions dated May
11, 1897, November 25, 1899, and July 5, 1901, the option which article 149 grants the
person, obliged to furnish subsistence, between paying the pension fixed or receiving and
keeping in his own house the party who is entitled to the same, is not so absolute as to
prevent cases being considered wherein, either because this right would be opposed to the
exercise of a preferential right or because of the existence of some justifiable cause morally
opposed to the removal of the party enjoying the maintenance, the right of selection must be
understood as being thereby restricted.
Whereas the only question discussed in the case which gave rise to this appeal was whether
there was any reason to prevent the exercise of the option granted by article 149 of the Civil
Code to the person obliged to furnish subsistence, to receive and maintain in his own house
the one who is entitled to receive it; and inasmuch as nothing has been alleged or discussed
with regard to the parental authority of Pedro Alcantara Calvo, which he ha not exercised,
and it having been set forth that the natural father simply claims his child for the purpose of
thus better attending to her maintenance, no action having been taken by him toward

providing the support until, owing to such negligence, the mother was obliged to demand it; it
is seen that these circumstances, together with the fact of the marriage of Pedro Alcantara,
and that it would be difficult for the mother to maintain relations with her daughter, all
constitute an impediment of such a nature as to prevent the exercise of the option in the
present case, without prejudice to such decision as may be deemed proper with regard to
the other questions previously cited in respect to which no opinion should be expressed at
this time.
The above was quoted with approval in United States and De Jesus vs. Alvir (9 Phil. Rep., 576),
wherein the court held that the rule laid down in article 149 of the Civil Code "is not absolute." but it
is insisted that there existed a preexisting or preferential right in each of these cases which was
opposed to the removal of the one entitled to support. It is true that in the first the person claiming
the option was the natural father of the child and had married a woman other than the child's mother,
and in the second the right to support had already been established by a final judgment in a criminal
case. Notwithstanding these facts the two cases clearly established the proposition that the option
given by article 149 of the Civil Code may not be exercised in any and all cases.
Counsel for the defendant cite, in support of their contention, the decision of the supreme court of
Spain, dated November 3, 1905. In this case Don Berno Comas, as a result of certain business
reverses and in order no to prejudice his wife, conferred upon her powers to administer and dispose
of her property. When she left him he gave her all the muniments of title, mortgage credits, notes,
P10,000 in accounts receivable, and the key to the safe in which he kept a large amount of jewels,
thus depriving himself of all his possessions and being reduced in consequence to want.
Subsequently he instituted this civil action against his wife, who was then living in opulence, for
support and the revocation of the powers heretofore granted in reference to the administration and
disposal of her property. In her answer the wife claimed that the plaintiff (her husband) was not
legally in a situation to claim support and that the powers voluntarily conferred and accepted by her
were bilateral and could not be canceled by the plaintiff. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiff the
defendant wife appealed to the Audencia Territorialwherein, after due trial, judgment was rendered in
her favor dismissing the action upon the merits. The plaintiff appealed to the supreme court and that
high tribunal, in affirming the judgment of the Audencia Territorial, said:
Considering that article 143, No. 1, of the Civil Code, providing that the spouses are mutually
obliged to provide each other with support, cannot but be subordinate to the other provisions
of said Code which regulates the family organization and the duties of spouses not legally
separated, among which duties are those of their living together and mutually helping each
other, as provided in article 56 of the aforementioned code; and taking this for granted, the
obligation of the spouse who has property to furnish support to the one who has no property
and is in need of it for subsistence, is to be understood as limited to the case where, in
accordance with law, their separation has been decreed, either temporarily or finally and this
case, with respect to the husband, cannot occur until a judgment of divorce is rendered,
since, until then, if he is culpable, he is not deprived of the management of his wife's property
and of the product of the other property belonging to the conjugal partnership; and
Considering that, should the doctrine maintained in the appeal prevail, it would allow married
persons to disregard the marriage bond and separate from each other of their own free will,
thus establishing, contrary to the legal provision contained in said article 56 of the Civil Code,
a legal status entirely incompatible with the nature and effects of marriage in disregard of the
duties inherent therein and disturbing the unity of the family, in opposition to what the law, in
conformity with good morals, has established; and.

Considering that, as the spouses D. Ramon Benso and Doa Adela Galindo are not legally
separated, it is their duty to live together and afford each other help and support; and for this
reason, it cannot be held that the former has need of support from his wife so that he may
live apart from her without the conjugal abode where it is his place to be, nor of her
conferring power upon him to dispose even of the fruits of her property in order therewith to
pay the matrimonial expenses and, consequently, those of his own support without need of
going to his wife; wherefore the judgment appealed from, denying the petition of D. Ramon
Benso for support, has not violated the articles of the Civil Code and the doctrine invoked in
the assignments of error 1 and 5 of the appeal.
From a careful reading of the case just cited and quoted from it appears quite clearly that the
spouses separated voluntarily in accordance with an agreement previously made. At least there are
strong indications to this effect, for the court says, "should the doctrine maintained in the appeal
prevail, it would allow married persons to disregard the marriage bond and separate from each other
of their own free will." If this be the true basis upon which the supreme court of Spain rested its
decision, then the doctrine therein enunciated would not be controlling in cases where one of the
spouses was compelled to leave the conjugal abode by the other or where the husband voluntarily
abandons such abode and the wife seeks to force him to furnish support. That this is true appears
from the decision of the same high tribunal, dated October 16, 1903. In this case the wife brought an
action for support against her husband who had willfully and voluntarily abandoned the conjugal
abode without any cause whatever. The supreme court, reversing the judgment absolving the
defendant upon the ground that no action for divorce, etc., had been instituted, said:
In the case at bar, it has been proven that it was Don Teodoro Exposito who left the conjugal
abode, although he claims, without however proving his contention, that the person
responsible for this situation was his wife, as she turned him out of the house. From this
state of affairs it results that it is the wife who is party abandoned, the husband not having
prosecuted any action to keep her in his company and he therefore finds himself, as long as
he consents to the situation, under the ineluctable obligation to support his wife in fulfillment
of the natural duty sanctioned in article 56 of the Code in relation with paragraph 1 of article
143. In not so holding, the trial court, on the mistaken ground that for the fulfillment of this
duty the situation or relation of the spouses should be regulated in the manner it indicates,
has made the errors of law assigned in the first three grounds alleged, because the nature of
the duty of affording mutual support is compatible and enforcible in all situations, so long as
the needy spouse does not create any illicit situation of the court above described.
lawphil.net

If we are in error as to the doctrine enunciated by the supreme court of Spain in its decision of
November 3, 1905, and if the court did hold, as contended by counsel for the defendant in the case
under consideration, that neither spouse can be compelled to support the other outside of the
conjugal abode, unless it be by virtue of a final judgment granting the injured one a divorce or
separation from the other, still such doctrine or holding would not necessarily control in this
jurisdiction for the reason that the substantive law is not in every particular the same here as it is in
Spain. As we have already stated, articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code in force in the Peninsula are
not in force in the Philippine Islands. The law governing the duties and obligations of husband and
wife in this country are articles 44 to 78 of the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870 .In Spain the
complaining spouse has, under article 105 of the Civil Code, various causes for divorce, such as
adultery on the part of the wife in every case and on the part of the husband when public scandal or
disgrace of the wife results therefrom; personal violence actually inflicted or grave insults: violence
exercised by the husband toward the wife in order to force her to change her religion; the proposal of
the husband to prostitute his wife; the attempts of the husband or wife to corrupt their sons or to
prostitute their daughters; the connivance in their corruption or prostitution; and the condemnation of
a spouse to perpetual chains or hard labor, while in this jurisdiction the only ground for a divorce is
adultery. (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil .Rep., 34, 45.) This positive and absolute doctrine was

announced by this court in the case just cited after an exhaustive examination of the entire subject.
Although the case was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States and the judgment
rendered by this court was there reversed, the reversal did not affect in any way or weaken the
doctrine in reference to adultery being the only ground for a divorce. And since the decision was
promulgated by this court in that case in December, 1903, no change or modification of the rule has
been announced. It is, therefore, the well settled and accepted doctrine in this jurisdiction.
But it is argued that to grant support in an independent suit is equivalent to granting divorce or
separation, as it necessitates a determination of the question whether the wife has a good and
sufficient cause for living separate from her husband; and, consequently, if a court lacks power to
decree a divorce, as in the instant case, power to grant a separate maintenance must also be
lacking. The weakness of this argument lies in the assumption that the power to grant support in a
separate action is dependent upon a power to grant a divorce. That the one is not dependent upon
the other is apparent from the very nature of the marital obligations of the spouses. The mere act of
marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife. This obligation is
founded not so much on the express or implied terms of the contract of marriage as on the natural
and legal duty of the husband; an obligation, the enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the
state itself that the laws will not permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife
to seek protection in the parental home. A judgment for separate maintenance is not due and
payable either as damages or as a penalty; nor is it a debt in the strict legal sense of the term, but
rather a judgment calling for the performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of the
sovereign. This is done from necessity and with a view to preserve the public peace and the purity of
the wife; as where the husband makes so base demands upon his wife and indulges in the habit of
assaulting her. The pro tanto separation resulting from a decree for separate support is not an
impeachment of that public policy by which marriage is regarded as so sacred and inviolable in its
nature; it is merely a stronger policy overruling a weaker one; and except in so far only as such
separation is tolerated as a means of preserving the public peace and morals may be considered, it
does not in any respect whatever impair the marriage contract or for any purpose place the wife in
the situation of a feme sole.
The foregoing are the grounds upon which our short opinion and order for judgment, heretofore filed
in this case, rest.
Torres, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

MORELAND, J., concurring:

I based my vote in this case upon the ground that a husband cannot, by his own wrongful acts,
relieve himself from the duty to support his wife imposed by law; and where a husband, by wrongful,
illegal, and unbearable conduct, drives his wife from the domicile fixed by him, he cannot take

advantage of her departure to abrogate the law applicable to the marital relation and repudiate his
duties thereunder. In law and for all purposes within its purview, the wife still remains an inmate of
the conjugal domicile; for I regard it as a principle of law universally recognized that where a person
by his wrongful and illegal acts creates a condition which under ordinary circumstances would
produce the loss of rights or status pertaining to another, the law will, whenever necessary to protect
fully the rights or status of the person affected by such acts, regard the condition by such acts
created as not existing and will recur to and act upon the original situation of the parties to determine
their relative rights or the status of the person adversely affected.
I do not believe, therefore, that the case is properly conceived by defendant, when the consideration
thereof proceeds solely on the theory that the wife is outside the domicile fixed by the husband.
Under the facts alleged in the complainant the wife is legally still within the conjugal domicile.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 83598 March 7, 1997

LEONCIA BALOGBOG and GAUDIOSO BALOGBOG, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RAMONITO BALOGBOG and GENEROSO
BALOGBOG, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Cebu City (Branch IX), declaring private respondents heirs of the deceased Basilio
and Genoveva Balogbog entitled to inherit from them.
The facts are as follows. Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio
Balogbog and Genoveva Arzibal who died intestate in 1951 and 1961, respectively. They had an
older brother, Gavino, but he died in 1935, predeceasing their parents.
In 1968, private respondents Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog brought an action for partition and
accounting against petitioners, claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina
Ubas and that, as such, they were entitled to the one-third share of Gavino in the estate of their
grandparents.
In their answer, petitioners denied knowing private respondents. They alleged that their brother
Gavino died single and without issue in their parents' residence at Tag-amakan, Asturias, Cebu. In
the beginning they claimed that the properties of the estate had been sold to them by their mother
when she was still alive, but they later withdrew this allegation.

Private respondents presented Priscilo Y. Trazo, 2 then 81 years old, mayor of the municipality of
Asturias from 1928 to 1934, who testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband and wife and
Ramonito to be their first child. On crossexamination, Trazo explained that he knew Gavino and Catalina
because they performed at his campaign rallies, Catalina as "balitaw" dancer and Gavino Balogbog as
her guitarist. Trazo said he attended the wedding of Gavino and Catalina sometime in 1929, in which Rev.
Father Emiliano Jomao-as officiated and Egmidio Manuel, then a municipal councilor, acted as one of the
witnesses.
The second witness presented was Matias Pogoy, 3 a family friend of private respondents, who testified
that private respondents are the children of Gavino and Catalina. According to him, the wedding of Gavino
and Catalina was solemnized in the Catholic Church of Asturias, Cebu and that he knew this because he
attended their wedding and was in fact asked by Gavino to accompany Catalina and carry her wedding
dress from her residence in Camanaol to the poblacion of Asturias before the wedding day. He testified
that Gavino died in 1935 in his residence at Obogon, Balamban, Cebu, in the presence of his wife. (This
contradicts petitioners' claim made in their answer that Gavino died in the ancestral house at Tagamakan, Asturias.) Pogoy said he was a carpenter and he was the one who had made the coffin of
Gavino. He also made the coffin of the couple's son, Petronilo, who died when he was six.
Catalina Ubas testified concerning her marriage to Gavino. 4 She testified that after the wedding, she
was handed a "receipt," presumably the marriage certificate, by Fr. Jomao-as, but it was burned during
the war. She said that she and Gavino lived together in Obogon and begot three children, namely,
Ramonito, Petronilo, and Generoso. Petronilo died after an illness at the age of six. On crossexamination,
she stated that after the death of Gavino, she lived in common law relation with a man for a year and then
they separated.
Private respondents produced a certificate from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar (Exh. P) that
the Register of Marriages did not have a record of the marriage of Gavino and Catalina, another
certificate from the Office of the Treasurer (Exh. L) that there was no record of the birth of Ramonito
in that office and, for this reason, the record must be presumed to have been lost or destroyed
during the war, and a certificate by the Parish Priest of Asturias that there was likewise no record of
birth of Ramonito in the church, the records of which were either lost or destroyed during the war.
(Exh. M)
On the other hand, as defendant below, petitioner Leoncia Balogbog testified 5 that Gavino died single
at the family residence in Asturias. She denied that her brother had any legitimate children and stated that
she did not know private respondents before this case was filed. She obtained a certificate (Exh. 10) from
the Local Civil Registrar of Asturias to the effect that that office did not have a record of the names of
Gavino and Catalina. The certificate was prepared by Assistant Municipal Treasurer Juan Maranga, who
testified that there was no record of the marriage of Gavino and Catalina in the Book of Marriages
between 1925 to 1935. 6
Witness Jose Narvasa testified 7 that Gavino died single in 1935 and that Catalina lived with a certain
Eleuterio Keriado after the war, although he did not know whether they were legally married. He added,
however, that Catalina had children by a man she had married before the war, although he did not know
the names of the children. On crossexamination, Narvasa stated that Leoncia Balogbog, who requested
him to testify, was also his bondsman in a criminal case filed by a certain Mr. Cuyos.
Ramonito Balogbog was presented 8 to rebut Leoncia Balogbog's testimony.
On June 15, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Cebu City rendered judgment for private
respondents (plaintiffs below), ordering petitioners to render an accounting from 1960 until the
finality of its judgment, to partition the estate and deliver to private respondents one-third of the
estate of Basilio and Genoveva, and to pay attorney's fees and costs.

Petitioners filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration, contending that the trial court erred in
not giving weight to the certification of the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Asturias (Exh. 10) to
the effect that no marriage of Gavino and Catalina was recorded in the Book of Marriages for the
years 1925-1935. Their motion was denied by the trial court, as was their second motion for new trial
and/or reconsideration based on the church records of the parish of Asturias which did not contain
the record of the alleged marriage in that church.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that private respondents failed to overcome the
legal presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are in fact
married, that a child is presumed to be legitimate, and that things happen according to the ordinary
course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. 9 Hence, this petition.
We find no reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals.
First. Petitioners contend that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should have been proven in
accordance with Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889 because this was the law in force at the
time the alleged marriage was celebrated. Art. 53 provides that marriages celebrated under the Civil
Code of 1889 should be proven only by a certified copy of the memorandum in the Civil Registry,
unless the books thereof have not been kept or have been lost, or unless they are questioned in the
courts, in which case any other proof, such as that of the continuous possession by parents of the
status of husband and wife, may be considered, provided that the registration of the birth of their
children as their legitimate children is also submitted in evidence.
This Court noted long ago, however, that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 1889 of Spain did not
take effect, having been suspended by the Governor General of the Philippines shortly after the
extension of that code to this
country. 10 Consequently, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since this case was brought in the lower
court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be determined in accordance with the present Civil
Code, which repealed the provisions of the former Civil Code, except as they related to vested
rights, 11 and the rules on evidence. Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a
woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married. 12 This presumption may be
rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary. 13 In this case, petitioners' claim that the certification
presented by private respondents (to the effect that the record of the marriage had been lost or destroyed
during the war) was belied by the production of the Book of Marriages by the assistant municipal treasurer
of Asturias. Petitioners argue that this book does not contain any entry pertaining to the alleged marriage
of private respondents' parents.
This contention has no merit. In Pugeda v. Trias, 14 the defendants, who questioned the marriage of the
plaintiffs, produced a photostatic copy of the record of marriages of the Municipality of Rosario, Cavite for
the month of January, 1916, to show that there was no record of the alleged marriage. Nonetheless,
evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage. Indeed,
although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, 15 the failure to present it is not
proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented to prove
marriage. 16 Here, private respondents proved, through testimonial evidence, that Gavino and Catalina
were married in 1929; that they had three children, one of whom died in infancy; that their marriage
subsisted until 1935 when Gavino died; and that their children, private respondents herein, were
recognized by Gavino's family and by the public as the legitimate children of Gavino.
Neither is there merit in the argument that the existence of the marriage cannot be presumed
because there was no evidence showing in particular that Gavino and Catalina, in the presence of
two witnesses, declared that they were taking each other as husband and wife. 17 An exchange of
vows can be presumed to have been made from the testimonies of the witnesses who state that a
wedding took place, since the very purpose for having a wedding is to exchange vows of marital

commitment. It would indeed be unusual to have a wedding without an exchange of vows and quite
unnatural for people not to notice its absence.

The law favors the validity of marriage, because the State is interested in the preservation of the
family and the sanctity of the family is a matter of constitutional concern. As stated in Adong
v. Cheong Seng Gee: 18
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an
institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently,
every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that
such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency
and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage." (Sec. 334, No. 28)Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio
Always presume marriage. (U.S. vs. Villafuerte and Rabano [1905], 4 Phil., 476; Son
Cui vs. Guepangco, supra; U.S. vs. Memoracion and Uri [1916], 34 Phil., 633; Teter
vs. Teter [1884], 101 Ind., 129.)
Second. Petitioners contend that private respondents' reliance solely on testimonial evidence to
support their claim that private respondents had been in the continuous possession of the status of
legitimate children is contrary to Art. 265 of the Civil Code which provides that such status shall be
proven by the record of birth in the Civil Register, by an authentic document or by final judgment. But
in accordance with Arts. 266 and 267, in the absence of titles indicated in Art. 265, the filiation of
children may be proven by continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child and by any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws. Thus the Civil Code provides:
Art. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation
shall be proved by the continuous possession of status of a legitimate child.
Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or
possession of status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed
by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Petitioners contend that there is no justification for presenting testimonies as to the possession by
private respondents of the status of legitimate children because the Book of Marriages for the years
1928-1929 is available.
What is in issue, however, is not the marriage of Gavino and Catalina but the filiation of private
respondents as their children. The marriage of Gavino and Catalina has already been shown in the
preceding discussion. The treasurer of Asturias, Cebu certified that the records of birth of that
municipality for the year 1930 could not be found, presumably because they were lost or destroyed
during the war (Exh. L). But Matias Pogoy testified that Gavino and Catalina begot three children,
one of whom, Petronilo, died at the age of six. Catalina testified that private respondents Ramonito
and Generoso are her children by Gavino Balogbog. That private respondents are the children of
Gavino and Catalina Balogbog cannot therefore be doubted.
Moreover, the evidence in the record shows that petitioner Gaudioso Balogbog admitted to the police
of Balamban, Cebu that Ramonito is his nephew. As the Court of Appeals found:

Ironically, it is appellant Gaudioso himself who supplies the clincher that tips the
balance in favor of the appellees. In an investigation before the Police Investigating
Committee of Balamban, Cebu, held on March 8, 1968, conducted for the purpose of
inquiring into a complaint filed by Ramonito against a patrolman of the Balamban
police force, Gaudioso testified that the complainant in that administrative case is his
nephew. Excerpts from the transcript of the proceedings conducted on that date
(Exhs. "N", "N-1", "N-2", "N-3" and "N-4") read:
Atty. Kiamco May it please this investigative body.
Q. Do you know the complainant in this Administrative Case No. 1?
A. Yes I know.
Q. Why do you know him?
A. I know because he is my nephew.
Q. Are you in good terms with your nephew, the complainant?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you mean to say that you are close to him?
A. Yes. We are close.
Q. Why do you say you are close?
A. We are close because aside from the fact that he is my nephew
we were also leaving (sic) in the same house in Butuan City, and I
even barrow (sic) from him money in the amount of P300.00, when I
return to Balamban, Cebu.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Why is Ramonito Balogbog your nephew?
A. Because he is the son of my elder brother.
This admission of relationship is admissible against Gaudioso although made in
another case. It is considered as a reliable declaration against interest (Rule 130,
Section 22). Significantly, Gaudioso did not try to offer any explanation to blunt the
effects of that declaration. He did not even testify during the trial. Such silence can
only mean that Ramonito is indeed the nephew of Gaudioso, the former being the
son of Gavino.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Romero, Puno and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Article 2-6
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 September 30, 1994

JUVY N. COSCA, EDMUNDO B. PERALTA, RAMON C. SAMBO, and APOLLO A.
VILLAMORA, complainants,
vs.
HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR., Presiding Judge, and NELIA B. ESMERALDA-BAROY,
Clerk of Court II, both of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, respondents.
Esteban R. Abonal for complainants.
Haide B. Vista-Gumba for respondents.

PER CURIAM, J.:

Complainants Juvy N. Cosca, Edmundo B. Peralta, Ramon C. Sambo, and Apollo Villamora, are
Stenographer I, Interpreter I, Clerk II, and Process Server, respectively, of the Municipal Trial Court
of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondents Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. and Nelia B. EsmeraldaBaroy are respectively the Presiding Judge and Clerk of Court II of the same court.
In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on October 5, 1992,
herein respondents were charged with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal solemnization of
marriage; (2) falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery in consideration of an
appointment in the court; (4) non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received; (5) infidelity in the
custody of detained prisoners; and (6) requiring payment of filing fees from exempted entities. 1
Pursuant to a resolution issued by this Court respondents filed their respective Comments. 2 A Reply
to Answers of Respondents was filed by complainants. 3 The case was thereafter referred to Executive
Judge David C. Naval of the Regional Trial Court, Naga City, for investigation report and
recommendation. The case was however transferred to First Assistant Executive Judge Antonio N.
Gerona when Judge Naval inhibited himself for the reason that his wife is a cousin of respondent Judge
Palaypayon, Jr. 4
The contending versions of the parties regarding the factual antecedents of this administrative
matter, as culled from the records thereof, are set out under each particular charge against
respondents.
1. Illegal solemnization of marriage

Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the requisite
marriage license. Thus, the following couples were able to get married by the simple expedient of
paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage license, viz.: Alano
P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin, Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and Maria
Gacer, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario, and Sammy
Bocaya and Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, their marriage contracts (Exhibits B, C, D, F, G, and
A, respectively) did not reflect any marriage license number. In addition, respondent judge did not
sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being that he
allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which was usually
several days after the ceremony. Indubitably, the marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil
registrar. Complainant Ramon Sambo, who prepares the marriage contracts, called the attention of
respondents to the lack of marriage licenses and its effect on the marriages involved, but the latter
opted to proceed with the celebration of said marriages.
Respondent Nelia Baroy claims that when she was appointed Clerk of Court II, the employees of the
court were already hostile to her, especially complainant Ramon Sambo who told her that he was
filing a protest against her appointment. She avers that it was only lately when she discovered that
the court had a marriage Register which is in the custody of Sambo; that it was Sambo who failed to
furnish the parties copies of the marriage contract and to register these with the local civil registrar;
and that apparently Sambo kept these marriage contracts in preparation for this administrative case.
Complainant Sambo, however, claims that all file copies of the marriage contracts were kept by
respondent Baroy, but the latter insists that she had instructed Sambo to follow up the submission by
the contracting parties of their marriage licenses as part of his duties but he failed to do so.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. contends that the marriage between Alano P. Abellano and Nelly
Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code, hence it is exempt from the marriage license
requirement; that he gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple a copy of
the marriage contract and to file the same with the civil registrar, but the latter failed to do so; that in
order to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently formalized their marriage by securing a
marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a copy of which was filed with the civil
registrar; that the other five marriages alluded to in the administrative complaint were not illegally
solemnized because the marriage contracts were not signed by him and they did not contain the
date and place of marriage; that copies of these marriage contracts are in the custody of
complainant Sambo; that the alleged marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie
Terrobias and Maria Emma Gaor, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, and of Arsenio Sabater and
Margarita Nacario were not celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of
a marriage license; that the marriage of Samy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte was celebrated even
without the requisite license due to the insistence of the parties in order to avoid embarrassment to
their guests but that, at any rate, he did not sign their marriage contract which remains unsigned up
to the present.
2. Falsification of monthly report for July, 1991 regarding the number of marriages
solemnized and the number of documents notarized.
It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized seven (7) marriages in the
month of July, 1992, when in truth he did not do so or at most those marriages were null and void;
that respondents likewise made it appear that they have notarized only six (6) documents for July,
1992, but the Notarial Register will show that there were one hundred thirteen (113) documents
which were notarized during that month; and that respondents reported a notarial fee of only P18.50
for each document, although in fact they collected P20.00 therefor and failed to account for the
difference.

Respondent Baroy contends, however, that the marriage registry where all marriages celebrated by
respondent judge are entered is under the exclusive control and custody of complainant Ramon
Sambo, hence he is the only one who should be held responsible for the entries made therein; that
the reported marriages are merely based on the payments made as solemnization fees which are in
the custody of respondent Baroy. She further avers that it is Sambo who is likewise the custodian of
the Notarial Register; that she cannot be held accountable for whatever alleged difference there is in
the notarial fees because she is liable only for those payments tendered to her by Sambo himself;
that the notarial fees she collects are duly covered by receipts; that of the P20.00 charged, P18.50 is
remitted directly to the Supreme Court as part of the Judiciary Development Fund and P150 goes to
the general fund of the Supreme Court which is paid to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur. Respondent theorizes that the discrepancies in the monthly report were manipulated
by complainant Sambo considering that he is the one in charge of the preparation of the monthly
report.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon avers that the erroneous number of marriages celebrated was
intentionally placed by complainant Sambo; that the number of marriages solemnized should not be
based on solemnization fees paid for that month since not all the marriages paid for are solemnized
in the same month. He claims that there were actually only six (6) documents notarized in the month
of July, 1992 which tallied with the official receipts issued by the clerk of court; that it is Sambo who
should be held accountable for any unreceipted payment for notarial fees because he is the one in
charge of the Notarial Register; and that this case filed by complainant Sambo is merely in retaliation
for his failure to be appointed as the clerk of court. Furthermore, respondent judge contends that he
is not the one supervising or preparing the monthly report, and that he merely has the ministerial
duty to sign the same.
3. Bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court
Complainants allege that because of the retirement of the clerk of court, respondent judge forwarded
to the Supreme Court the applications of Rodel Abogado, Ramon Sambo, and Jessell Abiog.
However, they were surprised when respondent Baroy reported for duty as clerk of court on October
21, 1991. They later found out that respondent Baroy was the one appointed because she gave a
brand-new air-conditioning unit to respondent judge.
Respondent Baroy claims that when she was still in Naga City she purchased an air-conditioning
unit but when she was appointed clerk of court she had to transfer to Tinambac and, since she no
longer needed the air conditioner, she decided to sell the same to respondent judge. The installation
and use thereof by the latter in his office was with the consent of the Mayor of Tinambac.
Respondent judge contends that he endorsed all the applications for the position of clerk of court to
the Supreme Court which has the sole authority over such appointments and that he had no hand in
the appointment of respondent Baroy. He contends that the air-conditioning unit was bought from his
co-respondent on installment basis on May 29, 1992, eight (8) months after Baroy had been
appointed clerk of court. He claims that he would not be that naive to exhibit to the public as item
which could not be defended as a matter of honor and prestige.
4. Cash bond issued without a receipt
It is alleged that in Criminal Case No. 5438, entitled "People vs. Mendeza, et al., "bondswoman
Januaria Dacara was allowed by respondent judge to change her property bond to cash bond; that
she paid the amount of P1,000.00 but was never issued a receipt therefor nor was it made to appear
in the records that the bond has been paid; that despite the lapse of two years, the money was never

returned to the bondswoman; and that it has not been shown that the money was turned over to the
Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.
Respondent Baroy counters that the cash bond was deposited with the former clerk of court, then
turned over to the acting clerk of court and, later, given to her under a corresponding receipt; that the
cash bond is deposited with the bank; and that should the bondswoman desire to withdraw the
same, she should follow the proper procedure therefor.
Respondent judge contends that Criminal Case No. 5438 was archieved for failure of the bondsman
to deliver the body of the accused in court despite notice; and that he has nothing to do with the
payment of the cash bond as this is the duty of the clerk of court.
5. Infidelity in the custody of prisoners
Complainants contend that respondent judge usually got detention prisoners to work in his house,
one of whom was Alex Alano, who is accused in Criminal Case No. 5647 for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act; that while Alano was in the custody of respondent judge, the former escaped
and was never recaptured; that in order to conceal this fact, the case was archived pursuant to an
order issued by respondent judge dated April 6, 1992.
Respondent judge denied the accusation and claims that he never employed detention prisoners
and that he has adequate household help; and that he had to order the case archived because it had
been pending for more than six (6) months and the accused therein remained at large.
6. Unlawful collection of docket fees
Finally, respondents are charged with collecting docket fees from the Rural Bank of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur, Inc. although such entity is exempt by law from the payment of said fees, and that
while the corresponding receipt was issued, respondent Baroy failed to remit the amount to the
Supreme Court and, instead, she deposited the same in her personal account.
Respondents Baroy contends that it was Judge-Designate Felimon Montenegro (because
respondent judge was on sick leave) who instructed her to demand payment of docket fees from
said rural bank; that the bank issued a check for P800.00; that she was not allowed by the Philippine
National Bank to encash the check and, instead, was instructed to deposit the same in any bank
account for clearing; that respondent deposited the same in her account; and that after the check
was cleared, she remitted P400.00 to the Supreme Court and the other P400.00 was paid to the
Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.
On the basis of the foregoing contentions, First Vice-Executive Judge Antonio N. Gerona prepared
and submitted to us his Report and Recommendations dated May 20, 1994, together with the
administrative matter. We have perspicaciously reviewed the same and we are favorably impressed
by the thorough and exhaustive presentation and analysis of the facts and evidence in said report.
We commend the investigating judge for his industry and perspicacity reflected by his findings in
said report which, being amply substantiated by the evidence and supported by logical illations, we
hereby approve and hereunder reproduce at length the material portions thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
The first charge against the respondents is illegal solemnization of marriage. Judge
Palaypayon is charged with having solemnized without a marriage license the

marriage of Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte (Exh. A). Alano Abellano and Nelly
Edralin (Exh. B), Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido (Exh. C), Eddie Terrobias and
Maria Emma Gaor (Exh. D), Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga (Exh. F) and Arsenio
Sabater and Margarita Nacario (Exh. G).
In all these aforementioned marriages, the blank space in the marriage contracts to
show the number of the marriage was solemnized as required by Article 22 of the
Family Code were not filled up. While the contracting parties and their witnesses
signed their marriage contracts, Judge Palaypayon did not affix his signature in the
marriage contracts, except that of Abellano and Edralin when Judge Palaypayon
signed their marriage certificate as he claims that he solemnized this marriage under
Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines. In said marriages the contracting
parties were not furnished a copy of their marriage contract and the Local Civil
Registrar was not sent either a copy of the marriage certificate as required by Article
23 of the Family Code.
The marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte is shown to have been solemnized by Judge
Palaypayon without a marriage license. The testimonies of Bocay himself and
Pompeo Ariola, one of the witnesses of the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte, and
the photographs taken when Judge Palaypayon solemnized their marriage (Exhs. K3 to K-9) sufficiently show that Judge Palaypayon really solemnized their marriage.
Bocaya declared that they were advised by Judge Palaypayon to return after ten (10)
days after their marriage was solemnized and bring with them their marriage license.
In the meantime, they already started living together as husband and wife believing
that the formal requisites of marriage were complied with.
Judge Palaypayon denied that he solemnized the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte
because the parties allegedly did not have a marriage license. He declared that in
fact he did not sign the marriage certificate, there was no date stated on it and both
the parties and the Local Civil Registrar did not have a copy of the marriage
certificate.
With respect to the photographs which show that he solemnized the marriage of
Bocaya and Besmonte, Judge Palaypayon explains that they merely show as if he
was solemnizing the marriage. It was actually a simulated solemnization of marriage
and not a real one. This happened because of the pleading of the mother of one of
the contracting parties that he consent to be photographed to show that as if he was
solemnizing the marriage as he was told that the food for the wedding reception was
already prepared, visitors were already invited and the place of the parties where the
reception would be held was more than twenty (20) kilometers away from the
poblacion of Tinambac.
The denial made by Judge Palaypayon is difficult to believe. The fact alone that he
did not sign the marriage certificate or contract, the same did not bear a date and the
parties and the Local Civil Registrar were not furnished a copy of the marriage
certificate, do not by themselves show that he did not solemnize the marriage. His
uncorroborated testimony cannot prevail over the testimony of Bocaya and Ariola
who also declared, among others, that Bocaya and his bride were advised by Judge
Palaypayon to return after ten (10) days with their marriage license and whose
credibility had not been impeached.

The pictures taken also from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the signing of
the marriage certificate in front of Judge Palaypayon and on his table (Exhs. K-3, K3-a, K-3-b, K-3-c, K-4, K-4-a, K-4-b, K-4-c,
K-4-d, K-5, K-5-a, K-5-b, K-6, K-7, K-8, K-8-a and K-9), cannot possibly be just to
show a simulated solemnization of marriage. One or two pictures may convince a
person of the explanation of Judge Palaypayon, but not all those pictures.
Besides, as a judge it is very difficult to believe that Judge Palaypayon would allows
himself to be photographed as if he was solemnizing a marriage on a mere pleading
of a person whom he did not even know for the alleged reasons given. It would be
highly improper and unbecoming of him to allow himself to be used as an instrument
of deceit by making it appear that Bocaya and Besmonte were married by him when
in truth and in fact he did not solemnize their marriage.
With respect to the marriage of Abellano and Edralin (Exh. B), Judge Palaypayon
admitted that he solemnized their marriage, but he claims that it was under Article 34
of the Family Code, so a marriage license was not required. The contracting parties
here executed a joint affidavit that they have been living together as husband and
wife for almost six (6) years already (Exh. 12; Exh. AA).
In their marriage contract which did not bear any date either when it was solemnized,
it was stated that Abellano was only eighteen (18) years, two (2) months and seven
(7) days old. If he and Edralin had been living together as husband and wife for
almost six (6) years already before they got married as they stated in their joint
affidavit, Abellano must ha(ve) been less than thirteen (13) years old when he started
living with Edralin as his wife and this is hard to believe. Judge Palaypayon should
ha(ve) been aware of this when he solemnized their marriage as it was his duty to
ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties who might ha(ve) executed a
false joint affidavit in order to have an instant marriage by avoiding the marriage
license requirement.
On May 23, 1992, however, after this case was already filed, Judge Palaypayon
married again Abellano and Edralin, this time with a marriage license (Exh. BB). The
explanation given by Judge Palaypayon why he solemnized the marriage of the
same couple for the second time is that he did not consider the first marriage he
solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code as (a) marriage at all because
complainant Ramon Sambo did not follow his instruction that the date should be
placed in the marriage certificate to show when he solemnized the marriage and that
the contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their marriage certificate.
This act of Judge Palaypayon of solemnizing the marriage of Abellano and Edralin for
the second time with a marriage license already only gave rise to the suspicion that
the first time he solemnized the marriage it was only made to appear that it was
solemnized under exceptional character as there was not marriage license and
Judge Palaypayon had already signed the marriage certificate. If it was true that he
solemnized the first marriage under exceptional character where a marriage license
was not required, why did he already require the parties to have a marriage license
when he solemnized their marriage for the second time?
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon that the first marriage of Abellano and Edralin
was not a marriage at all as the marriage certificate did not state the date when the
marriage was solemnized and that the contracting parties were not furnished a copy

of their marriage certificate, is not well taken as they are not any of those grounds
under Article(s) 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code which declare a marriage void
from the beginning. Even if no one, however, received a copy of the marriage
certificate, the marriage is still valid (Jones vs. H(o)rtiguela, 64 Phil. 179). Judge
Palaypayon cannot just absolve himself from responsibility by blaming his personnel.
They are not the guardian(s) of his official function and under Article 23 of the Family
Code it is his duty to furnish the contracting parties (a) copy of their marriage
contract.
With respect to the marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido (Exh. C), and
Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario (Exh. G), Selpo and Carrido and Sabater and
Nacarcio executed joint affidavits that Judge Palaypayon did not solemnize their
marriage (Exh. 13-A and Exh. 1). Both Carrido and Nacario testified for the
respondents that actually Judge Palaypayon did not solemnize their marriage as they
did not have a marriage license. On cross-examination, however, both admitted that
they did not know who prepared their affidavits. They were just told, Carrido by a
certain Charito Palaypayon, and Nacario by a certain Kagawad Encinas, to just go to
the Municipal building and sign their joint affidavits there which were already
prepared before the Municipal Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
With respect to the marriage of Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga (Exh. f), their
marriage contract was signed by them and by their two (2) witnesses, Atty. Elmer
Brioso and respondent Baroy (Exhs. F-1 and F-2). Like the other aforementioned
marriages, the solemnization fee was also paid as shown by a receipt dated June 7,
1992 and signed by respondent Baroy (Exh. F-4).
Judge Palaypayon also denied having solemnized the marriage of Gamay and Belga
allegedly because there was no marriage license. On her part, respondent Baroy at
first denied that the marriage was solemnized. When she was asked, however, why
did she sign the marriage contract as a witness she answered that she thought the
marriage was already solemnized (TSN, p. 14; 10-28-93).
Respondent Baroy was, and is, the clerk of court of Judge Palaypayon. She signed
the marriage contract of Gamay and Belga as one of the two principal sponsors. Yet,
she wanted to give the impression that she did not even know that the marriage was
solemnized by Judge Palaypayon. This is found very difficult to believe.
Judge Palaypayon made the same denial of having solemnized also the marriage of
Terrobias and Gaor (Exh. D). The contracting parties and their witnesses also signed
the marriage contract and paid the solemnization fee, but Judge Palaypayon
allegedly did not solemnize their marriage due to lack of marriage license. Judge
Palaypayon submitted the affidavit of William Medina, Vice-Mayor of Tinambac, to
corroborate his testimony (Exh. 14). Medina, however, did not testify in this case and
so his affidavit has no probative value.
Judge Palaypayon testified that his procedure and practice have been that before the
contracting parties and their witnesses enter his chamber in order to get married, he
already required complainant Ramon Sambo to whom he assigned the task of
preparing the marriage contract, to already let the parties and their witnesses sign
their marriage contracts, as what happened to Gamay and Belga, and Terrobias and
Gaor, among others. His purpose was to save his precious time as he has been

solemnizing marriages at the rate of three (3) to four (4) times everyday (TSN, p. 12;
2-1-94).
This alleged practice and procedure, if true, is highly improper and irregular, if not
illegal, because the contracting parties are supposed to be first asked by the
solemnizing officer and declare that they take each other as husband and wife before
the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two (2) witnesses before they are
supposed to sign their marriage contracts (Art. 6, Family Code).
The uncorroborated testimony, however, of Judge Palaypayon as to his alleged
practice and procedure before solemnizing a marriage, is not true as shown by the
picture taken during the wedding of Bocaya and Besmonte (Exhs. K-3 to K-9) and by
the testimony of respondent Baroy herself who declared that the practice of Judge
Palaypayon ha(s) been to let the contracting parties and their witnesses sign the
marriage contract only after Judge Palaypayon has solemnized their marriage (TSN,
p. 53;
10-28-93).
Judge Palaypayon did not present any evidence to show also that he was really
solemnizing three (3) to four (4) marriages everyday. On the contrary his monthly
report of cases for July, 1992 shows that his court had only twenty-seven (27)
pending cases and he solemnized only seven (7) marriages for the whole month
(Exh. E). His monthly report of cases for September, 1992 shows also that he
solemnized only four (4) marriages during the whole month (Exh. 7).
In this first charge of having illegally solemnized marriages, respondent Judge
Palaypayon has presented and marked in evidence several marriage contracts of
other persons, affidavits of persons and certification issued by the Local Civil
Registrar (Exhs. 12-B to 12-H). These persons who executed affidavits, however, did
not testify in this case. Besides, the marriage contracts and certification mentioned
are immaterial as Judge Palaypayon is not charged of having solemnized these
marriages illegally also. He is not charged that the marriages he solemnized were all
illegal.
The second charge against herein respondents, that of having falsified the monthly
report of cases submitted to the Supreme Court and not stating in the monthly report
the actual number of documents notarized and issuing the corresponding receipts of
the notarial fees, have been sufficiently proven by the complainants insofar as the
monthly report of cases for July and September, 1992 are concerned.
The monthly report of cases of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines Sur for July, 1992
both signed by the respondents, show that for said month there were six (6)
documents notarized by Judge Palaypayon in his capacity as Ex-Officio Notary
Public (Exhs. H to H-1-b). The notarial register of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines
Sur, however, shows that there were actually one hundred thirteen (113) documents
notarized by Judge Palaypayon for the said month (Exhs. Q to Q-45).
Judge Palaypayon claims that there was no falsification of the monthly report of
cases for July, 1992 because there were only six (6) notarized documents that were
paid (for) as shown by official receipts. He did not, however, present evidence of the
alleged official receipts showing that the notarial fee for the six (6) documetns were
paid. Besides, the monthly report of cases with respect to the number of documents

notarized should not be based on how many notarized documents were paid of the
notarial fees, but the number of documents placed or recorded in the notarial
register.
Judge Palaypayon admitted that he was not personally verifying and checking
anymore the correctness of the monthly reports because he relies on his corespondent who is the Clerk of Court and whom he has assumed to have checked
and verified the records. He merely signs the monthly report when it is already
signed by respondent Baroy.
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon is not well taken because he is required to
have close supervision in the preparation of the monthly report of cases of which he
certifies as to their correctness. As a judge he is personally responsible for the proper
discharge of his functions (The Phil. Trial Lawyer's Asso. Inc. vs. Agana, Sr., 102
SCRA 517). In Nidera vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA 581, it was held that "A judge cannot
take refuge behind the inefficiency or mismanagement of his court personnel."
On the part of respondent Baroy, she puts the blame of the falsification of the
monthly report of cases on complainant Sambo whom she allegedly assigned to
prepare not only the monthly report of cases, but the preparation and custody of
marriage contracts, notarized documents and the notarial register. By her own
admission she has assigned to complainant Sambo duties she was supposed to
perform, yet according to her she never bother(ed) to check the notarial register of
the court to find out the number of documents notarized in a month (TSN, p. 30; 1123-93).
Assuming that respondent Baroy assigned the preparation of the monthly report of
cases to Sambo, which was denied by the latter as he claims that he only typed the
monthly report based on the data given to him by her, still it is her duty to verify and
check whether the report is correct.
The explanation of respondent Baroy that Sambo was the one in custody of marriage
contracts, notarized documents and notarial register, among other things, is not
acceptable not only because as clerk of court she was supposed to be in custody,
control and supervision of all court records including documents and other properties
of the court (p. 32, Manual for Clerks of Court), but she herself admitted that from
January, 1992 she was already in full control of all the records of the court including
receipts (TSN, p. 11; 11-23-93).
The evidence adduced in this cases in connection with the charge of falsification,
however, also shows that respondent Baroy did not account for what happened to
the notarial fees received for those documents notarized during the month of July
and September, 1992. The evidence adduced in this case also sufficiently show that
she received cash bond deposits and she did not deposit them to a bank or to the
Municipal Treasurer; and that she only issued temporary receipts for said cash bond
deposits.
For July, 1992 there were only six (6) documents reported to have been notarized by
Judge Palaypayon although the documents notarized for said month were actually
one hundred thirteen (113) as recorded in the notarial register. For September, 1992,
there were only five (5) documents reported as notarized for that month, though the
notarial register show(s) that there were fifty-six (56) documents actually notarized.

The fee for each document notarized as appearing in the notarial register was
P18.50. Respondent Baroy and Sambo declared that what was actually being
charged was P20.00. Respondent Baroy declared that P18.50 went to the Supreme
Court and P1.50 was being turned over to the Municipal Treasurer.
Baroy, however, did not present any evidence to show that she really sent to the
Supreme Court the notarial fees of P18.50 for each document notarized and to the
Municipal Treasurer the additional notarial fee of P1.50. This should be fully
accounted for considering that Baroy herself declared that some notarial fees were
allowed by her at her own discretion to be paid later. Similarly, the solemnization fees
have not been accounted for by Baroy considering that she admitted that even (i)n
those instances where the marriages were not solemnized due to lack of marriage
license the solemnization fees were not returned anymore, unless the contracting
parties made a demand for their return. Judge Palaypayon declared that he did not
know of any instance when solemnization fee was returned when the marriage was
not solemnized due to lack of marriage license.
Respondent Baroy also claims that Ramon Sambo did not turn over to her some of
the notarial fees. This is difficult to believe. It was not only because Sambo
vehemently denied it, but the minutes of the conference of the personnel of the MTC
of Tinambac dated January 20, 1992 shows that on that date Baroy informed the
personnel of the court that she was taking over the functions she assigned to Sambo,
particularly the collection of legal fees (Exh. 7). The notarial fees she claims that
Sambo did not turn over to her were for those documents notarized (i)n July and
September, 1992 already. Besides there never was any demand she made for
Sambo to turn over some notarial fees supposedly in his possession. Neither was
there any memorandum she issued on this matter, in spite of the fact that she has
been holding meetings and issuing memoranda to the personnel of the court (Exhs.
V, W, FF, FF-1, FF-2, FF-3; Exhs. 4-A (supplement(s), 5-8, 6-S, 7-S and 8-S).
It is admitted by respondent Baroy that on October 29, 1991 a cash bond deposit of a
certain Dacara in the amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos was turned over
to her after she assumed office and for this cash bond she issued only a temporary
receipt (Exh. Y). She did not deposit this cash bond in any bank or to the Municipal
Treasurer. She just kept it in her own cash box on the alleged ground that the parties
in that case where the cash bond was deposited informed her that they would settle
the case amicably.
Respondent Baroy declared that she finally deposited the aforementioned cash bond
of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in
February, 1993, after this administrative case was already filed (TSN, pp. 27-28; 1222-93). The Pass Book, however, shows that actually Baroy opened an account with
the LBP, Naga Branch, only on March 26, 1993 when she deposited an amount of
Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos (Exhs. 8 to 8-1-a). She claims that One Thousand
(P1,000.000) Pesos of the initial deposit was the cash bond of Dacara. If it were true,
it was only after keeping to herself the cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00)
Pesos for around one year and five months when she finally deposited it because of
the filing of this case.
On April 29, 1993, or only one month and two days after she finally deposited the
One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos cash bond of Dacara, she withdrew it from the
bank without any authority or order from the court. It was only on July 23, 1993, or

after almost three (3) months after she withdrew it, when she redeposited said cash
bond (TSN, p. 6; 1-4-94).
The evidence presented in this case also show that on February 28, 1993
respondent Baroy received also a cash bond of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos
from a certain Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case No. 5180. For this cash bond deposit,
respondent Baroy issued only an annumbered temporary receipt (Exh. X and X-1).
Again Baroy just kept this Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos cash bond to herself.
She did not deposit it either (in) a bank or (with) the Municipal Treasurer. Her
explanation was that the parties in Crim. Case No. 5180 informed her that they would
settle the case amicably. It was on April 26, 1993, or almost two months later when
Judge Palaypayon issued an order for the release of said cash bond (Exh. 7).
Respondent Baroy also admitted that since she assumed office on October 21, 1991
she used to issue temporary receipt only for cash bond deposits and other payments
and collections she received. She further admitted that some of these temporary
receipts she issued she failed to place the number of the receipts such as that
receipt marked Exhibit X (TSN, p. 35; 11-23-93). Baroy claims that she did not know
that she had to use the official receipts of the Supreme Court. It was only from
February, 1993, after this case was already filed, when she only started issuing
official receipts.
The next charge against the respondents is that in order to be appointed Clerk of
Court, Baroy gave Judge Palaypayon an air conditioner as a gift. The evidence
adduced with respect to this charge, show that on August 24, 1991 Baroy bought an
air conditioner for the sum of Seventeen Thousand Six Hundred (P17,600.00) Pesos
(Exhs. I and I-1). The same was paid partly in cash and in check (Exhs. I-2 and I-3).
When the air conditioner was brought to court in order to be installed in the chamber
of Judge Palaypayon, it was still placed in the same box when it was bought and was
not used yet.
The respondents claim that Baroy sold it to Judge Palaypayon for Twenty Thousand
(P20,00.00) Pesos on installment basis with a down payment of Five Thousand
(P5,000.00) Pesos and as proof thereof the respondents presented a typewritten
receipt dated May 29, 1993 (Exh. 22). The receipt was signed by both respondents
and by the Municipal Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines Sur and another person as
witness.
The alleged sale between respondents is not beyond suspicion. It was bought by
Baroy at a time when she was applying for the vacant position of Clerk of Court (to)
which she was eventually appointed in October, 1991. From the time she bought the
air conditioner on August 24, 1991 until it was installed in the office of Judge
Palaypayon it was not used yet. The sale to Judge Palaypayon was only evidenced
by a mere typewritten receipt dated May 29, 1992 when this case was already filed.
The receipt could have been easily prepared. The Municipal Mayor of Tinambac who
signed in the receipt as a witness did not testify in this case. The sale is between the
Clerk of Court and the Judge of the same court. All these circumstances give rise to
suspicion of at least impropriety. Judges should avoid such action as would subject
(them) to suspicion and (their) conduct should be free from the appearance of
impropriety (Jaagueta vs. Boncasos, 60 SCRA 27).

With respect to the charge that Judge Palaypayon received a cash bond deposit of
One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos from Januaria Dacara without issuing a receipt,
Dacara executed an affidavit regarding this charge that Judge Palaypayon did not
give her a receipt for the P1,000.00 cash bond she deposited (Exh. N). Her affidavit,
however, has no probative value as she did not show that this cash bond of
P1,000.00 found its way into the hands of respondent Baroy who issued only a
temporary receipt for it and this has been discussed earlier.
Another charge against Judge Palaypayon is the getting of detention prisoners to
work in his house and one of them escaped while in his custody and was never
found again. To hide this fact, the case against said accused was ordered archived
by Judge Palaypayon. The evidence adduced with respect to this particular charge,
show that in Crim. Case No. 5647 entitled People vs. Stephen Kalaw, Alex Alano and
Allan Adupe, accused Alex Alano and Allan Adupe were arrested on April 12, 1991
and placed in the municipal jail of Tinambac, Camarines Sur (Exhs. 0, 0-1, 0-2 and 03; Exh. 25). The evidence presented that Alex Alano was taken by Judge Palaypayon
from the municipal jail where said accused was confined and that he escaped while
in custody of Judge Palaypayon is solely testimonial, particularly that of David Ortiz,
a former utility worker of the MTC of Tinambac.
Herein investigator finds said evidence not sufficient. The complainants should have
presented records from the police of Tinambac to show that Judge Palaypayon took
out from the municipal jail Alex Alano where he was under detention and said
accused escaped while in the custody of Judge Palaypayon.
The order, however, of Judge Palaypayon dated April 6, 1992 in Crim. Case No.
5047 archiving said case appears to be without basis. The order states: "this case
was filed on April 12, 1991 and the records show that the warrant of arrest (was)
issued against the accused, but up to this moment there is no return of service for
the warrant of arrest issued against said accused" (Exh. 0-4). The records of said
case, however, show that in fact there was a return of the service of the warrant of
arrest dated April 12, 1991 showing that Alano and Adupe were arrested (Exh. 0-3).
Judge Palaypayon explained that his order dated April 6, 1992 archiving Crim. Case
No. 5047 referred only to one of the accused who remained at large. The explanation
cannot be accepted because the two other accused, Alano and Adupe, were
arrested. Judge Palaypayon should have issued an order for the arrest of Adupe who
allegedly jumped bail, but Alano was supposed to be confined in the municipal jail if
his claim is true that he did not take custody of Alano.
The explanation also of Judge Palaypayon why he ordered the case archived was
because he heard from the police that Alano escaped. This explanation is not
acceptable either. He should ha(ve) set the case and if the police failed to bring to
court Alano, the former should have been required to explain in writing why Alano
was not brought to court. If the explanation was that Alano escaped from jail, he
should have issued an order for his arrest. It is only later on when he could not be
arrested when the case should have been ordered archived. The order archiving this
case for the reason that he only heard that Alano escaped is another circumstance
which gave rise to a suspicion that Alano might have really escaped while in his
custody only that the complainants could not present records or other documentary
evidence to prove the same.

The last charge against the respondents is that they collected filing fees on collection
cases filed by the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur which was supposed to
be exempted in paying filing fees under existing laws and that the filing fees received
was deposited by respondent Baroy in her personal account in the bank. The
evidence presented show that on February 4, 1992 the Rural Bank of Tinambac filed
ten (10) civil cases for collection against farmers and it paid the total amount of Four
Hundred (P400.00) Pesos representing filing fees. The complainants cited Section
14 of Republic Act 720, as amended, which exempts Rural Banks (from) the payment
of filing fees on collection of sums of money cases filed against farmers on loans
they obtained.
Judge Palaypayon, however, had nothing to do with the payment of the filing fees of
the Rural Bank of Tinambac as it was respondent Baroy who received them and
besides, on February 4, 1992, he was on sick leave. On her part Baroy claims that
the bank paid voluntarily the filing fees. The records, however, shows that
respondent Baroy sent a letter to the manager of the bank dated January 28, 1992 to
the effect that if the bank would not pay she would submit all Rural Bank cases for
dismissal (Annex 6, comment by respondent Baroy).
Respondent Baroy should have checked whether the Rural Bank of Tinambac was
really exempt from the payment of filing fees pursuant to Republic Act 720, as
amended, instead of threatening the bank to have its cases be submitted to the court
in order to have them dismissed. Here the payment of the filing fees was made on
February 4, 1992, but the Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos was only turned over to the
Municipal Treasurer on March 12, 1992. Here, there is an undue delay again in
complying with her obligation as accountable officer.
In view of the foregoing findings that the evidence presented by the complainants
sufficiently show that respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. had solemnized
marriages, particularly that of Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte, without a
marriage license, and that it having been shown that he did not comply with his duty
in closely supervising his clerk of court in the preparation of the monthly report of
cases being submitted to the Supreme Court, particularly for the months of July and
September, 1992 where it has been proven that the reports for said two (2) months
were falsified with respect to the number of documents notarized, it is respectfully
recommended that he be imposed a fine of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS
with a warning that the same or similar offenses will be more severely dealt with.
The fact that Judge Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts or certificates of
those marriages he solemnized without a marriage license, there were no dates
placed in the marriage contracts to show when they were solemnized, the contracting
parties were not furnished their marriage contracts and the Local Civil Registrar was
not being sent any copy of the marriage contract, will not absolve him from liability.
By solemnizing alone a marriage without a marriage license he as the solemnizing
officer is the one responsible for the irregularity in not complying (with) the formal
requ(i)sites of marriage and under Article 4(3) of the Family Code of the Philippines,
he shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Judge Palaypayon is likewise liable for his negligence or failure to comply with his
duty of closely supervising his clerk of court in the performance of the latter's duties
and functions, particularly the preparation of the monthly report of cases (Bendesula
vs. Laya, 58 SCRA 16). His explanation that he only signed the monthly report of

cases only when his clerk of court already signed the same, cannot be accepted. It is
his duty to closely supervise her, to check and verify the records if the monthly
reports prepared by his clerk of court do not contain false statements. It was held that
"A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or incompetence of court
personnel (Nidua vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA 158).
In view also of the foregoing finding that respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy, the
clerk of court of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, has been
found to have falsified the monthly report of cases for the months of July and
September, 1992 with respect to the number of documents notarized, for having
failed to account (for) the notarial fees she received for said two (2) months period;
for having failed to account (for) the solemnization fees of those marriages allegedly
not solemnized, but the solemnization fees were not returned; for unauthorized
issuance of temporary receipts, some of which were issued unnumbered; for
receiving the cash bond of Dacara on October 29, 1991 in the amount of One
Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for which she issued only a temporary receipt (Exh. Y)
and for depositing it with the Land Bank of the Philippines only on March 26, 1993, or
after one year and five months in her possession and after this case was already
filed; for withdrawing said cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos on April
29, 1993 without any court order or authority and redepositing it only on July 23,
1993; for receiving a cash bond of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos from Alfredo
Seprones in Crim. Case No. 5180, MTC, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, for which she
issued only an unnumbered temporary receipt (Exhs. X and X-1) and for not
depositing it with a bank or with the Municipal Treasurer until it was ordered released;
and for requiring the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur to pay filing fees on
February 4, 1992 for collection cases filed against farmers in the amount of Four
Hundred (P400.00) Pesos, but turning over said amount to the Municipal Treasurer
only on March 12, 1992, it is respectfully recommended that said respondent clerk of
court Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy be dismissed from the service.
It is provided that "Withdrawal of court deposits shall be by the clerk of court who
shall issue official receipt to the provincial, city or municipal treasurer for the amount
withdrawn. Court deposits cannot be withdrawn except by order of the court, . . . ."
(Revised Manual of Instructions for Treasurers, Sec. 183, 184 and 626; p. 127,
Manual for Clerks of Court). A circular also provides that the Clerks of Court shall
immediately issue an official receipt upon receipt of deposits from party litigants and
thereafter deposit intact the collection with the municipal, city or provincial treasurer
and their deposits, can only be withdrawn upon proper receipt and order of the Court
(DOJ Circular No. 52, 26 April 1968; p. 136, Manual for Clerks of Court). Supreme
Court Memorandum Circular No. 5, 25 November 1982, also provides that "all
collections of funds of fiduciary character including rental deposits, shall be deposited
immediately by the clerk of court concerned upon receipt thereof with City, Municipal
or Provincial Treasurer where his court is located" and that "no withdrawal of any of
such deposits shall be made except upon lawful order of the court exercising
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Respondent Baroy had either failed to comply with the foregoing circulars, or
deliberately disregarded, or even intentionally violated them. By her conduct, she
demonstrated her callous unconcern for the obligations and responsibility of her
duties and functions as a clerk of court and accountable officer. The gross neglect of
her duties shown by her constitute(s) a serious misconduct which warrant(s) her
removal from office. In the case of Belen P. Ferriola vs. Norma Hiam, Clerk of Court,
MTCC, Branch I, Batangas City; A.M. No. P-90-414; August 9, 1993, it was held that

"The clerk of court is not authorized to keep funds in his/her custody; monies
received by him/her shall be deposited immediately upon receipt thereof with the
City, Municipal or Provincial Treasurer. Supreme Court Circular Nos. 5 dated
November 25, 1982 and 5-A dated December 3, 1982. Respondent Hiam's failure to
remit the cash bail bonds and fine she collected constitutes serious misconduct and
her misappropriation of said funds constitutes dishonesty. "Respondent Norma Hiam
was found guilty of dishonesty and serious misconduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service and (the Court) ordered her immediate dismissal (from) the service.
xxx xxx xxx
We here emphasize once again our adjuration that the conduct and behavior of everyone connected
with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk,
should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must not
only be characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, must be beyond suspicion.
Every employee should be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. 5 Integrity in a judicial
office is more than a virtue, it is a necessity. 6 It applies, without qualification as to rank or position, from
the judge to the least of its personnel, they being standard-bearers of the exacting norms of ethics and
morality imposed upon a Court of justice.
On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently provides that the formal
requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for
therein. 7 Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not
affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly,
criminally and administratively liable. 8
The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal marriages,
and what we are providing for herein pertains to the administrative liability of respondents, all without
prejudice to their criminal responsibility. The Revised Penal Code provides that "(p)riests or ministers
of any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal
marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law." 9 This
is of course, within the province of the prosecutorial agencies of the Government.
The recommendation with respect to the administrative sanction to be imposed on respondent judge
should, therefore, be modified. For one, with respect to the charge of illegal solemnization of
marriages, it does appear that he had not taken to heart, but actually trifled with, the law's concern
for the institution of marriage and the legal effects flowing from civil status. This, and his undeniable
participation in the other offenses charged as hereinbefore narrated in detail, approximate such
serious degree of misconduct and of gross negligence in the performance of judicial duties as to
ineludibly require a higher penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby imposes a FINE of P20,000.00 on respondent Judge Lucio P.
Palaypayon. Jr., with a stern warning that any repetition of the same or similar offenses in the future
will definitely be severely dealt with. Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby DISMISSED from
the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to employment in any branch,
agency or instrumentality of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.
Let copies of this decision be spread on their records and furnished to the Office of the Ombudsman
for appropriate action.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason,
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., took no part.
Bidin, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990

TOMAS EUGENIO, SR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
20, Cagayan de Oro City, DEPUTY SHERIFF JOHNSON TAN, JR., Deputy
Sheriff of Branch 20, Regional Trial Court, Cagayan de Oro City, and the
Private Respondents, the petitioners in Sp. Proc. No. 88-55, for "Habeas
Corpus", namely: CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, SANTOS and NARCISA
VARGAS-BENTULAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 86470 May 17, 1990.
TOMAS EUGENIO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
20, Cagayan de Oro City, CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, FELIX VARGAS,
ERNESTO VARGAS, NATIVIDAD VARGAS-CAGAPE, NENITA VARGASCADENAS, LUDIVINA VARGAS-DE LOS SANTOS and NARCISA VARGASBENTULAN,respondents-appellees.
Maximo G. Rodriguez for petitioner.
Erasmo B. Damasing and Oliver Asis Improso for respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

On 5 October 1988, petitioner came to this Court with a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with application for restraining order and/or injunction (docketed as G.R.
No. 85140) seeking to enjoin respondent Judge from proceeding with the Habeas
Corpus case (Sp. Proc. No. 88- 55, RTC, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City), * the
respondent Sheriff from enforcing and implementing the writ and orders of the
respondent Judge dated 28, 29, and 30 September 1988, and to declare said writ
and orders as null and void. In a resolution issued on 11 October 1988, this Court
required comment from the respondents on the petition but denied the application
for a temporary restraining order.
The records disclose the following:
Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of (Vitaliana Vargas Vitaliana for brevity),
her full blood brothers and sisters, herein private respondents (Vargases', for
brevity) filed on 27 September 1988, a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of
Misamis Oriental (Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City) alleging that Vitaliana was
forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and confined by herein
petitioner in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. Despite her desire to
escape, Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her liberty without any legal authority.
At the time the petition was filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age,
single, and living with petitioner Tomas Eugenio.
The respondent court in an order dated 28 September 1988 issued the writ
of habeas corpus, but the writ was returned unsatisfied. Petitioner refused to
surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988) to the respondent
sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot be the subject of habeas
corpus proceedings; besides, according to petitioner, he had already obtained a
burial permit from the Undersecretary of the Department of Health, authorizing the
burial at the palace quadrangle of the Philippine Benevolent Christian Missionary,
Inc. (PBCM), a registered religious sect, of which he (petitioner) is the Supreme
President and Founder.
Petitioner also alleged that Vitaliana died of heart failure due to toxemia of
pregnancy in his residence on 28 August 1988. As her common law husband,
petitioner claimed legal custody of her body. These reasons were incorporated in an
explanation filed before the respondent court. Two (2) orders dated 29 and 30
September 1988 were then issued by respondent court, directing delivery of the
deceased's body to a funeral parlor in Cagayan de Oro City and its autopsy.
Petitioner (as respondent in the habeas corpus proceedings) filed an urgent motion
to dismiss the petition therein, claiming lack of jurisdiction of the court over the
nature of the action under sec. 1(b) of Rule 16 in relation to sec. 2, Rule 72 of the
Rules of Court. 1 A special proceeding for habeas corpus, petitioner argued, is not
applicable to a dead person but extends only to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention of a live person.

Before resolving the motion to dismiss, private respondents (as petitioners below)
were granted leave to amend their petition. 2 Claiming to have knowledge of the
death of Vitaliana only on 28 September 1988 (or after the filing of thehabeas
corpus petition), private respondents (Vargases') alleged that petitioner Tomas
Eugenia who is not in any way related to Vitaliana was wrongfully interfering with
their (Vargases') duty to bury her. Invoking Arts. 305 and 308 of the Civil Code, 3 the
Vargases contended that, as the next of kin in the Philippines, they are the legal
custodians of the dead body of their sister Vitaliana. An exchange of pleadings
followed. The motion to dismiss was finally submitted for resolution on 21 October
1988.
In the absence of a restraining order from this Court, proceedings continued before
the respondent court; the body was placed in a coffin, transferred to the Greenhills
Memorial Homes in Cagayan de Oro City, viewed by the presiding Judge of
respondent court, and examined by a duly authorized government pathologist. 4
Denying the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner, the court a quo held in an
order, 5 dated 17 November 1988, that:
It should be noted from the original petition, to the first amended petition, up to the
second amended petition that the ultimate facts show that if the person of Vitaliana
Vargas turns out to be dead then this Court is being prayed to declare the
petitioners as the persons entitled to the custody, interment and/or burial of the
body of said deceased. The Court, considering the circumstance that Vitaliana
Vargas was already dead on August 28, 1988 but only revealed to the Court on
September 29, 1988 by respondent's counsel, did not lose jurisdiction over the
nature and subject matter of this case because it may entertain this case thru the
allegations in the body of the petition on the determination as to who is entitled to
the custody of the dead body of the late Vitaliana Vargas as well as the burial or
interment thereof, for the reason that under the provisions of Sec. 19 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, which reads as follows:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation;
xxx xxx xxx
(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or
body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions:
xxx xxx xxx

it so provides that the Regional Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to try
this case. The authority to try the issue of custody and burial of a dead person is
within the lawful jurisdiction of this Court because of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and
because of the allegations of the pleadings in this case, which are enumerated in
Sec. 19, pars. 1, 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Thereafter, the court a quo proceeded as in or civil cases and, in due course,
rendered a decision on 17 January 1989, 6 resolving the main issue of whether or
not said court acquired jurisdiction over the case by treating it as an action for
custody of a dead body, without the petitioners having to file a separate civil action
for such relief, and without the Court first dismissing the original petition for habeas
corpus.
Citing Sections 19 and 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1981), 7 Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court 8 Articles 305 and
308 in relation to Article 294 of the Civil Code and Section 1104 of the Revised
Administrative Code, 9 the decision stated:
. . . . By a mere reading of the petition the court observed that the allegations in the
original petition as well as in the two amended petitions show that Vitaliana Vargas
has been restrained of her liberty and if she were dead then relief was prayed for
the custody and burial of said dead person. The amendments to the petition were
but elaborations but the ultimate facts remained the same, hence, this court
strongly finds that this court has ample jurisdiction to entertain and sit on this case
as an action for custody and burial of the dead body because the body of the
petition controls and is binding and since this case was raffled to this court to the
exclusion of all other courts, it is the primary duty of this court to decide and
dispose of this case. . . . . 10
Satisfied with its jurisdiction, the respondent court then proceeded to the matter of
rightful custody over the dead body, (for purposes of burial thereof). The order of
preference to give support under Art. 294 was used as the basis of the award. Since
there was no surviving spouse, ascendants or descendants, the brothers and sisters
were preferred over petitioner who was merely a common law spouse, the latter
being himself legally married to another woman. 11
On 23 January 1989, a new petition for review with application for a temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction was filed with this Court (G.R. No.
86470). Raised therein were pure questions of law, basically Identical to those
raised in the earlier petition (G.R. No. 85140); hence, the consolidation of both
cases.12 On 7 February 1989, petitioner filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an
injunction to maintain status quo pending appeal, which this Court denied in a
resolution dated 23 February 1989 stating that "Tomas Eugenio has so far failed to
sufficiently establish a clear legal right to the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana

Vargas, which now needs a decent burial." The petitions were then submitted for
decision without further pleadings.
Between the two (2) consolidated petitions, the following issues are raised:
1. propriety of a habeas corpus proceeding under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court to
recover custody of the dead body of a 25 year old female, single, whose nearest
surviving claimants are full blood brothers and sisters and a common law husband.
2. jurisdiction of the RTC over such proceedings and/or its authority to treat the
action as one for custody/possession/authority to bury the deceased/recovery of the
dead.
3. interpretation of par. 1, Art. 294 of the Civil Code (Art. 199 of the new Family
Code) which states:
Art. 294. The claim for support, when proper and two or more persons are obliged to
give it, shall be made in the following order:
(1) From the spouse;
xxx xxx xxx
Section 19, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides for the exclusive original jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Courts over civil cases. Under Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court, the writ of habeas corpus may be granted by a Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court). It is an elementary rule of procedure that what controls is not
the caption of the complaint or petition; but the allegations therein determine the
nature of the action, and even without the prayer for a specific remedy, proper relief
may nevertheless be granted by the court if the facts alleged in the complaint and
the evidence introduced so warrant. 13
When the petition for habeas corpus was filed before the court a quo, it was not
certain whether Vitaliana was dead or alive. While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it
will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfimetory operation on the filing
of the petition. Judicial discretion is exercised in its issuance, and such facts must be
made to appear to the judge to whom the petition is presented as, in his
judgment, prima facie entitle the petitioner to the writ. 14 While the court may
refuse to grant the writ if the petition is insufficient in form and substance, the writ
should issue if the petition complies with the legal requirements and its averments
make a prima facie case for relief. However, a judge who is asked to issue a writ
of habeas corpus need not be very critical in looking into the petition for very clear
grounds for the exercise of this jurisdiction. The latter's power to make full inquiry
into the cause of commitment or detention will enable him to correct any errors or
defects in the petition. 15

In Macazo and Nunez vs. Nunez, 16 the Court frowned upon the dismissal of
a habeas corpus petition filed by a brother to obtain custody of a minor sister,
stating:
All these circumstances notwithstanding, we believe that the case should not have
been dismissed. The court below should not have overlooked that by dismissing the
petition, it was virtually sanctioning the continuance of an adulterous and
scandalous relation between the minor and her married employer, respondent
Benildo Nunez against all principles of law and morality. It is no excuse that the
minor has expressed preference for remaining with said respondent, because the
minor may not chose to continue an illicit relation that morals and law repudiate.
xxx xxx xxx
The minor's welfare being the paramount consideration, the court below should not
allow the technicality, that Teofilo Macazo was not originally made a party, to stand
in the way of its giving the child full protection. Even in a habeas corpus proceeding
the court had power to award temporary custody to the petitioner herein, or some
other suitable person, after summoning and hearing all parties concerned. What
matters is that the immoral situation disclosed by the records be not allowed to
continue. 17
After the fact of Vitaliana's death was made known to the petitioners in the habeas
corpus proceedings,amendment of the petition for habeas corpus, not
dismissal, was proper to avoid multiplicity of suits. Amendments to pleadings are
generally favored and should be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice in order
that every case may so far as possible be determined on its real facts and in order
to expedite the trial of cases or prevent circuity of action and unnecessary expense,
unless there are circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the taking of the
adverse party by surprise or the like, which justify a refusal of permission to
amend. 18 As correctly alleged by respondents, the writ of habeas corpus as a
remedy became moot and academic due to the death of the person allegedly
restrained of liberty, but the issue of custody remained, which the court a quo had
to resolve.
Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, the
term spouse used therein not being preceded by any qualification; hence, in the
absence of such qualification, he is the rightful custodian of Vitaliana's body.
Vitaliana's brothers and sisters contend otherwise. Indeed, Philippine Law does not
recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who
cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the
public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the
community where they live may be considered legally mauled in common law
jurisdictions but not in the Philippines. 19

While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships
are present in our society, and that they produce a community of properties and
interests which is governed by law, 20 authority exists in case law to the effect that
such form of co-ownership requires that the man and woman living together must
not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. 21 In any case, herein
petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which
disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of
Cavite, 22 ,the Court, thru Mr. Justice Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code
(Support of Surviving Spouse and Children During Liquidation of Inventoried
Property) stated: "Be it noted however that with respect to 'spouse', the same must
be the legitimate 'spouse' (not common-law spouses)."
There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse"
embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in
cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by
spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple
whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are
husband and wife de facto. 23 But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the
case at bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing
to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a
lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded
spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.
Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving
brothers and sisters (the Vargases). Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative
Code provides:
Sec. 1103. Persons charged with duty of burial. The immediate duty of burying
the body of a deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense
thereof, shall devolve upon the persons hereinbelow specified:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) If the deceased was an unmarried man or woman, or a child, and left any kin,
the duty of burial shall devolve upon the nearest of kin of the deceased, if they be
adults and within the Philippines and in possession of sufficient means to defray the
necessary expenses.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Both petitions are hereby
DISMISSED. No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Gancayco and Grino-Aquino, JJ., are on leave.

Footnotes
* Hon. Alejandro Velez, presiding.
1 Rule 16 (Motion to Dismiss):
Sec. 1. Grounds. Within the time for pleading a motion to dismiss the action may
be made on any of the following grounds:
(a) . . .
(b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action or suit;
Rule 72 (Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules)
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. In the absence of special provisions,
the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in
special proceedings.
2 3 and 11 October 1988 orders, Record of Regional Trial Court Proceedings, pp. 74,
75 & 102.
3 Art. 305. The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative
shall be in accordance with the order established for support, under article 294. In
case of descendants of the same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall
be preferred. In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better right.
Art. 308. No human remains shall be retained, interred disposed of or exhumed
without the consent of the persons mentioned in Articles 294 and 305.
4 Record of RTC Proceedings, pp. 296-297.
5 Ibid., p. 338.
6 Record of RTC Proceedings, p. 577.
7 Supra.
8 Sec. 5 Inherent power of courts; Sec. 6 means to carry jurisdiction into effect.
9 Sec. 1104. Right of custody to body Any person charged by law with the duty of
burying the body of a deceased person is entitled to the custody of such body for
the purpose of burying it, except when an inquest is required by law for the purpose
of determining the cause of death; and, in case of death due to or accompanied by
a dangerous communicable disease, such body shall until buried remain in the

custody of the local board of health or local health officer, or if there be no such,
then in the custody of the municipal council.
10 G.R. No. 86470, Rollo at 34.
11 Annexes 7 & 8, Petition, G.R. No. 85140, Rollo at 85 and 86.
12 Resolution of 26 January 1989, G.R. No. 85140, Rollo at 114.
13 Ras v. Sua, G.R. No. L-23302, September 25, 1968, 25 SCRA 158-159; Nactor v.
IAC, G.R. No. 74122, March 15, 1988, 158 SCRA 635.
14 39 Am. Jur., 2d, Habeas corpus 129.
15 Ibid., 130.
16 G.R. No. L-12772, 24 January 1959, 105 Phil. 55.
17 Ibid.
18 PNB vs. CA, G.R. No. L-45770, 30 March 1988, 159 SCRA 933.
19 Fiel vs. Banawa, No. 56284-R, March 26, 1979, 76 OG 619.
20 Article 144 of the Civil Code provides:
When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not
married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by
either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
21 Aznar, et al. vs. Garcia, et al., G.R. Nos. L-11483-84, 14 February 1958, 102 Phil.
1055.
22 G.R. Nos. 61700-03, September 24, 1987, 153 SCRA 728.
23 People vs. Constantino, No. 01897-CR, September 6, 1963, 60 O.G. 3603.

Article 2 - 6Alcantara v. Alcantara(G.R. No.

167746 August 28, 2007)
FACTS: A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by petitioner Restituto
M. Alcantara against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging thaton December 8,
1982 she and respondent, without securing the required marriage license, went to
the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a
marriage for them. They met Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the
CDCC BR Chapel, who assisted their wedding for a fee and get married for that

same day. Petitioner and respondent went through another marriage ceremony
which was celebrated without themarriage license at the San Jose de Manuguit
Church in Tondo, Manila, on March 26, 1983. The alleged marriage license, procured
in Carmona, Cavite,appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party
was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license
with thelocal civil registrar. They then have a child in 1985. In 1988, they parted
ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment
beissued declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the
corresponding marriage contract and its entry on file. Respondent praysthat the
petition for annulment of marriage be denied for lack of merit. The RTC rendered its
Decision in favor of the Respondent, and dismiss the Petitionfor lack of merit.
Petitioner then submits at the C.A that at the precise time that his marriage with the
respondent was celebrated, there was no marriage license because he
andrespondent just went to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a fixer who
arranged everything for them. The wedding took place at the stairsin Manila City
Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel where Rev.Aquilino Navarro who solemnized the
marriage belongs. He and respondent did not goto Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a
marriage license. Assuming a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to
them, neither he nor the respondentwas a resident of the place.
ISSUE:1.)Was the absence of the marriage license before the marriage shall render
the marriage void?
2.) Whether or not the marriage license issued in Carmona Cavite was valid.
HELD: To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the
law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on
themarriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the
local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In
thiscase, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a
marriage license number.Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative
value of the marriage license, claims that neither he nor respondent is a residentof
Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul
petitioner and respondents marriage. Issuance of a marriage license ina city or
municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of
a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior tothe completion of
the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not
affect the validity of the marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of
marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity are civilly, criminally and administrativelyliable.The certification of
Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite, reads:This is to certify
that as per the registry Records of Marriage filed in this office, Marriage License No.
7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario
onDecember 8, 1982.Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they appeared

before a fixer who arranged everything for them and who facilitated the
ceremony before a certain Rev.Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the
CDCC Br Chapel -- will not strengthen his posture. The authority of the officer
or clergyman shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed in
the absence of any showing to the contrary. Moreover, the solemnizingofficer is not
duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and
regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizingofficer needs to know
is that the license has been issued by the competent official, and it may be
presumed from the issuance of the license that said officialhas fulfilled the duty to
ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is
DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30
September 2004 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143 of
Makati City, dated 14 February 2000, are AFFIRMED . Costs against petitioner.
Articles 7-10

SECOND DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996]
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C.
DOMAGTOY, respondent.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao
del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific
acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando
Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in
office and ignorance of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between
Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is
merely separated from his first wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano
Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on
October 27, 1994.Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding
was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa,
which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica

and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa,
Surigao del Norte.
In his letter-comment to the Office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge
avers that the office and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by
someone else, who, as the mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with his actuations
both as judge and as a private person. The same person had earlier filed
Administrative Matter No. 94-980-MTC, which was dismissed for lack of merit on
September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16, "Antonio Adapon
v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still pending.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his
act of having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man
separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the
Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact
that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years.
[1]
With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage
between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the
Family Code which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent
member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction; and that Article 8 thereof
applies to the case in question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings
submitted were considered sufficient for a resolution of the case. [2]
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant
have not been sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained
of and respondent judge's answer thereto will suffice and can be objectively
assessed by themselves to prove the latter's malfeasance.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn
Borga states that Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the
wedding ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in evidence
a joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and
sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey,
Samar.[3] The affidavit was not issued by the latter judge, as claimed by respondent
judge, but merely acknowledged before him.In their affidavit, the affiants stated
that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Pearanda in
September 1983; that after thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne five
children, Ida Pearanda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she
has not returned nor been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to
the presumption that she is already dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is
sufficient proof of Ida Pearanda's presumptive death, and ample reason for him to
proceed with the marriage ceremony. We do not agree.

Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:

"A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse."
(Emphasis added.)
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the
law is clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a
mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code
to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the previous
marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead,
in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the
declaration of his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he
remains married to Ida Pearanda. Whether wittingly, or unwittingly, it was manifest
error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted
by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and
therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, "The following
marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous x x x marriages not
falling under Article 41."
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the
court's jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:
"Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
x x x x x x xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in
open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general,
consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of
marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in

accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the
solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be
solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement
to that effect."
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justifications for his
having solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario
outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage
can be held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following
instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article
29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this
effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of
death or in a remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to
the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario. [4]
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority
of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is
the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be
solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the
court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue
of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the
solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith
will not invalidate the marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful,
is authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his
Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the
entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the
requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to
specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not
beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there
is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it
may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability.[5]
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica
and Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the
municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions
therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge
again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the
law. The legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are
elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure
to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of the law.

The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least,
proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They
should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is
imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved
in instant case.[6] It is not too much to expect them to know and apply the law
intelligently.[7] Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed,
compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law.While
magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not
penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of
law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and
void, there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Pearanda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court,
a six-month suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in
question resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the other lacked the
necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts said
recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in applying the law
and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby
SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002]
MERCEDITA MATA ARAES, petitioner, vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M.
OCCIANO, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of
the Law via a sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner
alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her

late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at
Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her
husband passed away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioners right
to inherit the vast properties left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise
deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine
Navy.
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal
acts and unethical misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much
hardships, embarrassment and sufferings.
On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to then
Acting Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao for appropriate action. On 8 June
2001, the Office of the Court Administrator required respondent judge to comment.
In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was requested
by a certain Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the
parties on 17 February 2000. Having been assured that all the documents to the
marriage were complete, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the
Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, on 17 February 2000,
Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the
rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located almost 25 kilometers from his
residence in Nabua. Arroyo then requested if respondent judge could solemnize the
marriage in Nabua, to which request he acceded.
Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully
examined the documents submitted to him by petitioner. When he discovered that
the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize
the marriage and suggested its resetting to another date. However, due to the
earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions for
the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion.
He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical
condition of Orobia who just suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he
reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and admonished the parties that
their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured
respondent judge that they would give the license to him in the afternoon of that
same day. When they failed to comply, respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo
but the latter only gave him the same reassurance that the marriage license would
be delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their
marriage is valid despite the absence of a marriage license. He attributes the
hardships and embarrassment suffered by the petitioner as due to her own fault and
negligence.

On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August

2001 with the Office of the Court Administrator. She attested that respondent judge
initially refused to solemnize her marriage due to the want of a duly issued marriage
license and that it was because of her prodding and reassurances that he eventually
solemnized the same. She confessed that she filed this administrative case out of
rage. However, after reading the Comment filed by respondent judge, she realized
her own shortcomings and is now bothered by her conscience.
Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their
Application for Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this
Application that the marriage license shall be issued on 17 January 2000. However,
neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it.
It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a Certification
that it has no record of such marriage that allegedly took place on 17 February
2000. Likewise, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur
issued another Certification dated 7 May 2001 that it cannot issue a true copy of the
Marriage Contract of the parties since it has no record of their marriage.
On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the latter
could communicate with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines
Sur for the issuance of her marriage license. Respondent judge wrote the Local Civil
Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9 May 2001, a Clerk of said
office, Grace T. Escobal, informed respondent judge that their office cannot issue the
marriage license due to the failure of Orobia to submit the Death Certificate of his
previous spouse.
The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation dated 15
November 2000, found the respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage
without a duly issued marriage license and for doing so outside his territorial
jurisdiction. A fine of P5,000.00 was recommended to be imposed on respondent
judge.
We agree.
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the
regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is
confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.
The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs. Domagtoy,[1] respondent
judge held office and had jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta.
Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. However, he solemnized a wedding at his
residence in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte which did not fall within the
jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos. We held that:

A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the
faithful is authorized to do so only within the area or diocese or place allowed by his
Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the
entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the
requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to
specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and
not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid
down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the
marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
[2]
(Emphasis supplied.)
In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the ground that
his act of solemnizing a marriage outside his jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance
of the law. We further held that:
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least,
proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They
should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is
imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved
in the instant case. x x x While magistrates may at times make mistakes in
judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited
ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced
the status of married persons.[3]
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the
municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of
petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and
subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance
of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but
nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the
requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara,[4] we held that a marriage which
preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent
issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the
marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the
solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not
possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this
respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by
petitioner. This Court has consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal
of the complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating
respondent from disciplinary action. Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration

of justice, as well as the discipline of court personnel, would be undermined.

[5]
Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve purely private or personal
matters. They can not be made to depend upon the will of every complainant who
may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound by
the unilateral act of a complainant in a matter which involves the Courts
constitutional power to discipline judges. Otherwise, that power may be put to
naught, undermine the trust character of a public office and impair the integrity and
dignity of this Court as a disciplining authority. [6]
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago,
JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
ManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-5955
LAXAMANA, petitioner,

September 19, 1952JOSE L.

vs.JOSE T. BALTAZAR, respondent.Gerardo S. Limlingan and Jose L.

Baltazar for petitioner.Macapagal, Punzalan and Yabut for
respondent.Ramon Duterte and Pedro Lopez as amici curiae.BENGZON, J.:
When in July 1952 the mayor of Sexmoan, Pampanga, was suspended, the vicemayor Jose T. Salazar, assumed office as mayor by virtue of section 2195 of the
Revised Administrative Code. However, the provincial governor, acting under
section 21 (a) of the Revised Election Code (R.A. 180), with the consent of the
provincial board appointed Jose L. Laxamana, as mayor of Sexmoan, who
immediately took the corresponding official oath.Result: this quo warranto
proceeding, based solely on the petitioner's proposition that the section first
mentioned has been repealed by the subsequent provision of the Revised Election
Code.If there was such repeal, this petition should be granted, and Laxamana
declared the lawful mayor of Sexmoan. Otherwise it must be denied.1
The two statutory provisions read as follows:
SEC. 2195. Temporary disability of the mayor. Upon the occasion of the absence,
suspension, or other temporary disability of the Mayor, his duties shall be
discharged by the Vice-Mayor, or if there be no Vice-Mayor, by the councilor who at
the last general election received the highest number of votes

.SEC. 21 (a). Vacancy in elective provincial, city or municipal office. Whenever a

temporary vacancy in any elective local office occurs, the same shall be filled by
appointment by the President if it is a provincial or city office, and by the provincial
governor, with the consent of the Provincial Board, if it is a municipal office. (R.A.
180, the Revised Election Code.
SEC. 21 (a) The portion relating to municipal offices was taken from section
2180 of the Revised Administrative Code, which partly provided:SEC. 2180.
Vacancies in municipal office. (a) In case of a temporary vacancy in any municipal
office, the same shall be filled by appointment by the provincial governor, with the
consentof the provincial board.(b) In case of a permanent vacancy in any municipal
office, the same shall be filled by appointment by the provincial board, except in
case of a municipal president, in which the permanent vacancy shall be filled by the
municipal vice-president. . . .
It will be seen that under this section, when the office of municipal president (now
mayor) become permanently vacant the vice-president stepped into the office. The
section omitted reference to temporary vacancy of such office because section
2195 governed that contingency. In this regard sections 2180 and 2195
supplemented each other. Paragraph (a) of section 2180 applied to municipal offices
in general, other than that of the municipal president.
Under the Revised Administrative Code, specially the two sections indicated
there was no doubt in Government circles that when the municipal president was
suspended from office, the vice-president took his place.
Temporary vacancy in office of municipal president. Paragraph (a) of this section
(2180) should be construed to cover only municipal offices other than the office of
president. Section 2195 of the Administrative Code should be applied in case of the
absence, suspension, or other temporary disability of the municipal president. (Op.
Atty. Gen. Sept. 21, 1917; Ins. Aud. Oct. 23, 1927.) (Araneta, Administrative Code
Vol. IV p. 2838)
Municipal president cannot designate acting president. There is no provision of
law expressly or implied authorizing the municipal president to designate any
person to act in his stead during his temporary absence or disability. From the
provision of section 2195 of the code, it is clear that the vice-president or, if there
be no vice-president, the councilor who at the last general election received the
highest number of votes, should automatically (without any formal designation)
discharge the duties of the president. (Op. Ins. Aud. March 2, 1926) (Araneta
Administrative Code Vol. IV, p. 2839)
Now it is reasonable to assume that the incorporation of the above section 2180
into the Revised Election Law as section 21 (a) did not have the effect of enlarging
its scope,2 to supersede or repeal section 2195, what with the presumption against
implied repeals.3 "Where a statute has received a contemporaneous and practical

interpretation and the statute as interpreted is re-enacted, the practical

interpretation is accorded greater weight than it ordinarily receives, and is regarded
as presumptively the correct interpretation of the law. The rule here is based upon
the theory that the legislature is acquainted with the contemporaneous
interpretation of a statute, especially when made by an administrative body or
executive officers charged with the duty of administering or enforcing the law, and
therefore impliedly adopts the interpretation upon re-enactment." (Sutherland
Statutory Construction, sec. 5109.)
Indeed, even disregarding their origin, the allegedly conflicting sections, could be
interpreted in the light of the principle of statutory construction that when a general
and a particular provision are inconsistent the latter is paramount to the former
(sec. 288, Act 190). In other words, section 2195 referring particularly to vacancy in
the office of mayor, must prevail over the general terms of section 21(a) as to
vacancies of municipal (local) offices. Otherwise stated, section 2195 may be
deemed an exception to or qualification of the latter.4 "Where one statute deals
with a subject in general terms, and another deals with a part of the same subject in
a more detailed way, the two should be harmonized if possible; but if there is any
conflict, the latter will prevail, regardless of whether it was passed prior to the
general statute." (Sutherland Statutory Construction, sec. 5204)
In a recent decision,5 we had occasion to pass on a similar situation repeal by
subsequent general provision of a prior special provision and we said,:
It is well-settled that a special and local statute, providing for a particular case or
class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms,
provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although
the terms of the general act are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the
special law. . . . It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general in
its terms and not expressly repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect
the special provisions, of such earlier statute. (Steamboat Company vs. Collector, 18
Wall. (U.S.), 478; Cass County vs. Gillett, 100 U.S. 585; Minnesota vs. Hitchcock, 185
U.S. 373, 396.)
Where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the later general the terms
of the general brood enough to include the matter provided for in the special the
fact that one is special and the other is general creates a presumption that the
special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general, one as a
general law of the land, the other as the law of a particularcase. (State vs. Stoll, 17
Wall. (U.S.) 425)
In fact even after the Revised Election Code was enacted, the Department of the
Interior and the office of executive Secretary who are charged with the supervision
of provincial and municipal governments have "consistently held that in case of the
suspension or other temporary disability of the mayor, the vice-mayor shall, by

operation of law, assume the office of the mayor, and if the vice-mayor is not
available, the said office shall be discharged by the first councilor." (Annex 5 of the
answer.)
Needless to say, the contemporaneous construction placed upon the statute by the
executive officers charged with its execution deserves great weight in the courts.6
Consequently it is our ruling that when the mayor of a municipality is suspended,
absent or temporarily unable, his duties should be discharged by the vice-mayor in
accordance with sec. 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code.
This quo warranto petition is dismissed with costs. So ordered.1wphl.ntParas, C.J.,
Pablo, Padilla, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.

.Article 22
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-40098 August 29, 1975

ANTONIO LIM TANHU, DY OCHAY, ALFONSO LEONARDO NG SUA and CO
OYO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE R. RAMOLETE as Presiding Judge, Branch III, CFI, Cebu and TAN
PUT, respondents.
Zosa, Zosa, Castillo, Alcudia & Koh for petitioners.
Fidel Manalo and Florido & Associates for respondents.
BARREDO, J.:
Petition for (1) certiorari to annul and set aside certain actuations of respondent
Court of First Instance of Cebu Branch III in its Civil Case No. 12328, an action for
accounting of properties and money totalling allegedly about P15 million pesos filed
with a common cause of action against six defendants, in which after declaring four
of the said defendants herein petitioners, in default and while the trial as against
the two defendants not declared in default was in progress, said court granted
plaintiff's motion to dismiss the case in so far as the non-defaulted defendants were
concerned and thereafter proceeded to hear ex-parte the rest of the plaintiffs

evidence and subsequently rendered judgment by default against the defaulted

defendants, with the particularities that notice of the motion to dismiss was not duly
served on any of the defendants, who had alleged a compulsory counterclaim
against plaintiff in their joint answer, and the judgment so rendered granted reliefs
not prayed for in the complaint, and (2) prohibition to enjoin further proceedings
relative to the motion for immediate execution of the said judgment.
Originally, this litigation was a complaint filed on February 9, 1971 by respondent
Tan Put only against the spouses-petitioners Antonio Lim Tanhu and Dy Ochay.
Subsequently, in an amended complaint dated September 26, 1972, their son Lim
Teck Chuan and the other spouses-petitioners Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua and Co Oyo
and their son Eng Chong Leonardo were included as defendants. In said amended
complaint, respondent Tan alleged that she "is the widow of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan,
who was a partner in the commercial partnership, Glory Commercial Company ...
with Antonio Lim Tanhu and Alfonso Ng Sua that "defendant Antonio Lim Tanhu,
Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua, Lim Teck Chuan, and Eng Chong Leonardo, through fraud
and machination, took actual and active management of the partnership and
although Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan was the manager of Glory Commercial Company,
defendants managed to use the funds of the partnership to purchase lands and
building's in the cities of Cebu, Lapulapu, Mandaue, and the municipalities of Talisay
and Minglanilla, some of which were hidden, but the description of those already
discovered were as follows: (list of properties) ...;" and that:
13. (A)fter the death of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan, the defendants, without liquidation
continued the business of Glory Commercial Company by purportedly organizing a
corporation known as the Glory Commercial Company, Incorporated, with paid up
capital in the sum of P125,000.00, which money and other assets of the said Glory
Commercial Company, Incorporated are actually the assets of the defunct Glory
Commercial Company partnership, of which the plaintiff has a share equivalent to
one third (/ 3) thereof;
14. (P)laintiff, on several occasions after the death of her husband, has asked
defendants of the above-mentioned properties and for the liquidation of the
business of the defunct partnership, including investments on real estate in Hong
Kong, but defendants kept on promising to liquidate said properties and just told
plaintiff to
15. (S)ometime in the month of November, 1967, defendants, Antonio Lim Tanhu,
by means of fraud deceit and misrepresentations did then and there, induce and
convince the plaintiff to execute a quitclaim of all her rights and interests, in the
assets of the partnership of Glory Commercial Company, which is null and void,
executed through fraud and without any legal effect. The original of said quitclaim
is in the possession of the adverse party defendant Antonio Lim Tanhu.

16. (A)s a matter of fact, after the execution of said quitclaim, defendant Antonio
Lim Tanhu offered to pay the plaintiff the amount P65,000.00 within a period of one
(1) month, for which plaintiff was made to sign a receipt for the amount of
P65,000.00 although no such amount was given and plaintiff was not even given a
copy of said document;
17. (T)hereafter, in the year 1968-69, the defendants who had earlier promised to
liquidate the aforesaid properties and assets in favor among others of plaintiff and
until the middle of the year 1970 when the plaintiff formally demanded from the
defendants the accounting of real and personal properties of the Glory Commercial
Company, defendants refused and stated that they would not give the share of the
plaintiff. (Pp. 36-37, Record.)
She prayed as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered:
a) Ordering the defendants to render an accounting of the real and personal
properties of the Glory Commercial Company including those registered in the
names of the defendants and other persons, which properties are located in the
Philippines and in Hong Kong;
b) Ordering the defendants to deliver to the plaintiff after accounting, one third (/ 3)
of the total value of all the properties which is approximately P5,000,000.00
representing the just share of the plaintiff;
c) Ordering the defendants to pay the attorney of the plaintiff the sum of Two
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P250,000.00) by way of attorney's fees and
damages in the sum of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).
This Honorable Court is prayed for other remedies and reliefs consistent with law
and equity and order the defendants to pay the costs. (Page 38, Record.)
The admission of said amended complaint was opposed by defendants upon the
ground that there were material modifications of the causes of action previously
alleged, but respondent judge nevertheless allowed the amendment reasoning that:
The present action is for accounting of real and personal properties as well as for
the recovery of the same with damages.
An objective consideration of pars. 13 and 15 of the amended complaint pointed out
by the defendants to sustain their opposition will show that the allegations of facts
therein are merely to amplify material averments constituting the cause of action in
the original complaint. It likewise include necessary and indispensable defendants
without whom no final determination can be had in the action and in order that
complete relief is to be accorded as between those already parties.

Considering that the amendments sought to be introduced do not change the main
causes of action in the original complaint and the reliefs demanded and to allow
amendments is the rule, and to refuse them the exception and in order that the real
question between the parties may be properly and justly threshed out in a single
proceeding to avoid multiplicity of actions. (Page 40, Record.)
In a single answer with counterclaim, over the signature of their common counsel,
defendants denied specifically not only the allegation that respondent Tan is the
widow of Tee Hoon because, according to them, his legitimate wife was Ang Siok Tin
still living and with whom he had four (4) legitimate children, a twin born in 1942,
and two others born in 1949 and 1965, all presently residing in Hongkong, but also
all the allegations of fraud and conversion quoted above, the truth being, according
to them, that proper liquidation had been regularly made of the business of the
partnership and Tee Hoon used to receive his just share until his death, as a result of
which the partnership was dissolved and what corresponded to him were all given
to his wife and children. To quote the pertinent portions of said answer:
AND BY WAY OF SPECIAL AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES,
defendants hereby incorporate all facts averred and alleged in the answer, and
further most respectfully declare:
1. That in the event that plaintiff is filing the present complaint as an heir of Tee
Hoon Lim Po Chuan, then, she has no legal capacity to sue as such, considering that
the legitimate wife, namely: Ang Siok Tin, together with their children are still alive.
Under Sec. 1, (d), Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court, lack of legal capacity to sue
is one of the grounds for a motion to dismiss and so defendants prays that a
preliminary hearing be conducted as provided for in Sec. 5, of the same rule;
2. That in the alternative case or event that plaintiff is filing the present case under
Art. 144 of the Civil Code, then, her claim or demand has been paid, waived
abandoned or otherwise extinguished as evidenced by the 'quitclaim' Annex 'A'
hereof, the ground cited is another ground for a motion to dismiss (Sec. 1, (h), Rule
16) and hence defendants pray that a preliminary hearing be made in connection
therewith pursuant to Section 5 of the aforementioned rule;
3. That Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan was legally married to Ang Siok Tin and were
blessed with the following children, to wit: Ching Siong Lim and Ching Hing Lim
(twins) born on February 16, 1942; Lim Shing Ping born on March 3, 1949 and Lim
Eng Lu born on June 25, 1965 and presently residing in Hongkong;
4. That even before the death of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan, the plaintiff was no longer
his common law wife and even though she was not entitled to anything left by Tee
Hoon Lim Po Chuan, yet, out of the kindness and generosity on the part of the
defendants, particularly Antonio Lain Tanhu, who, was inspiring to be monk and in

fact he is now a monk, plaintiff was given a substantial amount evidenced by the
'quitclaim' (Annex 'A');
5. That the defendants have acquired properties out of their own personal fund and
certainly not from the funds belonging to the partnership, just as Tee Hoon Lim Po
Chuan had acquired properties out of his personal fund and which are now in the
possession of the widow and neither the defendants nor the partnership have
anything to do about said properties;
6. That it would have been impossible to buy properties from funds belonging to the
partnership without the other partners knowing about it considering that the
amount taken allegedly is quite big and with such big amount withdrawn the
partnership would have been insolvent;
7. That plaintiff and Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan were not blessed with children who
would have been lawfully entitled to succeed to the properties left by the latter
together with the widow and legitimate children;
8. That despite the fact that plaintiff knew that she was no longer entitled to
anything of the shares of the late Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan, yet, this suit was filed
against the defendant who have to interpose the following
COUNTERCLAIM
A. That the defendants hereby reproduced, by way of reference, all the allegations
and foregoing averments as part of this counterclaim; .
B. That plaintiff knew and was aware she was merely the common-law wife of Tee
Hoon Lim Po Chuan and that the lawful and legal is still living, together with the
legitimate children, and yet she deliberately suppressed this fact, thus showing her
bad faith and is therefore liable for exemplary damages in an amount which the
Honorable Court may determine in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion. In
the event that plaintiff is married to Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan, then, her marriage is
bigamous and should suffer the consequences thereof;
C. That plaintiff was aware and had knowledge about the 'quitclaim', even though
she was not entitled to it, and yet she falsely claimed that defendants refused even
to see her and for filing this unfounded, baseless, futile and puerile complaint,
defendants suffered mental anguish and torture conservatively estimated to be not
less than P3,000.00;
D. That in order to defend their rights in court, defendants were constrained to
engage the services of the undersigned counsel, obligating themselves to pay
P500,000.00 as attorney's fees;

E. That by way of litigation expenses during the time that this case will be before
this Honorable Court and until the same will be finally terminated and adjudicated,
defendants will have to spend at least P5,000.00. (Pp. 44-47. Record.)
After unsuccessfully trying to show that this counterclaim is merely permissive and
should be dismissed for non-payment of the corresponding filing fee, and after
being overruled by the court, in due time, plaintiff answered the same, denying its
material allegations.
On February 3, 1973, however, the date set for the pre-trial, both of the two
defendants-spouses the Lim Tanhus and Ng Suas, did not appear, for which reason,
upon motion of plaintiff dated February 16, 1973, in an order of March 12, 1973,
they were all "declared in DEFAULT as of February 3, 1973 when they failed to
appear at the pre-trial." They sought to hive this order lifted thru a motion for
reconsideration, but the effort failed when the court denied it. Thereafter, the trial
started, but at the stage thereof where the first witness of the plaintiff by the name
of Antonio Nuez who testified that he is her adopted son, was up for re-crossexamination, said plaintiff unexpectedly filed on October 19, 1974 the following
simple and unreasoned
MOTION TO DROP DEFENDANTS LIM TECK
CHUAN AND ENG CHONG LEONARDO
COMES now plaintiff, through her undersigned counsel, unto the Honorable Court
most respectfully moves to drop from the complaint the defendants Lim Teck Chuan
and Eng Chong Leonardo and to consider the case dismissed insofar as said
defendants Lim Teck Chuan and Eng Chong Leonardo are concerned.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of the Honorable Court to drop from the
complaint the defendants Lim Teck Chuan and Eng Chong Leonardo and to dismiss
the case against them without pronouncement as to costs. (Page 50, Record.)
which she set for hearing on December 21, 1974. According to petitioners, none of
the defendants declared in default were notified of said motion, in violation of
Section 9 of Rule 13, since they had asked for the lifting of the order of default,
albeit unsuccessfully, and as regards the defendants not declared in default, the
setting of the hearing of said motion on October 21, 1974 infringed the three-day
requirement of Section 4 of Rule 15, inasmuch as Atty. Adelino Sitoy of Lim Teck
Chuan was served with a copy of the motion personally only on October 19, 1974,
while Atty. Benjamin Alcudia of Eng Chong Leonardo was served by registered mail
sent only on the same date.
Evidently without even verifying the notices of service, just as simply as plaintiff had
couched her motion, and also without any legal grounds stated, respondent court
granted the prayer of the above motion thus:

ORDER
Acting on the motion of the plaintiff praying for the dismissal of the complaint as
against defendants Lim Teck Chuan and Eng Chong Leonardo.
The same is hereby GRANTED. The complaint as against defendant Lim Teck Chuan
and Eng Chong Leonardo is hereby ordered DISMISSED without pronouncement as
to costs.
Simultaneously, the following order was also issued:
Considering that defendants Antonio Lim Tanhu and his spouse Dy Ochay as well as
defendants Alfonso Ng Sua and his spouse Co Oyo have been declared in default for
failure to appear during the pre-trial and as to the other defendants the complaint
had already been ordered dismissed as against them.
Let the hearing of the plaintiff's evidence ex-parte be set on November 20, 1974, at
8:30 A.M. before the Branch Clerk of Court who is deputized for the purpose, to
swear in witnesses and to submit her report within ten (10) days thereafter. Notify
the plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, October 21, 1974. (Page 52, Record.)
But, in connection with this last order, the scheduled ex-parte reception of evidence
did not take place on November 20, 1974, for on October 28, 1974, upon verbal
motion of plaintiff, the court issued the following self-explanatory order: .
Acting favorably on the motion of the plaintiff dated October 18, 1974, the Court
deputized the Branch Clerk of Court to receive the evidence of the plaintiff ex-parte
to be made on November 20, 1974. However, on October 28, 1974, the plaintiff,
together with her witnesses, appeared in court and asked, thru counsel, that she be
allowed to present her evidence.
Considering the time and expenses incurred by the plaintiff in bringing her
witnesses to the court, the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby authorized to receive
immediately the evidence of the plaintiff ex-parte.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, October 28, 1974. (Page 53. Record.)
Upon learning of these orders on October 23, 1973, the defendant Lim Teck Cheng,
thru counsel, Atty. Sitoy, filed a motion for reconsideration thereof, and on
November 1, 1974, defendant Eng Chong Leonardo, thru counsel Atty. Alcudia, filed
also his own motion for reconsideration and clarification of the same orders. These
motions were denied in an order dated December 6, 1974 but received by the

movants only on December 23, 1974. Meanwhile, respondent court rendered the
impugned decision on December 20, 1974. It does not appear when the parties
were served copies of this decision.
Subsequently, on January 6, 1975, all the defendants, thru counsel, filed a motion to
quash the order of October 28, 1974. Without waiting however for the resolution
thereof, on January 13, 1974, Lim Teck Chuan and Eng Chong Leonardo went to the
Court of Appeals with a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of the abovementioned orders of October 21, 1974 and October 28, 1974 and decision of
December 20, 1974. By resolution of January 24, 1975, the Court of Appeals
dismissed said petition, holding that its filing was premature, considering that the
motion to quash the order of October 28, 1974 was still unresolved by the trial
court. This holding was reiterated in the subsequent resolution of February 5, 1975
denying the motion for reconsideration of the previous dismissal.
On the other hand, on January 20, 1975, the other defendants, petitioners herein,
filed their notice of appeal, appeal bond and motion for extension to file their record
on appeal, which was granted, the extension to expire after fifteen (15) days from
January 26 and 27, 1975, for defendants Lim Tanhu and Ng Suas, respectively. But
on February 7, 1975, before the perfection of their appeal, petitioners filed the
present petition with this Court. And with the evident intent to make their
procedural position clear, counsel for defendants, Atty. Manuel Zosa, filed with
respondent court a manifestation dated February 14, 1975 stating that "when the
non-defaulted defendants Eng Chong Leonardo and Lim Teck Chuan filed their
petition in the Court of Appeals, they in effect abandoned their motion to quash the
order of October 28, 1974," and that similarly "when Antonio Lim Tanhu, Dy Ochay,
Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua and Co Oyo, filed their petition for certiorari and
prohibition ... in the Supreme Court, they likewise abandoned their motion to
quash." This manifestation was acted upon by respondent court together with
plaintiffs motion for execution pending appeal in its order of the same date February
14, 1975 this wise:
ORDER
When these incidents, the motion to quash the order of October 28, 1974 and the
motion for execution pending appeal were called for hearing today, counsel for the
defendants-movants submitted their manifestation inviting the attention of this
Court that by their filing for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction in
the Court of Appeals which was dismissed and later the defaulted defendants filed
with the Supreme Court certiorari with prohibition they in effect abandoned their
motion to quash.
IN VIEW HEREOF, the motion to quash is ordered ABANDONED. The resolution of the
motion for execution pending appeal shall be resolved after the petition for
certiorari and prohibition shall have been resolved by the Supreme Court.

SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, February 14, 1975. (Page 216, Record.)
Upon these premises, it is the position of petitioners that respondent court acted
illegally, in violation of the rules or with grave abuse of discretion in acting on
respondent's motion to dismiss of October 18, 1974 without previously ascertaining
whether or not due notice thereof had been served on the adverse parties, as, in
fact, no such notice was timely served on the non-defaulted defendants Lim Teck
Chuan and Eng Chong Leonardo and no notice at all was ever sent to the other
defendants, herein petitioners, and more so, in actually ordering the dismissal of the
case by its order of October 21, 1974 and at the same time setting the case for
further hearing as against the defaulted defendants, herein petitioners, actually
hearing the same ex-parte and thereafter rendering the decision of December 20,
1974 granting respondent Tan even reliefs not prayed for in the complaint.
According to the petitioners, to begin with, there was compulsory counterclaim in
the common answer of the defendants the nature of which is such that it cannot be
decided in an independent action and as to which the attention of respondent court
was duly called in the motions for reconsideration. Besides, and more importantly,
under Section 4 of Rule 18, respondent court had no authority to divide the case
before it by dismissing the same as against the non-defaulted defendants and
thereafter proceeding to hear it ex-parte and subsequently rendering judgment
against the defaulted defendants, considering that in their view, under the said
provision of the rules, when a common cause of action is alleged against several
defendants, the default of any of them is a mere formality by which those defaulted
are not allowed to take part in the proceedings, but otherwise, all the defendants,
defaulted and not defaulted, are supposed to have but a common fate, win or lose.
In other words, petitioners posit that in such a situation, there can only be one
common judgment for or against all the defendant, the non-defaulted and the
defaulted. Thus, petitioners contend that the order of dismissal of October 21, 1974
should be considered also as the final judgment insofar as they are concerned, or, in
the alternative, it should be set aside together with all the proceedings and decision
held and rendered subsequent thereto, and that the trial be resumed as of said
date, with the defendants Lim Teck Chuan and Eng Chong Leonardo being allowed
to defend the case for all the defendants.
On the other hand, private respondent maintains the contrary view that inasmuch
as petitioners had been properly declared in default, they have no personality nor
interest to question the dismissal of the case as against their non-defaulted codefendants and should suffer the consequences of their own default. Respondent
further contends, and this is the only position discussed in the memorandum
submitted by her counsel, that since petitioners have already made or at least
started to make their appeal, as they are in fact entitled to appeal, this special civil
action has no reason for being. Additionally, she invokes the point of prematurity
upheld by the Court of Appeals in regard to the above-mentioned petition therein of

the non-defaulted defendants Lim Teck Chuan and Eng Chong Leonardo. Finally, she
argues that in any event, the errors attributed to respondent court are errors of
judgment and may be reviewed only in an appeal.
After careful scrutiny of all the above-related proceedings, in the court below and
mature deliberation, the Court has arrived at the conclusion that petitioners should
be granted relief, if only to stress emphatically once more that the rules of
procedure may not be misused and abused as instruments for the denial of
substantial justice. A review of the record of this case immediately discloses that
here is another demonstrative instance of how some members of the bar, availing
of their proficiency in invoking the letter of the rules without regard to their real
spirit and intent, succeed in inducing courts to act contrary to the dictates of justice
and equity, and, in some instances, to wittingly or unwittingly abet unfair advantage
by ironically camouflaging their actuations as earnest efforts to satisfy the public
clamor for speedy disposition of litigations, forgetting all the while that the plain
injunction of Section 2 of Rule 1 is that the "rules shall be liberally construed in
order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining not only 'speedy'
but more imperatively, "just ... and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding." We cannot simply pass over the impression that the procedural
maneuvers and tactics revealed in the records of the case at bar were deliberately
planned with the calculated end in view of depriving petitioners and their codefendants below of every opportunity to properly defend themselves against a
claim of more than substantial character, considering the millions of pesos worth of
properties involved as found by respondent judge himself in the impugned decision,
a claim that appears, in the light of the allegations of the answer and the
documents already brought to the attention of the court at the pre-trial, to be rather
dubious. What is most regrettable is that apparently, all of these alarming
circumstances have escaped respondent judge who did not seem to have hesitated
in acting favorably on the motions of the plaintiff conducive to the deplorable
objective just mentioned, and which motions, at the very least, appeared to be 'of
highly controversial' merit, considering that their obvious tendency and immediate
result would be to convert the proceedings into a one-sided affair, a situation that
should be readily condemnable and intolerable to any court of justice.
Indeed, a seeming disposition on the part of respondent court to lean more on the
contentions of private respondent may be discerned from the manner it resolved
the attempts of defendants Dy Ochay and Antonio Lim Tanhu to have the earlier
order of default against them lifted. Notwithstanding that Dy Ochay's motion of
October 8, 1971, co-signed by her with their counsel, Atty. Jovencio Enjambre
(Annex 2 of respondent answer herein) was over the jurat of the notary public
before whom she took her oath, in the order of November 2, 1971, (Annex 3 id.) it
was held that "the oath appearing at the bottom of the motion is not the one
contemplated by the abovequoted pertinent provision (See. 3, Rule 18) of the rules.
It is not even a verification. (See. 6, Rule 7.) What the rule requires as interpreted by

the Supreme Court is that the motion must have to be accompanied by an affidavit
of merits that the defendant has a meritorious defense, thereby ignoring the very
simple legal point that the ruling of the Supreme Court in Ong Peng vs. Custodio, 1
SCRA 781, relied upon by His Honor, under which a separate affidavit of merit is
required refers obviously to instances where the motion is not over oath of the party
concerned, considering that what the cited provision literally requires is no more
than a "motion under oath." Stated otherwise, when a motion to lift an order of
default contains the reasons for the failure to answer as well as the facts
constituting the prospective defense of the defendant and it is sworn to by said
defendant, neither a formal verification nor a separate affidavit of merit is
necessary.
What is worse, the same order further held that the motion to lift the order of
default "is an admission that there was a valid service of summons" and that said
motion could not amount to a challenge against the jurisdiction of the court over the
person of the defendant. Such a rationalization is patently specious and reveals an
evident failure to grasp the import of the legal concepts involved. A motion to lift an
order of default on the ground that service of summons has not been made in
accordance with the rules is in order and is in essence verily an attack against the
jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant, no less than if it were
worded in a manner specifically embodying such a direct challenge.
And then, in the order of February 14, 1972 (Annex 6, id.) lifting at last the order of
default as against defendant Lim Tanhu, His Honor posited that said defendant "has
a defense (quitclaim) which renders the claim of the plaintiff contentious." We have
read defendants' motion for reconsideration of November 25, 1971 (Annex 5, id.),
but We cannot find in it any reference to a "quitclaim". Rather, the allegation of a
quitclaim is in the amended complaint (Pars. 15-16, Annex B of the petition herein)
in which plaintiff maintains that her signature thereto was secured through fraud
and deceit. In truth, the motion for reconsideration just mentioned, Annex 5, merely
reiterated the allegation in Dy Ochay's earlier motion of October 8, 1971, Annex 2,
to set aside the order of default, that plaintiff Tan could be but the common law wife
only of Tee Hoon, since his legitimate wife was still alive, which allegation, His Honor
held in the order of November 2, 1971, Annex 3, to be "not good and meritorious
defense". To top it all, whereas, as already stated, the order of February 19, 1972,
Annex 6, lifted the default against Lim Tanhu because of the additional
consideration that "he has a defense (quitclaim) which renders the claim of the
plaintiff contentious," the default of Dy Ochay was maintained notwithstanding that
exactly the same "contentions" defense as that of her husband was invoked by her.
Such tenuous, if not altogether erroneous reasonings and manifest inconsistency in
the legal postures in the orders in question can hardly convince Us that the matters
here in issue were accorded due and proper consideration by respondent court. In
fact, under the circumstances herein obtaining, it seems appropriate to stress that,
having in view the rather substantial value of the subject matter involved together

with the obviously contentious character of plaintiff's claim, which is discernible

even on the face of the complaint itself, utmost care should have been taken to
avoid the slightest suspicion of improper motivations on the part of anyone
concerned. Upon the considerations hereunder to follow, the Court expresses its
grave concern that much has to be done to dispel the impression that herein
petitioners and their co-defendants are being railroaded out of their rights and
properties without due process of law, on the strength of procedural technicalities
adroitly planned by counsel and seemingly unnoticed and undetected by
respondent court, whose orders, gauged by their tenor and the citations of
supposedly pertinent provisions and jurisprudence made therein, cannot be said to
have proceeded from utter lack of juridical knowledgeability and competence.
1
The first thing that has struck the Court upon reviewing the record is the seeming
alacrity with which the motion to dismiss the case against non-defaulted defendants
Lim Teck Chuan and Eng Chong Leonardo was disposed of, which definitely ought
not to have been the case. The trial was proceeding with the testimony of the first
witness of plaintiff and he was still under re-cross-examination. Undoubtedly, the
motion to dismiss at that stage and in the light of the declaration of default against
the rest of the defendants was a well calculated surprise move, obviously designed
to secure utmost advantage of the situation, regardless of its apparent unfairness.
To say that it must have been entirely unexpected by all the defendants, defaulted
and non-defaulted , is merely to rightly assume that the parties in a judicial
proceeding can never be the victims of any procedural waylaying as long as lawyers
and judges are imbued with the requisite sense of equity and justice.
But the situation here was aggravated by the indisputable fact that the adverse
parties who were entitled to be notified of such unanticipated dismissal motion did
not get due notice thereof. Certainly, the non-defaulted defendants had the right to
the three-day prior notice required by Section 4 of Rule 15. How could they have
had such indispensable notice when the motion was set for hearing on Monday,
October 21, 1974, whereas the counsel for Lim Teck Chuan, Atty. Sitoy was
personally served with the notice only on Saturday, October 19, 1974 and the
counsel for Eng Chong Leonardo, Atty. Alcudia, was notified by registered mail which
was posted only that same Saturday, October 19, 1974? According to Chief Justice
Moran, "three days at least must intervene between the date of service of notice
and the date set for the hearing, otherwise the court may not validly act on the
motion." (Comments on the Rules of Court by Moran, Vol. 1, 1970 ed. p. 474.) Such
is the correct construction of Section 4 of Rule 15. And in the instant case, there can
be no question that the notices to the non-defaulted defendants were short of the
requirement of said provision.
We can understand the over-anxiety of counsel for plaintiff, but what is
incomprehensible is the seeming inattention of respondent judge to the explicit

mandate of the pertinent rule, not to speak of the imperatives of fairness,

considering he should have realized the far-reaching implications, specially from the
point of view he subsequently adopted, albeit erroneously, of his favorably acting on
it. Actually, he was aware of said consequences, for simultaneously with his order of
dismissal, he immediately set the case for the ex-parte hearing of the evidence
against the defaulted defendants, which, incidentally, from the tenor of his order
which We have quoted above, appears to have been done by him motu propio As a
matter of fact, plaintiff's motion also quoted above did not pray for it.
Withal, respondent court's twin actions of October 21, 1974 further ignores or is
inconsistent with a number of known juridical principles concerning defaults, which
We will here take occasion to reiterate and further elucidate on, if only to avoid a
repetition of the unfortunate errors committed in this case. Perhaps some of these
principles have not been amply projected and elaborated before, and such paucity
of elucidation could be the reason why respondent judge must have acted as he did.
Still, the Court cannot but express its vehement condemnation of any judicial
actuation that unduly deprives any party of the right to be heard without clear and
specific warrant under the terms of existing rules or binding jurisprudence. Extreme
care must be the instant reaction of every judge when confronted with a situation
involving risks that the proceedings may not be fair and square to all the parties
concerned. Indeed, a keen sense of fairness, equity and justice that constantly looks
for consistency between the letter of the adjective rules and these basic principles
must be possessed by every judge, If substance is to prevail, as it must, over form
in our courts. Literal observance of the rules, when it is conducive to unfair and
undue advantage on the part of any litigant before it, is unworthy of any court of
justice and equity. Withal, only those rules and procedure informed, with and
founded on public policy deserve obedience in accord with their unequivocal
language or words..
Before proceeding to the discussion of the default aspects of this case, however, it
should not be amiss to advert first to the patent incorrectness, apparent on the face
of the record, of the aforementioned order of dismissal of October 21, 1974 of the
case below as regards non-defaulted defendants Lim and Leonardo. While it is true
that said defendants are not petitioners herein, the Court deems it necessary for a
full view of the outrageous procedural strategy conceived by respondent's counsel
and sanctioned by respondent court to also make reference to the very evident fact
that in ordering said dismissal respondent court disregarded completely the
existence of defendant's counterclaim which it had itself earlier held if indirectly, to
be compulsory in nature when it refused to dismiss the same on the ground alleged
by respondent Tan that he docketing fees for the filing thereof had not been paid by
defendants.
Indeed, that said counterclaim is compulsory needs no extended elaboration. As
may be noted in the allegations hereof aforequoted, it arose out of or is necessarily
connected with the occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim,

(Section 4, Rule 9) namely, plaintiff's allegedly being the widow of the deceased Tee
Hoon entitled, as such, to demand accounting of and to receive the share of her
alleged late husband as partner of defendants Antonio Lim Tanhu and Alfonso
Leonardo Ng Sua in Glory Commercial Company, the truth of which allegations all
the defendants have denied. Defendants maintain in their counterclaim that plaintiff
knew of the falsity of said allegations even before she filed her complaint, for she
had in fact admitted her common-law relationship with said deceased in a
document she had jointly executed with him by way of agreement to terminate their
illegitimate relationship, for which she received P40,000 from the deceased, and
with respect to her pretended share in the capital and profits in the partnership, it is
also defendants' posture that she had already quitclaimed, with the assistance of
able counsel, whatever rights if any she had thereto in November, 1967, for the sum
of P25,000 duly receipted by her, which quitclaim was, however, executed,
according to respondent herself in her amended complaint, through fraud. And
having filed her complaint knowing, according to defendants, as she ought to have
known, that the material allegations thereof are false and baseless, she has caused
them to suffer damages. Undoubtedly, with such allegations, defendants'
counterclaim is compulsory, not only because the same evidence to sustain it will
also refute the cause or causes of action alleged in plaintiff's complaint, (Moran,
supra p. 352) but also because from its very nature, it is obvious that the same
cannot "remain pending for independent adjudication by the court." (Section 2, Rule
17.)
The provision of the rules just cited specifically enjoins that "(i)f a counterclaim has
been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion
to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection
unless the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the
court." Defendants Lim and Leonardo had no opportunity to object to the motion to
dismiss before the order granting the same was issued, for the simple reason that
they were not opportunity notified of the motion therefor, but the record shows
clearly that at least defendant Lim immediately brought the matter of their
compulsory counterclaim to the attention of the trial court in his motion for
reconsideration of October 23, 1974, even as the counsel for the other defendant,
Leonardo, predicated his motion on other grounds. In its order of December 6, 1974,
however, respondent court not only upheld the plaintiffs supposed absolute right to
choose her adversaries but also held that the counterclaim is not compulsory,
thereby virtually making unexplained and inexplicable 180-degree turnabout in that
respect.
There is another equally fundamental consideration why the motion to dismiss
should not have been granted. As the plaintiff's complaint has been framed, all the
six defendants are charged with having actually taken part in a conspiracy to
misappropriate, conceal and convert to their own benefit the profits, properties and
all other assets of the partnership Glory Commercial Company, to the extent that

they have allegedly organized a corporation, Glory Commercial Company, Inc. with
what they had illegally gotten from the partnership. Upon such allegations, no
judgment finding the existence of the alleged conspiracy or holding the capital of
the corporation to be the money of the partnership is legally possible without the
presence of all the defendants. The non-defaulted defendants are alleged to be
stockholders of the corporation and any decision depriving the same of all its assets
cannot but prejudice the interests of said defendants. Accordingly, upon these
premises, and even prescinding from the other reasons to be discussed anon it is
clear that all the six defendants below, defaulted and non-defaulted, are
indispensable parties. Respondents could do no less than grant that they are so on
page 23 of their answer. Such being the case, the questioned order of dismissal is
exactly the opposite of what ought to have been done. Whenever it appears to the
court in the course of a proceeding that an indispensable party has not been joined,
it is the duty of the court to stop the trial and to order the inclusion of such party.
(The Revised Rules of Court, Annotated & Commented by Senator Vicente J.
Francisco, Vol. 1, p. 271, 1973 ed. See also Cortez vs. Avila, 101 Phil. 705.) Such an
order is unavoidable, for the "general rule with reference to the making of parties in
a civil action requires the joinder of all necessary parties wherever possible, and the
joinder of all indispensable parties under any and all conditions, the presence of
those latter being a sine qua non of the exercise of judicial power." (Borlasa vs.
Polistico, 47 Phil. 345, at p. 347.) It is precisely " when an indispensable party is not
before the court (that) the action should be dismissed." (People v. Rodriguez, 106
Phil. 325, at p. 327.) The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent
actuations of the court null and void, for want of authority to act, not only as to the
absent parties but even as to those present. In short, what respondent court did
here was exactly the reverse of what the law ordains it eliminated those who by
law should precisely be joined.
As may he noted from the order of respondent court quoted earlier, which resolved
the motions for reconsideration of the dismissal order filed by the non-defaulted
defendants, His Honor rationalized his position thus:
It is the rule that it is the absolute prerogative of the plaintiff to choose, the theory
upon which he predicates his right of action, or the parties he desires to sue,
without dictation or imposition by the court or the adverse party. If he makes a
mistake in the choice of his right of action, or in that of the parties against whom he
seeks to enforce it, that is his own concern as he alone suffers therefrom. The
plaintiff cannot be compelled to choose his defendants, He may not, at his own
expense, be forced to implead anyone who, under the adverse party's theory, is to
answer for defendant's liability. Neither may the Court compel him to furnish the
means by which defendant may avoid or mitigate their liability. (Vao vs. Alo, 95
Phil. 495-496.)
This being the rule this court cannot compel the plaintiff to continue prosecuting her
cause of action against the defendants-movants if in the course of the trial she

believes she can enforce it against the remaining defendants subject only to the
limitation provided in Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. ... (Pages 6263,
Record.)
Noticeably, His Honor has employed the same equivocal terminology as in plaintiff's
motion of October 18, 1974 by referring to the action he had taken as being
"dismissal of the complaint against them or their being dropped therefrom", without
perceiving that the reason for the evidently intentional ambiguity is transparent.
The apparent idea is to rely on the theory that under Section 11 of Rule 3, parties
may be dropped by the court upon motion of any party at any stage of the action,
hence "it is the absolute right prerogative of the plaintiff to choosethe parties he
desires to sue, without dictation or imposition by the court or the adverse party." In
other words, the ambivalent pose is suggested that plaintiff's motion of October 18,
1974 was not predicated on Section 2 of Rule 17 but more on Section 11 of Rule 3.
But the truth is that nothing can be more incorrect. To start with, the latter rule does
not comprehend whimsical and irrational dropping or adding of parties in a
complaint. What it really contemplates is erroneous or mistaken non-joinder and
misjoinder of parties. No one is free to join anybody in a complaint in court only to
drop him unceremoniously later at the pleasure of the plaintiff. The rule
presupposes that the original inclusion had been made in the honest conviction that
it was proper and the subsequent dropping is requested because it has turned out
that such inclusion was a mistake. And this is the reason why the rule ordains that
the dropping be "on such terms as are just" just to all the other parties. In the
case at bar, there is nothing in the record to legally justify the dropping of the nondefaulted defendants, Lim and Leonardo. The motion of October 18, 1974 cites
none. From all appearances, plaintiff just decided to ask for it, without any relevant
explanation at all. Usually, the court in granting such a motion inquires for the
reasons and in the appropriate instances directs the granting of some form of
compensation for the trouble undergone by the defendant in answering the
complaint, preparing for or proceeding partially to trial, hiring counsel and making
corresponding expenses in the premises. Nothing of these, appears in the order in
question. Most importantly, His Honor ought to have considered that the outright
dropping of the non-defaulted defendants Lim and Leonardo, over their objection at
that, would certainly be unjust not only to the petitioners, their own parents, who
would in consequence be entirely defenseless, but also to Lim and Leonardo
themselves who would naturally correspondingly suffer from the eventual judgment
against their parents. Respondent court paid no heed at all to the mandate that
such dropping must be on such terms as are just" meaning to all concerned with
its legal and factual effects.
Thus, it is quite plain that respondent court erred in issuing its order of dismissal of
October 21, 1974 as well as its order of December 6, 1974 denying reconsideration
of such dismissal. As We make this ruling, We are not oblivious of the circumstance
that defendants Lim and Leonardo are not parties herein. But such consideration is

inconsequential. The fate of the case of petitioners is inseparably tied up with said
order of dismissal, if only because the order of ex-parte hearing of October 21, 1974
which directly affects and prejudices said petitioners is predicated thereon.
Necessarily, therefore, We have to pass on the legality of said order, if We are to
decide the case of herein petitioners properly and fairly.
The attitude of the non-defaulted defendants of no longer pursuing further their
questioning of the dismissal is from another point of view understandable. On the
one hand, why should they insist on being defendants when plaintiff herself has
already release from her claims? On the other hand, as far as their respective
parents-co-defendants are concerned, they must have realized that they (their
parents) could even be benefited by such dismissal because they could question
whether or not plaintiff can still prosecute her case against them after she had
secured the order of dismissal in question. And it is in connection with this last point
that the true and correct concept of default becomes relevant.
At this juncture, it may also be stated that the decision of the Court of Appeals of
January 24, 1975 in G. R. No. SP-03066 dismissing the petition for certiorari of nondefaulted defendants Lim and Leonardo impugning the order of dismissal of October
21, 1974, has no bearing at all in this case, not only because that dismissal was
premised by the appellate court on its holding that the said petition was premature
inasmuch as the trial court had not yet resolved the motion of the defendants of
October 28, 1974 praying that said disputed order be quashed, but principally
because herein petitioners were not parties in that proceeding and cannot,
therefore, be bound by its result. In particular, We deem it warranted to draw the
attention of private respondent's counsel to his allegations in paragraphs XI to XIV
of his answer, which relate to said decision of the Court of Appeals and which have
the clear tendency to make it appear to the Court that the appeals court had upheld
the legality and validity of the actuations of the trial court being questioned, when
as a matter of indisputable fact, the dismissal of the petition was based solely and
exclusively on its being premature without in any manner delving into its merits.
The Court must and does admonish counsel that such manner of pleading, being
deceptive and lacking in candor, has no place in any court, much less in the
Supreme Court, and if We are adopting a passive attitude in the premises, it is due
only to the fact that this is counsel's first offense. But similar conduct on his part in
the future will definitely be dealt with more severely. Parties and counsel would be
well advised to avoid such attempts to befuddle the issues as invariably then will be
exposed for what they are, certainly unethical and degrading to the dignity of the
law profession. Moreover, almost always they only betray the inherent weakness of
the cause of the party resorting to them.
2
Coming now to the matter itself of default, it is quite apparent that the impugned
orders must have proceeded from inadequate apprehension of the fundamental

precepts governing such procedure under the Rules of Court. It is time indeed that
the concept of this procedural device were fully understood by the bench and bar,
instead of being merely taken for granted as being that of a simple expedient of not
allowing the offending party to take part in the proceedings, so that after his
adversary shall have presented his evidence, judgment may be rendered in favor of
such opponent, with hardly any chance of said judgment being reversed or
modified.
The Rules of Court contain a separate rule on the subject of default, Rule 18. But
said rule is concerned solely with default resulting from failure of the defendant or
defendants to answer within the reglementary period. Referring to the simplest form
of default, that is, where there is only one defendant in the action and he fails to
answer on time, Section 1 of the rule provides that upon "proof of such failure, (the
court shall) declare the defendant in default. Thereupon the court shall proceed to
receive the plaintiff's evidence and render judgment granting him such relief as the
complaint and the facts proven may warrant." This last clause is clarified by Section
5 which says that "a judgment entered against a party in default shall not exceed
the amount or be different in kind from that prayed for."
Unequivocal, in the literal sense, as these provisions are, they do not readily convey
the full import of what they contemplate. To begin with, contrary to the immediate
notion that can be drawn from their language, these provisions are not to be
understood as meaning that default or the failure of the defendant to answer should
be "interpreted as an admission by the said defendant that the plaintiff's cause of
action find support in the law or that plaintiff is entitled to the relief prayed for."
(Moran, supra, p. 535 citing Macondary & Co. v. Eustaquio, 64 Phil. 466, citing with
approval Chaffin v. McFadden, 41 Ark. 42; Johnson v. Pierce, 12 Ark. 599; Mayden v.
Johnson, 59 Ga. 105; People v. Rust, 292 111. 328; Ken v. Leopold 21 111. A. 163;
Chicago, etc. Electric R. Co. v. Krempel 116 111. A. 253.)
Being declared in default does not constitute a waiver of rights except that of being
heard and of presenting evidence in the trial court. According to Section 2, "except
as provided in Section 9 of Rule 13, a party declared in default shall not be entitled
to notice of subsequent proceedings, nor to take part in the trial." That provision
referred to reads: "No service of papers other than substantially amended pleadings
and final orders or judgments shall be necessary on a party in default unless he files
a motion to set aside the order of default, in which event he shall be entitled to
notice of all further proceedings regardless of whether the order of default is set
aside or not." And pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 41, "a party who has been declared
in default may likewise appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary
to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition for relief to set aside the order of
default has been presented by him in accordance with Rule 38.".
In other words, a defaulted defendant is not actually thrown out of court. While in a
sense it may be said that by defaulting he leaves himself at the mercy of the court,

the rules see to it that any judgment against him must be in accordance with law.
The evidence to support the plaintiff's cause is, of course, presented in his absence,
but the court is not supposed to admit that which is basically incompetent. Although
the defendant would not be in a position to object, elementary justice requires that,
only legal evidence should be considered against him. If the evidence presented
should not be sufficient to justify a judgment for the plaintiff, the complaint must be
dismissed. And if an unfavorable judgment should be justifiable, it cannot exceed in
amount or be different in kind from what is prayed for in the complaint.
Incidentally, these considerations argue against the present widespread practice of
trial judges, as was done by His Honor in this case, of delegating to their clerks of
court the reception of the plaintiff's evidence when the defendant is in default. Such
a Practice is wrong in principle and orientation. It has no basis in any rule. When a
defendant allows himself to be declared in default, he relies on the faith that the
court would take care that his rights are not unduly prejudiced. He has a right to
presume that the law and the rules will still be observed. The proceedings are held
in his forced absence, and it is but fair that the plaintiff should not be allowed to
take advantage of the situation to win by foul or illegal means or with inherently
incompetent evidence. Thus, in such instances, there is need for more attention
from the court, which only the judge himself can provide. The clerk of court would
not be in a position much less have the authority to act in the premises in the
manner demanded by the rules of fair play and as contemplated in the law,
considering his comparably limited area of discretion and his presumably inferior
preparation for the functions of a judge. Besides, the default of the defendant is no
excuse for the court to renounce the opportunity to closely observe the demeanor
and conduct of the witnesses of the plaintiff, the better to appreciate their
truthfulness and credibility. We therefore declare as a matter of judicial policy that
there being no imperative reason for judges to do otherwise, the practice should be
discontinued.
Another matter of practice worthy of mention at this point is that it is preferable to
leave enough opportunity open for possible lifting of the order of default before
proceeding with the reception of the plaintiff's evidence and the rendition of the
decision. "A judgment by default may amount to a positive and considerable
injustice to the defendant; and the possibility of such serious consequences
necessitates a careful and liberal examination of the grounds upon which the
defendant may seek to set it aside." (Moran, supra p. 534, citing Coombs vs.
Santos, 24 Phil. 446; 449-450.) The expression, therefore, in Section 1 of Rule 18
aforequoted which says that "thereupon the court shall proceed to receive the
plaintiff's evidence etc." is not to be taken literally. The gain in time and dispatch
should the court immediately try the case on the very day of or shortly after the
declaration of default is far outweighed by the inconvenience and complications
involved in having to undo everything already done in the event the defendant
should justify his omission to answer on time.

The foregoing observations, as may be noted, refer to instances where the only
defendant or all the defendants, there being several, are declared in default. There
are additional rules embodying more considerations of justice and equity in cases
where there are several defendants against whom a common cause of action is
averred and not all of them answer opportunely or are in default, particularly in
reference to the power of the court to render judgment in such situations. Thus, in
addition to the limitation of Section 5 that the judgment by default should not be
more in amount nor different in kind from the reliefs specifically sought by plaintiff
in his complaint, Section 4 restricts the authority of the court in rendering judgment
in the situations just mentioned as follows:
Sec. 4. Judgment when some defendants answer, and other make difficult. When
a complaint states a common cause of action against several defendant some of
whom answer, and the others fail to do so, the court shall try the case against all
upon the answer thus filed and render judgment upon the evidence presented. The
same proceeding applies when a common cause of action is pleaded in a
counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party claim.
Very aptly does Chief Justice Moran elucidate on this provision and the controlling
jurisprudence explanatory thereof this wise:
Where a complaint states a common cause of action against several defendants and
some appear to defend the case on the merits while others make default, the
defense interposed by those who appear to litigate the case inures to the benefit of
those who fail to appear, and if the court finds that a good defense has been made,
all of the defendants must be absolved. In other words, the answer filed by one or
some of the defendants inures to the benefit of all the others, even those who have
not seasonably filed their answer. (Bueno v. Ortiz, L-22978, June 27, 1968, 23 SCRA
1151.) The proper mode of proceeding where a complaint states a common cause of
action against several defendants, and one of them makes default, is simply to
enter a formal default order against him, and proceed with the cause upon the
answers of the others. The defaulting defendant merely loses his standing in court,
he not being entitled to the service of notice in the cause, nor to appear in the suit
in any way. He cannot adduce evidence; nor can he be heard at the final hearing,
(Lim Toco v. Go Fay, 80 Phil. 166.) although he may appeal the judgment rendered
against him on the merits. (Rule 41, sec. 2.) If the case is finally decided in the
plaintiff's favor, a final decree is then entered against all the defendants; but if the
suit should be decided against the plaintiff, the action will be dismissed as to all the
defendants alike. (Velez v. Ramas, 40 Phil. 787-792; Frow v. de la Vega, 15 Wal.
552,21 L. Ed. 60.) In other words the judgment will affect the defaulting defendants
either favorably or adversely. (Castro v. Pea, 80 Phil. 488.)
Defaulting defendant may ask execution if judgment is in his favor. (Castro v. Pea,
supra.) (Moran, Rules of Court, Vol. 1, pp. 538-539.)

In Castro vs. Pea, 80 Phil. 488, one of the numerous cases cited by Moran, this
Court elaborated on the construction of the same rule when it sanctioned the
execution, upon motion and for the benefit of the defendant in default, of a
judgment which was adverse to the plaintiff. The Court held:
As above stated, Emilia Matanguihan, by her counsel, also was a movant in the
petition for execution Annex 1. Did she have a right to be such, having been
declared in default? In Frow vs. De la Vega, supra, cited as authority in Velez vs.
Ramas, supra, the Supreme Court of the United States adopted as ground for its
own decision the following ruling of the New York Court of Errors in Clason vs.
Morris, 10 Jons., 524:
It would be unreasonable to hold that because one defendant had made default, the
plaintiff should have a decree even against him, where the court is satisfied from
the proofs offered by the other, that in fact the plaintiff is not entitled to a decree.
(21 Law, ed., 61.)
The reason is simple: justice has to be consistent. The complaint stating a common
cause of action against several defendants, the complainant's rights or lack of
them in the controversy have to be the same, and not different, as against all the
defendant's although one or some make default and the other or others appear, join
issue, and enter into trial. For instance, in the case of Clason vs. Morris above cited,
the New York Court of Errors in effect held that in such a case if the plaintiff is not
entitled to a decree, he will not be entitled to it, not only as against the defendant
appearing and resisting his action but also as against the one who made default. In
the case at bar, the cause of action in the plaintiff's complaint was common against
the Mayor of Manila, Emilia Matanguihan, and the other defendants in Civil Case No.
1318 of the lower court. The Court of First Instance in its judgment found and held
upon the evidence adduced by the plaintiff and the defendant mayor that as
between said plaintiff and defendant Matanguihan the latter was the one legally
entitled to occupy the stalls; and it decreed, among other things, that said plaintiff
immediately vacate them. Paraphrasing the New York Court of Errors, it would be
unreasonable to hold now that because Matanguihan had made default, the said
plaintiff should be declared, as against her, legally entitled to the occupancy of the
stalls, or to remain therein, although the Court of First Instance was so firmly
satisfied, from the proofs offered by the other defendant, that the same plaintiff was
not entitled to such occupancy that it peremptorily ordered her to vacate the stalls.
If in the cases of Clason vs. Morris, supra, Frow vs. De la Vega, supra, and Velez vs.
Ramas, supra the decrees entered inured to the benefit of the defaulting
defendants, there is no reason why that entered in said case No. 1318 should not be
held also to have inured to the benefit of the defaulting defendant Matanguihan and
the doctrine in said three cases plainly implies that there is nothing in the law
governing default which would prohibit the court from rendering judgment favorable
to the defaulting defendant in such cases. If it inured to her benefit, it stands to
reason that she had a right to claim that benefit, for it would not be a benefit if the

supposed beneficiary were barred from claiming it; and if the benefit necessitated
the execution of the decree, she must be possessed of the right to ask for the
execution thereof as she did when she, by counsel, participated in the petition for
execution Annex 1.
Section 7 of Rule 35 would seem to afford a solid support to the above
considerations. It provides that when a complaint states a common cause of action
against several defendants, some of whom answer, and the others make default,
'the court shall try the case against all upon the answer thus filed and render
judgment upon the evidence presented by the parties in court'. It is obvious that
under this provision the case is tried jointly not only against the defendants
answering but also against those defaulting, and the trial is held upon the answer
filed by the former; and the judgment, if adverse, will prejudice the defaulting
defendants no less than those who answer. In other words, the defaulting
defendants are held bound by the answer filed by their co-defendants and by the
judgment which the court may render against all of them. By the same token, and
by all rules of equity and fair play, if the judgment should happen to be favorable,
totally or partially, to the answering defendants, it must correspondingly benefit the
defaulting ones, for it would not be just to let the judgment produce effects as to
the defaulting defendants only when adverse to them and not when favorable.
In Bueno vs. Ortiz, 23 SCRA 1151, the Court applied the provision under discussion
in the following words:
In answer to the charge that respondent Judge had committed a grave abuse of
discretion in rendering a default judgment against the PC, respondents allege that,
not having filed its answer within the reglementary period, the PC was in default, so
that it was proper for Patanao to forthwith present his evidence and for respondent
Judge to render said judgment. It should be noted, however, that in entering the
area in question and seeking to prevent Patanao from continuing his logging
operations therein, the PC was merely executing an order of the Director of Forestry
and acting as his agent. Patanao's cause of action against the other respondents in
Case No. 190, namely, the Director of Forestry, the District Forester of Agusan, the
Forest Officer of Bayugan, Agusan, and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. Pursuant to Rule 18, Section 4, of the Rules of Court, 'when a complaint
states a common cause of action against several defendants some of whom answer
and the others fail to do so, the court shall try the case against all upon the answer
thus filed (by some) and render judgment upon the evidence presented.' In other
words, the answer filed by one or some of the defendants inures to the benefit of all
the others, even those who have not seasonably filed their answer.
Indeed, since the petition in Case No. 190 sets forth a common cause of action
against all of the respondents therein, a decision in favor of one of them would
necessarily favor the others. In fact, the main issue, in said case, is whether Patanao
has a timber license to undertake logging operations in the disputed area. It is not

possible to decide such issue in the negative, insofar as the Director of Forestry, and
to settle it otherwise, as regards the PC, which is merely acting as agent of the
Director of Forestry, and is, therefore, his alter ego, with respect to the disputed
forest area.
Stated differently, in all instances where a common cause of action is alleged
against several defendants, some of whom answer and the others do not, the latter
or those in default acquire a vested right not only to own the defense interposed in
the answer of their co- defendant or co-defendants not in default but also to expect
a result of the litigation totally common with them in kind and in amount whether
favorable or unfavorable. The substantive unity of the plaintiff's cause against all
the defendants is carried through to its adjective phase as ineluctably demanded by
the homogeneity and indivisibility of justice itself. Indeed, since the singleness of
the cause of action also inevitably implies that all the defendants are indispensable
parties, the court's power to act is integral and cannot be split such that it cannot
relieve any of them and at the same time render judgment against the rest.
Considering the tenor of the section in question, it is to be assumed that when any
defendant allows himself to be declared in default knowing that his defendant has
already answered, he does so trusting in the assurance implicit in the rule that his
default is in essence a mere formality that deprives him of no more than the right to
take part in the trial and that the court would deem anything done by or for the
answering defendant as done by or for him. The presumption is that otherwise he
would not -have seen to that he would not be in default. Of course, he has to suffer
the consequences of whatever the answering defendant may do or fail to do,
regardless of possible adverse consequences, but if the complaint has to be
dismissed in so far as the answering defendant is concerned it becomes his
inalienable right that the same be dismissed also as to him. It does not matter that
the dismissal is upon the evidence presented by the plaintiff or upon the latter's
mere desistance, for in both contingencies, the lack of sufficient legal basis must be
the cause. The integrity of the common cause of action against all the defendants
and the indispensability of all of them in the proceedings do not permit any
possibility of waiver of the plaintiff's right only as to one or some of them, without
including all of them, and so, as a rule, withdrawal must be deemed to be a
confession of weakness as to all. This is not only elementary justice; it also
precludes the concomitant hazard that plaintiff might resort to the kind of
procedural strategem practiced by private respondent herein that resulted in totally
depriving petitioners of every opportunity to defend themselves against her claims
which, after all, as will be seen later in this opinion, the record does not show to be
invulnerable, both in their factual and legal aspects, taking into consideration the
tenor of the pleadings and the probative value of the competent evidence which
were before the trial court when it rendered its assailed decision where all the
defendants are indispensable parties, for which reason the absence of any of them
in the case would result in the court losing its competency to act validly, any
compromise that the plaintiff might wish to make with any of them must, as a

matter of correct procedure, have to await until after the rendition of the judgment,
at which stage the plaintiff may then treat the matter of its execution and the
satisfaction of his claim as variably as he might please. Accordingly, in the case now
before Us together with the dismissal of the complaint against the non-defaulted
defendants, the court should have ordered also the dismissal thereof as to
petitioners.
Indeed, there is more reason to apply here the principle of unity and indivisibility of
the action just discussed because all the defendants here have already joined
genuine issues with plaintiff. Their default was only at the pre-trial. And as to such
absence of petitioners at the pre-trial, the same could be attributed to the fact that
they might not have considered it necessary anymore to be present, since their
respective children Lim and Leonardo, with whom they have common defenses,
could take care of their defenses as well. Anything that might have had to be done
by them at such pre-trial could have been done for them by their children, at least
initially, specially because in the light of the pleadings before the court, the
prospects of a compromise must have appeared to be rather remote. Such attitude
of petitioners is neither uncommon nor totally unjustified. Under the circumstances,
to declare them immediately and irrevocably in default was not an absolute
necessity. Practical considerations and reasons of equity should have moved
respondent court to be more understanding in dealing with the situation. After all,
declaring them in default as respondent court did not impair their right to a
common fate with their children.
3
Another issue to be resolved in this case is the question of whether or not herein
petitioners were entitled to notice of plaintiff's motion to drop their co-defendants
Lim and Leonardo, considering that petitioners had been previously declared in
default. In this connection, the decisive consideration is that according to the
applicable rule, Section 9, Rule 13, already quoted above, (1) even after a
defendant has been declared in default, provided he "files a motion to set aside the
order of default, he shall be entitled to notice of all further proceedings
regardless of whether the order of default is set aside or not" and (2) a party in
default who has not filed such a motion to set aside must still be served with all
"substantially amended or supplemented pleadings." In the instant case, it cannot
be denied that petitioners had all filed their motion for reconsideration of the order
declaring them in default. Respondents' own answer to the petition therein makes
reference to the order of April 3, 1973, Annex 8 of said answer, which denied said
motion for reconsideration. On page 3 of petitioners' memorandum herein this
motion is referred to as "a motion to set aside the order of default." But as We have
not been favored by the parties with a copy of the said motion, We do not even
know the excuse given for petitioners' failure to appear at the pre-trial, and We
cannot, therefore, determine whether or not the motion complied with the
requirements of Section 3 of Rule 18 which We have held to be controlling in cases

of default for failure to answer on time. (The Philippine-British Co. Inc. etc. et al. vs.
The Hon. Walfrido de los Angeles etc. et al., 63 SCRA 50.)
We do not, however, have here, as earlier noted, a case of default for failure to
answer but one for failure to appear at the pre-trial. We reiterate, in the situation
now before Us, issues have already been joined. In fact, evidence had been partially
offered already at the pre-trial and more of it at the actual trial which had already
begun with the first witness of the plaintiff undergoing re-cross-examination. With
these facts in mind and considering that issues had already been joined even as
regards the defaulted defendants, it would be requiring the obvious to pretend that
there was still need for an oath or a verification as to the merits of the defense of
the defaulted defendants in their motion to reconsider their default. Inasmuch as
none of the parties had asked for a summary judgment there can be no question
that the issues joined were genuine, and consequently, the reason for requiring
such oath or verification no longer holds. Besides, it may also be reiterated that
being the parents of the non-defaulted defendants, petitioners must have assumed
that their presence was superfluous, particularly because the cause of action
against them as well as their own defenses are common. Under these
circumstances, the form of the motion by which the default was sought to be lifted
is secondary and the requirements of Section 3 of Rule 18 need not be strictly
complied with, unlike in cases of default for failure to answer. We can thus hold as
We do hold for the purposes of the revival of their right to notice under Section 9 of
Rule 13, that petitioner's motion for reconsideration was in substance legally
adequate regardless of whether or not it was under oath.
In any event, the dropping of the defendants Lim and Leonardo from plaintiff's
amended complaint was virtually a second amendment of plaintiffs complaint. And
there can be no doubt that such amendment was substantial, for with the
elimination thereby of two defendants allegedly solidarily liable with their codefendants, herein petitioners, it had the effect of increasing proportionally what
each of the remaining defendants, the said petitioners, would have to answer for
jointly and severally. Accordingly, notice to petitioners of the plaintiff's motion of
October 18, 1974 was legally indispensable under the rule above-quoted.
Consequently, respondent court had no authority to act on the motion, to dismiss,
pursuant to Section 6 of Rule 15, for according to Senator Francisco, "(t) he Rules of
Court clearly provide that no motion shall be acted upon by the Court without the
proof of service of notice thereof, together with a copy of the motion and other
papers accompanying it, to all parties concerned at least three days before the
hearing thereof, stating the time and place for the hearing of the motion. (Rule 26,
section 4, 5 and 6, Rules of Court (now Sec. 15, new Rules). When the motion does
not comply with this requirement, it is not a motion. It presents no question which
the court could decide. And the Court acquires no jurisdiction to consider it. (Roman
Catholic Bishop of Lipa vs. Municipality of Unisan 44 Phil., 866; Manakil vs. Revilla,
42 Phil., 81.) (Laserna vs. Javier, et al., CA-G.R. No. 7885, April 22, 1955; 21 L.J. 36,

citing Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa vs. Municipality of Unisan 44 Phil., 866; Manakil
vs. Revilla, 42 Phil., 81.) (Francisco. The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines,
pp. 861-862.) Thus, We see again, from a different angle, why respondent court's
order of dismissal of October 21, 1974 is fatally ineffective.
4
The foregoing considerations notwithstanding, it is respondents' position that
certiorari is not the proper remedy of petitioners. It is contended that inasmuch as
said petitioners have in fact made their appeal already by filing the required notice
of appeal and appeal bond and a motion for extension to file their record on appeal,
which motion was granted by respondent court, their only recourse is to prosecute
that appeal. Additionally, it is also maintained that since petitioners have expressly
withdrawn their motion to quash of January 4, 1975 impugning the order of October
28, 1974, they have lost their right to assail by certiorari the actuations of
respondent court now being questioned, respondent court not having been given
the opportunity to correct any possible error it might have committed.
We do not agree. As already shown in the foregoing discussion, the proceedings in
the court below have gone so far out of hand that prompt action is needed to
restore order in the entangled situation created by the series of plainly illegal orders
it had issued. The essential purpose of certiorari is to keep the proceedings in lower
judicial courts and tribunals within legal bounds, so that due process and the rule of
law may prevail at all times and arbitrariness, whimsicality and unfairness which
justice abhors may immediately be stamped out before graver injury, juridical and
otherwise, ensues. While generally these objectives may well be attained in an
ordinary appeal, it is undoubtedly the better rule to allow the special remedy of
certiorari at the option of the party adversely affected, when the irregularity
committed by the trial court is so grave and so far reaching in its consequences that
the long and cumbersome procedure of appeal will only further aggravate the
situation of the aggrieved party because other untoward actuations are likely to
materialize as natural consequences of those already perpetrated. If the law were
otherwise, certiorari would have no reason at all for being.
No elaborate discussion is needed to show the urgent need for corrective measures
in the case at bar. Verily, this is one case that calls for the exercise of the Supreme
Court's inherent power of supervision over all kinds of judicial actions of lower
courts. Private respondent's procedural technique designed to disable petitioners to
defend themselves against her claim which appears on the face of the record itself
to be at least highly controversial seems to have so fascinated respondent court
that none would be surprised should her pending motion for immediate execution of
the impugned judgment receive similar ready sanction as her previous motions
which turned the proceedings into a one-sided affair. The stakes here are high. Not
only is the subject matter considerably substantial; there is the more important
aspect that not only the spirit and intent of the rules but even the basic rudiments

of fair play have been disregarded. For the Court to leave unrestrained the obvious
tendency of the proceedings below would be nothing short of wittingly condoning
inequity and injustice resulting from erroneous construction and unwarranted
application of procedural rules.
5
The sum and total of all the foregoing disquisitions is that the decision here in
question is legally anomalous. It is predicated on two fatal malactuations of
respondent court namely (1) the dismissal of the complaint against the nondefaulted defendants Lim and Leonardo and (2) the ex-parte reception of the
evidence of the plaintiff by the clerk of court, the subsequent using of the same as
basis for its judgment and the rendition of such judgment.
For at least three reasons which We have already fully discussed above, the order of
dismissal of October 21, 1974 is unworthy of Our sanction: (1) there was no timely
notice of the motion therefor to the non-defaulted defendants, aside from there
being no notice at all to herein petitioners; (2) the common answer of the
defendants, including the non-defaulted, contained a compulsory counterclaim
incapable of being determined in an independent action; and (3) the immediate
effect of such dismissal was the removal of the two non-defaulted defendants as
parties, and inasmuch as they are both indispensable parties in the case, the court
consequently lost the" sine qua non of the exercise of judicial power", per Borlasa
vs. Polistico, supra. This is not to mention anymore the irregular delegation to the
clerk of court of the function of receiving plaintiff's evidence. And as regards the exparte reception of plaintiff's evidence and subsequent rendition of the judgment by
default based thereon, We have seen that it was violative of the right of the
petitioners, under the applicable rules and principles on default, to a common and
single fate with their non-defaulted co-defendants. And We are not yet referring, as
We shall do this anon to the numerous reversible errors in the decision itself.
It is to be noted, however, that the above-indicated two fundamental flaws in
respondent court's actuations do not call for a common corrective remedy. We
cannot simply rule that all the impugned proceedings are null and void and should
be set aside, without being faced with the insurmountable obstacle that by so doing
We would be reviewing the case as against the two non-defaulted defendants who
are not before Us not being parties hereto. Upon the other hand, for Us to hold that
the order of dismissal should be allowed to stand, as contended by respondents
themselves who insist that the same is already final, not only because the period for
its finality has long passed but also because allegedly, albeit not very accurately,
said 'non-defaulted defendants unsuccessfully tried to have it set aside by the Court
of Appeals whose decision on their petition is also already final, We would have to
disregard whatever evidence had been presented by the plaintiff against them and,
of course, the findings of respondent court based thereon which, as the assailed
decision shows, are adverse to them. In other words, whichever of the two apparent

remedies the Court chooses, it would necessarily entail some kind of possible
juridical imperfection. Speaking of their respective practical or pragmatic effects, to
annul the dismissal would inevitably prejudice the rights of the non-defaulted
defendants whom We have not heard and who even respondents would not wish to
have anything anymore to do with the case. On the other hand, to include
petitioners in the dismissal would naturally set at naught every effort private
respondent has made to establish or prove her case thru means sanctioned by
respondent court. In short, We are confronted with a legal para-dilemma. But one
thing is certain this difficult situations has been brought about by none other than
private respondent who has quite cynically resorted to procedural maneuvers
without realizing that the technicalities of the adjective law, even when apparently
accurate from the literal point of view, cannot prevail over the imperatives of the
substantive law and of equity that always underlie them and which have to be
inevitably considered in the construction of the pertinent procedural rules.
All things considered, after careful and mature deliberation, the Court has arrived at
the conclusion that as between the two possible alternatives just stated, it would
only be fair, equitable and proper to uphold the position of petitioners. In other
words, We rule that the order of dismissal of October 21, 1974 is in law a dismissal
of the whole case of the plaintiff, including as to petitioners herein. Consequently,
all proceedings held by respondent court subsequent thereto including and
principally its decision of December 20, 1974 are illegal and should be set aside.
This conclusion is fully justified by the following considerations of equity:
1. It is very clear to Us that the procedural maneuver resorted to by private
respondent in securing the decision in her favor was ill-conceived. It was
characterized by that which every principle of law and equity disdains taking
unfair advantage of the rules of procedure in order to unduly deprive the other party
of full opportunity to defend his cause. The idea of "dropping" the non-defaulted
defendants with the end in view of completely incapacitating their co-defendants
from making any defense, without considering that all of them are indispensable
parties to a common cause of action to which they have countered with a common
defense readily connotes an intent to secure a one-sided decision, even improperly.
And when, in this connection, the obvious weakness of plaintiff's evidence is taken
into account, one easily understands why such tactics had to be availed of. We
cannot directly or indirectly give Our assent to the commission of unfairness and
inequity in the application of the rules of procedure, particularly when the propriety
of reliance thereon is not beyond controversy.
2. The theories of remedial law pursued by private respondents, although approved
by His Honor, run counter to such basic principles in the rules on default and such
elementary rules on dismissal of actions and notice of motions that no trial court
should be unaware of or should be mistaken in applying. We are at a loss as to why
His Honor failed to see through counsel's inequitous strategy, when the provisions

(1) on the three-day rule on notice of motions, Section 4 of Rule 15, (2) against
dismissal of actions on motion of plaintiff when there is a compulsory counterclaim,
Section 2, Rule 17, (3) against permitting the absence of indispensable parties,
Section 7, Rule 3, (4) on service of papers upon defendants in default when there
are substantial amendments to pleadings, Section 9, Rule 13, and (5) on the unity
and integrity of the fate of defendants in default with those not in default where the
cause of action against them and their own defenses are common, Section 4, Rule
18, are so plain and the jurisprudence declaratory of their intent and proper
construction are so readily comprehensible that any error as to their application
would be unusual in any competent trial court.
3. After all, all the malactuations of respondent court are traceable to the initiative
of private respondent and/or her counsel. She cannot, therefore, complain that she
is being made to unjustifiably suffer the consequences of what We have found to be
erroneous orders of respondent court. It is only fair that she should not be allowed
to benefit from her own frustrated objective of securing a one-sided decision.
4. More importantly, We do not hesitate to hold that on the basis of its own recitals,
the decision in question cannot stand close scrutiny. What is more, the very
considerations contained therein reveal convincingly the inherent weakness of the
cause of the plaintiff. To be sure, We have been giving serious thought to the idea of
merely returning this case for a resumption of trial by setting aside the order of
dismissal of October 21, 1974, with all its attendant difficulties on account of its
adverse effects on parties who have not been heard, but upon closer study of the
pleadings and the decision and other circumstances extant in the record before Us,
We are now persuaded that such a course of action would only lead to more legal
complications incident to attempts on the part of the parties concerned to
desperately squeeze themselves out of a bad situation. Anyway, We feel confident
that by and large, there is enough basis here and now for Us to rule out the claim of
the plaintiff.
Even a mere superficial reading of the decision would immediately reveal that it is
littered on its face with deficiencies and imperfections which would have had no
reason for being were there less haste and more circumspection in rendering the
same. Recklessness in jumping to unwarranted conclusions, both factual and legal,
is at once evident in its findings relative precisely to the main bases themselves of
the reliefs granted. It is apparent therein that no effort has been made to avoid
glaring inconsistencies. Where references are made to codal provisions and
jurisprudence, inaccuracy and inapplicability are at once manifest. It hardly
commends itself as a deliberate and consciencious adjudication of a litigation which,
considering the substantial value of the subject matter it involves and the
unprecedented procedure that was followed by respondent's counsel, calls for
greater attention and skill than the general run of cases would.

Inter alia, the following features of the decision make it highly improbable that if We
took another course of action, private respondent would still be able to make out
any case against petitioners, not to speak of their co-defendants who have already
been exonerated by respondent herself thru her motion to dismiss:
1. According to His Honor's own statement of plaintiff's case, "she is the widow of
the late Tee Hoon Po Chuan (Po Chuan, for short) who was then one of the partners
in the commercial partnership, Glory Commercial Co. with defendants Antonio Lim
Tanhu (Lim Tanhu, for short) and Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua (Ng Sua, for short) as copartners; that after the death of her husband on March 11, 1966 she is entitled to
share not only in the capital and profits of the partnership but also in the other
assets, both real and personal, acquired by the partnership with funds of the latter
during its lifetime."
Relatedly, in the latter part of the decision, the findings are to the following effect: .
That the herein plaintiff Tan Put and her late husband Po Chuan married at the
Philippine Independent Church of Cebu City on December, 20, 1949; that Po Chuan
died on March 11, 1966; that the plaintiff and the late Po Chuan were childless but
the former has a foster son Antonio Nuez whom she has reared since his birth with
whom she lives up to the present; that prior to the marriage of the plaintiff to Po
Chuan the latter was already managing the partnership Glory Commercial Co. then
engaged in a little business in hardware at Manalili St., Cebu City; that prior to and
just after the marriage of the plaintiff to Po Chuan she was engaged in the drugstore
business; that not long after her marriage, upon the suggestion of Po Chuan the
plaintiff sold her drugstore for P125,000.00 which amount she gave to her husband
in the presence of defendant Lim Tanhu and was invested in the partnership Glory
Commercial Co. sometime in 1950; that after the investment of the above-stated
amount in the partnership its business flourished and it embarked in the import
business and also engaged in the wholesale and retail trade of cement and GI
sheets and under huge profits;
xxx xxx xxx
That the late Po Chuan was the one who actively managed the business of the
partnership Glory Commercial Co. he was the one who made the final decisions and
approved the appointments of new personnel who were taken in by the partnership;
that the late Po Chuan and defendants Lim Tanhu and Ng Sua are brothers, the
latter two (2) being the elder brothers of the former; that defendants Lim Tanhu and
Ng Sua are both naturalized Filipino citizens whereas the late Po Chuan until the
time of his death was a Chinese citizen; that the three (3) brothers were partners in
the Glory Commercial Co. but Po Chuan was practically the owner of the partnership
having the controlling interest; that defendants Lim Tanhu and Ng Sua were
partners in name but they were mere employees of Po Chuan .... (Pp. 89-91,
Record.)

How did His Honor arrive at these conclusions? To start with, it is not clear in the
decision whether or not in making its findings of fact the court took into account the
allegations in the pleadings of the parties and whatever might have transpired at
the pre-trial. All that We can gather in this respect is that references are made
therein to pre-trial exhibits and to Annex A of the answer of the defendants to
plaintiff's amended complaint. Indeed, it was incumbent upon the court to consider
not only the evidence formally offered at the trial but also the admissions,
expressed or implied, in the pleadings, as well as whatever might have been placed
before it or brought to its attention during the pre-trial. In this connection, it is to be
regretted that none of the parties has thought it proper to give Us an idea of what
took place at the pre-trial of the present case and what are contained in the pre-trial
order, if any was issued pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 20.
The fundamental purpose of pre-trial, aside from affording the parties every
opportunity to compromise or settle their differences, is for the court to be apprised
of the unsettled issues between the parties and of their respective evidence relative
thereto, to the end that it may take corresponding measures that would abbreviate
the trial as much as possible and the judge may be able to ascertain the facts with
the least observance of technical rules. In other words whatever is said or done by
the parties or their counsel at the pre- trial serves to put the judge on notice of their
respective basic positions, in order that in appropriate cases he may, if necessary in
the interest of justice and a more accurate determination of the facts, make
inquiries about or require clarifications of matters taken up at the pre-trial, before
finally resolving any issue of fact or of law. In brief, the pre-trial constitutes part and
parcel of the proceedings, and hence, matters dealt with therein may not be
disregarded in the process of decision making. Otherwise, the real essence of
compulsory pre-trial would be insignificant and worthless.
Now, applying these postulates to the findings of respondent court just quoted, it
will be observed that the court's conclusion about the supposed marriage of plaintiff
to the deceased Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan is contrary to the weight of the evidence
brought before it during the trial and the pre-trial.
Under Article 55 of the Civil Code, the declaration of the contracting parties that
they take each other as husband and wife "shall be set forth in an instrument"
signed by the parties as well as by their witnesses and the person solemnizing the
marriage. Accordingly, the primary evidence of a marriage must be an authentic
copy of the marriage contract. While a marriage may also be proved by other
competent evidence, the absence of the contract must first be satisfactorily
explained. Surely, the certification of the person who allegedly solemnized a
marriage is not admissible evidence of such marriage unless proof of loss of the
contract or of any other satisfactory reason for its non-production is first presented
to the court. In the case at bar, the purported certification issued by a Mons. Jose M.
Recoleto, Bishop, Philippine Independent Church, Cebu City, is not, therefore,
competent evidence, there being absolutely no showing as to unavailability of the

marriage contract and, indeed, as to the authenticity of the signature of said

certifier, the jurat allegedly signed by a second assistant provincial fiscal not being
authorized by law, since it is not part of the functions of his office. Besides,
inasmuch as the bishop did not testify, the same is hearsay.
As regards the testimony of plaintiff herself on the same point and that of her
witness Antonio Nuez, there can be no question that they are both self-serving and
of very little evidentiary value, it having been disclosed at the trial that plaintiff has
already assigned all her rights in this case to said Nuez, thereby making him the
real party in interest here and, therefore, naturally as biased as herself. Besides, in
the portion of the testimony of Nuez copied in Annex C of petitioner's
memorandum, it appears admitted that he was born only on March 25, 1942, which
means that he was less than eight years old at the supposed time of the alleged
marriage. If for this reason alone, it is extremely doubtful if he could have been
sufficiently aware of such event as to be competent to testify about it.
Incidentally, another Annex C of the same memorandum purports to be the
certificate of birth of one Antonio T. Uy supposed to have been born on March 23,
1937 at Centro Misamis, Misamis Occidental, the son of one Uy Bien, father, and Tan
Put, mother. Significantly, respondents have not made any adverse comment on
this document. It is more likely, therefore, that the witness is really the son of
plaintiff by her husband Uy Kim Beng. But she testified she was childless. So which
is which? In any event, if on the strength of this document, Nuez is actually the
legitimate son of Tan Put and not her adopted son, he would have been but 13 years
old in 1949, the year of her alleged marriage to Po Chuan, and even then,
considering such age, his testimony in regard thereto would still be suspect.
Now, as against such flimsy evidence of plaintiff, the court had before it, two
documents of great weight belying the pretended marriage. We refer to (1) Exhibit
LL, the income tax return of the deceased Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan indicating that
the name of his wife was Ang Sick Tin and (2) the quitclaim, Annex A of the answer,
wherein plaintiff Tan Put stated that she had been living with the deceased without
benefit of marriage and that she was his "common-law wife". Surely, these two
documents are far more reliable than all the evidence of the plaintiff put together.
Of course, Exhibit LL is what might be termed as pre-trial evidence. But it is
evidence offered to the judge himself, not to the clerk of court, and should have at
least moved him to ask plaintiff to explain if not rebut it before jumping to the
conclusion regarding her alleged marriage to the deceased, Po Chuan. And in regard
to the quitclaim containing the admission of a common-law relationship only, it is to
be observed that His Honor found that "defendants Lim Tanhu and Ng Sua had the
plaintiff execute a quitclaim on November 29, 1967 (Annex "A", Answer) where they
gave plaintiff the amount of P25,000 as her share in the capital and profits of the
business of Glory Commercial Co. which was engaged in the hardware business",
without making mention of any evidence of fraud and misrepresentation in its

execution, thereby indicating either that no evidence to prove that allegation of the
plaintiff had been presented by her or that whatever evidence was actually offered
did not produce persuasion upon the court. Stated differently, since the existence of
the quitclaim has been duly established without any circumstance to detract from
its legal import, the court should have held that plaintiff was bound by her
admission therein that she was the common-law wife only of Po Chuan and what is
more, that she had already renounced for valuable consideration whatever claim
she might have relative to the partnership Glory Commercial Co.
And when it is borne in mind that in addition to all these considerations, there are
mentioned and discussed in the memorandum of petitioners (1) the certification of
the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City and (2) a similar certification of the Apostolic
Prefect of the Philippine Independent Church, Parish of Sto. Nio, Cebu City, that
their respective official records corresponding to December 1949 to December 1950
do not show any marriage between Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan and Tan Put, neither of
which certifications have been impugned by respondent until now, it stands to
reason that plaintiff's claim of marriage is really unfounded. Withal, there is still
another document, also mentioned and discussed in the same memorandum and
unimpugned by respondents, a written agreement executed in Chinese, but
purportedly translated into English by the Chinese Consul of Cebu, between Tan Put
and Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan to the following effect:
CONSULATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA Cebu City, Philippines
TRANSLATION
This is to certify that 1, Miss Tan Ki Eng Alias Tan Put, have lived with Mr. Lim Po
Chuan alias TeeHoon since 1949 but it recently occurs that we are incompatible with
each other and are not in the position to keep living together permanently. With the
mutual concurrence, we decided to terminate the existing relationship of common
law-marriage and promised not to interfere each other's affairs from now on. The
Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) has been given to me by Mr. Lim Po Chuan for
my subsistence.
Witnesses:
Mr. Lim Beng Guan Mr. Huang Sing Se
Signed on the 10 day of the 7th month of the 54th year of the Republic of China
(corresponding to the year 1965).
(SGD) TAN KI ENG
Verified from the records. JORGE TABAR (Pp. 283-284, Record.)

Indeed, not only does this document prove that plaintiff's relation to the deceased
was that of a common-law wife but that they had settled their property interests
with the payment to her of P40,000.
In the light of all these circumstances, We find no alternative but to hold that
plaintiff Tan Put's allegation that she is the widow of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan has not
been satisfactorily established and that, on the contrary, the evidence on record
convincingly shows that her relation with said deceased was that of a common-law
wife and furthermore, that all her claims against the company and its surviving
partners as well as those against the estate of the deceased have already been
settled and paid. We take judicial notice of the fact that the respective counsel who
assisted the parties in the quitclaim, Attys. H. Hermosisima and Natalio Castillo, are
members in good standing of the Philippine Bar, with the particularity that the latter
has been a member of the Cabinet and of the House of Representatives of the
Philippines, hence, absent any credible proof that they had allowed themselves to
be parties to a fraudulent document His Honor did right in recognizing its existence,
albeit erring in not giving due legal significance to its contents.
2. If, as We have seen, plaintiff's evidence of her alleged status as legitimate wife of
Po Chuan is not only unconvincing but has been actually overcome by the more
competent and weighty evidence in favor of the defendants, her attempt to
substantiate her main cause of action that defendants Lim Tanhu and Ng Sua have
defrauded the partnership Glory Commercial Co. and converted its properties to
themselves is even more dismal. From the very evidence summarized by His Honor
in the decision in question, it is clear that not an iota of reliable proof exists of such
alleged misdeeds.
Of course, the existence of the partnership has not been denied, it is actually
admitted impliedly in defendants' affirmative defense that Po Chuan's share had
already been duly settled with and paid to both the plaintiff and his legitimate
family. But the evidence as to the actual participation of the defendants Lim Tanhu
and Ng Sua in the operation of the business that could have enabled them to make
the extractions of funds alleged by plaintiff is at best confusing and at certain points
manifestly inconsistent.
In her amended complaint, plaintiff repeatedly alleged that as widow of Po Chuan
she is entitled to / 3 share of the assets and properties of the partnership. In fact,
her prayer in said complaint is, among others, for the delivery to her of such / 3
share. His Honor's statement of the case as well as his findings and judgment are all
to that same effect. But what did she actually try to prove at the ex- parte hearing?
According to the decision, plaintiff had shown that she had money of her own when
she "married" Po Chuan and "that prior to and just after the marriage of the plaintiff
to Po Chuan, she was engaged in the drugstore business; that not long after her
marriage, upon the suggestion of Po Chuan, the plaintiff sold her drugstore for

P125,000 which amount she gave to her husband in the presence of Tanhu and was
invested in the partnership Glory Commercial Co. sometime in 1950; that after the
investment of the above-stated amount in the partnership, its business flourished
and it embarked in the import business and also engaged in the wholesale and retail
trade of cement and GI sheets and under (sic) huge profits." (pp. 25-26, Annex L,
petition.)
To begin with, this theory of her having contributed of P125,000 to the capital of the
partnership by reason of which the business flourished and amassed all the millions
referred to in the decision has not been alleged in the complaint, and inasmuch as
what was being rendered was a judgment by default, such theory should not have
been allowed to be the subject of any evidence. But inasmuch as it was the clerk of
court who received the evidence, it is understandable that he failed to observe the
rule. Then, on the other hand, if it was her capital that made the partnership
flourish, why would she claim to be entitled to only to / 3 of its assets and profits?
Under her theory found proven by respondent court, she was actually the owner of
everything, particularly because His Honor also found "that defendants Lim Tanhu
and Ng Sua were partners in the name but they were employees of Po Chuan that
defendants Lim Tanhu and Ng Sua had no means of livelihood at the time of their
employment with the Glory Commercial Co. under the management of the late Po
Chuan except their salaries therefrom; ..." (p. 27, id.) Why then does she claim only
/ 3 share? Is this an indication of her generosity towards defendants or of a
concocted cause of action existing only in her confused imagination engendered by
the death of her common-law husband with whom she had settled her common-law
claim for recompense of her services as common law wife for less than what she
must have known would go to his legitimate wife and children?
Actually, as may be noted from the decision itself, the trial court was confused as to
the participation of defendants Lim Tanhu and Ng Sua in Glory Commercial Co. At
one point, they were deemed partners, at another point mere employees and then
elsewhere as partners-employees, a newly found concept, to be sure, in the law on
partnership. And the confusion is worse comfounded in the judgment which allows
these "partners in name" and "partners-employees" or employees who had no
means of livelihood and who must not have contributed any capital in the business,
"as Po Chuan was practically the owner of the partnership having the controlling
interest", / 3 each of the huge assets and profits of the partnership. Incidentally, it
may be observed at this juncture that the decision has made Po Chuan play the
inconsistent role of being "practically the owner" but at the same time getting his
capital from the P125,000 given to him by plaintiff and from which capital the
business allegedly "flourished."
Anent the allegation of plaintiff that the properties shown by her exhibits to be in
the names of defendants Lim Tanhu and Ng Sua were bought by them with
partnership funds, His Honor confirmed the same by finding and holding that "it is
likewise clear that real properties together with the improvements in the names of

defendants Lim Tanhu and Ng Sua were acquired with partnership funds as these
defendants were only partners-employees of deceased Po Chuan in the Glory
Commercial Co. until the time of his death on March 11, 1966." (p. 30, id.) It Is Our
considered view, however, that this conclusion of His Honor is based on nothing but
pure unwarranted conjecture. Nowhere is it shown in the decision how said
defendants could have extracted money from the partnership in the fraudulent and
illegal manner pretended by plaintiff. Neither in the testimony of Nuez nor in that
of plaintiff, as these are summarized in the decision, can there be found any single
act of extraction of partnership funds committed by any of said defendants. That
the partnership might have grown into a multi-million enterprise and that the
properties described in the exhibits enumerated in the decision are not in the
names of Po Chuan, who was Chinese, but of the defendants who are Filipinos, do
not necessarily prove that Po Chuan had not gotten his share of the profits of the
business or that the properties in the names of the defendants were bought with
money of the partnership. In this connection, it is decisively important to consider
that on the basis of the concordant and mutually cumulative testimonies of plaintiff
and Nuez, respondent court found very explicitly that, and We reiterate:
xxx xxx xxx
That the late Po Chuan was the one who actively managed the business of the
partnership Glory Commercial Co. he was the one who made the final decisions and
approved the appointments of new Personnel who were taken in by the partnership;
that the late Po Chuan and defendants Lim Tanhu and Ng Sua are brothers, the
latter to (2) being the elder brothers of the former; that defendants Lim Tanhu and
Ng Sua are both naturalized Filipino citizens whereas the late Po Chuan until the
time of his death was a Chinese citizen; that the three (3) brothers were partners in
the Glory Commercial Co. but Po Chuan was practically the owner of the partnership
having the controlling interest; that defendants Lim Tanhu and Ng Sua were
partners in name but they were mere employees of Po Chuan; .... (Pp. 90-91,
Record.)
If Po Chuan was in control of the affairs and the running of the partnership, how
could the defendants have defrauded him of such huge amounts as plaintiff had
made his Honor believe? Upon the other hand, since Po Chuan was in control of the
affairs of the partnership, the more logical inference is that if defendants had
obtained any portion of the funds of the partnership for themselves, it must have
been with the knowledge and consent of Po Chuan, for which reason no accounting
could be demanded from them therefor, considering that Article 1807 of the Civil
Code refers only to what is taken by a partner without the consent of the other
partner or partners. Incidentally again, this theory about Po Chuan having been
actively managing the partnership up to his death is a substantial deviation from
the allegation in the amended complaint to the effect that "defendants Antonio Lim
Tanhu, Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua, Lim Teck Chuan and Eng Chong Leonardo, through
fraud and machination, took actual and active management of the partnership and

although Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan was the manager of Glory Commercial Co.,
defendants managed to use the funds of the partnership to purchase lands and
buildings etc. (Par. 4, p. 2 of amended complaint, Annex B of petition) and should
not have been permitted to be proven by the hearing officer, who naturally did not
know any better.
Moreover, it is very significant that according to the very tax declarations and land
titles listed in the decision, most if not all of the properties supposed to have been
acquired by the defendants Lim Tanhu and Ng Sua with funds of the partnership
appear to have been transferred to their names only in 1969 or later, that is, long
after the partnership had been automatically dissolved as a result of the death of Po
Chuan. Accordingly, defendants have no obligation to account to anyone for such
acquisitions in the absence of clear proof that they had violated the trust of Po
Chuan during the existence of the partnership. (See Hanlon vs. Hansserman and.
Beam, 40 Phil. 796.)
There are other particulars which should have caused His Honor to readily
disbelieve plaintiffs' pretensions. Nuez testified that "for about 18 years he was in
charge of the GI sheets and sometimes attended to the imported items of the
business of Glory Commercial Co." Counting 18 years back from 1965 or 1966 would
take Us to 1947 or 1948. Since according to Exhibit LL, the baptismal certificate
produced by the same witness as his birth certificate, shows he was born in March,
1942, how could he have started managing Glory Commercial Co. in 1949 when he
must have been barely six or seven years old? It should not have escaped His
Honor's attention that the photographs showing the premises of Philippine Metal
Industries after its organization "a year or two after the establishment of Cebu Can
Factory in 1957 or 1958" must have been taken after 1959. How could Nuez have
been only 13 years old then as claimed by him to have been his age in those
photographs when according to his "birth certificate", he was born in 1942? His
Honor should not have overlooked that according to the same witness, defendant
Ng Sua was living in Bantayan until he was directed to return to Cebu after the
fishing business thereat floundered, whereas all that the witness knew about
defendant Lim Teck Chuan's arrival from Hongkong and the expenditure of
partnership money for him were only told to him allegedly by Po Chuan, which
testimonies are veritably exculpatory as to Ng Sua and hearsay as to Lim Teck
Chuan. Neither should His Honor have failed to note that according to plaintiff
herself, "Lim Tanhu was employed by her husband although he did not go there
always being a mere employee of Glory Commercial Co." (p. 22, Annex the
decision.)
The decision is rather emphatic in that Lim Tanhu and Ng Sua had no known income
except their salaries. Actually, it is not stated, however, from what evidence such
conclusion was derived in so far as Ng Sua is concerned. On the other hand, with
respect to Lim Tanhu, the decision itself states that according to Exhibit NN-Pre trial,
in the supposed income tax return of Lim Tanhu for 1964, he had an income of

P4,800 as salary from Philippine Metal Industries alone and had a total assess sable
net income of P23,920.77 that year for which he paid a tax of P4,656.00. (p. 14.
Annex L, id.) And per Exhibit GG-Pretrial in the year, he had a net income of P32,000
for which be paid a tax of P3,512.40. (id.) As early as 1962, "his fishing business in
Madridejos Cebu was making money, and he reported "a net gain from operation
(in) the amount of P865.64" (id., per Exhibit VV-Pre-trial.) From what then did his
Honor gather the conclusion that all the properties registered in his name have
come from funds malversed from the partnership?
It is rather unusual that His Honor delved into financial statements and books of
Glory Commercial Co. without the aid of any accountant or without the same being
explained by any witness who had prepared them or who has knowledge of the
entries therein. This must be the reason why there are apparent inconsistencies and
inaccuracies in the conclusions His Honor made out of them. In Exhibit SS-Pre-trial,
the reported total assets of the company amounted to P2,328,460.27 as of
December, 1965, and yet, Exhibit TT-Pre-trial, according to His Honor, showed that
the total value of goods available as of the same date was P11,166,327.62. On the
other hand, per Exhibit XX-Pre-trial, the supposed balance sheet of the company for
1966, "the value of inventoried merchandise, both local and imported", as found by
His Honor, was P584,034.38. Again, as of December 31, 1966, the value of the
company's goods available for sale was P5,524,050.87, per Exhibit YY and YY-Pretrial. Then, per Exhibit II-3-Pre-trial, the supposed Book of Account, whatever that is,
of the company showed its "cash analysis" was P12,223,182.55. We do not hesitate
to make the observation that His Honor, unless he is a certified public accountant,
was hardly qualified to read such exhibits and draw any definite conclusions
therefrom, without risk of erring and committing an injustice. In any event, there is
no comprehensible explanation in the decision of the conclusion of His Honor that
there were P12,223,182.55 cash money defendants have to account for, particularly
when it can be very clearly seen in Exhibits 11-4, 11-4- A, 11-5 and 11-6-Pre-trial,
Glory Commercial Co. had accounts payable as of December 31, 1965 in the
amount of P4,801,321.17. (p. 15, id.) Under the circumstances, We are not prepared
to permit anyone to predicate any claim or right from respondent court's unaided
exercise of accounting knowledge.
Additionally, We note that the decision has not made any finding regarding the
allegation in the amended complaint that a corporation denominated Glory
Commercial Co., Inc. was organized after the death of Po Chuan with capital from
the funds of the partnership. We note also that there is absolutely no finding made
as to how the defendants Dy Ochay and Co Oyo could in any way be accountable to
plaintiff, just because they happen to be the wives of Lim Tanhu and Ng Sua,
respectively. We further note that while His Honor has ordered defendants to deliver
or pay jointly and severally to the plaintiff P4,074,394.18 or / 3 of the
P12,223,182.55, the supposed cash belonging to the partnership as of December
31, 1965, in the same breath, they have also been sentenced to partition and give /

share of the properties enumerated in the dispositive portion of the decision,

which seemingly are the very properties allegedly purchased from the funds of the
partnership which would naturally include the P12,223,182.55 defendants have to
account for. Besides, assuming there has not yet been any liquidation of the
partnership, contrary to the allegation of the defendants, then Glory Commercial Co.
would have the status of a partnership in liquidation and the only right plaintiff
could have would be to what might result after such liquidation to belong to the
deceased partner, and before this is finished, it is impossible to determine, what
rights or interests, if any, the deceased had (Bearneza vs. Dequilla 43 Phil. 237). In
other words, no specific amounts or properties may be adjudicated to the heir or
legal representative of the deceased partner without the liquidation being first
terminated.
Indeed, only time and the fear that this decision would be much more extended
than it is already prevent us from further pointing out the inexplicable deficiencies
and imperfections of the decision in question. After all, what have been discussed
should be more than sufficient to support Our conclusion that not only must said
decision be set aside but also that the action of the plaintiff must be totally
dismissed, and, were it not seemingly futile and productive of other legal
complications, that plaintiff is liable on defendants' counterclaims. Resolution of the
other issues raised by the parties albeit important and perhaps pivotal has likewise
become superfluous.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is granted. All proceedings held in
respondent court in its Civil Case No. 12328 subsequent to the order of dismissal of
October 21, 1974 are hereby annulled and set aside, particularly the ex-parte
proceedings against petitioners and the decision on December 20, 1974.
Respondent court is hereby ordered to enter an order extending the effects of its
order of dismissal of the action dated October 21, 1974 to herein petitioners Antonio
Lim Tanhu, Dy Ochay, Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua and Co Oyo. And respondent court is
hereby permanently enjoined from taking any further action in said civil case gave
and except as herein indicated. Costs against private respondent.
Makalintal, C.J., Fernando, Aquino and Concepcion Jr., JJ., concur.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 116835. March 5, 1998]
ANTONIETTA GARCIA VDA. DE CHUA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, (Special Eight Division), HON. JAPAL M. GUIANI, RTC, Branch 14,
12thJudicial Region, Cotabato City, and FLORITA A. VALLEJO, As
Administratrix of the Estate of the late Roberto L. Chua. respondents.

DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Assailed before us in this Appeal by Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR Sp. No. 33101, promulgated
on 19 April 1994affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, of
Cotabato City in Special Procedure Case No. 331.
As culled from the records the following facts have been preponderantly
established:
During his lifetime, Roberto Lim Chua lived out of wedlock with private respondent
Florita A. Vallejo from 1970 up to 1981. Out of this union the couple begot two
illegitimate children, namely Roberto Rafson Alonzo and Rudyard Pride Alonzo.
On 28 May 1992, Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City.
On 2 July 1992, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato
City a Petition[1] which is reproduced hereunder:
IN RE: PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF HEIRSHIP, GUARDIANSHIP OVER THE
PERSONS AND PROPERTIES OF MINORS ROBERT RAFSON ALONZO SP. PROC. NO/ 331
and RUDYARD PRIDE ALONZO, all surnamed CHUA and ISSUANCE OF LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION. FLORITA ALONZO VALLEJO, Petitioner.
x--------------------------x
PETITION
COMES NOW the petitioner assisted by counsel and unto this Honorable Court most
respectfully states:
1. That she is of legal age, Filipino, married but separated from her husband and
residing at Quezon Avenue, Cotobato City, Philippines;
2. That sometime from 1970 up to and until late 1981 your petitioner lived with
Roberto Lim Chua as husband and wife and out of said union they begot two (2)
children, namely, Robert Rafson Alonzo Chua who was born in General Santos City
on April 28, 1977 and Rudyard Pride Alonzo Chua who was born in
Davao City on August 30, 1978. A xerox copy of the birth certificate of each child is
hereto attached as annex A and B, respectively.
3. That the aforementioned children who are still minors today are both staying with
herein petitioner at her address at Quezon Avenue, Cotabato City;
4. That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the above-mentioned minors, died intestate on
May 28, 1992 in Davao City.

5. That the aforementioned deceased left properties both real and

personal worth P5,000,000.00 consisting of the following:
a) Lot in Kakar, Cotabato City covered by TCT No. T-12835 with an area of 290 sq.
m. estimated at .. P50,000.00
b) Lot in Kakar, Cotabato City covered by TCT No. T-12834 with an area of 323 sq.m.
.... .. 50,000.00
c) Lot in Davao City covered by TCT No. T-126583 with an area of 303
sq.m. ............50,000.00
d) Lot in Davao City covered by TCT No. T-126584 with an area
of 303 sq.m. ...............50,000.00
e) Residential house in Cotabato City valued
at ............................................................300,000.00
f) Residential house in Davao City valued at ............................................................6
00,000.00
g) Car, Colt Lancer with Motor No. 4G33-3
AF6393 .................................................210,000.00
h) Colt, Galant Super Saloon with Motor No. 4G37-GB0165
..........................................545,000.00
I) Car, Colt Galant with Motor No. 4G5252D75248 .............................................110,000.00
j) Reo Isuzu Dump Truck with Motor No. DA640-838635
.. ..350,000.00
k) Hino Dump Truck with Motor No. ED100T47148 ..............................................350,000.00
l) Stockholdings in various corporations with par value estimated
at .........................3,335,000.00
T o t a l - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - P5,000,000.00
6. That deceased Roberto Lim Chua died single and without legitimate descendants
or ascendants, hence, the above named minors Robert Rafson Alonzo Chua
and Rudyard Pride Alonzo Chua, his children with herein petitioner shall succeed to
the entire estate of the deceased. (Article 988 of the Civil Code of the Philippines).

7. That the names, ages and residences of the relatives of said minors are the
following, to wit:
Names Relationship Ages Residences
1. Carlos Chua Uncle 60 Quezon Avenue,
Cotabato City
2. Aida Chua Auntie 55 RosaryHeights,
Cotabato City
3. Romulo Uy Uncle 40 c/o Overseas Fishing Exporation Co.
Inc., Matina,
Davao City
6. That considering the fact that the aforementioned minors by operation of law are
to succeed to the entire estate of Roberto Lim Chua under the provisions of
Article 988 of the New CivilCode of the Philippines, it is necessary that for the
protection of the rights and interest of Robert Rafson Alonzo Chua and Rudyard
Pride Alonzo Chua, both minors and heirs of deceased Roberto Lim Chua, a guardian
over the persons and properties of said minors be appointed by this Honorable
Court.
7. That herein petitioner being the mother and natural guardian of said minors is
also competent and willing to act as the guardian of minors Robert Rafson
Alonzo Chua and Rudyard PrideAlonzo Chua both staying and living with her; that
petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications of a
guardian.
WHREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed:
1. That, upon proper notice and hearing, an order be issued
declaring minors ROBERTO RAFSON ALONZO CHUA and RUDYARD
PRIDE ALONZO CHUA as heirs to the intestate estate of deceased ROBERTO LIM
CHUA;
2. That Letters of Administration be issued to herein petitioner for the
administration of the estate of the deceased ROBERTO LIM CHUA;
3. That the petitioner be also appointed the guardian of the persons and estate of
minors ROBERT RAFSON ALONZO CHUA and RUDYARD PRIDE ALONZO CHUA;

4. That after all the property of deceased Roberto Lim Chua have been inventoried
and expenses and just debts, have been paid, the intestate estate of Roberto Lim
Chua be distributed toits rightful heirs, the minors in this case, pursuant to the
provisions of Article 988 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines.
5. And for such other reliefs and remedies this Honorable Court may consider fit and
proper in the premises.
Cotabato City, Philippines, June 29, 1992.
(Sgd.) FLORITA ALONZO VALLEJO
(Petitioner)
The trial court issued an order setting the hearing of the petition on 14 August 1992
and directed that notice thereof be published in a newspaper of general circulation
in the province of Maguindanao and Cotabato City and or Davao City.
On 21 July 1992, herein petitioner Antoinetta Garcia Vda. de Chua, representing to
be the surviving spouse of Roberto Chua, filed a Motion to Dismiss[2] on the ground
of improper venue. Petitioner alleged that at the time of the decedent's
death Davao City was his residence, hence, the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is
the proper forum.
Private respondent filed an opposition to the Motion to Dismiss[3] dated July 20,
1992 based on the following grounds:
(1) That this petition is for the guardianship of the minor children of the petitioner
who are heirs to the estate of the late Roberto L. Chua and under Section 1, Rule 92
of the Rules of Court the venue shall be at the place where the minor resides;
(2) That the above-named minors are residents of Cotabato City:
(3) That the movant in this case has no personality to intervene nor to oppose in the
granting of this petition for the reason that she is a total stranger to the minors
Robert Rafson Alonzo and Rudyard Pride Alonzo, all surnamed Chua.
(4) That deceased Roberto L. Chua died a bachelor. He is the father of the abovenamed minors with the petitioner in this case;
(5) That movant/oppositor Antoinetta Chua is not the surviving spouse of the late
Roberto L. Chua but a pretender to the estate of the latter since the deceased never
contracted marriage with any woman until he died.
On 6 August 1992, private respondent Vallejo filed a Motion for Admission of an
Amended Petition[4] "in order that the designation of the case title can properly and
appropriately capture or capsulize in clear terms the material averments in the body
of the pleadings; thus avoiding any confusion or misconception of the nature and

real intent and purpose of this petition". The amended

petition[5] contains identical material allegations but differed in its title, thus:
IN RE: PETITION FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE INTESTATE
ESTATE OF ROBERTO CHUA, DECLARATION OF HEIRSHIP, GUARDIANSHIP OVER THE
PERSONS AND PROPERTIES OF MINORS ROBERT AND RUDYARD, all surnamed CHUA
and ISSUANCE OF LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.
FLORITA ALONZO VALLEJO,
Petitioner.
Paragraph 4 of the original petition was also amended to read as follows:
4. That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the abovementioned minors is a resident of
Cotabato City and died intestate on May 28, 1992 at Davao City.
The petition contains exactly the same prayers as those in the original petitions.
Petitioner opposed the motion to amend petition alleging that at the hearing of said
motion on 24 July 1992, private respondents counsel allegedly admitted that the
sole intention of the original petition was to secure guardianship over the persons
an property of the minors. [6]
On 21, August 1992, the trial court issued an order[7] denying the motion to dismiss
for lack of merit. The court ruled that Antoinetta Garcia had no personality to file the
motion todismiss not having proven her status as wife of the decedent. Further, the
court found that the actual residence of the deceased was Cotabato City, and even
assuming that there was concurrent venue among the Regional Trial Courts where
the decedent had resided, the R.T.C. of Cotabato had already taken cognizance of
the settlement of the decedent's estate to the exclusion of all others. The pertinent
portions of the order read:
At the hearing of the motion to dismiss on August 19, 1992, counsel for movant
Antonietta G. Chua presented 18 Exhibits in support of her allegation that she was
the lawful wife of the decedent and that the latter resides in Davao City at the time
of his death. Exh. 1 was the xerox copy of the alleged marriage contract between
the movant and the petitioner. This cannot be admitted in evidence on the ground
of the timely objection of the counsels for petitioner that the best evidence is the
original copy or authenticated copy which the movant cannot produce.Further, the
counsels for petitioner in opposition presented the following: a certification from the
Local Civil Registrar concerned that no such marriage contract was ever registered
with them; a letter from Judge Augusto
Banzali, the alleged person to have solemnized the alleged marriage that he has not
solemnized such alleged marriage. Exhibit 2 through 18 consist among others of
Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of Roberto L. Chua married to
Antonietta Garcia, and a resident of Davao City; Residence

Certificates from 1988 and 1989 issued at Davao City indicating that he was
married and was born in Cotabato City; Income Tax Returns for 1990 and 1991 filed
in Davao City where the status of the decedent was stated as married; passport of
the decedent specifying that he was married and his residence was Davao
City. Petitioner through counsels, objected to the admission in evidence of Exhibits 2
through 18 if the purpose is to establish the truth of the alleged marriage between
the decedent and Antonietta Garcia. The best evidence they said is the marriage
contract. They do not object to the admission of said exhibit if the purpose is to
show that Davao City was the business residence of the decedent.
Petitioner through counsels, presented Exhibit A through K to support her allegation
that the decedent was a resident of Cotabato City; that he died a bachelor; that he
begot two illegitimate children with the petitioner as mother. Among these exhibits
are Income Tax Returns filed in Cotabato City from 1968 through 1979 indicating
therein that he was single; birth certificates ofthe alleged two illegitimate children of
the decedent; Resident Certificates of the decedent issued in Cotabato
City; Registration Certificate of Vehicle of the decedent showing that his residence is
Cotabato City.
It is clear from the foregoing that the movant failed to establish the truth of her
allegation that she was the lawful wife of the decedent. The best evidence is a valid
marriage contract which the movant failed to produce. Transfer Certificates of
Title, Residence Certificates, passports and other similar documents cannot prove
marriage especially so when the petitioner has submitted a certification from the
Local Civil Registrar concerned that the alleged marriage was not registered and
a letter from the judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage that hehas not
solemnized said alleged marriage. Consequently, she has no personality to file the
subject motion to dismiss.
On the issue of the residence of the decedent at the time of his death, the decedent
as a businessman has many business residences from different parts of the
country where he usuallystays to supervise and pursue his business
ventures. Davao City is one of them. It cannot be denied that Cotabato City is his
actual residence where his alleged illegitimate children also reside.
The place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and
issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction
over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue (Fule vs. CA, L-40502,
November 29, 1976). Even assuming that there is concurrent venue among the
Regional Trial Courts of the places where the decedent has residences, the Regional
Trial Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the decedent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts (Section 1, Rule 73). It
was this Court which first took cognizance of the case when the petition was filed on
July 2, 1992, docketed as Special Proceeding No. 331 and an order of publication
issued by this Court on July 13, 1992.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is hereby denied for
lack of merit.
On 31 August 1992, upon motion of private respondent, the trial court issued an
order appointing Romulo Lim Uy, a first cousin of the deceased, as special
administrator of the decedent's estate.[8]
On the same day, the trial court likewise issued an Order appointing Florita Vallejo
as the guardian over the persons and properties of the two minor children. [9]
Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion dated 25 October 1993[10] praying that the
letters of administration issued to Vallejo be recalled and that new letters of
administration be issued in her . She, likewise, filed a Motion dated 5 Novembeer
1993[11] to declare the proceedings a mistrial. Both motions were denied by the trial
court in its Order dated 22 November 1993[12]Petitioners motion for reconsideration
of the order was denied by the trial court in an order dated 13 December 1993 [13]
Assailling the last two orders of the trial court, petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition (Rule 65) with the respondent Court of Appeals, docketed
as CA G.R. No. Sp. 33101, alleging that the trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion in:
(1) unilaterally and summarily converting, if not treating, the guardianship
proceedings into an intestate proceeding;
(2) summarily hearing the intestate proceedings without
jurisdiction and without any notice to herein petitioner whatsoever; and
(3) issuing the questioned order (sic) on the alleged pretension that herein
petitioner has no personality to intervene in SPL Proc. No. 331 questioning the
highly anomalous orders precipitately issued ex-parte by the public respondent
R.T.C. without notice to the petitioners.
Petitioner in the main argued that private respondent herself admitted in in her
opposition to petitioners motion to dismiss filed in the trial court and in open
court that the original petition she filed is one for guardianship; hence,
the trial court acted beyond its jurisdiction when it issued letters of
administration over the estate of Robert C. Chua, thereby converting the petition
into an intestate proceeding, without the amended petition being published in a
newspaper of general circulation as required by Section 3, Rule 79.
The Court of Appeals in its decision promulgated on 19 April 1994 [14] denied the
petition ratiocinating that the original petition filed was one for guardianship of the
illegitimate children of the deceased as well as for administration of his intestate
estate. While private respondent may have alleged in her opposition to the motion
to dismiss that petition was for guardianship, the fact remains that the very
allegations of the original petition unmistakably show a twin purpose: (1)

guardianship; and (2) issuance of letters of administration. As such, it was

unnecessary for her to republish the notice of hearing through a
newspaper of general circulation in the province. The amended petition was filed for
the only reason stated in the motion for leave: so that the the "case title can
properly and appropriately capture or capsulize in clear terms the material
averments in the body of the pleadings; thus avoiding any confusion or
misconception of the nature and real intent and purpose of this
petition", which was for guardianship over the persons and properties of her minor
children and for the settlement of the intestate estate of the decedent
who was their father. In other words, there being no change
in the material allegations between the original and amended
petitions, the publication of the first in a newspaper of general circulation sufficed
for purposes of compliance with the legal requirements of notice.
Moreover, the appellate court ruled that the petitioner's remedy is appeal from the
orders complained of under Section 1(f), Rule 109 of the Rules of Court, not
certiorari and prohibition.
Not satisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner comes
to this Court contending that the appellate court committed the following errors:
I
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY AND SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE ORIGINAL PETITION (Annex F, Petition) WAS FOR A TWIN
PURPOSE, TO WIT: FOR GUARDIANSHIP AND FOR INTESTATE ESTATE PROCEEDINGS;
II
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THERE IS NO NEED TO PUBLISH THE AMENDED PETITION FOR ADMINISTRATION OF
THE INTESTATE ESTATE THEREBY CONTRAVENING THE RULES OF COURT AND THE
RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT
III
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT
NULLIFYING THE ORDERS (Annex P to T) PRECIPITATELY ISSUED EXPARTE BY THE PUBLICRESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN
THE INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS WITHOUT PRIOR HEARING OR NOTICE TO HEREIN
PETITIONER THEREBY DEPRIVING THE LATTER (ANTOINETTA GARCIA VDA. DE CHUA )
OF DUE PROCESS AND OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD.
IV
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN SWEEPINGLY
HOLDING THAT PETITIONER'S REMEDY IS APPEAL.[15]

In support of her first assignment of errors, petitioner submits that the

Court of Appeals conclusion that the original petition was one for guardianship and
administration of the intestate estate is contradicted by the evidence on hand,
asserting that the original petition failed to allege and state the jurisdictional facts
required by the Rules of Court in petitions for administration of a decedent's estate,
such as: (a) the last actual residence of the decedent at the time of his death; (b)
names, ages and residences of the heirs; and (c) the names and residences of the
creditors of the decedent. Petitioner also reiterates her argument regarding private
respondents alleged admission that the original petition was one for guardianship
and not for issuance of letters of administration, pointing to the Opposition to the
Motion to Dismiss dated 20 July 1992, where the the private respondent alleged:
1. That this petition is for guardianship of the minor children of the petitioner who
are heirs to the estate of the late Roberto L. Chua and under Section 1, Rule 92 of
the Rules of Court the venue shall be at the place where the minor resides. [16]
As well as to the statements made by counsel for the private respondent during the
24 July 1992 hearing on the motion to dismiss:
ATTY. RENDON:
We filed our opposition to the motion to dismiss the petition because this is
a petition for guardianship of minors, not for intestate proceedings. So this is a case
where the mother wanted to be appointed as guardian because she is also the
litigant here. Because whenever there is an intestate proceedings, she has to
represent the minors, and under the Rules of Court in any guardianship
proceedings, the venue is at the place where the minor is actually residing. [17]
The petition is devoid of merit.
The title alone of the original petition clearly shows that the petition is one which
includes the issuance of letters of administration. The title of said petition reads:
IN RE: PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF HEIRSHIP, GUARDIANSHIP OVER THE PERSON
AND PROPERTIES OF MINORS ROBERTO ALONZO AND RUDYARD ALONZO, all
surnamed CHUA and ISSUANCE OF LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION. [18]
Likewise, the prayer of the petition states:
2. That Letters of Administration be issued to herein petition for the administration
of the estate of the deceased ROBERTO LIM CHUA.
The original petition also contains the jurisdictional facts required in a petition for
the issuance of letters of administration. Section 2, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court
reads:

Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration - A petition for letters of

administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as
known to the petitioner:
(a) jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs and the names and residences of
the creditors, of the decedent
(c) The probative value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed;
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of
administration. (underscoring ours).
The jurisdictional facts required in a petition for issuance of letters of administration
are: (1) the death of the testator; (2) residence at the time of death in the province
where the probate court is located; and (3) if the decedent was a non-resident, the
fact of being a resident of a foreign country and that the decedent has left an estate
in the province where the court is sitting. [19]
While paragraph 4 of the original petition stating:
(4) That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the above mentioned minors, died intestate on
May 28, 1992 in Davao City.
failed to indicate the residence of the deceased at the time of his death, the
omission was cured by the amended petitions wherein the same paragraph now
reads:
(4) That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the abovementioned minors is a resident of
Cotabato City and died intestate on May 28, 1992 at Davao City. [20] (Underscoring in
the original.)
All told the original petition alleged substantially all the facts required to
be stated in the petition for letters of administration. Consequently, there was no
need to publish the amended petition as petitioner would insist in her second
assignment of errors.
Be that as it may, petitioner has no legal standing to file the motion to dismiss as
she is not related to the deceased, nor does she have any interest in his estate as
creditor or otherwise. The Rules are explicit on who may do so:
Sec. 4. Opposition to petition for administration - Any interested person, may by
filing a written opposition, contest the petition on .the ground of incompetency of
the person for whom letters of administration are prayed therein, or on the ground

of the contestant's own right to the administration, and may pray that letters issue
to himself, or to any competent person or persons named in the opposition.
Only an interested person may oppose the petition for issuance of letters of
administration. An interested person is one who would be benefited by the estate
such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor; his
interest is material and direct, and not one that is only indirect or contingent. [21]
Petitioner was not able to prove her status as the surviving wife of the
decedent. The best proof of marriage between man and wife is a marriage contract
which Antoinetta Chua failed to produce. The lower court correctly
disregarded the photostat copy of the marriage certificate which she presented, this
being a violation of the best evidence rule, together with other worthless pieces
of evidence. The trial court correctly ruled in its 21 August 1992 Order that:
xxx Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates, passports and other similar
documents cannot prove marriage especially so when the petitioner has submitted
a certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that the alleged marriage
was not registered and a letter from the judge alleged
to have solemnized the marriage that he has not solemnized said alleged marriage.
xxx[22]
Under her third assignment of error, petitioner claims that the trial court issued its
orders, Annexes P to T without prior hearing or notice to her, thus, depriving her of
due process.
The orders referred to by petitioner are: Order dated 31 August 1992
appointing Romulo Lim Uy, first cousin of the deceased, as special administrator of
the estate; Order dated 31 August 1992 appointing private respondent as
guardian over the person and property of the minors; Order dated 5 August 1993,
directing the transfer of the remains of the deceased from Davao City to Cotabato
City; Order dated 6 September 1993 directing petitioner to turn over a Mitsubishi
Gallant car owned by the estate of the deceased to the special administrator; and
Order dated 28 September 1993, authorizing the sheriff to break open the
deceaseds house for the purpose of conducting an inventory of the properties found
therein, after the sheriff was refused entry to the house by the driver and maid of
petitioner.
Apart from the fact that petitioner was not entitled to notice of the proceedings of
the trial court, not being able to establish proof of her alleged marriage to the
decease, or of her interest in the estate as creditor or otherwise, petitioner
categorically stated in the instant petition that on 25 October 1993 she filed a
motion praying for the recall of the letters of administrationissued by the trial
court and another motion dated 5 August 1993 praying that the proceedings
conducted by the trial court be declared as a mistrial and the court orders relative
thereto be set aside and nullified. Petitioner further stated that her motions were

denied by the trial court in its Order dated 22 November 21,

1993 and that on 30 November 1993 she filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order of denial which in turn was denied by the trial court on 13 December 1993.
Due process was designed to afford opportunity to be heard, not that
an actual hearing should always and indispensably be held.[23] The essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard. [24] Here, even granting that the
petitioner was not notified of the orders of the trial court marked as Exhibits P to T,
inclusive, nonetheless, she was duly heard in her motions
to recall letters of administration and to declare the proceedings of the court as a
mistrial, which motions were denied in the Order dated 22 November 1933. [25] A
motion for the reconsideration of this order of denial was also duly heard by the trial
court but was denied in its Order of 13 December 1993. [26]
Denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has had the
opportunity to be heard on his motion for reconsideration. [27]
As to the last assignment of errors, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the
proper remedy of the petitioner in said court was an ordinary appeal and not a
special civil action forcertiorari; which can be availed of if a party has no plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Except for her bare
allegation that an ordinary appeal would be inadequate, nothing on record would
indicate that extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition is warranted.
Finally, petitioner further argues as supplement to her memorandum
that the ruling of the Court of Appeals treating the Special Proceeding No. 331 as
one for both guardianship andsettlement of estate is in contravention of our ruling
in Gomez vs. Imperial,[28] which the petitioner quotes:
The distribution of the residue of the estate of the deceased is a function pertaining
properly not to the guardianship proceedings, but to another proceeding which the
heirs are at liberty to initiate.
Petitioners reliance on said case is misplaced. In the Gomez case, the action before
the lower court was merely one for guardianship. Therefore said court did not have
the jurisdiction to distribute the estate of the deceased. While in the case at bar, the
petition filed before the court was both for guardianship and settlement of estate.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition of petitioner Antoinetta Chua is hereby
denied.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Romero, and Purisima, JJ., concur.
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,Article 25

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO, respondents.
Parungao, Abesamis, Eleazar & Pulgar Law Offices for private respondent.

PUNO, J.:
The case at bench originated from a petition filed by private respondent Angelina M.
Castro in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking a judicial declaration of
nullity of her marriage to Edwin F. Cardenas. 1 As ground therefor, Castro claims that
no marriage license was ever issued to them prior to the solemnization of their
marriage.
Despite notice, defendant Edwin F. Cardenas failed to file his answer. Consequently,
he was declared in default. Trial proceeded in his absence.
The controlling facts are undisputed:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil
ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The
marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents. Defendant
Cardenas personally attended to the processing of the documents required for the
celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage, license. In
fact, the marriage contract itself states that marriage license no. 3196182 was
issued in the name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro
Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the
marriage was unknown to Castro's parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when
Castro discovered she was pregnant, that the couple decided to live together.
However, their cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple
parted ways. On October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by
Castro's brother, with the consent of Cardenas.

The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her daughter, Castro
wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving for the States. She thus
consulted a lawyer, Atty. Frumencio E. Pulgar, regarding the possible annulment of
her marriage. Through her lawyer's efforts, they discovered that there was no
marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage.
As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from the Civil Register
of Pasig, Metro Manila. It reads:
February 20, 1987
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the names EDWIN F. CARDENAS and ANGELINA M. CASTRO
who were allegedly married in the Pasay City Court on June 21, 1970 under an
alleged (s)upportive marriage license
no. 3196182 allegedly issued in the municipality on June 20, 1970 cannot be
located as said license no. 3196182 does not appear from our records.
Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio.
(Sgd) CENONA D. QUINTOS
Senior Civil Registry Officer
Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of Pasig on or before June
24, 1970 in order to apply for a license. Neither did she sign any application
therefor. She affixed her signature only on the marriage contract on June 24, 1970 in
Pasay City.
The trial court denied the petition. 2 It held that the above certification was
inadequate to establish the alleged non-issuance of a marriage license prior to the
celebration of the marriage between the parties. It ruled that the "inability of the
certifying official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that there
was no marriage license issued."
Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to respondent appellate court. She
insisted that the certification from the local civil registrar sufficiently established the
absence of a marriage license.
As stated earlier, respondent appellate court reversed the Decision of the trial
court. 3 It declared the marriage between the contracting parties null and void and
directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to cancel the subject marriage contract.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines urges that respondent appellate court erred
when it ruled that the certification issued by the civil registrar that marriage license
no. 3196182 was not in their record adequately proved that no such license was

ever issued. Petitioner also faults the respondent court for relying on the selfserving and uncorroborated testimony of private respondent Castro that she had no
part in the procurement of the subject marriage license. Petitioner thus insists that
the certification and the uncorroborated testimony of private respondent are
insufficient to overthrow the legal presumption regarding the validity of a marriage.
Petitioner also points that in declaring the marriage between the parties as null and
void, respondent appellate court disregarded the presumption that the solemnizing
officer, Judge Pablo M. Malvar, regularly performed his duties when he attested in
the marriage contract that marriage license no. 3196182 was duly presented to him
before the solemnization of the subject marriage.
The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.
The core issue presented by the case at bench is whether or not the documentary
and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent are sufficient to establish
that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the
celebration of the marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas.
We affirm the impugned Decision.
At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law
governing marital relations was the New Civil Code. The law 4 provides that no
marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local civil
registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a
license would render the marriage voidab initio. 5
Petitioner posits that the certification of the local civil registrar of due search and
inability to find a record or entry to the effect that marriage license no. 3196182
was issued to the parties is not adequate to prove its non-issuance.
We hold otherwise. The presentation of such certification in court is sanctioned by
Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having
custody of an official record or by his deputy, that after diligent search, no record or
entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied
by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his
office contain no such record or entry.
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite
diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular
entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public
documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of
maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for
marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage
license was issued and such other relevant data. 6

The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil registrar of
Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a
record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by
any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, a certificate of "due search and inability to find" sufficiently proved that his
office did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties.
The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of her
petition is, in itself, not a ground to deny her petition. The failure to offer any other
witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of
the case. It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony
performed by a judge of a city court. The subject marriage is one of those
commonly known as a "secret marriage" a legally non-existent phrase but
ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the
relatives and/or friends of either or both of the contracting parties. The records
show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas was initially unknown to the
parents of the former.
Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified during the trial cannot
be held against her. Her husband, Edwin F. Cardenas, was duly served with notice of
the proceedings and a copy of the petition. Despite receipt thereof, he chose to
ignore the same. For failure to answer, he was properly declared in default. Private
respondent cannot be faulted for her husband's lack of interest to participate in the
proceedings. There was absolutely no evidence on record to show that there was
collusion between private respondent and her husband Cardenas.
It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court that the marriage
between the contracting parties is null and void for lack of a marriage license does
not discount the fact that indeed, a spurious marriage license, purporting to be
issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, may have been presented by Cardenas to the
solemnizing officer.
In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and
testimonial evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently
established the absence of the subject marriage license.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there being no showing of any reversible
error committed by respondent appellate court.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Article 26

(Correlate with Articles 15-18, Civil Code)

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001]

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK
A. RECIO, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our
jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of
the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law
of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts
do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any
other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must
be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999 Decision[1] and the March 24, 1999
Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil
Case No. 3026AF. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and
Rederick A. Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as
dissolved and both parties can now remarry under existing and applicable
laws to any and/or both parties.[3]
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.
The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian
citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.[4] They lived together as
husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, [5] a decree of divorce,
purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family
court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a
Certificate of Australian Citizenship issued by the Australian government.
[6]
Petitioner -- a Filipina -- and respondent were married on January 12,
1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City. [7] In
their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as single
and Filipino.[8]
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately
without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still

in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in

accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. [9]
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage[10] in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy -- respondent
allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on
January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondents marriage
to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had
revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution.
[11]
He contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been
validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989; [12] thus,
he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.
On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couples wedding and while
the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending -- respondent was able
to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia
because the marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down.[13]
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed on the
ground that it stated no cause of action.[14] The Office of the Solicitor
General agreed with respondent.[15] The court marked and admitted the
documentary evidence of both parties.[16] After they submitted their
respective memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution. [17]
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the
divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It
deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an
essential element of the marriage; that is, respondents alleged lack of
legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce
decree obtained by respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the
marriage; thus, there was no more marital union to nullify or annul.
Hence, this Petition.[18]
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
1
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in
Australia by the respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to

Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to contract a second marriage

with the petitioner.
2
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to
present a certificate of legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a
substantial requisite voiding the petitioners marriage to the respondent
3
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family
Code in this case.
4
The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13,
21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the Family Code as the applicable provisions in
this case.
5
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree
obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties
to remarry, without first securing a recognition of the judgment granting
the divorce decree before our courts.[19]
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall
concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between
respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether respondent
was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our
ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial courts recognition of the divorce between
respondent and Editha Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,
[20]
petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any other foreign
judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of
the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the
alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to
establish these elements.

Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the

Family Code, marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the
place where they were celebrated (the lex loci celebrationis). In effect, the
Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the conformity
of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place where
the marriage was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off
points for our discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute
divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.[21] A marriage between two
Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because
of Articles 15[22] and 17[23] of the Civil Code.[24] In mixed marriages involving
a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26[25] of the Family Code allows the
former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
[26]
A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their
respective national laws.[27]
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof
are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. [28] Therefore,
before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.[29] Presentation solely of the
divorce decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in
evidence, it must first comply with the registration requirements under
Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles read as follows:
ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting
parties shall file separately a sworn application for such license with the
proper local civil registrar which shall specify the following:
xxxxxxxxx
(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was
dissolved or annulled;
xxxxxxxxx
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously
married, the applicant shall be required to

ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously
married, the applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth or
baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article, the death
certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of the absolute
divorce, or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his
or her previous marriage. x x x.
ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage,
the partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the
delivery of the childrens presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the
appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same
shall not affect their persons.
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree
is a public document -- a written official act of an Australian family
court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity and due
execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is
given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be
presented and admitted in evidence.[30] A divorce obtained abroad is
proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a
judgment is the judgment itself.[31] The decree purports to be a written act
or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country. [32]
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or
document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country
by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested [33] by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in
the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued
by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office. [34]
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be
an authentic one issued by an Australian family court.[35] However,
appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on
evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of May 18,
1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its
admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the
Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. [36] The trial court ruled that it was
admissible, subject to petitioners qualification. [37] Hence, it was admitted
in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioners failure

to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act

of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.[38]
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is
not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal
laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.[39]Naturalization is
the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and
civil rights belonging to a citizen.[40] Naturalized citizens, freed from the
protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive
countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance
to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine
personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls
upon petitioner, because she is the party challenging the validity of a
foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the
original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of
Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a
long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by
Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in
the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges
the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of
an action.[41] In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the
material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the
answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material
allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. [42] Since the
divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the
pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws.[43] Like any other facts, they must be alleged and
proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges
are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. [44] The power of
judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt
upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue: Respondents Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce,
respondent was legally incapacitated to marry her in 1994. Hence, she
concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.

Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly
admitted in evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry
under Australian law.
Respondents contention is untenable. In its strict legal
sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause
arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic
ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited
divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while
the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. [45]There is no
showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by
respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a
conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a
separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow
after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is
effected.[46]
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some
foreign statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other
jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party
in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be
prohibited from marrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only
after proof of good behavior.[47]
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction
that reads:
1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes
absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy.
[48]

This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by

respondent may have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his
legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, we find no
basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the
Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondents capacity to remarry
despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a
disputable presumption or presumptive evidence as to his civil status
based on Section 48, Rule 39[49] of the Rules of Court, for the simple
reason that no proof has been presented on the legal effects of the
divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.

Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity

Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article
21 of the Family Code was not submitted together with the application for
a marriage license. According to her, its absence is proof that respondent
did not have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined
by the national law of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in
Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the
legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly
authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal
capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.
[50]

As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents

legal capacity to marry petitioner. A review of the records before this
Court shows that only the following exhibits were presented before the
lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit A Complaint; [51] (b) Exhibit B
Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino-Australian) and
Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva
Ecija;[52] (c) Exhibit C Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio
(Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon,
Metro Manila;[53] (d) Exhibit D Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan
City Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick A.
Recio and Editha D. Samson was in its records;[54] and (e) Exhibit E
Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;[55] (2) for
respondent: (a) Exhibit 1 -- Amended Answer;[56] (b) Exhibit 2 Family Law
Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of
Australia;[57] (c) Exhibit 3 Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick
A. Recio;[58] (d) Exhibit 4 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the
Family Court of Australia Certificate;[59] and Exhibit 5 -- Statutory
Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace
J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995.[60]
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who
was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry
petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioners contention that
the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed
respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to
adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing
his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the
second marriage.

Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to

respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn
out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry
petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that
the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to
receive evidence, if any, which show petitioners legal capacity to marry
petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the
parties marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence
two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the
Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the
other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice,
we REMAND the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving
evidence which conclusively show respondents legal capacity to marry
petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties marriage void on
the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila;
and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only to
be followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity to
lay down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional question.
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births,
Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started

auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only
child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a
separation de facto between them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private
respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg
Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had
been living apart since April, 1982. 2
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still
pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany,
promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of
the child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under German law said court was locally
and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage
was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private
respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still
married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and
with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los
Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal approved a
resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the
petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two branches of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William
Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the
respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua",
docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the
same court. 7
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid
resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar
petition was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of
Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and directed the
respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the accused have already been arraigned
and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of both
cases to his office for review. 9
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend
further proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner
moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings in said Criminal
Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for review then pending before the Secretary of
Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which
motion was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The same order also
directed the arraignment of both accused therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a
plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being

considered by respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former was
ordered detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent entered a plea of
not guilty. 14

On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a
prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court
denying her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is without
jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be
prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an
offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the
criminal complaint." 15
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from
implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal
Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoez
acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a
resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against the
petitioner. 16
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes
against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended
spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is
a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the
court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written complaint is
just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding 19 and
without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who
can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of
the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended
party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses above
mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as parens
patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate
the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction,
abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents, grandparents or guardian, such
amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the
offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it
necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so
at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in
fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as
of the filing of the complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that
the same requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been found
necessary since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the State, through
the People of the Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining witness therein.
However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the

present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more predominant
role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his
power and option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the
outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by
petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still
subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence
since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had
ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case. 21
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to
commence the action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or
capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity
to bring the action would be determined by his status before or subsequent to the commencement
thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or was acquired
subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would thereby have the
anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without the legal capacity to
do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as
to when precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal
prosecution can be commenced only by one who in law can be categorized as possessed of such
status. Stated differently and with reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is
necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the
complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by
the former against the latter.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with
ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the
right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that the innocent
spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however,
proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no legal
effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the
husband or wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant
when the offense is said to have been committed, he had ceased to be such when
the prosecution was begun; and appellant insists that his status was not such as to
entitle him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly said that the offense is
against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the reason for this
provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse must
be such when the prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction,
considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such
nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the
complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse,
and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the
complaint.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in
the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in our
civil law on the matter of status of persons.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a United
States court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a
trial court here alleging that her business concern was conjugal property and praying that she be ordered
to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business. Rejecting his
pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the
States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an
American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces
the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. ...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. ... 25
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of
petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of
divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case.
When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no
longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed.
Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one
of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be
no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the
former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the
other.
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private
respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of
the Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery "although the marriage be afterwards declared
void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of a
married woman to her marital vows, even though it should be made to appear that she is entitled to
have her marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually secures a formal
judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the
complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity because such declaration that the marriage
is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never existed. There being no marriage from the
beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg
to stand on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and within the purview of the decision
in said case is the situation where the criminal action for adultery was filed before the termination of

the marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite would
necessarily apply where the termination of the marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid
foreign divorce.
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must suffer
the same fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended spouse therein
had duly and seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency
but which was resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to
the one at bar or any issue determinative of the controversy herein.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and
another one enteredDISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of
jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made
permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PARAS, J., concurring:

It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute divorce as
valid also in the Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of his
obtaining an absolute divorce in Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party in case
his former wife actually has carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he already
implicitly authorized the woman to have sexual relations with others. A contrary ruling would be less
than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be allowed to deprive the woman of the same
privilege.
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the absolute
divorce between the American husband and his American wife as valid and binding in the Philippines
on the theory that their status and capacity are governed by their National law, namely, American
law. There is no decision yet of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of such a divorce if one of
the parties, say an American, is married to a Filipino wife, for then two (2) different nationalities
would be involved.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely
because of theNational law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the
American husband is concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved. This results in what
he calls a "socially grotesque situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a man who is no
longer her husband. It is the opinion however, of the undersigned that very likely the opposite
expresses the correct view. While under the national law of the husband the absolute divorce will be
valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of the proper foreign law (one of the exceptions to

comity) is when the foreign law will work an injustice or injury to the people or residents of the forum.
Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part of the husband would be
injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still valid under her national law,
it would seem that under our law existing before the new Family Code (which took effect on August
3, 1988) the divorce should be considered void both with respect to the American husband and the
Filipino wife.
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact that the
husband was an American can with a Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the divorce
insofar as the Filipino wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.

Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring:
It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute divorce as
valid also in the Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of his
obtaining an absolute divorce in Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party in case
his former wife actually has carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he already
implicitly authorized the woman to have sexual relations with others. A contrary ruling would be less
than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be allowed to deprive the woman of the same
privilege.
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the absolute
divorce between the American husband and his American wife as valid and binding in the Philippines
on the theory that their status and capacity are governed by their National law, namely, American
law. There is no decision yet of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of such a divorce if one of
the parties, say an American, is married to a Filipino wife, for then two (2) different nationalities
would be involved.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely
because of theNational law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the
American husband is concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved. This results in what
he calls a "socially grotesque situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a man who is no
longer her husband. It is the opinion however, of the undersigned that very likely the opposite
expresses the correct view. While under the national law of the husband the absolute divorce will be
valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of the proper foreign law (one of the exceptions to
comity) is when the foreign law will work an injustice or injury to the people or residents of the forum.
Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part of the husband would be
injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still valid under her national law,
it would seem that under our law existing before the new Family Code (which took effect on August
3, 1988) the divorce should be considered void both with respect to the American husband and the
Filipino wife.
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact that the
husband was an American can with a Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the divorce
insofar as the Filipino wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside the
Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by
respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for
Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent
is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the
marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on
April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United
States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila,
(the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be
ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right
to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause
of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court
wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of
June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground
that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in
the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to
appeal. certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of an
interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently
committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in
a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the error committed which,
in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie since it would be useless
and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed in this case within
the exception, and we have given it due course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in
the Philippines.

Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property
because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that
they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal
funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail
over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and
declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest
Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations
between petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative
community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal
fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who
appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over
private respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California,
authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground
of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community property nor community
obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP &
GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear
on my behalf and do an things necessary and proper to represent me, without further
contesting, subject to the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx 4
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United
States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending
in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to
local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. 6 In this
case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of
the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court
of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of
husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus
severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a
penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is
still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his
own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the
Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her
heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the
Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Patajo, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 154380

Present:

- versus -

CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,

Respondent.

Davide, Jr., C.J.,

(Chairman),
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio, and
Azcuna, JJ.

Promulgated:
October 5, 2005
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is
later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating
him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine
law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a
definite ruling on this apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of
law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision[1] dated
May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch
23 and itsResolution[2] dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration.
The court a quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is
capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of
the Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his
American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the
Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[3]

The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage
was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady
Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son
Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized
as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained
a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her
child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel,
California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry
invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed.
Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein
petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26
OF THE FAMILY CODE[4]

The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that
is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper
remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal
separation.[5] Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondents
situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial
determination.[6]
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case
but insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which
capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant
to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.[7]
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial
court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection,
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested under a deed, will, contract
or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive
order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before
breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court
to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration
of his rights or duties, thereunder.
...

The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are
adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy;
and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.[8]
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a
marriage between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship,
obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the
parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to
protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a
declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal
interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination
inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question
the validity of his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this
provision had come about in the first place, and what was the intent of the
legislators in its enactment?

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive
Order No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code, which took effect on August
3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37,
and 38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code,
Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36,
and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so
amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there
as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation
presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties
were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American
citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and
indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings[9] on the Family Code, the
Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following
objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1.

2.

The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses

are Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced
will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly
divorce them abroad can.
This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for
Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them
abroad will also be considered to be validly divorced here and can remarry. We propose that this be deleted and made into law only after more
widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)

Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that
the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a
member of theCivil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation

where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining
a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case
of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[10] The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree
validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently,
the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration
of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains
a foreign citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of
Appeals.[11] In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they
got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained
a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that
a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under
Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of
reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include
cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen
and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of
the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.
Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would
lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it
should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as
necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not
within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or
intent.[12]
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant
case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article
26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1.
2.

There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino

citizen and a foreigner; and
A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen,
there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano.
As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid
divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application
of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the
divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper remedy of the
Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal
separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular
case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have
all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a
sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally
separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien
spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted
by respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondents
wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and
mere allegation is not evidence.[13]
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation
that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign
divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must
prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it.[14] Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and
proved.[15] Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows
his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there
would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into
another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be
interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had
acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering
that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record,
we are unable to declare, based on respondents bare allegations that his wife, who
was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had
remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such

declaration could only be made properly upon respondents submission of the

aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED.
The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of
the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are
hereby SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice
Chairman

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

[7]

Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
[8]
Office of the Ombudsman v. Ibay, G.R. No. 137538, 3 September 2001, 364 SCRA 281, 286, citing Galarosa v.
Valencia, G.R. No. 109455, 11 November 1993, 227 SCRA 729, 737.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
GERBERT R. CORPUZ,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 186571

Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
BERSAMIN,
*
ABAD, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

versus -

DAISYLYN TIROL STO.

TOMAS and The SOLICITOR
GENERAL,
Respondents. -- -

Promulgated:
August 11, 2010

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision [1] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review
on certiorari[2]under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired
Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000.[3] On January
18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina,
in Pasig City.[4] Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left
for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in
April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was
having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned
to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of
Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for divorce
onDecember 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8,
2006.[5]
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another
Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines,
Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian
divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the registration
of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed
Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine
law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially
recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series
of 1982.[6]
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the
RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but
submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no
opposition to Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case
herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus,
requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to
Gerberts.

In its October 30, 2008 decision,[7] the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The
RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for
judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian
citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, [8] in order for him or her to be
able to remarry under Philippine law.[9] Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there
as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the
enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined
by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;[10] the provision was enacted to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.[11]
THE PETITION
From the RTCs ruling,[12] Gerbert filed the present petition.[13]
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory
relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination
of his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking
into account the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien
spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine
in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse
an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with
sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he might
be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiance in the Philippines since
two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry

Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective
Comments,[14] both support Gerberts position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of
this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURTS RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code as the substantive right it
establishes is in favor of the Filipino
spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent
behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages void [15] and
voidable[16] marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of
absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the
marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful
union for cause arising after the marriage.[17] Our family laws do not recognize
absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.[18]
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a
Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her
legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution, [19] enacted Executive Order No.
(EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as
follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there
as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227

effectively incorporated into the law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr.[20] and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.[21] In both cases, the Court refused to
acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of marital rights after a foreign courts
divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that
the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The
Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be
considered still married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's
obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to
live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien
spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights
to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.[22]

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law to avoid
the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. [23] The
legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her
marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino
spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse
considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.[24] Without the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the
foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that
purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to
the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing
the marital bond;[25] Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against
absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign
country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code
provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the
dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court

finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare
that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No
court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien
spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal
capacity are generally governed by his national law.[26]
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in
limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In
other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive
evidence of a right that clothes the party
with legal interest to petition for its
recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary
statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition
before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal
interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The
foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens
national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39
of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This
Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of a
judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction
to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a)

In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the

judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing;
and

(b)

In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the

judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of

a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.

To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is
sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before
our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we
have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her
national law.[27]
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments
and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, no sovereign is bound to give
effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country.
[28]
This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as
facts under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens applicable national law
to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. [29] The
recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in
another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his
claim or defense.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law
of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be
official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or
(2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the
copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in
the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record
is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce
decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity,[30] but failed to
include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce.[31] Under this situation, we can, at
this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence,
unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine
whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the
Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns) obvious
conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other
interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners
presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every
precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition
is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res
judicata[32] between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court.[33]
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of
reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect
of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending
judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This
same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not
for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of
the foreign divorce decree
As a matter of housekeeping concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and
Daisylyns marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the decree.
[34]
We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw
attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that [a]cts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register. The law

requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal
consequences touching upon a persons legal capacity and status, i.e., those
affecting all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature,
not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not.[35]
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting
a persons legal capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or
the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce
decrees in the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for recording the civil
status of persons, in which shall be entered:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
(j)

births;
deaths;
marriages;
annulments of marriages;
divorces;
legitimations;
adoptions;
acknowledgment of natural children;
naturalization; and
changes of name.
xxxx

Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep and preserve in
their offices the following books, in which they shall, respectively make the
proper entries concerning the civil status of persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages
solemnized but also divorces and dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and
naturalization register.

But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the
law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the
decreesregistration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a

judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res

judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists
recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office
acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the
Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the
strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement
of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, [36] and
Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982 [37] both of which required a
final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving
a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the
registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign
divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot
produce any legal effect.
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the
RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize
the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a
foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of
Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil register shall
be changed or corrected, without judicial order. The Rules of Court supplements
Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial
proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or
corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and
procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It
also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of
the province where the corresponding civil registry is located; [38] that the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the
proceedings;[39] and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a
newspaper of general circulation.[40] As these basic jurisdictional requirements have
not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with
the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as
requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree
in the civil registry one for recognition of the foreign decree and another
specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding
itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular
fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate
adversarial proceeding[41] by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be
measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari,
and REVERSE the October
30,
2008 decision
of
the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17,
2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be
furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Designated additional Member of the Third Division, in view of the retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
per Special Order No. 843 dated May 17, 2010.
[1]
Dated October 30, 2008, penned by Judge Perla B. Querubin; rollo, pp. 24-31.
[2]
Id. at 3-20.
[3]
Id. at 27.
[4]
Marriage Certificate, id. at 37.

[5]
[6]

Certificate of Divorce, id. at 38.

Id. at 47-50; the pertinent portion of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, states:

It would therefore be premature to register the decree of annulment in the Register of

Annulment of Marriages in Manila, unless and until final order of execution of such foreign
judgment is issued by competent Philippine court.
[7]
Supra note 1.
[8]
Executive Order No. 209, enacted on July 6, 1987.
[9]
Rollo, p. 31.
[10]
G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114.
[11]
Id. at 121.
[12]
Gerberts motion for reconsideration of the RTCs October 30, 2008 decision was denied in an order dated
February 17, 2009; rollo, p. 32.
[13]
Supra note 2.
[14]
Rollo, pp. 79-87 and 125-142, respectively.
[15]
The void marriages are those enumerated under Articles 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 44, and 53 in relation to Article 52
of the Family Code.
[16]
The voidable marriages are those enumerated under Article 45 of the Family Code.
[17]
Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 452.
[18]
Ibid. See A. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Volume One, with
the Family Code of the Philippines (2004 ed.), p. 262.
[19]
Proclamation No. 3, issued on March 25, 1996.
[20]
G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 139.
[21]
G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989, 174 SCRA 653.
[22]
Van Dorn v. Romillo, supra note 20 at 144.
[23]
Republic v. Orbecido, supra note 10 at 121.
[24]
The capacity of the Filipino spouse to remarry, however, depends on whether the foreign divorce decree
capacitated the alien spouse to do so.
[25]
See Article 17 in relation to Article 15 of the Civil Code:
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity
of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
xxxx
Art. 17. x x x Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective
by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.
[26]
Parenthetically, we add that an aliens legal capacity to contract is evidenced by a certificate issued by his or her
respective diplomatic and consular officials, which he or she must present to secure a marriage license (Article 21,
Family Code).The Filipino spouse who seeks to remarry, however, must still resort to a judicial action for a
declaration of authority to remarry.
[27]
Garcia v. Recio, supra note 17 at 447; citing Van Dorn v. Romillo, supra note 20.
[28]
Remedial Law, Volume II, Rules 23-56 (2007 ed.), p. 529.
[29]
Republic v. Orbecido III, supra note 10 at 123 and Garcia v. Recio, supra note 17 at 448; see also Bayot v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 155635, November 7, 2008, 570 SCRA 472.
[30]
Rollo, pp. 38-41.
[31]
The foreign divorce decree only stated that the marriage between Gerbert and Daisylyn was dissolved by the
Canadian court. The full text of the courts judgment was not included.
[32]
Literally means a thing adjudged, Blacks Law Dictionary (5 th ed.), p. 1178; it establishes a rule that a final
judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or
their privies in all later suits, on points and matters determined in the former. Supra note 28 at 462.
[33]
See Philsec Investment Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103493, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 102, 110,
where the Court said:
While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign judgments in several cases, it was
after the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to repel them on

grounds allowed under the law. It is not necessary for this purpose to initiate a separate action or
proceeding for enforcement of the foreign judgment. What is essential is that there is opportunity
to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court to properly determine its efficacy. This is
because in this jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in
rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a
party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.
[34]
On the face of the marriage certificate, the word DIVORCED was written in big, bold letters; rollo, p. 37.
[35]
Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007, 537 SCRA 373, 390, citing Beduya v. Republic, 120
Phil. 114 (1964).
[36]
Rollo, pp. 47-50.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 196049
June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR
OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR
GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 107, Quezon City, through a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of law. The petition
assails the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-1168582 and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of
petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married
respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines2 on 23
January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioners parents.
Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually,
they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara).
Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were
married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought
Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their
relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a
family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a
petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or
Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the
Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous

marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under

Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; 5 and (3) for the
RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the
Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between
Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office
(NSO).6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an
Order dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case from its active
civil docket.7 The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Venue. The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the
province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing
for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a nonresident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the
election of the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross
violation" of the above provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on
Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to
comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for
immediate dismissal of the petition." 8 Apparently, the RTC took the view
that only "the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or
Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 0211-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and
annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A
petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which
"seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact,"9 and not a civil
action which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong."10 In other words, the petition in the RTC
sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and
Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the
Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay
and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended
that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family
Code of the Philippines11on bigamy and was therefore entitled to
recognition by Philippine courts.12
In any case, it was also Fujikis view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied
only to void marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground
of psychological incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply
Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty parties
would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course,

difficult to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage

declared a nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing
marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore the personality to
nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the
Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the
"procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753) 15 in
relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a
duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to
send a copy of the final decree of the court to the local registrar of the
municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was
solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil
registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage"
and "judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning" are subject
to cancellation or correction.18 The petition in the RTC sought (among
others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the
certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Fujikis motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial
court "gravely erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based on
improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept
of venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction
which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v.
Intermediate Appellate Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot preempt the defendants prerogative to object to the improper laying of the
venue by motu proprio dismissing the case."20Moreover, petitioner alleged
that the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the petition
under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he substantially
complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioners motion for
reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute
nullity of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for
dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue under
Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as
a "third person"22 in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the
decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now
seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did
not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only said that
"[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal
of this case[,] it should be taken together with the other ground cited by
the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based
on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros
Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for
correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in
the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify
marriages x x x."26 Braza emphasized that the "validity of marriages as
well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack
such as [a] petition [for correction of entry] x x x."27

The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of

marriage between Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a
"jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the petition.28 Moreover, the verification
and certification against forum shopping of the petition was not
authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Hence, this also warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under
the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the
Letters of Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on
the petition for review.30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar
of Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the
NSO, participated through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a
comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion. 31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTCs
"pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in the trial
court for further proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as
the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare
the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor
General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave,
this Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she
had only discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was
bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished.
Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous
marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to
declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured
spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting
previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the
bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property
ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an
emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will
always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of
the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution. 34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the
Japanese Family Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right
of a party or a particular fact."37 WhileCorpuz concerned a foreign divorce
decree, in the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also
affected the civil status of the parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino
citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the
procedure to record "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the
civil status of persons" in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of
the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil

registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a

persons legal capacity and status x x x."38 The Japanese Family Court
judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should
therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional
infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v.
De Castro39 and Nial v. Bayadog40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a
void marriage may be collaterally attacked."41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with
the directive for them to comment on the petition. 42 Maekara wrote that
Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was previously married to
Fujiki.43Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on
Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to
oppose the petition.45 She would like to maintain her silence for fear that
anything she say might cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki. 46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between
his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in
a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in
a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration
of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind
the petition is bigamy."48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign
country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact
under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign
judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule
132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules
of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment
through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by
the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has
custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be
made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign
service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office. 50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of
foreign judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties should

follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the petition, 51 the
service of summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor, 53 the
setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This
is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose
of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on
claims and issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to
relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Raada,58 this Court
explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on
the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of
action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation." 59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil
status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a
foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the
foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other
mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private
international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in
the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment
affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating
to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does
not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a
new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts
cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign
judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the
status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the
jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize
the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign
judgment or final order against a person creates a "presumptive evidence
of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that
"the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign
judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign
judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine
court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of
efficiency and the protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting
the jurisdiction of other states.62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have
recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign
citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of
evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended

procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While
the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may,
however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry
when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad. 65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay
and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no
divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the
beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence
of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of
the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a
right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a
persons life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil
Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such
as birth, death or marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording.
As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court
declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be
made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings
(such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact."67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event,
order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been
recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the
cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional
Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese
Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil
status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality
to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between
Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the
Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material
interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the
property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is
interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the
civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The
interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to

preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68) his most intimate human

relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation
of law the moment he contracts marriage.69 These property interests in
marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family"70 and preserving the property regime of the
marriage.71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the
Constitution,72 but a spouses right in a marriage extends further to
relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations
between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse
to maintain the integrity of his marriage.74 In any case, Section 2(a) of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the
personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by
law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a
subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on
the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a]
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife"75it refers to the husband or the
wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code,
bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a
bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law.
The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who
has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void
from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone
can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in
the prosecution and prevention of crimes.77If anyone can file a criminal
action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous
marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the
husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not
only share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he
is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his
marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the
spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in the
judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly
the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the
financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but
most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse." 80 Being a
real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare
a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and
judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the
Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to
cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
III.

In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental,

this Court held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages"
in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court.81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can be
questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage. 82 The RTC relied
on Braza in dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as
a collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a
foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties
is a citizen of the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil
registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct
action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and
procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-1110-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the
requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children,84 the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses,85 and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine
collusion.86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of
the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No.
8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding
civil registry is located."87 In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve
his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in
the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of
a civil registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment
annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign
country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural
safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of
Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is
not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to
recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case
which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the
jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to
extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the
marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides
that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." InRepublic v.
Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the legislative intent of the second
paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the

Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse" 89 under the laws of his
or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only
authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce
decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine
courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying
a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address
the anomaly that results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws
do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The
anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while
the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country.
The correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the
foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the country where it
was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is
based on this Courts decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that
the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served."91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage
between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment
nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may
file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of
bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment
nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or
her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines,
the Filipino spouse will be discriminatedthe foreign spouse can remarry
while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine
courts are empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is
still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry.
Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts
already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene
domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign
divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is
that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent
with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family
Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has
the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy
available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a
criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent
to substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law.
They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status,
condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the
foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of
whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a

foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of

a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its
effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in
Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the
foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the
Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an
extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof
to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the
foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39
of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already
"presumptive evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition
of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment
serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil
registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and
fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will
be an inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the
foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines.1wphi1
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code.93 The recognition of a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal
liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover,
under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of
the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from the
Philippine archipelago."
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the
need to address the questions on venue and the contents and form of the
petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011
and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED andSET
ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for
further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Brion, Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
Penned by Judge Jose L. Bautista Jr.
2
In Pasay City, Metro Manila.
3
See rollo, p. 88; Trial Family Court Decree No. 15 of 2009, Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage between Maria Paz Galela Marinay and
Shinichi Maekara dated 18 August 2010. Translated by Yoshiaki Kurisu,
Kurisu Gyoseishoshi Lawyers Office (see rollo, p. 89).
4
Id.
5
FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (E.O. No. 209 as amended):

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;
xxxx
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of
the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where
there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years
shall be sufficient.
6
Rollo, pp. 79-80.
7
The dispositive portion stated:
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby ordered DISMISSED and
WITHDRAWN from the active civil docket of this Court. The RTC-OCC,
Quezon City is directed to refund to the petitioner the amount of One
Thousand Pesos (P1,000) to be taken from the Sheriffs Trust Fund.
8
Rollo, pp. 44-45. Section 5 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-1110-SC) provides:
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition. (1) The petition shall allege the
complete facts constituting the cause of action.
(2) It shall state the names and ages of the common children of the
parties and specify the regime governing their property relations, as well
as the properties involved.
If there is no adequate provision in a written agreement between the
parties, the petitioner may apply for a provisional order for spousal
support, custody and support of common children, visitation rights,
administration of community or conjugal property, and other matters
similarly requiring urgent action.
(3) It must be verified and accompanied by a certification against forum
shopping. The verification and certification must be signed personally by
the petitioner. No petition may be filed solely by counsel or through an
attorney-in-fact.
If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the verification and certification
against forum shopping shall be authenticated by the duly authorized
officer of the Philippine embassy or legation, consul general, consul or
vice-consul or consular agent in said country.
(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the
petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or
Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and
submit to the court proof of such service within the same period.
Failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground
for immediate dismissal of the petition.
9
RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Sec. 3(c). See rollo, pp. 55-56 (Petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration).
10
RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Sec. 3(a).
11
FAMILY CODE (E.O. No. 209 as amended), Art. 35. The following
marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxx
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;
xxxx
12
Rollo, p. 56.
13
FAMILY CODE, Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
14
Rollo, p. 68.
15
Enacted 26 November 1930.
16
CIVIL CODE, Art. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of
civil status shall be governed by special laws.
17
Act No. 3753, Sec. 7. Registration of marriage. - All civil officers and
priests or ministers authorized to solemnize marriages shall send a copy
of each marriage contract solemnized by them to the local civil registrar
within the time limit specified in the existing Marriage Law.
In cases of divorce and annulment of marriage, it shall be the duty of the
successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy
of the final decree of the court to the local civil registrar of the
municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized.
In the marriage register there shall be entered the full name and address
of each of the contracting parties, their ages, the place and date of the
solemnization of the marriage, the names and addresses of the witnesses,
the full name, address, and relationship of the minor contracting party or
parties or the person or persons who gave their consent to the marriage,
and the full name, title, and address of the person who solemnized the
marriage.
In cases of divorce or annulment of marriages, there shall be recorded the
names of the parties divorced or whose marriage was annulled, the date
of the decree of the court, and such other details as the regulations to be
issued may require.
18
RULES OF COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or
correction. Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the
civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c)
deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations;
(h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization;
(k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (1) civil interdiction; (m)
judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor;
and (o) changes of name.
19
273 Phil. 1 (1991).
20
Id. at 7. See rollo, pp. 65 and 67.
21
Rollo, p. 47.
22
Id. at 46.
23
Id. at 48.
24
Id.
25
G.R. No. 181174, 4 December 2009, 607 SCRA 638.
26
Id. at 641.
27
Id. at 643.
28
See rollo, p. 49.

29

Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC states in part:

Contents and form of petition. x x x
xxxx
(3) It must be verified and accompanied by a certification against forum
shopping. The verification and certification must be signed personally by
the petitioner. No petition may be filed solely by counsel or through an
attorney-in-fact.
If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the verification and certification
against forum shopping shall be authenticated by the duly authorized
officer of the Philippine embassy or legation, consul general, consul or
vice-consul or consular agent in said country.
xxxx
Failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground
for immediate dismissal of the petition.
30
Resolution dated 30 May 2011. Rollo, p. 105.
31
Under Solicitor General Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz.
32
Rollo, p. 137. The "Conclusion and Prayer" of the "Manifestation and
Motion (In Lieu of Comment)" of the Solicitor General stated:
In fine, the court a quos pronouncement that the petitioner failed to
comply with the requirements provided in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC should
accordingly be set aside. It is, thus, respectfully prayed that Civil Case No.
Q-11-68582 be reinstated for further proceedings.
Other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed
for.
33
G.R. No. 169766, 30 March 2011, 646 SCRA 637.
34
Id. at 656. Quoted in the Manifestation and Motion of the Solicitor
General, pp. 8-9. See rollo, pp. 132-133.
35
Rollo, p. 133.
36
G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010, 628 SCRA 266.
37
Id. at 287.
38
Rollo, p. 133.
39
G.R. No. 160172, 13 February 2008, 545 SCRA 162.
40
384 Phil. 661 (2000).
41
De Castro v. De Castro, supra note 39 at 169.
42
Supra note 30.
43
See rollo, p. 120.
44
Id.
45
See rollo, p. 146.
46
Id.
47
Supra note 33.
48
Supra note 33 at 655.
49
RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Sec. 24. Proof of official record. The
record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19,
when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is
not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the

foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which

the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a
document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation
must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if
he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
Rule 39, Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. The effect
of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order, is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment
or final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or
final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of
a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.
50
See RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Sec. 24-25. See also Corpuz v. Santo
Tomas, supra note 36 at 282.
51
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 5.
52
Id., Sec. 6.
53
Id., Sec. 9.
54
Id., Sec. 11-15.
55
Id., Sec. 17-18.
56
Id., Sec. 19 and 22-23.
57
Mijares v. Raada, 495 Phil. 372, 386 (2005) citing Eugene Scoles &
Peter Hay, Conflict of Laws 916 (2nd ed., 1982).
58
Id.
59
Id. at 386.
60
Civil Code, Art. 17. x x x
xxxx
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those
which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs
shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
61
Mijares v. Raada, supra note 57 at 386. "Otherwise known as the policy
of preclusion, it seeks to protect party expectations resulting from
previous litigation, to safeguard against the harassment of defendants, to
insure that the task of courts not be increased by never-ending litigation
of the same disputes, and in a larger sense to promote what Lord Coke
in the Ferrers Case of 1599 stated to be the goal of all law: rest and
quietness." (Citations omitted)
62
Mijares v. Raada, supra note 57 at 382. "The rules of comity, utility and
convenience of nations have established a usage among civilized states by
which final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are
reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions
that may vary in different countries." (Citations omitted)
63
43 Phil. 43 (1922).

64

Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010, 628 SCRA 266,
280; Garcia v. Recio, 418 Phil. 723 (2001); Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,
supra.
65
FAMILY CODE, Art. 26. x x x
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
66
Act No. 3753, Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for
recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be entered: (a) births;
(b) deaths; (c) marriages; (d) annulments of marriages; (e) divorces; (f)
legitimations; (g) adoptions; (h) acknowledgment of natural children; (i)
naturalization; and (j) changes of name.
Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or
correction. Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the
civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c)
deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations;
(h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization;
(k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (1) civil interdiction; (m)
judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor;
and (o) changes of name.
67
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, supra note 36 at 287.
68
FAMILY CODE, Art. 35-67.
69
FAMILY CODE, Art. 74-148.
70
FAMILY CODE, Art. 195 in relation to Art. 194.
71
See supra note 69.
72
CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 1: "No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law x x x."
73
FAMILY CODE, Art. 68-73.
74
CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5). The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance
to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase,
or modify substantive rights. x x x
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
75
Emphasis supplied.
76
Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815, as amended), Art. 349. Bigamy. - The
penalty of prisin mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.
77
See III RAMON AQUINO, THE REVISED PENAL CODE (1997), 518.

78

RULES OF COURT, Rule 111, Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil

actions. (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action.
xxxx
79
Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 3, Sec. 2. Parties in interest. A real party in
interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless
otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
80
Juliano-Llave v. Republic, supra note 33.
81
Supra note 25.
82
Supra note 25.
83
See supra note 68.
84
FAMILY CODE, Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the
absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the
spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the
custody and support of their common children. The Court shall give
paramount consideration to the moral and material welfare of said
children and their choice of the parent with whom they wish to remain as
provided to in Title IX. It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights
of the other parent.
Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 61.
85
FAMILY CODE, Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3),
(4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper
cases to marriages which are declared ab initio or annulled by final
judgment under Articles 40 and 45.
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support
of the common children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes,
unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial
proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated,
shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and
129.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 19. Decision. (1) If the court renders a
decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of
absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only
after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as
implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of
Properties.
xxxx
86
FAMILY CODE, Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take

steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be
based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor.
(1) Within one month after receipt of the court order mentioned in
paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public prosecutor shall submit a
report to the court stating whether the parties are in collusion and serve
copies thereof on the parties and their respective counsels, if any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the
basis thereof in his report. The parties shall file their respective comments
on the finding of collusion within ten days from receipt of a copy of the
report The court shall set the report for hearing and if convinced that the
parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall
set the case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to
appear for the State at the pre-trial.
87
RULES OF COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 1.
88
509 Phil. 108 (2005).
89
Id. at 114.
90
223 Phil. 357 (1985).
91
Id. at 363.
92
See RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Sec. 3(c).
93
See RULES OF COURT, Rule 72, Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of civil
actions. In the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in
ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special
proceedings.
Rule 111, Sec. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. x x x
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been
instituted, the latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be
found before judgment on the merits. The suspension shall last until final
judgment is rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless, before
judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the same may, upon
motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in
the court trying the criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence
already adduced in the civil action shall be deemed automatically
reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to the right of the
prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the offended
party in the criminal case and of the parties to present additional
evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and
decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of
prescription of the civil action which cannot be instituted separately or
whose proceeding has been suspended shall be tolled.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the
civil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed
extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action
that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
exist.