THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. PLACIDO OPEMIA, ET AL., Defendants-Appellees.

G.R. No. L-7987. March 26, 1956.

98 PHIL 698
FACTS:
An information was filed on February 26, 1953 in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, charging four persons
with theft of large cattle alleged to have been committed on or about June 18, 1952. The Defendants pleaded not guilty, in
the course of the trial the fourth witness of the prosecution the caretaker of the stolen carabao testified that the alleged theft
occurred sometime in July 1947.
The Fiscal asked the permission of the court to amend the information to make it conform to the evidence as regards
the date of the commission of the crime. Instant objection to the proposed amendment was raised on behalf of the
Defendants on the ground that it would violate their substantial rights because the case had already been pending for a long
time and the trial had progressed to such an extent that their defense had already been revealed to the prosecution.
The trial court sustained the objection of the defendants because the amendment would prejudice the substantial
right of the accused. The defense also asked the information to be quashed on the ground of variance between its
allegations and the evidence, the court verbally ruled the dismissal of the said information and declared the case
dismissed. The defendants are acquitted.
The case was appealed.
Solicitor Generals contention:
Instead of dismissing the case the lower court should have allowed the information to be amended.
Section 13 of Rule 106 provides:
SEC. 13. Amendment. The information of complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court,
at any time before the Defendant pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at
the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the Defendant.
Issue:
Whether or not the change of date as an amendment in the information will be prejudicial to the substantial rights of
the accused?
Held:
Yes.
The amendment proposed in the present case consists in changing the date of the commission of the crime charged
from June 18, 1952 to July, 1947.
It is also a cardinal rule in criminal procedure that after the Defendant has entered his plea, the information or
complaint may be amended only as to all matters of form when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights
of the Defendant (Rule 196, section 13). An amendment that would change the date of the commission of the offense
from 1947 to 1952 is certainly not a matter of form. The difference in date could not be attributed to a clerical error,
because the possibility of such an error is ruled out by the fact that the difference is not only in the year, but also in the month
and in the last two digits of the year. It is apparent that the proposed amendment concerns with material facts constituting the
offense, and consequently it would be prejudicial to the substantial rights of the Defendants.
His Honor has we think adduced good reasons for considering the amendment as referring to substance and not
merely to form. But even supposing it to be the contrary, its allowance, after the Defendants had pleaded, was discretionary
with the court and would be proper only if it would not prejudice their rights. We are not prepared to say that the court did not
make good use of that discretion in disallowing the amendment, considering that the variance sought to be introduced
thereby would appear to be really unfair to the Defendants, for as clearly explained by the court it violates their
constitutional right to be informed before the trial of the specific charge against them and deprives them of the
opportunity to defend themselves.
The appeal is dismissed.

FELICISIMO ROCABERTE, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. ANDRES S. SANTOS, Judge, RTC, Tagbilaran, Bohol, respondents.
Lilio L. Amora for petitioner.
G.R. No. 72994
January 23, 1991
193 SCRA 152
FACTS:
An information was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, City of Tagbilaran, accusing Felicisimo Rocaberte,
Florencio Ranario and Flaviana Ranario of the crime of Theft committed as follows:
That on or about the Period from 1977 to December 28, 1983 at the off offshore of West Canayaon, municipal of
Garcia-Hernandez, province of Bohol, Philippines . . ., the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping each
other, with intent to gain and without the consent of the owner, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
steal and carry away the following properties, to wit:
One (1) pc. sledge hammer, valued at

P136.00

One (1) pc. H beam, valued at

400.00

Two (2) cut abrasive steel plates for cargo

berth cover protector

158.00

Ninety-nine (99) blocks of aluminum, alloy

anodes at P3,750.00 each block

P371,250.00

TOTAL

P371,944.00

in the total amount of THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY-ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FORTY-FOUR PESOS
(P371,944.00), Philippine Currency, belonging to and owned by the Philippine Sinter Corporation, to the damage and
prejudice of the latter in the aforestated amount.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Articles 308, 309 of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioners Contention:
Thru counsel de officio, Atty. Lilio L. Amora, moved to quash the information, alleging that the statement of the time of
commission of the felony charged, "from 1977 to December 1983, a period of seven years," or "about 2,551 days," was fatally
defective: there was "so great a gap as to defy approximation in the commission of one and the same offense" (citing Peo. v.
Reyes, 108 SCRA 203); "the variance is certainly unfair to the accused for it violates their constitutional right to be informed
before the trial of the specific charge against them and deprives them of the opportunity to defend themselves . . ." (invoking
Peo. v. Openia, 98 Phil. 698).
The trial court denied the motion, the defendants filed a motion for reconsideration. The accused drew attention to
Section 4, Rule 117 "of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure," as a remedy that could be alternatively granted, viz.:
Sec. 4. Amendment of complaint or information. If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect in the complaint or
information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order the amendment to be made. But the motion for
reconsideration was also denied.
Thereby filing a motion for certiorari for the denial of the quashal of information or the refusal to amend the
information.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the variances in the approximate time of the commission of the offense can be cured by the
amendment of the information?
HELD:
The information should be amended.
The rules of criminal procedure declare that

. . . A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the defendant; the designation of the offense by the statute;
the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of
the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed.
and as regards the time of the commission of the offense, particularly that:
. . . It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at which the offense was committed
except when time is a material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have been committed at any
time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed as the information or complaint will permit.
In line with this last mentioned rule, a variance of a few months between the time set out in the indictment and that
established by the evidence during the trial has been held not to constitute an error so serious as to warrant reversal of
a conviction solely on that score.
Where, however, there was a variance of several years between the time stated in the information, 1947, and
the proof of its actual commission adduced at the trial, 1952, the dismissal of the case by the Trial Court was
sustained by this Court, since to allow amendment of the indictment to conform to the evidence would be violative of
defendant's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
A defect in the averment as to the time of the commission of the crime charged is not, however, a ground for a
motion to quash under Rule 116 of the Rules of Court. Even if it were, a motion for quashal on that account will be denied
since the defect is one that can be cured by amendment; instead, the court shall order the amendment to be made by
stating the time with particularity.
The remedy against an indictment that fails to allege the time of the commission of the offense with sufficient
definiteness is a motion for a bill of particulars, provided for in Section 6, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court of 1964.
Bill of particulars. Defendant may, at the time of or before arraignment, move for or demand a more definite
statement or a bill of particulars of any matter which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him
properly to plead or prepare for trial. The motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired.
From all that has been said, the conclusion should be clear. The information against petitioner Rocaberte is indeed
seriously defective. It places on him and his co-accused the unfair and unreasonable burden of having to recall their activities
over a span of more than 2,500 days. It is a burden nobody should be made to bear. The public prosecutor must make more
definite and particular the time of the commission of the crime of theft attributed to Rocaberte and his co-defendants. If he
cannot, the prosecution cannot be maintained, the case must be dismissed.
The petition is granted, thereby directing the prosecution to amend the information within such time the respondent
Judge deemed proper.

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PEDRO LAHOYLAHOY and MARCOS MADANLOG, defendantsappellants.
W. A. Kincaid for appellants.
Attorney-General Avancea for appellee.
G.R. No. 12453
July 15, 1918
NATURE
Review of a decision of the CFI of Province of Iloilo,sentencing the defendants Pedro Lahoylahoy and Marcos
Madanlog to death upon a complaint charging the crime of robbery with multiple homicide.
FACTS:
The information in a prosecution for robbery with quadruple homicide charged that the accused criminally and by
force appropriated certain articles of value, the property of one Roman Estriba, and on occasion thereof killed the said Roman
Estriba and three others. However, the proof showed that the money which was the subject of the robbery was taken from
one Juana Seran who was robbed and killed separately from the other three victims.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conviction for robbery with quadruple homicide can be sustained
HELD:
NO
Subsection 5 of section 6 of General Orders No. 58 declares that a complaint or information shall show, among
others things, the names of the persons against whom, or against whose property, the offense was committed, if known. The
complaint in this case therefore properly contained an averment as to the ownership of the property; and upon principle, in
charging the crime of robbery committed upon the person, the allegation of the owner's name is essential. But of course if his
name cannot be ascertained, it may be alleged that it is unknown.- From the fact that the name of the injured person may, in
case of necessity, be alleged as unknown it should NOT be inferred that the naming of such person, when known, is of no
importance. Where the name of the injured party is necessary as matter of essential description of the crime charged, the
complaint must invest such person with individuality by either naming him or alleging that his name is unknown.
It is elementary that in crimes against property, ownership must be alleged as matter essential to the proper
description of the offense. To constitute robbery, the property obtained must be that of another, and indictments for such
offenses must name the owner; and a variance in this respect between the indictment and the proof will be fatal. It is also
necessary in order to identify the offense.
A complaint charging the commission of the complex offense of robbery with homicide must necessarily charge each
of the component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were made the subject of separate
complaints. It is well recognized in this jurisdiction that where a complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to support
the charge as to one of the component offenses the defendant can be convicted of the other. The mere circumstance that the
two crimes are so related as to constitute one transaction in no way affects the principles of pleading involved in the case. To
permit a defendant to be convicted upon a charge of robbing one person when the proof shows that he robbed an entirely
different person, when the first was not present, is violative of the rudimentary principles of pleading; and in addition, is
subject to the criticism that the defendant is thereby placed in a position where he could not be protected from a future
prosecution by a plea of former conviction or acquittal. If we should convict or acquit these defendants today of the robbery
which is alleged to have been committed upon the property of Roman Estriba, it is perfectly clear that they could be
prosecuted tomorrow for robbery committed upon the property of Juana; and the plea of former jeopardy would be of no avail.
In the light of what has been said it is evident that, by reason of the lack of conformity between the allegation and the
proof respecting the ownership of the property, it is impossible to convict the two accused of the offense of robbery committed
by them in this case; and therefore they cannot be convicted of the complex offense of robbery with homicide. HOWEVER,
the accused were sentenced by the Supreme Court for four separate homicides.