Japan and The United Nations

Independent Study Project
Department of Japan
JAPAN AND THE UNITED NATIONS

The Struggle for a Permanent Seat with the Security Council
Talyn Rahman
BA Japanese and Management
140078
Word Count: 10,365
School of Oriental and African Studies (University of London)
1
This dissertation was submitted in partial
fulfilment of the requirements for the
degree of BA Japanese and Management of
the School of Oriental and African Studies
(University of London).
Acknowledgement forwarded to Dr Yuka

Kobayashi for all her help and advice.
2
Contents
ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................................................................................ 4
TABLES........................................................................................................................................................................ 4
1. INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................................................. 6
2. BACKGROUND.................................................................................................................................................... 6
3. JAPAN’S ASPIRATION: THE BUILDING PROCESS OF JAPAN’S DESIRE FOR A PERMANENT SEAT ....................... 7
Japan’s changing attitude in the United Nations ....................................................................................................... 7
1950-1960: On the road for a ‘respected’ Japan ................................................................................................... 8
1970s: The quest for a role .................................................................................................................................... 8
1980s: Money equals power? ................................................................................................................................ 9
1990s: Taking Control .......................................................................................................................................... 10
2000: Securing National Interest ......................................................................................................................... 11
4. JAPAN’S OBSTRUCTION: AND SO, THE STRUGGLE BEGINS.............................................................................. 12
Article 9 ‘peace clause’ of the Constitution ......................................................................................................... 12
The Government .................................................................................................................................................. 13
The Public............................................................................................................................................................. 15
United States of America: Friend or Foe? ............................................................................................................ 16
Russia: The Territorial Bully ................................................................................................................................. 18
China: Beyond Rivalry .......................................................................................................................................... 18
Korea: Asia versus Japan ...................................................................................................................................... 20
5. JAPAN AS THE IDEAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBER ........................................................................................ 21
Soft Power............................................................................................................................................................ 21
Non-nuclear Policy ............................................................................................................................................... 22
Mixed Identity ...................................................................................................................................................... 23
Permanent Seat for Cash ..................................................................................................................................... 23
The Other Candidates .......................................................................................................................................... 24
Identity Crisis ....................................................................................................................................................... 24
6. JAPAN’S OPTIONS TO BECOME A PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ................................. 24
Reform ................................................................................................................................................................. 25
Entry as a Quasi Member..................................................................................................................................... 25
Entry as a Full Member ........................................................................................................................................ 26
Entry as a Special Member .................................................................................................................................. 26
7. CONCLUSION: Breaking out of the Struggle .................................................................................................... 27
8. BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................................................. 28
3
ABBREVIATIONS
AA African and Asian (group)

DPJ Democratic Party of Japan
JCP Japanese Communist Party
JSDF Japanese Self-Defence Force
LDP Liberal Democratic Party
LON League of Nations
MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs
ODA Official Development Assistance
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PKO Peacekeeping Operations
PM Prime Minister
POW Prisoners of War
SC Security Council
SDF Social Democratic Party
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
US United States
WWII World War II
TABLES
Fig.1. UN and PKO Contributions Page 14

Fig.2. Japan General Election 2005 Page 19
Fig.3. Public view on how to strengthen Japan’s permanent bid candidacy Page 20
Fig.4. Financial assessment of the Security Council and candidate countries Page 30
4
JAPAN AND THE UNITED NATIONS
The Struggle for a Permanent Seat

with the Security Council
Talyn Rahman
5
1. INTRODUCTION
“Japan has better qualifications for permanent membership than other countries”
–Boutros Boutros-Ghali1
Japan’s initial membership to the United Nations (UN) in 1956 was nothing short of a monumental
moment. Entering the UN eleven years after its founding was Japan’s chance to re-establish itself as a
peace-loving, respected country. The scars Japan endured from losing World War II (WWII) had only proved
to the world that Japan was ready to actively participate in the protection of international security. It soon
became apparent that Japan was very conscious of how the world perceived it. International and domestic
circumstances had pushed Japan to alter its attitude of the UN; as a result Japan quickly became consumed
with the idea of becoming a permanent member of the Security Council (SC). As quoted above by the
former UN Secretary- General Boutros-Ghali, Japan’s qualifications as a permanent member have proved to
be worthier than that of Germany, Brazil, and India, who share Japan’s aspiration. Through Japan’s special
qualities, which will be examined later, Japan has demonstrated that it is possible to create a better world
without military means.2 Yet nearly five decades since its membership, this brings to question why Japan
has and is still struggling to secure its seat with the SC.
The idea of Japan’s ‘struggle’ refers to Japan’s fight to move toward its ultimate objective to become a
permanent member of the SC and the obstructions that stall its progress. As this thesis will examine,
Japan’s obstruction is identified by two levels: domestic and international. Examining each factor will
illustrate how Japan’s domestic and international struggle is having a direct impact on its candidacy. Further
to Japan’s aspiration and obstruction for permanent membership, it is important to examine what Japan
has done for the UN to have been praised so highly by Boutros-Ghali.3 Criticisms made by other
international members regarding Japan’s candidacy will also be analysed to see what effect this has had on
Japan’s progress. Japan’s strategy in approaching the candidacy is flawed, which is why Japan has been
struggling for so long. Critiques have often studied Japan’s actions and current position in the bid for a
permanent seat; however Japan’s strategy in strengthening their candidacy is yet to be fully examined. The
establishment of Japan’s aspiration and obstruction will lead us to critically explore Japan’s best options to
becoming a SC member.
2. BACKGROUND
The UN was initially founded after WWII in 1945 based upon the aims and qualities of its 1919
predecessor. The establishment of the UN was heavily reliant on the experience of the League of Nations
(LON). As the LON was tainted with various defects and weaknesses,4 the UN became a second attempt for
nations to collate in upholding international peace and security on an economic, social, and political
1
Aurelia George Mulgan, “International Peacekeeping and Japan’s Role” Asian Survey Vol.35, No.12 (Dec 1995), p.1115
2
Addressed in speech by PM Junichiro Koizumi “Kokuren Shinjidai”, September 21, 2004 at the 59th session of the General
Assembly
3
As quoted on top of this page.
4
Paul Taylor and Devon Curtis, “The United Nations” in John Baylis and Steve Smith, The Globalization of World Politics, 3rd ed.
(2005), p.406
6
foundation. For many countries, including Japan, the UN was a symbol of peace and a means of voicing
their opinion on an international level. Becoming a UN member was an important step for Japan to
participate in the maintenance of international peace and justice.
Similar to the LON, the UN mainly comprised of the victors of war, in this case, the members of ‘The
Alliance’. The former Alliance (United Kingdom, United States, France, China and former Soviet Union5) by
default became principal caretakers’ of the UN, known as the Security Council. Primarily, as one of five
main organs of the UN structure the SC play a powerful role in which appropriate procedures or methods
for the sustenance of international peace is decided upon. Like all members, the SC is bound by the articles
written in the UN Charter, which acts as a form of constitution in governing the UN. Nevertheless, Sadako
Ogata considered SC members to have a position of power due to the sheer influence they have in the UN
as permanent members.6 Although non-permanent members of the SC practically have “equal footing” as
that of permanent members,7 the difference that sets them apart is the right of veto. The function of veto
gives members of the SC power to unilaterally block resolutions or decisions. Once a veto is raised, no
further action can be taken regardless of the level of support shown by member states. The veto system
was once a substantial tool in balancing power and protecting the interest of the UN’s founding members,
although many criticisms have been made of its exploited use by permanent members.
The veto is problematic because it is often used for one’s national interest. National interest refers to a
country’s own goal whether the ambition is military, economical, or cultural.8 Within the UN, permanent
members of the SC have the right to impede on actions that may harm their national interest with the use
of veto. Any form of influential power, even becoming a UN member was intentionally denied to Japan and
other members of the former-Axis Powers9 as UN entrance was blocked by veto as a reprimand to their war
crimes.10 The condition of joining the UN is to be a peace-loving country. Access was formerly refused to
Japan because the ‘Allied’ nations did not consider the former Axis Powers as “peace-loving states”.11
3. JAPAN’S ASPIRATION: THE BUILDING PROCESS OF JAPAN’S DESIRE

FOR A PERMANENT SEAT
Japan’s changing attitude in the United Nations
Japan’s political strategy in handling the UN has a pattern in fluctuating every decade. The Japanese
idea of what exactly the UN is still remains vague, some describe the entity as “a tool for international
diplomacy”, others as “a bridge” between the North and South.12 Japan’s changing attitude in the UN
changes in response to international reactions which consequently led Japan to pursue an indefinite
5
The dissolution of the Soviet Union came about in 1991 ending the Cold War between USA. The country is now recognised as the
Russian Federation; however this thesis will refer to it as Russia.
6
Sadako Ogata, “The Changing Role of Japan in the United Nations” in Joshua D. Katz and Tilly C. Friedman-Lichtschein, Japan’s
ew World Role. (1985), p.29
7
Kokusaiho Gakkai, Japan and the United ations: Report of a study. (1958), p.86
8
Refer to Hans Morgenthau, Politics among ations. (1993) for a full conceptual understanding of national interest.
9
Besides Japan, Italy and Germany were also major members of the Second World War Axis Power.
10
Saidan Houjin Nihon Kokusairengo Kyoukai, A Concise Guide to the United ations. (1997), p.17
11
Satoshi Yoshikawa, “Kokuren Jouninnriji Koku Iri no Dadousei”, Kenpo Rongi. No.1 (1994), p.40
12
Liang Pan, The United ations in Japan’s Foreign and Security Policymaking, 1945-1992. (2005), p.342
7
political role. With the lack of satisfactory feedback Japan received from important nations, Japan’s
aspiration to become a SC member developed progressively as a result of the attitudes parried from UN
members.
1950-1960: On the road for a ‘respected’ Japan
Entering the UN was a major milestone for Japan to re-join the world through what seemed like a
respectable international entity. The loss of two wars not only damaged Japan’s self-image but caused
them to be forcibly excluded from international society. The victors of war lacked trust and respect for
Japan, resulting in Japan’s military being stripped of power and the country becoming bound to a
Constitution that renounced the rights to wage war. The Japanese people adored the UN as a symbol of
world peace and justice. Slogans like UN-centralism, UN-first, and national prestige13 became popular in
Japanese politics even before 1956. Entering an internationally collated entity was to be Japan’s fresh start
to eradicate its war-beaten image14 and mending international relationships.
Realists believe that countries must rely on their own military to protect their national interest.15
Considering that Japan’s military was removed, Japan had to seek another route for protection. Post-war
Prime Minister (PM) Shigeru Yoshida had persuaded the public that the UN was Japan’s solution in gaining
security,16 which launched the idea of seeking protection from the UN.17 However, the UN’s security
function was not as Japan expected because the UN appeared rather weak in the course of the Cold War.18
This was Japan’s first taste of UN dissatisfaction due to Japan’s misconception of the UN structure.
To gain respect from its global neighbours, Japan realised that active participation in major UN
security agendas would prove Japan as a peace-loving nation. In order to demonstrate their worth as a
valued member, Japan initialised talks of banning nuclear arms testing. Diplomats stressed the horrors of
being victimised by two nuclear bombings and even interfered with UK and US plans to improve their
nuclear arms19 during the 60s. However Japan only engaged in heavy talks of disarmament with the SC,
putting aside all other UN issues to secondary importance. Japan used the UN as a tool to keep to issues
that were perceived as future threats to Japanese security. This marked the beginning of Japan’s
involvement in the ‘bigger picture’ of international relations.
1970s: The quest for a role
Japan’s efforts to raise its international status through political power reached its limits around
1966.20 Having established itself as a respected member amongst other nations, Japan’s focus in the UN
grew from restoring its image to seeking a role. By the70s, Japan had a high level of economic prosperity.
13
Ibid. pp.344-345
14
Akashi Yasushi, Kokusai Rengo. (1985), p.6
15
Baylis and Smith, Globalization of World Politics, p.5
16
Drifte, Permanent SC Seat, p.13
17
Kokusaiho Gakkai, Japan and the U report, p.202
18
The Cold War conflict between SC members US and Soviet Union destabilised the UN from its founding till the late-80s. The
rivalry between the two superpowers was based on nuclear superiority. Pan, U in Japan’s policymaking, p.342
19
Ogata, “Changing Role of Japan”, p.34
20
Ibid. p.301
8
Japan was being perceived as the world’s “Number Two” nation since its economic growth accounted 10%
of the world’s economy.21 Economically surpassing most Western developed countries in such a short
amount of time, the international community began to entitle Japan as a “new kind of great power”22 due
to its economic strength; however the Japanese themselves either did not acknowledge this or completely
disregarded it.23
A country with substantial economic influence is perceived as a ‘soft power’ nation.24 Japan’s soft
power originates from its technological and financial power, enabling it to have considerable influence in
world trade and aid. However, with the absence of militaristic ‘hard power’ due to Article 9 (which will be
explained in Chapter 4), recognition as a soft power nation made Japan feel somewhat uncomfortable.
Instead Japan desired acknowledgment for its diplomatic skills. Consequently, Japan became involved in UN
activities like peacekeeping operations (PKO) to withdraw itself from its soft power image. PKO is
considered one of the most important activities in the maintenance of international peace deriving from
the UN Charter.25 Due to certain imposed restrictions, Japan could only offer non-military intermediary
services like medical care or supervision to PKO.26 Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) had high
hopes to send military personnel to areas where intermediary action was required; however UN members
ignored Japan’s militaristic ambition to expand their peacekeeping services and ensured to take advantage
of Japan’s soft power strength.
The UN expected Japan, the third largest economic power, to take on its financial weight especially
after the chronic financial crisis the UN suffered in the 1960s.27 At this stage, Japan had little or no voice in
securing a definite role in the UN. Japan lacked its own distinct international identity and its foreign
diplomacy was swamped with UN matters. Regardless of Japan’s continuous financial contribution to the
UN, Japanese officials felt that “[Japan] has no more ability to make its voice heard than a country with a
population of 50,000”,28 illustrating the lack of political power Japan as an important nation.
1980s: Money equals power?
Up to this point, member states only acknowledged Japan as an important benefactor. Although
Japan was discontented with the economic label, this international reaction pioneered Japan’s “checkbook
diplomacy” strategy.29 This strategy was formulated to allow Japan to openly use economic aid in gaining
recognition and defining a more solid role as the UN’s leading benefactor. By mid 1980s, Japan was second
only to the US in contributions to UN PKO30 as a means of fulfilling its international responsibilities. In due
time, however, Japan’s money-throwing tactic soon created domestic and international condemnation.
21
Bert Edström, Japan's Quest for a Role in the World, (1988), p.76
22
Ibid. p.90
23
Commented by Nakajima Mineo, in Nihon Bunka Foramu, “Hannichi ron no Kokusaiteki haikei” Shimpojiumu Hannichi Kanjo no
Kozo: Ajia no Hannichi ron (1975). p.111
24
The terms ‘soft’ and ‘hard power’ originally derives from Joseph Nye Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (1994).
25
Tetsuo Maeda, PKO: Sono Souzouteki Kanosei, (1991), pp.5-6
26
Other Japanese intermediary roles included observing elections, providing bureaucratic advice and guidance, transportation,
construction and, rescue and repatriation of war refugees. Maeda, PKO, pp.48-50
27
Pan, U in Japan’s policymaking, p.312
28
Ken Ishida, ‘Nihon kara mita Kokuren kaikakuron no sanchouryu’ in Chiba Daigaku Hougaku Ronshu 23, Vol.3 (1998), p.126
29
Richard D. Leitch, Jr., Akira Kato and Martin E. Weinstein, Japan’s Role in the Post-Cold War World, (1995), p.74
30
William L. Heinrich, U Peace-keeping Operations: A Guide to Japanese Policies (1999), p.17
9
Firstly, Japan’s economic contribution was condemned for having no particular responsibility in
shaping or implementing decisions in specialised UN agencies.31 Secondly, Japan was losing its credibility
because the world perceived it as taking a back seat in active participation. The US criticised that Japan
“avoid[ed] sweat” with their checkbook strategy because PKO required physical involvement,32 which
naturally embarrassed and irritated the Japanese. Also, being one of the only new-comer to donate large
sums to the UN, Japan expected first-class treatment. To further aggravate their frustration, the Kuwait
government cut Japan from their full-spread ‘thank you’ list for the contribution of their liberation.33
Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi believed that it was logical for Japan to earn the rights of permanent
membership due to its high financial contribution,34 but instead it suffered “deep disappointment”.35
The notion to seek power was stimulated by the tiresome second-class treatment Japan was
receiving. “International respectability”36 could only be sought through a position of power, and in the UN,
influencers were members of the SC. The Cold War conflict between the US and former Soviet Union
demonstrated that tension between SC members made the UN dysfunctional. MOFA official Takahiro
Shinyo commented that “it did not really matter whether we [Japan] did nothing or whether the UN did not
function…” so long as the SC did something.37 This proved that not only were the SC gatekeeper’s of the UN
but they also possessed dominant power over the UN’s functionality. Japan’s position in the international
community would be subordinate unless it was a key player in the UN and the position of power belonged
with permanent members of the SC, which introduced Japan’s path to permanent candidacy.
1990s: Taking Control
In order to gain plausible recognition from the SC, it was not until the 1990s that Japan attempted
full participation in the UN. Japan was not only keen to become the number one benefactor of the UN but
desired a key role in PKO. The difference between Japan’s current attitude and its previous from earlier
periods was Japan’s assertive nature to strengthen its record as a major UN member. Japan needed a
strong case to promote itself internationally in order to gain more support for the permanent bid.
Taking control of its soft power strength, Japan maximised its economic power to intrigue the
international community. For instance, Japan intentionally raised its contribution from 12.4% to 15% to
insist that it deserved “right of entry” for permanent membership.38 Though the checkbook strategy
backfired, Japanese diplomats decided that steering aid “to places where it will bring long-term benefits
back to its [Japan] donor”39 would secure support from developing nations. By 1996, its contribution to PKO
accounted for more than 15% of the total peacekeeping budget, which is half of US input40 as seen in fig.1
below. When Japan felt the SC was ignoring its efforts, popular slogan “taxation without representation”41
31
Immerman, “Japan in the UN”, p.186
32
Heinrich, U PKO, p.19
33
Ronald Dore, Japan, Internationalisation and the U (1997), p.xiii
34
Reinhard Drifte, Japan's Quest for a Permanent Security-Council Seat: A Matter of Pride or Justice? (1999), p.27
35
Pan, U in Japan’s policymaking, pp.298-299
36
Leitch et al, Role in Post-Cold War, p.75
37
Takahiro Shinyo, “The conditions of the permanent membership in the United Nations”, Japan Echo, no.2, (1993), p.58
38
39
40
41
10
incited domestic support for permanent membership.
UN and PKO contributions (in percentage) for January 1994
UN Budget share PKO Special Contribution share

* To be increased to 13.95 in
USA 25.0 31.7 1995, to 15.43 per cent in
Japan 12.4* 12.5 1996 and to 15.65 per cent
Germany 8.9 8.9 1997
Russia 6.7 8.5 Source: MOFA, fig.142
France 6.0 7.6
UK 5.0 6.3
China 0.7 0.9
Consequently, Japan started to play a more constructive role as a non-permanent SC member. Its
mediatory efforts in the Iran-Iraq war of 1987-8 not only strengthened its relationship with the US but
renowned Japan for its intermediary role in PKO.43 Furthermore, Japan established an objective to be
elected as often as possible to the UN’s most prestigious committees including the SC and the Economic
and Social Council (ECOSOC). Being elected as provisional general secretary of such committee’s ensured
Japan its international voice would be acknowledged by all members. By the end of the 90s, political and
economically elite nations perceived Japan a “big power” and “should be treated as such by the world”.44
2000: Securing National Interest
It had taken Japan the best of five decades to finally earn respect from the world. As experience
had shown, Japan was at an advantage when promoting its soft power strength. By 2000 the world had
become reliant on Japan’s financial assistance.
Through means of trading, foreign-direct investments, and Official Development Assistance (ODA),45
Japan successfully positioned itself in Asia. To expand its international credential, Japan established good
relationships with African and Latin American states by initiating development schemes to endorse learning
and technology in a cost efficient manner.46 Working in partnership with developing countries galvanised
support for its permanent candidacy which was important in convincing the SC of its worth. Asian countries
(except China) became reliant on Japan to represent them in UN meetings to the extent that it became
42
Source taken from Reinhard Drifte, Japan’s Foreign Policy for the 21st Century, (1998), p.140
43
44
Mushakoji Kinhide, “In search of a new diplomacy”, Japan Quarterly (1973), p.260
45
Official Development Assistance is a form of grant or loan given to less developed countries. The donor’s objective is non-
commercial although interest gained from the loan is marginal compared to normal market rates.
46
Drifte, Permanent SC Seat, p.145-149
11
customary for Japan to collect “viewpoints of its major Asian partners”.47 Clearly, Japan’s weight in
international politics is now so big that doing nothing would materially affect others.
Besides support from member states, reforming the UN is a pre-condition to Japan’s permanent
bid. Having gained international respect, Japan’s national interests could only be protected by removing the
original members of the SC from power. Former UN Minister Gennady Udovenko reinforced that the “war
established” SC cannot reflect the present and urged that Japan was its leading candidate.48
Despite tactical shifts in securing a more prestigious role in the UN, Japan’s aspiration for permanent
membership had always symbolised the desire for authority and world recognition. Japan’s more pressing
objectives in relation to the bid are to obtain veto, continue financing its own projects and acquire inside
information on permanent members.49 Unfortunately, achieving these goals is beyond Japan’s soft power
ability. In order to obtain a permanent seat, Japan must now overcome obstructions which inhibit its
aspiration.
4. JAPAN’S OBSTRUCTION: AND SO, THE STRUGGLE BEGINS
Japan’s Domestic Obstruction
The theme of Japan’s domestic obstruction surrounds the argument of whether to reform the
Japanese Constitution. The UN Charter states that all members are required to assist “in any action [the
UN] takes in accordance with the present charter”.50 Without an army, however, Japan cannot participate
in fuller PKO which involves military action. Political decision over reformation is heavily torn between the
people and the domestic government.
Article 9 ‘peace clause’ of the Constitution
“…the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of
force as means of settling international disputes…other war potential, will never be maintained…”
Article 9, Chapter II51
Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution has had immense significance in political practices of Japan. Many
criticised that Article 9 severely restricts Japan’s involvement in the UN, affecting its confidence in obtaining
a permanent seat. The peace clause is viewed as a “modern unequal treaty”52 given that the Japanese were
demanded to renounce the right to wage war, obtain nuclear arms, and preserve an army. The purpose of
the article was to prohibit the establishment of a militaristic Japan. Even former PM Yoshida believed that
47
Drifte, Foreign Policy, p.144
48
Statement by Ukraine Foreign Minister of the UN General Assembly Gennday Udovenko from UNU Nexions, “Okureru anpori
kakaku ni kenen hyoumei”, (1998)
49
Glenn D. Hook, et al. Japan's International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security. 2nd ed. (2005), p.371
50
United Nations. Charter of the United ations and Statute of the International Court of Justice (1995), p.5
51
Minoru, Oda., and Yoichi, Komori. Kenpo Kyujo wo Kataru, (2006). p.2
52
Ian Neary, The State and Politics in Japan (2002), p.53
12
Japanese people were “naturally given into aggression”.53 While surrendering its militaristic rights would
allow Japan to occupy “an honoured place in international society”,54 forcing the Japanese to adopt an anti-
militaristic culture has caused problems with their entry into the SC.
Firstly, the Japanese Self-Defence Force (JSDF)55 cannot legally be involved in high risk PKO,
including enforcement actions which require the use or handling of weapons. Confining the JSDF as
“pacifist watchdog[s]”56 is a highly unsatisfactory role for a country that wishes for permanent membership.
Although Britain does not classify PKO as a defining criterion for permanent membership, France remarked
that Japan must participate in all UN activities to gain their support for its candidacy.57 No doubt criticisms
from the SC push MOFA in expanding peacekeeping roles in which the JSDF can partake. However, even
despatching the JSDF to Mozambique (May 1993 - Dec 1995) was “largely ignored” because the operation
lacked risk factor.58 Article 9 is harnessing Japan’s capabilities to fully adhere to the UN Charter’s
peacekeeping principles as limitations to reinterpret Article 9 restrict Japan from sending military officials
to volatile areas.
Secondly, Article 9 removed Japan from having a ‘can do’ attitude in its peacekeeping efforts.
Japan’s negative attitude caused by Article 9 has given the government scope to blame the Constitution for
their lack of action.59 Furthermore, the government remains sceptical of their army owing to their war
crime and insist the role of the JSDF should remain small.60 However 39% of the public, who believe Japan’s
candidacy is inhibited by the Constitution,61 are becoming more impartial to the idea of reinterpreting the
conditions of Article 9 with the understanding that the JSDF would co-operate as part of a UN military
force.62 The Constitution cease to be a taboo and reinterpretation of the Constitution is in fact viewed as
one of the biggest trial for modern Japan.63 Until a method of redrafting Article 9 is uniformly decided upon,
the government has no choice but to approach the candidacy with a “neutrality without military”64 policy.
The Government
“We desire to obtain a seat quickly in the United Nations”

-Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida65
The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) have collectively been
Japan’s dominant party. The principle guideline of the Yoshida Doctrine, initiated by LDP leader Yoshida,
continues to influence political policies. On the basis of the Constitution, the Yoshida Doctrine highlights
53
Chu Shimizi, Chikujou ihonkoku Kempou Shingiroku (1962), p.14
54
Dore, Internationalisation and U, p.53
55
In practice, the JSDF are strictly in place to defending Japan from external threat. JSDF have limited capabilities to operate
overseas and have only recently been allowed to partake in PKO.
56
Mulgan, “International Peacekeeping”, p.1106
57
Ibid. p.1113
58
Heinrich, U PKO, pp.26-7
59
Maeda, PKO, pp.42-3
60
61
MOFA, “Gaimusho: Kokuren kaikuni kansuru ishiki chosa” http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/un_kaikaku/i_chosa.html
62
Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Re-emerges as a ‘ormal’ Military Power (2004), p.64
63
Kenpo Mondai Kenkyukai. Kenpo to Watashitachi, (1976), p.93
64
65
Proceedings in the House of Councillors, 13th Session, No.5, 23 January 1953, p.7
13
the importance of abiding the Constitution and the Three Principles of Nuclear Disarmament,66 which are
heavily practised by the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Japanese Communist Party (JCP). Yet
Yoshida’s instigated relationship with the US offends the ideals held by socialist parties but attracts the
attention of the democrats.
Guided by pacifism, JSP and JCP are adamant to eradicate extended peacekeeping involvement of
the JSDF. In deliberation to Article 9, left-wing diplomats regard the existence of the JSDF to be
unconstitutional.67 Unlike the JSP and JCP who seem attached to pacifist guidelines, mainstream democratic
leaders believe that the path to permanent membership is for Japan to return being a ‘normal’ country.
Ichiro Ozawa of the LDP described ‘normal’ as the right to participate in “any form of UN-sanctioned and
UN-centred multilateral military operation, from PKO to full combat peace enforcement and essentially war
fighting”.68 By ‘normalising’ the country, Japan can fully engage in high risk peacekeeping missions, which is
otherwise forbidden by Article 9. Furthermore, regarding peacekeeping as an “honourable military
occupation”,69 MOFA and the democrats wish to expand in activities away from humanitarian assistance,
which will balance out Japan’s soft power strength.
As the following table illustrates, given the overwhelming popularity enjoyed by the democrats, the
idea of normalisation may have an upper-hand. The LDP’s mission to “establish Japan’s own constitution”70
is favourably intriguing certain SC members for support, but persistence for pacifism supported by minority
parties is confusing Japan’s international ambition. Regardless of being dominant, parties are weak without
gaining public support for their policies. Political indecision and disunity between party principles is putting
considerable strain on Japan’s overall UN aspiration.
Japan General Election 2005

Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP)
411 18
9 7 New Komeito Party
(NKP)
Democratic Party of
Japan (DPJ)
113 Japanese
Communist Party
(JCP)
Social Democratic
Party (SDP)
People's New Party

296 (PNP)
New Party Nippon

31 (NPN)
New Party Daichi

(NPD)
Others
66
Outlined by LDP PM Eisaku Sato, the ‘Three Principles of Nuclear Disarmament’ specifies the ban of producing, possessing and
obtaining nuclear arms on Japanese soil. This principle has guided Japan’s disarmament policy.
67
Shunji Yanai, “UN Peace Operations and the Role of Japan: The Japanese View” in Alex Morrison and James Kiras, eds., U
Peace Operations and the Role of Japan (1996), p.76
68
Hughes, ‘ormal’ Military Power, pp.49-50
69
Morrison & Kiras, Peace Operations,p.87
70
Kosuke Takashi,”Japan to become ‘Britain of the Far East’”, Asian Times (2005)
14
Source: Adapted from Asahi Shimbun (Sept 05), fig. 271
The Public
“Millions of us in Japan love our Article 9”

Peace Activist Hitoshi Katsumori72
Public view on Japan’s role is divided between severe self-criticism of a militaristic Japan and the
need for Constitutional reinterpretation for military flexibility. In relation to fig.3, support is clearly aimed
towards peacekeeping activities that lack risk and maximise upon Japan’s soft power efficiencies. 64.1% of
the public agree that Japan should join the SC as a permanent member under these conditions.73
Prerequisites in becoming a permanent member through non-militaristic means are heavily supported by
the majority of the public. Although fig.3 suggests that 49% want Japan to remain a pacifist country, the
remaining 51% who are unaccounted for may want Article 9 removed or reinterpreted in order to
remilitarise Japan.
Source: Translated by author from MOFA 2005, fig.374
Regardless of popular recognition to modernise the Constitution, Japanese peace activists are
working together to strengthen the principles of Article 9. Comparing recent opinion polls to those from
71
Asahi Shimbun. “Minshuto Shindaihyou ni Maehara shi 2hyosa de Ken shi wo yaburu”, (2005)
72
Lecture by Hitoshi Katsumori on “A Revival of Japanese Militarism and a Crisis for Article 9 of Japan’s War Renouncing
Constitution”, Ohio University
73
This figure is presented in MOFA, “Kokuren Chosa”
74
Ibid.
15
1949, the number of people who want Japan to remain a pacifist nation has risen by 9%.75 This increase
suggests that general support for Japan’s candidacy will lose momentum if it was to relinquish its pacifist
position. Over the years, organisations supporting Article 9 prevented the government from constitutional
revision. From an activist point of view, constitutional reform will alter the main aims behind Japan’s
candidacy.76 Also, campaigns demonstrate that Article 9 in fact upholds UN’s vision for world peace, thus
pressurise policy makers to prevent Japan from giving up its pacifist qualities.
Besides forming domestic pressure groups to resist a government-led revision, activists are banding
together with international campaigners to spread the meaning of Article 9. Through movements like the
Global Article 9 Campaign, which comprises of 60 Japanese societies, activists are creating an international
network to protect Article 9 from permanent removal.77 Activists like Akira Kawasaki state that Article 9 will
“act as an international peace mechanism” once the world recognises the potential behind the Japanese
Constitution.78 By striving to globalise Article 9 to other governments and institutions, the Japanese public
will continue to obstruct government initiative to normalise Japan.
JAPAN’S INTERNATIONAL OBSTRUCTION
The nature of Japan’s international links with permanent members and Asian countries relate
closely to its historical misdeeds. It is important to analyse the reasons why permanent members China,
Russia and the US have stalled Japan’s progress for the bid. Equally as important is the understanding of
Asian response towards Japan. The examination of how each country obstructs Japan’s aspiration will
enable us to understand why Japan’s cautious approach in international relations directly affects its
candidacy.
Permanent Members: THE SECURITY COUNCIL
United States of America: Friend or Foe?
“…a way should be found to assure permanent representation in that [Security] council for Japan, whose
resources and influence are of major importance in world affairs”
-US President Richard Nixon79
Bilateral relationship between Japan and the US has stimulated Japan’s confidence in securing a
permanent seat. Partnership with one of the most influential members of the SC has given Japan strength
to exercise political power because the presence of the US gives Japan clout. Japan-US relationship is
75
76
Kastumori, Hitoshi. “Crisis for Article 9”
77
Akira Kawasaki, "Article 9's Global Impact". Foreign Policy in Focus (2007)
78
Ibid.
79
16
particularly close with the binding of their security alliance. The ‘Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and
Security’ alliance was originally signed to defend each country when under attack; however restrain s of
Article 9 has enabled Japan to receive guaranteed safety from the US without reciprocation. Protection
under America’s “nuclear umbrella”80 led Japan to focus its efforts in developing its economic power and
slowly overshadow America as the UN’s lead benefactor. Japan’s “wider responsibility”81 to the world is no
doubt credited to its ties with the US. But critiques illustrated that Japan’s relationship with the US is
leading Japan into “entrapment in US military strategy”,82 which directly influences Japan’s own diplomacy.
Security Alliance terms which consent American to set up military bases in Okinawa is discomfort to
Japan. Firstly, American nuclear arms stored in Okinawa breach conditions of Article 9. Secondly, 70% of US
bases in Okinawa are regarded as a burden for Japan.83 Despite these actions causing the Japanese some
distress, the government is powerless to take action against America considering that the Americans do not
require consultation with the Japanese government on the management of US military in Japan.84 Japan is
obliged to keep the US content as a repayment for being Japan’s security guarantor. In UN meetings, Japan
tends to vote similarly to the US and support American objectives. For example, playing the obedient ally,
Japan complied in assisting with the war in Iraq85 by expanding the JSDF for PKO under American pressure.
Additionally, Japan now ranks fifth in the world in defence spending, having been encouraged by the US to
develop Japanese weaponry and expanding its military.86 The phrase “when the United States sneezes
Japan catches a cold”87 characterises Japan as being a weak member of international society with their lack
of control in managing its own security and illustrating Japan’s heavy reliance on the Security Alliance.
There is no doubt that America overshadows Japan in the alliance. Japan needs to demand “an
equal partnership in maintaining the security of Asia”88 in order to develop its own voice. However the
dangers of rivalling with the US can put Japan at a disadvantage of losing its only form of defence,
illustrating the fear of entrapment already embedded within Japan’s foreign policy.89 Furthermore, America
is only happy to support Japan’s candidacy if it means that the US could improve its position in Asia.
Therefore, the US would not hesitate to “knock it [Japan’s candidacy] down”90 if Japan became an obstacle
in pursuing its own interest. In order to sustain American interest in Japan’s permanent bid, it is easier for
Japan to “simply placating Washington’s request”91 rather than rival a strong supporter that has the power
to completely jeopardise Japan’s chance in obtaining a permanent seat.
80
Hughes, ‘ormal’ Military Power, p.22
81
82
Ibid. p.65
83
Ibid. p.48
84
Neary, State and Politics,p.35
85
A commercial broadcast by Chairman Iba from Japanese Communist Party, entitled “Dou miru nihon no kokuren anpori jounin
rijikoku iri: sansei daga jouken ga hitsuyou” (2005)
86
The Economist. Pocket World in Figures. 8th ed. (2008), p.101
87
88
Tetsuya Kataoka and Ramon H. Myers, Defending an Economic Superpower. (1989), p.107
89
Hughes, ormal’ Military Power, p.65
90
91
Robert M. Orr, The Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid Power. (1990), p.113
17
Russia: The Territorial Bully
In 1997, President Yeltsin promised to support Japan’s bid for the first time, but Russian attitude
toward Japan’s candidacy has been ambiguous and opportunistic since then. As one of the five members of
the SC, Russia’s hindrance for Japan’s permanent bid had primarily been over the argument of the
‘Northern Territories’.92
Looking into history, Russia and Japan have always perceived each other through “territorial
glasses”.93 In brief, the main dispute surrounds the ownership of four islands located near Hokkaido known
as Kuril Islands. In the interest of satisfying their own interests, the constant struggle in reclaiming the
islands has had paralyzing effects in insuring a stable future based on partnership and co-operation. Instead,
each country remains insistent on “fishing rights”94 over the islands regardless of whether owning the
northern islands would benefit their nation economically or socially. In fact, Japanese ownership of Kuril
Islands have been regarded to “not [be] vitally necessary”95 for Japan’s national interest, as Japanese
habitation is minute and no financial contribution is made towards Japan’s economy. Yet for the sake of
exercising power over Russia, Japan has no less become imprisoned by the situation with Russia’s constant
change in its position in the dispute.
This issue in turn has created tensions that affect other aspects of Russo-Japanese relations. No less,
the lack of clear insight for negotiation from the Japanese has had implications in Japan’s permanent bid
and international security. In relation to Northern Territories, one of the reasons to why the US Security
Alliance is vital to Japan’s security is for the protection against Russian “nuclear blackmail”.96 Such blackmail
is indicated by Russia developing nuclear weapons as a scare tactic. For example, Russian announcement to
test its 50-megaton H-bomb was publicised to simply intimidate Japan’s non-nuclear policy and weaken its
diplomatic tactic for nuclear disarmament. 97 To further pressurise Japan’s decision over Kuril Islands,
dumping nuclear waste into the Japanese sea and becoming Asia’s biggest arms export is no less straining
Japan’s tact in diplomacy within its own continent. Japan has a responsibility to Asia in promoting and
sustaining non-proliferation, but constant grievances from Russia with its careless display of nuclear status
is faltering Japan’s position for the bid. While Russia continuously tests Japan’s diplomatic stamina, Russia
will reject to support Japan’s candidacy unless territorial issues have been resolved in Russia’s favour.
China: Beyond Rivalry
“Only a country that respects history, takes responsibility for [the past] and wins the trust of people in Asia
and the world can take on greater responsibilities in the international community”
92
Dispute over Kuril Islands, codenamed ‘The Northern Territories’ was established by one of the weakest post-war PM Suzuki
Zenko. Northern Territories was officially commemorated on the first signing of the Japanese-Russian Agreement on February 7th
1955
93
94
James E. Goodby, Vladamir I. Ivanov and Nabuo Shimotamai (eds.), “orthern Territories” and Beyond. (1995), p.155
95
Ibid. p.105
96
Kataoka and Myers, Defending Economic Superpower, p.80
97
18
- Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao98
Much of Japan’s difficulty in strengthening its bid has been roused up by anti-Japanese sentiment
held by the Chinese. With a long history of animosity, Japan’s historical tyranny against China and other
Asian neighbours has caused a fresh emergent of friction. Recent protests of Chinese opposition to Japan’s
membership bid are being directed towards Japan not taking responsibility for its war crimes in WWII.99 By
highlighting Japan’s aggressive past, Japan’s candidacy is losing its positive image.
Japan’s bid for permanent membership has stimulated mass protest in China due to Japan’s
inefficiency to apologise for their war crimes. Despite countless apologies made by Japanese diplomats and
most notably by Emperor Akihito in 1995, ten million Chinese protestors have signed online petitions to
obstruct Japan’s bid.100 The problem with Sino-Japanese relations is not the fact that there is no apology,
but rather that the Japanese ‘apology’ does not use terms the Chinese are willing to accept. Instead, the
Chinese are slandering Japanese apologies as being vague and insensitive.101 The Chinese have been
angered by trips to Yasukuni Shrine made by Japanese right-wing politicians, who have been blamed for
remembering war criminals as heroes. Yasukuni Shrine was made to remember those who died in wars,
including soldiers that were typified as Class A war criminals, but for China, Yasukuni Shrine is a symbol of
Japanese aggression. Visitation to the shrine by DPJ leaders Junichiro Koizumi and Abe Shinzo have been
criticised for showing sympathy towards criminals and diminishing any truth behind previous apologies.102
The Japanese media also sympathise with Chinese views of the situation and have discredited their own
government for their contradictory actions.103 Asahi Shimbun pointed out that the government’s words of
“deep remorse”104 for historical reconciliation is a façade.105 Similarly, Yoimiuri Shimbun openly claimed
that they will slander the government’s image if rituals made by democratic leaders were to continue.106
This brings to question how China can forgive Japan if Japan’s own people are refusing to accept actions of
their own government. Personal attacks from the Japanese media are not only strengthening China’s plan
to jeopardise Japan’s candidacy but is weakening Japan’s overall ‘peace-loving’ image.
Under these circumstances, China wished for Japan to remain a pacifist country and conceives
plans in pressurising Japan not expand the JSDF. The Hong Kong Standard urged that the Chinese “do not
oppose the Japanese people, we [the Chinese] oppose a small group of militarists who want to resurrect
Japanese domination”.107 Even though Japan has restraints to normalise the country, it is natural for China
and other Asian nations to feel threatened by the idea of a militarised Japan. While anti-Japanese
demonstrations continue to weaken Japan’s position for permanent membership, Japan’s efforts in keeping
an amiable relationship is proving to be a struggle.
98
Quote taken from Justin Curry, “Japan rejects ‘scary’ China’s war demands”, The Guardian, (2005)
99
War crime is widely defined in this thesis. The Tokyo Tribunal recognised Japanese war crimes to vary between biological human
experimentation, cannibalisation and mass murder. For more details, see Toshiyuki Tanaka, Hidden Horrors: Japanese war crimes in
World War II. (1996), pp.72-3
100
People’s Daily Online, “Nihon no jounin rijikoku iri - Netto ue de 1000man nin ga hantai” (2005)
101
Ibid.
102
Asahi Shimbun, “Jounin riji koku iri towareru ‘Haisenkoku’ no saihou” (2005)
103
Asahi Shimbun. “Nicchu Masatsu”. Media conference with Deputy Foreign Minister Hitoshi Tanaka.
104
Jane Yamazaki. Japanese Apologies for World War II, (2006), p.165
105
Asahi, “Haisenkoku”
106
Stated in David Pilling. “Japan’s top daily forces war reappraisal”, Financial Times (2006)
107
Hidenori Ijiri, “Sino-Japanese Controversy since the 1972 Diplomatic Normalisation” in Christopher Howe, ed., China and
Japan: History, Trends and Prospects. (1996), p.70
19
Non-Members: ASIA
Korea: Asia versus Japan
"We do not think Japan has the qualifications to become a UN Security Council member,
and we will try to make sure it does not become one"
- South Korean Ambassador Kim Sam-hoon108
Like China, North and South Korea have one of the strongest opposition campaigns against Japan’s bid
for permanent membership. According to Kosuke Takahashi, strong anti-Japanese sentiments from the
Koreans derive from Japanese colonial rule and have taken to the streets to express their antagonism.109
Memories of Japan’s violent occupation of Korea are comparable to the brutality caused to Chinese civilians.
Similarly, Korean opposition could be settled with a firm apology for the invasion, occupation, and sexual
enslavement of ‘comfort women’ for Japanese soldiers. However Koreans have also remarked that
“apology is too easy”.110 In fact, apology made by PM Miyazawa brought about “crowds of angry Koreans
storm[ing] the streets”, rejecting the apology to be “spacious” and “deceitful”.111 Rather than seeking an
apology, Koreans instead demand war compensation. Banding support from domestic groups like Young
Korean Academy and the Korean YMCA, Korea has shown great enmity towards Japan’s candidature and
initiated partnership with China to strengthen their campaign.
Additionally animosity between Korea, China and Japan is increasingly worrying neighbouring countries.
Singapore and Malaysia expressed concern that tensions in East Asia will lead to “accidents” and “cause
governments to lose control”.112 With ongoing riots held by China and Korea, painful memories of Japanese
cruelty are resurfacing within other Asian countries that experienced similar violence.113 Nevertheless these
countries have grown to bury negative feelings for Japan’s past mistakes due to trade, technology, financial
assistance from Japan.114 It is feared that any instability in Northeast Asia could adversely affect Southeast
Asia, as continuous political and civilian unrest in Asia is detaching Japan from its Asian community.115
Further to Japan’s ‘less obvious’ position in Asia, Leitch remarked that “to many Asians, the Japanese
seem arrogant and chauvinistic”116 due to Japan’s more persistent relationship with America. According to
Chosun, Japan representing Asia in the UN will irritate Asian people117 because Japan is not considered
‘Asian’. Taking advantage of Japan’s weak position in Asia, the development of nuclear arms in North Korea
is having a pessimistic effect on Japan’s non-nuclear policy. Not only can Korea’s nuclear missile reach
Japan, the emergent of Korea’s possible nuclear threat is directing Japan towards stronger America
liaison.118 Although Korea finds it difficult to criticise Japan’s need to modify its Security Alliance with its
108
Korea Net. “Seoul opposes Tokyo’s UNSC bid” (2005)
109
Kosuke Takahashi, “Roh reopens Japan’s war wounds”. Asian Times. (2005)
110
Yamazaki, Japanese Apologies, p.65
111
Ibid. pp.62-63
112
Eric Teo Chu Cheow, “Southeast Asian worry about North East Asia’s feud”, Japanese Institute of Global Communications
113
Chosun Nippo, “Nihon no shounin rijikoku iri wo shienshita Bush daitouryou” (2007)
114
Ibid.
115
Kenneth W. Thompson. China, Taiwan, Japan, the United States, and the World (1998), p.97
116
117
Chosun Nippo, “Bush daitouryou” (2007)
118
Yoimuri. “Kita chousen ni hikakuka he no gutaiteki koudou yokyuu… nichibei shunoukaidan” (2006)
20
American ally,119 from an Asian point of view, Japan is neglecting the needs of its neighbours. There is no
doubt that Korea is taking every measure to weaken Asian support for Japan’s candidacy. With the gradual
loss for respect as an Asian nation, Korea’s promise to “make sure”120 Japan will not become a permanent
member is destabilising Japan’s support in the Asian region.
5. JAPAN AS THE IDEAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBER
Positive attributes to Japan’s permanent member candidacy
Having established Japan’s aspiration and obstructions for candidacy, this chapter will now examine
what makes Japan an ideal member in relation to expectations led by the new century. Qualities which
reinforce Japan’s candidature will be balanced with criticisms that obstruct Japan’s progress.
Soft Power
Japan’s merit for permanent membership relies upon Japan’s ability to provide strong economic
and technological support. As exemplified in the fig.4, Japan is a dominant candidate in regards to its
financial power amongst existing permanent members and those who wish to seek permanent
membership. Domestic and international diplomats make it a point to stress Japan’s worthiness for
permanent membership purely based on their soft power efforts.121 Constitutional restraint for military
development subsequently facilitated Japan’s connection with other nations in an alternative fashion.
By playing on their soft power efficiency, economic contribution through ODA has positioned Japan
favourably amongst countries that lack presence in the UN. Taking Africa as an example, co-operation
between Africa and Asia (AA) is improving overall humanitarian developments in Third World countries.122
Funds towards the fight against AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria have allowed Japan to gain overwhelming
support from its African partners. Japan has also actively begun to support Islamic countries in the Middle
East through economic and technical assistance,123 and proposals have been made in extending PKO
budgets for 2008.124 Economic activities of foreign countries are vital to Japan’s existence as a dominant
and independent actor in the UN.
119
Takahashi, “Roh reopens wounds”
120
Quote stated under sub-heading on p.27
121
As suggested by Gennday Udovenko, UNU Nexions, “Okureru anpori”
122
MOFA, “Africa shokoku gaishou to no shushokukai ni okeru Kawaguchi daijin aisatsu” (2004)
123
124
MOFA. Misako Kaji statement from http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/speech/un2007/un0705-3.html
21
Source: Translated by the author from MOFA (2007), fig.4125
Non-nuclear Policy
Increase spending on foreign aid is further promoting Japan’s reputation as a non-nuclear power.
By concentrating efforts on humanitarian foreign aid, Japan is demonstrating that nuclear and weaponry
development is not positively contributing to international security. Samuel Huntington proposed that
economic power is more important in determining the primary or subordination of states than military
power because military conflict is becoming less of an option in settling disputes.126 While the Cold War
epitomised the constant threat of a nuclear war, risks of an accidental nuclear war are heightened now
more than ever considering that India, Pakistan and possibly North Korea have become nuclear states.
From the experiences of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, Japan stands firm in rejecting nuclear ownership
endorsed by powerful countries. Japan’s military limitation has also helped it develop a “more
sophisticated understanding” of the world, thereby gaining the ability to suggest a possible solution
without resorting to military means.127 From an UN perspective, Japan is in an ideal position to keep watch
on peacekeeping activities which is unlikely to be one-sided or imposed by militaristic means, thus neutrally
monitor SC activities.
125
MOFA, “Gaimusho: Naze nihon ha jounin rijikoku to naru bekika”. (2007)
126
Quoted in Drifte, Foreign Policy, p.2
127
Hanns W. Maull. “The future of UN Peacekeeping and the roles of Germany and Japan” in Morrison, Alex, and Kiras, James, U
Peace Operations, p.57
22
Mixed Identity
Japan’s ability to communicate with other nations is another attribute that has enhanced Japan’s
candidature. Gradually Japan has acquired an identity that appeals to that of Western, Eastern and
Southern neighbours. America views Japan as a Western ally even though geographically Japan is
positioned in the Far East.128 The idea of a mixed identity derived from Japan adopting Western institutions
and practices merging with Eastern social customs.129 Steven Holloway described Japan as having acquired
a “Scandinavian or neutralist flavour” reflecting its unbiased stance in international relations.130 The
creation of an identity which reflects both Eastern and Western ideals has allowed Japan to become the
first non-Western country to join the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) of
the UN in 1964,131 emphasising Japan’s mixed identity as a unique trait. With its mixed identity, Japan can
“bridge” East and West, and North and South countries,132 a trait which China lacks as a permanent
member.
Criticisms of Japan’s candidature
Permanent Seat for Cash
While Japan’s economic strategy continues to persuade poorer nations that it deserves permanent
membership, the method by which Japan’s money is being spent has put the country in a difficult position.
Firstly, Japan’s continuous efforts in providing funds have raised arguments that Japan is using their
financial power as a means for rationalising its candidature. China accused Japan of buying their way into
the SC by funding more money to UN projects than required.133 Also, MOFA diplomats openly admitted that
their contribution towards the UN is “still too meagre”134 and should raise their contribution for the right of
entry.135 Japan may be ready to shoulder a greater financial burden; however the reality to how their
money is spent is out of Japanese control. A statement by MOFA minister Misako Kaji declared that Japan is
considering to cut funding for PKO unless control over the management of UN funds is given to them.136
Recent reports of financial corruption and fraud in PKO have forced Japan to halt its objective on continuing
a role as the UN’s main benefactor,137 which ultimately threatens Japan’s soft power authority in the UN.
128
Immerman, “Japan in the UN”, p.187
129
130
Drifte, Permanent SC seat, p.153
131
Neary, State and Politics, p.65
132
Yasuhiro Ueki, “Japan’s UN Diplomacy: Sources of Passivism and Activism,” in Gerald Curtis, ed., Japan’s Foreign Policy After
the Cold War, (1993), p.350
133
134
Kataoka and Myers, Defending Economic Superpower, p.29
135
Ibid. p.29
136
MOFA, “Permanent Mission”
137
MOFA. “PKO Procurement at Public Meeting of the SC”. (2006)
23
The Other Candidates
Secondly, Japan’s candidacy for permanent membership is being mocked for its vague ideas in
regards to the future of the UN. Critiques argue that Japan as a permanent member will be no different to
that of a Japan that does not have a permanent seat.138 US endorsement is not enough to sustain Japan as a
lead candidate. The majority of the SC is in favour of backing India’s candidature because India is more
representative for developing countries. China expressed support for India, comparing India’s consistent
priorities to Japan’s dispersed actions.139 When compared to Britain and France, Japan’s inconsistency
illustrates their lack of international experience and political leadership which could inhibit future decisions
in the UN if Japan became a permanent member. India also seems to be more accepted as a future
permanent member due to their nuclear arms status. British, French and Russian diplomats made their
views clear in stating that being a nuclear power had “something to do with the qualification for a
permanent Security Council seat”.140 Therefore Japan’s opposition to obtaining nuclear arms in the future
affects its chance of gaining more than just US support for the bid.
Identity Crisis
In order to galvanise enough international support, it is important for Japan to target countries in
the AA bloc because Japan being recognised as a Western power offends Asian countries. Such reaction
derives from Japan’s lack of independence from the US, placing the needs of America before its own
country. The demands under Japan’s bilateral relationship with the US pressurises Japan in complying and
emulating American practices, thus leading Japan to psychologically leave Asia.141 According to Pan, Japan
was always forced into either co-operating with Western nations or pursuing a special interest as an Asian
power.142 Japan’s dilemma is not its relationship with the West specifically but its desire in wanting to
please two blocs that have contrasting identities. From an Asian angle, Japan is only ‘Asian’ in a
geographical sense. Being associated too closely to the West is having a negative effect since Japan cannot
rationalise that they will represent Asia as affectively as India.
6. JAPAN’S OPTIONS TO BECOME A PERMANENT MEMBER

OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
Strategies which are open to Japan in approaching the candidacy very much depend upon either
the reformation of the Japanese Constitution or the UN Charter. Alternate options for Japan to become a
permanent member are based on hypothetical situations. With the exclusion of the ‘enemy clause’ or
Article 9, it is possible for Japan to become a permanent member by adopting strategies which are
examined in this chapter.
138
139
Nikkan Sports. “Chukoku ga indo no jouninri iri shiji”. (2008)
140
141
Thompson, China, Taiwan, Japan, p.97
142
24
Reform
As discussed in Chapter 4, Article 9 of the Constitution restricts the JSDF from being involved in high
risk PKO. Article 9 bears no flexibility in expanding JSDF involvement in fuller PKO. For a nation that seeks
permanent membership, observations show that Japan cannot continue to play a passive role in
peacekeeping. Out of 118 countries, Japan ranks 83 for contributing its military to PKO,143 placing it at a
disappointing low level. Apart from its financial contributions, Japan’s participation in PKO compared with
that of other countries is unsatisfactory. The Constitution has to be flexible in allowing JSDF to adhere to
UN collective security actions. Using the JSDF for the purpose of international peace and security should be
allowed within Japan’s Constitution as Japan’s military will be used “to prevent war”144 not wage or
contribute to war. Complying with the UN Charter, Japan should therefore be permitted to expand the
military simply for UN functions and overcome its timid approach to amending Article 9.
Besides amending Article 9, Luck and other like-minded authors criticised that “no reform of the
United Nations would be complete without the reform of the Security Council”.145 Sixty years on, the SC no
longer reflect today’s world. As the fight against terrorism and weapons of mass destruction threaten the
world today, the UN must change and adapt to meet these challenges, which current SC cannot fulfil
without disarming its nuclear arms.146 Therefore, as of March 1995, recommendations to expanding the SC
with five additional permanent members and four non-permanent members, having only one extra
permanent member, or the choice to elect five new permanent members is being consulted.147 While the
expansion of the SC is at the forefront of UN reform, former SC members are reluctant to forfeiting their
permanent seat.148 Current permanent members agree that the creation of even one permanent seat will
make the UN ineffective as consensus for a vote will be made more difficult.149 Russia prefers the right of
veto to strictly belong to the “original P5”150 as the UN Charter still recognises Germany and Japan as
“enemy states”.151 Although Japan and Germany are perceived as “natural beneficiaries”152 of a permanent
seat, the UN Charter’s ‘enemy clause’ is a psychological weight153 to these candidates. Without deleting the
enemy clause, countries who oppose Japan’s candidature will be less reluctant to forgive past aggression
and accept enemies as permanent peacekeepers.154 Deleting the enemy clause will be a powerful symbol to
represent international forgiveness of Japan’s past misgivings.
Entry as a Quasi Member
The role of a quasi-member is one that Japan has filled many times. The term ‘quasi’ in relation to
the bid refers to preliminary permanent membership without the rights to veto. In short, quasi
143
Global Policy. (February 28, 2008) “Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN
Operations”.http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2008/feb08_2.pdf
144
145
Edward C. Luck, U SC: Practice and Promise. (2006), p.118
146
PM Junichiro Koizumi “Kokuren Shinjidai” Speech
147
Ibid. p.116
148
149
Ibid. p.143
150
Ibid.
151
References to the ‘enemy states’ appear in Article 53, 77, 107 of the UN Charter.
152
153
Hook, et al. Japan's International Relations, p.374
154
Yoshikawa, “Kokuren Jouninnriji”, pp.40-41
25
membership encapsulates the role of a non-permanent member of the SC.155 The difference between the
two is the non-requirement of being voted into the SC as a non-permanent member. Japan’s nine time
record of being voted as a non-permanent156 proves that Japan’s contribution in the UN is acknowledged by
international society. Although quasi membership removes the right to veto, SC members cannot veto the
admission of a non-permanent member.157 By switching objectives from permanent membership to
entering the SC as a non-permanent quasi member, Japan will not only become more involved in talks with
permanent members, but will be able to gain a more detailed insight to the works of the SC. Strong support
from the AA will guarantee Japan’s entry as a quasi member because the AA considers Japan as their UN
representative. In this way, Japan will maintain a close relationship with member states whilst exercising
authority as a semi-permanent member.
Entry as a Full Member
Characteristics of a full member reflect qualities of current SC members. Each SC member is a

nuclear state who is considered great military powers. Adopting such characteristics is a highly unlikely
option for Japan but hypothetically, the lack of constitutional restraint could tempt Japan to pursue the
path to normalisation. Japan strongly upholding a non-nuclear policy does not draw away from the fact that
the idea of developing nuclear arms has not been considered.158 In view of Japan’s technological and
economical strength, observers have commented that Japan could easily become a nuclear power in “a full
afternoon”.159 Moreover, British and French diplomats stating that Japan “deserves to have nuclear
weapons”160 could further entice Japan to believing nuclear status automatically gives one the right to
become a permanent member. Owning nuclear arms will allow Japan to eject from US’ defence security
and enable Japan to fully participate in PKO like other members. Through adapting similar qualities as
current permanent members, Japan would have attained the means to influence other nations, 161 and in
turn demand permanent membership.
Entry as a Special Member
There is a fair amount of evidence to suggest that entry as a special member is Japan’s strongest option
in pursuing permanent membership. Rather than copying qualities of current SC members, it is better for
Japan to strengthen its special qualities. Special membership status signifies an invite for permanent
membership with Japan’s current restrains. As a special member, the right to veto “should be given as a
matter of principle”.162 Dispossession of nuclear arms and military power puts Japan in an ideal position to
control other permanent members from “taking too radical actions” 163 using the veto to mediate extreme
155
156
Japan was voted in as a non-permanent member of the SC in the years 1958-9, 1966-7, 1971-2, 1975-6, 1981-2, 1992-3, 1997-8.
This information was found in Hook, et al. Japan's International Relations, p.371
157
Luck, U SC, p.69
158
Speech by Ambassador Kobayashi, “Mission of Japan to the European Communities”, Brussels, 11 May 1993, in ews & Views
from Japan (1993), p.3
159
Johnson, China, Taiwan, Japan, p.111
160
Drifte, Foreign Policy, pp.80-1
161
Hughes, ‘ormal’ Military Power, p.93
162
Anon, ‘Anpori kakudai gutaika no ugoki’, Sankei Shimbun, (1997)
163
Liang, U in Japan’s policymaking, p.41
26
opinions. Relying strongly on its non-militaristic principles, Japan will be acting as an “ideas-man”164 for
international security and development in the SC. Unlike previous options, as a special member Japan will
not be pressured into participating in PKO through a militaristic means. Rather, by expanding its soft power
qualities, Japan can maintain a concentrated effort on the financial management of the UN and ODA.
Special member status in the SC would best suit today’s international world and help maximise Japan’s
projection of its soft power asset without threatening its relationship with other nations and its situation at
home.
7. CONCLUSION: Breaking out of the Struggle
Japan is faced with paradoxical circumstances. In wanting world-class responsibility, Japan’s

eagerness to impress everyone has interfered with Japan’s approach to its candidature. Its ultimate
objective to become a permanent member of the SC is stalled as a result of conflicting opinions from
domestic and international forces. Government desire to normalise Japan into a military nation is
conflicting with domestic interest in preventing constitutional reform. Strong domestic pressure in
maintaining Article 9 is obstructing Japan to participate in a wider range of peacekeeping activities, in turn
receiving criticisms from SC members for not actively contributing to international security. Strengthening
relationship with Latin American and African countries puts Japan at a great advantage in securing
international co-operation for its bid. Nevertheless its bilateral relationship with the US is affecting Japan’s
connection with Asia. Without sustaining strong Asian support, Japan will be perceived as a weak
contender and an ineffective leader when representing Asia in UN meetings. Furthermore, with so much
Asian unrest towards Japan’s war crimes, illustrating it as the enemy is obliterating the ‘peace-loving image’
Japan tried so hard to regain over the last five decades. Japan’s persistence in wanting to satisfy its own
national interest and the interest of others is confusing its bid altogether. These obstructions are hardly
trivial matters but the Japanese government continues to ignore and clumsily evade these issues.
The answer to Japan’s struggle is to achieve unity. The Japanese government may insist that the
most direct way in resolving its stalemate for permanent membership is to remove the enemy clause and
re-elect members for the SC; however its failure to manage historical problems embraced by its neighbours
is stalling Japan’s progress for permanent membership. Japan needs to prioritise which issue to deal with
first rather than managing all problems simultaneously. Instead of focusing so heavily on nuclear-related
issues, Japan must first tackle problems presented by Korea, China and Russia to avoid attacks which make
it vulnerable. Problems regarding Japan’s war crime and Kurile Island will not disappear as pressure from its
neighbours and its people will persist. The Japanese government need to construct a strategy that will
diminish anti-Japanese sentiment by assuring its position as a pacifist country and honouring Article 9. Once
the issues faced by problem countries have been tackled, only then can Japan focus on non-proliferation,
disarmament and worldwide development without being bombarded by criticisms from other nations
which essentially weakens Japan’s permanent bid.
164
Hook, et al. Japan's International Relations, p.387
27
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31

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JAPAN AND THE UNITED NATIONS

BA Japanese and Management

Word Count: 10,365

School of Oriental and African Studies (University of London)

Acknowledgement forwarded to Dr Yuka

AA African and Asian (group)

Fig.1. UN and PKO Contributions Page 14

The Struggle for a Permanent Seat

3. JAPAN’S ASPIRATION: THE BUILDING PROCESS OF JAPAN’S DESIRE

Japan’s changing attitude in the United Nations

1950-1960: On the road for a ‘respected’ Japan

1970s: The quest for a role

1980s: Money equals power?

1990s: Taking Control

UN and PKO contributions (in percentage) for January 1994

UN Budget share PKO Special Contribution share

2000: Securing National Interest

4. JAPAN’S OBSTRUCTION: AND SO, THE STRUGGLE BEGINS

Japan’s Domestic Obstruction

Article 9 ‘peace clause’ of the Constitution

“We desire to obtain a seat quickly in the United Nations”

Japan General Election 2005

People's New Party

New Party Nippon

New Party Daichi

“Millions of us in Japan love our Article 9”

Source: Translated by author from MOFA 2005, fig.374

JAPAN’S INTERNATIONAL OBSTRUCTION

Permanent Members: THE SECURITY COUNCIL

United States of America: Friend or Foe?

China: Beyond Rivalry

Korea: Asia versus Japan

5. JAPAN AS THE IDEAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBER

Positive attributes to Japan’s permanent member candidacy

Criticisms of Japan’s candidature

Permanent Seat for Cash

6. JAPAN’S OPTIONS TO BECOME A PERMANENT MEMBER

Entry as a Quasi Member

Entry as a Full Member

Characteristics of a full member reflect qualities of current SC members. Each SC member is a

Entry as a Special Member

7. CONCLUSION: Breaking out of the Struggle

Japan is faced with paradoxical circumstances. In wanting world-class responsibility, Japan’s

NOTE: The titles of Japanese sources are translated by the author.

22. House of Councillors, 13th Session, No.5, 23 January 1953, p.7

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