FIRST DIVISION

for making the same mistakes repeatedly in her drafts despite her superiors
constantly calling her attention to correct them. This Court cannot turn a blind
eye to respondents well-documented lapses in typing/encoding decisions and
orders of petitioner Judge Marquez despite the apparent leniency of other judges
JUDGE PLACIDO C. MARQUEZ and
A.M. No. P-06-2249
in rating respondents past performance. Judge Marquez was not bound by the
ATTY. LYN L. LLAMASARES,
performance ratings given to respondent by her previous superiors and had the
[Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2351- discretion to give the rating that he believed she deserved.
Petitioners,
P]
Same; Same; Same; Gross Neglect of Duty; Transcript of Stenographic Notes
(TSNs); Failure to submit Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSNs) within the
period prescribed under Administrative Circular No. 24-90 constitutes gross
Present:
neglect of duty.This Court has repeatedly ruled that failure to submit TSNs
within the period prescribed under Administrative Circular No. 24-90 constitutes
gross neglect of duty. As a stenographer, respondent should bear in mind that
the performance of her duty is essential to the prompt and proper administration
- versus
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
of justice, and her inaction hampers the administration of justice and erodes
public faith in the judiciary. In her defense, respondent cites the certification
CARPIO,
issued by petitioner Atty. Llamasares on January 6 and July 2, 2004 that she
CORONA,
(respondent) had no pending stenographic notes as of the said dates. Atty.
Llamasares, on the other hand, claims that she was misled by respondent to issue
AZCUNA, and
such certification. Notwithstanding the contradicting claims of the parties, it is
undisputed that respondent indeed repeatedly failed to submit TSNs within the
LUCILA C. PACARIEM, Stenographer,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
period prescribed. The circumstances that (a) respondent appears to have
Regional
Trial
Court,
Branch
submitted all the transcripts enumerated in the Complaint, albeit beyond the
23, Manila,Respondent.
period mandated, and (b) there appears to be no proof that any party or counsel
has complained about the delay in respondents submission of transcripts do not
exonerate respondent for her non-compliance with Administrative Circular No. 2490. This Court need not wait for respondents laxity in her duties to in fact impede
Promulgated:
the administration of justice before we impose sanctions for her admitted
violation of said circular.
ober 8, 2008
Same; Same; Same; Loafing; Words and Phrases; Loafing is defined under the
Civil Service Rules as frequent unauthorized absences from duty during regular
hours.We likewise find merit in the charge of loafing, which is defined under
x------------------------------------------------x
the Civil Service Rules as frequent unauthorized absences from duty during
regular hours and, in the case at bar, is closely connected with the charge of
Courts; Court Personnel; Stenographers; The Court cannot turn a blind eye to a
dishonesty, as presented in sufficient and painstaking detail by petitioners.
stenographers well-documented lapses in typing/encoding decisions and orders
Petitioners presented the Logbook of Permission Slips that reflected the numerous
of petitioner Judge despite the apparent leniency of other judges in rating her
times that respondent was out of the office during work hours for the period
past performance.With respect to the charge of gross inefficiency or neglect of
August 27, 2003 to March 28, 2005.
duty, the Complaint essentially relies on the same acts upon which petitioner
Judge Marquezs Unsatisfactory performance ratings of respondent for 2004
Same; Same; Judicial employees must devote their official time to government
were based. Petitioners have adequately shown that such low performance
servicethey must exercise at all times a high degree of professionalism and
ratings were warranted in view of the error-filled output that respondent appear to
responsibility, as service in the judiciary is not only a duty but also a mission.It
have consistently produced during said period. While it may be true that
must be stressed that all judicial employees must devote their official time to
respondent is only human and may commit mistakes, there is simply no excuse
government service. They must exercise at all times a high degree of

professionalism and responsibility, as service in the judiciary is not only a duty; it

is a mission. To inspire public respect for the justice system, court officials and
employees are at all times behooved to strictly observe official time. Strict
observance of official time is mandatory lest the dignity of the justice system be
compromised. Thus, Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel mandates that the same shall commit themselves exclusively to the
business and responsibilities of their office during working hours.
Same; Same; By writing false and inaccurate entries in her former offices
Logbook of Permission Slips and Logbook of Daily Attendance of Court Personnel,
respondent likewise failed to meet the standard of honesty.In the case at bar,
we find that respondent has failed to live up to the standard of efficiency and
professionalism that the judiciary demands from its court personnel. Furthermore,
by writing false and inaccurate entries in her former offices Logbook of
Permission Slips and Logbook of Daily Attendance of Court Personnel, respondent
likewise failed to meet the standard of honesty.
Same; Same; An employees long years in public service should not be used as a
justification for laxity nor a cover for mediocrity but rather the same entails the
expectation that she will continually adhere to the highest standards of
professionalism, integrity and efficiency in the discharge of her official duties.
The Court sternly reminds respondent that her long years in public service should
not be used as a justification for laxity nor a cover for mediocrity but rather the
same entails the expectation that she will continually adhere to the highest
standards of professionalism, integrity and efficiency in the discharge of her
official duties.
DECISION
LEONARDO - DE CASTRO, J.:
Before us is the administrative complaint filed by petitioners Judge Placido
C. Marquez (Judge Marquez) and Atty. Lyn L. Llamasares (Atty. Llamasares), former
Presiding Judge and former Branch Clerk of Court, respectively, of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Manila charging respondent Lucila C. Pacariem,
former Stenographer III of the said RTC and now Stenographer detailed at RTC,
Branch 23, Manila, with gross neglect of duty, gross inefficiency, gross
insubordination, and gross misconduct.

This controversy arose from petitioners voluminous Complaint [1] dated

November 14, 2005 with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) detailing the
numerous infractions that respondent allegedly committed while working as a
court
stenographer
under
the
control
and
supervision
of
herein
petitioners. Petitioners insist that respondents actions constitute gross acts

inimical to her continued employment in the government, particularly in the

judicial department.

Petitioners assert that respondent repeatedly committed numerous

grammatical and typographical errors in her typewritten work despite constant
reminders. Furthermore, she constantly failed to follow corrections in the drafts
which usually required three to five revisions before they are finalized. In support
of these allegations, petitioners attached to their Complaint two hundred fifty-four
(254) pages worth of error-filled output allegedly made by respondent.[2]

Petitioners also complain that respondent failed to submit the transcript of

stenographic notes (TSN) of forty-five cases[3] within twenty (20) days from the
time the notes were taken as required under Administrative Circular No. 24-90,
which became effective on August 1, 1990. The pertinent portion of the said
circular states:

2. (a) All stenographers are required to transcribe all

stenographic notes and to attach the transcripts to the record of
the case not later than twenty (20) days from the time the notes
are taken. (Italics supplied)
In five (5) cases, respondent purportedly did not submit to petitioner Atty.
Llamasares the stenographic notes she had taken immediately at the close of the
particular sessions when they were taken, as required under Section 17, Rule 136
of the Rules of Court, which reads in part:

It shall be the duty of the stenographer who has attended a

session of a court to either in the morning or in the afternoon, to
deliver to the clerk of court, immediately at the close of such
morning or afternoon session, all the notes he has taken, to be
attached to the record of the case; and it shall likewise be the duty
of the clerk to demand that the stenographer comply with said
duty. xxx (Italics supplied)

It is also alleged that respondent misled Atty. Llamasares to sign certifications

dated January 6 and July 2, 2004 which declared that respondent had no pending
stenographic notes to be transcribed as of said dates. Furthermore, for failure to

timely file her application for sick leave on July 5, 2004 and special leave on
August 10, 2004, respondent is also accused of violating Sections 21, 53, and 54
of Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular No.41 (Series of 1998),
to wit:
Section 21. The special leave privileges are subject to the
following conditions:

2.5.2.1. That the official/employee may be granted a maximum of

three (3) days within a calendar year of any or combination of
special leave privileges of his choice which he would opt to avail;

2.5.2.2. That such privileges shall be non-cumulative and noncommutative;

2.5.2.3. That the official/employee shall submit the application for

the said leave privileges for at least one (1) week prior to
availment except on emergency cases; and

2.5.2.4. Special leave privilege may be availed of by the

official/employee when the occasion is personal to him and that of
his immediate family.
xxx

Section 53. All applications for sick leave of absence for one (1) full day or
more shall be made on the prescribed form and shall be filed
immediately upon employees return from such leave. Notice of
absence, however, should be sent to the immediate supervisor
and/or the agency head. Application for sick leave in excess of five
(5) successive days shall be accompanied by a proper medical
certificate.

Sick leave may be applied for in advance in cases where the official or
employee will undergo medical examination or operation or

advised to rest in view of ill health duly supported by a medical

certificate.

In ordinary application for sick leave already taken not exceeding five (5)
days, the head of department or agency concerned may duly
determine whether or not granting of sick leave is proper under
the circumstances. In case of doubt, a medical certificate may be
required.
Section 54. Sick leave shall be granted only on account of sickness or
disability on the part of the employee concerned or of any member
of his immediate family.
Approval of sick leave, whether with pay or without pay, is
mandatory provided proof of sickness or disability is attached to
the application in accordance with the applicable requirements.
Unreasonable delay in the approval thereof or non-approval
without justifiable reason shall be a ground for appropriate
sanction against the official concerned.[4] (Italics supplied)

In addition to the foregoing, petitioners accuse respondent of loafing, or

spending an unseemly amount of time outside of the office during office hours,
as revealed in the courts Logbook of Permission Slips covering the period August
27, 2003 to March 28, 2005. From the said Logbook, it can be gleaned that
respondent often left the office purportedly to go to the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP), the Supreme Court (SC), the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) and other government offices.Petitioners allege that she falsified
entries in the said Logbook. In some instances, she did not indicate in the same
Logbook her purpose for leaving the office during office hours and, in ten (10)
instances, she registered in the Logbook of Daily Attendance of Court Personnel a
time of arrival that is different from the one noted by the courts Officer-inCharge. The same document also discloses that she allegedly went to this Court
on July 9, September 28, October 25, December 14, 2004, February 11 & 14, and
March 2 & 28, 2005 but an inquiry with the SC Judicial Staff Officer, Security
Division revealed that her name did not appear in the SC Logbook on the said
dates.[5]

Petitioners also allege that respondent obtained a rating of Unsatisfactory for her
work performance during the periods of January 1 June 30, 2004, July
1 December 31, 2004, and January 1 April 5, 2005.[6] The last rating period was
abbreviated because respondent was transferred to Branch 23 pursuant to the

Order of the Executive Judge of ManilaRTC dated April 1, 2005. Respondent was
informed in writing of her Unsatisfactory performance rating for the period
January 1-June 30, 2004 and was sufficiently warned that a subsequent
Unsatisfactory rating would result in her separation from service pursuant to OCA
Circular No. 37-2002 dated 31 July 2002 in connection with Section 2.2 (a), Rule
XII of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, Series of 1998. In connection with the
said CSC Memorandum, respondent was sufficiently warned that her failure to
improve performance within the remaining period shall warrant her separation
from service. Respondent filed a protest of her Unsatisfactory performance rating
for January 1 June 30, 2004 and for July 1 December 31, 2004 with the OCAPerformance Evaluation Review Committee (PERC). However, petitioners point
out that a previous Joint Protest co-filed by herein respondent with regard to her
Unsatisfactory performance ratings from January-June 2002 also given by
petitioner Judge Marquez was dismissed per OCA-PERC Resolution dated
September 12, 2003.[7]

Lastly, petitioners aver that respondent had a pending administrative case for
gross misconduct filed by her former officemate at Branch 40, Rey C. Mutia. This
case was subsequently resolved by this Courts Third Division in a
Resolution[8] promulgated on July 11, 2006, the dispositive portion of which
declared:

WHEREFORE, we find Lucila C. Pacariem GUILTY of conduct

unbecoming a court employee and impose on her a FINE of P2,000,
with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts
in the future will be dealt with more severely.[9]
Respondent filed a Comment[10] dated February 7, 2006 wherein she alleges that
petitioners Complaint was filed in reaction to the Joint Protest which she co-filed
with reference to the Unsatisfactory performance ratings she received in 2002
from Judge Marquez and to the Reply she made in response to the series of
Memoranda issued to her by petitioner Atty. Llamasares. In both documents, she
claims that she had been discriminated against in her performance ratings. She
also asserts the fact that she had obtained consistent Very Satisfactory
performance ratings when she was in the service of previous judges, namely,
Judges Felicidad Varangdang-Villalon, Felipe G. Pacquing, and Herminia
Pasamba. Even Judge Antonio M. Eugenio, Jr., to whose court she was transferred
from her previous position in Judge Marquezs court, allegedly gave her a Very
Satisfactory rating.

Respondent admits that she does commit mistakes in the performance of

her job but she protests that petitioners magnified even her trivial errors. She
argues that the drafts presented as evidence were really meant for correction
and that corrections are normal because of the courts heavy workload and due to
petitioner Judge Marquezs work method where, for instance, he allegedly
sometimes changes the contents of what he dictated in open court after it is
reduced into writing. She maintains that she never neglected her duties and that
she has no pending stenographic notes as indicated by the Certification issued
by petitioner Atty. Llamasares herself.

Furthermore, respondent denies that she ever engaged in loafing. Whenever she
went out during office hours, these travels were made to the SC, GSIS, Court of
Appeals (CA) and the LBP for important matters like filing a loan, transmitting a
TSN to the CA, or to encash checks. In explaining her non-registration in the SC
Logbook, she avers that she usually goes to the SC through the CA, where her
kumare would accompany her to the SC which results in her entry without being
asked to register by the SC guards. She takes issue with the fact that petitioners
seem to be monitoring her every move which included the time of her arrival and
departure from the office. She also insists that the alleged difference of a few
minutes between her actual time of arrival and her logbook entry which
petitioners attribute to bad faith on her part is merely the result of nonsynchronicity of watches used by the parties.

Respondent also points to the fact that several other employees of RTC, Branch
40, Manila had transferred or resigned under petitioners term.

In response to the supposed violations of the 20-day period for transcription of

stenographic notes, she refers to her Answer [11] dated March 14, 2005 to the
Memorandum of petitioner Atty. Llamasares dated February 28, 2005 involving
the same issue, wherein she admits not being able to submit TSNs within the 20day period due to heavy workload. However, respondent claims that no party or
lawyer ever complained that she was not able to submit any transcript when
requested and that there was never an instance when Judge Marquez was not
able to decide a case due to non-transcription or delayed transcription of
stenographic notes on her part.

In its Report dated July 28, 2006,[12] the OCA noted that respondent was
rated Unsatisfactory for two consecutive rating periods covering January 1 June
30 and July 1December 31, 2004 based mostly on the same acts enumerated in

petitioners Complaint. Furthermore, the OCA foresees a similar rating for the first
semester of 2005 had it been not for her transfer to another court on April 1,
2005. At the time the report was released, respondents Protest regarding her
performance ratings has not yet been resolved by the PERC of RTC Manila. In the
same report, the OCA found meritorious the allegations of loafing and
falsification of the court attendance logbook against respondent but found no
merit in the other charges. Thus, the OCA made the following recommendations:

1.

That the instant complaint be RE-DOCKETED as a regular

administrative case;

2.

That respondent stenographer, Lucila C. Pacariem, be

found GUILTY of inefficiency, loafing and inaccuracies in her
entries on the logbook as to time of arrival, for which she should
be penalized with SUSPENSION FROM SERVICE for a period
of ONE YEAR without pay;

In a Resolution[16] dated March 7, 2007, the Courts First Division ordered Judge
Felixberto T. Olalia, RTC, Branch 8, Manila to submit a report on the status of
respondents Protest within thirty (30) days from notice. Judge Olalia responded in
a Letter[17] dated May 15, 2007 that the records of respondents Protest were
indorsed on March 8, 2007 to the Office of the Executive Judge, RTC Manila which
referred the same to Judge Cielito N. Mindaro-Grulla, 1 st Vice-Executive Judge, RTC
Manila.

In an Order dated November 20, 2007, the RTC Manilas Office of the 1st Vice
Executive Judge denied respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the order
dismissing her protest of the two consecutive Unsatisfactory performance ratings
for the periods January June 2004 and July December 2004 given to her by Judge
Marquez. In the November 20, 2007 Order, it was held that (1) respondent
[protestant] failed to prove her allegations of bad faith or prejudice on the part of
Judge Marquez in giving her the Unsatisfactory ratings complained of and (2)
Judge Marquezs ratings of respondent enjoyed the legal presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties.[18]
After a thorough review of the records, the Court finds that this case can already
be decided based on the pleadings filed by the parties.

3.

The rest of the charges be DISMISSED for lack of merit.

(Underscoring supplied)

Thereafter, the Court, through its Second Division, issued a

Resolution[13] dated September 25, 2006, ordering the redocketing of the present
case as a regular administrative matter and requiring the parties to manifest to
the Court whether they are willing to submit the matter for decision/resolution on
the basis of the pleadings filed, within ten days from notice.

Petitioner Atty. Llamasares, for herself and petitioner Judge Marquez, filed
a Manifestation[14] dated November 7, 2006 expressing their willingness to submit
to a decision/resolution based on the pleadings. Respondent in turn filed her
Manifestation[15] dated November 6, 2006 asking instead for a hearing on the
matter and calling the attention of the Court to her Protest of the performance
ratings that she received in 2004 and the first quarter of 2005 pending before the
PERC of RTC Manila and to her Motion for Reconsideration to this Courts Second
Division Resolution, finding her guilty of conduct unbecoming of a court
employee.

The issue to be resolved here is whether or not respondent is guilty of the

charges alleged in the Complaint. In this regard, we find the recommendations of
the OCA well-taken.

With respect to the charge of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty, the

Complaint essentially relies on the same acts upon which petitioner Judge
Marquezs Unsatisfactory performance ratings of respondent for 2004 were
based. Petitioners have adequately shown that such low performance ratings
were warranted in view of the error-filled output that respondent appear to have
consistently produced during said period. While it may be true that respondent is
only human and may commit mistakes, there is simply no excuse for making the
same mistakes repeatedly in her drafts despite her superiors constantly calling
her attention to correct them.

This Court cannot turn a blind eye to respondents well-documented lapses

in typing/encoding decisions and orders of petitioner Judge Marquez despite the
apparent leniency of other judges in rating respondents past performance. Judge
Marquez was not bound by the performance ratings given to respondent by her

previous superiors and had the discretion to give the rating that he believed she
deserved.

the numerous times that respondent was out of the office during work hours for
the period August 27, 2003 to March 28, 2005.

We do not find credence in respondents assertion that petitioners were

merely magnifying her errors and were motivated by ill-will or prejudice in filing
the Complaint against her. As the Office of the 1st Vice Executive Judge of
the RTC Manila correctly found in its November 20, 2007 Order, respondent failed
to prove that her low performance ratings were due to evident bad faith on the
part of Judge Marquez or were arbitrarily given to her.

The same documents, among others, showed that she went out of the
office on July 9, September 28, October 25, and December 14, 2004, February 11
& 14, and March 2 & 28, 2005, purportedly to go to this Court. However, an
inquiry made by petitioners with the SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer, Security
Division, revealed that respondents name did not appear in the Logbook of the
Court on these dates. We are unconvinced by respondents explanation that her
name was not reflected in the Courts Logbook because she usually entered
through the CA where she would be accompanied to this Court by her kumare, a
CA employee, thereby excusing respondent from registering with the Courts
security personnel. The Courts security personnel maintain a strict policy of
inspecting outsiders going into its premises, which respondent could not have
escaped. In fact, such an explanation would only compound her predicament as
she did not disclose such fact in her permission slips and, if true, she would then
likewise be admitting to flouting the security policies of this Court. An inference of
loafing on the part of her kumare can also be logically deduced from respondents
explanation.

Quite apart from the poor quality of her work, respondent admits that she
has not been able to faithfully follow the twenty-day period for completion and
submission of theTSN provided under Administrative Circular No. 24-90. She
claims that the delay is due to heavy workload and further asserts in her defense
that her delay in submission of transcripts has not caused any prejudice to Judge
Marquez, the counsels or the litigants.
This Court has repeatedly ruled that failure to submit TSNs within the
period prescribed under Administrative Circular No. 24-90 constitutes gross
neglect of duty.[19] As a stenographer, respondent should bear in mind that the
performance of her duty is essential to the prompt and proper administration of justice,
and her inaction hampers the administration of justice and erodes public faith in the
judiciary.[20] In her defense, respondent cites the certification issued by petitioner Atty.
Llamasares on January 6 and July 2, 2004 that she (respondent) had no pending
stenographic notes as of the said dates. Atty. Llamasares, on the other hand, claims that
she was misled by respondent to issue such certification. Notwithstanding the
contradicting claims of the parties, it is undisputed that respondent indeed repeatedly
failed to submit TSNs within the period prescribed. The circumstances that (a) respondent
appears to have submitted all the transcripts enumerated in the Complaint, albeit beyond
the period mandated, and (b) there appears to be no proof that any party or counsel has
complained about the delay in respondents submission of transcripts do not exonerate
respondent for her non-compliance with Administrative Circular No. 24-90. This Court
need not wait for respondents laxity in her duties to in fact impede the
administration of justice before we impose sanctions for her admitted violation of
said circular.

We likewise find merit in the charge of loafing, which is defined under the
Civil Service Rules as frequent unauthorized absences from duty during regular
hours[21] and, in the case at bar, is closely connected with the charge of
dishonesty,
as
presented
in
sufficient
and
painstaking
detail
by
petitioners. Petitioners presented the Logbook of Permission Slips that reflected

Moreover, petitioners pointed out that in some instances respondent did

not even state in the Logbook of Permission Slips her purpose for leaving the
office during regular hours. She also entered false information in the Logbook of
Daily Attendance of Court Personnel as can be gleaned from the substantial
discrepancies between respondents Logbook entries and those noted by the
Officer-In-Charge as to respondents time of arrival in the office on November 12 &
19, 2003, December 28, 2004, and March 8, 2005, which cannot be deemed as
inconsequential as respondent sees them.

It must be stressed that all judicial employees must devote their official
time to government service. They must exercise at all times a high degree of
professionalism and responsibility, as service in the judiciary is not only a duty; it
is a mission.[22] To inspire public respect for the justice system, court officials and
employees are at all times behooved to strictly observe official time. [23] Strict
observance of official time is mandatory lest the dignity of the justice system be
compromised.[24] Thus, Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel mandates that the same shall commit themselves exclusively to the
business and responsibilities of their office during working hours. [25]

In the case at bar, we find that respondent has failed to live up to the
standard of efficiency and professionalism that the judiciary demands from its
court personnel.Furthermore, by writing false and inaccurate entries in her former
offices Logbook of Permission Slips and Logbook of Daily Attendance of Court
Personnel, respondent likewise failed to meet the standard of honesty.

In the Complaint, respondent is also accused of delayed filing of her

application for sick leave on July 5, 2004 and special leave on August 10, 2004, in
violation of Sections 21, 53, and 54 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 41 (Series
of 1998). In denying this, respondent claims to have notified petitioner Clerk of
Court by phone of her absences on those two occasions and that she in fact filed
her applications therefore but both petitioners did not approve and sign them.
[26]
On this matter, we adopt the finding of the OCA that although respondents
leave applications appear to have been filed after the period prescribed in the
rules, there might have been an attempt on respondents part to file her leave
applications immediately but she was prevented by petitioners in view of the
apparent strained relations among them. We agree with the OCA that respondent
is not liable for this charge and the other remaining charges in the Complaint.

Having determined the liabilities of respondent, we come now to the

imposition of the appropriate penalty for her acts.

It is on record that petitioner Judge Marquez had given respondent two (2)
consecutive Unsatisfactory performance ratings in 2004. Under OCA Circular No.
37-2002, quoting Section 2.2(a), Rule XII of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40
(s.1998):
An official or employee who is given two (2) consecutive
UNSATISFACTORY ratings may be dropped from the rolls
after due notice. Notice shall mean that the officer or employee
concerned is informed in writing of his/her unsatisfactory
performance for a semester and is sufficiently warned that a
succeeding unsatisfactory performance shall warrant his
separation from the service. Such notice shall be given not later
than 30 days from the end of the semester and shall contain
sufficient information which shall enable the employee to prepare
an explanation. (Italics supplied)

Furthermore, Section 5, Rule IX, Book V of Executive Order No. 292, provides that
an employee who expresses dissatisfaction with the rating given him may appeal
through the established Grievance Procedure of the Department or Agency within
fifteen (15) days after receipt of his copy of his performance rating.

In its Report, the OCA appears to have refrained from recommending the highest
penalty of dismissal considering that respondents Protest of her performance
ratings for 2004 was still pending. It is undisputed that respondent has already
availed of the grievance procedure prescribed and was undoubtedly provided
with due process and consideration albeit with an undesired result, since
respondents Protest was dismissed.

In this regard, the law on the matter gives us the option of meting out the
penalty of dismissal on the respondent. In fact, in the past, this Court has
dropped from the rolls a stenographer who was likewise given two (2)
consecutive Unsatisfactory ratings by her superior for delay in transcribing
stenographic notes and her failure to transcribe notes properly. [27]

However, this Court, in other cases, has mitigated the imposable penalty
for humanitarian reasons. In such cases, we also considered length of service in
the judiciary; the respondents acknowledgement of his/her infractions and
feelings of remorse; and family circumstances, among others, in determining the
proper penalty. We have also ruled that where the penalty less punitive would
suffice, whatever missteps may be committed by labor ought not be visited with
a consequence so severe. It is not only because of the laws concern for the
workingman. There is, in addition, his family to consider. Unemployment brings
untold hardships and sorrows on those dependent on wage-earner. [28] In the
present case, apart from respondents long service in the government (since
1975), it appears on record that she was given a Very Satisfactory rating by
Judge Antonio M. Eugenio, Jr., to whose court she was transferred after her stint
in Judge Marquezs court. [29] We are inclined to give respondent the benefit of the
doubt and construe her subsequent favorable performance rating as an
indication of improvement in the discharge of her duties.

Having said the foregoing, we are accepting the OCAs recommendation of

imposing a penalty of one (1) year suspension without pay on respondent for
inefficiency/neglect of duty, loafing and making false/inaccurate entries in the
office Logbook.

On a final note, the Court sternly reminds respondent that her long years
in public service should not be used as a justification for laxity nor a cover for
mediocrity but rather the same entails the expectation that she will continually
adhere to the highest standards of professionalism, integrity and efficiency in the
discharge of her official duties.

WHEREFORE, we find that Ms. Lucila C. Pacariem is guilty of inefficiency/neglect

of duty, loafing and making false/inaccurate entries in the office Logbook for
which we impose the penalty of SUSPENSION FROM SERVICE for a period
of ONE (1) YEAR without pay, with a stern warning that repetition of the same
or similar acts will warrant a more severe penalty.

The other charges in the Complaint are dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. RTJ-03-1762.December 17, 2008.*

(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 02-1422-RTJ)
SERGIO & GRACELDA N. ANDRES, complainants, vs. JUDGE JOSE S.
MAJADUCON, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, ELMER D. LASTIMOSA,
Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff, RTC-OCC, and NASIL S.
PALATI, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, General Santos City,
respondents.
Courts; Judges; Raffle of Cases; The procedure for the raffling of cases under
Supreme Court Circular No. 7 is of vital importance to the administration of
justice because it is intended to ensure the impartial adjudication of casesby
raffling the cases, public suspicion regarding the assignment of cases to
predetermined judges is obviated.Respondent judge violated the explicit
mandate of the Court when he took cognizance of Civil Case No. 7066 wherein he
was named as one of two defendants and instantly dismissed it without first
conducting the requisite raffle. The Court, enunciating the importance of the
raffling of cases, held in the case of Ang Kek Chen v. Bello, 163 SCRA 358 (1988):
The procedure for the raffling of cases under Supreme Court Circular No. 7 is of
vital importance to the administration of justice because it is intended to ensure
the impartial adjudication of cases. By raffling the cases, public suspicion
regarding the assignment of cases to predetermined judges is obviated. A
violation or disregard of the Courts circular on how the raffle of cases should be
conducted is not to be countenanced.
Same; Same; An Executive Judge ought to know that raffling of cases is his
personal duty and responsibilityhe is expected to keep abreast and be
conversant with Supreme Court rules and circulars that affect the conduct of
cases before him and strictly comply therewith at all times.Respondent judge
cannot excuse himself from his duty as Executive Judge by dispensing with the
raffle of the case and dismissing it outright on the pretext that it would be just a
waste of time on his part to raffle and entertain the case. As Executive Judge, he
ought to know that raffling of cases is his personal duty and responsibility. He is
expected to keep abreast and be conversant with Supreme Court rules and
circulars that affect the conduct of cases before him and strictly comply
therewith at all times. Failure to abide by these rules undermines the wisdom
behind them and diminishes respect for the rule of law. Judges should therefore
administer their office with due regard to the integrity of the system of law itself,
remembering that they are not depositories of arbitrary power, but judges under
the sanction of law.
Same; Same; Contempt; Penalties; By declaring complainants guilty of direct
contempt of court, sentencing them to pay a fine of 2,000.00 and to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for ten (10) days, respondent judge exhibited his bias
against herein complainantshere, respondent judge cited complainants in
direct contempt of court for filing a complaint based on a deed of quitclaim that

had already been declared null and void, instead of having the said case, wherein
he was one of the defendants, raffled to the court which could properly act on
the case; A judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride, prejudice,
passion, or pettiness in the performance of his duties.By declaring
complainants guilty of direct contempt of court, sentencing them to pay a fine of
P2,000.00 and to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for ten (10) days,
respondent judge exhibited his bias against herein complainants. Contempt of
court is a defiance of the authority and dignity of the court or a judge acting
judicially, or such conduct as tends to bring the authority of the court and the
administration of justice into disrepute or disrespect. Here, respondent judge
cited complainants in direct contempt of court for filing a complaint (Civil Case
No. 7066) based on a deed of quitclaim that had already been declared null and
void, instead of having the said case, wherein he was one of the defendants,
raffled to the court which could properly act on the case. While the power to
punish in contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial
proceedings and to uphold due administration of justice, still, judges must be
slow to punish for direct contempt. This drastic power must be used judiciously
and sparingly. A judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride,
prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the performance of his duties.
Same; Same; Same; Abuse of Authority; Besides the basic equipment of
possessing the requisite learning in the law, a magistrate must exhibit that
hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint which are
indispensable qualities of every judge; Respondent judges act of
unceremoniously citing complainants in direct contempt is a clear evidence of his
unjustified use of the authority vested upon him by law.The salutary rule is that
the power to punish for contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not
vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment.
The courts must exercise the power to punish for contempt for purposes that are
impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as
persons but for the functions that they exercise. It has time and again been
stressed that besides the basic equipment of possessing the requisite learning in
the law, a magistrate must exhibit that hallmark judicial temperament of utmost
sobriety and self-restraint which are indispensable qualities of every judge. A
judge should be the last person to be perceived as a petty tyrant holding
imperious sway over his domain. Indeed, Section 6 of Canon 6 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct states that: Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all
proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation
to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an
official capacity. Respondent judges act of unceremoniously citing complainants
in direct contempt is a clear evidence of his unjustified use of the authority
vested upon him by law.
Judges; Bias and Partiality; A judge should strive to be at all times wholly free,
disinterested, impartial and independenthe has both the duty of rendering a
just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion

as to its fairness and as to its integrity.Respondent judge violated the above

canon when he dispensed with the raffle and took cognizance of Civil Case No.
7066 as well as ordered its outright dismissal and cited the complainants in
contempt of court. He thus created the impression that he intended to favor his
former clients, Melencio and Dominga. His actuations gave ground for the parties
to doubt his impartiality and objectivity. A judge should strive to be at all times
wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. He has both the duty of
rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free
from suspicion as to its fairness and as to its integrity. Well-known is the judicial
norm that judges should not only be impartial but should also appear impartial. A
critical component of due process is a hearing before an impartial and
disinterested tribunal, for all the other elements of due process, like notice and
hearing, would be meaningless if the ultimate decision would come from a partial
and biased judge.

Same; Court Personnel; Sheriffs; It is well-settled that when an order is placed in

the hands of a sheriff, it is his ministerial duty to proceed with reasonable
promptness to execute it in accordance with its mandate.It is well-settled that
when an order is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his ministerial duty to
proceed with reasonable promptness to execute it in accordance with its
mandate. The primary duty of sheriffs is to execute judgments and orders of the
court to which they belong. It must be stressed that a judgment, if not executed,
would be an empty victory on the part of the prevailing party. It is said that
execution is the fruit and the end of the suit and is very aptly called the life of
the law. It is also indisputable that the most difficult phase of any proceeding is
the execution of judgment. Hence, the officers charged with this delicate task
must act with considerable dispatch so as not to unduly delay the administration
of justice, otherwise, the decisions, orders, or other processes of the courts of
justice would be futile.

Same; Same; It is basic that a judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in
a litigation, but when circumstances appear that will induce the slightest doubt
on his honest actuations and probity in favor of either party, or incite such state
of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination.We take this occasion
once more to impress upon a trial judge that he must at all times maintain and
preserve the trust and faith of litigants in the courts impartiality. When he
exhibits actions that give rise, fairly or unfairly, to perceptions of bias, such faith
and confidence are eroded, and he has no choice but to inhibit himself
voluntarily. It is basic that a judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a
litigation, but when circumstances appear that will induce the slightest doubt on
his honest actuations and probity in favor of either party, or incite such state of
mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his
discretion in a way that the peoples faith in the courts of justice is not impaired.
The better course for the judge is to disqualify himself. Respondent judge was a
party defendant in Civil Case No. 7066 which was enough reason not to act on
the same and just leave the matter to the Vice-Executive Judge. His reluctance to
let go of the case all the more induced doubts and suspicions as to his honest
actuations, probity and objectivity. Evidently, respondent judge violated the clear
injunction embodied in the aforecited Canon of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

DECISION

Same; Gross Ignorance of the Law; For liability to attach for ignorance of the law,
the assailed order, decision or actuation must not only be contrary to existing
law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, it must also be established that he
was moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and corruption.We rule that there is
no merit in complainants charge of gross ignorance of the law leveled against
respondent judge. For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed
order, decision or actuation must not only be contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence but, most importantly, it must also be established that he was
moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and corruption. Gross ignorance of the
law is a serious accusation, and a person who accuses a judge of this very
serious offense must be sure of the grounds for the accusation.

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This administrative case arose from the complaint-affidavit [1] dated February 21,
2002 of Sergio N. Andres, Jr. and Gracelda N. Andres charging respondents Judge
Jose S. Majaducon, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court (RTC), General Santos
City, and Presiding Judge, Branch 23, with violation of Supreme Court Circular No.
7, Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Misconduct, and both Elmer D.
Lastimosa, Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff of South Cotabato, and Nasil S. Palati,
Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, General Santos City, with Abuse of
Authority, Ignorance of the Law and Grave Misconduct.

The complaint stemmed from the Special Order of Demolition [2] issued by Judge
Majaducon on August 22, 2001 in connection with the consolidated Civil Case
Nos. 1291[3]and 4647,[4] an action for declaration of nullity of documents and
recovery of possession of real property with writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction and damages. The said order directed the provincial sheriff
of General Santos City to demolish the improvements erected by the heirs of John
Sycip and Yard Urban Homeowners Association on the land belonging to spouses
Melencio Yu and Talinanap Matualaga. Pursuant to the Order of Demolition, a
Notice to Vacate[5] dated September 12, 2001 was issued by Sheriff Palati and
noted by Provincial Sheriff Lastimosa. The said notice was addressed to the heirs
of John Sycip, all members of Yard Urban Homeowners Association, and all
adverse claimants and actual occupants of Lot No. 2, Psu-135740, the land
subject of Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647.

To forestall the demolition of their houses, complainants, who claimed an interest

over Lot No. 2, Psu-135740, filed a Special Appearance with Urgent Ex-Parte
Manifestation[6]informing the court of the pending protest between them and the
heirs of Melencio Yu and Talinanap Matualaga before the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), docketed as RED Claim No. 3735.
[7]
In the Ex-Parte Manifestation, complainants alleged that they and their
predecessor-in-interest Concepcion Non Andres introduced improvements and
authorized the construction of several improvements on Lot No. 2, Psu135740. They also averred that they are not bound by the judgment rendered in
Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647 because neither they nor their predecessor-ininterest were impleaded as parties therein. They prayed that the provincial sheriff
or any of his deputies be enjoined from implementing the special order of
demolition on the improvements they made. They also wrote a letter[8] addressed
to respondents Lastimosa and Palati enjoining them from executing the order of
demolition under pain of administrative sanction.

On February 6, 2002, notwithstanding complainants manifestation and letter,

Lastimosa and Palati proceeded with the demolition of the improvements erected
by the complainants and their predecessor-in-interest.

Thus, on February 18, 2002, complainants instituted, with the RTC of

General Santos City, Civil Case No. 7066, an action for Specific Performance,
Reconveyance and Damages against the heirs of Melencio Yu and impleaded
Judge Majaducon, Lastimosa and Palati as co-defendants. The complaint alleged
that complainants title over Lot No. 2, Psu-135740 was valid, that they had been
occupying the property since 1957 and that the reckless and arbitrary demolition
of their improvements had unlawfully disturbed their peaceful occupation of the
property.[9] Complainants also filed an Urgent Motion for Special Raffle of said Civil
Case No. 7066.

[10]

In an Order
dated February 18, 2002, Judge Majaducon, acting as the Executive
Judge of RTC, General Santos City, denied the Urgent Motion for Special Raffle and
dismissed outright Civil Case No. 7066. On the same day, respondent judge
issued another Order[11] declaring complainants in direct contempt of court for
allegedly filing a complaint based on a quitclaim that had already been
pronounced null and void by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, complainants were
ordered to pay a fine of P2,000.00 and to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for
ten (10) days.

This prompted complainants to file the instant administrative complaint. They

averred that the actions of herein respondents constitute bad faith, malicious
motive, serious partiality, grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the law. They
also alleged that prior to his appointment in the judiciary, Judge Majaducon was
the former counsel of Melencio Yu and his mother Dominga Pinagawang.

In his Comment[12] dated April 16, 2002, respondent judge vehemently denied the
accusations hurled against him. He explained that he issued the special order of
demolition in the consolidated Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647 after a
decision[13] was rendered and a resolution[14] was issued by the Supreme Court
affirming the judgments of the RTC and the Court of Appeals (CA) declaring
spouses Melencio Uy and Talinanap Matualaga as the rightful owners of Lot No. 2,
Psu-135740 and ordering all occupants to vacate the premises. This was also the
reason why he ordered the outright dismissal of Civil Case No. 7066 filed by
herein complainants. He believed that complainants had no cause of action
because the courts had already decided that the quitclaim upon which
complainants based their action was null and void. Thus, to entertain the
complaint would be just a waste of time on the part of the court. Anent the
contempt order, he maintained that the same was justified because complainants
had instituted an unfounded suit based on a falsified document, thereby
demonstrating an obvious defiance and disrespect of the authority and dignity of
the court.

As to the charge of partiality, respondent judge denied being the former counsel
of Melencio Yus mother, Dominga Pinagawang. He explained that his real client
was Cesar Baas who requested him to write a letter demanding the squatters to
vacate the lot owned by Dominga. He asserted that after writing the letter,
another counsel took over the case.

Respondents Lastimosa and Palati filed their own Comment [15] on April 9,
2002 and averred that they faithfully observed the correct procedure in the
implementation of the order of demolition, including the twin requirements of
notice and hearing. According to them, they were extra careful in implementing
the same especially because it was, by far, the biggest demolition undertaken by
their office as it involved a 12-hectare property and about 1,500 persons. It also
generated interest among the media, thus they made sure that they consulted
with respondent judge all issues and questions relative to its implementation.

In the Agenda Report[16] dated December 12, 2002, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) recommended that respondent judge be fined in the amount
of P10,000.00 for violation of the rules governing the raffle of cases, and that the
administrative case against him be redocketed as a regular administrative
matter. The OCA, however, found that respondents Lastimosa and Palati did not
abuse their authority in the implementation of the order of demolition and
accordingly recommended the dismissal of the complaint against them.

In the Resolution dated March 5, 2003, the Court required the parties to manifest
their willingness to submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings filed.
[17]
Pursuant to respondents manifestation,[18] they filed their memorandum with
additional exhibits on April 22, 2003.[19] Complainants, on the other hand,
manifested that they would no longer file a memorandum and that they were
submitting the case for resolution.
Complainants assailed the respondent judges issuance of a special order of
dismissal in connection with Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647 despite their pending
protest before the DENR. To complainants, the issuance of said order of
demolition constituted gross ignorance of the law.

We are not persuaded. The evidence on hand shows that respondent judge issued
the special order of demolition only after carefully determining that there was no
more hindrance to issue the same. For one, the trial court, in Civil Case Nos. 1291
and 4647, had already adjudged that the land in question belonged to spouses Yu
and Matualaga and even nullified the quitclaim and all documents of conveyance
of sale in favor of complainants predecessor-in-interest. [20] In fact, the records of
the case disclosed that the decision of the trial court was affirmed by the CA in
CA-G.R. No. 69000[21] and CA-G.R. CV No. 54003[22] and ultimately by this
Court via its decision dated November 9, 1990 in G.R. No. 76487[23] and resolution
dated July 19, 1999 in G.R. No. 138132.[24]

It is thus beyond dispute that the judgment in Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647 had
already attained finality. The special order of demolition was issued by respondent
judge so that the final judgment could be fully implemented and executed, in
accordance with the principle that the execution of a final judgment is a matter of
right on the part of the prevailing party, and mandatory and ministerial on the
part of the court or tribunal issuing the judgment. [25] To be sure, it is essential to
the effective administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the
winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the
verdict.[26]

However, respondent judge abused his authority in dealing with Civil Case No.
7066 which cast serious doubt as to his impartiality. Respondent judges outright
dismissal of Civil Case No. 7066 entitled Heirs of Concepcion Non Andres, namely
Sergio, Sergio Jr., and Sofronio and Gracelda, all surnamed Andres v. Heirs of
Melencio Yu and Talinanap Matualaga, namely Eduardo, Leonora, Virgilio, Vilma,
Cynthia, Imelda and Nancy, all surnamed Yu, and represented by Virgilio Yu and
Cynthia Yu Abo, Atty. Elmer Lastimosa, in his capacity as Ex-Officio Provincial
Sheriff of South Cotobato, Mr. Nasil Palati, in his capacity as Deputy Sheriff,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, General Santos City, and Hon. Jose S. Majaducon,
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, General Santos City was
irregular. As correctly found by the OCA, respondent judge completely ignored the
procedure for the raffling of cases mandated by Supreme Court Circular No. 7
dated September 23, 1974, which we reproduce hereunder:

I. RAFFLING OF CASES

All cases filed with the Court in stations or groupings where there
are two or more branches shall be assigned or distributed to the
different branches by raffle. No case may be assigned to any
branch without being raffled. The raffle of cases should be regularly
conducted at the hour and on the day or days to be fixed by the
Executive Judge. Only the maximum number of cases, according to
their dates of filing, as can be equally distributed to all branches in
the particular station or grouping shall be included in the raffle. x x
x

Clearly, respondent judge violated the explicit mandate of the Court when he took
cognizance of Civil Case No. 7066 wherein he was named as one of two
defendants and instantly dismissed it without first conducting the requisite
raffle. The Court, enunciating the importance of the raffling of cases, held in the
case of Ang Kek Chen v. Bello[27]:

The procedure for the raffling of cases under Supreme Court

Circular No. 7 is of vital importance to the administration of justice
because it is intended to ensure the impartial adjudication of

cases. By raffling the cases, public suspicion regarding the

assignment of cases to predetermined judges is obviated. A
violation or disregard of the Courts circular on how the raffle of
cases should be conducted is not to be countenanced.

Respondent judge cannot excuse himself from his duty as Executive Judge by
dispensing with the raffle of the case and dismissing it outright on the pretext
that it would be just a waste of time on his part to raffle and entertain the
case. As Executive Judge, he ought to know that raffling of cases is his personal
duty and responsibility. He is expected to keep abreast and be conversant with
Supreme Court rules and circulars that affect the conduct of cases before him and
strictly comply therewith at all times. Failure to abide by these rules undermines
the wisdom behind them and diminishes respect for the rule of law. Judges should
therefore administer their office with due regard to the integrity of the system of
law itself, remembering that they are not depositories of arbitrary power, but
judges under the sanction of law.[28]

It has time and again been stressed that besides the basic equipment of
possessing the requisite learning in the law, a magistrate must exhibit that
hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint which are
indispensable qualities of every judge. A judge should be the last person to be
perceived as a petty tyrant holding imperious sway over his domain. [32]

Indeed, Section 6 of Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that:
Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before
the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to
litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals
in an official capacity.

Respondent judges act of unceremoniously citing complainants in direct contempt

is a clear evidence of his unjustified use of the authority vested upon him by law.
By declaring complainants guilty of direct contempt of court, sentencing them to
pay a fine of P2,000.00 and to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for ten (10)
days, respondent judge exhibited his bias against herein complainants.

Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority and dignity of the court or a

judge acting judicially, or such conduct as tends to bring the authority of the court
and the administration of justice into disrepute or disrespect. [29] Here, respondent
judge cited complainants in direct contempt of court for filing a complaint (Civil
Case No. 7066) based on a deed of quitclaim that had already been declared null
and void, instead of having the said case, wherein he was one of the defendants,
raffled to the court which could properly act on the case. While the power to
punish in contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial
proceedings and to uphold due administration of justice, still, judges must be slow
to punish for direct contempt. This drastic power must be used judiciously and
sparingly. A judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride, prejudice,
passion, or pettiness in the performance of his duties.[30]

The salutary rule is that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised on
the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not retaliatory
idea of punishment. The courts must exercise the power to punish for contempt
for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard
not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise. [31]

Respondent judge also took cognizance of Civil Case No. 7066 despite the fact
that prior to his appointment as judge, respondent served as counsel for Melencio
Yu and his mother, Dominga Pinagawang.

Respondents explanation that it was Cesar Baas who was his client and
not Melencio and Dominga was belied by the demand letter [33] dated June 20,
1980, which was signed by him.
Respondent judge clearly acted as counsel not only for Cesar Baas but for
Melencio and Dominga as well. Section 2 of Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct specifically provides that judges shall ensure that his or her conduct,
both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public,
the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the
judiciary. Section 5 of the same Canon further states that judges shall disqualify
themselves from participating in any proceedings in which they are unable to
decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer
that they are unable to decide the matter impartially. Such proceedings include,
but are not limited to, instances where (b) the judge previously served as lawyer
in the matter in controversy.

Respondent judge violated the above canon when he dispensed with the raffle
and took cognizance of Civil Case No. 7066 as well as ordered its outright
dismissal and cited the complainants in contempt of court. He thus created the
impression that he intended to favor his former clients, Melencio and
Dominga. His actuations gave ground for the parties to doubt his impartiality and
objectivity. A judge should strive to be at all times wholly free, disinterested,
impartial and independent. He has both the duty of rendering a just decision and
the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness
and as to its integrity.[34] Well-known is the judicial norm that judges should not
only be impartial but should also appear impartial. A critical component of due
process is a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal, for all the
other elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would be meaningless if
the ultimate decision would come from a partial and biased judge. [35]

We take this occasion once more to impress upon a trial judge that he must at all
times maintain and preserve the trust and faith of litigants in the court's
impartiality. When he exhibits actions that give rise, fairly or unfairly, to
perceptions of bias, such faith and confidence are eroded, and he has no choice
but to inhibit himself voluntarily. It is basic that a judge may not be legally
prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but when circumstances appear that will
induce the slightest doubt on his honest actuations and probity in favor of either
party, or incite such state of mind, he should conduct a careful selfexamination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the peoples faith in
the courts of justice is not impaired. The better course for the judge is to
disqualify himself.[36]

Respondent judge was a party defendant in Civil Case No. 7066 which was
enough reason not to act on the same and just leave the matter to the ViceExecutive Judge. His reluctance to let go of the case all the more induced doubts
and suspicions as to his honest actuations, probity and objectivity. Evidently,
respondent judge violated the clear injunction embodied in the aforecited Canon
of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Be that as it may, we rule that there is no merit in complainants charge of gross
ignorance of the law leveled against respondent judge. For liability to attach for
ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation must not only be
contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, it must also be
established that he was moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and corruption.
[37]
Gross ignorance of the law is a serious accusation, and a person who accuses a
judge of this very serious offense must be sure of the grounds for the accusation.

The violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 7 by respondent judge is

classified as a less serious charge under Section 9 of Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court. Section 11(B) of the same Rule provides the following sanctions for less
serious offenses:

Sec. 11. Sanctions.

B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the

following sanctions shall be imposed:

1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits

for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or

2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding

P20,000.00.

Finally, as regards the charge against Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff Elmer Lastimosa
and Sheriff IV Palati, complainants maintain that they abused their authority when
they enforced the order of demolition against complainants even though they
were not impleaded as parties in Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647 where the order
of demolition was issued.

The dispositive portion of the order of demolition issued by respondent judge

reads:
NOW THEREFORE, we command you to demolish the improvements
erected by the defendants HEIRS OF JOHN SYCIP (namely:
NATIVIDAD D. SYCIP, JOSE SYCIP, JR., ALFONSO SYCIP II, ROSE
MARIE SYCIP, JAMES SYCIP & GRACE SYCIP), Represented by
NATIVIDAD D. SYCIP, in Civil Case No. 1291 and the plaintiffs YARD
URBAN HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. ET AL. in Civil Case No.
4647, on that portion of land belonging to plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
1291 and defendants in Civil Case No. 4647, MELENCIO YU and
TALINANAP MATUALAGA, covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
(V-14496) (P-2331) P-523, located in Apopong, General Santos City.

This Special Order of Demolition shall be returned by you to this Court

within ten (10) days from the date of receipt hereof, together with
your proceedings indorsed hereon.[38]

Clearly, respondent judge neither ordered the eviction of any other person
occupying the property of spouses Yu and Matualaga other than the parties in
Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647, nor directed the Ex-Officio Sheriff to demolish the
houses or structures of any person other than the said parties. However, the
notice to vacate issued by Palati and noted by Lastimosa was addressed not just
to the parties but to all adverse claimants and actual occupants of the land
subject of the case. It directed that the houses and improvements of the parties,
as well as those of adverse claimants including complainants who were not
parties in Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647, would be demolished.

Worth quoting here is the decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 54003, which
decided the appeal of the decision in Civil Case No. 4647, viz:
Finally, the appellants assertion that they are not bound by the
decision in Civil Case No. 1291 because they are not parties therein
and that the appellees should first institute an action for ejectment
in order to acquire possession of the property is without merit. The
appellants failure to establish a vested and better right, either
derivative or personal, to the land in question as against the
appellees, forecloses any posturing of exemption from the legal
force and effect of the writ of execution issued by the trial court to
enforce a final judgment under the guise of denial of due process. A
judgment pertaining to ownership and/or possession of real
property is binding upon the defendants and all persons
claiming right of possession or ownership from the said
defendant and the prevailing party need not file a separate
action for ejectment to evict the said privies from the
premises.(Emphasis supplied)[39]
Evidently, the decision in Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647, which had long become
final and executory, can be enforced against herein complainants although they
were not parties thereto. There is no question that complainants merely relied on
the title of their predecessor-in-interest who was privy to John Sycip, the
defendant in Civil Case No. 1291. As such, complainants and their predecessor-ininterest can be reached by the order of demolition. [40]

Respondent sheriffs cannot be faulted with grave misconduct and abuse of

authority in implementing the order of demolition. The records before us are
simply bereft of any indication supportive of the allegation. Quite the contrary, we
find Lastimosa and Palati to have faithfully observed the correct procedure in the
implementation of respondent judges order. In fact, they were extra careful in the
enforcement of the same knowing that a lot of attention was given to it by the
media, involving as it did a 12-hectare property and about 1,500 persons. Despite
the controversy, they were able to carry out the demolition peacefully and
successfully.

It is well-settled that when an order is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his

ministerial duty to proceed with reasonable promptness to execute it in
accordance with its mandate. The primary duty of sheriffs is to execute
judgments and orders of the court to which they belong. It must be stressed that
a judgment, if not executed, would be an empty victory on the part of the
prevailing party. It is said that execution is the fruit and the end of the suit and is
very aptly called the life of the law. It is also indisputable that the most difficult
phase of any proceeding is the execution of judgment. Hence, the officers
charged with this delicate task must act with considerable dispatch so as not to
unduly delay the administration of justice, otherwise, the decisions, orders, or
other processes of the courts of justice would be futile.[41]

We take note of the fact that respondent judge had compulsorily retired from the
service on February 24, 2001.[42]
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds Judge Jose Majaducon GUILTY of
abuse of his authority for which he is meted a fine of P20,000.00 to be deducted
from his retirement benefits.

For lack of merit, the charge of grave abuse of authority against Elmer
Lastimosa and Nasil Palati is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
[Anres vs. Majaducon, 574 SCRA 169(2008)]