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companies have entered the Indian gas market in different parts of the gas value chain
(upstream, transmission, LNG terminals, and distribution). RIL, active in upstream, transmission
and distribution, is the most notorious example.
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OECD/IEA 2010
new guidelines called the Gas Utilisation Policy, which effectively took away gas producers'
rights to sell the gas they discover on the open market. These guidelines would be applicable for
the next five years and be reviewed afterwards. The recent ruling of the Supreme Court in May
2010 regarding the dispute between RIL and RNRL, reaffirms the role of the government in the
allocation and pricing of gas.
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Currently, the rules of the General Policy for the gas market imply that gas will be allocated
according to sectoral priorities set up by the government. This does not imply that the gas is
reserved: if one customer is not in a position to take the gas, the next one on the list becomes
eligible. Existing users have priority over Greenfield users. The gas is allocated as follows:
For existing customers:
Fertiliser producers
LPG and petrochemicals
Power plants
City Gas Distribution (CGD)
Refineries
Others.
For Greenfield users, the priorities are:
Fertiliser producers
Petrochemicals
CGD
Refineries
Power plants.
The above lists clearly show the preference for fertiliser producers, petrochemicals and power
plants as first category customers. CGD usually comes in second position. GoI gave priority to
power generators and fertiliser producers, making them the major customers supplied at the
lowest rate (APM prices decided by the government) by the state-owned oil and gas companies.
Industrial users, which are interested in switching to gas, do not have access to low-priced gas
resources and have to pay higher prices to private companies and LNG importers. This makes
sense when gas is more economical than the fuel they use (for example naphtha). This situation
has changed with the increase of APM prices to USD 4.2/MBtu in May 2010 (prices issues will be
discussed in depth in the following chapter). Natural gas pricing and allocation decisions are
made by the government at the national level, but the geographical availability of gas and
chances for regional development parity have always been a national energy concern. Until
recently, gas use was mostly limited to the North West as this is where most of the gas was
produced or arriving at LNG regasification terminals. The start of production in the East
(KG basin) is likely to change this and provide opportunities for potential customers in this
region to switch to gas, if enough supplies are available.
OECD/IEA 2010
prices. In 2006, the regulator PNGRB was created to set up the bases for a competitive market
and has been developing regulations since then.
In the transmission sector, GoI wishes to develop a policy concerning the approval of pipeline
construction that would be consistent, market-friendly, and would help avoid duplication of gas
transport routes. In December 2006, the monopoly on transmission networks for GAIL was
abolished enabling other companies to build and operate networks. The regulator PNGRB set up
the Access Code requiring third-party access for one third of the capacity and setting the tariffs
of transportation for third parties. PNGRB has therefore to determine tariffs for existing
pipelines as well as for pipelines authorised by the government (before PNGRB was created).
Typically, transport along the Hazira-Vijaipur-Jagdishpur pipeline costs USD 0.58/MBtu; GAIL
proposed to charge USD 0.88/MBtu for its 572 km-long Dahej-Uran-Panvel pipeline. For its
1 400 km-long East-West pipeline (EWPL), RGTIL opted for a two-zone tariff and wanted to
charge USD 0.3-0.4/MBtu for the first zone and USD 1.25/MBtu for the second zone.
Permission for the routes is given after the entity provides performance and bond guarantees. If
they do not fulfil the obligations of the common carrier principle, the ministry can revoke the
approval. To avoid this risk, companies propose competitive pipelines often heading to the
same markets. This raises the issue of the duplication of pipelines. So far, the pipelines licensing
policy proved to be highly conditional in following all those criteria:
The government may come up with conditions in cases where the pipelines of two
companies cross at a point;
The company that lays its pipeline first may be able to claim ownership of the junction while
the other may have to follow security-related regulations. The company completing the
project first would enjoy the status of pipeline owner with the power to block the other
project in case of conflict of interest;
If the crossing of two pipelines poses safety risks, the other pipeline would have to seek
government permission and follow stringent guidelines for crossing the owners pipeline.
Regarding gas distribution, PNGRB has been organising bids to develop gas distribution
infrastructure in cities. This includes distribution to residential users, and small and middle
enterprises (SME) as well as CNG. Companies are given exclusive rights for five years. Licenses
are to be awarded through an open competitive bidding process, with a level playing field for
both domestic and foreign entities. Several bids took place in 2008 and 2009. As of 2009, only
41 cities had distribution gas networks for domestic use but PNGRB plans to extend the
coverage to 250 cities within the next ten years.
Several issues explain the lack of development. First, the regulatory framework is unclear and
not conducive to attracting private investment. City gas has a low priority according to the
governments allocation policy but winners of the bids have nevertheless to secure gas supplies.
Furthermore, in order for a city to receive gas, it must be connected to the main transmission
system, which is still inadequate as it consists mainly in pipelines in the northwest region and
the EWPL. There are therefore large transportation pipeline requirements for major cities in the
South, the North and the East to be connected. Finally, a regulatory issue appeared in February
2010, when the Delhi High Court ruled that PNGRB did not have the authority to issue city gas
licences, because the government did not notify Section 16 of the Act explicitly giving these
powers to the board. In the meantime, the power of authorising companies which have won the
previous bids is back in the hands of the MoPNG. In July 2010, the government finally notified
the Section 16, empowering the downstream regulator to issue CGD licences.
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