Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

The Solicitor General, who represents respondents, summarizes the MOA-AD by stating that the same contained,
among others, the commitment of the parties to pursue peace negotiations, protect and respect human rights,
negotiate with sincerity in the resolution and pacific settlement of the conflict, and refrain from the use of threat
or force to attain undue advantage while the peace negotiations on the substantive agenda are on-going. 2

EN BANC
G.R. No. 183591

October 14, 2008

THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, duly represented by GOVERNOR JESUS SACDALAN

and/or VICE-GOVERNOR EMMANUEL PIOL, for and in his own behalf, petitioners,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL
DOMAIN (GRP), represented by SEC. RODOLFO GARCIA, ATTY. LEAH ARMAMENTO, ATTY.
SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN and/or GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., the
latter in his capacity as the present and duly-appointed Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP)
or the so-called Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, respondents.
DECISION

Early on, however, it was evident that there was not going to be any smooth sailing in the GRP-MILF peace
process. Towards the end of 1999 up to early 2000, the MILF attacked a number of municipalities in Central
Mindanao and, in March 2000, it took control of the town hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. 3 In response, then
President Joseph Estrada declared and carried out an "all-out-war" against the MILF.
When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office, the military offensive against the MILF was
suspended and the government sought a resumption of the peace talks. The MILF, according to a leading MILF
member, initially responded with deep reservation, but when President Arroyo asked the Government of Malaysia
through Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to help convince the MILF to return to the negotiating table, the
MILF convened its Central Committee to seriously discuss the matter and, eventually, decided to meet with the
GRP.4
The parties met in Kuala Lumpur on March 24, 2001, with the talks being facilitated by the Malaysian
government, the parties signing on the same date the Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption
of Peace Talks Between the GRP and the MILF. The MILF thereafter suspended all its military actions. 5

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Subject of these consolidated cases is the extent of the powers of the President in pursuing the peace
process.While the facts surrounding this controversy center on the armed conflict in Mindanao between the
government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the legal issue involved has a bearing on all areas in
the country where there has been a long-standing armed conflict. Yet again, the Court is tasked to perform a
delicate balancing act. It must uncompromisingly delineate the bounds within which the President may lawfully
exercise her discretion, but it must do so in strict adherence to the Constitution, lest its ruling unduly restricts the
freedom of action vested by that same Constitution in the Chief Executive precisely to enable her to pursue the
peace process effectively.
I. FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE PETITIONS
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the
Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement
on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia.
The MILF is a rebel group which was established in March 1984 when, under the leadership of the late Salamat
Hashim, it splintered from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) then headed by Nur Misuari, on the
ground, among others, of what Salamat perceived to be the manipulation of the MNLF away from an Islamic
basis towards Marxist-Maoist orientations.1
The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however, for upon motion
of petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, this Court
issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same.
The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the concluding of several prior agreements
between the two parties beginning in 1996, when the GRP-MILF peace negotiations began. On July 18, 1997, the
GRP and MILF Peace Panels signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities. The following year, they
signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998.

Formal peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli, Libya from June 20-22, 2001, the outcome of which
was the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) containing the basic principles and
agenda on the following aspects of the negotiation: Security Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral
Domain Aspect. With regard to the Ancestral Domain Aspect, the parties in Tripoli Agreement 2001 simply
agreed "that the same be discussed further by the Parties in their next meeting."
A second round of peace talks was held in Cyberjaya, Malaysia on August 5-7, 2001 which ended with the
signing of the Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001 leading to a
ceasefire status between the parties. This was followed by the Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian
Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, which was signed on May 7, 2002 at
Putrajaya, Malaysia. Nonetheless, there were many incidence of violence between government forces and the
MILF from 2002 to 2003.
Meanwhile, then MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim passed away on July 13, 2003 and he was replaced by Al Haj
Murad, who was then the chief peace negotiator of the MILF. Murad's position as chief peace negotiator was
taken over by Mohagher Iqbal.6
In 2005, several exploratory talks were held between the parties in Kuala Lumpur, eventually leading to the
crafting of the draft MOA-AD in its final form, which, as mentioned, was set to be signed last August 5, 2008.
II. STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Before the Court is what is perhaps the most contentious "consensus" ever embodied in an instrument - the MOAAD which is assailed principally by the present petitions bearing docket numbers 183591, 183752, 183893,
183951 and 183962.
Commonly impleaded as respondents are the GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain 7 and the Presidential
Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP) Hermogenes Esperon, Jr.
On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato8 and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piol filed a petition, docketed
as G.R. No. 183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.9 Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern,

1 | Page

petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOAAD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the
contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that
the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.10
This initial petition was followed by another one, docketed as G.R. No. 183752, also for Mandamus and
Prohibition11 filed by the City of Zamboanga, 12 Mayor Celso Lobregat, Rep. Ma. Isabelle Climaco and Rep. Erico
Basilio Fabian who likewise pray for similar injunctive reliefs. Petitioners herein moreover pray that the City of
Zamboanga be excluded from the Bangsamoro Homeland and/or Bangsamoro Juridical Entity and, in the
alternative, that the MOA-AD be declared null and void.
By Resolution of August 4, 2008, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order commanding and directing
public respondents and their agents to cease and desist from formally signing the MOA-AD. 13 The Court also
required the Solicitor General to submit to the Court and petitioners the official copy of the final draft of the
MOA-AD,14 to which she complied.15
Meanwhile, the City of Iligan 16 filed a petition for Injunction and/or Declaratory Relief, docketed as G.R. No.
183893, praying that respondents be enjoined from signing the MOA-AD or, if the same had already been signed,
from implementing the same, and that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. Petitioners herein additionally
implead Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as respondent.
The Province of Zamboanga del Norte,17 Governor Rolando Yebes, Vice-Governor Francis Olvis, Rep. Cecilia
Jalosjos-Carreon, Rep. Cesar Jalosjos, and the members 18 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del
Norte filed on August 15, 2008 a petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition, 19 docketed as G.R. No.
183951. They pray, inter alia, that the MOA-AD be declared null and void and without operative effect, and that
respondents be enjoined from executing the MOA-AD.
On August 19, 2008, Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay, and Aquilino Pimentel III filed a petition for
Prohibition,20docketed as G.R. No. 183962, praying for a judgment prohibiting and permanently enjoining
respondents from formally signing and executing the MOA-AD and or any other agreement derived therefrom or
similar thereto, and nullifying the MOA-AD for being unconstitutional and illegal. Petitioners herein additionally
implead as respondent the MILF Peace Negotiating Panel represented by its Chairman Mohagher Iqbal.
Various parties moved to intervene and were granted leave of court to file their petitions-/comments-inintervention. Petitioners-in-Intervention include Senator Manuel A. Roxas, former Senate President Franklin
Drilon and Atty. Adel Tamano, the City of Isabela 21 and Mayor Cherrylyn Santos-Akbar, the Province of Sultan
Kudarat22and Gov. Suharto Mangudadatu, the Municipality of Linamon in Lanao del Norte, 23 Ruy Elias Lopez of
Davao City and of the Bagobo tribe, Sangguniang Panlungsod member Marino Ridao and businessman Kisin
Buxani, both of Cotabato City; and lawyers Carlo Gomez, Gerardo Dilig, Nesario Awat, Joselito Alisuag,
Richalex Jagmis, all of Palawan City. The Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation, Inc. (Muslaf) and the Muslim
Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development (MMMPD) filed their respective Comments-inIntervention.

(i) insofar as the mandamus aspect is concerned, in view of the disclosure of official copies
of the final draft of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA); and
(ii) insofar as the prohibition aspect involving the Local Government Units is concerned, if
it is considered that consultation has become fait accompli with the finalization of the draft;
2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;
3. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it negotiated and initiated the
MOA vis--vis ISSUES Nos. 4 and 5;
4. Whether there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (1987
Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest (1987 Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28) including public consultation under Republic
Act No. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991)[;]
If it is in the affirmative, whether prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is an
appropriate remedy;
5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be
BINDING itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a
juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral
domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS
ACT OF 1997), particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)[;]
If in the affirmative, whether the Executive Branch has the authority to so bind the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines;
6. Whether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North Cotabato, Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan
and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, Lanao del Norte in/from the areas covered by the
projected Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable question; and

By subsequent Resolutions, the Court ordered the consolidation of the petitions. Respondents filed Comments on
the petitions, while some of petitioners submitted their respective Replies.

7. Whether desistance from signing the MOA derogates any prior valid commitments of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines.24

Respondents, by Manifestation and Motion of August 19, 2008, stated that the Executive Department shall
thoroughly review the MOA-AD and pursue further negotiations to address the issues hurled against it, and thus
moved to dismiss the cases. In the succeeding exchange of pleadings, respondents' motion was met with vigorous
opposition from petitioners.

The Court, thereafter, ordered the parties to submit their respective Memoranda. Most of the parties submitted
their memoranda on time.

The cases were heard on oral argument on August 15, 22 and 29, 2008 that tackled the following principal issues:

As a necessary backdrop to the consideration of the objections raised in the subject five petitions and six
petitions-in-intervention against the MOA-AD, as well as the two comments-in-intervention in favor of the
MOA-AD, the Court takes an overview of the MOA.

1. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic

III. OVERVIEW OF THE MOA-AD

2 | Page

The MOA-AD identifies the Parties to it as the GRP and the MILF.

MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this freedom of choice
consists in has not been specifically defined.

Under the heading "Terms of Reference" (TOR), the MOA-AD includes not only four earlier agreements between
the GRP and MILF, but also two agreements between the GRP and the MNLF: the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, and
the Final Peace Agreement on the Implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, signed on September 2, 1996
during the administration of President Fidel Ramos.

The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the "Bangsamoro homeland," the ownership of which is vested exclusively
in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation.32 Both parties to the MOA-AD
acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the public domain.33

The MOA-AD also identifies as TOR two local statutes - the organic act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM)25 and the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), 26 and several international law instruments
- the ILO Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries in relation to
the UN Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples, and the UN Charter, among others.

The Bangsamoro people are acknowledged as having the right to self-governance, which right is said to be rooted
on ancestral territoriality exercised originally under the suzerain authority of their sultanates and the Pat a
Pangampong ku Ranaw. The sultanates were described as states or "karajaan/kadatuan" resembling a body
politic endowed with all the elements of a nation-state in the modern sense.34

The MOA-AD includes as a final TOR the generic category of "compact rights entrenchment emanating from the
regime of dar-ul-mua'hada (or territory under compact) and dar-ul-sulh (or territory under peace agreement) that
partakes the nature of a treaty device."

The MOA-AD thus grounds the right to self-governance of the Bangsamoro people on the past suzerain authority
of the sultanates. As gathered, the territory defined as the Bangsamoro homeland was ruled by several sultanates
and, specifically in the case of the Maranao, by the Pat a Pangampong ku Ranaw, a confederation of independent
principalities (pangampong) each ruled by datus and sultans, none of whom was supreme over the others. 35

During the height of the Muslim Empire, early Muslim jurists tended to see the world through a simple
dichotomy: there was the dar-ul-Islam (the Abode of Islam) and dar-ul-harb (the Abode of War). The first
referred to those lands where Islamic laws held sway, while the second denoted those lands where Muslims were
persecuted or where Muslim laws were outlawed or ineffective. 27 This way of viewing the world, however,
became more complex through the centuries as the Islamic world became part of the international community of
nations.
As Muslim States entered into treaties with their neighbors, even with distant States and inter-governmental
organizations, the classical division of the world into dar-ul-Islam and dar-ul-harb eventually lost its meaning.
New terms were drawn up to describe novel ways of perceiving non-Muslim territories. For instance, areas
like dar-ul-mua'hada (land of compact) and dar-ul-sulh (land of treaty) referred to countries which, though under
a secular regime, maintained peaceful and cooperative relations with Muslim States, having been bound to each
other by treaty or agreement. Dar-ul-aman (land of order), on the other hand, referred to countries which, though
not bound by treaty with Muslim States, maintained freedom of religion for Muslims. 28

The MOA-AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people as "the First Nation' with defined territory and with a
system of government having entered into treaties of amity and commerce with foreign nations."
The term "First Nation" is of Canadian origin referring to the indigenous peoples of that territory, particularly
those known as Indians. In Canada, each of these indigenous peoples is equally entitled to be called "First
Nation," hence, all of them are usually described collectively by the plural "First Nations." 36 To that extent, the
MOA-AD, by identifying the Bangsamoro people as "the First Nation" - suggesting its exclusive entitlement to
that designation - departs from the Canadian usage of the term.
The MOA-AD then mentions for the first time the "Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which it grants the
authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro.37
B. TERRITORY

It thus appears that the "compact rights entrenchment" emanating from the regime of dar-ul-mua'hada and darul-sulh simply refers to all other agreements between the MILF and the Philippine government - the Philippines
being the land of compact and peace agreement - that partake of the nature of a treaty device, "treaty" being
broadly defined as "any solemn agreement in writing that sets out understandings, obligations, and benefits for
both parties which provides for a framework that elaborates the principles declared in the [MOA-AD]."29

The territory of the Bangsamoro homeland is described as the land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial,
fluvial and alluvial domains, including the aerial domain and the atmospheric space above it, embracing the
Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region.38

The MOA-AD states that the Parties "HAVE AGREED AND ACKNOWLEDGED AS FOLLOWS," and starts
with its main body.

More specifically, the core of the BJE is defined as the present geographic area of the ARMM - thus constituting
the following areas: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City. Significantly, this
core also includes certain municipalities of Lanao del Norte that voted for inclusion in the ARMM in the 2001
plebiscite.39

The main body of the MOA-AD is divided into four strands, namely, Concepts and Principles, Territory,
Resources, and Governance.
A. CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES
This strand begins with the statement that it is "the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of
Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as Bangsamoros.'" It defines "Bangsamoro people" as
the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu
archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full
blood, including their spouses.30
Thus, the concept of "Bangsamoro," as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only " Moros" as
traditionally understood even by Muslims,31 but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The

Outside of this core, the BJE is to cover other provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which are grouped
into two categories, Category A and Category B. Each of these areas is to be subjected to a plebiscite to be held
on different dates, years apart from each other. Thus, Category A areas are to be subjected to a plebiscite not later
than twelve (12) months following the signing of the MOA-AD. 40 Category B areas, also called "Special
Intervention Areas," on the other hand, are to be subjected to a plebiscite twenty-five (25) years from the signing
of a separate agreement - the Comprehensive Compact.41
The Parties to the MOA-AD stipulate that the BJE shall have jurisdiction over all natural resources within its
"internal waters," defined as extending fifteen (15) kilometers from the coastline of the BJE area; 42 that the BJE
shall also have "territorial waters," which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal waters up to the baselines of the
Republic of the Philippines (RP) south east and south west of mainland Mindanao; and that within
these territorialwaters, the BJE and the "Central Government" (used interchangeably with RP) shall
exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and management over all natural resources. 43 Notably, the jurisdiction over
the internal waters is not similarly described as "joint."

3 | Page

The MOA-AD further provides for the sharing of minerals on the territorial waters between the Central
Government and the BJE, in favor of the latter, through production sharing and economic cooperation
agreement.44 The activities which the Parties are allowed to conduct on the territorial waters are enumerated,
among which are the exploration and utilization of natural resources, regulation of shipping and fishing activities,
and the enforcement of police and safety measures. 45 There is no similar provision on the sharing of minerals and
allowed activities with respect to the internal waters of the BJE.
C. RESOURCES
The MOA-AD states that the BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign
countries and shall have the option to establish trade missions in those countries. Such relationships and
understandings, however, are not to include aggression against the GRP. The BJE may also enter into
environmental cooperation agreements.46
The external defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of the Central Government. The Central
Government is also bound to "take necessary steps to ensure the BJE's participation in international meetings and
events" like those of the ASEAN and the specialized agencies of the UN. The BJE is to be entitled to participate
in Philippine official missions and delegations for the negotiation of border agreements or protocols for
environmental protection and equitable sharing of incomes and revenues involving the bodies of water adjacent to
or between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain. 47
With regard to the right of exploring for, producing, and obtaining all potential sources of energy, petroleum,
fossil fuel, mineral oil and natural gas, the jurisdiction and control thereon is to be vested in the BJE "as the party
having control within its territorial jurisdiction." This right carries the proviso that, "in times of national
emergency, when public interest so requires," the Central Government may, for a fixed period and under
reasonable terms as may be agreed upon by both Parties, assume or direct the operation of such resources. 48

The MOA-AD provides that its provisions requiring "amendments to the existing legal framework" shall take
effect upon signing of the Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the aforesaid amendments, with due
regard to the non-derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the
Comprehensive Compact. As will be discussed later, much of the present controversy hangs on the legality of
this provision.
The BJE is granted the power to build, develop and maintain its own institutions inclusive of civil service,
electoral, financial and banking, education, legislation, legal, economic, police and internal security force, judicial
system and correctional institutions, the details of which shall be discussed in the negotiation of the
comprehensive compact.
As stated early on, the MOA-AD was set to be signed on August 5, 2008 by Rodolfo Garcia and Mohagher Iqbal,
Chairpersons of the Peace Negotiating Panels of the GRP and the MILF, respectively. Notably, the penultimate
paragraph of the MOA-AD identifies the signatories as "the representatives of the Parties," meaning the GRP
and MILF themselves, and not merely of the negotiating panels.53 In addition, the signature page of the MOA-AD
states that it is "WITNESSED BY" Datuk Othman Bin Abd Razak, Special Adviser to the Prime Minister of
Malaysia, "ENDORSED BY" Ambassador Sayed Elmasry, Adviser to Organization of the Islamic Conference
(OIC) Secretary General and Special Envoy for Peace Process in Southern Philippines, and SIGNED "IN THE
PRESENCE OF" Dr. Albert G. Romulo, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of RP and Dato' Seri Utama Dr. Rais Bin
Yatim, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, all of whom were scheduled to sign the Agreement last August 5,
2008.
Annexed to the MOA-AD are two documents containing the respective lists cum maps of the provinces,
municipalities, and barangays under Categories A and B earlier mentioned in the discussion on the strand on
TERRITORY.
IV. PROCEDURAL ISSUES

The sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production pertaining to natural resources is to
be 75:25 in favor of the BJE.49
The MOA-AD provides that legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro people arising from any unjust
dispossession of their territorial and proprietary rights, customary land tenures, or their marginalization shall be
acknowledged. Whenever restoration is no longer possible, reparation is to be in such form as mutually
determined by the Parties.50
The BJE may modify or cancel the forest concessions, timber licenses, contracts or agreements, mining
concessions, Mineral Production and Sharing Agreements (MPSA), Industrial Forest Management Agreements
(IFMA), and other land tenure instruments granted by the Philippine Government, including those issued by the
present ARMM.51
D. GOVERNANCE
The MOA-AD binds the Parties to invite a multinational third-party to observe and monitor the implementation
of the Comprehensive Compact. This compact is to embody the "details for the effective enforcement" and "the
mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation" of the MOA-AD. The MOA-AD explicitly provides
that the participation of the third party shall not in any way affect the status of the relationship between the
Central Government and the BJE.52

A. RIPENESS
The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. 54 Courts decline to issue advisory
opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic questions. 55 The limitation of the
power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite
allocation of power, to assure that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of
government.56
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible
of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. There must be a
contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence.57The Court can decide the constitutionality of an act or treaty only when a proper case between
opposing parties is submitted for judicial determination. 58
Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. 59 For a
case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, 60 and the petitioner must allege the
existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action. 61 He must show that
he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained
of.62

The "associative" relationship between the Central Government and the BJE
The MOA-AD describes the relationship of the Central Government and the BJE as "associative,"
characterized by shared authority and responsibility. And it states that the structure of governance is to be based
on executive, legislative, judicial, and administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the
Comprehensive Compact.

The Solicitor General argues that there is no justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial review in the present
petitions, reasoning that
The unsigned MOA-AD is simply a list of consensus points subject to further negotiations and
legislative enactments as well as constitutional processes aimed at attaining a final peaceful

4 | Page

agreement. Simply put, the MOA-AD remains to be a proposal that does not automatically create
legally demandable rights and obligations until the list of operative acts required have been duly
complied with. x x x

In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,67 the United States Supreme Court held that the challenge to the
constitutionality of the school's policy allowing student-led prayers and speeches before games was ripe for
adjudication, even if no public prayer had yet been led under the policy, because the policy was being challenged
as unconstitutional on its face.68

xxxx
In the cases at bar, it is respectfully submitted that this Honorable Court has no authority to pass upon
issues based on hypothetical or feigned constitutional problems or interests with no concrete bases.
Considering the preliminary character of the MOA-AD, there are no concrete acts that could possibly
violate petitioners' and intervenors' rights since the acts complained of are mere contemplated
steps toward the formulation of a final peace agreement. Plainly, petitioners and intervenors' perceived
injury, if at all, is merely imaginary and illusory apart from being unfounded and based on mere
conjectures. (Underscoring supplied)
The Solicitor General cites63 the following provisions of the MOA-AD:
TERRITORY
2. Toward this end, the Parties enter into the following stipulations:
d. Without derogating from the requirements of prior agreements, the Government stipulates to
conduct and deliver, using all possible legal measures, within twelve (12) months following the
signing of the MOA-AD, a plebiscite covering the areas as enumerated in the list and depicted in the
map as Category A attached herein (the "Annex"). The Annex constitutes an integral part of this
framework agreement. Toward this end, the Parties shall endeavor to complete the negotiations and
resolve all outstanding issues on the Comprehensive Compact within fifteen (15) months from the
signing of the MOA-AD.
GOVERNANCE
7. The Parties agree that mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation of this MOA-AD
shall be spelt out in the Comprehensive Compact to mutually take such steps to enable it to occur
effectively.
Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come
into forceupon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to
the legal framework with due regard to non-derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated
timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact.64 (Underscoring supplied)
The Solicitor General's arguments fail to persuade.
Concrete acts under the MOA-AD are not necessary to render the present controversy ripe. In Pimentel, Jr. v.
Aguirre,65 this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the
dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed,
even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.
xxxx

That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness. For example, in New York v. United
States,69 decided in 1992, the United States Supreme Court held that the action by the State of New York
challenging the provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act was ripe for adjudication even if the
questioned provision was not to take effect until January 1, 1996, because the parties agreed that New York had to
take immediate action to avoid the provision's consequences.70
The present petitions pray for Certiorari, 71 Prohibition, and Mandamus. Certiorari and Prohibition are remedies
granted by law when any tribunal, board or officer has acted, in the case of certiorari, or is proceeding, in the case
of prohibition, without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.72 Mandamus is a remedy granted by law when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of a right or office to which
such other is entitled.73 Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional
issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials. 74
The authority of the GRP Negotiating Panel is defined by Executive Order No. 3 (E.O. No. 3), issued on February
28, 2001.75 The said executive order requires that "[t]he government's policy framework for peace, including the
systematic approach and the administrative structure for carrying out the comprehensive peace process x x x be
governed by this Executive Order."76
The present petitions allege that respondents GRP Panel and PAPP Esperon drafted the terms of the MOA-AD
without consulting the local government units or communities affected, nor informing them of the proceedings.
As will be discussed in greater detail later, such omission, by itself, constitutes a departure by respondents from
their mandate under E.O. No. 3.
Furthermore, the petitions allege that the provisions of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution. The MOA-AD
provides that "any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come
into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal
framework," implying an amendment of the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in
effect,guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution. Such act constitutes another violation of its
authority. Again, these points will be discussed in more detail later.
As the petitions allege acts or omissions on the part of respondent that exceed their authority, by violating their
duties under E.O. No. 3 and the provisions of the Constitution and statutes, the petitions make a prima facie case
for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an actual case or controversy ripe for adjudication exists. When
an act of a branch of government is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not
only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.77
B. LOCUS STANDI
For a party to have locus standi, one must allege "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." 78
Because constitutional cases are often public actions in which the relief sought is likely to affect other persons, a
preliminary question frequently arises as to this interest in the constitutional question raised.79

By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of
Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute
becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.66

5 | Page

When suing as a citizen, the person complaining must allege that he has been or is about to be denied some right
or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by
reason of the statute or act complained of.80 When the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the
petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the execution of the laws.81

With regard to Senator Manuel Roxas, his standing is premised on his being a member of the Senate and a
citizen to enforce compliance by respondents of the public's constitutional right to be informed of the MOA-AD,
as well as on a genuine legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success or failure of either of the parties.
He thus possesses the requisite standing as an intervenor.

For a taxpayer, one is allowed to sue where there is an assertion that public funds are illegally disbursed or
deflected to an illegal purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law.82 The Court retains discretion whether or not to allow a taxpayer's suit. 83

With respect to Intervenors Ruy Elias Lopez, as a former congressman of the 3 rd district of Davao City, a
taxpayer and a member of the Bagobo tribe; Carlo B. Gomez, et al., as members of the IBP Palawan chapter,
citizens and taxpayers; Marino Ridao, as taxpayer, resident and member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Cotabato City; and Kisin Buxani, as taxpayer, they failed to allege any proper legal interest in the present
petitions. Just the same, the Court exercises its discretion to relax the procedural technicality on locus
standi given the paramount public interest in the issues at hand.

In the case of a legislator or member of Congress, an act of the Executive that injures the institution of Congress
causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury that can be questioned by legislators. A member of the
House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in his office.84
An organization may be granted standing to assert the rights of its members, 85 but the mere invocation by
theIntegrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law
does not suffice to clothe it with standing.86
As regards a local government unit (LGU), it can seek relief in order to protect or vindicate an interest of its own,
and of the other LGUs.87
Intervenors, meanwhile, may be given legal standing upon showing of facts that satisfy the requirements of the
law authorizing intervention,88 such as a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties.
In any case, the Court has discretion to relax the procedural technicality on locus standi, given the liberal attitude
it has exercised, highlighted in the case of David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,89 where technicalities of procedure were
brushed aside, the constitutional issues raised being of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance
deserving the attention of the Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. 90 The Court's
forbearing stance on locus standi on issues involving constitutional issues has for its purpose the protection of
fundamental rights.
In not a few cases, the Court, in keeping with its duty under the Constitution to determine whether the other
branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and have not
abused the discretion given them, has brushed aside technical rules of procedure.91
In the petitions at bar, petitioners Province of North Cotabato (G.R. No. 183591) Province of Zamboanga del
Norte (G.R. No. 183951), City of Iligan (G.R. No. 183893) and City of Zamboanga (G.R. No. 183752) and
petitioners-in-intervention Province
of
Sultan
Kudarat, City
of
Isabela and Municipality
of
Linamon havelocus standi in view of the direct and substantial injury that they, as LGUs, would suffer as their
territories, whether in whole or in part, are to be included in the intended domain of the BJE. These petitioners
allege that they did not vote for their inclusion in the ARMM which would be expanded to form the BJE territory.
Petitioners' legal standing is thus beyond doubt.
In G.R. No. 183962, petitioners Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay and Aquilino Pimentel III would have no
standing as citizens and taxpayers for their failure to specify that they would be denied some right or privilege or
there would be wastage of public funds. The fact that they are a former Senator, an incumbent mayor of Makati
City, and a resident of Cagayan de Oro, respectively, is of no consequence. Considering their invocation of the
transcendental importance of the issues at hand, however, the Court grants them standing.
Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano, in alleging their standing as taxpayers, assert that government
funds would be expended for the conduct of an illegal and unconstitutional plebiscite to delineate the BJE
territory. On that score alone, they can be given legal standing. Their allegation that the issues involved in these
petitions are of "undeniable transcendental importance" clothes them with added basis for their personality to
intervene in these petitions.

Intervening respondents Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development, an advocacy group
for justice and the attainment of peace and prosperity in Muslim Mindanao; and Muslim Legal Assistance
Foundation Inc., a non-government organization of Muslim lawyers, allege that they stand to be benefited or
prejudiced, as the case may be, in the resolution of the petitions concerning the MOA-AD, and prays for the
denial of the petitions on the grounds therein stated. Such legal interest suffices to clothe them with standing.
B. MOOTNESS
Respondents insist that the present petitions have been rendered moot with the satisfaction of all the reliefs
prayed for by petitioners and the subsequent pronouncement of the Executive Secretary that "[n]o matter what the
Supreme Court ultimately decides[,] the government will not sign the MOA." 92
In lending credence to this policy decision, the Solicitor General points out that the President had already
disbanded the GRP Peace Panel.93
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,94 this Court held that the "moot and academic" principle not being a magical
formula that automatically dissuades courts in resolving a case, it will decide cases, otherwise moot and
academic, if it finds that (a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; 95 (b) the situation is of exceptional
character and paramount public interest is involved;96 (c) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; 97 and (d) the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review.98
Another exclusionary circumstance that may be considered is where there is a voluntary cessation of the activity
complained of by the defendant or doer. Thus, once a suit is filed and the doer voluntarily ceases the challenged
conduct, it does not automatically deprive the tribunal of power to hear and determine the case and does not
render the case moot especially when the plaintiff seeks damages or prays for injunctive relief against the possible
recurrence of the violation.99
The present petitions fall squarely into these exceptions to thus thrust them into the domain of judicial review.
The grounds cited above in David are just as applicable in the present cases as they were, not only in David, but
also in Province of Batangas v. Romulo100 and Manalo v. Calderon101 where the Court similarly decided them on
the merits, supervening events that would ordinarily have rendered the same moot notwithstanding.
Petitions not mooted
Contrary then to the asseverations of respondents, the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution
of the GRP Peace Panel did not moot the present petitions. It bears emphasis that the signing of the MOA-AD did
not push through due to the Court's issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.
Contrary too to respondents' position, the MOA-AD cannot be considered a mere "list of consensus points,"
especially given its nomenclature, the need to have it signed or initialed by all the parties concerned on August

6 | Page

5, 2008, and the far-reaching Constitutional implications of these "consensus points," foremost of which is the
creation of the BJE.

damaged as a direct result of their issuance." They contend that the Court must have jurisdiction over the subject
matter for the doctrine to be invoked.

In fact, as what will, in the main, be discussed, there is a commitment on the part of respondents to amend
and effect necessary changes to the existing legal framework for certain provisions of the MOA-AD to take
effect. Consequently, the present petitions are not confined to the terms and provisions of the MOA-AD, but to
other on-going and future negotiations and agreements necessary for its realization. The petitions have not,
therefore, been rendered moot and academic simply by the public disclosure of the MOA-AD, 102 the
manifestation that it will not be signed as well as the disbanding of the GRP Panel not withstanding.

The present petitions all contain prayers for Prohibition over which this Court exercises original jurisdiction.
While G.R. No. 183893 (City of Iligan v. GRP) is a petition for Injunction and Declaratory Relief, the Court will
treat it as one for Prohibition as it has far reaching implications and raises questions that need to be resolved. 105 At
all events, the Court has jurisdiction over most if not the rest of the petitions.

Petitions are imbued with paramount public interest

There is no gainsaying that the petitions are imbued with paramount public interest, involving a significant part of
the country's territory and the wide-ranging political modifications of affected LGUs. The assertion that the
MOA-AD is subject to further legal enactments including possible Constitutional amendments more than
ever provides impetus for the Court to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the
public and, in this case, the government and its negotiating entity.
Respondents cite Suplico v. NEDA, et al.103 where the Court did not "pontificat[e] on issues which no longer
legitimately constitute an actual case or controversy [as this] will do more harm than good to the nation as a
whole."
The present petitions must be differentiated from Suplico. Primarily, in Suplico, what was assailed and eventually
cancelled was a stand-alone government procurement contract for a national broadband network involving a onetime contractual relation between two parties-the government and a private foreign corporation. As the issues
therein involved specific government procurement policies and standard principles on contracts, the majority
opinion in Suplico found nothing exceptional therein, the factual circumstances being peculiar only to the
transactions and parties involved in the controversy.
The MOA-AD is part of a series of agreements
In the present controversy, the MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out
the Tripoli Agreement 2001. The MOA-AD which dwells on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of said Tripoli
Agreement is the third such component to be undertaken following the implementation of the Security Aspect in
August 2001 and the Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development Aspect in May 2002.
Accordingly, even if the Executive Secretary, in his Memorandum of August 28, 2008 to the Solicitor General,
has stated that "no matter what the Supreme Court ultimately decides[,] the government will not sign the MOA[AD],"mootness will not set in in light of the terms of the Tripoli Agreement 2001.

Indeed, the present petitions afford a proper venue for the Court to again apply the doctrine immediately referred
to as what it had done in a number of landmark cases. 106 There is a reasonable expectation that petitioners,
particularly the Provinces of North Cotabato, Zamboanga del Norte and Sultan Kudarat, the Cities of Zamboanga,
Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, will again be subjected to the same problem in the future as
respondents' actions are capable of repetition, in another or any form.
It is with respect to the prayers for Mandamus that the petitions have become moot, respondents having, by
Compliance of August 7, 2008, provided this Court and petitioners with official copies of the final draft of the
MOA-AD and its annexes. Too, intervenors have been furnished, or have procured for themselves, copies of the
MOA-AD.
V. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
As culled from the Petitions and Petitions-in-Intervention, there are basically two SUBSTANTIVE issues to be
resolved, one relating to the manner in which the MOA-AD was negotiated and finalized, the other relating to its
provisions, viz:
1. Did respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to
information when they negotiated and later initialed the MOA-AD?
2. Do the contents of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution and the laws?
ON THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE
Petitioners invoke their constitutional right to information on matters of public concern, as provided in
Section 7, Article III on the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions,
as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.107

Need to formulate principles-guidelines

Surely, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one will be drawn up to carry out the Ancestral
Domain Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, in another or in any form, which could contain similar or
significantly drastic provisions. While the Court notes the word of the Executive Secretary that the government
"is committed to securing an agreement that is both constitutional and equitable because that is the only way that
long-lasting peace can be assured," it is minded to render a decision on the merits in the present petitions
toformulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and, most especially, the
government in negotiating with the MILF regarding Ancestral Domain.
Respondents invite the Court's attention to the separate opinion of then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban
inSanlakas v. Reyes104 in which he stated that the doctrine of "capable of repetition yet evading review" can
override mootness, "provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or continue to be prejudiced or

As early as 1948, in Subido v. Ozaeta,108 the Court has recognized the statutory right to examine and inspect
public records, a right which was eventually accorded constitutional status.
The right of access to public documents, as enshrined in both the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution,
has been recognized as a self-executory constitutional right. 109
In the 1976 case of Baldoza v. Hon. Judge Dimaano,110 the Court ruled that access to public records is predicated
on the right of the people to acquire information on matters of public concern since, undoubtedly, in a democracy,
the pubic has a legitimate interest in matters of social and political significance.
x x x The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange
of information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the nation's problems, nor a
meaningful democratic decision-making if they are denied access to information of general interest. Information

7 | Page

is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. As has been aptly observed:
"Maintaining the flow of such information depends on protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination
since, if either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases." x x x111
In the same way that free discussion enables members of society to cope with the exigencies of their time, access
to information of general interest aids the people in democratic decision-making by giving them a better
perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation 112 so that they may be able to criticize and participate in the
affairs of the government in a responsible, reasonable and effective manner. It is by ensuring an unfettered and
uninhibited exchange of ideas among a well-informed public that a government remains responsive to the
changes desired by the people.113

Whether Section 28 is self-executory, the records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission so
disclose:
MR. SUAREZ. And since this is not self-executory, this policy will not be enunciated or will not be in
force and effect until after Congress shall have provided it.
MR. OPLE. I expect it to influence the climate of public ethics immediately but, of course, the
implementing law will have to be enacted by Congress, Mr. Presiding Officer.128
The following discourse, after Commissioner Hilario Davide, Jr., sought clarification on the issue, is enlightening.

The MOA-AD is a matter of public concern

That the subject of the information sought in the present cases is a matter of public concern 114 faces no serious
challenge. In fact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD is indeed of public concern.115 In previous cases, the
Court found that the regularity of real estate transactions entered in the Register of Deeds, 116 the need for adequate
notice to the public of the various laws, 117 the civil service eligibility of a public employee, 118 the proper
management of GSIS funds allegedly used to grant loans to public officials, 119 the recovery of the Marcoses'
alleged ill-gotten wealth,120 and the identity of party-list nominees, 121 among others, are matters of public
concern. Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does
thesovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large.
Matters of public concern covered by the right to information include steps and negotiations leading to the
consummation of the contract. In not distinguishing as to the executory nature or commercial character of
agreements, the Court has categorically ruled:
x x x [T]he right to information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the
consummation of the transaction." Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for the
exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is
consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects.
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which may be
grossly disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes fait accompli. This negates the
State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a situation which the framers of the
Constitution could not have intended. Such a requirement will prevent the citizenry from participating
in the public discussion of any proposed contract, effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the
Bill of Rights. We can allow neither an emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State
of its avowed "policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest." 122 (Emphasis
and italics in the original)
Intended as a "splendid symmetry"123 to the right to information under the Bill of Rights is the policy of public
disclosure under Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy
of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. 124
The policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted Section 28 complements the right of access to
information on matters of public concern found in the Bill of Rights. The right to information guarantees the right
of the people to demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information
even if nobody demands.125
The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in a
genuinely open democracy, with the people's right to know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be
accountable by following such policy.126 These provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression
and essential to hold public officials at all times accountable to the people.127

MR. DAVIDE. I would like to get some clarifications on this. Mr. Presiding Officer, did I get the
Gentleman correctly as having said that this is not a self-executing provision? It would require a
legislation by Congress to implement?
MR. OPLE. Yes. Originally, it was going to be self-executing, but I accepted an amendment from
Commissioner Regalado, so that the safeguards on national interest are modified by the clause "as
may be provided by law"
MR. DAVIDE. But as worded, does it not mean that this will immediately take effect and
Congress may provide for reasonable safeguards on the sole ground national interest?
MR. OPLE. Yes. I think so, Mr. Presiding Officer, I said earlier that it should immediately
influence the climate of the conduct of public affairs but, of course, Congress here may no longer
pass a law revoking it, or if this is approved, revoking this principle, which is inconsistent with this
policy.129 (Emphasis supplied)
Indubitably, the effectivity of the policy of public disclosure need not await the passing of a statute. As
Congress cannot revoke this principle, it is merely directed to provide for "reasonable safeguards." The complete
and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public
disclosure derive the same self-executory nature. Since both provisions go hand-in-hand, it is absurd to say that
the broader130 right to information on matters of public concern is already enforceable while the correlative duty
of the State to disclose its transactions involving public interest is not enforceable until there is an enabling
law.Respondents cannot thus point to the absence of an implementing legislation as an excuse in not effecting
such policy.
An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication
between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political
discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's
will.131Envisioned to be corollary to the twin rights to information and disclosure is the design for feedback
mechanisms.
MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Yes. And lastly, Mr. Presiding Officer, will the people be able to
participate? Will the government provide feedback mechanisms so that the people can
participate and can react where the existing media facilities are not able to provide full feedback
mechanisms to the government? I suppose this will be part of the government implementing
operational mechanisms.
MR. OPLE. Yes. I think through their elected representatives and that is how these courses take place.
There is a message and a feedback, both ways.
xxxx

8 | Page

MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I just make one last sentence?
I think when we talk about the feedback network, we are not talking about public officials but
also network of private business o[r] community-based organizations that will be reacting. As a
matter of fact, we will put more credence or credibility on the private network of volunteers and
voluntary community-based organizations. So I do not think we are afraid that there will be another
OMA in the making.132 (Emphasis supplied)
The imperative of a public consultation, as a species of the right to information, is evident in the "marching
orders" to respondents. The mechanics for the duty to disclose information and to conduct public consultation
regarding the peace agenda and process is manifestly provided by E.O. No. 3. 133 The preambulatory clause of
E.O. No. 3 declares that there is a need to further enhance the contribution of civil society to the comprehensive
peace process by institutionalizing the people's participation.
One of the three underlying principles of the comprehensive peace process is that it "should be community-based,
reflecting the sentiments, values and principles important to all Filipinos" and "shall be defined not by the
government alone, nor by the different contending groups only, but by all Filipinos as one
community."134 Included as a component of the comprehensive peace process is consensus-building and
empowerment for peace, which includes "continuing consultations on both national and local levels to build
consensus for a peace agenda and process, and the mobilization and facilitation of people's participation in the
peace process."135
Clearly, E.O. No. 3 contemplates not just the conduct of a plebiscite to effectuate "continuing"
consultations, contrary to respondents' position that plebiscite is "more than sufficient consultation."136
Further, E.O. No. 3 enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP, one of which is to
"[c]onductregular dialogues with the National Peace Forum (NPF) and other peace partners to seek relevant
information, comments, recommendations as well as to render appropriate and timely reports on the progress of
the comprehensive peace process." 137 E.O. No. 3 mandates the establishment of the NPF to be "the principal
forumfor the PAPP to consult with and seek advi[c]e from the peace advocates, peace partners and concerned
sectors of society on both national and local levels, on the implementation of the comprehensive peace process, as
well as for government[-]civil society dialogue and consensus-building on peace agenda and initiatives." 138
In fine, E.O. No. 3 establishes petitioners' right to be consulted on the peace agenda, as a corollary to the
constitutional right to information and disclosure.
PAPP Esperon committed grave abuse of discretion
The PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation. The
furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal
authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof.
The Court may not, of course, require the PAPP to conduct the consultation in a particular way or manner. It
may, however, require him to comply with the law and discharge the functions within the authority granted by the
President.139
Petitioners are not claiming a seat at the negotiating table, contrary to respondents' retort in justifying the denial
of petitioners' right to be consulted. Respondents' stance manifests the manner by which they treat the salient
provisions of E.O. No. 3 on people's participation. Such disregard of the express mandate of the President is not
much different from superficial conduct toward token provisos that border on classic lip service. 140 It illustrates a
gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.
As for respondents' invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege, it is not tenable under the premises. The
argument defies sound reason when contrasted with E.O. No. 3's explicit provisions on continuing consultation

and dialogue on both national and local levels. The executive order even recognizes the exercise of the public's
right even before the GRP makes its official recommendations or before the government proffers its definite
propositions.141 It bear emphasis that E.O. No. 3 seeks to elicit relevant advice, information, comments and
recommendations from the people through dialogue.
AT ALL EVENTS, respondents effectively waived the defense of executive privilege in view of their unqualified
disclosure of the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD. By unconditionally complying with the Court's
August 4, 2008 Resolution, without a prayer for the document's disclosure in camera, or without a manifestation
that it was complying therewith ex abundante ad cautelam.
Petitioners' assertion that the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 declares it a State policy to "require all
national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government units, nongovernmental and people's organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or
program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions" 142 is well-taken. The LGC chapter on intergovernmental
relations puts flesh into this avowed policy:
Prior Consultations Required. - No project or program shall be implemented by government
authoritiesunless the consultations mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied with, and
prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided, That occupants in areas where such
projects are to be implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been
provided, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.143 (Italics and underscoring supplied)
In Lina, Jr. v. Hon. Pao,144 the Court held that the above-stated policy and above-quoted provision of the LGU
apply only to national programs or projects which are to be implemented in a particular local community. Among
the programs and projects covered are those that are critical to the environment and human ecology including
those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in the locality where these will be
implemented.145 The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership
of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people,146 which could pervasively and drastically result to the
diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.
With respect to the indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs), whose interests are
represented herein by petitioner Lopez and are adversely affected by the MOA-AD, the ICCs/IPs have, under the
IPRA, the right to participate fully at all levels of decision-making in matters which may affect their rights, lives
and destinies.147 The MOA-AD, an instrument recognizing ancestral domain, failed to justify its non-compliance
with the clear-cut mechanisms ordained in said Act,148 which entails, among other things, the observance of the
free and prior informed consent of the ICCs/IPs.
Notably, the IPRA does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate
and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise. The recognition of the ancestral
domain is the raison d'etre of the MOA-AD, without which all other stipulations or "consensus points"
necessarily must fail. In proceeding to make a sweeping declaration on ancestral domain, without complying with
the IPRA, which is cited as one of the TOR of the MOA-AD, respondents clearly transcended the boundaries
of their authority. As it seems, even the heart of the MOA-AD is still subject to necessary changes to the legal
framework. While paragraph 7 on Governance suspends the effectivity of all provisions requiring changes to the
legal framework, such clause is itself invalid, as will be discussed in the following section.
Indeed, ours is an open society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and available always
to public cognizance. This has to be so if the country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the
people and all government authority emanating from them.149
ON THE SECOND SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE
With regard to the provisions of the MOA-AD, there can be no question that they cannot all be accommodated
under the present Constitution and laws. Respondents have admitted as much in the oral arguments before this
Court, and the MOA-AD itself recognizes the need to amend the existing legal framework to render effective at

9 | Page

least some of its provisions. Respondents, nonetheless, counter that the MOA-AD is free of any legal infirmity
because any provisions therein which are inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until
the necessary changes to that framework are made. The validity of this argument will be considered later. For
now, the Court shall pass upon how
The MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws as presently worded.
In general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers conceded therein to the BJE.
Petitioners assert that the powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local government under present
laws, and even go beyond those of the present ARMM. Before assessing some of the specific powers that would
have been vested in the BJE, however, it would be useful to turn first to a general idea that serves as a unifying
link to the different provisions of the MOA-AD, namely, the international law concept of association.
Significantly, the MOA-AD explicitly alludes to this concept, indicating that the Parties actually framed its
provisions with it in mind.
Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on RESOURCES, and paragraph 4 on
GOVERNANCE. It is in the last mentioned provision, however, that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to
describe theenvisioned relationship between the BJE and the Central Government.
4. The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical entity shall
beassociative characterized by shared authority and responsibility with a structure of governance
based on executive, legislative, judicial and administrative institutions with defined powers and
functions in the comprehensive compact. A period of transition shall be established in a
comprehensive peace compact specifying the relationship between the Central Government and the
BJE. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The nature of the "associative" relationship may have been intended to be defined more precisely in the still to be
forged Comprehensive Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of "association" in international law,
and the MOA-AD - by its inclusion of international law instruments in its TOR- placed itself in an international
legal context, that concept of association may be brought to bear in understanding the use of the term
"associative" in the MOA-AD.
Keitner and Reisman state that
[a]n association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. In the
basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the principal,
while maintaining its international status as a state. Free associations represent a middle ground
between integration and independence. x x x150 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
For purposes of illustration, the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM),
formerly part of the U.S.-administered Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 151 are associated states of the U.S.
pursuant to a Compact of Free Association. The currency in these countries is the U.S. dollar, indicating their very
close ties with the U.S., yet they issue their own travel documents, which is a mark of their statehood. Their
international legal status as states was confirmed by the UN Security Council and by their admission to UN
membership.
According to their compacts of free association, the Marshall Islands and the FSM generally have the capacity to
conduct foreign affairs in their own name and right, such capacity extending to matters such as the law of the sea,
marine resources, trade, banking, postal, civil aviation, and cultural relations. The U.S. government, when
conducting its foreign affairs, is obligated to consult with the governments of the Marshall Islands or the FSM on
matters which it (U.S. government) regards as relating to or affecting either government.
In the event of attacks or threats against the Marshall Islands or the FSM, the U.S. government has the authority
and obligation to defend them as if they were part of U.S. territory. The U.S. government, moreover, has the

option of establishing and using military areas and facilities within these associated states and has the right to bar
the military personnel of any third country from having access to these territories for military purposes.
It bears noting that in U.S. constitutional and international practice, free association is understood as an
international association between sovereigns. The Compact of Free Association is a treaty which is subordinate to
the associated nation's national constitution, and each party may terminate the association consistent with the
right of independence. It has been said that, with the admission of the U.S.-associated states to the UN in 1990,
the UN recognized that the American model of free association is actually based on an underlying status of
independence.152
In international practice, the "associated state" arrangement has usually been used as a transitional device of
former colonies on their way to full independence. Examples of states that have passed through the status of
associated states as a transitional phase are Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent
and Grenada. All have since become independent states.153
Back to the MOA-AD, it contains many provisions which are consistent with the international legal concept
ofassociation, specifically the following: the BJE's capacity to enter into economic and trade relations with
foreign countries, the commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJE's participation in meetings and
events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of the Central
Government over external defense. Moreover, the BJE's right to participate in Philippine official missions bearing
on negotiation of border agreements, environmental protection, and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies
of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain, resembles the right of the
governments of FSM and the Marshall Islands to be consulted by the U.S. government on any foreign affairs
matter affecting them.
These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status
of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an "associative"
relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever
granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated
entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the
Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine
territory for independence.
Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD's provisions, therefore, already requires for its validity
the amendment of constitutional provisions, specifically the following provisions of Article X:
SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are
the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras
consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution
It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government
being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the

10 | P a g e

criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention,154 namely, a permanent population, a defined
territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory, the
spirit animating it - which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association - runs counter to the
national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being itself
contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the MOAAD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws.
Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective
when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose,
provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be
included in the autonomous region." (Emphasis supplied)
As reflected above, the BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by
the term "autonomous region" in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict
with it. Under paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the present geographic area of the
ARMM and, in addition, the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM during
the 2001 plebiscite - Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal - are automatically part of the BJE
without need of another plebiscite, in contrast to the areas under Categories A and B mentioned earlier in the
overview. That the present components of the ARMM and the above-mentioned municipalities voted for inclusion
therein in 2001, however, does not render another plebiscite unnecessary under the Constitution, precisely
because what these areas voted for then was their inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE.
The MOA-AD, moreover, would not comply with Article X, Section 20 of the Constitution
since that provision defines the powers of autonomous regions as follows:
SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and
national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;

Again on the premise that the BJE may be regarded as an autonomous region, the MOA-AD would require an
amendment that would expand the above-quoted provision. The mere passage of new legislation pursuant to subparagraph No. 9 of said constitutional provision would not suffice, since any new law that might vest in the BJE
the powers found in the MOA-AD must, itself, comply with other provisions of the Constitution. It would not do,
for instance, to merely pass legislation vesting the BJE with treaty-making power in order to accommodate
paragraph 4 of the strand on RESOURCES which states: "The BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation
and trade relations with foreign countries: provided, however, that such relationships and understandings do not
include aggression against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines x x x." Under our constitutional
system, it is only the President who has that power. Pimentel v. Executive Secretary155 instructs:
In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and
authority in external relations and is the country's sole representative with foreign nations. As
the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country's mouthpiece with respect to
international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and
governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties,
and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the
President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the scheme envisioned in the MOA-AD is
to be effected. That constitutional provision states: "The State recognizes and promotes the rights ofindigenous
cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development." (Underscoring
supplied)An associative arrangement does not uphold national unity. While there may be a semblance of unity
because of the associative ties between the BJE and the national government, the act of placing a portion of
Philippine territory in a status which, in international practice, has generally been a preparation for independence,
is certainly not conducive to national unity.
Besides being irreconcilable with the Constitution, the MOA-AD is also inconsistent with prevailing statutory
law, among which are R.A. No. 9054156 or the Organic Act of the ARMM, and the IPRA.157
Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act of the ARMM is a bar to the adoption of the definition of
"Bangsamoro people" used in the MOA-AD. Paragraph 1 on Concepts and Principles states:
1. It is the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves
and be accepted as "Bangsamoros". The Bangsamoro people refers to those who are natives or
original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu
archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization of its descendants whether mixed or of full blood.
Spouses and their descendants are classified as Bangsamoro. The freedom of choice of the Indigenous
people shall be respected. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
This use of the term Bangsamoro sharply contrasts with that found in the Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act,
which, rather than lumping together the identities of the Bangsamoro and other indigenous peoples living in
Mindanao, clearly distinguishes between Bangsamoro people and Tribal peoples, as follows:
"As used in this Organic Act, the phrase "indigenous cultural community" refers to Filipino citizens
residing in the autonomous region who are:

(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;

(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the
people of the region. (Underscoring supplied)

(a) Tribal peoples. These are citizens whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them
from other sectors of the national community; and
(b) Bangsa Moro people. These are citizens who are believers in Islam and who have retained
some or all of their own social, economic, cultural, and political institutions."
Respecting the IPRA, it lays down the prevailing procedure for the delineation and recognition of ancestral
domains. The MOA-AD's manner of delineating the ancestral domain of the Bangsamoro people is a clear

11 | P a g e

departure from that procedure. By paragraph 1 of Territory, the Parties simply agree that, subject to the
delimitations in the agreed Schedules, "[t]he Bangsamoro homeland and historic territory refer to the land mass as
well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, and the aerial domain, the atmospheric space above
it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region."
Chapter VIII of the IPRA, on the other hand, lays down a detailed procedure, as illustrated in the following
provisions thereof:
SECTION 52. Delineation Process. - The identification and delineation of ancestral domains shall be
done in accordance with the following procedures:
xxxx
b) Petition for Delineation. - The process of delineating a specific perimeter may be initiated by the
NCIP with the consent of the ICC/IP concerned, or through a Petition for Delineation filed with the
NCIP, by a majority of the members of the ICCs/IPs;
c) Delineation Proper. - The official delineation of ancestral domain boundaries including census of all
community members therein, shall be immediately undertaken by the Ancestral Domains Office upon
filing of the application by the ICCs/IPs concerned. Delineation will be done in coordination with the
community concerned and shall at all times include genuine involvement and participation by the
members of the communities concerned;
d) Proof Required. - Proof of Ancestral Domain Claims shall include the testimony of elders or
community under oath, and other documents directly or indirectly attesting to the possession or
occupation of the area since time immemorial by such ICCs/IPs in the concept of owners which shall
be any one (1) of the following authentic documents:
1) Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs customs and traditions;

e) Preparation of Maps. - On the basis of such investigation and the findings of fact based thereon, the
Ancestral Domains Office of the NCIP shall prepare a perimeter map, complete with technical
descriptions, and a description of the natural features and landmarks embraced therein;
f) Report of Investigation and Other Documents. - A complete copy of the preliminary census and a
report of investigation, shall be prepared by the Ancestral Domains Office of the NCIP;
g) Notice and Publication. - A copy of each document, including a translation in the native language of
the ICCs/IPs concerned shall be posted in a prominent place therein for at least fifteen (15) days. A
copy of the document shall also be posted at the local, provincial and regional offices of the NCIP, and
shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks to
allow other claimants to file opposition thereto within fifteen (15) days from date of such publication:
Provided, That in areas where no such newspaper exists, broadcasting in a radio station will be a valid
substitute: Provided, further, That mere posting shall be deemed sufficient if both newspaper and radio
station are not available;
h) Endorsement to NCIP. - Within fifteen (15) days from publication, and of the inspection process,
the Ancestral Domains Office shall prepare a report to the NCIP endorsing a favorable action upon a
claim that is deemed to have sufficient proof. However, if the proof is deemed insufficient, the
Ancestral Domains Office shall require the submission of additional evidence: Provided, That the
Ancestral Domains Office shall reject any claim that is deemed patently false or fraudulent after
inspection and verification: Provided, further, That in case of rejection, the Ancestral Domains Office
shall give the applicant due notice, copy furnished all concerned, containing the grounds for denial.
The denial shall be appealable to the NCIP: Provided, furthermore, That in cases where there are
conflicting claims among ICCs/IPs on the boundaries of ancestral domain claims, the Ancestral
Domains Office shall cause the contending parties to meet and assist them in coming up with a
preliminary resolution of the conflict, without prejudice to its full adjudication according to the section
below.
xxxx

2) Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs political structure and institution;

To remove all doubts about the irreconcilability of the MOA-AD with the present legal system, a discussion of
not only the Constitution and domestic statutes, but also of international law is in order, for

3) Pictures showing long term occupation such as those of old improvements, burial
grounds, sacred places and old villages;

Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution states that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land."

4) Historical accounts, including pacts and agreements concerning boundaries entered into
by the ICCs/IPs concerned with other ICCs/IPs;

Applying this provision of the Constitution, the Court, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,158 held that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights is part of the law of the land on account of which it ordered the release on bail of a
detained alien of Russian descent whose deportation order had not been executed even after two years. Similarly,
the Court in Agustin v. Edu159 applied the aforesaid constitutional provision to the 1968 Vienna Convention on
Road Signs and Signals.

5) Survey plans and sketch maps;

6) Anthropological data;
7) Genealogical surveys;
8) Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional communal forests and hunting grounds;
9) Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional landmarks such as mountains, rivers,
creeks, ridges, hills, terraces and the like; and
10) Write-ups of names and places derived from the native dialect of the community.

International law has long recognized the right to self-determination of "peoples," understood not merely as the
entire population of a State but also a portion thereof. In considering the question of whether the people of
Quebec had a right to unilaterally secede from Canada, the Canadian Supreme Court in REFERENCE RE
SECESSION OF QUEBEC160 had occasion to acknowledge that "the right of a people to self-determination is
now so widely recognized in international conventions that the principle has acquired a status beyond
convention' and is considered a general principle of international law."
Among the conventions referred to are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 161 and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 162 which state, in Article 1 of both covenants,
that all peoples, by virtue of the right of self-determination, "freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social, and cultural development."

12 | P a g e

The people's right to self-determination should not, however, be understood as extending to a unilateral right of
secession. A distinction should be made between the right of internal and external self-determination.
REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC is again instructive:
"(ii) Scope of the Right to Self-determination
126. The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination of a
people is normally fulfilled through internal self-determination - a people's pursuit of its
political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework of an existing state. A
right toexternal self-determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of the assertion
of a right to unilateral secession) arises in only the most extreme of cases and, even then, under
carefully defined circumstances. x x x
External self-determination can be defined as in the following statement from the Declaration on
Friendly Relations, supra, as
The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with
an independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by
apeople constitute modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that people. (Emphasis
added)
127. The international law principle of self-determination has evolved within a framework of
respect for the territorial integrity of existing states. The various international documents that
support the existence of a people's right to self-determination also contain parallel statements
supportive of the conclusion that the exercise of such a right must be sufficiently limited to prevent
threats to an existing state's territorial integrity or the stability of relations between sovereign states.

under normal conditions therefore, bears upon a question which International Law leaves entirely to
the domestic jurisdiction of one of the States concerned. Any other solution would amount to an
infringement of sovereign rights of a State and would involve the risk of creating difficulties and a
lack of stability which would not only be contrary to the very idea embodied in term "State," but
would also endanger the interests of the international community. If this right is not possessed by a
large or small section of a nation, neither can it be held by the State to which the national group wishes
to be attached, nor by any other State. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Committee held that the dispute concerning the Aaland Islands did not refer to a question which is left by
international law to the domestic jurisdiction of Finland, thereby applying the exception rather than the rule
elucidated above. Its ground for departing from the general rule, however, was a very narrow one, namely, the
Aaland Islands agitation originated at a time when Finland was undergoing drastic political transformation. The
internal situation of Finland was, according to the Committee, so abnormal that, for a considerable time, the
conditions required for the formation of a sovereign State did not exist. In the midst of revolution, anarchy, and
civil war, the legitimacy of the Finnish national government was disputed by a large section of the people, and it
had, in fact, been chased from the capital and forcibly prevented from carrying out its duties. The armed camps
and the police were divided into two opposing forces. In light of these circumstances, Finland was not, during the
relevant time period, a "definitively constituted" sovereign state. The Committee, therefore, found that Finland
did not possess the right to withhold from a portion of its population the option to separate itself - a right which
sovereign nations generally have with respect to their own populations.
Turning now to the more specific category of indigenous peoples, this term has been used, in scholarship as well
as international, regional, and state practices, to refer to groups with distinct cultures, histories, and connections
to land (spiritual and otherwise) that have been forcibly incorporated into a larger governing society. These
groups are regarded as "indigenous" since they are the living descendants of pre-invasion inhabitants of lands
now dominated by others. Otherwise stated, indigenous peoples, nations, or communities are culturally distinctive
groups that find themselves engulfed by settler societies born of the forces of empire and conquest. 164 Examples
of groups who have been regarded as indigenous peoples are the Maori of New Zealand and the aboriginal
peoples of Canada.

x x x x (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

The Canadian Court went on to discuss the exceptional cases in which the right to external self-determination can
arise, namely, where a people is under colonial rule, is subject to foreign domination or exploitation outside a
colonial context, and - less definitely but asserted by a number of commentators - is blocked from the meaningful
exercise of its right to internal self-determination. The Court ultimately held that the population of Quebec had no
right to secession, as the same is not under colonial rule or foreign domination, nor is it being deprived of the
freedom to make political choices and pursue economic, social and cultural development, citing that Quebec is
equitably represented in legislative, executive and judicial institutions within Canada, even occupying prominent
positions therein.
The exceptional nature of the right of secession is further exemplified in the REPORT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF JURISTS ON THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE AALAND ISLANDS
QUESTION.163 There, Sweden presented to the Council of the League of Nations the question of whether the
inhabitants of the Aaland Islands should be authorized to determine by plebiscite if the archipelago should remain
under Finnish sovereignty or be incorporated in the kingdom of Sweden. The Council, before resolving the
question, appointed an International Committee composed of three jurists to submit an opinion on the preliminary
issue of whether the dispute should, based on international law, be entirely left to the domestic jurisdiction of
Finland. The Committee stated the rule as follows:
x x x [I]n the absence of express provisions in international treaties, the right of disposing of
national territory is essentially an attribute of the sovereignty of every State. Positive
International Law does not recognize the right of national groups, as such, to separate
themselves from the State of which they form part by the simple expression of a wish, any more
than it recognizes the right of other States to claim such a separation. Generally speaking, the grant
or refusal of the right to a portion of its population of determining its own political fate by
plebiscite or by some other method, is, exclusively, an attribute of the sovereignty of every
State which is definitively constituted. A dispute between two States concerning such a question,

As with the broader category of "peoples," indigenous peoples situated within states do not have a general right to
independence or secession from those states under international law,165 but they do have rights amounting to what
was discussed above as the right to internal self-determination.
In a historic development last September 13, 2007, the UN General Assembly adopted the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN DRIP) through General Assembly Resolution 61/295. The
vote was 143 to 4, the Philippines being included among those in favor, and the four voting against being
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the U.S. The Declaration clearly recognized the right of indigenous
peoples to self-determination, encompassing the right to autonomy or self-government, to wit:
Article 3
Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
Article 4
Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right
to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as
ways and means for financing their autonomous functions.
Article 5

13 | P a g e

Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic,
social and cultural institutions, while retaining their right to participate fully, if they so choose, in the
political, economic, social and cultural life of the State.
Self-government, as used in international legal discourse pertaining to indigenous peoples, has been understood
as equivalent to "internal self-determination." 166 The extent of self-determination provided for in the UN DRIP is
more particularly defined in its subsequent articles, some of which are quoted hereunder:
Article 8
1. Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or
destruction of their culture.
2. States shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention of, and redress for:
(a) Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them of their integrity as distinct peoples,
or of their cultural values or ethnic identities;
(b) Any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, territories or
resources;
(c) Any form of forced population transfer which has the aim or effect of violating or
undermining any of their rights;
(d) Any form of forced assimilation or integration;
(e) Any form of propaganda designed to promote or incite racial or ethnic discrimination
directed against them.
Article 21
1. Indigenous peoples have the right, without discrimination, to the improvement of their economic
and social conditions, including, inter alia, in the areas of education, employment, vocational training
and retraining, housing, sanitation, health and social security.
2. States shall take effective measures and, where appropriate, special measures to ensure continuing
improvement of their economic and social conditions. Particular attention shall be paid to the rights
and special needs of indigenous elders, women, youth, children and persons with disabilities.
Article 26
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have
traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and
resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or use, as
well as those which they have otherwise acquired.
3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and resources. Such
recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure systems of
the indigenous peoples concerned.

Article 30
1. Military activities shall not take place in the lands or territories of indigenous peoples, unless
justified by a relevant public interest or otherwise freely agreed with or requested by the indigenous
peoples concerned.
2. States shall undertake effective consultations with the indigenous peoples concerned, through
appropriate procedures and in particular through their representative institutions, prior to using their
lands or territories for military activities.
Article 32
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for the
development or use of their lands or territories and other resources.
2. States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their
own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval
of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in connection with
the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources.
3. States shall provide effective mechanisms for just and fair redress for any such activities, and
appropriate measures shall be taken to mitigate adverse environmental, economic, social, cultural or
spiritual impact.
Article 37
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the recognition, observance and enforcement of treaties,
agreements and other constructive arrangements concluded with States or their successors and to have
States honour and respect such treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements.
2. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as diminishing or eliminating the rights of
indigenous peoples contained in treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements.
Article 38
States in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples, shall take the appropriate measures,
including legislative measures, to achieve the ends of this Declaration.
Assuming that the UN DRIP, like the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, must now be regarded as
embodying customary international law - a question which the Court need not definitively resolve here - the
obligations enumerated therein do not strictly require the Republic to grant the Bangsamoro people, through the
instrumentality of the BJE, the particular rights and powers provided for in the MOA-AD. Even the more specific
provisions of the UN DRIP are general in scope, allowing for flexibility in its application by the different States.
There is, for instance, no requirement in the UN DRIP that States now guarantee indigenous peoples their own
police and internal security force. Indeed, Article 8 presupposes that it is the State which will provide protection
for indigenous peoples against acts like the forced dispossession of their lands - a function that is normally
performed by police officers. If the protection of a right so essential to indigenous people's identity is
acknowledged to be the responsibility of the State, then surely the protection of rights less significant to them as
such peoples would also be the duty of States. Nor is there in the UN DRIP an acknowledgement of the right of
indigenous peoples to the aerial domain and atmospheric space. What it upholds, in Article 26 thereof, is the right
of indigenous peoples to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or
otherwise used or acquired.

14 | P a g e

Moreover, the UN DRIP, while upholding the right of indigenous peoples to autonomy, does not obligate States to
grant indigenous peoples the near-independent status of an associated state. All the rights recognized in that
document are qualified in Article 46 as follows:
1. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, group or person
any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations
orconstrued as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally
or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States.
Even if the UN DRIP were considered as part of the law of the land pursuant to Article II, Section 2 of the
Constitution, it would not suffice to uphold the validity of the MOA-AD so as to render its compliance with other
laws unnecessary.
It is, therefore, clear that the MOA-AD contains numerous provisions that cannot be reconciled with the
Constitution and the laws as presently worded. Respondents proffer, however, that the signing of the MOAAD alone would not have entailed any violation of law or grave abuse of discretion on their part, precisely
because it stipulates that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the laws shall not take effect until these laws are
amended. They cite paragraph 7 of the MOA-AD strand on GOVERNANCE quoted earlier, but which is
reproduced below for convenience:
7. The Parties agree that the mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation of this MOAAD shall be spelt out in the Comprehensive Compact to mutually take such steps to enable it to occur
effectively.
Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come
into force upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the
legal framework with due regard to non derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated
timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact.
Indeed, the foregoing stipulation keeps many controversial provisions of the MOA-AD from coming into force
until the necessary changes to the legal framework are effected. While the word "Constitution" is not
mentioned in the provision now under consideration or anywhere else in the MOA-AD, the term "legal
framework" is certainly broad enough to include the Constitution.
Notwithstanding the suspensive clause, however, respondents, by their mere act of incorporating in the MOA-AD
the provisions thereof regarding the associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government, have
already violated the Memorandum of Instructions From The President dated March 1, 2001, which states that the
"negotiations shall be conducted in accordance with x x x the principles of the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Republic of the Philippines." (Emphasis supplied) Establishing an associative relationship
between the BJE and the Central Government is, for the reasons already discussed, a preparation for
independence, or worse, an implicit acknowledgment of an independent status already prevailing.
Even apart from the above-mentioned Memorandum, however, the MOA-AD is defective because the suspensive
clause is invalid, as discussed below.
The authority of the GRP Peace Negotiating Panel to negotiate with the MILF is founded on E.O. No. 3, Section
5(c), which states that there shall be established Government Peace Negotiating Panels for negotiations with
different rebel groups to be "appointed by the President as her official emissaries to conduct negotiations,
dialogues, and face-to-face discussions with rebel groups." These negotiating panels are to report to the President,
through the PAPP on the conduct and progress of the negotiations.
It bears noting that the GRP Peace Panel, in exploring lasting solutions to the Moro Problem through its
negotiations with the MILF, was not restricted by E.O. No. 3 only to those options available under the laws as
they presently stand. One of the components of a comprehensive peace process, which E.O. No. 3 collectively
refers to as the "Paths to Peace," is the pursuit of social, economic, and political reforms which may require new

legislation or even constitutional amendments. Sec. 4(a) of E.O. No. 3, which reiterates Section 3(a), of E.O. No.
125,167states:
SECTION 4. The Six Paths to Peace. - The components of the comprehensive peace process comprise
the processes known as the "Paths to Peace". These component processes are interrelated and not
mutually exclusive, and must therefore be pursued simultaneously in a coordinated and integrated
fashion. They shall include, but may not be limited to, the following:
a. PURSUIT OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORMS. This component involves
the vigorous implementation of various policies, reforms, programs and projects aimed at
addressing the root causes of internal armed conflicts and social unrest. This may require
administrative action, new legislation or even constitutional amendments.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The MOA-AD, therefore, may reasonably be perceived as an attempt of respondents to address, pursuant to this
provision of E.O. No. 3, the root causes of the armed conflict in Mindanao. The E.O. authorized them to "think
outside the box," so to speak. Hence, they negotiated and were set on signing the MOA-AD that included various
social, economic, and political reforms which cannot, however, all be accommodated within the present legal
framework, and which thus would require new legislation and constitutional amendments.
The inquiry on the legality of the "suspensive clause," however, cannot stop here, because it must be
askedwhether the President herself may exercise the power delegated to the GRP Peace Panel under E.O.
No. 3, Sec. 4(a).
The President cannot delegate a power that she herself does not possess. May the President, in the course of peace
negotiations, agree to pursue reforms that would require new legislation and constitutional amendments, or
should the reforms be restricted only to those solutions which the present laws allow? The answer to this question
requires a discussion of the extent of the President's power to conduct peace negotiations.
That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups is not explicitly mentioned in
the Constitution does not mean that she has no such authority. In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,168 in issue was
the authority of the President to declare a state of rebellion - an authority which is not expressly provided for in
the Constitution. The Court held thus:
"In her ponencia in Marcos v. Manglapus, Justice Cortes put her thesis into jurisprudence. There, the
Court, by a slim 8-7 margin, upheld the President's power to forbid the return of her exiled
predecessor. The rationale for the majority's ruling rested on the President's
. . . unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and
which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The
powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the
article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the
Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the
Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the
abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific powers of
the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a
diminution of the general grant of executive power.
Thus, the President's authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her
powers as chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief
powers. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

15 | P a g e

Similarly, the President's power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly included in her powers as Chief
Executive and Commander-in-Chief. As Chief Executive, the President has the general responsibility to promote
public peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and
lawless violence.169
As the experience of nations which have similarly gone through internal armed conflict will show, however,
peace is rarely attained by simply pursuing a military solution. Oftentimes, changes as far-reaching as a
fundamental reconfiguration of the nation's constitutional structure is required. The observations of Dr. Kirsti
Samuels are enlightening, to wit:
x x x [T]he fact remains that a successful political and governance transition must form the core of any
post-conflict peace-building mission. As we have observed in Liberia and Haiti over the last ten years,
conflict cessation without modification of the political environment, even where state-building is
undertaken through technical electoral assistance and institution- or capacity-building, is unlikely to
succeed. On average, more than 50 percent of states emerging from conflict return to conflict.
Moreover, a substantial proportion of transitions have resulted in weak or limited democracies.
The design of a constitution and its constitution-making process can play an important role in the
political and governance transition. Constitution-making after conflict is an opportunity to create a
common vision of the future of a state and a road map on how to get there. The constitution can be
partly a peace agreement and partly a framework setting up the rules by which the new democracy
will operate.170
In the same vein, Professor Christine Bell, in her article on the nature and legal status of peace agreements,
observed that the typical way that peace agreements establish or confirm mechanisms for demilitarization and
demobilization is by linking them to new constitutional structures addressing governance, elections, and legal
and human rights institutions.171
In the Philippine experience, the link between peace agreements and constitution-making has been recognized by
no less than the framers of the Constitution. Behind the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions 172is
the framers' intention to implement a particular peace agreement, namely, the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 between
the GRP and the MNLF, signed by then Undersecretary of National Defense Carmelo Z. Barbero and then MNLF
Chairman Nur Misuari.
MR. ROMULO. There are other speakers; so, although I have some more questions, I will reserve my
right to ask them if they are not covered by the other speakers. I have only two questions.
I heard one of the Commissioners say that local autonomy already exists in the Muslim region; it
is working very well; it has, in fact, diminished a great deal of the problems. So, my question is: since
that already exists, why do we have to go into something new?
MR. OPLE. May I answer that on behalf of Chairman Nolledo. Commissioner Yusup Abubakar is
right thatcertain definite steps have been taken to implement the provisions of the Tripoli
Agreement with respect to an autonomous region in Mindanao. This is a good first step, but
there is no question that this is merely a partial response to the Tripoli Agreement itself and to
the fuller standard of regional autonomy contemplated in that agreement, and now by state
policy.173(Emphasis supplied)
The constitutional provisions on autonomy and the statutes enacted pursuant to them have, to the credit of their
drafters, been partly successful. Nonetheless, the Filipino people are still faced with the reality of an on-going
conflict between the Government and the MILF. If the President is to be expected to find means for bringing this
conflict to an end and to achieve lasting peace in Mindanao, then she must be given the leeway to explore, in the
course of peace negotiations, solutions that may require changes to the Constitution for their implementation.
Being uniquely vested with the power to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups, the President is in a
singular position to know the precise nature of their grievances which, if resolved, may bring an end to hostilities.

The President may not, of course, unilaterally implement the solutions that she considers viable, but she may not
be prevented from submitting them as recommendations to Congress, which could then, if it is minded, act upon
them pursuant to the legal procedures for constitutional amendment and revision. In particular, Congress would
have the option, pursuant to Article XVII, Sections 1 and 3 of the Constitution, to propose the recommended
amendments or revision to the people, call a constitutional convention, or submit to the electorate the question of
calling such a convention.
While the President does not possess constituent powers - as those powers may be exercised only by Congress, a
Constitutional Convention, or the people through initiative and referendum - she may submit proposals for
constitutional change to Congress in a manner that does not involve the arrogation of constituent powers.
In Sanidad v. COMELEC,174 in issue was the legality of then President Marcos' act of directly submitting
proposals for constitutional amendments to a referendum, bypassing the interim National Assembly which was
the body vested by the 1973 Constitution with the power to propose such amendments. President Marcos, it will
be recalled, never convened the interim National Assembly. The majority upheld the President's act, holding that
"the urges of absolute necessity" compelled the President as the agent of the people to act as he did, there being
no interim National Assembly to propose constitutional amendments. Against this ruling, Justices Teehankee and
Muoz Palma vigorously dissented. The Court's concern at present, however, is not with regard to the point on
which it was then divided in that controversial case, but on that which was not disputed by either side.
Justice Teehankee's dissent,175 in particular, bears noting. While he disagreed that the President may directly
submit proposed constitutional amendments to a referendum, implicit in his opinion is a recognition that he
would have upheld the President's action along with the majority had the President convened the interim National
Assembly and coursed his proposals through it. Thus Justice Teehankee opined:
"Since the Constitution provides for the organization of the essential departments of government,
defines and delimits the powers of each and prescribes the manner of the exercise of such powers, and
the constituent power has not been granted to but has been withheld from the President or Prime
Minister, it follows that the President's questioned decrees proposing and submitting constitutional
amendments directly to the people (without the intervention of the interim National Assembly in
whom the power is expressly vested) are devoid of constitutional and legal basis." 176 (Emphasis
supplied)
From the foregoing discussion, the principle may be inferred that the President - in the course of conducting
peace negotiations - may validly consider implementing even those policies that require changes to the
Constitution, but she may not unilaterally implement them without the intervention of Congress, or act in any
way as if the assent of that body were assumed as a certainty.
Since, under the present Constitution, the people also have the power to directly propose amendments through
initiative and referendum, the President may also submit her recommendations to the people, not as a formal
proposal to be voted on in a plebiscite similar to what President Marcos did in Sanidad, but for their independent
consideration of whether these recommendations merit being formally proposed through initiative.
These recommendations, however, may amount to nothing more than the President's suggestions to the people,
for any further involvement in the process of initiative by the Chief Executive may vitiate its character as a
genuine "people's initiative." The only initiative recognized by the Constitution is that which truly proceeds from
the people. As the Court stated in Lambino v. COMELEC:177
"The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the people's voice.' However, the Lambino Group
unabashedly states in ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification of their petition with the
COMELEC, that ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms.' The Lambino Group thus admits that their
people's' initiative is an unqualified support to the agenda' of the incumbent President to change
the Constitution. This forewarns the Court to be wary of incantations of people's voice' or sovereign
will' in the present initiative."

16 | P a g e

It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, 178 only to preserve and defend
the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution,
but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these
changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere
recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.
The foregoing discussion focused on the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, since her
authority to propose new legislation is not in controversy. It has been an accepted practice for Presidents in this
jurisdiction to propose new legislation. One of the more prominent instances the practice is usually done is in the
yearly State of the Nation Address of the President to Congress. Moreover, the annual general appropriations bill
has always been based on the budget prepared by the President, which - for all intents and purposes - is a proposal
for new legislation coming from the President.179
The "suspensive clause" in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards
Given the limited nature of the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot
guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be submitted
to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either to Congress or the
people, in whom constituent powers are vested.
Paragraph 7 on Governance of the MOA-AD states, however, that all provisions thereof which cannot be
reconciled with the present Constitution and laws "shall come into force upon signing of a Comprehensive
Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework." This stipulation does not bear the
marks of a suspensive condition - defined in civil law as a future and uncertain event - but of a term. It is not a
question of whether the necessary changes to the legal framework will be effected, but when. That there is no
uncertainty being contemplated is plain from what follows, for the paragraph goes on to state that the
contemplated changes shall be "with due regard to non derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated
timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact."
Pursuant to this stipulation, therefore, it is mandatory for the GRP to effect the changes to the legal framework
contemplated in the MOA-AD - which changes would include constitutional amendments, as discussed earlier. It
bears noting that,
By the time these changes are put in place, the MOA-AD itself would be counted among the "prior
agreements" from which there could be no derogation.
What remains for discussion in the Comprehensive Compact would merely be the implementing details for these
"consensus points" and, notably, the deadline for effecting the contemplated changes to the legal framework.
Plainly, stipulation-paragraph 7 on GOVERNANCE is inconsistent with the limits of the President's authority
to propose constitutional amendments, it being a virtual guarantee that the Constitution and the laws of the
Republic of the Philippines will certainly be adjusted to conform to all the "consensus points" found in the MOAAD.Hence, it must be struck down as unconstitutional.
A comparison between the "suspensive clause" of the MOA-AD with a similar provision appearing in the 1996
final peace agreement between the MNLF and the GRP is most instructive.
As a backdrop, the parties to the 1996 Agreement stipulated that it would be implemented in two phases. Phase
Icovered a three-year transitional period involving the putting up of new administrative structures through
Executive Order, such as the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) and the Southern Philippines
Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), while Phase II covered the establishment of the new regional
autonomous government through amendment or repeal of R.A. No. 6734, which was then the Organic Act of the
ARMM.

The stipulations on Phase II consisted of specific agreements on the structure of the expanded autonomous region
envisioned by the parties. To that extent, they are similar to the provisions of the MOA-AD. There is, however, a
crucial difference between the two agreements. While the MOA-AD virtually guarantees that the "necessary
changes to the legal framework" will be put in place, the GRP-MNLF final peace agreement states thus:
"Accordingly, these provisions [on Phase II] shall be recommended by the GRP to Congress for incorporation in
the amendatory or repealing law."
Concerns have been raised that the MOA-AD would have given rise to a binding international law obligation on
the part of the Philippines to change its Constitution in conformity thereto, on the ground that it may be
considered either as a binding agreement under international law, or a unilateral declaration of the Philippine
government to the international community that it would grant to the Bangsamoro people all the concessions
therein stated. Neither ground finds sufficient support in international law, however.
The MOA-AD, as earlier mentioned in the overview thereof, would have included foreign dignitaries as
signatories. In addition, representatives of other nations were invited to witness its signing in Kuala Lumpur.
These circumstances readily lead one to surmise that the MOA-AD would have had the status of a binding
international agreement had it been signed. An examination of the prevailing principles in international law,
however, leads to the contrary conclusion.
The Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lom Accord Amnesty 180 (the Lom Accord case) of the Special Court
of Sierra Leone is enlightening. The Lom Accord was a peace agreement signed on July 7, 1999 between the
Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a rebel group with which the Sierra
Leone Government had been in armed conflict for around eight years at the time of signing. There were noncontracting signatories to the agreement, among which were the Government of the Togolese Republic, the
Economic Community of West African States, and the UN.
On January 16, 2002, after a successful negotiation between the UN Secretary-General and the Sierra Leone
Government, another agreement was entered into by the UN and that Government whereby the Special Court of
Sierra Leone was established. The sole purpose of the Special Court, an international court, was to try persons
who bore the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean
law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since November 30, 1996.
Among the stipulations of the Lom Accord was a provision for the full pardon of the members of the RUF with
respect to anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives as members of that organization since the conflict
began.
In the Lom Accord case, the Defence argued that the Accord created an internationally binding obligation not
to prosecute the beneficiaries of the amnesty provided therein, citing, among other things, the participation of
foreign dignitaries and international organizations in the finalization of that agreement. The Special Court,
however, rejected this argument, ruling that the Lome Accord is not a treaty and that it can only create binding
obligations and rights between the parties in municipal law, not in international law. Hence, the Special Court
held, it is ineffective in depriving an international court like it of jurisdiction.
"37. In regard to the nature of a negotiated settlement of an internal armed conflict it is easy to
assume and to argue with some degree of plausibility, as Defence counsel for the defendants
seem to have done, that the mere fact that in addition to the parties to the conflict, the document
formalizing the settlement is signed by foreign heads of state or their representatives and
representatives of international organizations, means the agreement of the parties is
internationalized so as to create obligations in international law.
40. Almost every conflict resolution will involve the parties to the conflict and the mediator or
facilitator of the settlement, or persons or bodies under whose auspices the settlement took place but
who are not at all parties to the conflict, are not contracting parties and who do not claim any
obligation from the contracting parties or incur any obligation from the settlement.

17 | P a g e

41. In this case, the parties to the conflict are the lawful authority of the State and the RUF
which has no status of statehood and is to all intents and purposes a faction within the state. The
non-contracting signatories of the Lom Agreement were moral guarantors of the principle that,
in the terms of Article XXXIV of the Agreement, "this peace agreement is implemented with
integrity and in good faith by both parties". The moral guarantors assumed no legal
obligation. It is recalled that the UN by its representative appended, presumably for avoidance of
doubt, an understanding of the extent of the agreement to be implemented as not including certain
international crimes.
42. An international agreement in the nature of a treaty must create rights and obligations regulated by
international law so that a breach of its terms will be a breach determined under international law
which will also provide principle means of enforcement. The Lom Agreement created neither
rights nor obligations capable of being regulated by international law. An agreement such as the
Lom Agreement which brings to an end an internal armed conflict no doubt creates a factual
situation of restoration of peace that the international community acting through the Security
Council may take note of. That, however, will not convert it to an international agreement which
creates an obligation enforceable in international, as distinguished from municipal, law. A breach
of the terms of such a peace agreement resulting in resumption of internal armed conflict or creating a
threat to peace in the determination of the Security Council may indicate a reversal of the factual
situation of peace to be visited with possible legal consequences arising from the new situation of
conflict created. Such consequences such as action by the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII
arise from the situation and not from the agreement, nor from the obligation imposed by it. Such
action cannot be regarded as a remedy for the breach. A peace agreement which settles
an internal armed conflict cannot be ascribed the same status as one which settles an
international armed conflict which, essentially, must be between two or more warring States.
The Lom Agreement cannot be characterised as an international instrument. x x x" (Emphasis,
italics and underscoring supplied)

effect, since such a requirement would be inconsistent with the strictly unilateral nature of the juridical
act by which the pronouncement by the State was made.
44. Of course, not all unilateral acts imply obligation; but a State may choose to take up a certain
position in relation to a particular matter with the intention of being bound-the intention is to be
ascertained by interpretation of the act. When States make statements by which their freedom of
action is to be limited, a restrictive interpretation is called for.
xxxx
51. In announcing that the 1974 series of atmospheric tests would be the last, the French
Government conveyed to the world at large, including the Applicant, its intention effectively to
terminate these tests. It was bound to assume that other States might take note of these
statements and rely on their being effective. The validity of these statements and their legal
consequences must be considered within the general framework of the security of international
intercourse, and the confidence and trust which are so essential in the relations among States. It is
from the actual substance of these statements, and from the circumstances attending their
making, that the legal implications of the unilateral act must be deduced. The objects of these
statements are clear and they were addressed to the international community as a whole, and the
Court holds that they constitute an undertaking possessing legal effect. The Court considers *270
that the President of the Republic, in deciding upon the effective cessation of atmospheric tests, gave
an undertaking to the international community to which his words were addressed. x x x (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

Similarly, that the MOA-AD would have been signed by representatives of States and international organizations
not parties to the Agreement would not have sufficed to vest in it a binding character under international law.

As gathered from the above-quoted ruling of the ICJ, public statements of a state representative may be construed
as a unilateral declaration only when the following conditions are present: the statements were clearly addressed
to the international community, the state intended to be bound to that community by its statements, and that not to
give legal effect to those statements would be detrimental to the security of international intercourse. Plainly,
unilateral declarations arise only in peculiar circumstances.

In another vein, concern has been raised that the MOA-AD would amount to a unilateral declaration of the
Philippine State, binding under international law, that it would comply with all the stipulations stated therein,
with the result that it would have to amend its Constitution accordingly regardless of the true will of the people.
Cited as authority for this view is Australia v. France,181 also known as the Nuclear Tests Case, decided by the
International Court of Justice (ICJ).

The limited applicability of the Nuclear Tests Case ruling was recognized in a later case decided by the ICJ
entitledBurkina Faso v. Mali,183 also known as the Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute. The public declaration
subject of that case was a statement made by the President of Mali, in an interview by a foreign press agency, that
Mali would abide by the decision to be issued by a commission of the Organization of African Unity on a frontier
dispute then pending between Mali and Burkina Faso.

In the Nuclear Tests Case, Australia challenged before the ICJ the legality of France's nuclear tests in the South
Pacific. France refused to appear in the case, but public statements from its President, and similar statements from
other French officials including its Minister of Defence, that its 1974 series of atmospheric tests would be its last,
persuaded the ICJ to dismiss the case. 182 Those statements, the ICJ held, amounted to a legal undertaking
addressed to the international community, which required no acceptance from other States for it to become
effective.

Unlike in the Nuclear Tests Case, the ICJ held that the statement of Mali's President was not a unilateral act with
legal implications. It clarified that its ruling in the Nuclear Tests case rested on the peculiar circumstances
surrounding the French declaration subject thereof, to wit:

Essential to the ICJ ruling is its finding that the French government intended to be bound to the international
community in issuing its public statements, viz:
43. It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts, concerning legal or factual
situations, may have the effect of creating legal obligations. Declarations of this kind may be, and
often are, very specific. When it is the intention of the State making the declaration that it should
become bound according to its terms, that intention confers on the declaration the character of a
legal undertaking, the State being thenceforth legally required to follow a course of conduct
consistent with the declaration. An undertaking of this kind, if given publicly, and with an intent to
be bound, even though not made within the context of international negotiations, is binding. In these
circumstances, nothing in the nature of a quid pro quo nor any subsequent acceptance of the
declaration, nor even any reply or reaction from other States, is required for the declaration to take

40. In order to assess the intentions of the author of a unilateral act, account must be taken of all the
factual circumstances in which the act occurred. For example, in the Nuclear Tests cases, the Court
took the view that since the applicant States were not the only ones concerned at the possible
continuance of atmospheric testing by the French Government, that Government's unilateral
declarations had conveyed to the world at large, including the Applicant, its intention
effectively to terminate these tests (I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 269, para. 51; p. 474, para. 53). In the
particular circumstances of those cases, the French Government could not express an intention
to be bound otherwise than by unilateral declarations. It is difficult to see how it could have
accepted the terms of a negotiated solution with each of the applicants without thereby
jeopardizing its contention that its conduct was lawful. The circumstances of the present case
are radically different. Here, there was nothing to hinder the Parties from manifesting an
intention to accept the binding character of the conclusions of the Organization of African Unity
Mediation Commission by the normal method: a formal agreement on the basis of
reciprocity. Since no agreement of this kind was concluded between the Parties, the Chamber finds
that there are no grounds to interpret the declaration made by Mali's head of State on 11 April 1975 as

18 | P a g e

a unilateral act with legal implications in regard to the present case. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Assessing the MOA-AD in light of the above criteria, it would not have amounted to a unilateral declaration on
the part of the Philippine State to the international community. The Philippine panel did not draft the same with
the clear intention of being bound thereby to the international community as a whole or to any State, but only to
the MILF. While there were States and international organizations involved, one way or another, in the
negotiation and projected signing of the MOA-AD, they participated merely as witnesses or, in the case of
Malaysia, as facilitator. As held in the Lom Accord case, the mere fact that in addition to the parties to the
conflict, the peace settlement is signed by representatives of states and international organizations does not mean
that the agreement is internationalized so as to create obligations in international law.

Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the
GRP Peace Panel mooted the present petitions, the Court finds that the present petitions provide an exception to
the "moot and academic" principle in view of (a) the grave violation of the Constitution involved; (b) the
exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest; (c) the need to formulate controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the fact that the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review.
The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace signed by the government and the MILF back in June 2001. Hence, the present MOA-AD
can be renegotiated or another one drawn up that could contain similar or significantly dissimilar provisions
compared to the original.

Since the commitments in the MOA-AD were not addressed to States, not to give legal effect to such
commitments would not be detrimental to the security of international intercourse - to the trust and confidence
essential in the relations among States.

The Court, however, finds that the prayers for mandamus have been rendered moot in view of the respondents'
action in providing the Court and the petitioners with the official copy of the final draft of the MOA-AD and its
annexes.

In one important respect, the circumstances surrounding the MOA-AD are closer to that of Burkina
Faso wherein, as already discussed, the Mali President's statement was not held to be a binding unilateral
declaration by the ICJ. As in that case, there was also nothing to hinder the Philippine panel, had it really been its
intention to be bound to other States, to manifest that intention by formal agreement. Here, that formal agreement
would have come about by the inclusion in the MOA-AD of a clear commitment to be legally bound to the
international community, not just the MILF, and by an equally clear indication that the signatures of the
participating states-representatives would constitute an acceptance of that commitment. Entering into such a
formal agreement would not have resulted in a loss of face for the Philippine government before the international
community, which was one of the difficulties that prevented the French Government from entering into a formal
agreement with other countries. That the Philippine panel did not enter into such a formal agreement suggests that
it had no intention to be bound to the international community. On that ground, the MOA-AD may not
be considered a unilateral declaration under international law.

The people's right to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Article III of the Constitution is
insplendid symmetry with the state policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest
under Sec. 28, Article II of the Constitution. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand
information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands.
The complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on
public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as
may be provided by law.

The MOA-AD not being a document that can bind the Philippines under international law notwithstanding,
respondents' almost consummated act of guaranteeing amendments to the legal framework is, by itself,
sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse lies not in the fact that they considered, as a
solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a state within a state, but in their brazen willingness toguarantee
that Congress and the sovereign Filipino people would give their imprimatur to their solution. Upholding
such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a
Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the
Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with
that process.
The sovereign people may, if it so desired, go to the extent of giving up a portion of its own territory to the Moros
for the sake of peace, for it can change the Constitution in any it wants, so long as the change is not inconsistent
with what, in international law, is known as Jus Cogens.184 Respondents, however, may not preempt it in that
decision.
SUMMARY
The petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of respondents to consult the local government units or
communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate under E.O. No. 3. Moreover,
respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any
alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental
importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the
requisitelocus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo.

The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the highest
order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the consummation
of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or commercial character of the
agreement.
An essential element of these twin freedoms is to keep a continuing dialogue or process of communication
between the government and the people. Corollary to these twin rights is the design for feedback mechanisms.
The right to public consultation was envisioned to be a species of these public rights.
At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and justify the exercise of the people's right
to be consulted on relevant matters relating to the peace agenda.
One, E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels and
for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace
Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and recommendations from
peace partners and concerned sectors of society.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to conduct
consultations before any project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including those that
may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The
MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the
Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great
number of inhabitants from their total environment.
Three, Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for
the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free
and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute
does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an
ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.

19 | P a g e

The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a defense to the general right to information or the
specific right to consultation is untenable. The various explicit legal provisions fly in the face of executive
secrecy. In any event, respondents effectively waived such defense after it unconditionally disclosed the official
copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and public scrutiny.

27

In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to
carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic
Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in
excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise
thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.

28

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but
the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the
BJE, areunconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the
same is on its way to independence.

31

Cesar Adib Majul, The General Nature of Islamic Law and its Application in the Philippines, lecture
delivered as part of the Ricardo Paras Lectures, a series jointly sponsored by the Commission on Bar
Integration of the Supreme Court, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the U.P. Law Center,
September 24, 1977.
Ibid., vide M.A. Muqtedar Khan Ph.D., immigrant American Muslims and the Moral Dilemmas of
Citizenship, http://www.islamfortoday.com/khan04.htm, visited on September 18, 2008, and Syed
Shahabuddin, Muslim World and the contemporary Ijma' on rules of governance ii,http://www.milligazette.com/Archives/2004/01-15May04-Print-Edition/0105200471.htm, visited on
September 18, 2008.
A traditional Muslim historical account of the acts of Shariff Kabungsuwan is quoted by historian
Cesar Adib Majul in his book, Muslims in the Philippines (1973):
After a time it came to pass that Mamalu, who was the chief man next to Kabungsuwan,
journeyed to Cotabato. He found there that many of the people had ceased to regard the
teachings of the Koran and had fallen into evil ways. Mamamlu sent to Kabungsuwan word
of these things.

While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal
framework will not be effective until that framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion
of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central
Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions From The President dated March 1, 2001,
addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the
necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace
Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to
authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the
people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of
the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process.

Kabungsuwan with a portion of his warriors went from Malabang to Cotabato and found
that the word sent to him by Mamamlu was true. Then he assembled together all the
people. Those of them, who had done evilly and disregarded the teachings of the Koran
thenceforth, he drove out of the town into the hills, with their wives and children.
Those wicked one who were thus cast out were the beginnings of the tribes of the Tirurais
and Manobos, who live to the east of Cotabato in the country into which their evil
forefathers were driven. And even to this day they worship not God; neither do they obey
the teachings of the Koran . . . But the people of Kabungsuwan, who regarded the teachings
of the Koran and lived in fear of God, prospered and increased, and we Moros of today are
their descendants. (Citation omitted, emphasis supplied).

While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration binding on the
Philippines under international law, respondents' act of guaranteeing amendments is, by itself, already a
constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally defective.
WHEREFORE, respondents' motion to dismiss is DENIED. The main and intervening petitions are GIVEN
DUE COURSE and hereby GRANTED.

35

The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace
of 2001 is declared contrary to law and the Constitution.

36

Francisco L. Gonzales, Sultans of a Violent Land, in Rebels, Warlords and Ulama: A Reader on
Muslim Separatism and the War in Southern Philippines 99, 103 (1999).
The Charter of the Assembly of First Nations, the leading advocacy group for the indigenous
peoples of Canada, adopted in 1985, begins thus:

SO ORDERED.

"WE THE CHIEFS OF THE INDIAN FIRST NATIONS IN CANADA HAVING

DECLARED:
THAT our peoples are the original peoples of this land having been put here by the Creator;
x x x."

Footnotes
18

Namely, Seth Frederick Jaloslos, Fernando Cabigon, Jr., Uldarico Mejorada II, Edionar Zamoras,
Edgar Baguio, Cedric Adriatico, Felixberto Bolando, Joseph Brendo Ajero, Norbideiri Edding,
Anecito Darunday, Angelica Carreon, and Luzviminda Torrino.
25

R.A. No. 6734, as amended by R.A. 9054 entitled An Act to Strengthen and Expand the organic act
for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the purpose republic act no. 6734,
entitled an act of providing for the autonomous region in muslim mindanao, as amended.

114

In Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra note 109 at 541, it was held that:

In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which
can be applied. `Public concern' like `public interest' is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms
embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these
directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary
citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter
at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.

26

R.A. No. 8371, An act to recognize, protect and promote the rights of indigenous cultural
communities/indigenous peoples, creating a national commission on indigenous peoples, establishing
implementing mechanisms, appropriating funds therefor, and for other purposes, October 29, 1997.

123

Vide V Record, Constitutional Commission 26-28 (September 24, 1986) which is replete with such
descriptive phrase used by Commissioner Blas Ople.

20 | P a g e

129

V Record, Constitutional Commission 28-29 (September 24, 1986). The phrase "safeguards on
national interest" that may be provided by law was subsequently replaced by "reasonable conditions,"
as proposed by Commissioner Davide [vide V Record, Constitutional Commission 30 (September 24,
1986)].
130

In Chavez v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 164527, August 15, 2007, 530 SCRA 235, 331,
the Court stated:
x x x The duty to disclose covers only transactions involving public interest, while the duty
to allow access has a broader scope of information which embraces not only transactions
involving public interest, but any matter contained in official communications and public
documents of the government agency. (Underscoring supplied)
139

Cf. Garcia v. Board of Investments, G.R. No. 88637, September 7, 1989, 177 SCRA 374, 382-384
where it was held that the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987 mandates the holding of consultations
with affected communities, whenever necessary, on the acceptability of locating the registered
enterprise within the community.
140

In their Memorandum, respondents made allegations purporting to show that consultations were
conducted on August 30, 2001 in Marawi City and Iligan City, on September 20, 2001 in Midsayap,
Cotabato, and on January 18-19, 2002 in Metro Manila. (Memorandum of September 24, 2008, p. 13)

[G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004]

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, vs. The COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes are deserving of the
privilege. It is a precious heritage, as well as an inestimable acquisition, [1] that cannot be taken lightly by
anyone - either by those who enjoy it or by those who dispute it.
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single question of profound importance
to the nation. The issue of citizenship is brought up to challenge the qualifications of a presidential candidate to
hold the highest office of the land. Our people are waiting for the judgment of the Court with bated breath. Is
Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one of the main contenders for the presidency, a natural-born
Filipino or is he not?
The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and American colonial roots and reminds
us of the rich heritage of civil law and common law traditions, the fusion resulting in a hybrid of laws and
jurisprudence that could be no less than distinctly Filipino.
Antecedent Case Settings
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter
"FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of thePhilippines under the
Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of
candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of thePhilippines, stated his name to be
"Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon.
Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated,

on 09 January 2004, a petition docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to
disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a
material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in
truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his
father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner
asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ,
the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of
respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before
his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married
Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004, petitioner, in support of
his claim, presented several documentary exhibits - 1) a copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified
photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her having filed a case for
bigamy and concubinage against the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his bigamous
relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an English translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of the
certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification issued by the Director of the Records Management and
Archives Office, attesting to the fact that there was no record in the National Archives that a Lorenzo Poe or
Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the Philippines before 1907, and 6) a certification from the Officer-In-Charge of
the Archives Division of the National Archives to the effect that no available information could be found in the
files of the National Archives regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence, the more significant ones
being - a) a certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives Division of the National Archives that
there appeared to be no available information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San
Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National
Archives that no available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a
certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for
the Province of Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No.
23477 and No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy
of the purported marriage contract between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification issued by the
City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the said office during the
period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed during World War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit. Three days later, or
on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 06 February
2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, petitioner assailed the decision of the COMELEC before
this Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The
petition, docketed G. R. No. 161824, likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary
injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would include G. R. No. 161434, entitled
"Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley
Poe (a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.), and Victorino X. Fornier," and the other, docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled
"Zoilo Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both challenging the jurisdiction
of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the
Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.
Jurisdiction of the Court
In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the COMELEC deny due course to or
cancel FPJs certificate of candidacy for alleged misrepresentation of a material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a naturalborn citizen) before the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. --- A verified petition seeking to
deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that
any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false

21 | P a g e

in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In addition to the powers and functions
conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest
elections and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would authorize "any interested party" to file a
verified petition to deny or cancel the certificate of candidacy of any nuisance candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule
64[2] in an action for certiorari under Rule 65[3] of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of
the 1987 Constitution also reads
"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it within
sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for
decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum, required by the rules of the
Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any
decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that judicial power is vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law which power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824 was aptly elevated to, and could
well be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary view could be a gross denial to our people of their
fundamental right to be fully informed, and to make a proper choice, on who could or should be elected to occupy
the highest government post in the land.
In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions of
Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when
it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they
directly instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose."
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution to
designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential contests, has constrained this
Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas,[4] as not (being) justiciable controversies or disputes involving contests on
the elections, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse prompted
Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential
Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the VicePresident-Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793
designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be the members of the
tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of government under the 1973 Constitution
might have implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemed
revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election scenario. Election contests
consist of either an election protest or a quo warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one
objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12,

Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court en
banc on 18 April 1992, would support this premise Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the Philippines.
Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo
warranto against the President or Vice-President. An election protest shall not include a petition for quo
warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include an election protest.
Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines
who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the VicePresident, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner.
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President
or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who
usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office.[5]In such context, the election contest can
only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have received
either the second or third highest number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a
post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a
candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs. Commission on Elections et
al.," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a.Fernando Poe, Jr."
would have to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief historical background on the concept of
citizenship.
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322
B.C., described the "citizen" to refer to a man who shared in the administration of justice and in the holding of an
office.[6] Aristotle saw its significance if only to determine the constituency of the "State," which he described as
being composed of such persons who would be adequate in number to achieve a self-sufficient existence. [7] The
concept grew to include one who would both govern and be governed, for which qualifications like autonomy,
judgment and loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was seen to deal with rights and entitlements, on the one
hand, and with concomitant obligations, on the other. [8] In its ideal setting, a citizen was active in public life and
fundamentally willing to submit his private interests to the general interest of society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th century, the concept was
limited, by and large, to civil citizenship, which established the rights necessary for individual freedom, such as
rights to property, personal liberty and justice.[9] Its meaning expanded during the 19th century to include political
citizenship, which encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of political power. [10] The 20th century saw
the next stage of the development of social citizenship, which laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to
economic well-being and social security.[11] The idea of citizenship has gained expression in the modern welfare
state as it so developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage of development, in keeping with the
rapidly shrinking global village, might well be the internationalization of citizenship.[12]
The Local Setting - from Spanish
Times to the Present
There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime but "subjects of Spain" or
"Spanish subjects."[13] In church records, the natives were called 'indios', denoting a low regard for the inhabitants
of the archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship became highly codified during the 19th century but their sheer

22 | P a g e

number made it difficult to point to one comprehensive law. Not all of these citizenship laws of Spain however,
were made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly extended by Royal Decrees. [14]
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain on 16
July 1805 but as to whether the law was extended to the Philippines remained to be the subject of differing views
among experts;[15] however, three royal decrees were undisputably made applicable to Spaniards in the Philippines
- the Order de la Regencia of 14 August 1841,[16] the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 specifically defining the
political status of children born in the Philippine Islands, [17] and finally, the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July
1870, which was expressly made applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July 1870.[18]
The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine Islands because of the express
mandate of its Article 89, according to which the provisions of the Ultramar among which this country was
included, would be governed by special laws.[19]
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18 December 1889, which came
out with the first categorical enumeration of who were Spanish citizens. (a)

Persons born in Spanish territory,

(b)

Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of Spain,

(c)

Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,

(d)

Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of any town of the
Monarchy.[20]

The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the state of decline as a
superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony in the East to an upcoming world power, the United
States. An accepted principle of international law dictated that a change in sovereignty, while resulting in an
abrogation of all political laws then in force, would have no effect on civil laws, which would remain virtually
intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and the United States. [21] Under
Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories ceded to the
United States would be determined by its Congress "Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the present treaty
relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either
event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they
shall also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce, and professions, being subject in respect thereof to
such laws as are applicable to foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance
to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of the exchange of
ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which
declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which
they reside.
Thus
"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States
shall be determined by the Congress."[22]
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States Congress on the subject, the
native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects. Although they did not become American
citizens, they, however, also ceased to be "aliens" under American laws and were thus issued passports describing
them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the United States.

The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also
commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the Congress
of the United States on the Philippines ".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish subjects on the
11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be
deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United
States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen
hundred and ninety eight."[23]
Under the organic act, a citizen of the Philippines was one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a
Spanish subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The term inhabitant was taken to include 1) a native-born
inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish
papers on or before 11 April 1899.[24]
Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902,
during which period no citizenship law was extant in the Philippines. Weight was given to the view, articulated in
jurisprudential writing at the time, that the common law principle of jus soli, otherwise also known as the
principle of territoriality, operative in the United States and England, governed those born in the Philippine
Archipelago within that period.[25] More about this later.
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following amendment to the Philippine Bill
of 1902 "Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the
natives of other insular possession of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands
who would become citizens of the United States, under the laws of the United States, if residing therein." [26]
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine citizens" had for the first time
crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used by William H. Taft, the first Civil Governor General in the
Philippines when he initially made mention of it in his slogan, "The Philippines for the Filipinos." In 1916, the
Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law restated virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill of
1902, as so amended by the Act of Congress in 1912 That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April,
eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequently
thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between
the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except such
others as have since become citizens of some other country; Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein
provided for, is hereby authorized to provide for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the
Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the
United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or
who could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States, if residing therein."
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of the
Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on
said date, and, 3) since that date, not a citizen of some other country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was a mode of acquiring
citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any such link with common law, by adopting, once and for
all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as being the basis of Filipino citizenship Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the Philippines -

23 | P a g e

(1)

Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution

(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had
been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.

(4)

Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

The Case Of FPJ

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine
citizenship.
(5)

Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing civil law provisions at the
time, which provided that women would automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their
foreign husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations that effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting
their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children and required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still
elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to correct this anomaly, as well as fully
cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino women as equals to men, the framers of the 1973 Constitution
crafted the provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such concerns Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1)

Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.

(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred
and thirty-five.
(4)

Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that

"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or
omission she is deemed, under the law to have renounced her citizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, except for subsection (3)
thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935
Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1)

Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

(2)

Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and

"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter,
able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at
least ten years immediately preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." [27]
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935
Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res
judicata and jus sanguinis[28] had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a
person to being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs[29] (1912),
did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary
of Labor[30] (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by
birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest established direct
ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F.
Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been presented in evidence, his death certificate, however,
identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of his death on
11 September 1954. The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he was born on 17
May 1915 to an Espaol father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Espaol mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by
petitioner was an uncertified copy of a supposed certificate of the alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita
Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their
marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years old,
unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American
citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a
Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old and married.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth
certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with
some degree of certainty from the documents would be that 1.

The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;

2.

FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;

3.

Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940;

4.

The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and

5.

At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.

Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that FPJ is a natural-born Filipino
citizen? The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death
certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The documents have
been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC.

24 | P a g e

The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner and Exhibit "3" for respondent. The
marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley was submitted as Exhibit "21" for respondent. The death
certificate of Lorenzo Pou was submitted by respondent as his Exhibit "5." While the last two documents were
submitted in evidence for respondent, the admissibility thereof, particularly in reference to the facts which they
purported to show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the date of marriage of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley
and the death certificate relative to the death of Lorenzo Pou on 11 September 1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan,
were all admitted by petitioner, who had utilized those material statements in his argument. All three documents
were certified true copies of the originals.

In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the
infant or only by the mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in
the document the name of the father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information by
which such father could be identified.
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary acknowledgment of filiation or
paternity, the certificate was required to be signed or sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement
rendered the same useless as being an authoritative document of recognition. [33] In Mendoza vs. Mella,[34] the
Court ruled -

Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document,
no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
x x x
(d)

xxx

xxx

When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is recorded in a public office.

Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie
Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the
Rules of Court provides:
Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of
the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of
the facts therein stated.
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made therein could be grounded
on 1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of the statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to
a breach of that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4) the publicity of
record which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as might have occurred. [31]
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 September 1954, at the age of 84
years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year 1870
when the Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the
Philippines during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 considering that there was no existing record about
such fact in the Records Management and Archives Office. Petitioner, however, likewise failed to show that
Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the same period. In his death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou
was stated to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to
conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at the time of his death was also his
residence before death. It would be extremely doubtful if the Records Management and Archives Office would
have had complete records of all residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.
Proof of Paternity and Filiation Under Civil Law.
Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or civil status of the child to the
father [or mother]) or paternity (relationship or civil status of the father to the child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ
evidently being an illegitimate son according to petitioner, the mandatory rules under civil law must be used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08 December 1889 up until the
day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required to
establish filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or
compulsory acknowledgment was possible only if done during the lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary
acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public document. [32] Complementary to the
new code was Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5 thereof, that -

"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the question here really is whether or not his
birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which is merely a certified copy of the registry record, may be relied upon as
sufficient proof of his having been voluntarily recognized. No such reliance, in our judgment, may be placed
upon it. While it contains the names of both parents, there is no showing that they signed the original, let alone
swore to its contents as required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all that might have happened, it was not even
they or either of them who furnished the data to be entered in the civil register. Petitioners say that in any event
the birth certificate is in the nature of a public document wherein voluntary recognition of a natural child may
also be made, according to the same Article 131. True enough, but in such a case, there must be a clear statement
in the document that the parent recognizes the child as his or her own."
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere in the document was the
signature of Allan F. Poe found. There being no will apparently executed, or at least shown to have been
executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other proof of voluntary recognition remained to be "some other
public document." In Pareja vs. Pareja,[35] this Court defined what could constitute such a document as proof of
voluntary acknowledgment:
"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents, those executed by private individuals
which must be authenticated by notaries, and those issued by competent public officials by reason of their
office. The public document pointed out in Article 131 as one of the means by which recognition may be made
belongs to the first class."
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children into
voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be expressedly made in a record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment took place in favor
of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child who was recognized or judicially declared as
natural. Compulsory acknowledgment could be demanded generally in cases when the child had in his favor any
evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of the
child, and might pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to claim acknowledgment, however, could
only be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument, "authentic writing," so as to be an
authentic writing for purposes of voluntary recognition, simply as being a genuine or indubitable writing of the
father. The term would include a public instrument (one duly acknowledged before a notary public or other
competent official) or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173, and Article 175 provide:
Art. 172.
(1)

The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned.

25 | P a g e

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1)

The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2)

Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Art. 173.
The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be
transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall
have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of the
parties.
x x x

xxx

x x x.

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same,
evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on
the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent.
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the code reads:
"Art. 256.
This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,[36] the Court has ruled:
"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child should be decided under Article 278 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2260 of that Code provides that 'the voluntary recognition of a natural
child shall take place according to this Code, even if the child was born before the effectivity of this body of laws'
or before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278 may be given retroactive effect."
It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate
children is an attempt to break away from the traditional idea of keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate
relationships within the family in favor of the greater interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are
intended to merely govern the private and personal affairs of the family. There is little, if any, to indicate that the
legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would also affect his political rights or, in general, his
relationship to the State. While, indeed, provisions on "citizenship" could be found in the Civil Code, such
provisions must be taken in the context of private relations, the domain of civil law; particularly "Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the organization of the family and the
regulation of property. It has thus [been] defined as the mass of precepts which determine and regulate the
relations of assistance, authority and obedience among members of a family, and those which exist among
members of a society for the protection of private interests."[37]
[38]

In Yaez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,

the Court has held:

"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws relating to family rights and duties, or to
the status, condition and legal capacity of persons, govern Spaniards although they reside in a foreign country;
that, in consequence, 'all questions of a civil nature, such as those dealing with the validity or nullity of the

matrimonial bond, the domicile of the husband and wife, their support, as between them, the separation of their
properties, the rules governing property, marital authority, division of conjugal property, the classification of their
property, legal causes for divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority to decree it, and, in general, the civil
effects of marriage and divorce upon the persons and properties of the spouses, are questions that are governed
exclusively by the national law of the husband and wife."
The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, stating that "Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad" that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the Constitutional provisions on
citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in civil relationships found in different parts of the Civil Code,
[39]
such as on successional rights and family relations. [40] In adoption, for instance, an adopted child would be
considered the child of his adoptive parents and accorded the same rights as their legitimate child but such legal
fiction extended only to define his rights under civil law[41] and not his political status.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This discriminatory attitude may be
traced to the Spanish family and property laws, which, while defining proprietary and successional rights of
members of the family, provided distinctions in the rights of legitimate and illegitimate children. In the
monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution and inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly according to
bloodlines and the concern to keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the Spanish Civil Code, and the
invidious discrimination survived when the Spanish Civil Code became the primary source of our own Civil
Code. Such distinction, however, remains and should remain only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly
impede or impinge on the domain of political law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status should thus be deemed
independent from and not inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Code or
Family Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity, although good law, do not have preclusive effects on
matters alien to personal and family relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could well and should govern. For
instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being applicable by the Civil Code or
Family Code provisions.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect
to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it
occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than
such act or declaration. The word `pedigree includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the
dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of
family history intimately connected with pedigree.
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead or unable to testify,
(b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is
in question, (d) declaration must be made before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationship between
the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe
submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing
his own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together with Bessie Kelley and his children (including
respondent FPJ) in one house, and as one family "I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in Stockton, California, U.S.A., after
being sworn in accordance with law do hereby declare that:

26 | P a g e

1.

I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.

2.

Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.

3.

Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe, more popularly known
in the Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr., or `FPJ.

4.

Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's Hospital, Magdalena
Street, Manila.
x x x

xxx

parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to
challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of
DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid
of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress."

xxx

7.

Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while they were students at
the University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also introduced to Fernando Poe, Sr., by
my sister that same year.

8.

Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.

9.

Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children, Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and
Fernando II, and myself lived together with our mother at our family's house on Dakota St.
(now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation of Manila in 1945, except for some
months between 1943-1944.

10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more children after
Ronald Allan Poe.
x x x

xxx

xxx

18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald Allan Poe is a
natural born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of Fernando Poe, Sr.
Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.
Ruby Kelley Mangahas
Declarant

DNA Testing

In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to
obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any
physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or
paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals,[42] this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing "Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways
available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage
testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis
Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The
analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the
other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed to establish

Petitioners Argument For Jurisprudential Conclusiveness

Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his
citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child. According to petitioner, prior to his marriage
to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez, making his
subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The veracity of the
supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be most doubtful at best. But the
documentary evidence introduced by no less than respondent himself, consisting of a birth certificate of
respondent and a marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino
father and an American mother who were married to each other a year later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to
unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate child. Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so
followed the citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, basing his stand on the ruling of this
Court in Morano vs. Vivo,[43] citing Chiongbian vs. de Leon[44] and Serra vs. Republic.[45]
On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is most convincing; he
states "We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of them. If the pronouncement of the Court
on jus sanguinis was on the lis mota, the pronouncement would be a decision constituting doctrine under the rule
ofstare decisis. But if the pronouncement was irrelevant to the lis mota, the pronouncement would not be a
decision but a mere obiter dictum which did not establish doctrine. I therefore invite the Court to look closely
into these cases.
First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a Filipino father. It was about a stepson
of a Filipino, a stepson who was the child of a Chinese mother and a Chinese father. The issue was whether the
stepson followed the naturalization of the stepfather. Nothing about jus sanguinis there. The stepson did not
have the blood of the naturalized stepfather.
Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. It was about a
legitimate son of a father who had become Filipino by election to public office before the 1935 Constitution
pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935 Constitution. No one was illegitimate here.
Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. Serra was an
illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. The issue was whether one who was already a
Filipino because of his mother who still needed to be naturalized. There is nothing there about invidious jus
sanguinis.
Finally, Paa vs. Chan.[46] This is a more complicated case. The case was about the citizenship of Quintin Chan
who was the son of Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan claimed that his father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a
Chinese father and a Filipino mother. Quintin therefore argued that he got his citizenship from Leoncio, his
father. But the Supreme Court said that there was no valid proof that Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina
mother. The Court therefore concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino. If Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was
his son Quintin. Quintin therefore was not only not a natural-born Filipino but was not even a Filipino.
The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter dictum. The Court said obiter that
even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were Filipino, Quintin would not be Filipino because Quintin was
illegitimate. This statement about Quintin, based on a contrary to fact assumption, was absolutely unnecessary
for the case. x x x It was obiter dictum, pure and simple, simply repeating the obiter dictum in Morano vs. Vivo.
x x x

xxx

xxx

27 | P a g e

"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual foundation in the Constitution, it would
also violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution not once but twice. First, it would make an
illegitimate distinction between a legitimate child and an illegitimate child, and second, it would make an
illegitimate distinction between the illegitimate child of a Filipino father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino
mother.
The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established long ago by People vs. Cayat. [47] I would
grant that the distinction between legitimate children and illegitimate children rests on real differences. x x x But
real differences alone do not justify invidious distinction. Real differences may justify distinction for one purpose
but not for another purpose.
x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public service? What possible state interest
can there be for disqualifying an illegitimate child from becoming a public officer. It was not the fault of the
child that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child of the fullness of political rights for no fault of his
own? To disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an important public office is to punish him for the
indiscretion of his parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there is neither justice nor
rationality in the distinction, then the distinction transgresses the equal protection clause and must be reprobated.
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member of this Court), Professor Ruben
Balane and Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom, have expressed similar views. The thesis of petitioner,
unfortunately hinging solely on pure obiter dicta, should indeed fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did so for
the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with
the assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise parental authority and had the duty to support her
illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant consideration is that the 1935 Constitution, the
fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit
than it is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the Constitution states that among the citizens of the
Philippines are those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. There utterly is no cogent justification to
prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none provided.

been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the en
masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if
acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during
which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino
citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
(4)
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold
that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in
violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to
substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their
position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled
in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,[48] must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS
1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr.,
Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino
X. Fornier, Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez, Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for want of jurisdiction.
2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and
Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the
part of respondent Commission on Elections in dismissing the petition in SPA No. 04-003.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED.

BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999

RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR,
vs.
VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.
RESOLUTION

In Sum
KAPUNAN, J.:
(1)
The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses jurisdiction over the petition
in G. R. No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R.
No. 161824 assails the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, for lack
of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has prayed for the disqualification of respondent FPJ from running
for the position of President in the 10 th May 2004 national elections on the contention that FPJ has committed
material representation in his certificate of candidacy by representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines.

Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father validly elect
Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of majority? This is the question sought to
be resolved in the present case involving the application for admission to the Philippine Bar of Vicente D. Ching.
The facts of this case are as follows:

(2)
The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the petitions in G. R. No.
161434 and No. 161634 both having been directly elevated to this Court in the latters capacity as the only
tribunal to resolve a presidential and vice-presidential election contest under the Constitution. Evidently, the
primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly be invoked only after, not before, the elections are held.

Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a
Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the
Philippines.

(3)
In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by
the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen,
which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a
Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from
taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo
Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have
been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos,
Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well

On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis University in Baguio
City, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of this Court, dated 1 September
1998, he was allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that he must submit to the Court
proof of his Philippine citizenship.
In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November 1998, the following documents:

28 | P a g e

1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of Accountancy of the Professional
Regulations Commission showing that Ching is a certified public accountant;

5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan
from 1992 to 1995;

2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, Election Officer
of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao La Union showing that Ching is a
registered voter of the said place; and

6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance with Commonwealth Act
No. 625;

3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, showing that
Ching was elected as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union during the
12 May 1992 synchronized elections.
On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching was one of the successful Bar
examinees. The oath-taking of the successful Bar examinees was scheduled on 5 May 1999. However, because of
the questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take his oath. Pursuant to the resolution of
this Court, dated 20 April 1999, he was required to submit further proof of his citizenship. In the same resolution,
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the
bar and on the documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship.
The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a Chinese father and
a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon
reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship" 1 in strict compliance with the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act Providing for the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine
Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen." The OSG adds that "(w)hat he
acquired at best was only an inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by election upon reaching the
age of majority." 2 In this regard, the OSG clarifies that "two (2) conditions must concur in order that the election
of Philippine citizenship may be effective, namely: (a) the mother of the person making the election must be a
citizen of the Philippines; and (b) said election must be made upon reaching the age of majority." 3 The OSG then
explains the meaning of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority:"
The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed to mean a reasonable
time after reaching the age of majority which had been interpreted by the Secretary of
Justice to be three (3) years (VELAYO, supra at p. 51 citing Op., Sec. of Justice No. 70, s.
1940, Feb. 27, 1940). Said period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when a
(sic) person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino (ibid., citing Op. Nos. 355
and 422, s. 1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s. 1953). But in Cuenco, it was held that an election
done after over seven (7) years was not made within a reasonable time.
In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does,
it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar
circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on the
construction of the phrase "reasonable period" and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.
On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of Election of Philippine
Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999. In his Manifestation, Ching states:
1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;
2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared myself as one in my school
records and other official documents;
3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant) reserved for Filipino citizens;

7. My election was expressed in a statement signed and sworn to by me before a notary

public;
8. I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of the Philippines;
9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of allegiance to (sic) the Civil
Registrar of Tubao La Union, and
10. I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps. 10.00) as filing fees.
Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the question raised is whether he has
elected Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable time." In the affirmative, whether his citizenship by election
retroacted to the time he took the bar examination.
When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of
the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed
the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine
citizenship. 4 This right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided
that "(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred
and thirty-five" are citizens of the Philippines. 5Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried
over to the 1987 Constitution which states that "(t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine citizens. 6 It should be noted,
however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should not be
understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the
1935 Constitution. 7 If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains
subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before the
effectivity of the new Constitution. 8
C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the
procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1
thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention
"in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer
oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement
with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."
However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the election of
Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made "upon
reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. 9 In the
opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this
dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the
pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States Government to the effect that the election should
be made within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of majority. 10 The phrase "reasonable time" has been
interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of
majority. 11 However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, 12 that the three (3) year period is not an
inflexible rule. We said:

4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was eligible to vote;

29 | P a g e

It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period after reaching the
age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3) years is the
reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted
to above, which period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when the person
concerned has always considered himself a Filipino. 13

In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the
exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court,
we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age
constitutes a positive act of Philippine citizenship. (p. 52: emphasis
supplied)

However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine citizenship is not indefinite:
Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He became of age
on February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was made on May 15, 1951, when he was
over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7) years after he had reached the age of
majority. It is clear that said election has not been made "upon reaching the age of
majority." 14
In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years old when he
complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years after he had
reached the age of majority. Based on the interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's
election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the
privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his
continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registered voter
and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down
the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.
Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what Ching erroneously labels as informal
election of citizenship. Ching cannot find a refuge in the case of In re: Florencio Mallare, 15the pertinent portion
of which reads:
And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic) legally married to an alien,
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship. It has been established that Esteban Mallare was a
registered voter as of April 14, 1928, and that as early as 1925 (when he was about 22 years
old), Esteban was already participating in the elections and campaigning for certain
candidate[s]. These acts are sufficient to show his preference for Philippine citizenship. 16
Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances obtaining therein are very different from
those in the present case, thus, negating its applicability. First, Esteban Mallare was born before the effectivity of
the 1935 Constitution and the enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the requirements and procedures prescribed
under the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for electing Philippine citizenship would not be applicable to him.
Second, the ruling in Mallare was an obiter since, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not necessary for
Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine citizenship because he was already a Filipino, he being a natural child of a
Filipino mother. In this regard, the Court stated:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino,
and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges attached
to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of
the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543, Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952, Sy
Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28,
1954). Neither could any act be taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-filipino
divest him of the citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully entitled. 17
The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives, 18 where we held:
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal process.

The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the
Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be excepted to have
elected Philippine citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare
rule.
xxx xxx xxx
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still
have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there
are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only
to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during
election time, running for public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are
themselves formal manifestations for these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or
his status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this
case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent
would not only have been superfluous but it would also have resulted in an absurdity. How
can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship? 19
The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However, even if we consider the special
circumstances in the life of Ching like his having lived in the Philippines all his life and his consistent belief that
he is a Filipino, controlling statutes and jurisprudence constrain us to disagree with the recommendation of the
OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen (14)
years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect
Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching the
age of majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship.
The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All
that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the
same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be
simply glossed over.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed
when convenient. 20 One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such
citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case,
Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result. this golden privilege slipped away
from his grasp.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application for admission to
the Philippine Bar.

30 | P a g e

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed of a foreign country: Provided, That the
rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country, and the
taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a
Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the following circumstances is present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with said foreign country; or

Footnote:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution;

(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering said service, or acceptance of said
commission, and taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so only in connection with his
service to said foreign country; And provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is
commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign country under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a)
or (b), shall not be Republic of the Philippines during the period of his service to, or commission in, the armed forces
of said country. Upon his discharge from the service of the said foreign country, he shall be automatically entitled to
the full enjoyment of his civil and politically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil political rights as a Filipino
citizen x x x.

(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office;

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen on
June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines;

On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. 3 He
ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a
convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.1wphi1.nt

4 Sec. 1, Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution reads:

Sec. 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines, and, upon
reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship;
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a
natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution. 4
On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision 5 dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected
Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated April 27, 2000.6

G.R. No. 142840

May 7, 2001
Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision on the following grounds:

ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner,

vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.

1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it
ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being such
in view of the loss and renunciation of such citizenship on his part.

CONCURRING OPINION
DISSENTING OPINION
KAPUNAN, J.:
The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person
shall be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen."1
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of
Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. 2
On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the
Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for
under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to
or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Said provision of law reads:
SECTION 1. How citizenship may be lost. A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways
and/or events:

2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it
considered private respondent as a citizen of the Philippines despite the fact he did not validly acquire his Philippine
citizenship.
3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was invalid, the HRET committed serious
errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it dismissed the petition despite the
fact that such reacquisition could not legally and constitutionally restore his natural-born status. 7
The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino since he lost h is Philippine
citizenship when he swore allegiance to the United States in 1995, and had to reacquire the same by repatriation. He insists that
Article citizens are those who are from birth with out having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.
Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as natural-born citizen when he was repatriated since the
phrase "from birth" in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.
The petition is without merit.

31 | P a g e

The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follow:

In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States.
However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, which provides:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in,
the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired
United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the
Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mother, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority, and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.8
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship
correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth
is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.9

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of
Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original
status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. 27 It bears stressing that the act of
repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to perform an act to regain his
citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its decision, the term "natural-born citizen" was first defined in
Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows:

As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship."10
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under
Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law
(Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the
qualifications12 and none of the disqualification13 provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine
citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the
intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3)
has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the
interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies. 14
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth
Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by
naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.15
Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine
citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode
for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63. 16 Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who
wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications 17 and none of the disqualification mentioned in
Section 4 of C.A. 473.18
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the
armed forces;19 services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; 20 (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United
States at any other time, 21 (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien;22 and (5) political economic necessity.23
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned
resides or last resided.
In Angat v. Republic,24 we held:
xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the person desiring to reacquire
Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his
residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines. [Italics in the original. 25
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. 26 This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a naturalborn citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act
to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must be a Filipino citizen birth and (2) he does not
have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which were not considered natural-born: (1)
those who were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973, 38 of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of
majority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not considered natural-born obviously because they
were not Filipino at birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before the
effectively of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born because they also had to perform an act to perfect
their Philippines citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now consider those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution
and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age as natural-born. After defining who re natural-born
citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3),
Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born
citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of
citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a
naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is
natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing
Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be naturalborn or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the
reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceeding in order to reacquire
his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as
member of the House of Representatives.
A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the members of the House. 29 The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check "whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter. 30 In the absence
thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power and annul the decision of the HRET nor to substitute the
Court's judgement for that of the latter for the simple reason that it is not the office of a petition for certiorari to inquire into the
correctness of the assailed decision.31 There is no such showing of grave abuse of discretion in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Footnote
1

1987 Constitution, Article IV, Section 6.

32 | P a g e

Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution states:

(a) He must not be opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of
persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments;

The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(b) He must not be defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or
assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas;

1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;

(c) He must not be polygamist or believer in the practice of polygamy;

2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution
had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands;

(d) He must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude;
3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines;
(e) He must not be suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elected
Philippine citizenship; and

(f) He must have, during the period of his residence in the Philippines (of not less than six months
before filing his application), mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere
desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideal s of the Filipinos;

5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

(g) He must not be a citizen or subject of a nation with whom the Philippines is at war, during the period
of such war;

An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering
Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States (1960).
4

(h) He must not be citizen or subject of foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to
become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.

Said provision reads:

No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write,
and except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected,
and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the
election.

15

Section 2, C.A. No. 63.

16

An Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936).

17
11

During the period under Martial Law declared by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, thousands of aliens were
naturalized by Presidential Decree where the screening of the applicants was undertaken by special committee under
Letter of Instructions No. 270, dated April 11,1975, as amended.
12

1. The applicant must have lost his original Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country or by
express renunciation of his citizenship (Sec. 1 [1] and [2], C.A. No. 63);
2. He must be at least twenty-one years of age and shall have resided in the Philippines at least six months before he
applies for naturalization (Sec. 3[1], C.A. No. 63);

Section 2, Act 473 provides the following qualifications:

(a) He must be not less than 21 years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition;

3. He must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence
(of at least six months prior to the filing of the application) in the Philippines, in his relations with the constituted
government as well as with the community in which he is living (Sec. 3[2], C.A. No. 63);

(b) He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than ten years;
(c) He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution, and must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire
period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government and well as
with the community in which he is living;
(d) He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine
currency, or must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation;
(e) He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any of the principal languages; and
(f) He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public schools or private
schools recognized by the Bureau of Private Schools of the Philippines where Philippine history,
government and civic are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the entire period
of the residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the learning of his petition for naturalization
as Philippine citizen.
13

Section 4, Act 473, provides the following disqualifications:

4. He subscribes to an oath declaring his intention to renounce absolutely and perpetually al faith and allegiance to
the foreign authority, state or sovereignty of which he was a citizen or subject (Sec. 3[3], C.A. No. 63).
29

Article IV, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides thus:

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representative shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members three of whom shall be Justices
of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of
the Senate of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under
the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.
CONCURRING OPINION

EN BANC
G.R. No. 142840
May 7, 2001
ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.

33 | P a g e

CONCURRING OPINION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
I concur in the ponencia of Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, holding that the House Electoral Tribunal did not gravely abuse its
discretion in ruling that Private Respondent Teodoro C. Cruz remains a natural-born Filipino citizen and is eligible to continue
being a member of Congress. Let me just add a few points.
The Facts in Brief
It is undisputed that Congressman Cruz was born on April 27, 1960 in San Clemente, Tarlac, to Filipino parents. He was,
therefore, a Filipino citizen, pursuant to Section 1 (2), 1 Article IV of the Constitution. Furthermore, not having done any act to
acquire or perfect the Philippine citizenship he obtained from birth, he was a natural-born Filipino citizen, in accordance
with Section 22 of the same Article IV.
It is not disputed either that private respondent rendered military service to the United States Marine Corps from November 1958
to October 1993. On June 5, 1990, he was naturalized as an American citizen, in connection with his US military service.
Consequently, under Section 1 (4)3 of CA No. 63, he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Upon his discharge from the US Marine Corps, private respondent returned to the Philippines and decided to regain his Filipino
citizenship. Thus, on March 17, 1994, availing himself of the benefits of Republic Act (RA) No. 2630, entitled "An Act Providing
for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such by Rendering Service to, or Accepting Commission in, the
Armed Force of the United States,"4 Cruz took his oath of allegiance to the Republic and registered the same with the Local Civil
Registry of Mangatarem, Pangasinan. On the same day, he also executed an Affidavit of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship.

Naturalized citizens are former aliens or foreigners who had to undergo a rigid procedure, in which they had to adduce sufficient
evidence to prove that they possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law in order to become
Filipino citizens. In contrast, as stated in the early case Roa v. Collector of Customs, 12 a natural-born citizen is a citizen "who has
become such at the moment of his birth."
The assailed HRET Decision, penned by Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, explains clearly who are considered natural-born
Filipino citizens. He traces the concept as first defined in Article III of the 1973 Constitution, which simply provided as follows:
"Sec 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act
to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship."
Under the above definition, there are two requisites in order that a Filipino citizen may be considered "natural-born": (1) one must
be a citizen of the Philippines from birth, and (2) one does not have to do anything to acquire or perfect one's Philippine
citizenship.13 Thus, under the 1973 Constitution, excluded from the class of "natural-born citizens" were (1) those who were
naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected
Philippine citizenship.14
The present Constitution, however, has expanded the scope of natural-born citizens to include "[t]hose who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof," meaning those covered under class (2) above. Consequently, only
naturalized Filipino citizens are not considered natural-born citizens. Premising therefrom, respondent being clearly and
concededly not naturalized is, therefore, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. 15
With respect to repatriates, since the Constitution does not classify them separately, they naturally reacquire
theiroriginal classification before the loss of their Philippine citizenship. In the case of Congressman Teodoro C. Cruz, upon his
repatriation in1994, he reacquired his lost citizenship. In other words, he regained his original status as a natural-born Filipino
citizen, nothing less.

Main Issue
3. No Grave Abuse of Discretion on the Part of HRET
The main question here is: Did the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) commit grave abuse of discretion in
holding that, by reason of his repatriation, Congressman Teodoro C. Cruz had reverted to his original status as a natural-born
citizen? I respectfully submit that the answer is "No." In fact, I believe that the HRET was correct in its ruling.
1. Repatriation Is Recovery of Original Citizenship
First, repatriation is simply the recovery of original citizenship. Under Section 1 of RA 2630, a person "who ha[s] lost his
citizenship" may "reacquire" it by " taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines." Former Senate President
Jovito R. Salonga, a noted authority on the subject, explains this method more precisely in his treatise, Private International
Law.5 He defines repatriation as "the recovery of the original nationality upon fulfillment of certain condition."6 Webster
buttresses this definition by describing the ordinary or common usage ofrepatriate, as "to restore or return to one's country of
origin, allegiance, or citizenship; x x x."7 In relation to our subject matter, repatriation, then, means restoration of citizenship. It
is not a grant of a new citizenship, but a recovery of one's former or original citizenship.
To "reacquire" simply means "to get back as one's own again." 8 Ergo, since Cruz, prior to his becoming a US citizen, was a
natural-born Filipino citizen, he "reacquired" the same status upon repatriation. To rule otherwise that Cruz became a nonnatural-born citizen would not be consistent whit the legal and ordinary meaning of repatriation. It would be akin to
naturalization, which is the acquisition of a new citizenship. "New." Because it is not the same as the with which he has
previously been endowed.
In any case, "the leaning, in questions of citizenship, should always be in favor of [its] claimant x x x." 9 Accordingly, the same
should be construed in favor of private respondent, who claims to be a natural-born citizen.

Third, the HRET did not abuse, much less gravely abuse, its discretion in holding that Respondent Cruz is a natural-born Filipino
citizen who is qualified to be a member of Congress. I stress that the Court, in this certiorari proceeding before us, is limited to
determining whether the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its
assailed Decision. The Court has no power to reverse or modify HRET's rulings, simply because it differs in its perception of
controversies. It cannot substitute its discretion for that of HRET, an independent, constitutional body with its own specific
mandate.
The Constitution explicitly states that the respective Electoral Tribunals of the chambers of Congress "shall be the sole judges of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications their respective members."16 In several cases,17 this Court has held
that the power and the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals are original and exclusive, as if they remained in the legislature, a
coequal branch of government. Their judgment are beyond judicial interference, unless rendered without or in excess of their
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.18In the elegant words of Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez Jr.:19
"The Court does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors of independent branches of
the Government. It comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so
grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution calls for remedial action."
True, there is no settled judicial doctrine on the exact effect of repatriation. But, as earlier explained, the legal and common
definition of repatriation is the reacquisition of the former citizenship. How then can the HRET be rebuked with grave abuse of
discretion? At best, I can concede that the legal definition is not judicially settled or is even doubtful. But an interpretation made
in good faith and grounded o reason one way or the other cannot be the source of grave abuse amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. The HRET did not violate the Constitution or the law or any settled judicial doctrine. It was definitely acting within
its exclusive domain.

2. Not Being Naturalized, Respondent Is Natural Born

Second, under the present Constitution, private respondent should be deemed natural-born, because was not naturalized. Let me
explain.There are generally two classes of citizens: (1) natural-born citizens and (2) naturalized citizens. 10 While CA 63 provides
that citizenship may also be acquired by direct act of the Legislature, I believe that those who do become citizens through such
procedure would properly fall under the second category (naturalized).11

Be it remembered that our Constitution vests upon the HRET the power to be the sole judge of the qualifications of members of
the House of Representatives, one of which is citizenship. Absent any clear showing of a manifest violation of the Constitution or
the law or nay judicial decision, this Court cannot impute grave abuse of discretion to the HRET in the latter's actions on matters
over which full discretionary authority is lodged upon it by our fundamental law.20 Even assuming that we disagree with the
conclusion of public respondent, we cannot ipsofacto attribute to it "grave abuse of discretion." Verily, there is a line between
perceived error and grave abuse.21

34 | P a g e

By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. "It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law." 22
That the HRET, after careful deliberation and purposeful study, voted 7 to 2 to issue its Decision upholding the qualifications of
Congressman Cruz could not in any wise be condemned as gravely abusive. Neither can I find any "patent or gross" arbitrariness
or despotism "by reason of passion or hostility" in such exercise.

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

xxx

xxx

x x x"

"Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens from birth without having to perform any act to acquire
or perfect their Philippine citizenship. x x x."
3

4. In Case of Doubt, Popular Will Prevails

Fourth, the court has a solemn duty to uphold the clear and unmistakable mandate of the people. It cannot supplant the sovereign
will of the Second District of Pangasinan with fractured legalism. The people of the District have clearly spoken. They
overwhelmingly and unequivocally voted for private respondent to represent them in the House of Representatives. The votes that
Cruz garnered (80, 119) in the last elections were much more than those of all his opponents combined (66, 182). 23 In such
instances, all possible doubts should be resolved in favor of the winning candidate's eligibility; to rule otherwise would be to
defeat the will of the people.24
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that in case of doubt, political laws must be so constructed as to give life and
spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. 25 Public interest and the sovereign will should, at all times, be
the paramount considerations in election controversies. 26 For it would be better to err in favor of the people's choice than to be
right in complex but little understood legalisms.27
"Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of
our democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost
effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to
cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate's
qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrative that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal
principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create
greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and
promote."28
5. Current Trend Towards Globalization
Fifth, the current trend, economically as well as politically, is towards globalization. 29 Protectionist barriers dismantled. Whereas,
in the past, governments frowned upon the opening of their doors to aliens who wanted to enjoy the same privileges as their
citizens, the current era is adopting a more liberal perspective. No longer are applicants for citizenship eyed with the suspicion
that they merely want to exploit local resources for themselves. They are now being considered potential sources of
developmental skills, know-how and capital.1wphi1.nt
More so should our government open its doors to former Filipinos, like Congressman Cruz, who want to rejoin the Filipino
community as citizens again. They are not "aliens" in the true sense of the law. They are actually Filipino by blood, by origin and
by culture, who want to reacquire their former citizenship.
It cannot be denied that most Filipinos go abroad and apply for naturalization in foreign countries, because of the great economic
or social opportunities there. Hence, we should welcome former Filipino citizens desirous of not simply returning to the country
or regaining Philippine citizenship, but of serving the Filipino people as well. One of these admirable Filipino is private
respondent who, in only a year after being absent from the Philippines for about eight (8) years, was already voted municipal
mayor of Mangatarem, Pangasinan. And after serving as such for just one term, he was overwhelmingly chosen by the people to
be their representative in Congress.
I reiterate, the people have spoken. Let not a restrictive and parochial interpretation of the law bar the sovereign will. Let not
grave abuse be imputed on the legitimate exercise of HRET's prerogatives.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
Footnote
1

"Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

"Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways
and/or events:
xxx

xxx

x x x"

(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country: x x x ."
4

Sec. 1 thereof provides:

"Sec. 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the
United States, acquired U.S. citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with the Local Civil Registry in
the place where he resides of last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship.

DISSENTING OPINION
EN BANC
G.R. No. 142840
May 7, 2001
ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.
DISSENTING OPINION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
With due respect, I disagree with the ponencia of Justice Santiago M. Kapunan. I am convinced that private respondent Teodoro
C. Cruz is not natural born citizen and, therefore, must be disqualified as a member of Congress.
Who are natural-born citizens?
The laws on citizenship its acquisition or loss, and the rights, privileges and immunities of citizens have given rise to some of
the most disputations and visceral issues resolved by this Court. The problem is taken up connection with the sovereign right of
voters to choose their representatives in Congress.
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Antonio Bengson III asks this Court of Representative of the Second District of
Pangasinan because he does not posses the constitutional requirement of being a natural-born citizen of this country. Respondent,
on the other hand, insists that he is qualified to be elected to Congress considering that by repatriation, he re-acquired his status as
a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Records show that Teodoro Cruz was born in the Philippines on April 27, 1960 to Filipino parents, spouses Lamberto and
Carmelita Cruz. On November 5, 1985, he enlisted in the United States Armed Forces and served the United States Marine Corps.
While in the service for almost five years, he applied for naturalization with the US District Court of Northern District of
California and was issued his Certificate of Naturalization No. 14556793 as an American citizen. On October 27, 1993, he was
honorably discharged from the US Marine Corps. He then decided to return to the Philippines.
Cruz availed of repatriation under R.A. No. 2630, an act providing for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by persons who lost
such citizenship by rendering service to or accepting commission in the Armed Forces of the United States. On March 17, 1994,
he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The oath was registered with the Local Civil Registry of
Mangatarem, Pangasinan. On the same date, he executed an Affidavit of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. Thus, on April
11, 1994, the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation ordered the cancellation of his Alien Certificate of Residence (ICR No.
286582) and issued him an Identification Certificate.

35 | P a g e

The cancellation of his ACR and ICR was affirmed by the Justice Department. On January 18, 1995, the United States Embassy in
Manila issued to him a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United States.
In the local election of 1995, Cruz filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of Mangatarem, Pangasinan, declaring himself to be
a naturalized Filipino citizen. He won and served as mayor for one term.
Thereafter, Cruz filed his certificate of candidacy for a seat in Congress, this time declaring himself as a natural-born Filipino.
Again, he won with a lead of 26,671 votes over candidate Antonio Bengson, III.
On September 3, 1998, Cruz was proclaimed winner in the congressional race in the Second District of Pangasinan.
Bengson then filed a petition for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with the House of Representative Electoral not being a natural-born
Filipino citizen when he filed his Certificate of Candidacy on March 15, 1998, is not qualified to run as a member of the House of
Representatives. That he should be a natural-born citizen is a qualification mandated by Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution
which provides: "No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines."
After oral arguments and the submission by the parties of their respective memoranda and supplemental memoranda, the HRET
rendered a decision holding that Cruz reacquired his natural-born citizenship upon his repatriation in 1994 and declaring him duly
elected representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections, thus:
"WHEREFORE, the petition for quo warranto is DISMISSED and Respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is hereby
DECLARED duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections.
"As soon as this Decision becomes final and executory, let notices and copies thereof be sent to the President of the
Philippines; the House of Representatives, through the Speaker, and the Commission on Audit, through its Chairman,
pursuant to Rule 76 of the 1998 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Costs de oficio."
On March 13, 2000, Bengson filed a motion for reconsideration of the said Decision but the same was denied by the HRET in
Resolution No. 00-48.

Petitioner contends that the phrase "from birth" indicates that citizenship must start at a definite point and must be continuous,
constant and without interruption. The Constitution does not extend the privilege of reacquiring a natural-born citizen status to
respondent, who at one time, became an alien. His loss of citizenship carried with it the concomitant loss of all the benefits,
privileges and attributes of "natural-born" citizenship. When he reacquired his citizenship in 1994, he had to comply with
requirements for repatriation, thus effectively taking him out of the constitutional definition of a natural-born Filipino. For his
part, respondent maintains that the phrase "from birth" refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a "naturalborn". Since he was born to Filipino from birth. His reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 2630 results in
his reacquisition of his inherent characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.
For his part, respondent maintains that the phrase "from birth" refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a
"natural-born". Since he was born to Filipino parents, he has been a natural-born Filipino from birth. His reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 2630 results in his reacquisition of his inherent characteristic of being a naturalborn citizen.
The state of being a natural-born citizen has been regarded, not so much in its literal sense, but more in its legal connotation.
The very first natural-born Filipinos did not acquire that status at birth. They were born as Spanish subjects. In Roa vs. Collector
of Customs,2 the Supreme Court traces the grant of natural-born status from the Treaty of Paris, and the Acts of Congress of July
1, 1902 and March 23, 1912, which is a reenactment of Section 4 of the former with a proviso which reads:
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of
other Insular possessions of the United States and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who could
become citizens of the United State under the laws of the United State, if residing therein."
It was further held therein that under the said provision, "every person born the 11 th of April, of parents who were Spanish
subjects on that date and who continued to reside in this country are at the moment of their birth ipso facto citizens of the
Philippine Islands."
Under the April 7, 1900 Instructions of President William McKinley to the Second Philippine Commission, considered as our first
colonial charter of fundamental law, we were referred to as "people of the Islands," or "inhabitants of the Philippine Islands," or
"natives of the Islands" and not as citizens, much less natural-born citizens. The first definition of "citizens of the Philippine
Islands" in our law is found in Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902. 3

Bengson now comes to us via a petition for certiorari assailing the HRET Decision on grounds that:
"1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it
ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being such
in view of the loss and renuciation of such citizenship on his part.
"2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it
considered private respondent as a citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he did not validly acquire his
Philippine citizenship.
"3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was invalid, the HRET committed
serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of despite the fact that such reacquisition could not
legally and constitutionally restore his natural-born status."
The sole issue raised in this petition is whether or not respondent Cruz was natural-born citizen of the Philippines at the time of
the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy for a seat in the House of Representatives.
Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution1 provides:
"Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. xxx."
Petitioner and respondent present opposing interpretations of the phrase "from birth" contained in the above provisions.

Philippine citizenship, including the status of natural-born, was initially a loose or even non-existent qualification. As a
requirement for the exercise of certain rights and privileges, it became a more strict and difficult status to achieve with the passing
of the years.
Early decisions of the Supreme Court held that Philippine citizenship could be acquired under either the jus sanguinis or jus
soli doctrine.4
This liberal policy was applied even as the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law of the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916
appear to have limited "citizens of the Philippine Islands" to resident inhabitants who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899,
their children born subsequent thereto, and later, those naturalized according to law by the Philippine legislature. Only later
was jus sanguinis firmly applied and jus soli abandoned.
Hence, the status of being a natural-born citizen at its incipient is a privilege conferred by law directly to those who intended, and
actually continued, to belong to the Philippine Island. Even at the time of its conception in the Philippines, such persons upon
whom citizenship was conferred did not have to do anything to acquire full citizenship. 5
Respondent wants us to believe that since he was natural-born Filipino at birth, having been born in the Philippines to Filipino
parents, he was automatically restored to that status when he subsequently reacquired his citizenship after losing it.
Public respondent HRET affirmed respondent's position when it pronounced that the definition of natural-born citizen in Section
2, Article IV of the Constitution refers to the classes of citizens enumerated in Section 1 of the same Article, to wit:
"Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

36 | P a g e

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;

If citizenship is gained through naturalization, repatriation or legislation, the citizen concerned can not be considered natural-born.
Obviously, he has to perform certain acts to become a citizen.

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

As expressed in the Dissent of Justice Jose C. Vitug7 in the instant case, concurred in by Justice A.R. Melo:8
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age
of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
Thus , respondent HRET held that under the above enumeration, there are only two classes of citizens, i.e., natural-born and
naturalized. Since respondent Cruz is not a naturalized citizen, then he is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
I do not agree. I reiterate that Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution defines natural-born citizens as " those who are citizens of
the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."
Pursuant to R.A. No. 2630, quoted as follow:
"Republic Act No. 2630. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR REACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY
PERSONS WHO LOST SUCH CITIZENSHIP BY RENDERING SERVICE TO, OR ACCEPTING COMMISSION
IN, THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES, provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship be rendering service to, or accepting commission in the
Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United
States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registering the same with the Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the
Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship."
respondent Cruz had perform certain acts before he could again become a Filipino citizen. He had to take an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines and register his oath with the Local Civil Registry of Mangatarum, Pangasinan. He had to
renounce his American citizenship and had to execute an affidavit of reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

"Repatriation is the resumption or recovery of the original nationally upon the fulfillment of certain conditions.
While an applicant need not have to undergo the tedious and time consuming process required by the Revised
Naturalization Law (CA 473, s amended), he, nevertheless, would still have to make an express and unequivocal act
of formally rejecting his adopted state and reaffirming his total and exclusive allegiance and loyalty to the Republic
of the Philippines. It bears emphasis that, to be of section 2, Article IV, of the 1987 Constitution, one should not have
to perform any act at all or go through any process, judicial or administrative, to enable him to reacquire his
citizenship. willoughby opines that a natural-born citizen is one who is able to claim citizenship without any prior
declaration on his part of a desire to obtain such status. Under this view, the term 'natural born' citizens could also
cover those who have been collectively deemed citizens by reason of the Treaty of Paris and the Philippine Bill of
1902 and those who have been accorded by the 1935 Constitution to be Filipino citizens (those born in the
Philippines of alien parents who, before the adoption of the 1935 Constitution had been elected to public office.)"
The two dissenting Justice correctly stated that the "stringent requirement of the Constitution is so placed as to insure that only
Filipino citizens with an absolute and permanent degree of allegiance and loyalty shall be eligible for membership in Congress,
the branch of the government directly involved and given the dedicate task of legislation."
The dissenting opinion further states:
"The term 'natural-born' Filipino citizen, first constitutionally defined in the 1973 Charter, later adopted by the 1987
Constitution, particularly in Section 2, Article IV thereof, is meant to refer to those ' who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship,' and to those ' who
elect Philippine citizenship.' Time and again, the Supreme Court has declared that where the laws speaks in clear and
categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation there is only room for
application. The phrase 'from birth indicates that there is a starting point of his citizenship and this citizenship should
be continuous, constant and without interruption."
Thus, respondent is not eligible for election to Congress as the Constitution requires that a member of the House of
Representative must be a "natural-born citizen of the Philippines."

Clearly, he did not reacquire his natural-born citizenship. The cardinal rule in the interpretation and constitution of a constitution
is to give effect to the intention of the framers and of the people who adopted it. Words appearing in Constitution are used
according to their plain, natural, and usual significance and import and must be understood in the sense most obvious to the
common understanding of the people at the time of its adoption.

For sure, the framers of our Constitution intended to provide a more stringent citizenship requirement for higher elective offices,
including that of the office of a Congressman. Otherwise, the Constitution should have simply provided that a candidate for such
position can be merely a citizen of the Philippines, as required of local elective officers.

The provision on "natural-born citizens of the Philippines" is precise, clear and definite. Indeed, neither HRET nor this Court can
construe it other than what its plain meaning conveys. It is not phrased in general language which may call for construction of
what the words imply.

The spirit of nationalism pervading the 1935 Constitution, the first charter framed and ratified by the Filipino (even as the draft
had to be approved by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt of the United States) guide and governs the interpretation of
Philippine citizenship and the more narrow and bounden concept of being a natural-born citizen.

In J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration,6 this Court held:

Under the 1935 costitution,9 the requirement of natural-born citizenship was applicable to the President and Vice Persident. 10 A
person who had been a citizen for only five (5) years could be elected to the National Assembly. 11Only in 1940,12 when the first
Constitution was amended did natural-born citizenship become a requirement for Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives.13 A Filipino naturalized for at least five (5) years could still be appointed Justice of the Supreme court or a Judge
of a lower court.14

"Ascertainment of meaning of provisions of Constitution begins with the language of the document itself. The words
used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning, except where technical terms are employed, in which
case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being
essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as
much as possible, should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of
the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the
postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say."
The definition of a natural-born citizen in the Constitution must be applied to this petition according to its natural sense.
Respondent HRET likewise ruled that the "reacquisition of Philippine citizenship through any of these modes: (naturalization,
repatriation and legislation under Section 3, C.A. No. 63) results in the restoration of previous status, either as a natural-born or a
naturalized citizen" is a simplistic approach and tends to be misleading.

The history of the Constitution shows that the meaning and application of the requirement of being natural-born have become
more narrow and qualified over the years.
Under the 1973 Constitution, 15 the President, members of the National Assembly, Prime Minister, Justices of the Supreme Court,
Judges of inferior courts, the chairmen and members of the Constitutional Commission and the majority of members of the
cabinet must be natural-born citizens. 16 The 1987 Constitution added the Ombudsman and his deputies and the members of the
Commission on Human Rights to those who must be natural-born citizens. 17
The questioned Decision of respondent HRET reverses the historical trend and clear intendment of the Constitution. It shows a
more liberal, if not a cavalier approach to the meaning and import of natural born citizen and citizenship in general.

37 | P a g e

It bears stressing that we are tracing and enforcing a doctrine embodied in no less that the constitution. Indeed, a deviation from
the clear and constitutional definition of a "natural born Filipino citizen" is a matter which can only be accomplished through a
constitutional amendment. Clearly respondent HRET gravely abused its discretion.

1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States, San Francisco, California, on September 14,
1955, and is considered an American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did
not lose his Filipino citizenship.

Respondent Cruz has availed himself of the procedure whereby his citizenship has been restored. He can run for public office
where natural-born citizenship is not mandated. But he cannot be elected to high offices which the Constitution has reserved only
for natural-born Filipino citizens.

Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen. In other words, he
holds dual citizenship.

WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition.1wphi1.nt

The question presented is whether under our laws, he is disqualified from the position for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy. Is he eligible for the office he seeks to be elected?

Footnote
3

Section 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on
the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine and then resided in said Islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the
protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provision of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris, December
tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.

Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective
local position.
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano DISQUALIFIED as candidate for
Vice-Mayor of Makati City.
On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. [3] The motion remained pending even until after
the election held on May 11, 1998.
Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998, of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers
tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but suspended the proclamation of the winner.

[G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]

ERNESTO

S. MERCADO, petitioner,
ELECTIONS, respondents.

vs. EDUARDO

BARRIOS

MANZANO

and

the

COMMISSION

ON
On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. [4] Petitioners motion was opposed by
private respondent.

DECISION
The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution. Voting 4 to 1,
with one commissioner abstaining, the COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of its Second Division and declared private
respondent qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. [5] The pertinent portions of the
resolution of the COMELEC en banc read:

MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of
Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. The results of the election were as follows:
Eduardo B. Manzano
Ernesto S. Mercado
Gabriel V. Daza III

As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship
by operation of the United States Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli.

103,853
100,894
54,275[1]

The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain
Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998, [2] the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered
the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under 40(d) of
the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. The
COMELECs Second Division said:
What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification of Eduardo Barrios Manzano as candidate for the office
of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998 elections. The petition is based on the ground that the respondent is an
American citizen based on the record of the Bureau of Immigration and misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen.

He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as his father and mother were
Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the age of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines using an American passport as
travel document. His parents also registered him as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an alien
certificate of registration. This, however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine
citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States.
It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a voter, and voted in the
elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he
no longer had U.S. citizenship.
At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, was not yet
final. Respondent Manzano obtained the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice-mayor of Makati City, garnering
one hundred three thousand eight hundred fifty three (103,853) votes over his closest rival, Ernesto S. Mercado, who obtained one
hundred thousand eight hundred ninety four (100,894) votes, or a margin of two thousand nine hundred fifty nine (2,959)
votes. Gabriel Daza III obtained third place with fifty four thousand two hundred seventy five (54,275) votes. In applying
election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of the popular choice than be embroiled in complex legal issues involving
private international law which may well be settled before the highest court (Cf. Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 257
SCRA 727).

In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of
Immigration under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in

38 | P a g e

WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby REVERSES the resolution of the Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998,
ordering the cancellation of the respondents certificate of candidacy.
We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be QUALIFIED as a candidate for the position of vice-mayor of Makati
City in the May 11, 1998, elections.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board of Canvassers, upon proper notice to the parties, to reconvene
and proclaim the respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano as the winning candidate for vice-mayor of Makati City.
Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers, on the evening of August 31, 1998,
proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of the City of Makati.
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to declare
private respondent disqualified to hold the office of vice mayor of Makati City. Petitioner contends that
[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:
A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he:
1.

He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of majority when he was already 37 years old; and,

2.
He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered himself as a voter and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995
and 1998.
B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati;
C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division adopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet final so
that, effectively, petitioner may not be declared the winner even assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold the
elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.
We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondent Manzano whether petitioner Mercado has
personality to bring this suit considering that he was not an original party in the case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril
nor was petitioners motion for leave to intervene granted.

Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in litigation nor an interest to protect because he is
a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City
even if the private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and executory judgment.
The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the proceedings before the
COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the results of the election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on
the basis of which petitioner came out only second to private respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no
proclamation at that time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private respondent from the race at the
time he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo v. COMELEC, [6] reiterated in several cases, [7] only applies to cases in which the
election of the respondent is contested, and the question is whether one who placed second to the disqualified candidate may be
declared the winner. In the present case, at the time petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File Intervention on May 20, 1998,
there had been no proclamation of the winner, and petitioners purpose was precisely to have private respondent disqualified
from running for [an] elective local position under 40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the
disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the action, so was petitioner since the
latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
Nor is petitioners interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a motion for intervention only on May 20,
1998, after private respondent had been shown to have garnered the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice
mayor. That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent
is clear from 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides:
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall
not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or anyintervenor, may during the pendency thereof
order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.
Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet
been no final judgment rendered.
The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioners motion for intervention was tantamount to a denial of the
motion, justifying petitioner in filing the instant petition for certiorari. As the COMELEC en banc instead decided the merits of
the case, the present petition properly deals not only with the denial of petitioners motion for intervention but also with the
substantive issues respecting private respondents alleged disqualification on the ground of dual citizenship.
This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private respondent Manzano possesses dual citizenship and, if so,
whether he is disqualified from being a candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.

I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT

II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION

Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC in support of his
claim that petitioner has no right to intervene and, therefore, cannot bring this suit to set aside the ruling denying his motion for
intervention:
Section 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene. Any person allowed to initiate an action or proceeding may,
before or during the trial of an action or proceeding, be permitted by the Commission, in its discretion to intervene in such action
or proceeding, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by such action or proceeding.
....
Section 3. Discretion of Commission. In allowing or disallowing a motion for intervention, the Commission or the Division, in
the exercise of its discretion, shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the original parties and whether or not the intervenors rights may be fully protected in a separate action or proceeding.

The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under 40 of the Local Government Code of 1991
(R.A. No. 7160), which declares as disqualified from running for any elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual
citizenship. This provision is incorporated in the Charter of the City of Makati. [8]
Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor General, who sides with him in this case, contends
that through 40(d) of the Local Government Code, Congress has command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons
possessing dual allegiance to hold local elective office.
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. [9] For
instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso factoand without any voluntary act on his
part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is
possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:

39 | P a g e

(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers country such children
are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or
omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of
another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act,
loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the Constitution provides: Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the
national interest and shall be dealt with by law. This provision was included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of
Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained its necessity as follows:[10]
. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual citizenship. I have circulated a memorandum to the Bernas
Committee according to which a dual allegiance - and I reiterate a dual allegiance - is larger and more threatening than that of
mere double citizenship which is seldom intentional and, perhaps, never insidious. That is often a function of the accident of
mixed marriages or of birth on foreign soil. And so, I do not question double citizenship at all.
What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional cognizance of the problem of dual allegiance. For
example, we all know what happens in the triennial elections of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce
which consists of about 600 chapters all over the country. There is a Peking ticket, as well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely known
is the fact that the Filipino-Chinese community is represented in the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China in Taiwan. And
until recently, the sponsor might recall, in Mainland China in the Peoples Republic of China, they have the Associated Legislative
Council for overseas Chinese wherein all of Southeast Asia including some European and Latin countries were represented, which
was dissolved after several years because of diplomatic friction. At that time, the Filipino-Chinese were also represented in that
Overseas Council.
When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind of allegiance of Filipinos, of citizens who are already
Filipinos but who, by their acts, may be said to be bound by a second allegiance, either to Peking or Taiwan. I also took close
note of the concern expressed by some Commissioners yesterday, including Commissioner Villacorta, who were concerned about
the lack of guarantees of thorough assimilation, and especially Commissioner Concepcion who has always been worried about
minority claims on our natural resources.
Dual allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan, Singapore, China or Malaysia, and this is already
happening. Some of the great commercial places in downtown Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese it is of
common knowledge in Manila. It can mean a tragic capital outflow when we have to endure a capital famine which also means
economic stagnation, worsening unemployment and social unrest.
And so, this is exactly what we ask that the Committee kindly consider incorporating a new section, probably Section 5, in the
article on Citizenship which will read as follows: DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP AND SHALL BE
DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO LAW.

security. In the course of those debates, I think some noted the fact that as a result of the wave of naturalizations since the
decision to establish diplomatic relations with the Peoples Republic of China was made in 1975, a good number of these
naturalized Filipinos still routinely go to Taipei every October 10; and it is asserted that some of them do renew their oath of
allegiance to a foreign government maybe just to enter into the spirit of the occasion when the anniversary of the Sun Yat-Sen
Republic is commemorated. And so, I have detected a genuine and deep concern about double citizenship, with its attendant risk
of double allegiance which is repugnant to our sovereignty and national security. I appreciate what the Committee said that this
could be left to the determination of a future legislature. But considering the scale of the problem, the real impact on the security
of this country, arising from, let us say, potentially great numbers of double citizens professing double allegiance, will the
Committee entertain a proposed amendment at the proper time that will prohibit, in effect, or regulate double citizenship?
Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual
citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20 must be understood as
referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike
those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine
citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable
consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the
Constitutional Commission, pointed out: [D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the
laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen
of another country is something completely beyond our control. [12]
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they
are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and
of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the following
discussion on 40(d) between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows:[13]
SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page 17: Any person with dual citizenship
is disqualified to run for any elective local position. Under the present Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose
mother is a citizen of the Philippines but his father is a foreigner is a natural-born citizen of the Republic. There is
no requirement that such a natural born citizen, upon reaching the age of majority, must elect or give up Philippine
citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to the country of his or her father and one
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, may such a situation disqualify the person to run for a local government
position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the moment when he would want to run for public
office, he has to repudiate one of his citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country of origin or the country of the father
claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen? No one can renounce. There are such countries in the world.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office would, in effect, be an election for him of his
desire to be considered as a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not require an election. Under the Constitution, a
person whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines is, at birth, a citizen without any overt act to claim the citizenship.

In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these citizens with dual allegiance, thus: [11]
. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern about dual citizenship in the sense that it implies a double
allegiance under a double sovereignty which some of us who spoke then in a freewheeling debate thought would be repugnant to
the sovereignty which pervades the Constitution and to citizenship itself which implies a uniqueness and which elsewhere in the
Constitution is defined in terms of rights and obligations exclusive to that citizenship including, of course, the obligation to rise to
the defense of the State when it is threatened, and back of this, Commissioner Bernas, is, of course, the concern for national

SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the Gentlemans example, if he does not
renounce his other citizenship, then he is opening himself to question. So, if he is really interested to run, the first
thing he should do is to say in the Certificate of Candidacy that: I am a Filipino citizen, and I have only one
citizenship.

40 | P a g e

SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr. President. He will always have one
citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested upon him or her in the Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will prove that he also acknowledges other
citizenships, then he will probably fall under this disqualification.
This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must renounce all allegiance and fidelity to any
foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty [14] of which at the time he is a subject or citizen before he can be issued a
certificate of naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines. In Parado v. Republic,[15] it was held:
[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty to any other country or
government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is
satisfied and complied with. The determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our
Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly
enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and
application. If the requirement of the Chinese Law of Nationality were to be read into our Naturalization Law, we would be
applying not what our legislative department has deemed it wise to require, but what a foreign government has thought or
intended to exact. That, of course, is absurd. It must be resisted by all means and at all cost. It would be a brazen encroachment
upon the sovereign will and power of the people of this Republic.
III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on September 4, 1955, of Filipino
parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, while the United States follows the doctrine of jus soli,
the parties agree that, at birth at least, he was a national both of the Philippines and of the United States. However, the
COMELEC en banc held that, by participating in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private respondent effectively
renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law, so that now he is solely a Philippine national.
Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is not sufficient evidence of
renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation was made when private respondent was already 37 years old, it
was ineffective as it should have been made when he reached the age of majority.
In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced his American citizenship, the COMELEC
must have in mind 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of the United States, which provided that A person who is a
national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . . (e) Voting in a political election
in a foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory. To be sure this
provision was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in Afroyim v. Rusk[16] as beyond the power given to the U.S.
Congress to regulate foreign relations. However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private
respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. Private respondents certificate of
candidacy, filed on March 27, 1998, contained the following statements made under oath:
6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF NATURAL-BORN OR NATURALIZED)

NATURAL-BORN

....
10.

11.
12.

I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A, BARANGAY SAN LORENZO,

CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR .

PROMULGATED BY THE DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES; AND THAT I IMPOSE THIS OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF VOLUNTARILY,
WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE
FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE TRUE AND CORRECT OF MY OWN PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.
The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo v. COMELEC it was held:[17]
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity of his repatriation not
effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would disqualify him from running for
any elective local position? We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really
STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment,
Frivaldo wrote that he had long renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship-long before May 8, 1995. At best,
Frivaldo was stateless in the interim-when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriated to his
Filipino citizenship.
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:
By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the
Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath
of allegiance to the Philippine Government.
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of 1995 have not been effectively
rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any
showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse.
There is, therefore, no merit in petitioners contention that the oath of allegiance contained in private respondents
certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute renunciation of his American citizenship. Equally without merit is petitioners
contention that, to be effective, such renunciation should have been made upon private respondent reaching the age of majority
since no law requires the election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.
Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is registered as an American citizen in the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an American passport which he used in his last travel to the United
States on April 22, 1997. There is no merit in this. Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual
citizenship. The acts attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion of his American nationality before the
termination of his American citizenship. What this Court said in Aznar v. COMELEC[18] applies mutatis mutandis to private
respondent in the case at bar:
. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate
stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. . . . [T]he Certification that he is an American does not
mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express
renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We
consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be express, it stands to reason that there can be no such
loss of Philippine citizenship when there is no renunciation, either express or implied.
To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident
or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and
allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.

I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.

I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I WILL SUPPORT AND DEFEND
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILL MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH AND
ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT I WILL OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS AND DECREES

On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has
spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this
country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

41 | P a g e

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that
trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate
proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago,[19] we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after
taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial
documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing
Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Quisumbing, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and YnaresSantiago, JJ., concur.

On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar are the
petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following grounds:
1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.

Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., on leave.

Pardo, J., no part.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the HRET in its
resolution dated February 22, 1989.
Hence, these petitions for certiorari.
We treat the comments as answers and decide the issues raised in the petitions.
ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION

G.R. Nos. 92191-92 July 30, 1991

ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner,
vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.
G.R. Nos. 92202-03 July 30, 1991
SIXTO T. BALANQUIT, JR., petitioner,
vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.
Hechanova & Associates for petitioner Co.
Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro and Arcilla Law Offices for respondent Ong, Jr.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p

The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for
voting purposes. The sole issue before us is whether or not, in making that determination, the HRET acted with grave abuse of
discretion.

The first question which arises refers to our jurisdiction.

The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate Electoral
Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualificationsof their respective
members. (See Article VI, Section 17, Constitution)
The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the word soleemphasizes the
exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals.
The Supreme Court in the case of Lazatin v. HRET (168 SCRA 391 [1988]) stated that under the 1987 Constitution, the
jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal is original and exclusive, viz:
The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred (Angara v.
Electoral Commission, supra at p. 162). The exercise of power by the Electoral Commission under the
1935 Constitution has been described as "intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
originally remained in the legislature." (id., at p. 175) Earlier this grant of power to the legislature was
characterized by Justice Malcolm as "full, clear and complete; (Veloso v. Board of Canvassers of Leyte
and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919]) Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly
reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal and it remained as full, clear and complete as that previously
granted the Legislature and the Electoral Commission, (Lachica v. Yap, 25 SCRA 140 [1968]) The same
may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal under the 1987 Constitution. (p.
401)
The Court continued further, ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests
relating to election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on
a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court . . . the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full,
clear and complete and excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail
it or even affect the same." (pp. 403-404)

42 | P a g e

When may the Court inquire into acts of the Electoral Tribunals under our constitutional grants of power?
In the later case of Robles v. HRET (181 SCRA 780 [1990]) the Supreme Court stated that the judgments of the Tribunal are
beyond judicial interference save only "in the exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a
determination that the Tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion or paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as
constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting
such GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for such abuse." (at pp. 785-786)
In the leading case of Morrero v. Bocar (66 Phil. 429 [1938]) the Court ruled that the power of the Electoral Commission "is
beyond judicial interference except, in any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of power as will
constitute a denial of due process." The Court does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors of
independent branches of the Government, It comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse of
discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution calls for remedial action.
The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded jurisdiction, so to speak, to review the decisions of
the other branches and agencies of the government to determine whether or not they have acted within the bounds of the
Constitution. (See Article VIII, Section 1, Constitution)
Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the
Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing that the HRET has
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective
power; it will not decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRET alone to decide. ( See Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668
[1989]) It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error.
As constitutional creations invested with necessary power, the Electoral Tribunals, although not powers in the tripartite scheme of
the government, are, in the exercise of their functions independent organs independent of Congress and the Supreme Court.
The power granted to HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in
the legislature. (Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 [1936])
In passing upon petitions, the Court with its traditional and careful regard for the balance of powers, must permit this exclusive
privilege of the Tribunals to remain where the Sovereign authority has place it. (See Veloso v. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and
Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919])

The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year
1915.
Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar. In Laoang, he was able to establish an enduring relationship with
his neighbors, resulting in his easy assimilation into the community.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices.
He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in
love and, thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the private respondent who was born in 1948.
The private respondent's father never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware store and shared and survived
the vicissitudes of life in Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, the
father of the private respondent, unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family,
filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen.
On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April 28, 1955 as final and
executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization was issued to
him.
At the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the private respondent then a minor of nine years was finishing his elementary
education in the province of Samar. There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs
and practices of the local populace were concerned.
Fortunes changed. The house of the family of the private respondent in Laoang, Samar was burned to the ground.

It has been argued that under Article VI, Section 17 of the present Constitution, the situation may exist as it exists today where
there is an unhealthy one-sided political composition of the two Electoral Tribunals. There is nothing in the Constitution,
however, that makes the HRET because of its composition any less independent from the Court or its constitutional functions any
less exclusive. The degree of judicial intervention should not be made to depend on how many legislative members of the HRET
belong to this party or that party. The test remains the same-manifest grave abuse of discretion.
In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part of the HRET which will
necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Supreme Court.

ON THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP

The records show that in the year 1895, the private respondent's grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong
Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of hard work.
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial administration.

Undaunted by the catastrophe, the private respondent's family constructed another one in place of their ruined house. Again, there
is no showing other than that Laoang was their abode and home.
After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better education, went to Manila in order to
acquire his secondary and college education.
In the meantime, another misfortune was suffered by the family in 1975 when a fire gutted their second house in Laoang, Samar.
The respondent's family constructed still another house, this time a 16-door apartment building, two doors of which were reserved
for the family.
The private respondent graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board Examinations.
Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He found a job in the Central Bank
of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila. In 1971, his elder
brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was
challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to derived
citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as
a natural born Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it was
precisely amending the article on this subject.

43 | P a g e

The private respondent frequently went home to Laoang, Samar, where he grew up and spent his childhood days.

interpretation of who is a natural-born citizen as provided in section 4 of the

1973 Constitution by adding that persons who have elected Philippine
Citizenship under the 1935 Constitution shall be natural-born? Am I right Mr.
Presiding Officer?

In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim.

For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and correspondingly, voted there
during those elections.
The private respondent after being engaged for several years in the management of their family business decided to be of greater
service to his province and ran for public office. Hence, when the opportunity came in 1987, he ran in the elections for
representative in the second district of Northern Samar.

Fr. Bernas: yes.

xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Nolledo: And I remember very well that in the Reverend Father Bernas'
well written book, he said that the decision was designed merely to
accommodate former delegate Ernesto Ang and that the definition on naturalborn has no retroactive effect. Now it seems that the Reverend Father Bernas
is going against this intention by supporting the amendment?

Mr. Ong was overwhelmingly voted by the people of Northern Samar as their representative in Congress. Even if the total votes
of the two petitioners are combined, Ong would still lead the two by more than 7,000 votes.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:

Fr. Bernas: As the Commissioner can see, there has been an evolution in my
thinking. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 189)

SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:

xxx xxx xxx
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;
Mr. Rodrigo: But this provision becomes very important because his election
of Philippine citizenship makes him not only a Filipino citizen but a naturalborn Filipino citizen entitling him to run for Congress. . .

2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and

Fr. Bernas: Correct. We are quite aware of that and for that reason we will
leave it to the body to approve that provision of section 4.

4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Mr. Rodrigo: I think there is a good basis for the provision because it strikes
me as unfair that the Filipino citizen who was born a day before January 17,
1973 cannot be a Filipino citizen or a natural-born citizen. (Records of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 231)

SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship
in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2,
1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date.
The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which discriminates against Filipino women. There is no
ambiguity in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, viz:
Mr. Azcuna: With respect to the provision of section 4, would this refer only to
those who elect Philippine citizenship after the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution or would it also cover those who elected it under the 1973
Constitution?
Fr. Bernas: It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine citizenship by
virtue of the provision of the 1935 Constitution whether the election was done
before or after January 17, 1973. (Records of the Constitutional Commission,
Vol. 1, p. 228; Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Rodrigo: The purpose of that provision is to remedy an inequitable
situation. Between 1935 and 1973 when we were under the 1935 Constitution,
those born of Filipino fathers but alien mothers were natural-born Filipinos.
However, those born of Filipino mothers but alien fathers would have to elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and if they do elect,
they become Filipino citizens but not natural-born Filipino citizens. (Records
of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 356)
The foregoing significantly reveals the intent of the framers. To make the provision prospective from February 3, 1987 is to give a
narrow interpretation resulting in an inequitable situation. It must also be retroactive.
It should be noted that in construing the law, the Courts are not always to be hedged in by the literal meaning of its language. The
spirit and intendment thereof, must prevail over the letter, especially where adherence to the latter would result in absurdity and
injustice. (Casela v. Court of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 [1970])
A Constitutional provision should be construed so as to give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed,
hence, it is the spirit of the provision which should prevail over the letter thereof. (Jarrolt v. Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580)

Mr. Trenas: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political Rights and
Obligations and Human Rights has more or less decided to extend the

In the words of the Court in the case of J.M. Tuason v. LTA (31 SCRA 413 [1970]:

44 | P a g e

To that primordial intent, all else is subordinated. Our Constitution, any constitution is not to be
construed narrowly or pedantically for the prescriptions therein contained, to paraphrase Justice Holmes,
are not mathematical formulas having their essence in their form but are organic living institutions, the
significance of which is vital not formal. . . . (p. 427)
The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother
was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still
have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born.
Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an alien father were placed on
equal footing. They were both considered as natural-born citizens.
Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-born" cannot be made to depend on the fleeting accident of time or result in two
kinds of citizens made up of essentially the same similarly situated members.
It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted, that is, in order to remedy this accidental anomaly, and, therefore, treat
equally all those born before the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship either before or after the effectivity of
that Constitution.
The Constitutional provision in question is, therefore curative in nature. The enactment was meant to correct the inequitable and
absurd situation which then prevailed, and thus, render those acts valid which would have been nil at the time had it not been for
the curative provisions. (See Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA 342 [1980])
There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage. Crucial to this case is the
issue of whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen.
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born status to children born of
Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and
unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had
been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973
and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of
his already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and
unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old.
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal process.
In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the
Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship (p. 52; emphasis supplied)

examinations and getting a license. He has participated in political exercises as a Filipino and has always considered himself a
Filipino citizen. There is nothing in the records to show that he does not embrace Philippine customs and values, nothing to
indicate any tinge of alien-ness no acts to show that this country is not his natural homeland. The mass of voters of Northern
Samar are frilly aware of Mr. Ong's parentage. They should know him better than any member of this Court will ever know him.
They voted by overwhelming numbers to have him represent them in Congress. Because of his acts since childhood, they have
considered him as a Filipino.
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect citizenship. For those
already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a
profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running
for public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations of choice for these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is a
national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent would not only have been superfluous
but it would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship?
The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how Mr. Ong elected citizenship. It observed that "when protestee was only
nine years of age, his father, Jose Ong Chuan became a naturalized Filipino. Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act squarely
applies its benefit to him for he was then a minor residing in this country. Concededly, it was the law itself that had already
elected Philippine citizenship for protestee by declaring him as such." (Emphasis supplied)
The petitioners argue that the respondent's father was not, validly, a naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of the oath
of citizenship.
The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping Mr. Ong's father of his citizenship after his death and at this very
late date just so we can go after the son.
The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a collateral approach. This can not be done. In our jurisdiction, an
attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity. (See Queto v. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52
[1970])
To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as null and void would run against the principle
of due process. Jose Ong Chuan has already been laid to rest. How can he be given a fair opportunity to defend himself. A dead
man cannot speak. To quote the words of the HRET "Ong Chuan's lips have long been muted to perpetuity by his demise and
obviously he could not use beyond where his mortal remains now lie to defend himself were this matter to be made a central issue
in this case."
The issue before us is not the nullification of the grant of citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan. Our function is to determine whether or
not the HRET committed abuse of authority in the exercise of its powers. Moreover, the respondent traces his natural born
citizenship through his mother, not through the citizenship of his father. The citizenship of the father is relevant only to determine
whether or not the respondent "chose" to be a Filipino when he came of age. At that time and up to the present, both mother and
father were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not have elected any other citizenship unless he first formally renounced Philippine
citizenship in favor of a foreign nationality. Unlike other persons faced with a problem of election, there was no foreign
nationality of his father which he could possibly have chosen.

The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to have elected citizenship as they were already
citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.

There is another reason why we cannot declare the HRET as having committed manifest grave abuse of discretion. The same
issue of natural-born citizenship has already been decided by the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and by the Batasang
Pambansa convened by authority of the Constitution drafted by that Convention. Emil Ong, full blood brother of the respondent,
was declared and accepted as a natural born citizen by both bodies.

The respondent was born in an outlying rural town of Samar where there are no alien enclaves and no racial distinctions. The
respondent has lived the life of a Filipino since birth. His father applied for naturalization when the child was still a small boy. He
is a Roman Catholic. He has worked for a sensitive government agency. His profession requires citizenship for taking the

45 | P a g e

Assuming that our opinion is different from that of the Constitutional Convention, the Batasang Pambansa, and the respondent
HRET, such a difference could only be characterized as error. There would be no basis to call the HRET decision so arbitrary and
whimsical as to amount to grave abuse of discretion.

testimonial evidence and of the transcript of the proceedings of the body which the aforesaid resolution of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention was predicated.
On the contrary, the documents presented by the private respondent fall under the exceptions to the best evidence rule.

What was the basis for the Constitutional Convention's declaring Emil Ong a natural born citizen?
Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April 1899 and
then residing in said islands and their children born subsequent thereto were conferred the status of a Filipino citizen.
Was the grandfather of the private respondent a Spanish subject?
Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain enumerates those who were considered Spanish Subjects, viz:
ARTICLE 17. The following are Spaniards:

It was established in the proceedings before the HRET that the originals of the Committee Report No. 12, the minutes of the
plenary session of 1971 Constitutional Convention held on November 28, 1972 cannot be found.
This was affirmed by Atty. Ricafrente, Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional Convention; by Atty. Nolledo, Delegate to
the 1971 Constitutional Convention; and by Atty. Antonio Santos, Chief Librarian of the U.P Law Center, in their respective
testimonies given before the HRET to the effect that there is no governmental agency which is the official custodian of the records
of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. (TSN, December 12, 1988, pp. 30-31; TSN, January 17, 1989, pp. 34-35; TSN, February
1, 1989, p. 44; TSN, February 6, 1989, pp. 28-29)
The execution of the originals was established by Atty. Ricafrente, who as the Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention was the proper party to testify to such execution. (TSN, December 12, 1989, pp. 11-24)

1. Persons born in Spanish territory.

2. Children born of a Spanish father or mother, even though they were born out of Spain.
3. Foreigners who may have obtained naturalization papers.
4. Those without such papers, who may have acquired domicile in any town in the Monarchy. (Emphasis
supplied)
The domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence. This domicile, once established is considered to continue
and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established. (Article 50, NCC; Article 40, Civil Code of Spain; Zuellig v. Republic,
83 Phil. 768 [1949])
As earlier stated, Ong Te became a permanent resident of Laoang, Samar around 1895. Correspondingly, a certificate of residence
was then issued to him by virtue of his being a resident of Laoang, Samar. (Report of the Committee on Election Protests and
Credentials of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, September 7, 1972, p. 3)
The domicile that Ong Te established in 1895 continued until April 11, 1899; it even went beyond the turn of the 19th century. It
is also in this place were Ong Te set-up his business and acquired his real property.
As concluded by the Constitutional Convention, Ong Te falls within the meaning of sub-paragraph 4 of Article 17 of the Civil
Code of Spain.
Although Ong Te made brief visits to China, he, nevertheless, always returned to the Philippines. The fact that he died in China,
during one of his visits in said country, was of no moment. This will not change the fact that he already had his domicile fixed in
the Philippines and pursuant to the Civil Code of Spain, he had become a Spanish subject.
If Ong Te became a Spanish subject by virtue of having established his domicile in a town under the Monarchy of Spain,
necessarily, Ong Te was also an inhabitant of the Philippines for an inhabitant has been defined as one who has actual fixed
residence in a place; one who has a domicile in a place. (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. II) Apriori, there can be no other logical
conclusion but to educe that Ong Te qualified as a Filipino citizen under the provisions of section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.

The inability to produce the originals before the HRET was also testified to as aforestated by Atty. Ricafrente, Atty. Nolledo, and
Atty. Santos. In proving the inability to produce, the law does not require the degree of proof to be of sufficient certainty; it is
enough that it be shown that after a bona fide diligent search, the same cannot be found. ( see Government of P.I. v. Martinez, 44
Phil. 817 [1918])
Since the execution of the document and the inability to produce were adequately established, the contents of the questioned
documents can be proven by a copy thereof or by the recollection of witnesses.
Moreover, to erase all doubts as to the authenticity of the documentary evidence cited in the Committee Report, the former
member of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, Atty. Nolledo, when he was presented as a witness in the hearing of the protest
against the private respondent, categorically stated that he saw the disputed documents presented during the hearing of the
election protest against the brother of the private respondent. (TSN, February 1, 1989, pp. 8-9)
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Sarmiento, a vice-president of the Constitutional Convention, states that he was presiding
officer of the plenary session which deliberated on the report on the election protest against Delegate Emil Ong. He cites a long
list of names of delegates present. Among them are Mr. Chief Justice Fernan, and Mr. Justice Davide, Jr. The petitioners could
have presented any one of the long list of delegates to refute Mr. Ong's having been declared a natural-born citizen. They did not
do so. Nor did they demur to the contents of the documents presented by the private respondent. They merely relied on the
procedural objections respecting the admissibility of the evidence presented.
The Constitutional Convention was the sole judge of the qualifications of Emil Ong to be a member of that body. The HRET by
explicit mandate of the Constitution, is the sole judge of the qualifications of Jose Ong, Jr. to be a member of Congress. Both
bodies deliberated at length on the controversies over which they were sole judges. Decisions were arrived at only after a full
presentation of all relevant factors which the parties wished to present. Even assuming that we disagree with their conclusions, we
cannot declare their acts as committed with grave abuse of discretion. We have to keep clear the line between error and grave
abuse.
ON THE ISSUE OF RESIDENCE
The petitioners question the residence qualification of respondent Ong.

The HRET itself found this fact of absolute verity in concluding that the private respondent was a natural-born Filipino.

The petitioners lose sight of the meaning of "residence" under the Constitution. The term "residence" has been understood as
synonymous with domicile not only under the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution.

The petitioners' sole ground in disputing this fact is that document presented to prove it were not in compliance with the best the
evidence rule. The petitioners allege that the private respondent failed to present the original of the documentary evidence,

The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of residence vis-a-vis the qualifications of a candidate
for Congress continues to remain the same as that of domicile, to wit:

46 | P a g e

Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971

Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the
place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the elections. So
my question is: What is the Committee's concept of residence of a candidate
for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile or
constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, in so far as the regular members of the
National Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely provides,
among others, and a resident thereof, that is, in the district, for a period of not
less than one year preceding the day of the election. This was in effect lifted
from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile.
(Records of the 1987 Constitutional Convention, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986. p. 87)
xxx xxx xxx

The properties owned by the Ong Family are in the name of the private respondent's parents. Upon the demise of his parents,
necessarily, the private respondent, pursuant to the laws of succession, became the co-owner thereof (as a co- heir),
notwithstanding the fact that these were still in the names of his parents.
Even assuming that the private respondent does not own any property in Samar, the Supreme Court in the case ofDe los Reyes
v. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish his residence
and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative . (Emphasis
supplied)
To require the private respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamount to a property
qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements.
Nowhere is it required by the Constitution that the candidate should also own property in order to be qualified to run.
(see Maquera v. Borra, 122 Phil. 412 [1965])
It has also been settled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than
in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence. (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954])

Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think

Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has been
interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.

As previously stated, the private respondent stayed in Manila for the purpose of finishing his studies and later to practice his
profession, There was no intention to abandon the residence in Laoang, Samar. On the contrary, the periodical journeys made to
his home province reveal that he always had the animus revertendi.

Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.

Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the proper time
to go back to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially
considering that a provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says
that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to
the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical and actual
residence. (Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, Vol. 11, July 22,
1986, p. 110)
The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word "residence" which regarded it as having the
same meaning as domicile.
The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return.
(Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966 [1967]) The absence of a person from said permanent residence, no matter how long,
notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile of that person. In other words, domicile is characterized by animus
revertendi (Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966])
The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the
petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the present.
The private respondent, in the proceedings before the HRET sufficiently established that after the fire that gutted their house in
1961, another one was constructed.
Likewise, after the second fire which again destroyed their house in 1975, a sixteen-door apartment was built by their family, two
doors of which were reserved as their family residence. (TSN, Jose Ong, Jr., November 18,1988, p. 8)

The Philippines is made up not only of a single race; it has, rather, undergone an interracial evolution. Throughout our history,
there has been a continuing influx of Malays, Chinese, Americans, Japanese, Spaniards and other nationalities. This racial
diversity gives strength to our country.
Many great Filipinos have not been whole-blooded nationals, if there is such a person, for there is none. To mention a few, the
great Jose Rizal was part Chinese, the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee was part Chinese, and of course our own President,
Corazon Aquino is also part Chinese. Verily, some Filipinos of whom we are proud were ethnically more Chinese than the private
respondent.
Our citizens no doubt constitute the country's greatest wealth. Citizenship is a special privilege which one must forever cherish.
However, in order to truly revere this treasure of citizenship, we do not, on the basis of too harsh an interpretation, have to
unreasonably deny it to those who qualify to share in its richness.
Under the overly strict jurisprudence surrounding our antiquated naturalization laws only the very affluent backed by influential
patrons, who were willing to suffer the indignities of a lengthy, sometimes humiliating, and often corrupt process of clearances by
minor bureaucrats and whose lawyers knew how to overcome so many technical traps of the judicial process were able to acquire
citizenship. It is time for the naturalization law to be revised to enable a more positive, affirmative, and meaningful examination
of an applicant's suitability to be a Filipino. A more humane, more indubitable and less technical approach to citizenship problems
is essential.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal is AFFIRMED. Respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is declared a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and a resident of Laoang,
Northern Samar.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

The petitioners' allegation that since the private respondent owns no property in Laoang, Samar, he cannot, therefore, be a resident
of said place is misplaced.

Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano and Gancayco, JJ., took no part.

47 | P a g e

On September 20, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for naturalization captioned: "In the Matter of Petition of Juan
G. Frivaldo to be Re-admitted as a Citizen of the Philippines under Commonwealth Act No. 63" (Rollo, pp. 1723).

G.R. No. 104654 June 6, 1994

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ROSALIO G. DE LA ROSA, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 28, MANILA and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.
G.R. No. 105715 June 6, 1994
RAUL
R.
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.

LEE, petitioner,

On January 14, 1992, private respondent filed a "Motion to Set Hearing Ahead of Schedule," where he manifested
his intention to run for public office in the May 1992 elections. He alleged that the deadline for filing the
certificate of candidacy was March 15, one day before the scheduled hearing. He asked that the hearing set on
March 16 be cancelled and be moved to January 24 (Rollo, pp. 27-28).
The motion was granted in an Order dated January 24, 1992, wherein the hearing of the petition was moved to
February 21, 1992. The said order was not published nor a copy thereof posted.

G.R. No. 105735 June 6, 1994

RAUL
R.
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.

In an Order dated October 7, 1991 respondent Judge set the petition for hearing on March 16, 1992, and directed
the publication of the said order and petition in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation, for
three consecutive weeks, the last publication of which should be at least six months before the said date of
hearing. The order further required the posting of a copy thereof and the petition in a conspicuous place in the
Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Manila (Rollo, pp. 24-26).

LEE, petitioner,

The Solicitor General for petitioner in G.R. No. 104654.

Yolando F. Lim counsel for private respondent.

QUIASON, J.:

On February 21, the hearing proceeded with private respondent as the sole witness. He submitted the following
documentary evidence: (1) Affidavit of Publication of the Order dated October 7, 1991 issued by the publisher of
The Philippine Star (Exh. "A"); (2) Certificate of Publication of the order issued
by the National Printing Office (Exh. "B"); (3) Notice of Hearing of Petition (Exh. "B-1"); (4) Photocopy of a
Citation issued by the National Press Club with private respondents picture (Exhs. "C" and "C-2"); (5) Certificate
of Appreciation issued by the Rotary Club of Davao (Exh. "D"); (6) Photocopy
of a Plaque of Appreciation issued by the Republican College, Quezon City (Exh. "E"); (7) Photocopy of a Plaque
of Appreciation issued by the Davao-Bicol Association (Exh. "F"); (8) Certification issued by the Records
Management and Archives Office that the record of birth of private respondent was not on file (Exh. "G"); and (8)
Certificate of Naturalization issued by the United States District Court (Exh. "H").
Six days later, on February 27, respondent Judge rendered the assailed Decision, disposing as follows:

In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 (1989), this Court declared private respondent, Juan G.
Frivaldo, an alien and therefore disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon.
Once
more,
the
citizenship
of
private
respondent
is
put
in
issue
in
these petitions docketed as G.R. No.104654 and G.R. No. 105715 and G.R. No. 105735. The petitions were
consolidated since they principally involve the same issues and parties.
I
G.R. No. 104654
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to R.A. No. 5440 and
Section 25 of the Interim Rules, filed by the Republic of the Philippines: (1) to annul the Decision dated February
27, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila, in SP Proc. No. 91-58645, which re-admitted private
respondent as a Filipino citizen under the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. No. 63 as amended by C.A. No.
473); and (2) to nullify the oath of allegiance taken by private respondent on February 27, 1992.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO, is readmitted as a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines by naturalization, thereby vesting
upon him, all the rights and privileges of a natural born Filipino citizen (Rollo, p. 33).
On the same day, private respondent was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before respondent Judge (Rollo, p.
34).
On March 16, a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit Motion for Reconsideration" was filed by
Quiterio H. Hermo. He alleged that the proceedings were tainted with jurisdictional defects, and prayed for a new
trial to conform with the requirements of the Naturalization Law.
After receiving a copy of the Decision on March 18, 1992, the Solicitor General interposed a timely appeal
directly with the Supreme Court.
G.R. No. 105715
This is a petition for certiorari, mandamus with injunction under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court in
relation to Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution with prayer for temporary restraining order filed by

48 | P a g e

Raul R. Lee against the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and private respondent, to annul the en
banc Resolution of the COMELEC, which dismissed his petition docketed as SPC Case No. 92-273. The said
petition sought to annul the proclamation of private respondent as Governor-elect of the Province of Sorsogon.
Petitioner was the official candidate of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) for the position of governor
of the Province of Sorsogon in the May 1992 elections. Private respondent was the official candidate of the
Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats (Lakas-NUCD) for the same position.
Private respondent was proclaimed winner on May 22, 1992.
On June 1, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to annul the proclamation of private respondent as
Governor-elect of the Province of Sorsogon on the grounds: (1) that the proceedings and composition of the
Provincial Board of Canvassers were not in accordance with law; (2) that private respondent is an alien, whose
grant of Philippine citizenship is being questioned by the State in G.R. No. 104654; and (3) that private
respondent is not a duly registered voter. Petitioner further prayed that the votes case in favor of private
respondent be considered as stray votes, and that he, on the basis of the remaining valid votes cast, be proclaimed
winner.
On June 10, the COMELEC issued the questioned en banc resolution which dismissed the petition for having
been filed out of time, citing Section 19 of R.A. No. 7166. Said section provides that the period to appeal a ruling
of the board of canvassers on questions affecting its composition or proceedings was three days.
In this petition, petitioner argues that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it ignored the
fundamental issue of private respondents disqualification in the guise of technicality.
Petitioner claims that the inclusion of private respondents name in the list of registered voters in Sta. Magdalena,
Sorsogon was invalid because at the time he registered as a voter in 1987, he was as American citizen.
Petitioner further claims that the grant of Filipino citizenship to private respondent is not yet conclusive because
the case is still on appeal before us.
Petitioner prays for: (1) the annulment of private respondents proclamation as Governor of the Province of
Sorsogon; (2) the deletion of private respondents name from the list of candidates for the position of governor;
(3) the proclamation of the governor-elect based on the remaining votes, after the exclusion of the votes for
private respondent; (4) the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin private respondent from taking his
oath and assuming office; and (5) the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel the COMELEC to resolve the
pending disqualification case docketed as SPA Case No. 92-016, against private respondent.

The petition for cancellation alleged: (1) that private respondent is an American citizen, and therefore ineligible to
run as candidate for the position of governor of the Province of Sorsogon; (2) that the trial courts decision
re-admitting private respondent as a Filipino citizen was fraught with legal infirmities rendering it null and void;
(3) that assuming the decision to be valid, private respondents oath of allegiance, which was taken on the same
day the questioned decision was promulgated, violated Republic Act No. 530, which provides for a two-year
waiting period before the oath of allegiance can be taken by the applicant; and (4) that the hearing of the petition
on February 27, 1992, was held less than four months from the date of the last publication of the order and
petition. The petition prayed for the cancellation of private respondents certificate of candidacy and the deletion
of his name from the list of registered voters in Sta. Magdalena, Sorsogon.
In his answer to the petition for cancellation, private respondent denied the allegations therein and averred: (1)
that Quiterio H. Hermo, not being a candidate for the same office for which private respondent was aspiring, had
no standing to file the petition; (2) that the decision re-admitting him to Philippine citizenship was presumed to be
valid; and (3) that no case had been filed to exclude his name as a registered voter.
Raul R. Lee intervened in the petition for cancellation of private respondents certificate of candidacy (Rollo, p.
37.).
On May 13, 1992, said intervenor urged the COMELEC to decide the petition for cancellation, citing Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides that all petitions on matters involving the cancellation of a
certificate of candidacy must be decided "not later than fifteen days before election," and the case of Alonto v.
Commission on Election, 22 SCRA 878 (1968), which ruled that all pre-proclamation controversies should be
summarily
decided
(Rollo,
p. 50).
The COMELEC concedes that private respondent has not yet reacquired his Filipino citizenship because the
decision granting him the same is not yet final and executory (Rollo, p. 63). However, it submits that the issue of
disqualification
of
a
candidate
is
not
among
the
grounds
allowed
in
a
pre-proclamation controversy, like SPC Case No. 92-273. Moreover, the said petition was filed out of time.
The COMELEC contends that the preparation for the elections occupied much of its time, thus its failure to
immediately resolve SPA Case No. 92-016. It argues that under Section 5 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, it is excused from deciding a disqualification case within the period provided by law for reasons
beyond its control. It also assumed that the same action was subsequently abandoned by petitioner when he filed
before it a petition for quo warranto docketed as EPC No. 92-35. The quo warranto proceedings sought private
respondents disqualification because of his American citizenship.
II

G.R. No. 105735

G.R. No. 104654

This is a petition for mandamus under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to Section 5(2) of Article
VIII of the Constitution, with prayer for temporary restraining order. The parties herein are identical with the
parties in G.R. No. 105715.

We shall first resolve the issue concerning private respondents citizenship.

In substance, petitioner prays for the COMELECs immediate resolution of SPA Case No. 92-016, which is a
petition for the cancellation of private respondents certificate of candidacy filed on March 23, 1992 by Quiterio
H. Hermo, the intervenor in G.R. No. 104654 (Rollo, p. 18).

In his comment to the States appeal of the decision granting him Philippine citizenship in G.R. No. 104654,
private respondent alleges that the precarious political atmosphere in the country during Martial Law compelled
him to seek political asylum in the United States, and eventually to renounce his Philippine citizenship.
He claims that his petition for naturalization was his only available remedy for his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. He tried to reacquire his Philippine citizenship through repatriation and direct act of Congress.

49 | P a g e

However, he was later informed that repatriation proceedings were limited to army deserters or Filipino women
who had lost their citizenship by reason of their marriage to foreigners (Rollo, pp. 49-50). His request to Congress
for sponsorship of a bill allowing him to reacquire his Philippine citizenship failed to materialize, notwithstanding
the endorsement of several members of the House of Representatives in his favor (Rollo, p. 51). He attributed this
to the maneuvers of his political rivals.
He also claims that the re-scheduling of the hearing of the petition to an earlier date, without publication, was
made without objection from the Office of the Solicitor General. He makes mention that on the date of the
hearing, the court was jam-packed.

provide a special procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by former Filipino citizens akin to the
repatriation of a woman who had lost her Philippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien.
The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for naturalization of private respondent. The
proceedings conducted, the decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken therein, are null and void for
failure to comply with the publication and posting requirements under the Revised Naturalization Law.

It is private respondents posture that there was substantial compliance with the law and that the public was wellinformed of his petition for naturalization due to the publicity given by the media.

Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for naturalization and the order setting it for hearing must be
published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation.
Compliance therewith is jurisdictional (Po Yi Bo v. Republic, 205 SCRA 400 [1992]). Moreover, the publication
and posting of the petition and the order must be in its full test for the court to acquire jurisdiction (Sy v.
Republic, 55 SCRA 724 [1974]).

Anent the issue of the mandatory two-year waiting period prior to the taking of the oath of allegiance, private
respondent theorizes that the rationale of the law imposing the waiting period is to grant the public an
opportunity to investigate the background of the applicant and to oppose the grant of Philippine citizenship if
there is basis to do so. In his case, private respondent alleges that such requirement may be dispensed with,
claiming that his life, both private and public, was well-known. Private respondent cites his achievement as a
freedom fighter and a former Governor of the Province of Sorsogon for six terms.

The petition for naturalization lacks several allegations required by Sections 2 and 6 of the Revised Naturalization
Law, particularly: (1) that the petitioner is of good moral character; (2) that he resided continuously in the
Philippines for at least ten years; (3) that he is able to speak and write English and any one of the principal
dialects; (4) that he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition until his
admission to Philippine citizenship; and (5) that he has filed a declaration of intention or if he is excused from
said filing, the justification therefor.

The appeal of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines is meritorious. The naturalization
proceedings in SP Proc. No. 91-58645 was full of procedural flaws, rendering the decision an anomaly.

The absence of such allegations is fatal to the petition (Po Yi Bi v. Republic, 205 SCRA 400 [1992]).

Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru naturalization under the Revised
Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed by the said law. It is not for an applicant to
decide for himself and to select the requirements which he believes, even sincerely, are applicable to his case and
discard those which be believes are inconvenient or merely of nuisance value. The law does not distinguish
between an applicant who was formerly a Filipino citizen and one who was never such a citizen. It does not
provide a special procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by former Filipino citizens akin to the
repatriation of a woman who had lost her Philippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien.
The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for naturalization of private respondent. The
proceedings conducted, the decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken therein, are null and void for
failure to comply with the publication and posting requirements under the Revised Naturalization Law.
Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for naturalization and the order setting it for hearing must be
published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation
respondent cites his achievements as a freedom fighter and a former Governor of the Province of Sorsogon for six
terms.
The
appeal
of
the
Solicitor
General
in
behalf
of
the
Republic
of
the
Philippines
is
meritorious.
The
naturalization
proceedings
in
SP
Proc.
No. 91-58645 was full of procedural flaws, rendering the decision an anomaly.
Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru naturalization under the Revised
Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed by the said law. It is not for an applicant to
decide for himself and to select the requirements which he believes, even sincerely, are applicable to his case and
discard those which he believes are inconvenient or merely of nuisance value. The law does not distinguish
between an applicant who was formerly a Filipino citizen and one who was never such a citizen. It does not

Likewise, the petition is not supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons who vouched for the good
moral character of private respondent as required by Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law. Private
respondent also failed to attach a copy of his certificate of arrival to the petition as required by Section 7 of the
said law.
The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities: (1) the hearing of the petition was
set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the order advancing the date of hearing, and
the petition itself; (2) the petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the petition; (3)
petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the judgment; and (4) petitioner took
his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year waiting period.
A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only after 30 days from its promulgation and, insofar as
the Solicitor General is concerned, that period is counted from the date of his receipt of the copy of the decision
(Republic v. Court of First Instance of Albay, 60 SCRA 195 [1974]).
Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision granting citizenship in naturalization proceedings shall be
executory until after two years from its promulgation in order to be able to observe if: (1) the applicant has left
the country; (2) the applicant has dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or profession; (3) the
applicant has not been convicted of any offense or violation of government promulgated rules; and (4) the
applicant has committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the country or contrary to government announced
policies.
Even discounting the provisions of R.A. No. 530, the courts cannot implement any decision granting the petition
for naturalization before its finality.
G.R. No. 105715

50 | P a g e

In view of the finding in G.R. No. 104654 that private respondent is not yet a Filipino citizen, we have to grant
the petition in G.R. No. 105715 after treating it as a petition for certiorari instead of a petition for mandamus.
Said petition assails the en banc resolution of the COMELEC, dismissing SPC Case No. 92-273, which in turn is
a petition to annul private respondents proclamation on three grounds: 1) that the proceedings and composition
of the Provincial Board of Canvassers were not in accordance with law; 2) that private respondent is an alien,
whose grant of Filipino citizenship is being questioned by the State in G.R. No. 104654; and 3) that private
respondent is not a duly registered voter. The COMELEC dismissed the petition on the grounds that it was filed
outside
the
three-day
period
for
questioning
the
proceedings
and composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers under Section 19 of R.A. No. 7166.
The COMELEC failed to resolve the more serious issue the disqualification of private respondent to be
proclaimed Governor on grounds of lack of Filipino citizenship. In this aspect, the petition is one for quo
warranto. In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 (1989), we held that a petition for quo
warranto, questioning the respondents title and seeking to prevent him from holding office as Governor for
alienage, is not covered by the ten-day period for appeal prescribed in Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Furthermore, we explained that "qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be
possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officers entire
tenure; once any of the required qualification is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged."
Petitioners argument, that to unseat him will frustrate the will of the electorate, is untenable. Both the Local
Government Code and the Constitution require that only Filipino citizens can run and be elected to public office.
We can only surmise that the electorate, at the time they voted for private respondent, was of the mistaken belief
that he had legally reacquired Filipino citizenship.
Petitioner in G.R. No. 105715, prays that the votes cast in favor of private respondent be considered stray and that
he, being the candidate obtaining the second highest number of votes, be declared winner. In Labo, Jr. v.
COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1 (1989), we ruled that where the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is
later declared to be disqualified to hold the office to which he was elected, the candidate who garnered the second
highest number of votes is not entitled to be declared winner (See also Geronimo v. Ramos, 136 SCRA 435
[1985]; Topacio v. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 [1912]).
G.R. No. 105735
In view of the discussions of G.R. No. 104654 and G.R. No. 105715, we find the petition in G.R. No. 105735
moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. No. 104654 and G.R. No. 105715 are both GRANTED while the petition in
G.R. No. 105735 is DISMISSED. Private respondent is declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore
DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as GOVERNOR of the Province of Sorsogon. He is ordered to
VACATE his office and to SURRENDER the same to the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sorsogon once this
decision becomes final and executory. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J. and Cruz, J., took no part.
G.R. Nos. 178831-32

July 30, 2009

JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NAPOLEON N. CAMERO and RENALD F. VILLANDO, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179120

July 30, 2009

LOUIS C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. PROSPERO NOGRALES, Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the
Philippines, and JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. Nos. 179132-33

July 30, 2009

OLIVIA P. PARAS, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. PROSPERO NOGRALES, in his capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives; HON.
ROBERTO NAZARENO, in his capacity as Secretary General of the House of Representatives; HON.
RHODORA SEVILLA, in her capacity as Deputy Secretary General for Finance of the House of
Representatives; THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOCELYN SY
LIMKAICHONG, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. Nos. 179240-41

July 30, 2009

RENALD F. VILLANDO, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PERALTA, J.:
The instant motion with prayer for oral argument filed by Louis C. Biraogo, petitioner in G.R. No. 179120, seeks
a reconsideration of the Courts April 1, 2009 Decision, which granted Jocelyn D. Sy Limkaichongs petition
forcertiorari in G.R. Nos. 178831-32. The Court dismissed all the other petitions, including Biraogos petition,
and reversed the Joint Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division dated May 17,
2007 in SPA Nos. 07-247 and 07-248 disqualifying Limkaichong from running as a congressional candidate in
the First District of Negros Oriental due to lack of citizenship requirement.
Biraogo prefaced his motion by stating that justice and constitutionalism must remain entrenched in Philippine
case law. To achieve this end, he maintained that the Court should reconsider its April 1, 2009 Decision. He also
prayed for an oral argument, which he posited, would help the Court in the just and proper disposition of the
pending incident.

51 | P a g e

After an assiduous review of the motion for reconsideration, we resolve that the same should be denied for lack of
merit.
Most of the arguments advanced by Biraogo are a mere rehash of his previous arguments, which we have all
considered and found without merit in the Decision dated April 1, 2009. Nonetheless, in order to lay to rest once
and for all Biraogo's misgivings, we shall discuss only the relevant issues and revalidate our Decision by ruling
on his motion as follows:
The core issue in the consolidated petitions is the qualification of Limkaichong to run for, be elected to, and
assume and discharge, the position of Representative for the First District of Negros Oriental. The contention of
the parties who sought her disqualification is that she is not a natural-born citizen, hence, she lacks the citizenship
requirement in Section 6,1 Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In the election that ensued, she was voted for by
the constituents of Negros Oriental and garnered the highest votes. She was eventually proclaimed as the winner
and has since performed her duties and responsibilities as Member of the House of Representatives.
Indeed, the citizenship requirement was enshrined in our Constitution in order to ensure that our people and
country do not end up being governed by aliens.2 With this principle in mind, we have said in Aquino v.
COMELEC3 that if one of the essential qualifications for running for membership in the House of Representatives
is lacking, then not even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters would substitute for a requirement
mandated by the fundamental law itself. Hence assuming, time constraints notwithstanding, and after proper
proceedings before the proper tribunal be had, that Limkaichong would prove to be an alien, the court of justice
would tilt against her favor and would not sanction such an imperfection in her qualification to hold office. But,
first things first.
The proponents against Limkaichong's qualification stated that she is not a natural-born citizen because her
parents were Chinese citizens at the time of her birth. They went on to claim that the proceedings for the
naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father, never attained finality due to procedural and substantial defects.
In our Decision, We held that:
However, in assailing the citizenship of the father, the proper proceeding should be in accordance with Section 18
of Commonwealth Act No. 473 which provides that:
Sec. 18. Cancellation of Naturalization Certificate Issued. - Upon motion made in the proper proceedings by
the Solicitor General or his representative, or by the proper provincial fiscal, the competent judge may
cancel the naturalization certificate issued and its registration in the Civil Register:
1. If it is shown that said naturalization certificate was obtained fraudulently or illegally;
2. If the person naturalized shall, within five years next following the issuance of said naturalization
certificate, return to his native country or to some foreign country and establish his permanent
residence there: Provided, That the fact of the person naturalized remaining more than one year in his
native country or the country of his former nationality, or two years in any other foreign country, shall
be considered asprima facie evidence of his intention of taking up his permanent residence in the
same:

4. If it is shown that the minor children of the person naturalized failed to graduate from a public or
private high school recognized by the Office of Private Education [now Bureau of Private Schools] of
the Philippines, where Philippine history, government or civics are taught as part of the school
curriculum, through the fault of their parents either by neglecting to support them or by transferring
them to another school or schools. A certified copy of the decree canceling the naturalization
certificate shall be forwarded by the Clerk of Court of the Department of Interior [now Office of the
President] and the Bureau of Justice [now Office of the Solicitor General];
5. If it is shown that the naturalized citizen has allowed himself to be used as a dummy in violation of
the constitutional or legal provisions requiring Philippine citizenship as a requisite for the exercise,
use or enjoyment of a right, franchise or privilege. (Emphasis supplied)
As early as the case of Queto v. Catolico, where the Court of First Instance judge motu propio and not in the
proper denaturalization proceedings called to court various grantees of certificates of naturalization (who had
already taken their oaths of allegiance) and cancelled their certificates of naturalization due to procedural
infirmities, the Court held that:
x x x It may be true that, as alleged by said respondents, that the proceedings for naturalization were tainted
with certain infirmities, fatal or otherwise, but that is beside the point in this case. The jurisdiction of the court
to inquire into and rule upon such infirmities must be properly invoked in accordance with the procedure laid
down by law. Such procedure is the cancellation of the naturalization certificate. [Section 1(5), Commonwealth
Act No. 63], in the manner fixed in Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, hereinbefore quoted, namely,
"upon motion made in the proper proceedings by the Solicitor General or his representatives, or by the proper
provincial fiscal." In other words, the initiative must come from these officers, presumably after previous
investigation in each particular case. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its representatives designated by statute, that may
question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the appropriate denaturalization
proceedings. It is plainly not a matter that may be raised by private persons in an election case involving the
naturalized citizens descendant.
Accordingly, it is not enough that one's qualification, or lack of it, to hold an office requiring one to be a naturalborn citizen, be attacked and questioned before any tribunal or government institution. Proper proceedings must
be strictly followed by the proper officers under the law. Hence, in seeking Limkaichong's disqualification on
account of her citizenship, the rudiments of fair play and due process must be observed, for in doing so, she is not
only deprived of the right to hold office as a Member of the House of Representative but her constituents would
also be deprived of a leader in whom they have put their trust on through their votes. The obvious rationale
behind the foregoing ruling is that in voting for a candidate who has not been disqualified by final judgment
during the election day, the people voted for her bona fide, without any intention to misapply their franchise, and
in the honest belief that the candidate was then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise
of the powers of government.4lavvphil
These precepts, notwithstanding, Biraogo remained firm in his belief that this Court erred in its Decision and that
the COMELEC Joint Resolution dated May 17, 2007 disqualifying Limkaichong should have been affirmed. He
even went to a great extent of giving a dichotomy of the said Joint Resolution by stating that it was composed of
two parts, the first part of which is the substantive part, and the second, pertains to the injunctive part. For this
purpose, the dispositive portion of the said COMELEC Joint Resolution is reproduced below:

3. If the petition was made on an invalid declaration of intention;

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are GRANTED and Jocelyn D. Sy-Limkaichong is declared as DISQUALIFIED
from her candidacy for Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental.

52 | P a g e

The Provincial Supervisor of the Commission on Elections of Negros Oriental is hereby directed to strike out the
name JOCELYN SY-LIMKAICHONG from the list of eligible candidates for the said position, and the concerned
Board of Canvassers is hereby directed to hold and/or suspend the proclamation of JOCELYN SYLIMKAICHONG as winning candidate, if any, until this decision has become final.
SO ORDERED.5
Biraogo maintained that the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Limkaichong suspended only the execution of
the substantive relief or the first part of the above-quoted COMELEC Joint Resolution. However, it did not
suspend the execution of the injunctive part and, accordingly, the Provincial Supervisor of the COMELEC should
not have proceeded with Limkaichong's proclamation as the winning candidate in the elections.
His argument has no leg to stand on. We cannot take a decision or resolution on a piece-meal basis and apply only
that part which is seemingly beneficial to one's cause and discard the prejudicial part which, obviously, would just
be a hindrance in advancing one's stance or interests. Besides, the COMELEC Joint Resolution which Biraogo
dichotomized was effectively suspended when Limkaichong timely filed her Motion for Reconsideration pursuant
to Section 13(c),6 Rule 18 and Section 2, 7 Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Hence, it cannot as yet
be implemented for not having attained its finality.

Petitioners (in G.R. Nos. 179120, 179132-33, and 179240-41) steadfastly maintained that Limkaichongs
proclamation was tainted with irregularity, which will effectively prevent the HRET from acquiring jurisdiction.
The fact that the proclamation of the winning candidate, as in this case, was alleged to have been tainted with
irregularity does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction. 11 The Court has shed light on this in the case of VinzonsChato,12 to the effect that:
In the present case, it is not disputed that respondent Unico has already been proclaimed and taken his oath of
office as a Member of the House of Representatives (Thirteenth Congress); hence, the COMELEC correctly ruled
that it had already lost jurisdiction over petitioner Chato's petition. The issues raised by petitioner Chato
essentially relate to the canvassing of returns and alleged invalidity of respondent Unico's proclamation. These
are matters that are best addressed to the sound judgment and discretion of the HRET. Significantly, the allegation
that respondent Unico's proclamation is null and void does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction:
x x x [I]n an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate who has taken his
oath of office and assumed his post as congressman is raised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET. The reason
for this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between
constitutional bodies, with due regard to the people's mandate.

Nevertheless, events have already transpired after the COMELEC has rendered its Joint Resolution. Limkaichong
was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers, she had taken her oath of office, and she was allowed to
officially assume the office on July 23, 2007. Accordingly, we ruled in our April 1, 2009 Decision that the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), and no longer the COMELEC, should now assume jurisdiction
over the disqualification cases. Pertinently, we held:

Further, for the Court to take cognizance of petitioner Chato's election protest against respondent Unico would be
to usurp the constitutionally mandated functions of the HRET.

x x x The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath,
andassumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction
begins.8 It follows then that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction
over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should now
present his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and
decide a case involving a Member of the House of Representatives with respect to the latter's election, returns and
qualifications. The use of the word "sole" in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 9 of the
OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals' jurisdiction over election contests relating to its
members.10

The 1998 HRET Rules, as amended, provide for the manner of filing either an election protest or a petition
for quo warranto against a Member of the House of Representatives. In our Decision, we ruled that the ten-day
prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules does not apply to disqualification based on citizenship, because
qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. 13 Accordingly, the 1987 Constitution requires that
Members of the House of Representatives must be natural-born citizens not only at the time of their election but
during their entire tenure. Being a continuing requirement, one who assails a member's citizenship or lack of it
may still question the same at any time, the ten-day prescriptive period notwithstanding.lavvphi1

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:

In fine, we hold that Biraogo had not successfully convinced us to reconsider our Decision and grant his motion
for reconsideration.

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the
House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
xxxx

In fine, any allegations as to the invalidity of the proclamation will not prevent the HRET from assuming
jurisdiction over all matters essential to a members qualification to sit in the House of Representatives.

In a last-ditched attempt to muddle the issues, Biraogo observed that the Decision dated April 1, 2009 is a
complete turn-around from the ruling embodied in the Decision written by Justice Ruben T. Reyes which,
although unpromulgated, was nonetheless signed by fourteen (14) Associate Justices and approved by the Court
en banc on July 15, 2008. He decried the absence of an explanation in the Decision dated April 1, 2009 for the
said departure or turn-around.
Such a position deserves scant consideration.
The Court in Belac v. Commision on Elections,14 held that a decision must not only be signed by the Justices who
took part in the deliberation, but must also be promulgated to be considered a Decision, to wit:

53 | P a g e

[A] true decision of the Court is the decision signed by the Justices and duly promulgated. Before that decision
is so signed and promulgated, there is no decision of the Court to speak of. The vote cast by a member of the
Court after the deliberation is always understood to be subject to confirmation at the time he has to sign the
decision that is to be promulgated. The vote is of no value if it is not thus confirmed by the Justice casting it. The
purpose of this practice is apparent. Members of this Court, even after they have cast their votes, wish to preserve
their freedom of action till the last moment when they have to sign the decision, so that they may take full
advantage of what they may believe to be the best fruit of their most mature reflection and deliberation. In
consonance with this practice, before a decision is signed and promulgated, all opinions and conclusions
stated during and after the deliberation of the Court, remain in the breasts of the Justices, binding upon no
one, not even upon the Justices themselves. Of course, they may serve for determining what the opinion of the
majority provisionally is and for designating a member to prepare the decision of the Court, but inno way is that
decision binding unless and until signed and promulgated.
We add that at any time before promulgation, the ponencia may be changed by the ponente. Indeed, if any
member of the court who may have already signed it so desires, he may still withdraw his concurrence and
register a qualification or dissent as long as the decision has not yet been promulgated. A promulgation signifies
that on the date it was made the judge or judges who signed the decision continued to support it.
Thus, an unpromulgated decision is no decision at all. At the very least, they are part of the confidential internal
deliberations of the Court which must not be released to the public. A decision becomes binding only after it is
validly promulgated.15 Until such operative act occurs, there is really no decision to speak of, even if some or all
of the Justices have already affixed their signatures thereto. During the intervening period from the time of
signing until the promulgation of the decision, any one who took part in the deliberation and had signed the
decision may, for a reason, validly withdraw one's vote, thereby preserving one's freedom of action.
In sum, we hold that Biraogos Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer for Oral Argument must be denied. This
Court did not err in ruling that the proper remedy of those who may assail Limkaichong's disqualification based
on citizenship is to file before the HRET the proper petition at any time during her incumbency.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer for Oral Argument filed by petitioner Louis C.
Biraogo in G.R. No. 179120 is DENIED with FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 151914. July 31, 2002]
TEODULO M. COQUILLA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MR. NEIL
M. ALVAREZ, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the resolution, [1] dated July 19, 2001, of the Second Division of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), ordering the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of petitioner
Teodulo M. Coquilla for the position of mayor of Oras, Eastern Samar in the May 14, 2001 elections and the
order, dated January 30, 2002, of the COMELEC en banc denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:

Petitioner Coquilla was born on February 17, 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up
and resided there until 1965, when he joined the United States Navy. He was subsequently naturalized as a U.S.
citizen.[2] From 1970 to 1973, petitioner thrice visited the Philippines while on leave from the U.S. Navy.
[3]
Otherwise, even after his retirement from the U.S. Navy in 1985, he remained in the United States.
On October 15, 1998, petitioner came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although he
continued making several trips to the United States, the last of which took place on July 6, 2000 and lasted until
August 5, 2000.[4] Subsequently, petitioner applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 [5] to the Special
Committee on Naturalization. His application was approved on November 7, 2000, and, on November 10, 2000,
he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines. Petitioner was issued Certificate of Repatriation No. 000737 on
November 10, 2000 and Bureau of Immigration Identification Certificate No. 115123 on November 13, 2000.
On November 21, 2000, petitioner applied for registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar. His
application was approved by the Election Registration Board on January 12, 2001. [6] On February 27, 2001, he
filed his certificate of candidacy stating therein that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for two (2)
years.[7]
On March 5, 2001, respondent Neil M. Alvarez, who was the incumbent mayor of Oras and who was
running for reelection, sought the cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy on the ground that the latter
had made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by stating that he had been a resident of
Oras for two years when in truth he had resided therein for only about six months since November 10, 2000,
when he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.
The COMELEC was unable to render judgment on the case before the elections on May 14, 2001.
Meanwhile, petitioner was voted for and received the highest number of votes (6,131) against private
respondents 5,752 votes, or a margin of 379 votes. On May 17, 2001, petitioner was proclaimed mayor of Oras
by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.[8] He subsequently took his oath of office.
On July 19, 2001, the Second Division of the COMELEC granted private respondents petition and ordered
the cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy on the basis of the following findings:
Respondents frequent or regular trips to the Philippines and stay in Oras, Eastern Samar after his retirement from
the U.S. Navy in 1985 cannot be considered as a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant . . . of
the U.S.A. prior to November 10, 2000 as would qualify him to acquire the status of residency for purposes of
compliance with the one-year residency requirement of Section 39(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 in
relation to Sections 65 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. The one (1) year residency requirement
contemplates of the actual residence of a Filipino citizen in the constituency where he seeks to be elected.
All things considered, the number of years he claimed to have resided or stayed in Oras, Eastern Samar since
1985 as an American citizen and permanent resident of the U.S.A. before November 10, 2000 when he reacquired
his Philippine citizenship by [repatriation] cannot be added to his actual residence thereat after November 10,
2000 until May 14, 2001 to cure his deficiency in days, months, and year to allow or render him eligible to run
for an elective office in the Philippines. Under such circumstances, by whatever formula of computation used,
respondent is short of the one-year residence requirement before the May 14, 2001 elections. [9]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the COMELEC en banc on
January 30, 2002. Hence this petition.
I.

54 | P a g e

Two questions must first be resolved before considering the merits of this case: (a) whether the 30-day
period for appealing the resolution of the COMELEC was suspended by the filing of a motion for reconsideration
by petitioner and (b) whether the COMELEC retained jurisdiction to decide this case notwithstanding the
proclamation of petitioner.
A. With respect to the first question, private respondent contends that the petition in this case should be
dismissed because it was filed late; that the COMELEC en banc had denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration for being pro forma; and that, pursuant to Rule 19, 4 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the
said motion did not suspend the running of the 30-day period for filing this petition. He points out that petitioner
received a copy of the resolution, dated July 19, 2001, of the COMELECs Second Division on July 28, 2001, so
that he had only until August 27, 2001 within which to file this petition. Since the petition in this case was filed
on February 11, 2002, the same should be considered as having been filed late and should be dismissed.
Private respondents contention has no merit.
Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides in pertinent parts:
Sec. 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration. A motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or
ruling of a Division shall be filed within five days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro-forma,
suspends the execution for implementation of the decision, resolution, order, or ruling.
Sec. 4. Effect of Motion for Reconsideration on Period to Appeal. A motion to reconsider a decision,
resolution, order, or ruling, when not pro-forma, suspends the running of the period to elevate the matter to the
Supreme Court.
The five-day period for filing a motion for reconsideration under Rule 19, 2 should be counted from the
receipt of the decision, resolution, order, or ruling of the COMELEC Division. [10] In this case, petitioner received
a copy of the resolution of July 19, 2001 of the COMELECs Second Division on July 28, 2001. Five days later,
on August 2, 2001, he filed his motion for reconsideration. On February 6, 2002, he received a copy of the order,
dated January 30, 2002, of the COMELEC en banc denying his motion for reconsideration. Five days later, on
February 11, 2002, he filed this petition for certiorari. There is no question, therefore, that petitioners motion for
reconsideration of the resolution of the COMELEC Second Division, as well as his petition for certiorari to set
aside of the order of the COMELECen banc, was filed within the period provided for in Rule 19, 2 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure and in Art. IX(A), 7 of the Constitution.
It is contended, however, that petitioners motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc did
not suspend the running of the period for filing this petition because the motion was pro forma and, consequently,
this petition should have been filed on or before August 27, 2001. It was actually filed, however, only on
February 11, 2002. Private respondent cites the finding of the COMELEC en bancthat
An incisive examination of the allegations in the Motion for Reconsideration shows that the same [are] a mere
rehash of his averments contained in his Verified Answer and Memorandum. Neither did respondent raise new
matters that would sufficiently warrant a reversal of the assailed resolution of the Second Division. This makes
the said Motion pro forma.[11]
We do not think this contention is correct. The motion for reconsideration was not pro forma and its filing
did suspend the period for filing the petition for certiorari in this case. The mere reiteration in a motion for
reconsideration of the issues raised by the parties and passed upon by the court does not make a motion pro

forma; otherwise, the movants remedy would not be a reconsideration of the decision but a new trial or some
other remedy.[12] But, as we have held in another case:[13]
Among the ends to which a motion for reconsideration is addressed, one is precisely to convince the court that its
ruling is erroneous and improper, contrary to the law or the evidence; and in doing so, the movant has to dwell of
necessity upon the issues passed upon by the court. If a motion for reconsideration may not discuss these issues,
the consequence would be that after a decision is rendered, the losing party would be confined to filing only
motions for reopening and new trial.
Indeed, in the cases where a motion for reconsideration was held to be pro forma, the motion was so held
because (1) it was a second motion for reconsideration, [14] or (2) it did not comply with the rule that the motion
must specify the findings and conclusions alleged to be contrary to law or not supported by the evidence, [15] or (3)
it failed to substantiate the alleged errors, [16] or (4) it merely alleged that the decision in question was contrary to
law,[17] or (5) the adverse party was not given notice thereof. [18] The 16-page motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner in the COMELEC en banc suffers from none of the foregoing defects, and it was error for the
COMELEC en banc to rule that petitioners motion for reconsideration was pro forma because the allegations
raised therein are a mere rehash of his earlier pleadings or did not raise new matters. Hence, the filing of the
motion suspended the running of the 30-day period to file the petition in this case, which, as earlier shown, was
done within the reglementary period provided by law.
B. As stated before, the COMELEC failed to resolve private respondents petition for cancellation of
petitioners certificate of candidacy before the elections on May 14, 2001. In the meantime, the votes were
canvassed and petitioner was proclaimed elected with a margin of 379 votes over private respondent. Did the
COMELEC thereby lose authority to act on the petition filed by private respondent?
R.A. No. 6646 provides:
SECTION 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is
not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order
the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis
added)
SECTION 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. The procedure
hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as
provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
The rule then is that candidates who are disqualified by final judgment before the election shall not be
voted for and the votes cast for them shall not be counted. But those against whom no final judgment of
disqualification had been rendered may be voted for and proclaimed, unless, on motion of the complainant, the
COMELEC suspends their proclamation because the grounds for their disqualification or cancellation of their
certificates of candidacy are strong. Meanwhile, the proceedings for disqualification of candidates or for the
cancellation or denial of certificates of candidacy, which have been begun before the elections, should continue
even after such elections and proclamation of the winners. In Abella v. COMELEC[19] and Salcedo II v.
COMELEC,[20] the candidates whose certificates of candidacy were the subject of petitions for cancellation were
voted for and, having received the highest number of votes, were duly proclaimed winners. This Court, in the first
case, affirmed and, in the second, reversed the decisions of the COMELEC rendered after the proclamation of

55 | P a g e

candidates, not on the ground that the latter had been divested of jurisdiction upon the candidates proclamation
but on the merits.
II.
On the merits, the question is whether petitioner had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least one (1)
year before the elections held on May 14, 2001 as he represented in his certificate of candidacy. We find that he
had not.
First, 39(a) of the Local Government Code (R.A No. 7160) provides:
Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the
barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for
at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any
other local language or dialect. (Emphasis added)
The term residence is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to dwelling or
habitation,[21] but rather to domicile or legal residence, [22] that is, the place where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually
intends to return and remain (animus manendi).[23] A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is
usually the place where the childs parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new
domicile (domicile of choice).[24]
In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in
the U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on and until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship,
petitioner was an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines save as our immigration laws may have
allowed him to stay as a visitor or as a resident alien.
Indeed, residence in the United States is a requirement for naturalization as a U.S. citizen. Title 8, 1427(a)
of the United States Code provides:
Requirements of naturalization . Residence
(a) No person, except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, shall be naturalized unless such applicant, (1)
immediately preceding the date of filing his application for naturalization has resided continuously, after being
lawfully admitted for permanent residence, within the United States for at least five years and during the five
years immediately preceding the date of filing his petition has been physically present therein for periods totaling
at least half of that time, and who has resided within the State or within the district of the Service in the United
States in which the applicant filed the application for at least three months, (2) has resided continuously within
the United States from the date of the application up to the time of admission to citizenship, and (3) during all the
period referred to in this subsection has been and still is a person of good moral character, attached to the
principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the
United States. (Emphasis added)
In Caasi v. Court of Appeals,[25] this Court ruled that immigration to the United States by virtue of a greencard,
which entitles one to reside permanently in that country, constitutes abandonment of domicile in the Philippines.
With more reason then does naturalization in a foreign country result in an abandonment of domicile in the
Philippines.

Nor can petitioner contend that he was compelled to adopt American citizenship only by reason of his
service in the U.S. armed forces.[26] It is noteworthy that petitioner was repatriated not under R.A. No. 2630,
which applies to the repatriation of those who lost their Philippine citizenship by accepting commission in the
Armed Forces of the United States, but under R.A. No. 8171, which, as earlier mentioned, provides for the
repatriation of, among others, natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic
necessity. In any event, the fact is that, by having been naturalized abroad, he lost his Philippine citizenship and
with it his residence in the Philippines. Until his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship on November 10, 2000,
petitioner did not reacquire his legal residence in this country.
Second, it is not true, as petitioner contends, that he reestablished residence in this country in 1998 when
he came back to prepare for the mayoralty elections of Oras by securing a Community Tax Certificate in that year
and by constantly declaring to his townmates of his intention to seek repatriation and run for mayor in the May
14, 2001 elections.[27] The status of being an alien and a non-resident can be waived either separately, when one
acquires the status of a resident alien before acquiring Philippine citizenship, or at the same time when one
acquires Philippine citizenship. As an alien, an individual may obtain an immigrant visa under 13 [28] of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1948 and an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) [29] and thus waive his status
as a non-resident. On the other hand, he may acquire Philippine citizenship by naturalization under C.A. No. 473,
as amended, or, if he is a former Philippine national, he may reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation or by
an act of Congress,[30] in which case he waives not only his status as an alien but also his status as a non-resident
alien.
In the case at bar, the only evidence of petitioners status when he entered the country on October 15,
1998, December 20, 1998, October 16, 1999, and June 23, 2000 is the statement Philippine Immigration []
Balikbayan in his 1998-2008 U.S. passport. As for his entry on August 5, 2000, the stamp bore the added
inscription good for one year stay. [31] Under 2 of R.A. No. 6768 (An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program),
the term balikbayan includes a former Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in a foreign country and comes
or returns to the Philippines and, if so, he is entitled, among others, to a visa-free entry to the Philippines for a
period of one (1) year (3(c)). It would appear then that when petitioner entered the country on the dates in
question, he did so as a visa-free balikbayanvisitor whose stay as such was valid for one year only. Hence,
petitioner can only be held to have waived his status as an alien and as a non-resident only on November 10, 2000
upon taking his oath as a citizen of the Philippines under R.A. No. 8171. [32] He lacked the requisite residency to
qualify him for the mayorship of Oras, Eastern, Samar.
Petitioner invokes the ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections[33] in support of his contention that the
residency requirement in 39(a) of the Local Government Code includes the residency of one who is not a citizen
of the Philippines. Residency, however, was not an issue in that case and this Court did not make any ruling on
the issue now at bar. The question in Frivaldo was whether petitioner, who took his oath of repatriation on the
same day that his term as governor of Sorsogon began on June 30, 1995, complied with the citizenship
requirement under 39(a). It was held that he had, because citizenship may be possessed even on the day the
candidate assumes office. But in the case of residency, as already noted, 39(a) of the Local Government Code
requires that the candidate must have been a resident of the municipality for at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election.
Nor can petitioner invoke this Courts ruling in Bengzon III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
What the Court held in that case was that, upon repatriation, a former natural-born Filipino is deemed to have
recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen.
[34]

Third, petitioner nonetheless says that his registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar in
January 2001 is conclusive of his residency as a candidate because 117 of the Omnibus Election Code requires
that a voter must have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the city or municipality wherein he
proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. As held in Nuval v. Guray,

56 | P a g e

[35]

however, registration as a voter does not bar the filing of a subsequent case questioning a candidates lack of
residency.
Petitioners invocation of the liberal interpretation of election laws cannot avail him any. As held
in Aquino v. Commission on Elections:[36]
A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In a republican government those laws are
themselves ordained by the people. Through their representatives, they dictate the qualifications necessary for
service in government positions. And as petitioner clearly lacks one of the essential qualifications for running for
membership in the House of Representatives, not even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters of the
Second District of Makati City would substitute for a requirement mandated by the fundamental law itself.
Fourth, petitioner was not denied due process because the COMELEC failed to act on his motion to be
allowed to present evidence. Under 5(d), in relation to 7, of R.A. No. 6646 (Electoral Reforms Law of 1987),
proceedings for denial or cancellation of a certificate of candidacy are summary in nature. The holding of a
formal hearing is thus not de rigeur. In any event, petitioner cannot claim denial of the right to be heard since he
filed a Verified Answer, a Memorandum and a Manifestation, all dated March 19, 2001, before the COMELEC in
which he submitted documents relied by him in this petition, which, contrary to petitioners claim, are complete
and intact in the records.

misrepresentation concerning a material fact. In the case at bar, what is involved is a false statement concerning a
candidates qualification for an office for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. This is a misrepresentation
of a material fact justifying the cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy. The cancellation of
petitioners certificate of candidacy in this case is thus fully justified.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the resolution of the Second Division of the Commission
on Elections, dated July 19, 2001, and the order, dated January 30, 2002 of the Commission on Elections en
banc are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 87193 June 23, 1989

JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES, SORSOGON
CHAPTER, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, SALVADOR NEE ESTUYE, respondents.
J.L. Misa & Associates for petitioner.

III.
Lladoc, Huab & Associates for private respondent.
The statement in petitioners certificate of candidacy that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for
two years at the time he filed such certificate is not true. The question is whether the COMELEC was justified
in ordering the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for this reason. We hold that it was. Petitioner made a
false representation of a material fact in his certificate of candidacy, thus rendering such certificate liable to
cancellation. The Omnibus Election Code provides:
SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is
announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which
he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post
office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the
Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal
orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or
immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his
knowledge.
SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to
deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that
any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be
filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and
shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
Indeed, it has been held that a candidates statement in her certificate of candidacy for the position of
governor of Leyte that she was a resident of Kananga, Leyte when this was not so[37] or that the candidate was a
natural-born Filipino when in fact he had become an Australian citizen [38] constitutes a ground for the
cancellation of a certificate of candidacy. On the other hand, we held in Salcedo II v. COMELEC[39] that a
candidate who used her husbands family name even though their marriage was void was not guilty of

CRUZ, J.:
Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and
assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter (hereafter,
League), represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the
Commission on Elections a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo; election and proclamation on the ground that
he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on January 20, 1983. In his answer
dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the
special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President
Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the
unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad." He added that he had returned to the
Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. He also argued that the challenge
to his title should be dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto petition that should have been filed within ten
days from his proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The League,
moreover, was not a proper party because it was not a voter and so could not sue under the said section.
Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses but the respondent Commission on
Elections decided instead by its Order of January 20, 1988, to set the case for hearing on the merits. His motion
for reconsideration was denied in another Order dated February 21, 1988. He then came to this Court in a petition
forcertiorari and prohibition to ask that the said orders be set aside on the ground that they had been rendered
with grave abuse of discretion. Pending resolution of the petition, we issued a temporary order against the hearing
on the merits scheduled by the COMELEC and at the same time required comments from the respondents.

57 | P a g e

In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo was a naturalized American
citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was
therefore not qualified to run for and be elected governor. They also argued that their petition in the Commission
on Elections was not really for quo warranto under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate
purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from continuing as governor, his candidacy and election being null and void ab
initio because of his alienage. Even if their petition were to be considered as one for quo warranto, it could not
have been filed within ten days from Frivaldo's proclamation because it was only in September 1988 that they
received proof of his naturalization. And assuming that the League itself was not a proper party, Estuye himself,
who was suing not only for the League but also in his personal capacity, could nevertheless institute the suit by
himself alone.
Speaking for the public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the contention that Frivaldo was not a citizen
of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he
was disqualified from public office in the Philippines. His election did not cure this defect because the electorate
of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the Local Government Code, and the Omnibus Election Code. He
also joined in the private respondent's argument that Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code was not
applicable because what the League and Estuye were seeking was not only the annulment of the proclamation and
election of Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also asking for the termination of Frivaldo's incumbency as
governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a Filipino.
In his Reply, Frivaldo insisted that he was a citizen of the Philippines because his naturalization as an American
citizen was not "impressed with voluntariness." In support he cited the Nottebohm Case, [(1955 I.C.J. 4; 49
A.J.I.L. 396 (1955)] where a German national's naturalization in Liechtenstein was not recognized because it had
been obtained for reasons of convenience only. He said he could not have repatriated himself before the 1988
elections because the Special Committee on Naturalization created for the purpose by LOI No. 27C had not yet
been organized then. His oath in his certificate of candidacy that he was a natural-born citizen should be a
sufficient act of repatriation. Additionally, his active participation in the 1987 congressional elections had
divested him of American citizenship under the laws of the United States, thus restoring his Philippine
citizenship. He ended by reiterating his prayer for the rejection of the move to disqualify him for being timebarred under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Considering the importance and urgency of the question herein raised, the Court has decided to resolve it directly
instead of allowing the normal circuitous route that will after all eventually end with this Court, albeit only after
a, long delay. We cannot permit this delay. Such delay will be inimical to the public interest and the vital
principles of public office to be here applied.

The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and
employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42
of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the
Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election
Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being
an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-born"
citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however,
that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following certification from the United
States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of
the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
OFFICE
OF
UNITED
STATES
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THE
DISTRICT

CLERK
COURT

September 23, 1988

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
Our records show that JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, born on October 20, 1915, was
naturalized in this Court on January 20, 1983, and issued Certificate of Naturalization No.
11690178.
Petition No. 280225.
Alien Registration No. A23 079 270.
Very truly yours,

WILLIAM L. WHITTAKER
It is true that the Commission on Elections has the primary jurisdiction over this question as the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Congress and elective provincial
and city officials. However, the decision on Frivaldo's citizenship has already been made by the COMELEC
through its counsel, the Solicitor General, who categorically claims that Frivaldo is a foreigner. We assume this
stance was taken by him after consultation with the public respondent and with its approval. It therefore
represents the decision of the COMELEC itself that we may now review. Exercising our discretion to interpret the
Rules of Court and the Constitution, we shall consider the present petition as having been filed in accordance
with Article IX-A Section 7, of the Constitution, to challenge the aforementioned Orders of the COMELEC.
The basic question we must resolve is whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time
of his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon. All the other issues raised in this petition
are merely secondary to this basic question.

Clerk
by:
(Sgd.)

ARACELI V. BAREN
Deputy Clerk

58 | P a g e

This evidence is not denied by the petitioner. In fact, he expressly admitted it in his answer.
Nevertheless, as earlier noted, he claims it was "forced" on him as a measure of protection
from the persecution of the Marcos government through his agents in the United States.
The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of the
Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced
into embracing American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not
the result of his own free and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected
outright.
There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and
some of them subject to greater risk than he, who did not find it necessary nor do they
claim to have been coerced to abandon their cherished status as Filipinos. They did not
take the oath of allegiance to the United States, unlike the petitioner who solemnly
declared "on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and
fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty of whom or which I have
heretofore been a subject or citizen," meaning in his case the Republic of the Philippines.
The martyred Ninoy Aquino heads the impressive list of those Filipinos in exile who,
unlike the petitioner, held fast to their Philippine citizenship despite the perils of their
resistance to the Marcos regime.
The Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the international law principle of
effective nationality which is clearly not applicable to the case at bar. This principle is
expressed in Article 5 of the Hague Convention of 1930 on the Conflict of Nationality
Laws as follows:
Art. 5. Within a third State a person having more than one
nationality shall be treated as if he had only one. Without prejudice
to the application of its law in matters of personal status and of any
convention in force, a third State shall, of the nationalities which any
such person possesses, recognize exclusively in its territory either
the nationality of the country in which he is habitually and
principally resident or the nationality of the country with which in
the circumstances he appears to be in fact most closely connected.
Nottebohm was a German by birth but a resident of Guatemala for 34 years when he
applied for and acquired naturalization in Liechtenstein one month before the outbreak of
World War II. Many members of his family and his business interests were in Germany. In
1943, Guatemala, which had declared war on Germany, arrested Nottebohm and
confiscated all his properties on the ground that he was a German national. Liechtenstein
thereupon filed suit on his behalf, as its citizen, against Guatemala. The International Court
of Justice held Nottebohm to be still a national of Germany, with which he was more
closely connected than with Liechtenstein.
That case is not relevant to the petition before us because it dealt with a conflict between
the nationality laws of two states as decided by a third state. No third state is involved in
the case at bar; in fact, even the United States is not actively claiming Frivaldo as its
national. The sole question presented to us is whether or not Frivaldo is a citizen of the
Philippines under our own laws, regardless of other nationality laws. We can decide this
question alone as sovereign of our own territory, conformably to Section 1 of the said

Convention providing that "it is for each State to determine under its law who are its
nationals."
It is also worth noting that Nottebohm was invoking his naturalization in Liechtenstein
whereas in the present case Frivaldo is rejecting his naturalization in the United States.
If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine
citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country.
Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may
be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
While Frivaldo does not invoke either of the first two methods, he nevertheless claims he
has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of a valid repatriation. He claims that by
actively participating in the elections in this country, he automatically forfeited American
citizenship under the laws of the United States. Such laws do not concern us here. The
alleged forfeiture is between him and the United States as his adopted country. It should be
obvious that even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did
not and could not have the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the
Philippines that he had earlier renounced. At best, what might have happened as a result of
the loss of his naturalized citizenship was that he became a stateless individual.
Frivaldo's contention that he could not have repatriated himself under LOI 270 because the
Special Committee provided for therein had not yet been constituted seems to suggest that
the lack of that body rendered his repatriation unnecessary. That is far-fetched if not
specious Such a conclusion would open the floodgates, as it were. It would allow all
Filipinos who have renounced this country to claim back their abandoned citizenship
without formally rejecting their adoptedstate and reaffirming their allegiance to the
Philippines.
It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends that by
simply filing his certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already effectively
recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the formal declaration the law envisions
surely, Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered. If the
Special Committee had not yet been convened, what that meant simply was that the
petitioner had to wait until this was done, or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial
proceedings.
The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on Elections should be dismissed
for tardiness is not well-taken. The herein private respondents are seeking to prevent
Frivaldo from continuing to discharge his office of governor because he is disqualified
from doing so as a foreigner. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements
and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of
office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost,
his title may be seasonably challenged. If, say, a female legislator were to marry a foreigner
during her term and by her act or omission acquires his nationality, would she have a right
to remain in office simply because the challenge to her title may no longer be made within
ten days from her proclamation? It has been established, and not even denied, that the
evidence of Frivaldo's naturalization was discovered only eight months after his
proclamation and his title was challenged shortly thereafter.

59 | P a g e

This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this
country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected
by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting
public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications
prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the
people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if
they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this
rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks
to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country
only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.

As a rule, the quo warranto petition seeking to annul the petitioner's election and
proclamation should have been filed with ten days after the proclamation of election
results. 2 The purpose of the law in not allowing the filing of protests beyond the period
fixed by law is to have a certain and definite time within which petitions against the results
of an election should be filed and to provide summary proceedings for the settlement of
such disputes. 3 The Rules of Court allow the Republic of the Philippines to file quo
warranto proceedings against any public officer who performs an act which works a
forfeiture of his office. 4 However, where the Solicitor General or the President feel that
there are no good reasons to commence quo warranto proceedings, 5 the Court should allow
a person like respondent Estuye or his league to bring the action.

It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored by
the Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it should be treasured like
a pearl of great price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot
be lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a
jealous and possessive mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager
arms its prodigal if repentant children. The returning renegade must show, by an express
and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love.

I must emphasize, however, that my concurrence is limited to a clear case of an alien

holding an elective public office. And perhaps in a clear case of disloyalty to the Republic
of the Philippines. 6Where the disqualification is based on age, residence, or any of the
many grounds for ineligibility, 7 I believe that the ten-day period should be applied strictly.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is hereby

declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from serving as
Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered to vacate his office and
surrender the same to the duly elected Vice-Governor of the said province once this
decision becomes final and executory. The temporary restraining order dated March 9,
1989, is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., took no part.

The pragmatic approach is also shown by the fact that the Court found it inexpedient to
wait for the final decision of COMELEC. This step is most unusual but considering the
total lack of any serious grounds for the petitioner's claim of having regained his Philippine
citizenship, I am constrained to concur in the procedure pro hac vice.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur in the pragmatic approach taken by the Court. I agree that when the higher
interests of the State are involved, the public good should supersede any procedural
infinities which may affect a petition filed with the Commission on Elections. I fail to see
how the Court could allow a person who by his own admissions is indubitably an alien to
continue holding the office of Governor of any province.
It is an established rule of long standing that the period fixed by law for the filing of a
protest whether quo warranto or election contest is mandatory and jurisdictional. 1

Cortes J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur in the pragmatic approach taken by the Court. I agree that when the higher
interests of the State are involved, the public good should supersede any procedural
infinities which may affect a petition filed with the Commission on Elections. I fail to see
how the Court could allow a person who by his own admissions is indubitably an alien to
continue holding the office of Governor of any province.
It is an established rule of long standing that the period fixed by law for the filing of a
protest whether quo warranto or election contest is mandatory and jurisdictional. 1

As a rule, the quo warranto petition seeking to annul the petitioner's election and
proclamation should have been filed with ten days after the proclamation of election
results. 2 The purpose of the law in not allowing the filing of protests beyond the period
fixed by law is to have a certain and definite time within which petitions against the results
of an election should be filed and to provide summary proceedings for the settlement of
such disputes. 3 The Rules of Court allow the Republic of the Philippines to file quo
warranto proceedings against any public officer who performs an act which works a
forfeiture of his office. 4 However, where the Solicitor General or the President feel that
there are no good reasons to commence quo warranto proceedings, 5 the Court should allow
a person like respondent Estuye or his league to bring the action.
I must emphasize, however, that my concurrence is limited to a clear case of an alien
holding an elective public office. And perhaps in a clear case of disloyalty to the Republic
of the Philippines. 6Where the disqualification is based on age, residence, or any of the
many grounds for ineligibility, 7 I believe that the ten-day period should be applied strictly.

60 | P a g e

The pragmatic approach is also shown by the fact that the Court found it inexpedient to
wait for the final decision of COMELEC. This step is most unusual but considering the
total lack of any serious grounds for the petitioner's claim of having regained his Philippine
citizenship, I am constrained to concur in the procedure pro hac vice.

LOIDA NICOLAS-LEWIS, GREGORIO B. MACABENTA, ALEJANDRO A. ESCLAMADO,

ARMANDO B. HEREDIA, REUBEN S. SEGURITAN, ERIC LACHICA FURBEYRE, TERESITA A.
CRUZ, JOSEFINA OPENA DISTERHOFT, MERCEDES V. OPENA, CORNELIO R. NATIVIDAD,
EVELYN D. NATIVIDAD,
Petitioners,

- versus -

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.

Prodded for clarification by petitioner Loida Nicolas-Lewis in the light of the ruling in Macalintal vs.
COMELEC [3] on the residency requirement, the COMELEC wrote in response:

G.R. No. 162759

Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
PUNO,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO-MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

Although R.A. 9225 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality , it is the

Commission's position that those who have availed of the law cannot exercise the right of
suffrage given under the OAVL for the reason that the OAVL was not enacted for
them. Hence, as Filipinos who have merely re-acquired their citizenship on 18 September
2003 at the earliest, and as law and jurisprudence now stand, they are considered regular
voters who have to meet the requirements of residency, among others under Section 1,
Article 5 of the Constitution. [4]
Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004 elections owing to
the COMELEC's refusal to include them in the National Registry of Absentee Voters, petitioner Nicolas-Lewis et
al., [5] filed on April 1, 2004 this petition for certiorari and mandamus.

Promulgated:
August 4, 2006

A little over a week before the May 10, 2004 elections, or on April 30, 2004, the COMELEC filed
a Comment,[6] therein praying for the denial of the petition. As may be expected, petitioners were not able to
register let alone vote in said elections.

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, petitioners, referring to themselves as "duals" or dual citizens,
pray that they and others who retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225,
the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, be allowed to avail themselves of the mechanism
provided under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003[1] (R.A. 9189) and that the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) accordingly be ordered to allow them to vote and register as absentee voters under the aegis of R.A.
9189.

The facts:

Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 which
accords to such applicants the right of suffrage, among others. Long before the May 2004 national and local
elections, petitioners sought registration and certification as "overseas absentee voter" only to be advised by the
Philippine Embassy in the United States that, per a COMELEC letter to the Department of Foreign Affairs dated
September 23, 2003[2], they have yet no right to vote in such elections owing to their lack of the one-year
residence requirement prescribed by the Constitution. The same letter, however, urged the different Philippine
posts abroad not to discontinue their campaign for voters registration, as the residence restriction adverted to
would contextually affect merely certain individuals who would likely be eligible to vote in future elections.

On May 20, 2004, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation (in Lieu of Comment),
therein stating that all qualified overseas Filipinos, including dual citizens who care to exercise the right
of suffrage, may do so , observing, however, that the conclusion of the 2004 elections had rendered the petition
moot and academic.[7]
The holding of the 2004 elections had, as the OSG pointed out, indeed rendered the petition moot and
academic, but insofar only as petitioners participation in such political exercise is concerned. The broader and
transcendental issue tendered or subsumed in the petition, i.e., the propriety of allowing duals to participate and
vote as absentee voter in future elections, however, remains unresolved.

Observing the petitioners and the COMELECs respective formulations of the issues, the same may be
reduced into the question of whether or not petitioners and others who might have meanwhile retained and/or
reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee voter under R.A. 9189.

The Court resolves the poser in the affirmative, and thereby accords merit to the petition.

61 | P a g e

In esse, this case is all about suffrage. A quick look at the governing provisions on the right of suffrage is,
therefore, indicated.

We start off with Sections 1 and 2 of Article V of the Constitution, respectively reading as follows:

SECTION 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not

otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have
resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to
vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. xxx.
SEC 2. The Congress shall provide a system for absentee voting by qualified
Filipinos abroad.
In a nutshell, the aforequoted Section 1 prescribes residency requirement as a general eligibility factor for
the right to vote. On the other hand, Section 2 authorizes Congress to devise a system wherein an absentee may
vote, implying that a non-resident may, as an exception to the residency prescription in the preceding section, be
allowed to vote.
In response to its above mandate, Congress enacted R.A. 9189 - the OAVL [8] - identifying in its Section 4
who can vote under it and in the following section who cannot, as follows:
Section 4. Coverage. All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise
disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of elections, may vote for
president, vice-president, senators and party-list representatives.
Section 5. Disqualifications. The following shall be disqualified from voting
under this Act:
(a)

(e)
Any citizen of the Philippines abroad previously declared insane or
incompetent by competent authority . (Words in bracket added.)
Notably, Section 5 lists those who cannot avail themselves of the absentee voting mechanism. However,
Section 5(d) of the enumeration respecting Filipino immigrants and permanent residents in another country opens
an exception and qualifies the disqualification rule. Section 5(d) would, however, face a constitutional challenge
on the ground that, as narrated inMacalintal, it -

violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the
voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he
proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding an election. [The
challenger] cites Caasi vs. Court of Appeals [9] to support his claim [where] the Court
held that a green card holder immigrant to the [US] is deemed to have abandoned his
domicile and residence in the Philippines.
[The challenger] further argues that Section 1, Article V of the Constitution does
not allow provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be
qualified to vote in a political exercise; that the legislature should not be allowed to
circumvent the requirement of the Constitution on the right of suffrage by providing a
condition thereon which in effect amends or alters the aforesaid residence requirement to
qualify a Filipino abroad to vote. He claims that the right of suffrage should not be granted
to anyone who, on the date of the election, does not possess the qualifications provided for
by Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.[10] (Words in bracket added.)

As may be recalled, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 mainly on the

Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance with Philippine

laws;

strength of the following premises:

(b)
Those who have expressly renounced their Philippine citizenship and who
have pledged allegiance to a foreign country;
(c)
Those who have [been] convicted in a final judgment by a court or
tribunal of an offense punishable by imprisonment of not less than one (1) year, including
those who have been found guilty of Disloyalty as defined under Article 137 of the
Revised Penal Code, .;

(d)
An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host
country, unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by
the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in
the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of his/her registration under this
Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another
country. Failure to return shall be the cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant
or permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent
disqualification to vote in absentia.

As finally approved into law, Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically
disqualifies an immigrant or permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host
country because immigration or permanent residence in another country implies
renunciation of one's residence in his country of origin. However, same Section allows an
immigrant and permanent resident abroad to register as voter for as long as he/she executes
an affidavit to show that he/she has not abandoned his domicile in pursuance of the
constitutional intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that all citizens of the
Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law must be entitled to exercise the right of
suffrage and, that Congress must establish a system for absentee voting; for otherwise, if
actual, physical residence in the Philippines is required, there is no sense for the framers of
the Constitution to mandate Congress to establish a system for absentee voting.
Contrary to the claim of [the challenger], the execution of the affidavit itself is not
the enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only proof
of the intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume residency in
the Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had not in
fact abandoned his domicile of origin. Thus, it is not correct to say that the execution of

62 | P a g e

the affidavit under Section 5(d) violates the Constitution that proscribes provisional
registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a
political exercise. [11]

(5)
That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office
in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:
(a)
are candidates for or are occupying any public office
in the country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or

Soon after Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 passed the test of constitutionality, Congress enacted R.A. 9225 the

(b)
are in active service as commissioned or noncommissioned officers in the armed forces of the country which they
are naturalized citizens.

relevant portion of which reads:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have
lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby
deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of
allegiance to the Republic:
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking
the aforesaid oath.
SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. The unmarried child, whether legitimate,
illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire
Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the
Philippines.

SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject
to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the
following conditions:
(1)
Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the
requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189,
otherwise known as The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and other existing laws;
(2)
Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall
meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship ;
3)

xxx

xxx

xxx.

(4) xxx

xxx

xxx;

After what appears to be a successful application for recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9189,
petitioners now invoke their right to enjoy political rights, specifically the right of suffrage, pursuant to
Section 5 thereof.

Opposing the petitioners bid, however, respondent COMELEC invites attention to the same Section 5 (1)
providing that duals can enjoy their right to vote, as an adjunct to political rights, only if they meet the
requirements of Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, R.A. 9189 and other existing laws. Capitalizing on what
at first blush is the clashing provisions of theaforecited provision of the Constitution, which, to repeat, requires
residency in the Philippines for a certain period, and R.A. 9189 which grants a Filipino non-resident absentee
voting rights,[12] COMELEC argues:

4.

DUALS MUST FIRST ESTABLISH THEIR DOMICILE/ RESIDENCE IN

THE PHILIPPINES

4.01.

The inclusion of such additional and specific requirements in RA 9225 is

logical. The duals, upon renouncement of their Filipino citizenship and
acquisition of foreign citizenship, have practically and legally abandoned their
domicile and severed their legal ties to the homeland as a consequence. Having
subsequently acquired a second citizenship (i.e., Filipino) then, duals must, for
purposes of voting, first of all, decisively and definitely establish their domicile
through positive acts; [13]

The Court disagrees.

As may be noted, there is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to
actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to
vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that duals are most likely non-residents, grants
under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be
overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who,
save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote.
Thus, wrote the Court in Macalintal:

63 | P a g e

It is clear from these discussions of the Constitutional Commission that [it]

intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not
abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission even intended to extend to young
Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents domicile of origin is in
the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time.
It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for Section 2
[Article V] immediately after the residency requirement of Section 1. By the doctrine of
necessary implication in statutory construction, , the strategic location of Section 2
indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to the actual
residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same
Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in
the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy the residency
requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the residency
requirement found in Section 1 of the same Article was in fact the subject of debate when
Senate Bill No. 2104, which became R.A. No. 9189, was deliberated upon on the Senate
floor, thus:
Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, this bill should be looked
into in relation to the constitutional provisions. I think the sponsor
and I would agree that the Constitution is supreme in any statute that
we may enact.

This is consistent, Mr. President, with the constitutional

mandate that we that Congress must provide a franchise to
overseas Filipinos.
If we read the Constitution and the suffrage principle
literally as demanding physical presence, then there is no way we
can provide for offshore voting to our offshore kababayan, Mr.
President.
Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, when the Constitution says,
in Section 2 of Article V, it reads: The Congress shall provide a
system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a
system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
The key to this whole exercise, Mr. President, is
qualified. In other words, anything that we may do or say in
granting our compatriots abroad must be anchored on the
proposition that they are qualified. Absent the qualification, they
cannot vote. And residents (sic) is a qualification.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Look at what the Constitution says In the place wherein

they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding
the election.
Mr. President, all of us here have run (sic) for office.

Let me read Section 1, Article V, of the Constitution .

xxx

xxx

xxx

Now, Mr. President, the Constitution says, who shall have

resided in the Philippines. They are permanent immigrants. They
have changed residence so they are barred under the
Constitution. This is why I asked whether this committee
amendment which in fact does not alter the original text of the bill
will have any effect on this?

I live in Makati. My neighbor is Pateros . We are

separated only by a creek. But one who votes in Makati cannot vote
in Pateros unless he resides in Pateros for six months. That is how
restrictive our Constitution is. .
As I have said, if a voter in Makati would want to vote in
Pateros, yes, he may do so. But he must do so, make the transfer six
months before the election, otherwise, he is not qualified to vote.
xxx

Senator Angara. Good question, Mr. President. And this has

been asked in various fora. This is in compliance with the
Constitution. One, the interpretation here of residence is
synonymous with domicile.
As the gentleman and I know, Mr. President, domicile is
the intent to return to one's home. And the fact that a Filipino may
have been physically absent from the Philippines and may be
physically a resident of the United States, for example, but has a
clear intent to return to the Philippines, will make him qualified as
a resident of the Philippines under this law.

xxx

xxx

Senator Angara. It is a good point to raise, Mr.

President. But it is a point already well-debated even in the
constitutional commission of 1986. And the reason Section 2 of
Article V was placed immediately after the six-month/one-year
residency requirement is to demonstrate unmistakably that Section
2 which authorizes absentee voting is an exception to the sixmonth/one-year residency requirement. That is the first principle,
Mr. President, that one must remember.
The second reason, Mr. President, is that under our
jurisprudence residency has been interpreted as synonymous
with domicile.

64 | P a g e

But the third more practical reason, is, if

we follow the interpretation of the gentleman, then
it
is
legally and constitutionally impossible to give a franchise to vote
to overseas Filipinos who do not physically live in the country,
which is quite ridiculous because that is exactly the whole
point of this exercise to enfranchise them and empower them
to vote. [14] (Emphasis and words in bracket added; citations
omitted)

Absentee Voting refers to the process by which qualified citizens of

the Philippines abroad exercise their right to vote;
Overseas Absentee Voter refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified to
register and vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law, who is abroad on the
day of elections;
While perhaps not determinative of the issue tendered herein, we note that the expanded thrust of R.A.
9189 extends also to what might be tag as the next generation of "duals". This may be deduced from the inclusion
of the provision on derivative citizenship in R.A. 9225 which reads:

Lest it be overlooked, no less than the COMELEC itself admits that the Citizenship Retention and
Re-Acquisition Act expanded the coverage of overseas absentee voting. According to the poll body:

1.05 With the passage of RA 9225 the scope of overseas absentee voting has been
consequently expanded so as to include Filipinos who are also citizens of other countries,
subject, however, to the strict prerequisites indicated in the pertinent provisions of RA
9225; [15]

Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope of that law
with the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that "duals" may now exercise the right of suffrage
thru the absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters. R.A. 9189 defines the terms adverted to in the
following wise:

SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. The unmarried child, whether legitimate,

illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire
Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the
Philippines.
It is very likely that a considerable number of those unmarried children below eighteen (18) year
s of age had never set foot in the Philippines. Now then, if the next generation of "duals" may nonetheless
avail themselves the right to enjoy full civil and political rights under Section 5 of the Act, then there is neither no
rhyme nor reason why the petitioners and other present day "duals," provided they meet the requirements under
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in relation to R.A. 9189, be denied the right of suffrage as an overseas
absentee voter. Congress could not have plausibly intended such absurd situation.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court rules and so holds that those
who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and
Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, may exercise the right to vote under the system of absentee voting in Republic Act
No. 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.
SO ORDERED.

65 | P a g e