Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
To cite this Article Levy, Avigdor(1982) 'Military reform and the problem of centralization in the Ottoman empire in the
eighteenth century', Middle Eastern Studies, 18: 3, 227 — 249
To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/00263208208700508
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263208208700508
The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents
will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses
should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss,
actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly
or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
Military Reform and the Problem of Centralization
in the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century
Avigdor Levy
suggest that an ongoing conflict between reform and conservatism was the
central theme of Ottoman political development in the eighteenth century.
Based on this approach a non-specialist could conclude that whenever reform
failed it was due to not much more than 'the adamant conservatism of the
Janissaries and ulema\x
Moreover, since students of Ottoman history have become preoccupied
with this theme, other significant aspects of military reform have received only
little attention. In Armies and Societies in Europe, 1494-1789, Andre Corvisier
discusses the emergence of the modern military and makes the following
generalizations:
The subject goes well beyond the frame of the army itself. In effect, the
army was a special domain, one in which the sovereign authority first
prevailed; and military administration . . . served in many ways as a
proving ground for other governmental operations. In every case the
State had to overome obstacles in order to create effective armies.2
Students of Ottoman military institutions would surely find these remarks
highly evocative. True, the Ottoman empire was subject to conditions and
developments which differed considerably from those prevailing in the
European states forming the subject of Corvisier's study. But the basic issues
and tensions of state-military relations appear remarkably similar.
Ottoman military reform, like that of contemporary European states, was
motivated and shaped by a combination of external and internal factors.
From the second half of the seventeenth century external challenges had
become increasingly more threatening. Repeated military defeats resulting in
permanent territorial losses fully exposed the inferiority of Ottoman arms in
the face of expansionist European enemies. If it were to survive at all, the
Ottoman empire was in urgent need to upgrade its armed forces. At the same
time there were strong internal incentives for military reform.
Ottoman society consisted of a multitude of overlapping, self-administering
entities, such as religious communities {millets) and brotherhoods with their
state-wide hierarchies, local guilds and urban and rural parishes. During its
zenith, from the mid-fifteenth century through most of the sixteenth, the State
controlled this highly variegated social order mainly through the means of a
228 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
But these were essentially regarded as changes in detail, while the avowed
objective remained the restoration of the old institutions along their
traditional principles. In fact, it was this adherence to traditional values which
gave the reformers a measure of strength and the means to legitimize
unpopular policies. Since the military reforms were generally part of a wider
political-administrative reorganization, they were applied with the same
principles in mind. Hereafter we shall refer to measures intended to improve
the military, but without introducing significant institutional changes as
restorative military reform.
Before discussing restorative military reform it is necessary to outline the
basic characteristics of the disorganization which affected the main military
services at the time of Ottoman decline. During this period it had become the
practice that the paid military corps, and especially the Janissaries, were
infiltrated by civilian elements seeking to enjoy the privileges and immunities
conferred on the military. These civilians performed no worthwhile military
service and their lack of discipline eventually affected the performance of the
professional soldiers. In time many of the newcomers also succeeded in having
their names officially inscribed on the rolls thereby becoming eligible for pay.
The increase in numbers did not represent any accretion in military strength
but rather the contrary — growing corruption and the disintegration of the
army as a fighting force. In addition, the inflated muster rolls became a
crushing burden on the treasury. In the case of the timarli troops the process of
disintegration operated in different ways. Due to legitimate needs for funds,
but mostly because of administrative laxness and corruption, increasing
numbers of military fiefs were abolished and their income diverted for non-
military purposes. In addition, fief-holders found ways to avoid military
service and training. Consequently, the number of feudal troops capable of
rendering military duty was constantly on the decline. The salient features of
restorative military reform were intended, in brief, to reverse these trends. The
paid army corps were purged of those who did not render active military
service. The remaining troops were then brought under tighter discipline and
their training improved. The decrease in numbers also helped to ease the
burden on the treasury. For the feudal troops reform usually meant measures
intended to increase the numbers of active soldiers and improve their
230 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
effectiveness. The rolls of these troops were examined and attempts were made
to force fief-holders to train regularly and render military duties, or relinquish
their holdings in favor of others willing to serve. Moreover, in some instances,
military fiefs which had been previously abolished were actually restored for
their original purpose.
In addition, however, restorative reformers also introduced technological
improvements borrowed from Europe. They imported and manufactured by
imitation improved models of artillery pieces, new types ofsmall firearms and
more effective gunpowder. They adopted new techniques in the engineering
arts of fortification and siege and in shipbuilding. But as imitators and
importers the Ottomans inevitably trailed behind their European adversaries
in the adoption of new technology. In the seventeenth century, as the pace of
western technological advances accelerated, that gap became increasingly
wider.9
Downloaded By: [University of Leeds] At: 15:59 28 February 2010
Ibrahim Paja (1717-1730) who sent five missions to Europe — two to Vienna
and one each to Paris, Moscow and Poland. He instructed all his emissaries to
prepare detailed reports as to what can be learned from Europe, particularly
in military and technological matters. During this period several works
written by Ottomans and Europeans gained considerable circulation in
manuscript form among the elite. All these works suggested sweeping military
reforms after European models.15 It should be noted, however, that this was a
period of considerable literary and cultural activity in general. The first
Ottoman-Turkish press was established by a Hungarian convert to Islam who
remains known only as Ibrahim Muteferrika (16747-1745). All of the first 16
books printed in this press were of a pragmatic military-political nature.16
The Tulip Era and the regime which sponsored it were brought to an end by
a popular, Janissary-led uprising known after its leader as the Patrona Revolt
(September 1730). The uprising had been nurtured for some time by a
Downloaded By: [University of Leeds] At: 15:59 28 February 2010
the most technical, military branches. Bonneval also advocated the reform of
the infantry and the cavalry which constituted the bulk of the Ottoman armed
forces. He recommended the modernization of the Janissary corps by
breaking up the large regiments into smaller tactical units and increasing the
ratio of junior officers to men. But the Janissaries were able to resist these
changes.20
In addition to opposition on the part of the old military, there were other
factors which inhibited Bonneval's efforts. The French embassy considered
him a turncoat and throughout this period acted to undermine his position.
Another major obstacle stemmed from the fierce rivalry within the Ottoman
ruling elite itself. Bonneval was first recruited in September 1731 by Grand
Vezir Topal Osman Pasa (September 1731-March 1732) who gave him
considerable latitude and support. But when shortly afterwards Osman was
deposed, the new Grand Vezir Hekimoglu Ali Pa§a (March 1732-July 1735)
who was also reform-minded, virtually ignored Bonneval because of his
Downloaded By: [University of Leeds] At: 15:59 28 February 2010
association with the previous regime. It was only in the beginning of 1734 that
Ali recognized Bonneval's usefulness and allowed him to continue with his
military activity.21 But when Ali fell out of office in the following year,
Bonneval's work was, once again, disrupted. He regained some of his former
influence during the short tenure of office of Grand Vezir Muhsinzade
Abdullah Pasa (August-December 1737), but at the end of November 1738 he
was arrested and banished to Kastamonu, perhaps at the insistence of the
French ambassador. Less than a year later, however, Bonneval was recalled,
but he never regained his former influence. From 1739 until his death in 1747
his duties were essentially confined to the administration of the small Corps of
Bombardiers.22
The first tentative attempts to introduce western-inspired military reform
were part of sporadic efforts to re-establish a strong central authority. It is
significant that the two grand vezirs who gave Bonneval the widest latitude,
Topal Osman and Hekimoglu Ali, were also those who most fervently
attempted to follow in the footsteps of the Kopriiliis. Their chief ambition was
to strengthen the position of the grand vezir vis-a-vis other foci of power at the
capital as well as to reassert the authority of the center over the provinces.
Osman did it with brute cruelty 'covered ... with the mantle of justice',23 while
Ali resorted to more subtle methods giving the impression that 'moderation
. . . [was] his governing principle'.24
Osman's achievements during his short term of office were remarkable. He
succeeded in restoring order and security to the capital following an extended
period of anarchy. He vigorously introduced a series of administrative and
financial reforms coupled with numerous new appointments intended to curb
the clergy, the bureaucrats and the military. He partially succeeded in
stamping out the numerous uprisings in Anatolia and initiated a com-
prehensive reform in the timar system. He attempted to re-establish central
control over the financial affairs of Egypt and he considerably improved the
defences of the empire on its European frontiers.25 Hekimoglu Ali continued
these policies and brought them to a greater degree of fruition. During his
tenure of office the navy was strengthened through administrative reform and
the construction of modern vessels.26 Both men must have realized that a
234 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
disciplined modern army could well serve their political objectives. At the end,
however, neither succeeded in attaining them and they were dismissed because
the Court objected to the aggrandizement of the office of grand vezir.27
The first attempt to introduce western-inspired military reform exhibited
some of the characteristic problems which were to reappear during the entire
period under discussion. That the reforms were desirable was recognized by
the reigning sultan and men in authority. In the person of Bonneval and his
assistants the Ottomans had a small, but qualified, team of European officers
who could have directed the reforms as required. The reforms failed
essentially for lack of a determined and stable leadership that could sustain
them in the face of strong popular opposition. The court, while not taking a
direct lead in affairs of government, acted to prevent the office of the grand
vezir from becoming too powerful. This was achieved by a variety of means:
terms of office were kept short; key government offices were rotated among
political rivals known for their bitter mutual hostility; and, on occasion,
Downloaded By: [University of Leeds] At: 15:59 28 February 2010
In the last third of the eighteenth century the Ottoman empire was involved in
two of the most injurious wars in its history; the first against Russia
(1768-1774) and the second against a coalition of Russia and Austria
(1787-1792). Although the Ottomans generally enjoyed numerical superiority
MILITARY REFORM IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 235
who used to live on board their ships. During winter, when naval operations
were suspended, it was the practice to dismiss the sailors to their homes. The
result was that many of them failed to show up for service in the following
spring thereby forcing the naval authorities to recruit each year a large
number of unseasoned sailors. To enhance professionalism Cezayirli Hasan
wanted to build permanent barracks in order to keep and train the seamen
throughout the winter months. This plan was opposed by many. One of its
bitter enemies was the reform-minded Halil Hamid. The grand vezir feared
that the new barracks, proposed to be constructed at the naval arsenal in the
capital, would strengthen the grand admiral's influence in affairs of state.
Cezayirli Hasan, however, proceeded to build the barracks at his personal
expense in spite of the opposition. He repaid the grand vezir by joining the
Iatter's political enemies and contributing to his eventual downfall.51
The most energetic military reformers were also engaged in wide-ranging
attempts to counter the disruptive impact of the foreign wars and strengthen
the central government. Seyyid Mehmed gave great consideration to
reforming the central administration, by appointing capable men to key
positions and doing away with the pernicious practice of needlessly rotating
provincial governors.52 Both Seyyid Mehmed and Halil Hamid were
concerned with the decline of the government's control over the provinces and
the rise of independent provincial rulers. They issued decrees which placed the
authority to confirm the nomination of local notables (ayans) in the hands of
the grand vezir, rather than the provincial governors, as had been the practice
before. When this proved to no avail another grand vezir Koca Yusuf Pasa
(January 1786-June 1789) finally took a radical step and attempted to outlaw
the position of the ayan altogether(April 1786).53 These legislative initiatives
were coupled with punitive military expeditions against some of the most
rebellious provincial rulers. It was in this connection that in June 1786
Cezayirli Hasan led an expedition against the rebellious Mamluks of Egypt.
The expedition proved a military success. It had to be cut short, however,
because of the outbreak of a new war in Europe and thus it failed to achieve
the objective of re-establishing the government's control over Egypt.54
Centralizing policies and military expeditions met with a similar fate in other
regions as well. In spite of a spasmodic show of strength, the power of the
238 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
convenient pretext to call for his dismissal. Among the latter was also the
influential and reform-minded Grand Admiral Cezayirli Hasan. The
agitation eventually resulted in Halil Hamid's dismissal (31 March 1785) and
later execution.56
For the time being the presence of the French mission was tolerated mainly
because a new war with Russia seemed imminent. But without Halil Hamid's
strong leadership the drive for military reform had dissipated. In the fall of
1787 another Ottoman-Russian war indeed broke out and when it became
apparent that the Habsburgs, to whom the King of France was now related by
marriage, were about to join Russia, the French government withdrew its
mission.57 The second phase of western-inspired reform had come to a close.
The reforms of the 1770s and 1780s were on a wider scale by far than those
of the previous phase. A significant departure from past practices was
Ottoman acceptance of European instructors without their first having to
convert to Islam. This evoked conservative criticism. But at the same time, it
was a clear indication of a wider consensus among the ruling elite regarding
the necessity of western-inspired reform. Yet, with all their boldness, the
reforms affected only the most technical and numerically small military
branches. The main body of the Ottoman army, the infantry and the cavalry,
remained as antiquated as it had been.
The limited results of this second phase are attributable to the same factors
which militated against the success of the first: opposition on the part of the
old military corps and their civilian allies and the extreme divisiveness among
the ruling elite. But it would appear that at this stage economic constraints had
become more prominent than in the past. If we are to accept Charles Issawi's
statement that 'until the 19th century, labor was by far the most important
factor of production',58 then the paucity of the Ottoman state revenue was
indeed outstanding when compared to those of contemporary European
governments. With a population estimated at close to twenty million in the
Balkans and Anatolia,59 Eton, reporting 'from the most authentic
documents', stated that in 1776 the total revenue was 44,942,500 piasters
(kuru§), equivalent at that time to about 4.5 million British pounds. 60 If these
figures are correct, then in the following decades state revenues continued to
decline. Stratford Canning, writing in 1809, reported that 'before 1794', and
MILITARY REFORM IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 239
presumably by the end of the 1787-92 war, the revenue 'did not exceed
20,000,000 piastres'.61 New taxes introduced in the reign of Selim III produced
an additional income of 'something short of 30,000,000 piastres'. But due to
the devaluation of the Ottoman currency, Canning estimated that at the time
of writing, in 1809, it scarcely equalled 2.25 million British pounds, 'a sum
very far indeed below their wants, and which, when compared with the
enormous extent of the Ottoman Empire, betrays in a strong light the mis-
management which exists in the manner of collecting it'.62 By comparison,
Britain, with only 9.5 million inhabitants in 1787-90 had an average annual
revenue of 16.8 million pounds, while France with a population of 24 million
had revenues equal to 18 million pounds in 1787 and 24 million pounds in
1789.63
Thornton, a well-informed observer, writing a decade or so later, came to
the unmistakable conclusion:
Downloaded By: [University of Leeds] At: 15:59 28 February 2010
centers as Ruschuk, Silistre, Vidin and Yannina. In the last decades of the
eighteenth century these notables had become increasingly wealthy, powerful
and independent.68 Selim's efforts to re-establish some central control over the
provinces by means of a rejuvenated system of checks and balances that would
curb the centrifugal forces had failed miserably.69 In addition to the provincial
opponents whose formidable power was a recent phenomenon, there were all
the traditional antagonists. Moreover, the military reforms were universally
unpopular because they were accompanied by increased taxation, inflation,
food shortages, and other economic hardships. At the same time the ruling
elite continued to exhibit its inherent weaknesses of endemic divisiveness and
deadly rivalry even among those who believed in the need for reform.70 Faced
with mounting opposition at a critical point Selim himself proved to be
lacking in determination. His half-hearted attempt to extend the conscription
to the New Order Army to his Balkan provinces was defeated by the local
notables in the summer of 1806. The notables then took the initiative and
entered into an alliance with the Janissaries of Istanbul and other opponents
of reform. By May 1807 this powerful coalition was able to bring about the
Sultan's deposition and the abolition of his reform policy. The New Order
Army was dissolved and many of its officers and supporters killed. The new
barracks, factories, schools and other installations were destroyed. Little
survived the wave of reaction which set in.
Contemporary observers saw in the New Order Army a supreme test not
merely for Ottoman ability to infuse new strength in the military, but for the
very viability of the state. Following the establishment of the new force Eton
wrote:
The mere institution of this militia is an important event; and Selim may,
perhaps, effect by policy, what several of his ancestors have attempted
by force. Could he put himself at the head of a disciplined army, he
would conquer the Ulema as easily as the Janizaries, and the Turkish
power, though it would never again be formidable to Europe, might be
respectable in Asia.71
Consequently, the collapse of Selim's reforms was seen not merely as a setback
to military modernization. More significantly, it was an indication of the
MILITARY REFORM IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 241
As we have seen, the impulse for military reform stemmed from two sources:
first, the need of the central government to maintain, or restore, its control
over the bureaucracy and the military and suppress the centrifugal forces
threatening to break up the state from within; and second, the necessity to
defend the state against external enemies. Both motives were inherent to the
Ottoman traditional political system, and they were also closely interrelated.
For failure in foreign wars undermined the political and moral foundations of
the state. In the eighteenth century the external threat forced military
reformers to adopt increasingly western models. This could hardly be
Downloaded By: [University of Leeds] At: 15:59 28 February 2010
reciprocation (mukdbele bi-l-misl), or fighting the enemy with his own means.
To prove this point these religious leaders cited passages from the Koran and
precedents from the life of the Prophet Muhammad and of medieval Islamic
history.74 But these 'liberal' religious leaders apparently represented only a
small segment of the higher clergy. It is likely that the majority of the clergy,
especially of the lower classes, espoused more conservative views, criticized
western-inspired reform and lent legitimacy to its opponents. Nevertheless, it
is important to note that as a system of beliefs, Ottoman Islam could
accommodate both reformers and conservatives; and political leaders who
were sufficiently determined could, and did, receive the religious-legal
sanction which they deemed necessary to carry out and lend legitimacy to
western-inspired reform.75
Regarding the popular attitudes of Ottoman-Muslim society as a whole,
again it is likely that these were traditional and conservative in nature. The
Downloaded By: [University of Leeds] At: 15:59 28 February 2010
elements which were opposed to reform — for whatever reason — could count
on gaining the popular sentiment by appealing to traditional values, however
vaguely formulated. This, in fact, was the greatest asset of the political
opponents of reform. But 'conservatism' — however it may be defined —
generally remained an inchoate force requiring direction and leadership to
realize its potential. Ottoman society rejected westernizing reform in the reign
of Selim III, but the same society accepted it, in a definitive and irreversible
manner, less than two decades later, in the reign of Mahmud II (1808-1839).
During this span of time, as far as can be ascertained, there had been no
perceptible changes in religious doctrine or in popular outlook and values. It
would appear, therefore, that while 'conservatism' remained a constant
condition, the determinative variables for the failure of eighteenth-century
reform must be searched for elsewhere.
The first cause for the failure of reform appears to stem from the weakness
of its 'ideological' underpinnings. In western and central Europe the rise of
modern armies was part of a wide-ranging social and political transformation.
It resulted in the consolidation of the power of the state and the concomitant
reduction of the authority of intermediate bodies, such as guilds, towns and
provinces. The rise of modern European armies was, therefore, identified with
social and political change and was promoted by those centripetal forces
seeking it. The modern army thus testified to the growing ability of the central
government to reach wider areas of societal activity. By contrast, in the
Ottoman empire the forces promoting military reform were those which
espoused not only the restoration of a traditional political system, but also the
conservation of the existing medieval social order. It is significant that reform-
minded rulers usually reinforced the observance of the traditional sumptuary
laws which imposed a strict dress code on persons of different religions, classes
and professions.76 Military reformers supported ideals which were
conservative in all essential aspects. Consequently, military reforms requiring
the breakup of the guild-like structure of the traditional military order were
dissonant with the basic thrust of general restorative reform. Thus, while there
was wide consensus, although little cooperation, among the ruling elite
regarding the desirability of restorative reform, the issue of westernization
tended to split and narrow that consensus.
MILITARY REFORM IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 243
maintain his lofty position the sultan was supposed to exist in a state of blissful
isolation above the turmoil of political realities. 'The King of Kings who is
Caliph of the World has need for no one', declared an eighteenth-century
writer.77 In addition, courtiers and politicians, for their own advantage, did
their best to divert the sultan's attentions from government affairs to other
activities. Consequently, the sultans of the eighteenth century became
ensnarled in a style of rule uncharacteristic of that which prevailed in the age
of Ottoman greatness when the sovereigns actively ruled. In theory the grand
vezir was the actual mover of governmental affairs. According to our
eightenth-century source he should have been 'an unrestricted representative
[of the sultan]. . . The whole of the regulating and ordering of the affairs of
the country . . . should be committed to his responsibility... requests which he
presents to the Imperial Presence should not be denied. The unrestrained
grand vezir must have the favor of his patron . . . \ 7 8
Realities however were far from the ideal. Court functionaries, rival
politicians, leading members of the clergy and, above all, the sultans
themselves feared the aggrandizement in power of the grand vezirs. To avoid
this, throughout the eighteenth century, appointments to this office, with few
exceptions, were of short duration. In the 68-year period from October 1730 to
August 1798 no less thn 48 times were appointments made to this office,
although some appointees served more than once. As a result during this
period the average term of office was about 17 months. It is an interesting
observation that during the early years of each reign tenure was exceedingly
short. The single exception to this rule was the reign of Mustafa III
(1757-1774). Upon ascending the throne Mustafa found and kept in office the
able statesman and man of letters Koca Ragib Mehmed Pa^a (January
1757-April 1763). But Mahmud I (1730-1754) appointed three grand vezirs
within the first 17 months of his reign; Osman III (1754-1757) during his short
reign of less than three years had seven grand vezirs; and Selim III (1789-1807)
replaced no less than four grand vezirs within the first 21 months of his reign.
It was only after the new sultan's party had firmly entrenchd itself that
lengthier periods of tenure were allowed. It seems as if in the eighteenth
century the court was determined not to allow the rise of a powerful dynasty of
grand vezirs, such as the Kopriilu family which during the previous century
244 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
western Balkan provinces were more powerful and independent than the local
rulers of Anatolia because of two important factors. They were in control of
agriculturally rich land and geography placed them in a favorable position to
engage more freely in independent international commerce.79 The situation in
the Nile valley was similar to that in the Balkans. It was, therefore, in these
regions where resistance to the government's centralizing policies was the
strongest and most successful.
These processes further contributed to the shrinking of the economic base
of the state. As available resources were dwindling, military reform, by
necessity, meant either new taxation on an already heavily taxed population,
or the diversion of funds from existing institutions. Due to the fragmentation
of the elite, the established armed forces, but especially the Janissaries and the
timarh cavalry, became increasingly independent of civilian control. Instead,
they were dominated by the class interests of their senior and intermediary
officers. To the latter any reform measure appeared to threaten vital economic
and social interests and they were, therefore, to be found in the forefront of
any movement opposed to reform. They were the group most directly
threatened by reform and they were the ones who opposed it most vigorously
and consistently. To move forcefully against the established military was
wrought with danger. The old military establishment was large and its
interests overlapped those of substantial segments of the Muslim middle and
lower classes in the capital and other urban centers. In the Balkan provinces
the feudal fighting class formed the administrative-military infra-structure on
which rested Ottoman sovereignty over areas largely inhabited by an
increasingly restive Christian population.
To carry out western-inspired military reform was, therefore, above all a
test of the center's ability to reassert itself. The failure of military reform was
seen as a sure sign of political decomposition. At the dawn of the nineteenth
century to friend and foe alike the Ottoman empire appeared moribund. As is
well known, however, the Ottoman empire did not disintegrate in 1807.
Moreover, in 1826 Sultan Mahmud II was able to revive the New Order Army
under a different name. This time the process proved irreversible and
Mahmud's reforms served as a basis not only for the establishment of a
modern army, but they also introduced a new form of government which
MILITARY REFORM IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 245
never coincided.
NOTES
A note on transliteration: Ottoman-Turkish names and terms are transliterated by using present-
day Turkish spelling. In words of Arabic origin the final b and d are preserved (katib, not katip;
Mahmud, not Mahmut).
1. William H. McNeill, The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community (Chicago,
1963), 695.
2. Andre Corvisier, Armies and Societies in Europe, 1494-1789, tr. Abigail T. Siddall
(Bloomington, Indiana, 1979), 61.
3. On Ottoman institutions at their zenith consult the following recent works: Halil Inalcik,
The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600, trs. N. ItzkowitzandC. Imber (London,
1973); M. A. Cook (ed.), A History of the Ottoman Empire to 1730 (Cambridge, 1976), 1-102
(Chapters by M. A. Cook, H. Inalcik and V. J. Parry); Stanford J. Shaw, History of the
Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, volume I: Empire of the Gazis (Cambridge, 1976),
1-167; Peter F. Sugar, Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule (volume V of the series A
History of East Central Europe, Seattle, 1977), 3-183; Bistra A. Cvetkova, Les Institutions
Ottomanes en Europe (Wiesbaden, 1978), 1-77.
4. For an excellent short discussion of the decline of the Ottoman dynasty and its impact on the
state see Cook, 103-156 (Chapters by V. J. Parry), and especially pp. 133-38. On Ottoman
decline in general see: Shaw, History, I, 169-298; Sugar, 187-288; Cvetkova, 78-117.
5. Cf. Bernard Lewis, 'Ottoman Observers of Ottoman Decline', Islamic Studies, I (1962),
71-87; Lewis V. Thomas, A Study ofNaima (ed. Norman Itzkowitz, New York, 1972), 94-96;
Halil Inalcik, 'The Ottoman Decline and its Effects upon the Reaya', in Henrik Birnbaum
and Speros Vryonis, Jr, Aspects of the Balkans: Continuity and Change (The Hague, 1972),
346-47; M. Cagatay Ulucay, 'Koci Bey', Islam Ansiklopedisi (henceforth abbreviated as I A),
VI, 823-31; M. Cavid Baysun, 'Naima', I A. IX, 44-49; Shaw, History, I, 290-93.
6. Walter Livingston Wright, Jr, Ottoman Statecraft: The Book of Counsel for Vezirs and
Governors of Sari Mehmed Pasha, the Defterdar (Princeton, 1935), 110-15, 142-48.
7. Another Kopriilii, Nu'man Pasa, served as grand vezir in 1710, but for two months only.
8. Shaw, History, I, 197-98, 209-212; Halil Inalcik, 'Centralization and Decentralization in
Ottoman Administration', in Thomas Naff and Roger Owen (eds.), Studies in Eighteenth
Century Islamic History (Carbondale, Illinois, 1977), 27-31; Ismail Hakki Uzuncarsili,
Osmanli Tarihi, vol. Ill, part II (Ankara 1954), 275-77; vol. IV, part I (Ankara, 1956), 1-9;
M. Tayyib Gokbilgin, 'Kopruliiler', IA. VI, 892-908.
9. On this subject see Halil Inalcik, 'The Socio-Political Effects of the Diffusion of Fire-Arms
in the Middle East', in V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp, eds., War, Technology and Society in the
246 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
Middle East (Oxford, 1975), 195-217; and in the same volume V. J. Parry, 'La Maniere de
Combattre', 218-56; also see idem, 'Materials of War in the Ottoman Empire', in M. A.
Cook (ed.), Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East (Oxford, 1970), 225-27; idem,
'Warfare' in P. M. Holt et al. (eds.), The Cambridge History of Islam, vol. II (Cambridge,
1970), 835-36.
10. Raimondo de Montecucculi, Memoires de Montecucculi, tr. J. Adam (3 vols., Amsterdam,
1746), II, 363.
11. Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli, VEtat Militaire de I'Empire Ottoman (2 parts, Haya, 1732), 11,33;
Henry Grenville, Observations sur 1'etat actuel de I'Empire Ottoman, ed. A. S. Ehrenkreutz
(Ann Arbor, 1965), 15-19.
12. The Ottoman historian Cevdet identifies the intermediary officers of the Janissary corps as
the most obstinate opponents of reform. He refers to them as the 'Janissary Elders' {peak
eskileri). Through the control of administrative positions in the individual regiments (ortas),
these men were best able to profit from various illegal activities and also were conveniently
positioned to influence and control the majority of men under their command. Many of
these intermediary officers were also affiliated with, or even leading members in, various
guilds thereby able to mobilize also the support of part of the urban classes. Cf. Ahmed
Downloaded By: [University of Leeds] At: 15:59 28 February 2010
29. Uzuncarsih, Tarih, IV, 1,341-43; Bekir Sitki Baykal and Abdiilkadir Karahan, 'Ragib Pasa',
IA, IX, 594-98.
30. Cited in Berkes, Secularism, 63.
31. Toderini, III, 214. For a discussion of tnis 'period of reaction', see Berkes, Secularism,
51-69.
32. Cf. Ulucay and Kartekin, 20.
33. Cf. Ergin. II, 265.
34. Uzuncarsih. Tarih, IV, I, 479; Hammer, Histoire, XVI, 279 and ff.
35. Uzuncarsih, Tarih, IV, I, 480; Adnan-Adivar, Him, 181n.
36. The old school, although never officially closed, had stopped operating by now. Francois de
Tott, Memoirs of Baron de Tott (2 vols., London, 1785), II, 179.
37. Mustafa Nuri, Netaic-ul-Vukuat (4 vols., Istanbul, 1294-1327/1877-1909), IV, 7;
Uzuncar$ih, Tarih, IV, I, 481-83; Ergin, II, 265-66; Toderini, I, 162-65; Leonce Pingaud,
Choiseul-Gouffler, La France en Orient sous Louis XVI (Paris, 1887), 98.
38. The text published in 1786 consisted of the collected lectures, translated into Turkish, of the
French instructor Jean de Lafitte-Clave. Its title: 'Principles of Knowledge Concerning the
Organization of an Army and its Temporary Fortification' (Usul-ul-Maariffi tertib-i Ordu ve
Downloaded By: [University of Leeds] At: 15:59 28 February 2010
Tahsinuhii Muvakkaten). Copies of this rare text, consisting of 80 folios and numerous plates
and bound in two volumes, are found at Topkapi Saray Library (nos. 35, 570 and 934). In
1787 were printed the lectures of the instructor Laurent-Jean-Francois Truguet, entitled
'Principles of Knowledge Concerning the Organization of a Navy and Naval Maneuvers'
Usul-ul-Maariffifenn-i Vech-i Tasnif-i Sefain-i Donanma ve Fenn-i Tedbir-iHarekatiha). The
book contains 93 folios and 13 plates. Cf. Uzuncarjih, Tarih, IV, I, 485-86; Pingaud, 99;
Abdulhak Adnan-Adivar, La Science chez les Turcs Ottomans (Paris, 1939), 155.
39. Pingaud, 84.
40. This unit was referred to at the time as Sur'at topcusu, literally meaning 'speed artillery'. The
Ottoman military historian §evket explains this term as meaning the same as sahra topcusu,
or field artillery. Cf. Mahmud §evket, Osmanli Teskildt ve kiyafet Askeriyesi (two parts,
Istanbul, 1325/1907), II, 4.
41. A. Manucy, Artillery Through the Ages (Washington. D.C., 1949), 10-12.
42. Cevdet, II (1292/1875), 192-93, 283-85; Nuri, IV, 5-6; Uzuncarsih, Kapukulu, II, 67-68.
43. Pingaud, 95 and ff.
44. Ibid., 103.
45. Uzuncarsili, Tarih, IV, I, 483-84.
46. Pingaud, 101.
47. Ibid., 100-101.
48. Cezayirli Hasan served briefly also as grand vezir from December 1789 until his death in
March 1790.
49. Uzuncarsih, Tarih. IV, I, 474.
50. Cevdet, III (1303/1886), 67-69; Uzuncarsih, Kapukulu, I, 494-95; II, 120, 132-33. For
detailed information on Halil Hamid's reforms see: I. H. Uzuncarsih, 'Sadrazam Halil
Hamit Pasa', Turkiyat Mecmuasi, V (1936), 213-67; a summary is found in his Tarih, IV, I,
477-84.
51. Uzuncarsih, Tarih, IV, I, 476-77; Cevdet, III, 2-3; William Eaton, A Survey of the Turkish
Empire (2nd ed., London, 1799), 85-90.
52. Uzuncarsih, Tarih, IV, I, 474.
53. Inalcik, 'Centralization', 48-50.
54. Uzuncarsili, Tarih, IV, I, 509-18.
55. Cf. Shaw, History, I, 253-54.
56. Nuri, IV, 6.
57. Pingaud, 212.
58. Charles Issawi, 'The Ottoman Empire in the European Economy, 1600-1914. Some
Observations and Many Questions', in Kemal H. Karpat (ed.), The Ottoman State and its
Place in World History (Leiden, 1974), 107.
59. Cf. ibid., 108-10.
60. Eton, 39-47.
61. Cited in Charles Issawi, 'Population and Resources in the Ottoman Empire and Iran', in
Thomas Naff and Roger Owen (eds.), Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History
(Carbondale, 111., 1977), 388-89, note 46.
248 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
62. Ibid. This information appears to tally with Ottoman estimates of state revenues in the 1820s
and 1830s. An informed Ottoman source Kececizade Izzet Molla estimated the annual
revenue in 1827 at 200 million kurus. (See his Layiha, ms. no. K. 337 in the Cevdet
Manuscript Collection, Belediye Library, Istanbul, p. 64.) This amount was equal to about
3.5 million British pounds (Cf. Charles White, Three Years in Constantinople, etc., 3 vols.,
1846. Vol. II, pp. 74-76, contains a table of the rates of exchange of the British pound to the
Ottoman kurus, from 1814 to 1843).
Nafiz Pa§a who served as Finance Minister during the reigns of Mahmud II and
Abdtilmecid I estimated the annual revenue in the late 1830s at 300 million kuriif (Nuri, IV,
114) at that time equal to about 3 million British pounds. The complexities of Ottoman state
finances cannot be discussed here. It should be noted, however, that the Ottoman
government was the recipient of 'income' also in kind and in services. With the possible
exception of the last estimate which is supported by sketchy evidence found in the archives
(for example: Topkapi Saray Archives, Istanbul, register no. D 3086 and document no. E
3082), the figures quoted above cannot be considered as conclusive. They do, however,
indicate a remarkable consistency and the derived 'curve' corresponds to our information
regarding the strength of the central government and its ability to control sources of
Downloaded By: [University of Leeds] At: 15:59 28 February 2010
revenue. In the absence of more reliable information, the following summary may be of
interest:
Annual
Revenue in million
Source Period kuru§ pounds Remarks
79. Cf. report by the British ambassador Ainslie of 1790, cited in Issawi, 'Population and
Resources', 158.
80. See note 60 above.
81. Nur Yalman, 'Some Observations on Secularism in Islam: The Cultural Revolution in
Turkey', Daedalus, vol. 102, no. 1 (Winter 1973), 164.