Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
SECTION 1.
THE LEGISLATIVE POWER SHALL BE VESTED IN THE CONGRESS OF
THE PHILIPPINES WHICH SHALL CONSIST OF A SENATE AND A HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT RESERVED TO THE
PEOPLE BY THE PROVISION ON INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM.
1.MARCOS VS COMELEC
Facts:
March 8, 1995 Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election
Supervisor.
March 23, 1995 Montejo, incumbent of and candidate for the same position,
filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC,
alleging that Marcos did not meet the residency requirement.
March 29, 1995 Marcos filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy in the COMELECs head office in Intramuros claiming that her error
in the first certificate was the result of an honest misrepresentation and
that she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.
April 24, 1995 COMELEC Second Division by a vote of 2-1 came up with a
Resolution that found Montejos petition for disqualification meritorious,
Marcos corrected certificate of candidacy void, and her original certificate
cancelled.
May 7, 1995 COMELEC en banc denied Marcos Motion for Reconsideration
of the Resolution drafted on April 24.
May 11, 1995 COMELEC issued another Resolution allowing Marcos
proclamation to the office should the results of the canvass show that she
obtained the highest number of votes. However, this was reversed and
instead directed that the proclamation would be suspended even if she did
win.
May 25, 1995 In a supplemental petitition, Marcos declared that she was
the winner of the said Congressional election.
Issues/ Held/Ratio: (1) WON plaintiff had established legal residency
required to be a voter, and thus candidate, of the first district of Leyte.
Yes. It is the fact if residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy
which out to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has
2. Aquino v COMELEC
Facts:
Agapito Aquino filed a Cert. of Candidacy to run for Rep in the 2nd district of
Makati. However, Mateo Bedon ( Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP) filed a
petition to disqualify Aquino on the grounds that he lacked the residence
qualification under Sec 6, Art 7 of the 1987 Consti. Hearings were conducted
by the COMELEC and dismissed Bedons petition to disqualify.
During the counting of votes, Aquino garnered more votes against Agusto
Syjuco. Bedon then filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of
Aquino to which COMELEC agreed by issuing an Order. COMELEC then again
issued another Order declaring Aquino to be disqualified due to the lack of
constitutional qualification of residence.
Hence, the petition for certiorari.
Issue: W/N COMELEC erred in deciding that petitioner lacked the
constitutional reqts for residence.
Held:
No! Aquino failed to prove that he was a resident of the 2nd Legislative
District of Makati for a period of one year at the time of election. His domicile
of origin was in Concepcion, Tarlac. COMELEC said that the intention not to
establish a permanent home in Makati is evident in his leasing a condo unit
instead of buying one. While a lease contract may give an indication that he
intends to reside in Makati, it does not engender the kind of permanency
required to prove abandonment of ones domicile. Aquino himself testified
that his intention was really for a year because he has other residences in
Manila or Quezon City.
Residence is synonymous with domicile -> place where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home where he, no matter where he may
be found eventually intends to return and remain (ruling in Co V Electoral
Tribunal of House of Rep)
3. Coquilla vs COMELEC
FACTS:
Coquilla was born on 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He
grew up and resided there until 1965, when he was subsequently naturalized
as a U.S. citizen after joining the US Navy. In 1998, he came to the
Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although he continued
making several trips to the United States.Coquilla eventually applied for
repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 which was approved. On November 10,
2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.
On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of Butunga,
Oras, Eastern Samar which was approved in 2001. On February 27, 2001, he
filed his certificate of candidacy stating that he had been a resident of Oras,
Eastern Samar for 2 years.
Incumbent mayor Alvarez, who was running for re-election sought to cancel
Coquillas certificate of candidacy on the ground that his statement as to the
two year residency in Oras was a material misrepresentation as he only
resided therein for 6 months after his oath as a citizen.
Before the COMELEC could render a decision, elections commenced and
Coquilla was proclaimed the winner. On July 19, 2001, COMELEC granted
Alvarez petition and ordered the cancellation of petitioners certificate of
candidacy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Coquilla had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least
on year before the elections held on May 14, 2001 as what he represented in
his COC.
RULING:
No. The statement in petitioners certificate of candidacy that he had been a
resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for two years at the time he filed such
certificate is not true. The question is whether the COMELEC was justified in
ordering the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for this reason.
Petitioner made a false representation of a material fact in his certificate of
candidacy, thus rendering such certificate liable to cancellation. In the case
at bar, what is involved is a false statement concerning a candidates
qualification for an office for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. This
is a misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the cancellation of
petitioners certificate of candidacy. The cancellation of petitioners
certificate of candidacy in this case is thus fully justified.
4. Pimentel vs. COMELEC GR 161658, Nov. 3, 2003
Facts: Congress passed RA 9165, Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, and makes it mandatory for candidates for public office, students of
secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private
offices, and persons charged before the prosecutors office with certain
offenses, among other personalities, to undergo a drug test. Hence, Senator
Pimentel, who is a senatorial candidate for the 2004 synchronized elections,
challenged Section 36(g) of the said law.
Issue: is the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office an
unconstitutional imposition of additional qualification on candidates for
Senator?
Held: Yes. Section 36 (g) of RA 9165, requiring all candidates for public office
whether appointed or elected both in the national or local government
undergo a mandatory drug test is UNCONSITUTIONAL. Under Sec.3, Art. VI of
the Constitution, an aspiring candidate for Senator needs only to meet 5
qualifications: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and
(5) residency. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these
qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of
any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lower
court the said communication is not absolutely privileged.
6. OSMENA VS PENDATUN
109 Phil. 863 Political Law The Legislative Department Parliamentary
Immunity
Facts: In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr. delivered a speech
entitled A Message to Garcia. In the said speech, he disparaged then
President Carlos Garcia and his administration. Subsequently, House
Resolution No. 59 was passed by the lower house in order to investigate the
charges made by Osmea during his speech and that if his allegations were
found to be baseless and malicious, he may be subjected to disciplinary
actions by the lower house.
Osmea then questioned the validity of the said resolution before the
Supreme Court. Osmea avers that the resolution violates his parliamentary
immunity for speeches delivered in Congress. Congressman Salipada
Pendatun filed an answer where he averred that the Supreme Court has not
jurisdiction over the matter and Congress has the power to discipline its
members.
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeas immunity has been violated?
HELD: No. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution enshrines
parliamentary immunity upon members of the legislature which is a
fundamental privilege cherished in every parliament in a democratic world. It
guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of
being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any
other forum outside the Hall of Congress. However, it does not protect him
from responsibility before the legislative body whenever his words and
conduct are considered disorderly or unbecoming of a member therein.
Therefore, Osmeas petition is dismissed.
7. Adaza v. Pacana135 SCRA 431
FACTS:
Adaza is the governor of Misamis Oriental and Pacana is the vice-governor.
Their respective term of office expires on March 3, 1986. Both parties ran in
the Batasang Pambansa (BP) elections in 1984 and respondent lost to
petitioner. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath of office as the governor.
Petitioner has brought this petition to exclude respondent therefrom,
claiming to be the lawful occupant of the position.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not a provincial governor who was elected as Mababatas
Pambansa (MP) can exercise the functions of both simultaneously; and 2)
whether or not a vice-governor who ran for the position of MP but lost, can
continue serving as vice governor and subsequently succeed to the office of
governor if said office is vacated.
HELD:
Section 10, Article VIII of the Constitution is clear and unambiguous. A
member of the BP may not hold any other office in the government. A public
office is a public trust. A holder thereof is subject to regulations and
conditions as the law may impose and he cannot complain of any restrictions
on his holding of more than one office. The contention that Pacana, as a
mere private citizen, runs afoul of BP Blg. 697 which provides that governors,
or members of sangguniang or barangay officials, upon filing a certificate of
candidacy be considered on forced leave of absence from office. When
respondent reassumed the position of vice-governor after the BP elections,
he was acting within the law. Thus, the instant petition is denied.
8. PUYAT VS DE GUZMAN
FACTS:
On 14 May 1979, an election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe
Industries (IPI), a private corporation, was held six of the elected directors
were herein petitioners that may be called the Puyat Group, while the other
five were herein respondents, the Acero Group. Thus, the Puyat Group would
be in control of the Board and of the management of IPI.On 25 May 1979, the
Acero Group instituted at the SEC quo warranto proceedings questioning the
election.
Conferences were held on 25-31 May 1979 and the Puyat Group objected on
Constitutional grounds the appearance of Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then
a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as counsel for the Acero
group. Section 11, Article VIII, 1973 Constitution, then in force, provided that
no Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before xxx any administrative
body" and SEC was an administrative body. The prohibition being clear,
Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance.
When SEC Case was called on 31 May 1979, it turned out that Assemblyman
Fernandez had purchased on 15 May 1979 ten shares of IPI stock for
Php200.00, but the deed of sale was notarized only on 30 May 1979. He then
filed on 31 May 1979 an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the SEC Case as
the owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation,
which motion was granted by the SEC Commissioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, in intervening in the SEC
Case, is in effect appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly, before an
administrative body in contravention of the Constitutional provision.
RULING:
The Court en banc ruled that ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for
Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as
counsel. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his
ownership of ten (10) IPI shares.
However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of
Assemblyman Fernandez. He had acquired a mere Php200.00 worth of stock
in IPI. He acquired them "after the fact", that is, on 30 May 1979, after the
contested election of Directors, after the quo warranto suit had been filed,
and one day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC. And
what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to
appear as counsel for the Acero group, but which was objected to by
petitioners Puyat group. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he
decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground of legal interest in the matter
under litigation.
Under those facts and circumstances, there has been an indirect appearance
as counsel before an administrative body, which is a circumvention of the
Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention" was an afterthought to enable
him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity.
A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision
ineffective. All an Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an
administrative body is to acquire a minimal participation in the "interest" of
the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That which the
Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general
legislative act which is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or
impliedly prohibited.
Thus, the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case falls
within the ambit of the prohibition contained in the 1973 Constitution.
Respondent Commissioner's Order granting Assemblyman Fernandez leave
to intervene in the SEC Case was reversed and set aside
SECTION 16.
1. THE SENATE SHALL ELECT ITS PRESIDENT AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, ITS SPEAKER, BY A MAJORITY VOTE OF ALL ITS
RESPECTIVE MEMBERS. EACH HOUSE SHALL CHOOSE SUCH OTHER
OFFICERS AS IT MAY DEEM NECESSARY.
2. A MAJORITY OF EACH HOUSE SHALL CONSTITUTE A QUORUM TO
DO BUSINESS, BUT A SMALLER NUMBER MAY ADJOURN FROM DAY TO
DAY AND MAY COMPEL THE ATTENDANCE OF ABSENT MEMBERS IN
SUCH MANNER, AND UNDER SUCH PENALTIES, AS SUCH HOUSE MAY
PROVIDE.
3. EACH HOUSE MAY DETERMINE THE RULES OF ITS PROCEEDINGS,
PUNISH ITS MEMBERS FOR DISORDERLY BEHAVIOR, AND, WITH THE
CONCURRENCE OF TWO-THIRDS OF ALL ITS MEMBERS, SUSPEND OR
EXPEL A MEMBER. A PENALTY OF SUSPENSION, WHEN IMPOSED,
SHALL NOT EXCEED SIXTY DAYS.
4. EACH HOUSE SHALL KEEP A JOURNAL OF ITS PROCEEDINGS, AND
FROM TIME TO TIME PUBLISH THE SAME, EXCEPTING SUCH PARTS AS
MAY, IN ITS JUDGMENT, AFFECT NATIONAL SECURITY; AND THE YEAS
AND NAYS ON ANY QUESTION SHALL, AT THE REQUEST OF ONE-
The court does not have any jurisdiction in view of the separation of powers
and the constitutional grant to the senate of the power to elect its own
president. The selection of the presiding officer affects only the senators
themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change, or
reinstate them. The petition to put back the petitioner to preside is only
acceptable if the majority of the senators want to, such remedy lies in the
senate session hall and not in the supreme court.
Assuming that the court has jurisdiction, the session left by Avelino and
presided by Arranz was a continuation of the session. Thus, the departure of
the minority senators does not prevent the remaining majority senators from
passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement.
10. Alejandrino v. Quezon, 46 Phil. 83 (1924)
F:
The petitioner in this original petition for mandamus and injunction is
Jose Alejandrino, a Senator appointed by the Governor General. to represent
the 12th Senatorial District. The casus belli is a resolution adopted by the
Philippine Senate composed of the respondent Senators, On February
5,1924, depriving Alejandrino of all the prerogatives, privileges, and
emoluments of his office for the period of 1 yr from 1/24 having been
declared guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant violation of the privileges
of the Senate for having treacherously assaulted Sen. de Vera on the
occasion of certain phrases being uttered by the latter in the course of the
debate regarding the credentials of Mr. Alejandrino. The burden of
petitioner's complaint is that the resolution is unconstitutional and entirely of
no effect.
Issue: WON the Supreme Court by mandamus and injunction may annul the
suspension of Senator Alejandrino and compel the Philippine Senate to
reinstate him in his official position?
Held.
The general rule is that the writ will not lie from one branch of the gov't to a
coordinate branch, for the very obvious reason that neither is inferior to the
other. Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members, or its
officers, to compel the performance of duties purely legislative in their
character w/c therefore pertains to their legislative functions and over w/c
they have exclusive control.The courts cannot dictate action in this respect
without a gross usurpation of power.
Precedents have held that where a member has been expelled by the
legislative body, the courts have no power, irrespective of whether the
expulsion was right or wrong, to issue a mandate to compel his
reinstatement.
11. US vs Pons
Facts: Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On April 5, 1914,
the steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived in Manila from Spain and it contained 25
barrels of wine. The said barrels of wine were delivered to Beliso. Beliso
subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons house. On the other hand, the
customs authorities noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as wine on record
were not delivered to any listed merchant (Beliso not being one). And so the
customs officers conducted an investigation thereby discovering that the 25
barrels of wine actually contained tins of opium. Since the act of trading and
dealing opium is against Act No. 2381, Pons and Beliso were charged for
illegally and fraudulently importing and introducing such contraband material
to the Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act 2381 was
approved while the Philippine Commission (Congress) was not in session. He
said that his witnesses claim that the said law was passed/approved on 01
March 1914 while the special session of the Commission was adjourned at
12MN on February 28, 1914. Since this is the case, Act 2381 should be null
and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to
determine if Act 2381 was indeed made a law on February 28, 1914.
HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment
but the SC refused to go beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals. The
said Journals are conclusive on the Court and to inquire into the veracity of
the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as the SC have said,
clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the
organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence,
to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and
to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. Pons
witnesses cannot be given due weight against the conclusiveness of the
Journals which is an act of the legislature. The journals say that the
Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the
question, and the court did not err in declining to go beyond these journals.
The SC passed upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular
case.
12. ARROYO VS. DE VENECIA (277 SCRA 268)
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National
Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called sin taxes (actually specific
taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes, originated in the
House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was approved on third
reading on September 12, 1996 and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to
the Senate which approved it with certain amendments on third reading on
November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee was formed to
reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the
bill. The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House
at 8 a.m. on November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel
Javier, chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to deliver
his sponsorship speech, after which he was interpellated. Rep. Rogelio
Sarmiento was first to interpellate. He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo
moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to the
motion and asked for a head count. After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy
Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation of
the sponsor thereafter proceeded. In the course of his interpellation, Rep.
Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum,
although until the end of his interpellation he never did. What happened
thereafter is shown in the following transcript of the session on November
21, 1996 of the House of Representatives, as published by Congress in the
newspaper issues of December 5 and 6, 1996:
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and ratify the
conference committee report.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion?
MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.
(Gavel)
MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to
know what is the question that the Chair asked the distinguished sponsor.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There was a motion by the Majority
Leader for approval of the report, and the Chair called for the motion.
MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so I wanted to object.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one minute.
(It was 3:01 p.m.)
(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four oclock, Wednesday,
next week.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four oclock,
Wednesday, next week.
On that same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the
respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally
passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21,
1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on
November 22, 1996. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and/or
challenging the validity of RA 8240.
ISSUES:
Whether or not RA 8240 was passed in violation of rules of the House which
will therefore be a violation of the Constitution.
Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to look into the internal
proceeding of the House.
HELD:
It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated
in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of
the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a
law. Petitioners claim that Rep. Arroyo was still making a query to the Chair
when the latter declared Rep. Albanos motion approved. But what happened
is that, after Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the committee
report, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the approval and
ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for
objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: There being none,
approved. At the same time the Chair was saying this, however, Rep.
Arroyo was asking, What is that . . . Mr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep.
Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently
objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the conference
committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair,
symbolized by its banging of the gavel. Verily, the fact that nobody objects
means a unanimous action of the House making the passage of the bill to a
law in accordance with the law. The Constitution does not require that the
yeas and nays of the Members be taken every time a House has to vote,
except only in the following instances: upon the last and third readings of the
bill. Therefore, no violation of the Constitution was shown.
In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a
member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the
dispute to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has no more power to look
into the internal proceedings of a House than members of that House as long
as no violation of the Constitutional violation is shown.
13. Alejo Mabanag vs Jose Lopez Vito
78 Phil. 1 Political Law Journal Adoption of the Enrolled Bill Theory
FACTS: Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three
senators were suspended by senate due to election irregularities. The 8
representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the lower House except
in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some senators and
House Reps were not considered in determining the required vote (of each
house) in order to pass the Resolution (proposing amendments to the
Constitution) which has been considered as an enrolled bill by then. At the
same time, the votes were already entered into the Journals of the respective
House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it could have been
otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of Congress had been
counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would
have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of
Congress. Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said
resolution amending the constitution. Respondents argued that the SC
cannot take cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the
conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar.
Whether or not the said resolution was duly enacted by Congress.
HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the
journals from each House and an authenticated copy of the Act had been
presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals
does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the
due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in
section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC found in the journals no
signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself with
considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced.
It did not do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate,
namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine
the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals
and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to
have been noted between the two documents and the court did not say or so
much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater
weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified
copies shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the
due enactment thereof.
**Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both
houses, signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the president and
filed by the secretary of state.
Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act
No. 2210, provides: Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the
proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives body that
may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals
of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or
resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk of secretary, or printed by their
order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the
Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the
presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof
of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.
The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution
(enrolled bill) by the legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of
an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the journals.
14. CASCO PHILIPPINES CHEMICAL CO., INC. VS. GIMENEZ (7 SCRA 347)
FACTS:
There was enacted a Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise known as the Foreign
Exchange Act. The Central Bank of the Philippines issued Circular No. 95
fixing the a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions.
Petitioner, Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc, engaged in the manufacture of
synthetic resin glues bought imported urea and formaldehyde which are
main raw materials in the production of its products and has paid the margin
fee. Thereafter, petitioner sought to refund the said margin fee pursuant to
to Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board which declared that urea and
formaldehyde is exempt from said sale. The Central Bank issued the
corresponding vouchers for the refund but failed to give the money on the
ground that the exemption granted by the Monetary Board is not within the
purview of the said RA.
The pertinent provisions of the Republic Act provide:
The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provisions of
section one hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange
for the importation of the following:
X
X
X
XVII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard
when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users.
Petitioner contends that the term urea formaldehyde should be construed as
urea and formaldehyde. It shall be noted that the National Institute of
Science and Technology has expressed that urea formaldehyde is not a
chemical solution. It is a finished product distinct and different from urea and
formaldehyde
ISSUE:
Whether or not Urea and Formaldehyde are exempt by law from the payment
of the aforesaid margin fee.
HELD:
Denied the petition.
RATIO:
The enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the
measure passed by the Congress and approved by the President. If there has
been any mistake in the printing of a bill before it was certified by the
officers of the Congress and approved by the Executive, the remedy is by
amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree. The importation of
urea and formaldehyde is not exempt from payment of margin fees being
distinct and different from urea formaldehyde as provided in the law.
15. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance - 249 SCRA 635
FACTS:
Petitioners (Tolentino, Kilosbayan, Inc., Philippine Airlines, Roco, and
Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association) seek reconsideration of the
Courts previous ruling dismissing the petitions filed for the declaration of
Petitioners claim that the R.A. violates their press freedom and religious
liberty, having removed them from the exemption to pay VAT. Suffice it to
say that since the law granted the press a privilege, the law could take back
the privilege anytime without offense to the Constitution. By granting
exemptions, the State does not forever waive the exercise of its sovereign
prerogative.
Lastly, petitioners contend that the R.A. violates due process, equal
protection and contract clauses and the rule on taxation. Petitioners fail to
take into consideration the fact that the VAT was already provided for in E.O.
No. 273 long before the R.A. was enacted. The latter merely EXPANDS the
base of the tax. Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable
articles or kinds of property of the same class be taxed at the same rate, the
taxing power having authority to make reasonable and natural classifications
for purposes of taxation. It is enough that the statute applies equally to all
persons, forms and corporations placed in s similar situation.
15. Tolentino v Sec. of Finance
Facts:
House of Rep. filed House Bill 11197 (An Act Restructuring the VAT
System to Widen its Tax Base and Enhance its Admin., Amending for these
Purposes)
Upon receipt of Senate, Senate filed another bill completely different
from that of the House Bill
Senate finished debates on the bill and had the 2nd and 3rd reading of
the Bill on the same day
Bill was deliberated upon in the Conference Committee and become
enrolled bill which eventually became the EVAT law.
Procedural Issue:
(1) WoN RA 7716 originated exclusively from the House of Rep. in
accordance with sec 24, art 6 of Consti
(2) WoN the Senate bill violated the three readings on separate days
requirement of the Consti
(3) WoN RA 7716 violated sec 26(1), art 6 - one subject, one title rule.
NOTE: This case was filed by PAL because before the EVAT Law, they were
exempt from taxes. After the passage of EVAT, they were already included.
PAL contended that neither the House or Senate bill provided for the removal
of the exemption from taxes of PAL and that it was inly made after the
meeting of the Conference Committee w/c was not expressed in the title of
RA 7166
Held:
(1) YES! Court said that it is not the law which should originate from the
House of Rep, but the revenue bill which was required to originate from the
House of Rep. The inititiative must ocme from the Lower House because they
are elected in the district level meaning they are expected to be more
sensitive to the needs of the locality.
Also, a bill originating from the Lower House may undergo extensive changes
while in the Senate. Senate can introduce a separate and distinct bill other
than the one the Lower House proposed. The Constitution does not prohibit
the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the
House bill, so long as action by Senate is withheld pending the receipt of the
House bill.
(2) NO. The Pres. certified that the Senate bill was urgent. Presidential
certification dispensed the requirement not only of printing but also reading
the bill in 3 separate days. In fact, the Senate accepted the Pres.
certification
(3) No. Court said that the title states that the purpose of the statute is to
expand the VAT system and one way of doing this is to widen its base by
withdrawing some of the exemptions granted before. It is also in the power
of Congress to amend, alter, repeal grant of franchises for operation of public
utility when the common good so requires.
One subject rule is intended to prevent surprise upon Congress members
and inform people of pending legislation. In the case of PAL, they did not
know of their situation not because of any defect in title but because they
might have not noticed its publication until some event calls attention to its
existence.
15. TOLENTINO VS. THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE Case Digest
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO VS. THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
1994 Aug 25
G.R. No. 115455
235 SCRA 630
FACTS: The valued-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange
of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. It is
equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in money of goods
or properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the
sale or exchange of services. Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax
base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending
the National Internal Revenue Code.
The Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA) contends that
the imposition of VAT on sales and leases by virtue of contracts entered into
prior to the effectivity of the law would violate the constitutional provision of
non-impairment of contracts.
ISSUE: Whether R.A. No. 7716 is unconstitutional on ground that it violates
the contract clause under Art. III, sec 10 of the Bill of Rights.
RULING: No. The Supreme Court the contention of CREBA, that the
imposition of the VAT on the sales and leases of real estate by virtue of
contracts entered into prior to the effectivity of the law would violate the
constitutional provision of non-impairment of contracts, is only slightly less
abstract but nonetheless hypothetical. It is enough to say that the parties to
a contract cannot, through the exercise of prophetic discernment, fetter the
exercise of the taxing power of the State. For not only are existing laws read
into contracts in order to fix obligations as between parties, but the
reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into
contracts as a basic postulate of the legal order. The policy of protecting
contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government
which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of
society. In truth, the Contract Clause has never been thought as a limitation
on the exercise of the State's power of taxation save only where a tax
exemption has been granted for a valid consideration.
Such is not the case of PAL in G.R. No. 115852, and the Court does not
understand it to make this claim. Rather, its position, as discussed above, is
that the removal of its tax exemption cannot be made by a general, but only
by a specific, law.
Further, the Supreme Court held the validity of Republic Act No. 7716 in its
formal and substantive aspects as this has been raised in the various cases
before it. To sum up, the Court holds:
(1) That the procedural requirements of the Constitution have been complied
with by Congress in the enactment of the statute;
(2) That judicial inquiry whether the formal requirements for the enactment
of statutes - beyond those prescribed by the Constitution - have been
observed is precluded by the principle of separation of powers;
(3) That the law does not abridge freedom of speech, expression or the
press, nor interfere with the free exercise of religion, nor deny to any of the
parties the right to an education; and
(4) That, in view of the absence of a factual foundation of record, claims that
the law is regressive, oppressive and confiscatory and that it violates vested
rights protected under the Contract Clause are prematurely raised and do
not justify the grant of prospective relief by writ of prohibition.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.
Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994
Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of
goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716
seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its
administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are
various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.
One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it
is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S.
No. 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings
as required by the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the
Constitution
Held: The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House
of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not
bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is
required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which
initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must
substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senates
power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose
amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the
initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of
the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the
House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the
districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to
the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in
the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the
House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt
of the House bill.
The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3
readings on separate days as required by the Constitution because the
second and third readings were done on the same day. But this was because
the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential
certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that
of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by
the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing
and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of
legislative practice.
*****
Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance
Facts: These are motions seeking reconsideration of our decision dismissing
the petitions filed in these cases for the declaration of unconstitutionality of
R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. Now
it is contended by the PPI that by removing the exemption of the press from
the VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates
SEC. 35. Repealing Clause. All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders,
instructions, rules and regulation or parts thereof inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are repealed or modified accordingly.
All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except those
provided for under Commonwealth Act No. 265, republic acts Numbered 69,
180, 1414, 2087, and 5059. The Corporation may continue the franking
privilege under Circular No. 35 dated October 24, 1977 and that of the VicePresident, under such arrangements and conditions as may obviate abuse or
unauthorized use thereof.
These measures withdraw the franking privilege (free mail) from the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land
Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other
government offices.
The first objection is based on Art. VI, Sec. 26(1) of the Constitution, which
provides that Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. RA 7345 is entitled An
Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers, functions
and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other
Purposes Connected Therewith. It is the submission of the petitioners that
Sec. 35 of RA 7345 which withdrew the franking privilege from the Judiciary
is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect its purposes.
The second objection was that the second paragraph of the repealing clause
was not included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or of House Bill
No. 4200. It appeared only in the Conference Committee Report, its addition
violates Article VI Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution, which provides that:
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed
three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form
have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except
when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to
meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken
immediately after, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
Petitioners stress that Section 35 was never a subject of any disagreement
between both Houses and so the second paragraph could not have been
validly added as an amendment.
The third and most serious challenge of the petitioners is based on the equal
protection clause. It is alleged that RA 7345 is discriminatory because while
withdrawing the franking privilege from the Judiciary, it retains the same for
the President of the Philippines, Vice-President, Senators and Members of the
the presiding officers of Congress. The Court declines to look into the
petitioners charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of
the bill that eventually became RA 7354 and that the copies thereof in its
final form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both the
enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly
enacted in accordance with Article VI Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution.
On the third contention on equal protection of laws, the argument of the
respondents that the considerable volume of mail of the Judiciary justifies the
withdrawal of its franking privilege, is self-defeating. The respondents are in
effect saying that the franking privilege should be extended only to those
who do not need it very much, if at all (like the widows of former Presidents)
but not to those who need it badly. The Court states, at this time when the
Judiciary is being faulted for the delay in the administration of justice, the
withdrawal from it of the franking privilege can only further deepen this
serious problem. The Court is unable to disagree with the respondents that
Section 35 of RA 7345 represents a valid exercise of police power. On the
contrary, the Court finds its repealing clause to be discriminatory and that it
denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all
persons or things similarly situated.
In sum, the Court sustains RA 7345 against the attack that its subject is not
expressed in its title and that it was not passed in accordance with the
prescribed procedure. However, the Court annuls Section 35 of the law as
violative of Article III Sec. 1 of the Constitution that no person shall be
deprived of the equal protection of the laws.
17. Astorga vs. Villegas
G.R. No. L-23475, April 30, 1974
Enrolled Bill Doctrine: As the President has no authority to approve a bill not
passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State,
and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the Chief Executive,
carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive
departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of
enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress.
Approval of Congress, not signatures of the officers, is essential
When courts may turn to the journal: Absent such attestation as a result of
the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, the
entries in the journal should be consulted.
FACTS:
House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the House of
Representatives and then sent to the Senate for reading. During discussion
at the Senate, Senator Tolentino and Senator Roxas recommended
amendments thereto. Despite the fact that it was the Tolentino amendment
that was approved and the Roxas amendment not even appearing in the
journal, when Senate sent its certification of amendment to the House, only
the Roxas amendment was included, not the Tolentino amendment.
Nevertheless, the House approved the same. Printed copies were then
certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of Reps, the Speaker,
the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President, and sent to the
President of the Philippines who thereby approved the same. The Bill thus
was passed as RA 4065. However, when the error was discovered, both the
Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew their signatures.
ISSUES:
Whether or not RA 4065 was passed into law
Whether or not the entries in the journal should prevail over the enrolled bill
RULING:
Rationale of the Enrolled Bill Theory
The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field
vs. Clark as follows:
The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the
President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official
attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It
is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the
President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of
the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in
obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass
Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives
his approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a
bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and
unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not
passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State,
and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the
United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and
executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the
duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The
respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial
department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed
Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to
the Chief Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding
such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would
be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not
intended by the law-making body.
18. ABBAS VS. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (166 SCRA 651)
FACTS:
Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution states that the Electoral Tribunal
shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court...and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the
HOR, as the case may be. On October 9, 1987, Petitioners filed before the
respondent Tribunal an election contest docketed as SET Case No. 002-87
against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senatorselect in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections. The respondent tribunals
was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six
(6) senators.
On November 17, the petitioner filed with the respondent Tribunal a Motion
for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the
hearing and resolution of the above case on the ground that all of them are
interested parties, and respondents. This mass disqualification, in effect,
would leave only the three Justices to serve as Members of the Electoral
Tribunal. The Motion was denied and hence, this petition for certiorari.
ARGUMENTS:
Petitioners argue that considerations of public policy and norms of fair play
and due process require the mass disqualification. Further, necessity dictates
that an amendment of the Tribunals Rules of procedure permitting the
contest to be decided by only three Members is a practicable and
unconstitutionally unobjectable solution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a Senate Electoral Tribunal composed of only three (3)
Justices of the SC is a valid Electoral Tribunal under the Constitution
HELD:
NO. The suggested device is unfeasible and repugnant to the Constitution.
REASONS:
NO, except for cases requiring the exercise of the Courts extraordinary
jurisdiction.
REASONS:
Inapplicability of Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code to the case at bar:
Under the 1973 Constitution, Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code
applies to petitions filed before the COMELEC contesting the election of any
Member of the Batasang Pambansa or any regional, provincial or city official.
Under the 1987 Constitution, it has ceased to be effective. First, the
Batasang Pambansa has already been abolished and legislative power is now
vested in a bicameral Congress. Second, the Constitution vests exclusive
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the Members of the HOR and the Senate in their respective
Electoral Tribunals.
Exclusive character of the Electoral Tribunals Power: The power of the HRET,
as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives, to promulgate
rules and regulations relative to matters within its jurisdiction, including the
period for filing election protests before it, is beyond dispute. The use of the
word sole emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred.
It is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained
originally in the legislature. Its rule-making power necessarily flows from the
general power granted it by the Constitution.
It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred is
conferred or duly enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise
of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. Following this
principle, the HRET, in order to fully exercise its constitutional function may
implement its own rules concerning the filing of electoral protests.
A short review of our constitutional history reveals that, except under the
1973 Constitution, the power to judge all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the legislative branch has been
exclusively granted to the legislative body itself. In the 1935 Constitution,
this power was lodged to an independent, impartial and non-partisan body
attached to the legislature and specially created for that singular purpose.
Under the 1973 Constitution, this delineation between the power of the
Executive and the Legislature was blurred when jurisdiction over electoral
contests was vested in the COMELEC, an agency with general jurisdiction
over the conduct of election for all elective national and local officials. The
1987 constitution vested this jurisdiction back to the respective Electoral
Tribunals of the Senate and House of Representatives.
Scope of the Supreme Court over decisions made by the HRET: So long as
the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all
contests related to the election, returns and qualifications of its Members,
any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall as
a rule, not be reviewed by the Court. Its corrective power extends only to
decisions and resolutions constituting a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction by the Electoral Tribunals.
20. BONDOC VS. PINEDA (201 SCRA 792)
FACTS:
Marciano Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr.
Ermigidio Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party were rivals in the congressional
elections held on May 11, 1987. Pineda was the proclaimed winner, but
Bondoc filed a protest before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET). The said tribunal is composed of nine (9) members, 3 of whom are
Justices of the Supreme Court, and the remaining six (6) are members of the
House of Representatives chosen on the basis of proportional representation
from political parties and party list. A decision has been reached by the HRET
where Bondoc won over by Pineda; thus the LDP members in the tribunal
insisted on a reappreciation of votes and recount of ballots delaying the
finalization of the decision at least four months. The reexamination resulted
in increase of Bondocs lead over Pineda from 23 to 107 votes. It shall be
noted that Congressman Camasura, a member LDP, voted with the Supreme
Court Justices to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest; hence, HRET
issued a Notice of Promulgation No. 25 declaring Bondoc as the winner.
Subsequently, Congressman Cojuanco informed Camasura and Bautista that
the LDP expelled them from the party on the ground of betrayal to the cause
and objectives, and loyalty to LDP. Thereafter, Cojuanco informed the House
Speaker Mitra of the ouster of the said Congressmen and their decision to
withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Camasura to the HRET.
The Tribunal issued a Resolution canceling the previous decision on the
ground that without the vote of Congressman Camasura, who was relieved
from the Tribunal, the decision lacks the concurrence of five members as
required by Sec. 24 of the Rules of Tribunal, and therefore, cannot be validly
promulgated.
A Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed by Bondoc
seeking the following reliefs:
1.) to annul the decision of HRET to withdraw the nomination of Camasura to
the HRET.;
2.) issue a writ of prohibition restraining whoever may be designated in place
of Camasura from
assuming, ossupying, and discharging functions as a member of the HRET,;
The petitioner challenges this reappointment and the court issued a TRO for
Daza and Singson from serving in the CA.
ISSUE:
WON the reappointment of members of the CA is constitutional
HELD:
Yes. Petition Dismissed
RATIO:
Sec 18 Art VI of the constitution provides that there shall be a Commission
on Appointments consisting of, among others, 12 members of the HR elected
by the House on the basis of proportional representation. Since there was a
shift in the number of members of the LP to maintain proportional
representation the House reconstituted CA and awarded LDP the seats.
The petitioner argues that LDP is not a stable and permanent party so it is
not entitled for seats in the CA. Court held that when COMELEC granted the
registration of LDP as a registered political party, LDP is qualified to have
seats in the CA maintaining proportional representation.
21. Lidasan vs. Comelec
GR NO. L-280892
Petioner: BARA LIDASAN
Respondent: COMELEC
FACTS:
The Chief Executive signed the House Bill 1247 which is now known to be
Republic Act 4790,
An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del
Sur. Such new Municipality includes 21 barrios, 9 of which are from Lanao
del Sur, and the other 12 are from Cotabato. (From Lanao: Kapatagan,
Bongabong, Aipang,Dagowan,Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos, and
Magolatung and From Cotabato: Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong,
Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo,Tangabao,Tiongko, Colodan, and
Kabamawakan). The Comelec, prompted by the coming election adopted the
resolution which provides for the barrios that will be included in Lanao del
Sur. Apprised by this happening, the Office of the President, through the
Assistant Executive Secretary, recommended to the Comelec that the said
resolution be suspended until clarified by the correcting legislation. But the
Comelec stood by its own interpretation, and declared that the RA 4790
the title of the law in question sufficiently complies with the provisions of the
Constitutions which provides that no bill may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the
bill.
the law does not constitute class legislation
certain indispensable parties were not included in the petition
the petitioner has no standing to institute the action
the payment of the commutable sick and vacation leave is not an indirect
scheme to increase the salary.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioner has the legal standing to institute the petition
Whether of not the law in question is violative of the Constitution.
RULING:
1st point: Petitioners standing to institute the suit.
The Petitioner can validly institute the suit. In the determination of the
degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the
constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons
individually affected, but also taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing
the illegal expenditures of moneys raised by taxation and they may,
therefore, question the constitutionality pf statutes requiring expenditure of
public moneys.
2nd point: Whether or not RA 3836 violates Sec 14, Art VI of the Constitution.
The Constitutional provision in Section 14, Art Vi includes in the term of
compensation other emoluments. This is the pivotal point on this
fundamental question . Most of the authorities and decided cases have
regarded emolument as the profit arising from office or employment; that
which is received as compensation for services which is annexed to
possession of an office, salary, fees, and perquisites. It is evident that
retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it is a
part of compensation for services of one possessing any office.
No increase in said compensation shall take effect until the expiration of the
full term of all members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to
approval of such increase
Republic Act 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators
and House of Representatives, to take effect upon approval of the said Act.
Retirement benefits were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting
the expiration of the full term of all Members of the Senate and the House of
representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter
to the prohibition in Sec 14, Art Vi of the Constitiution.
FACTS:
This is a petition to render Republic Act No. 7675 unconstitutional. RA 7675 is
also known as An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a
Highly urbanized City to be Known as the City of Mandaluyong. Prior to the
enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and
San Juan belonged to only one legislative district.
Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this
legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually became RA 7675.
Pres. Ramos signed it into the law on Feb. 9, 1994. Pres. Ramos signed RA
7675 into the law on Feb. 9, 1994. A plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994
where the people of Mandaluyong was asked whether they approved of the
conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as
provided under RA 7675. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of
the voting population.18,621 voted yes whereas 7,911 voted no. By
virtue, of these results, RA 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.
Article VIII Sec.49 of RA 7675 provides:
As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own
legislative district with the first representative to be elected in the next
national elections after the passage of this Act. The remainder of the former
legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative
district of San Juan with its first representative to be elected at the same
election.
Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Sec.49 of RA 7675
embraces two principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong
into a highly urbanized city; and (2)the division of the congressional district
of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts. The second aforestated
subject is not germane tot the subject matter of RA 7675 since the said law
treats of the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city, as
expressed in the title of the law. Thus, the one subject-one bill rule has not
been complied with.
Petitioners assert that there is no mention of the assailed law of any census
to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum
requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two
legislative districts, which is allegedly violative of Article VI Sec. 5(4) of the
Constitution.
Petitioners also argue that Section 49 has resulted in an increase in the
composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article
VI Sec. 5(1).
ISSUE:
FACTS:
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole
issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to
appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the
North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and
Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project).
On September 28, 2005, the President then issued Executive Order 464,
Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to
the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials
Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution,
and For Other Purposes, which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect
immediately.
ISSUES:
Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress;
Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters
of public concern; and
Whether respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they
implemented E.O. 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation.
HELD:
The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article
VI of the Constitution. This power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials
of the executive branch; it is co-extensive with the power to legislate. The
matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and those which may
be a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that the operation of
government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for
investigation.
Yes. Although there are clear distinctions between the right of Congress to
information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people
to information on matters of public concern, any executive issuance tending
to unduly limit disclosures of information in investigations in Congress
necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be
in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern.
Yes. While E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it does
not follow that the same is exempt from the need for publication.It has a
direct effect on the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern. Due process requires that the people should have been apprised of
its issuance before it was implemented.
The Supreme Court declared Section 1 and Section 2(a) of Executive Order
464 valid while Sections 2(b) and 3 are void.
Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. The requirement then to
secure presidential consent under Section 1 is limited only to appearances in
the question hour. Under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the
appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on
their part.
Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads
in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to
respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless
a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President
herself or by the Executive Secretary
On Section 2(a) No infirmity, can be imputed to as it merely provides
guidelines, binding only on the heads of office mentioned in Section 2(b), on
what is covered by executive privilege. It does not purport to be conclusive
on the other branches of government. It may thus be construed as a mere
expression of opinion by the President regarding the nature and scope of
executive privilege.
Unconstitutionality of Sections 2 (b) and 3
Section 3 requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to
secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of
Congress.
Whenever an official invokes E.O. 464 to justify his failure to be present, such
invocation must be construed as a declaration to Congress that the
President, or a head of office authorized by the President, has determined
that the requested information is privileged, and that the President has not
reversed such determination. There is an implied claim of privilege, which
implied claim is not accompanied by any specific allegation of the basis
thereof.
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b)
is invalid as it is merely implied. It does not provide for precise and certain
reasons for the claim, which deprives the Congress to determine whether the
withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case.
The salient provisions of the Executive Order 464 are as follows:
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. In
accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement
the Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers between co-equal
branches of the government, all heads of departments of the Executive
Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to
appearing before either House of Congress.
When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the
President so states in writing, the appearance shall only be conducted in
executive session.
SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege.
where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly
manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with
the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation.
Section 7 of Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
31. ABAKADA, et al. vs. Ermita
Facts: They argue that the VAT is a tax levied on the sale, barter or exchange
of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services, which
cannot be included within the purview of tariffs under the exempted
delegation as the latter refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable
upon merchandise to the government and usually imposed on goods or
merchandise imported or exported.
Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., further contend that delegating
to the President the legislative power to tax is contrary to republicanism.
They insist that accountability, responsibility and transparency should dictate
the actions of Congress and they should not pass to the President the
decision to impose taxes. They also argue that the law also effectively
nullified the Presidents power of control, which includes the authority to set
aside and nullify the acts of her subordinates like the Secretary of Finance,
by mandating the fixing of the tax rate by the President upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance.
Facts:
1. RA 9337: VAT Reform Act enacted on May 24, 2005.
2. Sec. 4 (sales of goods and properties), Sec. 5 (importation of goods) and
Sec. 6 (services and lease of property) of RA 9337, in collective, granted the
Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain:
a. whether by 12/31/05, the VAT collection as a percentage of the 2004 GDP
exceeds 2.8% or
b. the natl govt deficit as a percentage of the 2004 GDP exceeds 1.5%
3. If either condition is met, the Sec of Finance must inform the President
who, in turn, must impose the 12% VAT rate (from 10%) effective January 1,
2006.
4. ABAKADA maintained that Congress abandoned its exclusive authority to
fix taxes and that RA 9337 contained a uniform proviso authorizing the
President upon recommendation by the DOF Secretary to raise VAT to 12%.
5. Sen Pimentel maintained that RA 9337 constituted undue delegation of
legislative powers and a violation of due process since the law was
ambiguous and arbitrary. Same with Rep. Escudero.
6. Pilipinas Shell dealers argued that the VAT reform was arbitrary,
oppressive and confiscatory.
7. Respondents countered that the law was complete, that it left no
discretion to the President, and that it merely charged the President with
carrying out the rate increase once any of the 2 conditions arise.
Issue: WON there was undue delegation No.
Ratio:
1. Constitution allows as under exempted delegation the delegation of tariffs,
customs duties, and other tolls, levies on goods imported and exported. VAT
is tax levied on sales of goods and services which could not fall under this
exemption. Hence, its delegation if unqualified is unconstitutional.
2. Legislative power is authority to make a complete law. Thus, to be valid, a
law must be complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy and it must fix
a standard, limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable.
3. No undue delegation when congress describes what job must be done who
must do it and the scope of the authority given. (Edu v Ericta)
4. Sec of Finance was merely tasked to ascertain the existence of facts. All
else was laid out.
5. Mainly ministerial for the sec to ascertain the facts and for the president to
carry out the implementation for the vat. They were agents of the legislative
dept.
6. No delegation but mere implementation of the law.
SECTION 25.
1. THE CONGRESS MAY NOT INCREASE THE APPROPRIATIONS
RECOMMENDED BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE OPERATION OF THE
GOVERNMENT AS SPECIFIED IN THE BUDGET. THE FORM, CONTENT, AND
MANNER OF PREPARATION OF THE BUDGET SHALL BE PRESCRIBED BY LAW.
2. NO PROVISION OR ENACTMENT SHALL BE EMBRACED IN THE GENERAL
APPROPRIATIONS BILL UNLESS IT RELATES SPECIFICALLY TO SOME
PARTICULAR APPROPRIATION THEREIN. ANY SUCH PROVISION OR
ENACTMENT SHALL BE LIMITED IN ITS OPERATION TO THE APPROPRIATION
TO WHICH IT RELATES.
3. THE PROCEDURE IN APPROVING APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE CONGRESS
SHALL STRICTLY FOLLOW THE PROCEDURE FOR APPROVING
APPROPRIATIONS FOR OTHER DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES.
4. A SPECIAL APPROPRIATIONS BILL SHALL SPECIFY THE PURPOSE FOR
WHICH IT IS INTENDED, AND SHALL BE SUPPORTED BY FUNDS ACTUALLY
proscribed by Art. VI, Sec. 19, par. 2 of the 1935 Constitution of the
Philippines, which reads:
No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriation
bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein; and
any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to such
appropriation.
A perusal of the challenged provision of R.A. 1600 fails to disclose its
relevance or relation to any appropriation item therein, or to the
Appropriation Act as a whole. It was indeed a non-appropriation item inserted
in an appropriation measure in violation of the constitutional inhibition
against "riders" to the general appropriation act. The paragraph in question
also violated Art. VI, Sec. 21, par. 1 5 of the 1935 Constitution of the
Philippines which provided that "No bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the
bill." This constitutional requirement nullified and rendered inoperative any
provision contained in the body of an act that was not fairly included in the
subject expressed in the title or was not germane to or properly connected
with that subject. if a provision in the body of the act is not fairly included in
this restricted subject, like the provision relating to the policy matters of
calling to active duty and reversion to inactive duty of reserve officers of the
AFP, such provision is inoperative and of no effect.
Upon the foregoing dissertation, Paragraph 11 of the Special Provisions of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines was declared as unconstitutional, invalid and
inoperative. Being unconstitutional, it confers no right and affords no
protection. In legal contemplation it is as though it has never been passed.
Petitioner no longer having legal basis for such claims, his petition was
denied.
33. Aglipay v. Ruiz
GR 45459, 13 March 1937 (64 Phil 201)
First Division, Laurel (p): 5 concur.
Facts: In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila
that he would order the issuance of postage stamps commemorating the
celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic
Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, Mons.
Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, in the
fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto,
Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President
of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioners attorney, the
Director of Posts publicly announced having sent to the United States the
designs of the postage for printing. The said stamps were actually issued and
sold though the greater part thereof remained unsold. The further sale of the
stamps was sought to be prevented by the petitioner.
Issue: Whether the issuance of the postage stamps was in violation of the
Constitution.
Ferrer and the construction of a waiting shed. Funds for the said projects will
be obtained through the selling of tickets and cash donations.
b. Resolution No. 6- The chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta would be
the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would
remain in his residence for one year and until the election of his successor.
The image would be made available to the Catholic Church during the
celebration of the saints feast day.
These resolutions have been ratified by 272 voters, and said projects were
implemented. The image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic
Church of the barangay. However, after a mass, Father Sergio Marilao
Osmea refused to return the image to the barangay council, as it was the
churchs property since church funds were used in its acquisition.
Resolution No. 10 was passed for the authorization of hiring a lawyer for the
replevin case against the priest for the recovery of the image. Resolution No.
12 appointed Brgy. Captain Veloso as a representative to the case. The
priest, in his answer assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions. The
priest with Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, contends that
Sec. 8 Article IV1 and Sec 18(2) Article VIII) 2 of the constitution was
violated.
Issue: Whether or Not any freedom of religion clause in the Constitution
violated.
Held: No. As said by the Court this case is a petty quarrel over the custody of
the image. The image was purchased in connection with the celebration of
the barrio fiesta and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor
interfering with religious matters or beliefs of the barrio residents. Any
activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint(such as the
acquisition) is not illegal. Practically, the image was placed in a laymans
custody so that it could easily be made available to any family desiring to
borrow the image in connection with prayers and novena. It was the councils
funds that were used to buy the image, therefore it is their property. Right of
the determination of custody is their right, and even if they decided to give it
to the Church, there is no violation of the Constitution, since private funds
were used. Not every government activity which involves the expenditure of
public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the
constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom
of worship and banning the use of public money or property.
35. LLADOC VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE [14 SCRA 292; NO.L19201; 16 JUN 1965]
Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
A gift tax is not a property tax, but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of
property by way of gift inter vivos, the imposition of which on property used
exclusively for religious purposes, does not constitute an impairment of
Constitution exempt from taxation as employed in the Constitution
should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of taxes. And
there being no clear, positive or express grant of such privilege by law, in
favor of petitioner, the exemption herein must be deniedRUBI VS.
PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO [39 PHIL 660; NO. 14078; 7 MAR 1919]
Friday, February 06, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 wherein
non-Christian inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) will be directed to take up their
habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands. It is resolved that under
section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the
sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent
settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit
homesteads on this reservation providing that said homestead applications
are previously recommended by the provincial governor.
In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code, all
the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of
the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in
Calapan, were ordered to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao,
Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this
order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in
accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code.
Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary
measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the
protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized
customs among them.
It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their
dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished.
It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty
by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said
to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their
will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial
sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.
FACTS:
The Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit entity which owns a parcel of land in
Quezon City. Erected in the middle of the aforesaid lot is a hospital known as
the Lung Center of the Philippines. The ground floor is being leased to a
canteen, medical professionals whom use the same as their private clinics,
as well as to other private parties. The right portion of the lot is being leased
for commercial purposes to the Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center. The