Risk in Arctic operations under influence of different covariates

Table of Contents
Abstract .................................................................................................................................. 2
1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 3

1.1 Overview .................................................................................................................................. 3

1.2 Problem statement .............................................................................................................. 4
1.3 Goal of the report .............................................................................................................. 5
1.4 Limitations .............................................................................................................................. 5

2 Arctic issues ...................................................................................................................... 6

2.1 Overview .................................................................................................................................. 6

2.2 Arctic Hazards ....................................................................................................................... 7
2.3 Uncertainties in Arctic ........................................................................................................ 7
2.4 Risks in Arctic ........................................................................................................................ 9
2.5 Risk picture............................................................................................................................ 9

3 Risk Assessment ........................................................................................................... 13

3.1 The HAZID process ...........................................................................................................15

4 A case of Risk exposure of offshore platforms in the presence of Icebergs

................................................................................................................................................ 20
4.1 Overview ................................................................................................................................21
4.2 Initiating event.............................................................................................................................. 21
4.3 Barrier .............................................................................................................................................. 22
4.4 Fault tree Analysis ....................................................................................................................... 22
4.5 Consequence analysis ................................................................................................................ 24
4.5.1 Consequence classification..........................................................................................25

5. Conclusions and Future recommendations ....................................................... 27

6. References ..................................................................................................................... 28

Abstract
The growing interests in Arctic oil and gas resources has increased in recent times. It
has been estimated that 25% of the remaining worlds oil reserves can be found in
Arctic. It is a challenge for the development of projects in Arctic regions due to harsh
and vulnerable climatic conditions which can increase the risk related to human and
environment. Highly complexed and technologically advanced system are needed for
development of such projects. However, risks and failure are inevitable and while
operating in artic, it should always be considered about such risks and ways to
mitigate it.

This project gives an overview of the risks involved in artic operations. Working
under Arctic conditions will be influenced by covariates like snow, ice, waves, low
temperature, human factors, etc. Reliability and maintainability, process of
maintenance, support activities, and reliable data and information are some of the
factors that might be affected due to the presence of covariates. Risk management in
Arctic is utterly a must to make decisions and to decrease the probability of hazards
and deadly consequences. The effects of covariates in Arctic operations has been
discussed in this paper and focus has been made to do a risk assessment for such
challenge.

1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
Risk analysis can be either quantitative or qualitative approach in evaluating the
unwanted event, analyzing the consequences, applying the mitigating measures and
lowering down the impact as low as possible. Steps that can be followed in this
concept of risk analysis can be as following :

Identification of the incident

Estimating its occurrence frequency

Determine the consequences

Develop risk level based on the frequency of occurrence and severity of

consequences

Apply control measures

Reduce uncertainty

Take decisions

A proper risk analysis helps in controlling the unwanted situation, estimating damage
of potential and facilitates in making decisions to control such situations by
evaluating the effective measures. Hazard identification is one of the important
process in the risk analysis. Use of barriers to prevent unwanted event is a must in
lowering the risk. With every operational activities, maintenance or installation, there

are always certain risk or uncertainties associated. In addition, with different

operational condition, level of risk can differ which in this report will be described.

The change in the operational environment can influence the reliability and
maintainability performance for any kind of operations to a certain extent [1]. The
tough and harsh climatic conditions of the Arctic is one of the main challenge faced in
exploring hydrocarbons in these areas. Taking such issues under considerations,
Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA) focuses on the safety barriers [2,3].
Implementing these safety barriers can somehow lower the impact level and degree of
severity of the consequences in case if unwanted event took place. This report will
focus on Risk in Arctic under different covariates or uncertainties.

Figure 1 : Oversight of Risk (Haddon, 1980)

1.2 Problem statement

Different critical factors related to environment such as temperature, snow, ice and
icing, wind, ice drift, polar low or visibility can affect the Arctic operations. Besides,
communicational and navigational challenges, challenges related with materials,
human factors (ergonomics), political challenges or logistics challenges have to be
considered while doing risk analysis of Arctic operations. Maintenance and
operational tasks in Arctic needs major planning so that it can be carried out

efficiently. More importantly, lack of data and information on Arctic makes a

challenge to do risk assessment. Uncertainties in weather forecast for example is a
challenge which brings a risk to offshore operations [4]. The only difference between
Arctic operations in compared to onshore operations is brought by harsh climate
which has lots of adverse effects as pointed in above statements.
This project will try to look at the potential risk factors in operation in Arctic and to
implement reliability and maintenance in such environments.

1.3 Goal of the report

The goal is to make an approach in analyzing the risk factors which causes potential
harms. Assessing the risks from hazard, identifying suitable measures that can
eliminate or reduce the risk to an accepted level will be carried out in the report.

1.4 Limitations
There are lots of potential factors that can bring uncertainty in Arctic operations. Here
in this report, impact on logistics, spare parts inventory will not be discussed in depth.
More focus will be made upon the critical factors brought by the environment and its
related issues.

2 Arctic issues
2.1 Overview
Arctic has large potential for energy. Offshore activities in the Arctic has created a
new horizon for the oil and gas field developments. Such developments in Arctic are
new and challenging. The working conditions can be harsh and challenging [5].
Arctic is characterized by a very low temperature and most of the time it is dark. Such
factors could lead in the reduction of efficiency of working personnel or the
functionality of the safety system which can eventually lead to potential hazards.
Experiences with working in cold climates are few, which has build a challenge for
the operations in Arctic.

Figure 2: Arctic picture

With growing interests in Arctic, new technologies have been developed for safe and
sustainable operations thus lowering down the risk. Even in the presence of
uncertainties, development of the technologies are promising and reliable to perform
the offshore activities well. For example, ice conditions in Arctic can be a challenge
and apart understanding the mechanics of ice and developing guidelines to predict
such ice formations and mitigating measures to perform the work effectively.

2.2 Arctic Hazards

Hazard in basic meaning is a physical situation that can bring a threat to life, health or
property. With such hazardous potentials, unwanted event generally called as incident
takes place. The consequences of hazard and its occurrence possibility gives the
measure of risk. In Arctic, there are different uncertainties factors that could give rise
to such hazardous conditions during operations. Complex geological structures,
climate, ecology, infrastructure, long distance to market are some uncertainty factors
[6].

With the fact that in the coming years more activities will head towards north, hence
it is important to take in to considerations the hazards associated with Arctic and
apply the mitigating measures. The key consideration is design element and for this
the knowledge about the conditions related to physical environment is put in the
priority [7]. Spare parts need to be highly reliable. Installed materials and equipment
should be able to withstand the harsh conditions of Arctic. The constructions in Arctic
depends highly on weather conditions and so as its operability. Limitations of the
equipment performance and interruption in transportation can also lead to hazardous
result, thereby increasing the risk degree.

2.3 Uncertainties in Arctic

Arctic has complex [8] physical environment with strongly interacting components.
These gives rise to a measureable difference in the predictions for Arctic.
Introductions of covariates such as wind, ice, waves, low temperature, darkness, etc,
can bring the uncertainties. In addition, political, logistic , economical challenge also
create uncertainties, but however in this report, we will discuss the effects brought by
the physical environment and will try to discuss their effects and controlling

measures. In such scenario, operations in cold climates especially in Arctic is

different on the following points basis:

Icing on vessels

Unpredictable weather

Presence of sea Ice

Such factors can affect the reliability and maintainability issues. Hence to avoid such
effects, it is important to understand the conditions of Arctic and implement necessary
strategies. However, lack of data is one of the important challenge in defining the
system in Arctic. Introductions of mathematical modeling like Proportional hazard
model and Accelerated failure time model can somehow be used to study the effects
of the covariates in the production performance [1]. These models basically shows the
effect under the influence of different factors while operating in Arctic. The hazard
rate is influenced by the presence of covariates along the passage of time as shown in
the figure below.

Figure 3: Hazard model showing hazard rate in the presence of covariates

2.4 Risks in Arctic

Risk can be roughly said as an event or consequence or as a combination of
probability and expected loss. Mathematically,
Risk = f (P,C) where P and C are probability and consequence for any specified event.
In the presence of uncertainties, various risks could be associated. These can be listed
as:
Environmental risks:

Wildlife

Ice conditions with design limits

Weather conditions

Oil spill from rig

Oil spill from well

Technical risks:

Incomplete design

Inadequate design

Uncertainty over the source and availability of materials

Appropriateness of specifications

Logistic risks :

Availability of resources

Availability of sufficient transportation facilities, ice breaking supply vessels,

etc.

Operational risks:

Downtime

Low performance

2.5 Risk picture

Offshore activities in Arctic need to consider the challenges which can add risk and
hence all of these contributing factors must be taken under consideration during best
operational practices. As pointed above, the risk contributing factors could be many,
9

however the scope of this project cannot cover all of these factors like logistic and
technical issues due to the lack of data.
Presence of hazards in Arctic can cause unwanted event. Identifying the hazards and
building proper barriers can reduce the accident. Hazard is a source of physical
damage and risk is the measure of possibility of the conversion of hazard that can give
rise to loss or damage.

Figure 4: A simple hazard picture

10

2.6 Identification of Risk factors in Arctic

Risk factors

Controlling measures

Low temperatures can have major

Working

staffs

impacts on the working environment and

protected

by

can affect the materials used on platforms

working areas

Reliable

should
the

materials

be

enclosing

should

be

selected
Ice presence for most of the parts of the

year, sea ice and drifting ice

loads from ice

Human performance might be affected

because

of

low

temperatures,

Additional design to overcome the

Ice management systems

Selection and training of workers

long

and ensuring adequate working

darkness periods, vibration from ice and

psychological aspects of living in such

periods

long distance remote areas

Well designed living conditions to

provide relief during working
hours

Vulnerable environments

More safety barriers need to be

applied

Probability of other risk factors

should be reduced to account the
increased consequences of the
unwanted incidents

Oil spills in ice is a major challenge.

Detecting oil spills during polar nights is

Reliable technology for detecting

such spills should be developed

also a challenge
Escape, evacuation and rescue of

Several methods for evacuation

working personnel is a challenge due to

and rescue should be implemented

the long distance, darkness and ice.

to ensure the safety of personnel

Indigenous interests can be perceived as

a risk for industrial activity in the Arctic

doe to the lack of operator knowledge

Detailed study of rights and

cultures should be made

Involvement of such groups

11

Bow tie diagram

Figure 5: A bow tie to show a case of Arctic

12

3 Risk Assessment

Defining the problem is the main task in risk analysis. Different hazards can be
identified while doing Arctic operations and identifying those hazards is the first step.
Arctic has vulnerable environment and hence the probability of failure in Arctic is
high. Defining the problem is followed by the analysis which in this case would be
HAZID. The cause and consequences are developed to develop a risk picture. Based
upon the risk picture, different alternatives are proposed that can considerably provide
greater risk reduction.
In the Arctic, one of the major challenge is to identify the potential risks and to
develop the measures to control them.
Some of the factors that characterize the Arctic are

Long distance

Ice

Cold

Poor communication

Weather and forecasting

Polar lows

Risk Acceptance criteria

The NORSOK Z-013N defines the risk acceptance criteria as, Criteria that are
applied in order to express the acceptable level of risk for the activity at hand. After
the identification and implications of risk reduction measures, it is always necessary
that the risk acceptance criteria must be suitable for decision process, communication
and independent.

Figure 6: Risk assessment

13

The risk factors in Arctic can be avoided by different means of controlling methods,
but however to what extent such measures could be applied or how far can it be
reasonably practicable is the key issue.

Figure 7: ALARP principle

Reduction of risk, either by reducing the probability of occurrence or by reducing the

consequence level is the idea in ALARP. Due to the uncertainty in the Arctic, the risk
factors is increased which means that the probability and consequences of unwanted
events must be lowered.

Figure 8: Risk degree

14

The main aim of the risk management is to make the scenario free from unwanted
event and drive the process in the acceptable zone of risk or negligible risk. The major
developments in the high North is seeking such attributes which is a major challenge
due to the lack of information and uncertainties. So, basically understanding the
problems is an issue and designing corresponding barriers might be the solution to
some extent.

3.1 The HAZID process

Hazard identification (HAZID) is structured way to approach in identifying the
hazards and provide input in the risk analysis. Steps in HAZID are:

Identify hazards

Describe the failure modes

Estimating their frequencies and consequences

Suggest risk mitigating measures

Develop a risk scenario based on risk matrix

Below is a table to show the measure of the probability in to 8 categories.

PI

Probability

Definition

Extremely remote

Once in the life time

Very remote

Likely to occur once in several operations

Remote

Likely to occur once per year

Little possibility

Likely to occur in the total operation

Reasonable Probable

Likely to occur few times during operations in

the life time

Probable

Likely to occur once per year

Frequent

Likely to occur once per month

Very frequent

Like to occur once or twice a week

Table 1: Probability index

In the HAZID, the risk matrix is of order 8 8 for which the the severity level was
also divided in to 8 categories as shown in the table below. The main problem with
these tables was to assign the values which was made through discussion.
Below is the table for the consequence classification on the basis of the severity.

15

Severity factor

Consequence description

No impact

Minor first aid

Damages or injuries that might require help

Serious impacts, operational damage

Major threat, life threatning

Major injuries, or damage to the functioning equipment

Stop of the operation and chances of loss of lives

Unrecoverable damages

Death, loss of reputation, Bankrupt.

Table 2: Severity index

Again, the product of the probability and severity gives the risk measure for which it
has been categorized in to four parts. They are low, medium, high and very high.
Low (L) [ 6]

Minor injuries, negligible damages which

can be accepted.

Medium(M) [8-20]

Loss of potential that requires controlling

measures. Use ALARP

High (H) [20-35]

Not acceptable, high damage and chances

of loss of lives

Very High (V.H) [ 35]

Project should be abandoned and risk

assessment is necessary

Table 3: Risk classification

On the following basis, a HAZID has been made which is shown below. Again, an
intuition was made that, the high and medium risk measure have to be brought down
either by lowering down the probability or consequence. Hence after applying the
mitigating measures, it has been considered that the most of the risk level was brought
down to the acceptable limit which is shown in HAZID.

16

17

Based on the HAZID, the 1st level risk matrix was developed which is shown below. From the table it is seen that the some of the risk value are
in red zone which strictly needs some controlling measures by all means possible. The sequence number in [] represents the corresponding
events from HAZID.

8
7

[4,1]

[4,2]

[4,3]
[5,2]
[7,1]
[5,3]
[6,1]
[6,2]

[5,7][7,2]
[8,1] [9,1]

[4,5]
[4,6]
[1,4]
[5,5]

[1,5]

[11,1]

[3,1][3,3] [5,4]
[5,6] [10,1]
[4,4]

[3,2] [12,1]

[2,2] [3,4]
[5,1] [5,8]

[9,2]

[1,2]

[5,9]

[2,1]

[1,1][1,3]

2
1
1

Table 4: 1st level risk matrix

18

8
7
6
5

[1,4][7,1][7,2]
[8,1]

[1,5][5,2]

[1,2] [3,1]
[5,1][5,2][5,5]
[6,1]
[1,3][3,2][4,3]
[4,6][5,3][6,2]

[3,3][3,4][4,1][4,2]

[2,2][5,9]

[1,1][5,7] [9,1][12,1]

3
2
1

[2,1][4,5][5,4][8,2]
[9,2] [10,1][11,1]

[4,4]

[5,8]
1

Table 5: Updated risk matrix

Among many potential hazard, one of the hazard is presence of ice in Arctic. Hence, to make more comprehensive illustrations in this issue, I
have chose to do risk analysis for the offshore platform in the presence of icebergs which is the second part of this project.

19

4 A case of Risk exposure of offshore platforms in the

presence of Icebergs

20

4.1 Overview
Among various Arctic operations, one major risk is collision with the drifting
icebergs. It is always a matter of challenge to predict such dangers mostly in oil and
gas activities in offshore. The presence of ice can actually bring a catastrophic
unwanted event if not prevented before it strikes. Operations in Arctic has to consider
such challenges for safe operations. Uncertainties in ice drift and not good enough
understanding of ice management is a major problem. In this part of the report, a
simple casual and consequence analysis has been made on iceberg collision by the use
of FTA(Fault Tree Analysis) and ETA(Event Tree Analysis) analysis. A concept of
barrier management has been described which actually can help to reduce the
probability and consequence of the unwanted event, thereby reducing the degree of
risk.
The Norsok N-003 industry standard defines approximate 100- and 10 000-year limits
for how far south a collision between an iceberg and an installation is likely. While
the Johan Castberg discovery under consideration for development lies within
the10000-year boundary, for instance, the Snhvit and Goliat fields are just outside it.
The complex nature of offshore is always a challenge to predict the risks associated
with icebergs. Determining the probability of collisions and estimating the
consequences gives the measure of risk. The expected increase in the exploitation of
hydrocarbons had lead to the increased probability of collisions. This report has
shown the risk analysis of iceberg collision and has basically try to generalize to a
certain extent about the issue and the recommendations has been provided.
4.2 Initiating event
The production platform can be assumed to be surrounded by different zones
according to the criticality of iceberg approach. For example, the zones can be divided
in to three zones. The green zone where the ice floes are detected and icebreaker are
implemented. In case, the ice has crossed the green zone, it enters in to the yellow
zone where the relative danger is high and preparation for emergency shutdown is to
be made ready. Finally in the red zone, every procedures are disconnected and
evacuated before iceberg hits the production platform. Approaching Iceberg is the
initiating event.

21

4.3 Barrier
Barriers are established to handle the risk that can be encountered by preventing the
happening of unwanted events or by applying the mitigating measures to reduce the
consequence [9]. It includes the ways, solutions and efforts necessary to reduce the
risk. In the growing business era, barrier management is a necessary evil and has been
a part of companies with HSE management and performance management.
To identify the barriers, it is important to identify their functions based upon the risk
picture. The risk management[10] describes the barrier management picture which is
shown in the figure below.
Barriers used to prevent from icebergs can be
-Net towing
- Propeller washing
-Water cannon deflection

4.4 Fault tree Analysis

The fault tree below has shown the initiating basic event that could lead to such
collisions due to icebergs. Different factors are involved in initiating such unwanted
event and a chain of such events lead to such event which in this case are
environment, human error, technical failure, data acquisition failure and so on.

22

Figure 9: FTA analysis for FTA analysis

23

The basic events shown in the figure can be listed as follows:

Cause
Human error

Initiating events
a. Improper training
b. Stress
c. Overpressure of work
d. Mishandling of the towing equipment
e. Insufficient knowledge on ice
management

GPS system fails

f. bad weather conditions

g. failure of the positioning system
h. GPS might beunder maintenance

Data failure

i. misinteroretation of the data

j. equipment failure in data acquistion

Environment

k. wind
l. oceanic current
m. tsunami
n. waves
o. earthquake
p. corolois force

4.5 Consequence analysis

After the unwanted events has taken place, different consequences can exist.
Depending upon the nature of the consequence, degree of severity is assigned which
when combined with the value of probability gives the measure of risk. In case of
iceberg collision, proper ice management can though reduce the severity and hence
less loss of property and lives. For instance, we can divide the zones around platform
in to green, yellow and red zones. After the drift of iceberg has been started, it is
important to know its drift path and other factors that could affect its drift such as
wind and oceanic current. Proper barriers if imposed can highly reduce the
consequences and can save the production facility. However, once the iceberg enters

24

in to the forbidden zone, it is made sure that the towing has been made properly and
the ice exploders has been functioning well. In case, these options fails, evacuation
has to be made before iceberg reaches the platform.
A basic ETA can be made for such iceberg drift and the resulting consequences.
Figure below shows the ETA and the consequence category according to the
probability of occurrence.

4.5.1 Consequence classification

Low
There will be no serious danger for the people operating on the rig, in the worst case
there will be people with minor injuries. The environmental damage will be minor up
to moderate depending on the reaction speed of the crew on board. During the actions
taken to prevent such collisions it is possible that there will be a temporary loss of
production.
Medium
When the first barriers fail, safety will come first and the economical aspect of the rig
will be ignored. The production line will be cut, this means loss of production until
they have built a new production line.
High
We will end up in this category when the first attempt to cut the production line fails.
This means that the platform has trouble with disconnecting from the well, resulting
in more damage in rig and overboard. This causes huge environmental damage, and it
increases the probability of fire and explosions occurring on the rig even more.
Very high
In this case all or almost all barriers failed and the order to evacuate will be given.
The platform is unable for production and this can cause serious damages. This can
even cause huge environmental damage and fires will be continuously fed. The
likelihood of explosions occurring is very high; because of this the probability of
people getting seriously injured and killed is inevitable. The damage may be so high
to the platform that it will become instable and will sink in worst case scenario.

25

Figure 10: ETA analysis for iceberg collision

26

5. Conclusions and Future recommendations

Development in north is full of challenges and opportunities. Identifying the hazard
and uncertainty is a major challenge in risk analysis. In case of Arctic, there might be
other unseen challenges which might create obstacle in the development process. So,
in order to make the risk level in the acceptable limits, continuous research and some
of the important aspects like operational planning, emergency preparedness should be
sound enough. Principle of ALARP which is widely used is the typical requirement in
such activities for example. In addition, risk communication is another important
aspect. The exchange of information and opinion on risk among different parties
involved is crucial. It is a part of risk assessment and must be undertaken in a
systematic ways.

In the case shown in the second part of the project, more efficient techniques might be
required to carry out the operations safely. Study of modeling of Arctic under
influence of various covariates, for example the drift of ice can be useful to know.
More enhanced iceberg detection technologies and exact idea about the location of
icebergs are some of the crucial information that helps in a more effective operations.
It has been said in [11] that deflection capabilities on icebergs in sea ice need more
investigation. Such issues can be emphasized. The operational scenario requires more
special attention which comprises of different issues again.

27

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