RABADILLA vs.

CA

Lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the obligation to respect and deliver
yearly ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, on each
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, [3] dated December 23,
month of December, SEVENTY FIVE (75) piculs of Export and TWENTY FIVE (25) piculs of
1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555, which set aside the decision of Branch 52 of the Regional
Domestic, until Maria Marlina shall die, lastly should the buyer, lessee or the mortgagee of
Trial Court in Bacolod City, and ordered the defendants-appellees (including herein
this lot, not have respected my command in this my addition (Codicil), Maria Marlina
petitioner), as heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with Coscolluela y Belleza, shall immediately seize this Lot No. 1392 from my heir and the
its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
latter's heirs, and shall turn it over to my near desendants, (sic) and the latter shall then
have the obligation to give the ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar until Maria Marlina
The antecedent facts are as follows:
shall die. I further command in this my addition (Codicil) that my heir and his heirs of this
Lot No. 1392, that they will obey and follow that should they decide to sell, lease,
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge
mortgage, they cannot negotiate with others than my near descendants and my sister." [4]
Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was
instituted as a devisee of 511, 855 square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot No. Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the deceased, Dr. Jorge
1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre. The said Codicil, which was duly probated and admitted in
Rabadilla, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44498 thereto issued in his name.
Special Proceedings No. 4046 before the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental,
contained the following provisions:
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny
(petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.
"FIRST
On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a complaint,
I give, leave and bequeath the following property owned by me to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
docketed as Civil Case No. 5588, before Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod
resident of 141 P. Villanueva, Pasay City:
City, against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of
subject Codicil. The Complaint alleged that the defendant-heirs violated the conditions of
(a) Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RTthe Codicil, in that:
4002 (10942), which is registered in my name according to the records of the Register of
Deeds of Negros Occidental.
1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank and the Republic Planters
(b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the aforementioned property and the
rights which I shall set forth hereinbelow, shall be inherited and acknowledged by the
children and spouse of Jorge Rabadilla.
xxx
FOURTH
(a)....It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that should I die and Jorge
Rabadilla shall have already received the ownership of the said Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod
Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), and also at the time
that the lease of Balbinito G. Guanzon of the said lot shall expire, Jorge Rabadilla shall have
the obligation until he dies, every year to give to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza,
Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and Twenty Five (25) piculs of Domestic sugar,
until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza dies.
FIFTH
(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod
Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10492), shall have the
obligation to still give yearly, the sugar as specified in the Fourth paragraph of his
testament, to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza on the month of December of each year.
SIXTH
I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot No. 1392, in the event that the one to
whom I have left and bequeathed, and his heir shall later sell, lease, mortgage this said

Bank in disregard of the testatrix's specific instruction to sell, lease, or mortgage only to
the near descendants and sister of the testatrix.
2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver one hundred (100) piculs
of sugar (75 piculs export sugar and 25 piculs domestic sugar) to plaintiff Maria Marlena
Coscolluela y Belleza from sugar crop years 1985 up to the filing of the complaint as
mandated by the Codicil, despite repeated demands for compliance.
3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the Codicil which provided that in
case of the sale, lease, or mortgage of the property, the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee shall
likewise have the obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar per crop year to herein private
respondent.
The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to
reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, the
cancellation of TCT No. 44498 in the name of the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the
issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of the surviving heirs of the late Aleja
Belleza.
On February 26, 1990, the defendant-heirs were declared in default but on March 28, 1990
the Order of Default was lifted, with respect to defendant Johnny S. Rabadilla, who filed his
Answer, accordingly.
During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that:

On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private respondent) and a certain Alan Azurin, son-in- On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
law of the herein petitioner who was lessee of the property and acting as attorney-in-fact of trial court; ratiocinating and ordering thus:
defendant-heirs, arrived at an amicable settlement and entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement on the obligation to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar, to the following effect: "Therefore, the evidence on record having established plaintiff-appellant's right to receive
100 piculs of sugar annually out of the produce of Lot No. 1392; defendants-appellee's
"That for crop year 1988-89, the annuity mentioned in Entry No. 49074 of TCT No. 44489
obligation under Aleja Belleza's codicil, as heirs of the modal heir, Jorge Rabadilla, to
will be delivered not later than January of 1989, more specifically, to wit:
deliver such amount of sugar to plaintiff-appellant; defendants-appellee's admitted noncompliance with said obligation since 1985; and, the punitive consequences enjoined by
75 piculs of 'A' sugar, and 25 piculs of 'B' sugar, or then existing in any of our names, Mary both the codicil and the Civil Code, of seizure of Lot No. 1392 and its reversion to the estate
Rose Rabadilla y Azurin or Alan Azurin, during December of each sugar crop year, in Azucar of Aleja Belleza in case of such non-compliance, this Court deems it proper to order the
Sugar Central; and, this is considered compliance of the annuity as mentioned, and in the
reconveyance of title over Lot No. 1392 from the estates of Jorge Rabadilla to the estate of
same manner will compliance of the annuity be in the next succeeding crop years.
Aleja Belleza. However, plaintiff-appellant must institute separate proceedings to re-open
Aleja Belleza's estate, secure the appointment of an administrator, and distribute Lot No.
That the annuity above stated for crop year 1985-86, 1986-87, and 1987-88, will be
1392 to Aleja Belleza's legal heirs in order to enforce her right, reserved to her by the
complied in cash equivalent of the number of piculs as mentioned therein and which is as
codicil, to receive her legacy of 100 piculs of sugar per year out of the produce of Lot No.
herein agreed upon, taking into consideration the composite price of sugar during each
1392 until she dies.
sugar crop year, which is in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P105,000.00).
Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another one entered ordering
defendants-appellees, as heirs of Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392,
That the above-mentioned amount will be paid or delivered on a staggered cash
together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
installment, payable on or before the end of December of every sugar crop year, to wit:
SO ORDERED."[7]
For 1985-86, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on
or before December of crop year 1988-89;
Dissatisfied with the aforesaid disposition by the Court of Appeals, petitioner found his way
to this Court via the present petition, contending that the Court of Appeals erred in
For 1986-87, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on ordering the reversion of Lot 1392 to the estate of the testatrix Aleja Belleza on the basis of
or before December of crop year 1989-90;
paragraph 6 of the Codicil, and in ruling that the testamentary institution of Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla is a modal institution within the purview of Article 882 of the New Civil Code.
For 1987-88, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on
or before December of crop year 1990-91; and
The petition is not impressed with merit.
For 1988-89, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in resolving the appeal in accordance
or before December of crop year 1991-92."[5]
with Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions and in deviating from the sole
issue raised which is the absence or prematurity of the cause of action. Petitioner
However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid Memorandum of Agreement except
maintains that Article 882 does not find application as there was no modal institution and
for a partial delivery of 50.80 piculs of sugar corresponding to sugar crop year 1988 -1989. the testatrix intended a mere simple substitution - i.e. the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, was to be substituted by the testatrix's "near descendants" should the obligation
On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came out with a decision, dismissing the
to deliver the fruits to herein private respondent be not complied with. And since the
complaint and disposing as follows:
testatrix died single and without issue, there can be no valid substitution and such
testamentary provision cannot be given any effect.
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforegoing findings, the Court finds that the action is
prematurely filed as no cause of action against the defendants has as yet arose in favor of The petitioner theorizes further that there can be no valid substitution for the reason that
plaintiff. While there maybe the non-performance of the command as mandated exaction
the substituted heirs are not definite, as the substituted heirs are merely referred to as
from them simply because they are the children of Jorge Rabadilla, the title holder/owner of "near descendants" without a definite identity or reference as to who are the "near
the lot in question, does not warrant the filing of the present complaint. The remedy at bar descendants" and therefore, under Articles 843[8] and 845[9] of the New Civil Code, the
must fall. Incidentally, being in the category as creditor of the left estate, it is opined that
substitution should be deemed as not written.
plaintiff may initiate the intestate proceedings, if only to establish the heirs of Jorge
Rabadilla and in order to give full meaning and semblance to her claim under the Codicil.
In the light of the aforegoing findings, the Complaint being prematurely filed is DISMISSED
without prejudice.
SO ORDERED."[6]

The contentions of petitioner are untenable. Contrary to his supposition that the Court of
Appeals deviated from the issue posed before it, which was the propriety of the dismissal of
the complaint on the ground of prematurity of cause of action, there was no such deviation.
The Court of Appeals found that the private respondent had a cause of action against the
petitioner. The disquisition made on modal institution was, precisely, to stress that the
private respondent had a legally demandable right against the petitioner pursuant to
subject Codicil; on which issue the Court of Appeals ruled in accordance with law.
It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are transmitted
from the moment of death of the decedent[10] and compulsory heirs are called to succeed
by operation of law. The legitimate children and descendants, in relation to their legitimate
parents, and the widow or widower, are compulsory heirs.[11] Thus, the petitioner, his
mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
succeeded the latter by operation of law, without need of further proceedings, and the
successional rights were transmitted to them from the moment of death of the decedent,
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the
time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the
estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
subject to the condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered to the herein private
respondent every year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs
succeeded to his rights and title over the said property, and they also assumed his
(decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot involved to herein private respondent.
Such obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally corresponds to the right of private
respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or performance of which is now being
demanded by the latter through the institution of the case at bar. Therefore, private
respondent has a cause of action against petitioner and the trial court erred in dismissing
the complaint below.
Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions is not
applicable because what the testatrix intended was a substitution - Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was
to be substituted by the testatrix's near descendants should there be noncompliance with
the obligation to deliver the piculs of sugar to private respondent.
Again, the contention is without merit.
Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of
the heir or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1)
provide for the designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass in case the
original heir should die before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to
inherit, as in a simple substitution,[12] or (2) leave his/her property to one person with the
express charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a
fideicommissary substitution.[13] The Codicil sued upon contemplates neither of the two.
In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by
reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation.[14] In the case under consideration, the
provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to

predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix's near descendants would substitute

him. What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the
conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized and turned over
to the testatrix's near descendants.
Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on this point, petitioner is correct.
In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to preserve
the property and to transmit the same later to the second heir.[15] In the case under
consideration, the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate the
property provided the negotiation is with the near descendants or the sister of the
testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a fideicommissary substitution is lacking; the
obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir the preservation of the property and its
transmission to the second heir. "Without this obligation to preserve clearly imposed by the
testator in his will, there is no fideicommissary substitution." [16] Also, the near descendants'
right to inherit from the testatrix is not definite. The property will only pass to them should
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation to deliver part of the usufruct to
private respondent.
Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing here. Under
Article 863, the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the property is transmitted
must not be beyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. A fideicommissary
substitution is therefore, void if the first heir is not related by first degree to the second
heir.[17] In the case under scrutiny, the near descendants are not at all related to the
instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under
subject Codicil is in the nature of a modal institution and therefore, Article 882 of the New
Civil Code is the provision of law in point. Articles 882 and 883 of the New Civil Code
provide:
Art. 882. The statement of the object of the institution or the application of the property
left by the testator, or the charge imposed on him, shall not be considered as a condition
unless it appears that such was his intention.
That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided that the
instituted heir or his heirs give security for compliance with the wishes of the testator and
for the return of anything he or they may receive, together with its fruits and interests, if
he or they should disregard this obligation.
Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an institution referred to in the preceding
article cannot take effect in the exact manner stated by the testator, it shall be complied
with in a manner most analogous to and in conformity with his wishes.
The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law
of succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal institution, the
testator states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or application of the
property left by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir. [18] A
"mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of
his rights to the succession.[19] On the other hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition,
the condition must happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the
testator. The condition suspends but does not obligate; and the mode obligates but does
not suspend.[20] To some extent, it is similar to a resolutory condition. [21]

From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the
testatrix intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise
clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his
successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private
respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter. However, the
testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of his institution
as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that
should the obligation be not complied with, the property shall be turned over to the
testatrix's near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject
Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir
without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.

desires of the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot be the subject of a
compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the very purpose of making a Will.

Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation
imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from
the Will itself that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution
should be considered as modal and not conditional. [22]

It appears from the record of the case that on February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V. Rosales, a
resident of Cebu City, died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunate T. Rosales
and their two (2) children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child,
Carterio Rosales, predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his
widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. The estate of the dismissed has an
estimated gross value of about Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).

Neither is there tenability in the other contention of petitioner that the private respondent
has only a right of usufruct but not the right to seize the property itself from the instituted
heir because the right to seize was expressly limited to violations by the buyer, lessee or
mortgagee.
In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will, as to the
application of any of its provisions, the testator's intention is to be ascertained from the
words of the Will, taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was made.
[23]
Such construction as will sustain and uphold the Will in all its parts must be adopted. [24]
Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation to deliver One Hundred
(100) piculs of sugar yearly to Marlena Belleza Coscuella. Such obligation is imposed on the
instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his heirs, and their buyer, lessee, or mortgagee should
they sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise negotiate the property involved. The Codicil further
provides that in the event that the obligation to deliver the sugar is not respected, Marlena
Belleza Coscuella shall seize the property and turn it over to the testatrix's near
descendants. The non-performance of the said obligation is thus with the sanction of
seizure of the property and reversion thereof to the testatrix's near descendants. Since the
said obligation is clearly imposed by the testatrix, not only on the instituted heir but also
on his successors-in-interest, the sanction imposed by the testatrix in case of nonfulfillment of said obligation should equally apply to the instituted heir and his successorsin-interest.
Similarly unsustainable is petitioner's submission that by virtue of the amicable settlement,
the said obligation imposed by the Codicil has been assumed by the lessee, and whatever
obligation petitioner had become the obligation of the lessee; that petitioner is deemed to
have made a substantial and constructive compliance of his obligation through the
consummated settlement between the lessee and the private respondent, and having
consummated a settlement with the petitioner, the recourse of the private respondent is
the fulfillment of the obligation under the amicable settlement and not the seizure of
subject property.
Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a
person disposes of his property, to take effect after his death. [25] Since the Will expresses
the manner in which a person intends how his properties be disposed, the wishes and

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ROSALES vs. ROSALES, 148 SCRA 69

In this Petition for Review of two (2) Orders of the Court of First Instance of Cebu the
question raised is whether the widow whose husband predeceased his mother can inherit
from the latter, her mother-in-law.

On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The case was docketed as
Special Proceedings No. 3204-R. Thereafter, the trial court appointed Magna Rosales
Acebes administratrix of the said estate.
In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order dated June 16,
1972 declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs of the deceased and prescribing
their respective share of the estate
Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox
Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales son, 1/4.
This declaration was reiterated by the trial court in its Order I dated February 4, 1975.
These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the estate in
her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased,
claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together with her son,
Macikequerox Rosales.
Thus, Irenea Rosales sought the reconsideration of the aforementioned Orders. The trial
court denied her plea. Hence this petition.
In sum, the petitioner poses two (2) questions for Our resolution petition. First is a widow
(surviving spouse) an intestate heir of her mother-in-law? Second are the Orders of the
trial court which excluded the widow from getting a share of the estate in question final as
against the said widow?
Our answer to the first question is in the negative.
Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those who inherit by their
own right, and those who inherit by the right of representation. 1 Restated, an intestate heir
can only inherit either by his own right, as in the order of intestate succession provided for
in the Civil Code, 2 or by the right of representation provided for in Article 981 of the same
law. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code are:

Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right,
dividing the inheritance in equal shares.

Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of the
parent-in-law. We had occasion to make this observation in Lachenal v. Salas, 4 to Wit:

Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are dead,
survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of representation.

We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined in Civil Case No. 3597 (not
in the intestate proceeding) because it affects the lessee thereof, Lope L. Leoncio, the
decedent's son-in-law, who, although married to his daughter or compulsory heir, is
nevertheless a third person with respect to his estate. ... (Emphasis supplied).

Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shag inherit by right of representation,
and if any one of them should have died, leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining to
him shall be divided among the latter in equal portions.

By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code aforecited does not
support petitioner's claim. A careful examination of the said Article confirms that the estate
Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or their descendants contemplated therein is the estate of the deceased spouse. The estate which is the subject
and illegitimate children or their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, such
matter of the intestate estate proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra V.
widow or widower shall be entitled to the same share as that of a legitimate child.
Rosales, the mother-in-law of the petitioner. It is from the estate of Petra V. Rosales that
Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the inheritance by the right of representation as
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an
provided by Article 981 of the Code.
intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision which entitles
her to inherit from her mother-in- law either by her own right or by the right of
The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by Articles 970 and 971
representation. The provisions of the Code which relate to the order of intestate succession of the Civil Code, viz
(Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a
decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. The conspicuous absence of a provision Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the
which makes a daughter-in-law an intestate heir of the deceased all the more confirms Our representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and
observation. If the legislature intended to make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of
acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have
the parent-in-law, it would have so provided in the Code.
inherited.
Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the provisions of Article
887 of the Civil Code which provides that:

Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person
represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented but the one
whom the person represented would have succeeded. (Emphasis supplied.)

Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their
legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287;
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2;
neither do they exclude one another.

Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to succession by law
because of his blood relationship. He does not succeed his father, Carterio Rosales (the
person represented) who predeceased his grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter whom
his father would have succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the same right of representation
as she has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.
Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband Carterio Rosales
he had an inchoate or contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as compulsory
heir. Be that as it may, said right of her husband was extinguished by his death that is why
it is their son Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from Petra Rosales by right of
representation. He did not succeed from his deceased father, Carterio Rosales.
On the basis of the foregoing observations and conclusions, We find it unnecessary to pass
upon the second question posed by the petitioner.

In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.

Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that a surviving spouse is not an
intestate heir of his or her parent-in-law.

The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall inherit
from them in the manner and to the extent established by this Code.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The aforesaid provision of law 3 refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case
the surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the
estate of a parent-in-law.

LAPUZ SY vs. EUFEMIO, 43 SCRA 177

Petition, filed after the effectivity of Republic Act 5440, for review by certiorari of an order,
dated 29 July 1969, of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, in its Civil Case

No. 20387, dismissing said case for legal separation on the ground that the death of the
therein plaintiff, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, which occurred during the pendency of the case,
abated the cause of action as well as the action itself. The dismissal order was issued over
the objection of Macario Lapuz, the heir of the deceased plaintiff (and petitioner herein)
who sought to substitute the deceased and to have the case prosecuted to final judgment.

But petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy (through her self-assumed substitute for the lower
court did not act on the motion for substitution) stated the principal issue to be as follows:

On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against
Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging, in the main, that they were married civilly on 21 September
1934 and canonically on 30 September 1934; that they had lived together as husband and
wife continuously until 1943 when her husband abandoned her; that they had no child; that
they acquired properties during their marriage; and that she discovered her husband
cohabiting with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok at 1319 Sisa Street, Manila, on or about
March 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which, among
others, would order that the defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of his share
of the conjugal partnership profits.

The issue as framed by petitioner injects into it a supposed conversion of a legal separation
suit to one for declaration of nullity of a marriage, which is without basis, for even
petitioner asserted that "the respondent has acquiesced to the dismissal of his
counterclaim" (Petitioner's Brief, page 22). Not only this. The petition for legal separation
and the counterclaim to declare the nullity of the self same marriage can stand
independent and separate adjudication. They are not inseparable nor was the action for
legal separation converted into one for a declaration of nullity by the counterclaim, for
legal separation pre-supposes a valid marriage, while the petition for nullity has a voidable
marriage as a pre-condition.

In his second amended answer to the petition, herein respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio
alleged affirmative and special defenses, and, along with several other claims involving
money and other properties, counter-claimed for the declaration of nullity ab initio of his
marriage with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage,
celebrated according to Chinese law and customs, with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok.

The first real issue in this case is: Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an
action for legal separation, abate the action? If it does, will abatement also apply if the
action involves property rights? .

Issues having been joined, trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective
evidence. But before the trial could be completed (the respondent was already scheduled
to present surrebuttal evidence on 9 and 18 June 1969), petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy
died in a vehicular accident on 31 May 1969. Counsel for petitioner duly notified the court
of her death.

When an action for legal separation is converted by the counterclaim into one for a
declaration of nullity of a marriage, does the death of a party abate the proceedings?

An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board
separation of the spouses (there being no absolute divorce in this jurisdiction) is purely
personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing
only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108,
by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings
and even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in
character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action
itself actio personalis moritur cum persona.

On 9 June 1969, respondent Eufemio moved to dismiss the "petition for legal
... When one of the spouses is dead, there is no need for divorce, because the marriage is
separation" 1 on two (2) grounds, namely: that the petition for legal separation was filed
beyond the one-year period provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code; and that the death dissolved. The heirs cannot even continue the suit, if the death of the spouse takes place
during the course of the suit (Article 244, Section 3). The action is absolutely dead (Cass.,
of Carmen abated the action for legal separation.
July 27, 1871, D. 71. 1. 81; Cass. req., May 8, 1933, D. H. 1933, 332.") 4 .
On 26 June 1969, counsel for deceased petitioner moved to substitute the deceased
Marriage is a personal relation or status, created under the sanction of law, and an action
Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz. Counsel for Eufemio opposed the motion.
for divorce is a proceeding brought for the purpose of effecting a dissolution of that
On 29 July 1969, the court issued the order under review, dismissing the case. 2 In the body relation. The action is one of a personal nature. In the absence of a statute to the contrary,
of the order, the court stated that the motion to dismiss and the motion for substitution
the death of one of the parties to such action abates the action, for the reason that death
had to be resolved on the question of whether or not the plaintiff's cause of action has
has settled the question of separation beyond all controversy and deprived the court of
survived, which the court resolved in the negative. Petitioner's moved to reconsider but the jurisdiction, both over the persons of the parties to the action and of the subject-matter of
motion was denied on 15 September 1969.
the action itself. For this reason the courts are almost unanimous in holding that the death
of either party to a divorce proceeding, before final decree, abates the action. 1 Corpus
After first securing an extension of time to file a petition for review of the order of dismissal Juris, 208; Wren v. Moss, 2 Gilman, 72; Danforth v. Danforth, 111 Ill. 236; Matter of
issued by the juvenile and domestic relations court, the petitioner filed the present petition Grandall, 196 N.Y. 127, 89 N.E. 578; 134 Am St. Rep. 830; 17 Ann. Cas. 874; Wilcon v.
on 14 October 1969. The same was given due course and answer thereto was filed by
Wilson, 73 Mich, 620, 41 N.W. 817; Strickland v. Strickland, 80 Ark. 452, 97 S. W. 659;
respondent, who prayed for the affirmance of the said order. 3
McCurley v. McCurley, 60 Md. 185, 45 Am. Rep. 717; Begbie v. Begbie, 128 Cal. 155, 60
Pac. 667, 49 L.R.A. 141. 5
Although the defendant below, the herein respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio, filed
counterclaims, he did not pursue them after the court below dismissed the case. He
The same rule is true of causes of action and suits for separation and maintenance
acquiesced in the dismissal of said counterclaims by praying for the affirmance of the order (Johnson vs. Bates, Ark. 101 SW 412; 1 Corpus Juris 208).
that dismissed not only the petition for legal separation but also his counterclaim to declare
the Eufemio-Lapuz marriage to be null and void ab initio.
A review of the resulting changes in property relations between spouses shows that they
are solely the effect of the decree of legal separation; hence, they can not survive the

death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree. On the point, Article 106 of the Civil
Code provides: .
Art. 106. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:
(1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage
bonds shall not be severed; .
(2) The conjugal partnership of gains or the absolute conjugal community of property shall
be dissolved and liquidated, but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of
the profits earned by the partnership or community, without prejudice to the provisions of
article 176;
(3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, unless
otherwise directed by the court in the interest of said minors, for whom said court may
appoint a guardian;

separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come
into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in
expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be
forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected
consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
As to the petition of respondent-appellee Eufemio for a declaration of nullity ab initio of his
marriage to Carmen Lapuz, it is apparent that such action became moot and academic
upon the death of the latter, and there could be no further interest in continuing the same
after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights
acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6
could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or
by the heirs of the appellant.

In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only voidable under
Article 83, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, because the second marriage had been
contracted with the first wife having been an absentee for seven consecutive years, or
(4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse by
when she had been generally believed dead, still the action for annulment became
intestate succession. Moreover, provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will extinguished as soon as one of the three persons involved had died, as provided in Article
of the innocent one shall be revoked by operation of law.
87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the action for annulment should be brought
during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved. And furthermore, the liquidation of
From this article it is apparent that the right to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership
any conjugal partnership that might have resulted from such voidable marriage must be
of gains (or of the absolute community of property), the loss of right by the offending
carried out "in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse", as expressly
spouse to any share of the profits earned by the partnership or community, or his
provided in Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment proceeding.
disqualification to inherit by intestacy from the innocent spouse as well as the revocation of
testamentary provisions in favor of the offending spouse made by the innocent one, are all ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------rights and disabilities that, by the very terms of the Civil Code article, are vested
---------------exclusively in the persons of the spouses; and by their nature and intent, such claims and
disabilities are difficult to conceive as assignable or transmissible. Hence, a claim to said
rights is not a claim that "is not thereby extinguished" after a party dies, under Section 17,
Rule 3, of the Rules of Court, to warrant continuation of the action through a substitute of
BARITUA vs. CA, 183 SCRA 565
the deceased party.
This petition for review on certiorari assails as erroneous and contrary to existing relevant
Sec. 17. Death of party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the
laws and applicable jurisprudence the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated December
court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear
11, 1987 which reversed and set aside that of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XXXII, at Pili,
and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such
Camarines Sur. 2 The challenged decision adjudged the petitioners liable to the private
time as may be granted...
respondents in the total amount of P20,505.00 and for costs.
The same result flows from a consideration of the enumeration of the actions that survive
for or against administrators in Section 1, Rule 87, of the Revised Rules of Court:
SECTION 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or
administrator. No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon
shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions to recover real or
personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and
actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be
commenced against him.
Neither actions for legal separation or for annulment of marriage can be deemed fairly
included in the enumeration..
A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff,
even if property rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of decree of

The facts are as follows:

In the evening of November 7, 1979, the tricycle then being driven by Bienvenido Nacario
along the national highway at Barangay San Cayetano, in Baao, Camarines Sur, figured in
an accident with JB Bus No. 80 driven by petitioner Edgar Bitancor and owned and operated
by petitioner Jose Baritua. 3 As a result of that accident Bienvenido and his passenger
died 4 and the tricycle was damaged. 5 No criminal case arising from the incident was ever
instituted. 6
Subsequently, on March 27, 1980, as a consequence of the extra-judicial settlement of the
matter negotiated by the petitioners and the bus insurer Philippine First Insurance
Company, Incorporated (PFICI for brevity) Bienvenido Nacario's widow, Alicia Baracena
Vda. de Nacario, received P18,500.00. In consideration of the amount she received, Alicia
executed on March 27, 1980 a "Release of Claim" in favor of the petitioners and PFICI,
releasing and forever discharging them from all actions, claims, and demands arising from

the accident which resulted in her husband's death and the damage to the tricycle which
the deceased was then driving. Alicia likewise executed an affidavit of desistance in which
she formally manifested her lack of interest in instituting any case, either civil or criminal,
against the petitioners. 7

The petition is meritorious.

On September 2, 1981, or about one year and ten months from the date of the accident on
November 7, 1979, the private respondents, who are the parents of Bienvenido Nacario,
filed a complaint for damages against the petitioners with the then Court of First Instance
of Camarines Sur. 8 In their complaint, the private respondents alleged that during the vigil
for their deceased son, the petitioners through their representatives promised them (the
private respondents) that as extra-judicial settlement, they shall be indemnified for the
death of their son, for the funeral expenses incurred by reason thereof, and for the damage
for the tricycle the purchase price of which they (the private respondents) only loaned to
the victim. The petitioners, however, reneged on their promise and instead negotiated and
settled their obligations with the long-estranged wife of their late son. The Nacario spouses
prayed that the defendants, petitioners herein, be ordered to indemnify them in the
amount of P25,000.00 for the death of their son Bienvenido, P10,000.00 for the damaged
tricycle, P25,000.00 for compensatory and exemplary damages, P5,000.00 for attorney's
fees, and for moral damages. 9

Art. 1231. Obligations are extinguished:

Obligations are extinguished by various modes among them being by payment. Article
1231 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:

(1) By payment or performance;

(2) By the loss of the thing due;
(3) By the condonation or remission of the debt;
(4) By the confusion or merger of the rights of creditor and debtor;
(5) By compensation;
(6) By novation.
(Emphasis ours.)

After trial, the court a quo dismissed the complaint, holding that the payment by the
There is no denying that the petitioners had paid their obligation petition arising from the
defendants (herein petitioners) to the widow and her child, who are the preferred heirs and
accident that occurred on November 7, 1979. The only question now is whether or not
successors-in-interest of the deceased Bienvenido to the exclusion of his parents, the
Alicia, the spouse and the one who received the petitioners' payment, is entitled to it.
plaintiffs (herein private respondents), extinguished any claim against the defendants
10
(petitioners).
Article 1240 of the Civil Code of the Philippines enumerates the persons to whom payment
to extinguish an obligation should be made.
The parents appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the judgment of the trial
court. The appellate court ruled that the release executed by Alicia Baracena Vda. de
Art 1240. Payment shall be made to the person in whose favor the obligation has been
Nacario did not discharge the liability of the petitioners because the case was instituted by constituted, or his successor in interest, or any person authorized to receive it.
the private respondents in their own capacity and not as "heirs, representatives,
successors, and assigns" of Alicia; and Alicia could not have validly waived the damages
Certainly there can be no question that Alicia and her son with the deceased are the
being prayed for (by the private respondents) since she was not the one who suffered
successors in interest referred to in law as the persons authorized to receive payment. The
these damages arising from the death of their son. Furthermore, the appellate court said
Civil Code states:
that the petitioners "failed to rebut the testimony of the appellants (private respondents)
that they were the ones who bought the tricycle that was damaged in the incident.
Article 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
Appellants had the burden of proof of such fact, and they did establish such fact in their
testimony . . . 11Anent the funeral expenses, "(T)he expenses for the funeral were likewise
1. Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and
shouldered by the appellants (the private respondents). This was never contradicted by the ascendants;
appellees (petitioners). . . . Payment (for these) were made by the appellants, therefore,
the reimbursement must accrue in their favor. 12
2. In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants with respect to their
legitimate children and decendants;
Consequently, the respondent appellate court ordered the petitioners to pay the private
respondents P10,000.00 for the damage of the tricycle, P5,000.00 for "complete" funeral
3. The widow or widower;
services, P450.00 for cemetery lot, P55.00 fororacion adulto, and P5,000.00 for attorney's
fees. 13 The petitioners moved for
4. Acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction;
a reconsideration of the appellate court's decision 14 but their motion was denied. 15 Hence,
5. Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287.
this petition.
The issue here is whether or not the respondent appellate court erred in holding that the
petitioners are still liable to pay the private respondents the aggregate amount of
P20,505.00 despite the agreement of extrajudicial settlement between the petitioners and
the victim's compulsory heirs.

Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2.
Neither do they exclude one another. (Emphasis ours.)
Article 985. In default of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his parents
and ascendants shall inherit from him, to the exclusion of collateral relatives.

(Emphasis ours.)
It is patently clear that the parents of the deceased succeed only when the latter dies
without a legitimate descendant. On the other hand, the surviving spouse concurs with all
classes of heirs. As it has been established that Bienvenido was married to Alicia and that
they begot a child, the private respondents are not successors-in-interest of Bienvenido;
they are not compulsory heirs. The petitioners therefore acted correctly in settling their
obligation with Alicia as the widow of Bienvenido and as the natural guardian of their lone
child. This is so even if Alicia had been estranged from Bienvenido. Mere estrangement is
not a legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased
spouse.

Waiver of Shares,[5] with Rafael and Salud, Estrellitas parents. The extra-judicial
settlement provided for the division of the properties of Estrellita and her two daughters
between petitioner and spouses Rafael and Salud. The properties include bank deposits, a
car and the Paraaque property. The total value of the deposits deducting the funeral and
other related expenses in the burial of Estrellita, Carmela and Jennifer, amounts to Three
Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00).[6] The settlement gave fifty percent (50%) of the total
amount of the bank deposits of Estrellita and her daughters to Rafael, except Saving
Account No. 104-111211-0 under the name of Jennifer which involves a token amount. The
other fifty percent (50%) was allotted to petitioner. The Paraaque property and the car
were also given to petitioner with Rafael and Salud waiving all their claims, rights,
ownership and participation as heirs[7] in the said properties.

Neither could the private respondents, as alleged creditors of Bienvenido, seek relief and
compensation from the petitioners. While it may be true that the private respondents
loaned to Bienvenido the purchase price of the damaged tricycle and shouldered the
expenses for his funeral, the said purchase price and expenses are but money claims
against the estate of their deceased son. 16 These money claims are not the liabilities of the
petitioners who, as we have said, had been released by the agreement of the extra-judicial
settlement they concluded with Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario, the victim's widow and
heir, as well as the natural guardian of their child, her co-heir. As a matter of fact, she
executed a "Release Of Claim" in favor of the petitioners.

On November 18, 1992, Rafael died. To settle Rafaels estate, Teresita instituted an
intestate estate proceeding[8] docketed as Sp. Proc. No. C-1679, with Branch 120 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City listing as heirs Salud, Ramon, Ricardo and the
wife (Zenaida) and children of Antonio. Teresita prayed to be appointed Special
Administratrix of Rafaels estate. Additionally, she sought to be appointed as guardian ad
litem of Salud, now senile, and Ricardo, her incompetent brother. Herein private
respondent Ramon filed an opposition[9] dated March 24, 1993, praying to be appointed
instead as Salud and Ricardos guardian. Barely three weeks passed, Ramon filed another
opposition[10] alleging, among others, that Estrellita was given the Valenzuela property by
Rafael which she sold for not les than Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00) before her
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- gruesome murder. Ramon pleaded for courts intervention to determine the legality and
-------------------validity of the intervivos distribution made by deceased Rafael to his children,[11] Estrellita
included. On May 12, 1993, Ramon filed his own petition, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. CVIZCONDE vs. CA, 286 SCRA 217
1699, entitled InMatter Of The Guardianship Of Salud G. Nicolas and Ricardo G. Nicolas
and averred that their legitime should come from the collation of all the properties
Petitioner Lauro G. Vizconde and his wife Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde had two children, viz., distributed to his children by Rafael during his lifetime.[12] Ramon stated that herein
Carmela and Jennifer. Petitioners wife, Estrellita, is one of the five siblings of spouses
petitioner is one of Rafaels children by right of representation as the widower of deceased
Rafael Nicolas and Salud Gonzales-Nicolas. The other children of Rafael and Salud are
legitimate daughter of Estrellita.[13]
Antonio Nicolas; Ramon Nicolas; Teresita Nicolas de Leon, and Ricardo Nicolas, an
incompetent. Antonio predeceased his parents and is now survived by his widow, Zenaida, In a consolidated Order, dated November 9, 1993, the RTC appointed Ramon as the
and their four children.
Guardian of Salud and Ricardo while Teresita, in turn, was appointed as the Special
On May 22, 1979, Estrellita purchased from Rafael a parcel of land with an area of 10,110
sq. m. located at Valenzuela, Bulacan (hereafter Valenzuela property) covered by TCT No.
(T-36734) 13206 for One Hundred Thirty Five Thousand Pesos (P135,000.00), evidenced by
a Lubusang Bilihan ng Bahagi ng Lupa na Nasasakupan ng Titulo TCT NO. T-36734.[1] In
view thereof, TCT No. V-554 covering the Valenzuela property was issued to Estrellita. [2] On
March 30, 1990, Estrellita sold the Valenzuela property to Amelia Lim and Maria Natividad
Balictar Chiu for Three Million, Four Hundred Five Thousand, Six Hundred Twelve Pesos
(P3,405,612.00).[3] In June of the same year, Estrellita bought from Premiere Homes, Inc., a
parcel of land with improvements situated at Vinzon St., BF Homes, Paraaque (hereafter
Paraaque property) using a portion of the proceeds was used in buying a car while the
balance was deposited in a bank.

Administratrix of Rafaels estate. The courts Order did not include petitioner in the slate of
Rafaels heirs.[14] Neither was the Paraaque property listed in its list of properties to be
included in the estate.[15]Subsequently, the RTC in an Order dated January 5, 1994,
removed Ramon as Salud and Ricardos guardian for selling his wards property without the
courts knowledge and permission.[16]

Sometime on January 13, 1994, the RTC released an Order giving petitioner ten (10) days
x x x within which to file any appropriate petition or motion related to the pending petition
insofar as the case is concerned and to file any opposition to any pending motion that has
been filed by both the counsels for Ramon Nicolas and Teresita de Leon. In response,
petitioner filed a Manifestation, dated January 19, 1994, stressing tha the was neither a
compulsory heir nor an intestate heir of Rafael and he has no interest to participate in the
proceedings. The RTC noted said Manifestation in its Order dated February 2, 1994.
The following year an unfortunate event in petitioners life occurred. Estrellita and her two [17] Despite the Manifestation, Ramon, through a motion dated February 14, 1994, moved
daughters, Carmela and Jennifer, were killed on June 30, 1991, an incident popularly known to include petitioner in the intestate estate proceeding and asked that the Paraaque
as the Vizconde Massacre. The findings of the investigation conducted by the NBI reveal property, as well as the car and the balance of the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela
that Estrellita died ahead of her daughters.[4] Accordingly, Carmela, Jennifer and herein
property, be collated.[18] Acting on Ramons motion, the trial court on March 10, 1994
petitioner succeeded Estrellita and, with the subsequent death of Carmela and Jennifer,
granted the same in an Order which pertinently reads as follows:
petitioner was left as the sole heir of his daughters. Nevertheless, petitioner entered into
an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde With
xxx
xxx
xxx

On the Motion To Include Lauro G. Vizconde In Intestate proceedings in instant case and
considering the comment on hi Manifestation, the same is hereby granted. [19]

Basic principles of collation need to be emphasized at the outset. Article 1061 of the Civil
Code speaks of collation. It states:

xxx

Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring
into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the
decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title,
in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in
the account of the partition.

xxx

xxx

Petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Order which Ramon opposed.
[20]
On August 12, 1994, the RTC rendered an Order denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration. It provides:
xxx

xxx

xxx

The centerpoint of oppositor-applicants argument is that spouses Vizconde were then

financially incapable of having purchased or acquired for a valuable consideration the
property at Valenzuela from the deceased Rafael Nicolas. Admittedly, the spouses
Vizconde were then living with the deceased Rafael Nicolas in the latters ancestral
home. In fact, as the argument further goes, said spouses were dependent for support on
the deceased Rafael Nicolas. And Lauro Vizconde left for the United States in, defacto separation, from the family for sometime and returned to the Philippines only after
the occurrence of violent deaths of Estrellita and her two daughters.
To dispute the contention that the spouses Vizconde were financially incapable to buy the
property from the late Rafael Nicolas, Lauro Vizconde claims that they have been engaged
in business venture such as taxi business, canteen concessions and garment
manufacturing. However, no competent evidence has been submitted to indubitably
support the business undertakings adverted to.
In fine, there is no sufficient evidence to show that the acquisition of the property from
Rafael Nicolas was for a valuable consideration.
Accordingly, the transfer of the property at Valenzuela in favor of Estrellita by her father
was gratuitous and the subject property in Paraaque which was purchased out of the
proceeds of the said transfer of property by the deceased Rafael Nicolas in favor of
Estrellita, is subject to collation.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED.[21] (Underscoring added)
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with respondent Court of Appeals. In
its decision of December 14, 1994, respondent Court of Appeals [22] denied the petition
stressing that the RTC correctly adjudicated the question on the title of the Valenzuela
property as the jurisdiction of the probate court extends to matters incidental and
collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate
of the deceased (Cf.: Sec. 1, Rule 90, Revised Rules of Court). [23] Dissatisfied, petitioner
filed the instant petition for review oncertiorari. Finding prima facie merit, the Court on
December 4, 1995, gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.
The core issue hinges on the validity of the probate courts Order, which respondent Court
of Appeals sustained, nullifying the transfer of the Valenzuela property from Rafael to
Estrellita and declaring the Paraaque property as subject to collation.
The appeal is well taken.

Collation is the act by virtue of which descendants or other forced heirs who intervene in
the division of the inheritance of an ascendant bring into the common mass, the property
which they received from him, so that the division may be made according to law and the
will of the testator.[24] Collation is only required of compulsory heirs succeeding with other
compulsory heirs and involves property or rights received by donation or gratuitous title
during the lifetime of the decedent.[25] The purpose for it is presumed that the intention of
the testator or predecessor in interest in making a donation or gratuitous transfer to a
forced heir is to give him something in advance on account of his share in the estate, and
that the predecessors will is to treat all his heirs equally, in the absence of any expression
to the contrary.[26] Collation does not impose any lien on the property or the subject matter
of collationable donation. What is brought to collation is not the property donated itself,
but rather the value of such property at the time it was donated, [27] the rationale being that
the donation is a real alienation which conveys ownership upon its acceptance, hence any
increase in value or any deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or donee.
[28]

The attendant facts herein do no make a case of collation. We find that the probate court,
as well as respondent Court of Appeals, committed reversible errors.
First: The probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of petitioner in the intestate estate
proceeding. Petitioner, a son-in-law of Rafael, is one of Rafaels compulsory heirs. Article
887 of the Civil Code is clear on this point:
Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1)
Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;
(2)
In default of the following, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their
legitimate children and ascendants;
(3)

The widow or widower;

(4)

Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5)

Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.

Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4, and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos 1 and 2;
neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall inherit
from them in the manner and to the extent established by this Code.

With respect to Rafaels estate, therefore, petitioner who was not even shown to be a
creditor of Rafael is considered a third person or a stranger. [29] As such, petitioner may not
be dragged into the intestate estate proceeding. Neither may he be permitted or allowed
to intervene as he has no personality or interest in the said proceeding, [30] which petitioner
correctly argued in his manifestation.[31]

of evidence to that effect, the collation sought is untenable for lack of ground or basis
therefor.

Fourth: Even on the assumption that collation is appropriate in this case the probate
court, nonetheless, made a reversible error in ordering collation of the Paraaque
property. We note that what was transferred to Estrellita, by way of a deed of sale, is the
Second: As a rule, the probate court may pass upon and determine the title or ownership
Valenzuela property. The Paraaque property which Estrellita acquired by using the
of a property which may or may not be included in the estate proceedings. [32] Such
proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property does not become collationable simply by
determination is provisional in character and is subject to final decision in a separate action reason thereof. Indeed collation of the Paraaque property has no statutory basis.[36] The
to resolve title.[33] In the case at bench, however, we note that the probate court went
order of the probate court presupposes that the Paraaque property was gratuitously
beyond the scope of its jurisdiction when it proceeded to determine the validity of the sale conveyed by Rafael to Estrellita. Records indicate, however, that the Paraaque property
of the Valenzuela property between Rafael and Estrellita and ruled that the transfer of the
was conveyed for and in consideration of P900,000.00,[37] by Premier Homes, Inc., to
subject property between the concerned parties was gratuitous. The interpretation of the
Estrellita. Rafael, the decedent, has no participation therein, and petitioner who
deed and the true intent of the contracting parties, as well as the presence or absence of
inherited and is now the present owner of the Paraaque property is not one of Rafaels
consideration, are matter outside the probate courts jurisdiction. These issues should be heirs. Thus, the probate courts order of collation against petitioner is unwarranted for the
ventilated in an appropriate action. We reiterate:
obligation to collate is lodged with Estrellita, the heir, and not to herein petitioner who does
not have any interest in Rafaels estate. As it stands, collation of the Paraaque property is
x x x we are of the opinion and so hold, that a court which takes cognizance of testate or
improper for, to repeat, collation covers only properties gratuitously given by the decedent
intestate proceedings has power and jurisdiction to determine whether or not the
during his lifetime to his compulsory heirs which fact does not obtain anent the transfer of
properties included therein or excluded therefrom belong prima facie to the deceased,
the Paraaque property. Moreover, Rafael, in a public instrument, voluntarily and willfully
although such a determination is not final or ultimate in nature, and without prejudice to
waived any claims, rights, ownership and participation as heir[38] in the Paraaque
the right of the interested parties, in a proper action, to raise the question bearing on the
property.
ownership or existence of the right or credit. [34]
Fifth:
Finally, it is futile for the probate court to ascertain whether or not the
Third: The order of the probate court subjecting the Paraaque property to collation is
Valenzuela property may be brought to collation. Estrellita, it should be stressed, died
premature. Records indicate that the intestate estate proceedings is still in its initiatory
ahead of Rafael. In fact, it was Rafael who inherited from Estrellita an amount more than
stage. We find nothing herein to indicate that the legitimate of any of Rafaels heirs has
the value of the Valenzuela property.[39] Hence, even assuming that the Valenzuela property
been impaired to warrant collation. We thus advert to our ruling in Udarbe v. Jurado, 59
may be collated collation may not be allowed as the value of the Valenzuela property has
Phil. 11, 13-14, to wit:
long been returned to the estate of Rafael. Therefore, any determination by the probate
court on the matter serves no valid and binding purpose.
We are of the opinion that this contention is untenable. In accordance with the provisions
of article 1035[35] of the Civil Code, it was the duty of the plaintiffs to allege and prove that
the donations received by the defendants were inofficious in whole or in part and
prejudiced the legitimate or hereditary portion to which they are entitled. In the absence