Election Law Doctrines

Romualdez-Marcos
COMELEC.

v.

The word residence, for the purpose

of meeting the qualification for an
elective position, means domicile or
the individuals permanent home, a
place to which, whenever absent for
business or for pleasure, one intends
to return, and depends on facts and
circumstances in the sense that they
disclose intent. It includes the twin
elements of the fact of residing or
physical presence in a fixed place, and
animus manendi, or the intention of
returning there permanently.

Caasi vs Comelec

The Supreme Court held that Miguels

application for immigrant status and
permanent residence in the U.S. and
his possession of a green card
attesting to such status are conclusive
proof that he is a permanent resident
of the U.S. despite his occasional visits
to the Philippines. The waiver of such
immigrant status should be as
indubitable as his application for it.
Absent clear evidence that he made
an irrevocable waiver of that status or
that he surrendered his green card to
the appropriate U.S. authorities before
he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local
election on January 18, 1988, the
Courts conclusion is that he was
disqualified to run for said public
office, hence, his election thereto was
null and void.

Macalintal vs Comelec

There can be no absentee voting if the

absentee voters are required to
physically reside in the Philippines
within the period required for nonabsentee
voters.
Further,
as
understood in election laws, domicile

and resident are interchangeably

used. Hence, one is a resident of his
domicile (insofar as election laws is
concerned). The domicile is the place
where one has the intention to return
to. Thus, an immigrant who executes
an affidavit stating his intent to return
to the Philippines is considered a
resident of the Philippines for purposes
of being qualified as a voter (absentee
voter to be exact). If the immigrant
does not execute the affidavit then he
is not qualified as an absentee voter.
Election and Suffrage

Moya vs Del Fierro

no technical rule or rules should be

permitted to defeat the intention of
the voter, if that intention is
discoverable from the ballot itself, not
from evidence aliunde. This rule of
interpretation goes to the very root of
the system. Rationally, also, this must
be the justification for the suggested
liberalization
of
the
rules
on
appreciation of ballots which are now
incorporated in section 144 of the
Election Code (Commonwealth Act No.
357).

Badelles vs Cabili

"The boundaries of the forbidden area

into which Comelec may not tread are
also marked by jurisprudence. That
Comelec is not the proper forum to
seek annulment of an election based
on terrorism, frauds and other illegal
practices, is a principle emphasized in
decisions of this Court." For as
announced in Nacionalista Party v.
Commission on Elections, 9 assuming
that there be a failure to conduct an
election in a free, orderly and honest
manner, "the duty to cure or remedy
the resulting evil" did not rest with the
Commission on Elections but in "some
other agencies of the Government."
More specifically, with reference to

provincial and municipal officials,

election contests "are entrusted to the
courts." Then came this express
affirmation: "The power to decide
election contests necessarily includes
the power to determine the validity or
nullity of the votes questioned by
either of the contestants." .

Dissenting Opinion of Justice

Puno
in
Tolentino
vs
COMELEC

The electorate should have been

informed of the time, place and
manner of conduct of the May 14,
2001 special election for the single
senatorial seat for the unexpired term
of former Senator Teofisto Guingona,
Jr. Tolentino, UNIDO, Blo Umpar Adiong
and Hassan all deepened the doctrine
that a meaningful exercise of the right
of suffrage in a genuinely free, orderly
and honest election is predicated upon
an electorate informed on the issues
of
the
day, the
programs
of
government laid out before them, the
candidates running in the election and
the time, place and manner of conduct
of the election. It is for this reason that
the Omnibus Election Code is studded
with
processes,
procedures
and
requirements
that
ensure
voter
information. Free and intelligent vote
is not enough; correct ascertainment
of the will of the people is equally
necessary. The procedure adopted in
the case at bar for holding the May 14,
2001
special
senatorial
election
utterly failed to ascertain the peoples
choice in the special election. In not
allowing the voter to separately
indicate the candidate he voted for the
three-year senatorial term, the voter
was deprived of his right to make an
informed judgment based on his own
reasons and valuations. Consequently,
his true will in the special election was
not ascertained. As a particle of
sovereignty, it is the thinking voter
who must determine who should win

in the special election and not the

unthinking
machine
that
will
mechanically ascertain the 13th placer
in
the
general
election
by
mathematical computations.
COMELEC

Purisima vs Salanga

Interpretation of election laws should

give effect to the expressed will of the
electorate.
Patent
erasures
and
superimpositions in words and figures
of the votes stated in the election
returns strike at the reliability of said
returns as basis for canvass and
proclamation. A comparison with the
other copies, and, in case of
discrepancy, a recount, is the only way
to remove grave doubts as to the
correctness of said returns as well as
of ascertaining that they reflect the
will of the people.

Cauton vs Comelec

The Commission on Elections has the

power to inquire whether there exist
discrepancies among the various
copies of the election returns.11Of all
the copies prepared by the board of
inspectors the copy least susceptible
to being tampered with is the one
deposited in the ballot box. Where the
three copies outside the ballot boxes
appear to have been uniformly
altered, there is no plausible reason
why the copy deposited in the ballot
box may not be used to determine
whether discrepancies exist in the
various copies. Inasmuch as the
Commission on Elections has the right
to
determine
whether
said
discrepancies exist, it must also have
the right to consult said returns, which
cannot be done unless the ballot boxes
are opened. It is noteworthy that the
Revised Election Code does not
provide that it is the courts that have

the power to order the opening of the

ballot box in a situation like this.
Section 157 of the Revised Election
Code, on which petitioner herein relies
in support of his stand in the present
case, authorizes the opening of the
ballot box whenever it is the subject of
an official investigation. It provides:
The municipal treasurer shall keep the
boxes unopened in his possession in a
secure
place
and
under
his
responsibility for three months, unless
they are the subject of an official
investigation, or a component court or
tribunal shall demand them sooner, or
the competent authority shall order
their preservation for a longer time in
connection with any pending contest
or investigation.
Under this section the ballot boxes
may be opened in case there is an
election contest. They may also be
opened even if there is no election
contest when their contents have to
be used as evidence in the prosecution
of election frauds.12Moreover, they
may be opened when they are the
subject of any official investigation
which may be ordered by a competent
court
or
other
competent
authority.13The "competent authority"
must include the Commission on
Elections which is charged with the
administration and enforcement of the
laws relative to the conduct of
elections. In the instant case the
Commission on Elections found that it
has been clearly established that the
election returns outside the ballot
boxes, in all the precincts in the
municipalities of Candon, Santiago and
Sta. Cruz, have been tampered with.

Roque vs Comelec

The COMELEC is an independent

constitutional body with a distinct and
pivotal role in our scheme of
government. In the discharge of its
awesome functions as overseer of fair
elections, administrator and lead
implementor of laws relative to the
conduct of elections, it should not be
stymied with restrictions that would
perhaps be justified in the case of an
organization of lesser responsibility.
[103] It should be afforded ample
elbow room and enough wherewithal
in devising means and initiatives that
would enable it to accomplish the
great objective for which it was
created--to promote free, orderly,
honest and peaceful elections.

Arroyo vs DOJ and Comelec

2012

Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987

Constitution enumerates the powers
and functions of the Comelec. The
grant to the Comelec of the power to
investigate and prosecute election
offenses as an adjunct to the
enforcement and administration of all
election laws is intended to enable the
Comelec to effectively insure to the
people the free, orderly, and honest
conduct of elections. Under the above
provision of law, the power to conduct
preliminary investigation is vested
exclusively with the Comelec. The
latter, however, was given by the
same provision of law the authority to
avail itself of the assistance of other
prosecuting arms of the government.
Comelec
Resolution
No.
9266,
approving the creation of the Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team,
should be viewed not as an abdication
of
the
constitutional
bodys
independence but as a means to fulfill
its duty of ensuring the prompt
investigation
and prosecution of
election offenses as an adjunct of its
mandate of ensuring a free, orderly,

honest,
peaceful
elections.

and

credible

Arroyo vs DOJ and Comelec

2013

DOES THE COMELEC HAS EXCLUSIVE

POWER TO INVESTIGATE ELECTION
CASES?
YES, UNDER BP 881 OR THE COMELEC
ELECTION CODE. BUT NOT ANYMORE
UNDER SECTION 43 OF RA 9369.
While recognizing the Comelecs
exclusive power to investigate and
prosecute
cases
under
Batas
Pambansa Bilang 881 or the Omnibus
Election Code, the Court pointed out
that the framers of the 1987
Constitution did not have such
intention. This exclusivity is thus a
legislative enactment that can very
well be amended by Section 43 of RA
9369. Therefore, under the present
law,
the
Comelec
and
other
prosecuting arms of the government,
such as the DOJ, now exercise
concurrent
jurisdiction
in
the
investigation
and prosecution of
election offenses.
BUT IS THE CREATION OF THE JOINT
COMMITTEE NOT AN ABDICATION OF
COMELECS INDEPENDENCE UNDER
THE CONSTITUTION?
NO BECAUSE THE COMELEC HAS STILL
TO APPROVE THE RESOLUTIONS OF
THE JOINT COMMITTEE. JOINT ORDER
NO. 001-2011 DATED 15 AUGUST 2011
PROVIDES THAT THE RESOLUTIONS OF
THE
JOINT
COMMITTEE
FINDING
PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ELECTION
OFFENSES SHALL STILL BE APPROVED
BY THE COMELEC IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE COMELEC RULES OF
PROCEDURE.
To be sure, the creation of a Joint
Committee is not repugnant to the
concept of concurrent jurisdiction
authorized by the amendatory law. As

we explained in our September 18,

2012 Decision:

x x x The doctrine of concurrent

jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to
deal with the same subject matter.
Contrary to the contention of the
petitioners, there is no prohibition on
simultaneous
exercise
of
power
between two coordinate bodies. What
is prohibited is the situation where one
files a complaint against a respondent
initially with one office (such as the
Comelec) for preliminary investigation
which was immediately acted upon by
said office and the re-filing of
substantially the same complaint with
another office (such as the DOJ). The
subsequent assumption of jurisdiction
by the second office over the cases
filed will not be allowed.
Indeed, it is a settled rule that the
body or agency that first takes
cognizance of the complaint shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of
the others.

Ongsioko reyes vs Comelec

Yes, COMELEC retains jurisdiction

because the jurisdiction of the HRET
begins only after the candidate is
considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, as stated in Section
17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
For one to be considered a Member of
the House of Representatives, there
must be a concurrence of these
requisites: (1) valid proclamation; (2)
proper oath, and (3) assumption of
office.
Thus
the
petitioner
cannot
be
considered a member of the HR yet as
she has not assumed office yet. Also,
the 2nd requirement was not validly
complied with as a valid oath must be
made (1) before the Speaker of the

House of Representatives, and (2) in

open session. Here, although she
made the oath before Speaker
Belmonte, there is no indication that it
was made during plenary or in open
session and, thus, it remains unclear
whether the required oath of office
was indeed complied
Voters

People vs Corral

The modern conception of suffrage is

that
voting
is
a
function
of
government. The right to vote is not a
natural right but it is a right created by
law. Suffrage is a privilege granted by
the State to such persons as are most
likely to exercise it for the public
good. The existence of the right of
suffrage is a threshold for the
preservation and enjoyment of all
other rights that it ought to be
considered as one of the most sacred
parts of the constitution

Registration of Voters

Yra vs Abano

The Executive Bureau has held that

the term "qualified" when applied to a
voter does not necessarily mean that a
person must be a registered voter. To
become a qualified candidate a person
does not need to register as an
elector. It is sufficient that he
possesses
all
the
qualifications
prescribed in section 431 and none of
the disqualifications prescribed in
section 432. The fact that a candidate
failed to register as an elector in the
municipality does not deprive him of
the right to become a candidate to be
voted for.

Akbayan Youth vs COMELEC

Right of suffrage is not absolute. It

ought to be exercised within the

proper bounds and framework of the
Constitution and must properly yield to
pertinent laws skillfully enacted by the
Legislature. Sec. 8 of RA 8189
provides:
System
of
Continuing
Registration of Voters. The Personal
filing of application of registration of
voters shall be conducted daily in the
office of the Election Officer during
regular office hours. No registration
shall, however, be conducted during
the period starting one hundred
twenty (120) days before a regular
election and ninety (90) days before a
special election. Failing to register on
time, the court notes the doctrine on
coming to court with unclean hands.
Well-entrenched is the rule in our
jurisdiction that the law aids the
vigilant and not those who slumber on
their rights.
Candidates

Frivaldo vs COMELEC

Article XI Sec 9 of 1987 Constitution

states that all public officials and
employees owe the State and the
Constitution "allegiance at all times"
and the specific requirement in
Section 42 of the Local Government
Code that a candidate for local
elective office must be inter alia a
citizen of the Philippines and a
qualified voter of the constituency
where he is running. Qualifications for
public
office
are
continuing
requirements and must be possessed
not only at the time of appointment or
election or assumption of office but
during the officer's entire tenure. The
Court did not allow petitioner to sit as
a governor while owing allegiance to
another country.

Mercado vs Manzano

Section 40 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise

known as the Local Government Code
of 1991, declares as disqualified from

running for any elective position

those with dual citizenship. The
phrase dual citizenship must be
understood as referring to dual
allegiance Consequently, persons
with mere dual citizenship do not fall
under this disqualification. Unlike
those with dual allegiance, who must
therefore, be subject to strict process
with respect to the termination of their
status, for candidates with dual
citizenship, it should suffice if, upon
the filing of their certificates of
candidacy,
they
elect
Philippine
citizenship to terminate their status as
persons
with
dual
citizenship
considering that their condition is the
unavoidable
consequence
of
conflicting laws of different states.

Villaber vs Comelec

Sec. 12. Disqualifications. Any

person who has been declared by
competent
authority
insane
or
incompetent, or has been sentenced
by final judgment for subversion,
insurrection, rebellion, or for any
offense for which he has been
sentenced to a penalty of more than
eighteen months, or for a crime
involving moral turpitude, shall be
disqualified to be a candidate and to
hold any office, unless he has been
given plenary pardon or granted
amnesty. As to the meaning of moral
turpitude, we have consistently
adopted the definition in Blacks Law
Dictionary as an act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private
duties which a man owes his fellow
men, or to society in general, contrary
to the accepted and customary rule of
right and duty between man and
woman, or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.
That not every criminal act involves
moral turpitude, and that as to what
crime involves moral turpitude is for
the Supreme Court to determine.

The presence of the second

element (in elements of violation of BP
22) manifests moral turpitude. We
held that a conviction for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 imports deceit and
certainly relates to and affects the
good
moral
character
of
a
person.Thus, paraphrasing Blacks
definition, a drawer who issues an
unfunded check deliberately reneges
on his private duties he owes his
fellow men or society in a manner
contrary to accepted and customary
rule of right and duty, justice, honesty
or good morals.

Lonzanida vs Comelec

Section 8 of Article X of the

Constitution and Section 43 of the
Local Government Code (R.A. No.
7160) restates the same rule, that:
No local elective official shall serve
for more than three consecutive terms
in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of
service for the full term for which the
elective
official
concerned
was
elected.
The petitioner cannot be deemed to
have served the May 1995 to 1998
term because he was ordered to
vacate his post before the expiration
of the term. Pursuant to the
constitutional
provision
above,
voluntary renunciation of a term does
not cancel the renounced term in the
computation of the three term limit;
conversely,
involuntary
severance
from office for any length of time short
of the full term provided by law
amounts
to
an
interruption
of
continuity of service. To come within
the prohibition, two requisites must
concur: (1) that the official concerned
has been elected for three consecutive

terms in the same local government

post; and (2) that he has fully served
three consecutive terms.

such powers by virtue of the still then

valid proclamation.

Abundo vs Comelec

The
consecutiveness
of
what
otherwise would have been Abundos
three
successive,
continuous
mayorship was effectively broken
during the 2004- 2007 term when he
was initially deprived of title to, and
was veritably disallowed to serve and
occupy, an office to which he, after
due proceedings, was eventually
declared to have been the rightful
choice of the electorate.
The declaration of being the winner in
an election protest grants the local
elected official the right to serve the
unexpired portion of the term. Verily,
while he was declared winner in the
protest for the mayoralty seat for the
2004-2007 term, Abundos full term
has been substantially reduced by the
actual service rendered by his
opponent (Torres). Hence, there was
actual involuntary interruption in the
term of Abundo and he cannot be
considered to have served the full
2004-2007 term.
Prior to the finality of the election
protest, Abundo did not serve in the
mayors office and, in fact, had no
legal right to said position. During the
pendency of the election protest,
Abundo ceased from exercising power
or authority. Consequently, the period
during which Abundo was not serving
as mayor should be considered as a
rest period or break in his service
because prior to the judgment in the
election protest, it was Abundos
opponent, Torres, who was exercising

Marquez vs Comelec

The Court believes and thus holds that

Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government
Code of 1991, to the extent that it
confines the term "fugitive from
justice" to refer only to a person (the
fugitive) "who has been convicted by
final judgment," is an inordinate and
undue circumscription of the law.

Dela Cruz vs Comelec

A stray vote is invalidated because

there is no way of determining the real
intention of the voter. As far as
COMELEC is concerned, the confusion
caused by similarity of surnames of
candidates for the same position and
putting the electoral process in
mockery or disrepute, had already
been rectified by the new voting
system where the voter simply shades
the oval corresponding to the name of
their chosen candidate. We hold that
the rule in Resolution No. 4116
considering the votes cast for a
nuisance candidate declared as such
in a final judgment, particularly where
such nuisance candidate has the same
surname as that of the legitimate
candidate, not stray but counted in
favor of the latter, remains a good law.
Private respondent admits that the
voters were properly informed of the
cancellation of COC of Aurelio because
COMELEC published the same before
election day. As we pronounced
in Bautista, the voters' constructive
knowledge
of
such
cancelled
candidacy made their will more
determinable, as it is then more logical
to conclude that the votes cast for
Aurelio could have been intended only
for
the
legitimate
candidate,
petitioner. The possibility of confusion

in names of candidates if the names of

nuisance candidates remained on the
ballots on election day, cannot be
discounted or eliminated, even under
the
automated
voting
system
especially considering that voters who
mistakenly shaded the oval beside the
name of the nuisance candidate
instead of the bona fide candidate
they intended to vote for could no
longer ask for replacement ballots to
correct the same.

Risos-Vidal vs Comelec

Former President Estrada was granted

an absolute pardon that fully restored
all his civil and political rights, which
naturally includes the right to seek
public elective office, the focal point of
this controversy. The wording of the
pardon extended to former President
Estrada is complete, unambiguous,
and unqualified. A close scrutiny of the
text of the pardon extended to former
President Estrada shows that both the
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua
and its accessory penalties are
included in the pardon. The first
sentence refers to the executive
clemency
extended
to
former
President Estrada who was convicted
by the Sandiganbayan of plunder and
imposed a penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The latter is the principal
penalty pardoned which relieved him
of imprisonment. The sentence that
followed, which states that (h)e is
hereby restored to his civil and
political rights, expressly remitted the
accessory penalties that attached to
the principal penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

Maquiling vs Comelec

The use of foreign passport after

renouncing ones foreign citizenship is
a positive and voluntary act of
representation as to ones nationality

and citizenship; it does not divest

Filipino
citizenship
regained
by
repatriation but it recants the Oath of
Renunciation required to qualify one to
run for an elective position. Between
03 April 2009, the date he renounced
his foreign citizenship, and 30
November 2009, the date he filed his
COC, he used his US passport four
times, actions that run counter to the
affidavit of renunciation he had earlier
executed. By using his foreign
passport,
Arnado
positively
and
voluntarily represented himself as an
American, Arnados category of dual
citizenship is that by which foreign
citizenship is acquired through a
positive
act
of
applying
for
naturalization. This is distinct from
those considered dual citizens by
virtue of birth, who are not required by
law to take the oath of renunciation as
the mere filing of the certificate of
candidacy already carries with it an
implied
renunciation
of
foreign
citizenship.
Dual
citizens
by
naturalization, on the other hand, are
required to take not only the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines but also to personally
renounce foreign citizenship in order
to qualify as a candidate for public
office. With Arnado being barred from
even becoming a candidate, his
certificate of candidacy is thus
rendered void from the beginning.

Miranda vs Abaya

SEC. 73. Certificate of candidacy -- No

person shall be eligible for any
elective public office unless he files a
sworn certificate of candidacy within
the period fixed herein. By its express
language, the foregoing provision of
law is absolutely mandatory. It is but
logical to say that any person who
attempts to run for an elective office

but does not file a certificate of

candidacy, is not a candidate at all. No
amount of votes would catapult him
into office.
In Gador vs. Comelec (95 SCRA
431 [1980]), the Court held that a
certificate of candidacy filed beyond
the period fixed by law is void, and the
person who filed it is not, in law, a
candidate. Much in the same manner
as a person who filed no certificate of
candidacy at all and a person who filed
it out of time, a person whose
certificate of candidacy is cancelled or
denied due course is no candidate at
all.
A disqualified candidate may
only be substituted if he had a valid
certificate of candidacy in the first
place because, if the disqualified
candidate did not have a valid and
seasonably
filed
certificate
of
candidacy, he is and was not a
candidate at all. If a person was not a
candidate, he cannot be substituted
under Section 77 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
Aratea vs Comelec
As the Comelec stated in their
February 2011 Resolution: Since
Lonzanida was never a candidate for
the position of Mayor [of] San Antonio,
Zambales, the votes cast for him
should be considered stray votes.
Consequently, Intervenor Antipolo,
who remains as the sole qualified
candidate for the mayoralty post and
obtained the highest number of votes,
should now be proclaimed as the duly
elected Mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales. Lonzanida's certificate of
candidacy was cancelled because he
was ineligible or not qualified to run
for Mayor. Whether his certificate of
candidacy is cancelled before or after
the elections is immaterial because
the cancellation on such ground
means he was never a candidate from

the very beginning, his certificate of

candidacy being void ab initio. There
was only one qualified candidate for
Mayor in the May 2010 elections Antipolo, who therefore received the
highest number of votes.

Jalosjos vs Comelec

The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos

has not come to settle his domicile in
Ipil since he has merely been staying
at his brothers house. But this
circumstance alone cannot support
such conclusion. Indeed, the Court has
repeatedly held that a candidate is not
required to have a house in a
community to establish his residence
or domicile in a particular place. It is
sufficient that he should live there
even if it be in a rented house or in the
house of a friend or relative. To insist
that the candidate own the house
where he lives would make property a
qualification for public office. What
matters is that Jalosjos has proved two
things: actual physical presence in Ipil
and an intention of making it his
domicile.

Quinto vs Comelec 2009

In
considering
persons
holding
appointive positions as ipso facto
resigned from their posts upon the
filing of their CoCs, but not considering
as resigned all other civil servants,
specifically the elective ones, the law
unduly discriminates against the first
class. The fact alone that there is
substantial distinction between those
who hold appointive positions and
those occupying elective posts, does
not justify such differential treatment.
In order that there can be valid
classification so that a discriminatory
governmental act may pass the
constitutional
norm
of
equal
protection, it is necessary that the four

(4) requisites of valid classification be

complied with, namely:
(1)
It must be based upon
substantial distinctions;
(2)
It must be germane to the
purposes of the law;
(3)
It must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and
(4)
It must apply equally to all
members of the class.
The classification, even if based on
substantial distinctions, will still be
invalid if it is not germane to the
purpose of the law. Applying the four
requisites to the instant case, the
Court finds that the differential
treatment
of
persons
holding
appointive offices as opposed to those
holding elective ones is not germane
to the purposes of the law.

Quinto vs Comelec 2010

The equal protection of the law clause

in the Constitution is not absolute, but
is subject to reasonable classification.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist
between
elective
officials
and
appointive officials. The former occupy
their office by virtue of the mandate of
the electorate. They are elected to an
office for a definite term and may be
removed
therefrom
only
upon
stringent conditions. On the other
hand, appointive officials hold their
office by virtue of their designation
thereto by an appointing authority.
Some appointive officials hold their
office in a permanent capacity and are
entitled to security of tenure while
others serve at the pleasure of the
appointing authority.
Another
substantial
distinction
between the two sets of officials is
that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title
I,
Subsection
A.
Civil
Service
Commission,
Book
V
of
the

Administrative
Code
of
1987
(Executive Order No. 292), appointive
officials, as officers and employees in
the civil service, are strictly prohibited
from engaging in any partisan political
activity or take (sic) part in any
election except to vote. Under the
same provision, elective officials, or
officers or employees holding political
offices,
are
obviously
expressly
allowed to take part in political and
electoral activities.
Since the classification justifying
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e.,
elected officials vis--vis appointive
officials, is anchored upon material
and significant distinctions and all the
persons belonging under the same
classification are similarly treated, the
equal protection clause of the
Constitution is, thus, not infringed.
Considering that elected officials are
put in office by their constituents for a
definite term, it may justifiably be said
that they were excluded from the
ambit of the deemed resigned
provisions in utmost respect for the
mandate of the sovereign will. In other
words,
complete
deference
is
accorded to the will of the electorate
that they be served by such officials
until the end of the term for which
they were elected. In contrast, there is
no such expectation insofar as
appointed officials are concerned
The
dichotomized
treatment
of
appointive and elective officials is
therefore germane to the purposes of
the law.

Mendoza vs Comelec

Indeed, the grave abuse of discretion

of the COMELEC is patent in the fact
that despite the existence in its books
of the clearly worded Section 6 of Rule
18, which incidentally has been
acknowledged by this Court in the

recent
case
of
Marcoleta
v.
COMELEC, 5 it completely ignored and
disregarded its very own decree and
proceeded
with
the
questioned
Resolution of 8 February 2010 and
Order of 4 March 2010, in all, annulling
the proclamation of petitioner Joselito
R. Mendoza as the duly elected
governor
of
Bulacan,
declaring
respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan
as the duly elected governor, and
ordering petitioner Joselito R. Mendoza
to cease and desist from performing
the functions of the Governor of
Bulacan and to vacate said office in
favor of respondent Roberto M.
Pagdanganan.
The grave abuse of discretion of the
COMELEC is underscored by the fact
that the protest that petitioner
Pagdanganan filed on 1 June 2007
overstayed with the COMELEC until
the present election year when the
end of the term of the contested office
is at hand and there was hardly
enough time for the re-hearing that
was conducted only on 15 February
2010. As the hearing time at the
division had run out, and the rehearing time at the banc was fast
running out, the unwanted result came
about: incomplete appreciation of
ballots; invalidation of ballots on
general
and
unspecific
grounds;
unrebutted presumption of validity of
ballots.

Socrates vs Comelec

The three-term limit rule for elective

local officials is found in Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution, which
states:
Section 8.
The term of office of
elective
local
officials,
except
barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three
years and no such official shall serve

for more than three consecutive

terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.
This three-term limit rule is reiterated
in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160,
otherwise
known
as
the
Local
Government Code, which provides:
Section 43. Term of Office. (a) x x x
(b) No local elective official shall serve
for more than three (3) consecutive
terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of
service for the full term for which the
elective official was elected.
After three consecutive terms, an
elective local official cannot seek
immediate re-election for a fourth
term. The prohibited election refers to
the next regular election for the same
office following the end of the third
consecutive term.
Any subsequent
election, like a recall election, is no
longer covered by the prohibition for
two reasons.
First, a subsequent
election like a recall election is no
longer an immediate re-election after
three consecutive terms. Second, the
intervening period constitutes an
involuntary
interruption
in
the
continuity of service.
Campaign, Election Propaganda

Chavez vs Comelec

SECTION
32. All
propaganda
materials such as posters, streamers,
stickers or paintings on walls and
other materials showing the picture,
image or name of a person, and all

advertisements on print, in radio or on

television showing the image or
mentioning the name of a person, who
subsequent to the placement or
display thereof becomes a candidate
for public office shall be immediately
removed by said candidate and radio
station, print media or television
station within 3 days after the
effectivity of these implementing
rules; otherwise, he and said radio
station, print media or television
station shall be presumed to have
conducted premature campaigning in
violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
The offense, as expressly prescribed in
the assailed provision, is the nonremoval of the described propaganda
materials three (3) days after the
effectivity of COMELEC Resolution No.
6520. If the candidate for public office
fails to remove such propaganda
materials after the given period, he
shall be liable under Section 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code for premature
campaigning. Indeed, nowhere is it
indicated in the assailed provision that
it shall operate retroactively. There is,
therefore, no ex post facto law in this
case.

Penera vs Comelec (1st 2009)

True, that pursuant to Section 15 of

Republic Act No. 8436, as amended,
even after the filing of the COC but
before the start of the campaign
period, a person is not yet officially
considered a candidate. Nevertheless,
a person, upon the filing of his/her
COC, already explicitly declares his/her
intention to run as a candidate in the
coming elections. The commission by
such a person of any of the acts
enumerated under Section 79(b) of
the Omnibus Election Code (i.e.,

holding rallies or parades, making

speeches, etc.) can, thus, be logically
and reasonably construed as for the
purpose of promoting his/her intended
candidacy.
When the campaign period starts and
said person proceeds with his/her
candidacy, his/her intent turning into
actuality, we can already consider
his/her acts, after the filing of his/her
COC and prior to the campaign period,
as the promotion of his/her election as
a candidate, hence, constituting
premature campaigning, for which
he/she may be disqualified.
As previously established, a person,
after filing his/her COC but prior to
his/her becoming a candidate (thus,
prior to the start of the campaign
period), can already commit the acts
described under Section 79(b) of the
Omnibus Election Code as election
campaign or partisan political activity.
However, only after said person
officially becomes a candidate, at the
beginning of the campaign period, can
said acts be given effect as premature
campaigning under Section 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code. Only after
said person officially becomes a
candidate, at the start of the
campaign
period,
can
his/her disqualification be sought for
acts
constituting
premature
campaigning. Obviously, it is only at
the start of the campaign period, when
the person officially becomes a
candidate, that the undue and
iniquitous advantages of his/her prior
acts,
constituting
premature
campaigning, shall accrue to his/her
benefit.
Compared to the other
candidates who are only about to
begin their election campaign, a
candidate
who
had
previously

engaged in premature campaigning

already enjoys an unfair headstart in
promoting his/her candidacy.

Penera
2009)

vs

Comelec

(MFR

(1) The
effective
date
when
partisan political acts become
unlawful as to a candidate is
when the campaign period
starts. Before the start of the
campaign period, the same
partisan political acts are lawful.
(2) Accordingly, a candidate is
liable for an election offense
only for acts done during the
campaign period, not before. In
other words, election offenses
can
be
committed
by
a
candidate only upon the start of
the campaign period. Before the
start of the campaign period,
such election offenses cannot
be so committed. Since the law
is clear, the Court has no
recourse but to apply it.

SWS vs Comelec

The Court held that Section (5)4 is

invalid because (1) it imposes a prior
restraint on the freedom of expression,
(2) it is a direct and total suppression
of a category of expression even
though such suppression is only for a
limited
period,
and
(3)
the
governmental interest sought to be
promoted can be achieved by means
other than suppression of freedom of
expression.
It has been held that "[mere]
legislative preferences or beliefs
respecting
matters
of
public
convenience
may
well
support
regulation directed at other personal
activities, but be insufficient to justify

such as diminishes the exercise of

rights so vital to the maintenance of
democratic institutions.

GMA Network vs Comelec

The guaranty of freedom to speak is

useless
without
the
ability
to
communicate and disseminate what is
said. And where there is a need to
reach a large audience, the need to
access the means and media for such
dissemination becomes critical. This is
where the press and broadcast media
come along. At the same time, the
right to speak and to reach out would
not be meaningful if it is just a token
ability to be heard by a few. It must be
coupled with substantially reasonable
means by which the communicator
and the audience could effectively
interact.
Section
9
(a)
of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, with its
adoption of the "aggregate-based"
airtime limits unreasonably restricts
the guaranteed freedom of speech and
of the press
The assailed rule on "aggregatebased" airtime limits is unreasonable
and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and
constrains the ability of candidates
and political parties to reach out and
communicate with the people. Here,
the adverted reason for imposing the
"aggregate-based" airtime limits
leveling the playing field does not
constitute a compelling state interest
which would justify such a substantial
restriction
on
the
freedom
of
candidates and political parties to
communicate
their
ideas,
philosophies, platforms and programs
of government. And, this is specially
so in the absence of a clear-cut basis
for the imposition of such a prohibitive
measure. In this particular instance,
what the COMELEC has done is

analogous to letting a bird fly after one

has clipped its wings.

ER Ejercito vs Comelec

SEC. 13. Authorized Expenses

of Candidates and Political
Parties.

The
aggregate
amount that a candidate or
registered political party may
spend for election campaign
shall be as follows:
(a) For candidates Ten pesos
(P10.00) for President and Vice
President;
and
for
other
candidates, Three pesos (P3.00)
for
every
voter
currently
registered in the constituency
where he filed his certificate of
candidacy: Provided, That,
a
candidate without any political
party and without support from
any political party may be
allowed to spend Five pesos
(P5.00) for every such voter;
and
(b) For political parties Five
pesos (P5.00) for every voter
currently registered in the
constituency or constituencies
where it has official candidates.
Any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, any
contribution in cash or in kind to
any candidate or political party
or coalition of parties for
campaign
purposes,
duly
reported to the Commission,
shall not be subject to the
payment of any gift tax.
The phrase "those incurred or caused
to be incurred by the candidate" is
sufficiently adequate to cover those
expenses which are contributed or
donated in the candidate's behalf. By
virtue of the legal requirement that a
contribution or donation should bear
the
written
conformity
of
the

candidate,
a
contributor/supporter/donor certainly
qualifies as "any person authorized by
such candidate or treasurer." Ubi lex
non distinguit, nec nos distinguere
debemus. (Where the law does not
distinguish, neither should We.) There
should be no distinction in the
application of a law where none is
indicated.
The
inclusion
of
the
amount
contributed by a donor to the
candidate's allowable limit of election
expenses does not trample upon the
free exercise of the voters' rights of
speech and of expression under
Section
4,
Article
III
of
the Constitution. As a content-neutral
regulation, the law's concern is not to
curtail the message or content of the
advertisement promoting a particular
candidate but to ensure equality
between and among aspirants with
"deep pockets" and those with less
financial resources. Any restriction on
speech or expression is only incidental
and is no more than necessary to
achieve the substantial governmental
interest of promoting equality of
opportunity in political advertising.

Diocese
Comelec

of

Bacolod

vs

COMELEC's general role includes a

mandate to ensure equal opportunities
and
reduce
spending among
candidates
and
their
registered
political parties. It is not to regulate or
limit the speech of the electorate as it
strives to participate in the electoral
exercise.
The tarpaulin in question may be
viewed as producing a caricature of
those who are running for public
office.
Their
message
may
be
construed generalizations of very
complex individuals and party-list
organizations. They are classified into

black and white: as belonging to

"Team Patay" or "Team Buhay."
But this caricature, though not
agreeable to some, is still protected
speech.
Embedded in the tarpaulin, however,
are opinions expressed by petitioners.
It is a specie of expression protected
by our fundamental law. It is an
expression
designed
to
invite
attention,
cause
debate,
and
hopefully, persuade. It may be
motivated by the interpretation of
petitioners of their ecclesiastical duty,
but their parishioner's actions will
have very real secular consequences.
Certainly, provocative messages do
matter for the elections.
What is involved in this case is the
most
sacred
of
speech
forms:
expression by the electorate that
tends to rouse the public to debate
contemporary issues. This is not
speech by candidates or political
parties to entice votes. It is a portion
of the electorate telling candidates the
conditions for their election. It is the
substantive content of the right to
suffrage.
This is a form of speech hopeful of a
quality of democracy that we should
all deserve. It is protected as a
fundamental and primordial right by
our Constitution. The expression in the
medium
chosen
by
petitioners
deserves our protection.

1-UTAK vs Comelec

The right to participate in

electoral processes is a basic and
fundamental
right
in
any
democracy. It includes not only the
right to vote, but also the right to
urge others to vote for a particular
candidate. The right to express

one's preference for a candidate is

likewise part of the fundamental
right to free speech. Thus, any
governmental restriction on the
right to convince others to vote for
a candidate carries with it a heavy
presumption of invalidity.
Pursuant to the assailed provisions
of Resolution No. 9615, posting an
election campaign material during an
election period in PUVs and transport
terminals carries with it the penalty
of revocation of the public utility
franchise and shall make the owner
thereof liable for an election offense.
The prohibition constitutes a clear
prior restraint on the right to free
expression of the owners of PUVs
and transport terminals. As a result
of the prohibition, owners of PUVs
and transport terminals are forcefully
and
effectively
inhibited
from
expressing their preferences under
the pain of indictment for an election
offense and the revocation of their
franchise or permit to operate.
It is now deeply embedded in our
jurisprudence
that
freedom
of
speech and of the press enjoys a
preferred status in our hierarchy of
rights. The rationale is that the
preservation of other rights depends
on how well we protect our freedom
of speech and of the press. It has
been our constant holding that this
preferred freedom calls all the more
for utmost respect when what may
be curtailed is the dissemination of
information
to
make
more
meaningful the equally vital right of
suffrage.
In Adiong,
the
Court,
while
recognizing that the COMELEC has
supervisory
power vis--vis the
conduct and manner of elections
under Section 4, Article IX-C of
the Constitution, nevertheless held
that such supervisory power does
not extend to the very freedom of an

individual to express his preference

of candidates in an election by
placing election campaign stickers
on his vehicle.