PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY,

1993, V O L . X V N o

1-2

BOOK - REVIEW
T H E E N D O F L I F E : EUTHANASIA AND M O R A L I T Y ,
J A M E S R A C H E L S , O X F O R D U N I V E R S I T Y P R E S S , O X F O R D , 1986
Reviewer: Stanley Sfekas
Southeastern College
Athens, Greece
James Rachels argues against the traditional view that the killing of
the innocent is always wrong and presents an alternative view based on a
fecund distinction between having a life and merely being alive, between
a biographical life and a biological life. In an essay which makes a signal
contribution to the euthanasia debate, he examines the ideas and assumptions that lie behind one of the most important moral rules, the
rule against killing. Where killing is concerned, the dominant moral
tradition of our culture is, Rachels holds, profoundly mistaken at almost
every point. His essay presents a systematic argument against the traditional
view and a defense of an alternative account.
Rachels acknowledges that the traditional theory, from a philosophical
point of view, is the only fully worked-out, systematically elaborated
theory of the subject we have. Its development has been one of the great
intellectual achievements of Western culture, accompliced by thinkers of
great ingenuity and high moral purpose, and a complex account of the
morality of killing has thus resulted. This account appeals to a series of
distinctions that, taken together, define a class of actions said to be
absolutely forbidden. In deciding whether a particular killing is permissible,
the method is to aprly the distinctions to determine whether the act falls
into the forbidden class.
Some of these distinctions have to do with the status of the victim;
for example, is the victim human or non-human, for at the heart of the
traditional dotrine is the idea that the protection of human life - all
human life - is immensely important. Likewise, it matters enormously,
whether the human in question is innocent or not. Capital punishment

76

BOOK - R E V I E W

and killing in war are traditionally sanctioned on the ground that the
people who are killed are not innocent. It is the killing of the innocent
that is prohibited.
Other traditional distinctions focus on the qualities of the act; for
example, it matters whether the killing would be intentional. It is the
intentional killing of innocent humans fhaX is absolutely forbidden. Perhaps
the most problematic of the traditional distinctions is between killing
people and merely letting people die. On the traditional view, even
though killing innocent people is forbidden, letting them die is sometimes
permitted. This maze of distinctions, Rachels maintains, cannot withstand
analysis.
To replace the traditional view, Rachels begins by distinguishing
between having a life and merely being alive. Merely being alive, in the
biological sense, is relatively unimportant. One's life, by contrast, is of
immense significance. It is the sum of one's aspirations, decisions, activities,
projects, and human relationships. The point of the moral rule against
killing is the protection of lives in this biographical sense. Only by
paying careful attention to the concept of a life can we understand the
value of life and the evil of death.
The details of Rachel's account are strikingly different from the
traditional approach. The distinction between human and non-human,
so important to the traditional view, is subordinated to the concern with
the protection of lives. Because most humans have lives, killing them is
objectionable. However, some unfortunate humans, such as Karen Ann
Quinlan, do not have lives, even though they are alive; and so killing
them is a morally different matter. Likewise, the other traditional distinctions - between innocence and non-innocence, intentional and non intentional killing, and ordinary and extraordinary means - also turn out
to be of secondary importance. And Rachels argues that the distinction
between killing and letting die is morally insignificant as well and provides
no basis for thinking that an act of letting someone die is morally better
than an act of killing.
In deciding questions of life and death the crucial question in Rachels'
account is always: 'Is a life, in the biographical sense, being destroyed or
otherwise adversely affected?' If not, the rule against killing offers no
objection. Rachels sees being moral, not as a matter of faithfulness to
abstract rules or divine laws, but as a matter of doing what is best for
those affected by ouz, conduct. Warning against blind rule -worship,
Rachels notes that the point of the rule against killing is the protection
of its victims. If we should not kill, it is because in killing we are harming

BOOK - R E V I E W

someone. In euthanasia cases, the kilUng of a patient can be viewed as in

no way harming the patient, indeed perhaps even helping. But on the
traditional view, this has little importance: an innocent human should
not be intentionally killed.
Rachels' account stands in stark antithesis: the importance of being
alive is derivative from the more fundamental importance of having a
life. Death is an evil for the person who dies because it forecloses possibiUties
for his or her life; because it eliminates the chance for developing abilities
and talents; because it frustrates desires, hopes and aspirations. This
view leads to a new understanding of the sanctity of life. Againsts the
background of the traditional view, Rachels' alternative approach thus
emerges as a radical idea.