A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO FIRE AND EXPLOSION SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT AND

COMPLIANCE WITH THE DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES AND EXPLOSIVE ATMOSPHERES

REGULATIONS (DSEAR) 2002
By Kevin James Dodd and Jon Lowe

SYNOPSIS
With the introduction of the Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmospheres Regulations
(DSEAR) 2002, fire and explosion safety is now a key element of an organisations demonstration
of legal compliance. Organisations must now determine how best they can demonstrate
compliance before 1st July 2006. This paper gives an overview of the requirements of DSEAR and
seeks to describe practical methods to achieve compliance and, in particular, the production of a
suitable and sufficient assessment of risk.
1.0

INTRODUCTION

Fire and explosion legislation has long been present on the UK statute. For example the
Explosives Act dates from 1875.
Comparatively recent prescriptive regulation such as the Fire Precautions Act 1971, has been the
foundation of fire legislation. However, over recent years the focus of regulation has changed.
Health and safety legislation has now moved towards the requirement to identify hazard and
assess risk. For example the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 (but
first introduced in 1992) requires organisations to complete a suitable and sufficient assessment of
the risks to which employees are exposed to at work, incorporating the provision of the Fire
Precautions (Workplace) Regulations 1997.
The Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmosphere Regulations 2002 follow and build upon
the provisions within these regulations. The aim of DSEAR 2002 is to ensure that organisations
have:

2.0

Identified their fire and explosion hazards.

Assessed the risk presented by these hazards.
Developed technical and organisational measures to establish both control and mitigation.
OVERVIEW OF THE DANGEROUS
ATMOSPHERES REGULATIONS 2002

SUBSTANCES

AND

EXPLOSIVE

The Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmospheres Regulations 2002 came into force on 9
December 2002.
These regulations implemented Directive 1999/92/EC (ATEX 137) of the European parliament and
the Council of 16 December 1999 specified the minimum requirements for improving the safety
and health of workers potentially at risk from explosive atmospheres (Official Journal of the
European Communities; 2000).
This directive is supported by Directive 94/9/EC (Official Journal of the European Communities,
1994) concerning equipment and protective systems intended for use in potentially explosive
atmospheres [Reference 8]. In the United Kingdom this has been transposed as the Equipment
and Protective Systems Intended for Use in Potentially Explosive Atmospheres (EPS) Regulation
1996 (as amended) [Reference 3].
The regulatory framework is summarised in Figure 1.

Page 1 of 22

Figure 1

European and UK Regulatory Framework

The purpose of DSEAR 2002 is to protect people from the risks associated with dangerous
substances that can cause fire, explosion or other energy releasing events.
An ATEX dangerous substance can be defined as:
a.

A substance or preparation which is classified as (under the Dangerous Substance

Directive 67/548/EEC):

b.

A substance or preparation which because of its physicochemical or chemical properties and

the way it is used or present in the workplace creates a risk.
Any dust, whether in the form of solid particles or fibrous materials or otherwise, which can
form an explosive mixture in air or an explosive atmosphere.

c.

In addition, the regulation defines an explosive atmosphere as a mixture with air, under
atmospheric conditions.
DSEAR 2002 requires an organisation to:

Assess the risk to people whose safety may be affected by the use or presence of a
dangerous substance.
Apply a hierarchy of control to potential risks from dangerous substances in the workplace.
Complete hazard area classification to an appropriate international standard (
Establish provision to deal with accidents, incidents and emergency.
Provide information, instruction and training to all relevant personnel.
Identify pipes, tanks and containers which contain dangerous substances.

Page 2 of 22

In addition, before a workplace is first used an organisation must verify that it is safe.
The transitional requirements for DSEAR 2002 are established within the Regulation.
For equipment and protective systems already in place, organisations need to review existing risk
assessments immediately. However, hazardous area classification may be completed before 30th
June 2006.
For plant modification organisations must comply with DSEAR at the time of the modification. New
plants must comply with DSEAR immediately.
Approved Codes of Practice have been issued in support of the regulation. In addition to these
standards are also available Table 1.
Table 1

European Standards Supporting the Implementation of DSEAR 2002

Explosion hazard
Basic principles and
methodology
Area Classification
Electrical Equipment
Selection/design, installation
Inspection, maintenance
Design and testing
Non-Electrical Equipment
Selection/design, testing

GAS
EN 1127-1

DUST
EN 1127-1

EN 60079-10

EN 50281-3

EN 60079-14
EN- 60079-17
EN 50014-series

EN 50281-1-2
EN 50281-1-2
EN 50281-series

EN 13463-1 series

EN 13463-1-series

3.0

Compliance with the Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmospheres

Regulations 2002

3.1

Introduction

Compliance requires an organisation to demonstrate that systems and procedures have been
developed and implemented to address each of the key elements of the regulation.
Figure 2 presents a route map to compliance incorporating the key elements of the regulation.
Three distinct phases have been identified:

An information gathering phase completed using gap analysis.

An implementation phase where risk is assessed and supporting ignition source assessment,
hazard identification, hazardous area classification are completed.
Completion phase where the results of the risk assessment are applied.

Risk assessment is considered central. Hazard identification, ignition source assessment and
hazardous area classification can support this study. These studies then inform the completion
phase. Ultimately any inspection of mechanical and electrical equipment should be considered
within risk assessment. However, the extent of inspection is dependant upon the hazardous area
classification.
Each element will be introduced and discussed in the following sections.

Page 3 of 22

Figure 2

Route Map to Compliance

DSEAR
Compliance
Gap Analysis

Ignition Source
Assessment

Emergency
Planning

Hazard
Identification

Inspection / Testing
/ Review of
Mechanical and
electrical
Equipment

Risk Assessment

Hazardous Area
Classification

3.2

Information /
Training /
Instruction

Gap Analysis

The Health and Safety Executive has suggested that DSEAR complements the general duty to
manage risks under the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999. DSEAR
expands upon existing duties to manage the hazards and risks associated with the release of
dangerous substances and their potential to result in fire and explosion. The Health and Safety
Executive further suggest that the impact upon the diligent employer should be small (The Health
and Safety Executive, 2004).
It is reasonable to assume that many sites have existing systems in place to manage risks. A gap
analysis is therefore considered to be an essential initial step to identify those systems that already
do or can be used to demonstrate ATEX compliance. The gap analysis can then be used to
develop a compliance programme.
A gap analysis can be completed against a simple protocol developed from the regulation,
supporting approved codes of practice and European Norm standards. A sites work processes can
then be assessed against the criteria. The protocol itself can be simple or comprehensive
depending upon the nature of an organisation.
AK EHS & Risk has applied such protocols to a number of sites in both the UK and mainland
Europe. In each case opportunities to demonstrate compliance through existing or modified
systems were identified. However, in certain cases significant gaps in safety management systems
were also identified. All this information assisted in the development of a programme to achieve
compliance.
3.3

Risk Assessment

3.3.1

Introduction

The requirement to complete a suitable and sufficient assessment of risk is central to DSEAR
compliance.
Risk assessment requires a risk to be:

Analysed to identify hazards and estimate risk.

Evaluated to determine whether tolerability criteria have been met.

Page 4 of 22

The assessment of fire and explosion risk may become quite onerous. However, the key
components of a DSEAR risk assessment are identical to any other assessment of risk. These are
summarised in Figure 3.
Figure 3

Risk Assessment

A risk assessment under DSEAR is only necessary if a dangerous substance is or is liable to be

present. The regulation stipulates that the following are considered:
a.
b.
c.

d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.

The hazardous properties of the substance.

Information on safety provided by the supplier, including information contained in any
relevant safety data sheet.
The circumstances of the work including:
i.
The work processes and substances used and their possible interaction.
ii.
The quantity of each substance involved.
iii.
Where the work will involve more than one dangerous substance, the risk presented by
such substances in combination.
iv. The arrangements for safe handling, storage and transport of dangerous substances
and of waste containing dangerous substances.
Activities, such as maintenance, where there is the potential for a high level of risk.
The effect of measures which have been or will be taken pursuant to these Regulations.
The likelihood that an explosive atmosphere will occur and its persistence.
The likelihood that ignition sources, including electrostatic discharges, will be present and
become active and effective.
The scales of the anticipated effects of a fire or an explosion.
Any places which are or can be connected via openings to places in which explosive
atmospheres may occur.
Such additional safety information as the employer may need in order to complete the risk
assessment.

Modifying the basic model presented in Figure 3 Risk Assessment and considering the
requirement of the regulation, a DSEAR assessment can be considered as a series of logical
steps (CEN, 2004):

Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Step 4
Step 5

Identify the fire and explosion hazard the presence of a DSEAR dangerous
substance.
Identify the hazardous events leading to failure including the presence of a flammable /
explosive atmosphere and subsequent ignition.
Identify control established to ensure fire and explosion safety.
Estimate the risk by determining the likelihood of failure and extent of harm
(consequence).
Evaluate the risk to determine whether it is tolerable.

Page 5 of 22

Figure 4 summarises these concepts and introduces the specific consequence requirements for a
DSEAR risk assessment. The consequences of the ignition of a flammable / explosive atmosphere
can only be determined if the mechanism of harm is understood. A jet fire, for example, will have
different consequences (or extent of harm) than a Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion
(BLEVE). In assessing these it is important to understand both the mechanism and the location of
the release and safe guards in place.
Figure 4
Hazard
Presence of
Dangerous
Substance

Summary of the Concepts and Requirements of a DSEAR Assessment

Intermediate
Consquence

Hazardous events
Loss of
Containment

Ignition

Within
Containment

Generation of
vapour
Unconfined

JET FIRE

THERMAL RADIATION

FLASH FIRE

THERMAL RADIATION

Ignition

POOL FIRE

THERMAL RADIATION

Heats Pressue
Vessel

BLEVE

Ignition

Rain out

Pool formation

Consquence
Determinant

THERMAL RADIATION

OVERPRESSUE

Vapour / dust

Evaporation and
generation of
vapour cloud or
dust cloud
Confined

Ignition

Explosion

OVERPRESSUE

These issues will be discussed further in the following sections.

3.3.2

Risk Analysis

3.3.2.1

Identification of Hazards

The effective identification of hazards and hazardous events is the first stage of any risk
assessment process. DSEAR defines a hazard as those substances and preparations with the
potential to create fires, explosions or other similar energetic events. A dangerous substance must
be present or liable to be present and form a mixture with air to combust. This determination is
often simple for gases, vapours and mists but can be difficult for dusts. For dusts is may be
necessary to complete detailed studies to determine if they are combustible. Physical testing may
be appropriate or a review of the historical records to identify incidents involving the material.
The hazard identification study should focus on where these dangerous substances are and / or
could be located. Hazardous events are not merely associated with loss of containment events but
also the presence of dangerous substance within containment.
Organisations often have several techniques to do this. It is important that any technique does
identify all the potential hazards associated with each dangerous substances. It may be that a
single technique cannot or does not do this. The gap analysis will identify this.
The depth of any hazard identification study will be determined by the nature and extent of the
hazard. DSEAR covers both process and occupational safety risk. A comprehensive hazard study
technique based upon the use of P&ID / EFD / PFD may be appropriate for the former but not for
the latter. Task analysis may be more appropriate for the latter and not the former. It may be that
both techniques need to be applied in order to demonstrate compliance.

Page 6 of 22

Hazardous area classification also offers an opportunity to achieve compliance. This is a

requirement of the regulation where an explosive atmosphere is likely to be present (Health and
Safety Executive, 2003). Hazardous area classification also requires that the point or location from
which a flammable gas, vapour, liquid or dust may be released or is present and can form an
explosive atmosphere to be identified and classified (British Standards Institute, 2003a). The initial
step could also form the basis of a wider hazard identification step for DSEAR compliance. AK
EHS & Risk has proposed a compliance programme based upon the development of hazardous
area classification studies. This was possible as the site in question did not have such studies in
place.
It is essential, however, in demonstrating compliance a systematic approach must be adopted that
can address all areas (both process and non-process) and hazards. For example a comprehensive
process hazard review may not be sufficient. Simple occupational safety issues associated with the
use of flammable materials in laboratories may not be captured.
It may also be appropriate at this point to assess the frequency of such an event. This can be
either qualitative or quantitative depending upon the nature of the hazard, but is associated with
the Loss of Containment event only.
3.3.2.2

Ignition Source Assessment

3.3.2.2.1

Introduction

DSEAR is explicit in requiring an analysis of ignition sources. The regulation stipulates that the
likelihood that ignition sources will:

Be present.
Become active.
Be effective.

The depth of any ignition source assessment will depend upon the nature and extent of the overall
risk presented by the presence of a flammable / explosive atmosphere. However, each of these
issues will be discussed further in section 3.3.2.2.2 and 3.3.2.2.3.
By defining an area as hazardous (during risk assessment and formally in hazardous area
classification) there is an assumption that a flammable and / or explosive atmosphere can be
present, containment cannot be guaranteed and hence the only recourse is to prevent ignition.
3.3.2.2.2

Identification of Sources of Ignition

DSEAR requires that the likelihood of an ignition source being present is assessed. All potential
sources of ignition permanently located within or with the potential to be introduced into a defined
hazardous area should therefore be identified and documented. These could be associated within
permanent / temporary plant and equipment, process operations or merely the presence of people
at the location. BE EN 1127-1 provides a potential list of generic ignition sources and ignition
mechanisms [British Standards Institute, 1998], and these are reproduced in Appendix 1. Such a
list could form the basis for any assessment.
Equipment in particular, both electrical and non-electrical, can be a source of ignition and these will
be discussed in more detail in section 3.3.2.2.4 and 3.3.2.2.5.
3.3.2.2.3

Assessment of the Likelihood of Ignition

In addition to requiring that ignition sources are present, DSEAR also requires that they can
become active and are effective. It may be that whilst an ignition source is present there is:

No foreseeable mechanism for it be active and ignite a flammable / explosive atmosphere.

Insufficient energy within the source to ignite the flammable / explosive atmosphere.

Page 7 of 22

Determining the likelihood of ignition is therefore important. It is reliant upon being able to match
the ignition source with the location and extent of the flammable atmosphere and determining the
ignition mechanism and capability of the source. This can be a difficult exercise to complete and
the depth of study should once again be commensurate with the overall risk.
A comprehensive assessment may be appropriate, where each potential source is identified, the
likelihood of it being active determined and its potential compared with the properties of each
flammable material.
This study can be both qualitative and quantitative. For this type of study the following information
may be required:

The minimum ignition energy of the dangerous substance.

The minimum ignition temperature of an explosive atmosphere.
The minimum ignition temperature of a dust layer.
Equipment failure mechanisms and data.
Probability of ignition.
Release rates.
Extent and quantity of the flammable atmosphere.

A determination can then be made to the likelihood of ignition.

However, it may be more appropriate to apply a simple qualitative work model. BS EN 1127 [British
Standard Institute, 1998] presents a simple word model against which ignition sources can be
assessed. These are:

High - Sources of ignition that can occur continuously or frequently.

Medium - Sources of ignition that can occur in rare situations.
Low - Sources of ignition which can only occur in very rare situation.

It is recommended that if the likelihood of occurrence of an effective ignition source cannot be

estimated then it presence should be assumed.
This model assumes that the ignition source is effective. This simple model can be expanded
further to incorporate effectiveness:

High Strong ignition source.

Medium Medium ignition source.
Low Weak ignition source.

Finally the flammable / explosive atmosphere must be able to reach the source of ignition. An
assumption can be made that only ignition source within the maximum possible cloud dimensions
will be considered. However, the probability of the cloud reaching a source of ignition could also be
considered.
3.3.2.2.4

Electrical Equipment

Electrical equipment has long been considered to present a potential ignition hazard. For this
reason standards requiring hazardous areas to be classified and equipment to be designed for
these areas to prevent ignition are long established. It is expected that within any DSEAR
compliance programme the hazards and risk associated with electrical equipment will already be
understood and addressed. Section 3.3.2.7.4 of this paper further discusses the concepts of the
protection established for electrical equipment and the requirements for inspection and testing.
3.3.2.2.4

Mechanical Equipment

DSEAR requires that all potential sources of ignition within a defined hazardous area are
considered and hence mechanical equipment does need to be considered.

Page 8 of 22

Where mechanical equipment is new, then ATEX certified equipment should always be
considered. In this way equipment designed for a particular hazardous zone can be specified and
sourced. However, potential problems arise if ATEX certified equipment cannot be purchased or
the site has existing mechanical equipment within a hazardous area. A demonstration of safety,
through risk assessment will be required.
One potential method to complete this is based upon BS EN 13463 and summarised in Figure 5.
This method is based upon the identification a potential faults that could result in ignition. A
hazardous area classification must first be completed as the depth of this assessment is based
upon the zone in which the equipment is situated.
Figure 5

Assessment of Mechanical Equipment

Identify Area
Classification

Group II
Category 1

Group II
Category 2

Group II
Category 3

Identify all potential

ignition sources
Rare Malfunction

Identify all potential

ignition sources
Expected Malfunction

Identify all potential

ignition sources
Normal operation

Determine
Likelihood

Identify all potential

measures to prevent
ignition

Reassess
Likelihood

Identify
Consequences

Assess Risk

For example, equipment located within a zone 0 is required to be Category 1 and hence all
potential ignition sources associated with a rare malfunction, expected malfunction and during
normal operation should be identified. Control for these is then identified and options for
improvement identified and assessed. The potential exists for this analysis to be incorporated into
the wider risk assessment.
3.3.2.3

Frequency Assessment

In the model discussed in Sections 3.3.2.1 and 3.3.2.2 and summarised in Figure 3 it can be seen
that the likelihood of a fire and / or explosion is the product of:

The likelihood of a dangerous substance forming a flammable or explosive atmosphere.

The probability of ignition.

However, there is a further factor that may need to be considered. To receive a specified level of
harm from a hazard, people need to be within the hazard radius. It may be appropriate to consider
the probability of this in any assessment.
Once again a qualitative or quantitative approach may be adopted depending upon the nature of
the hazard and incorporated into the overall frequency assessment.

Page 9 of 22

3.3.2.6

Estimation of Consequence of Fire and Explosion

The focus of a DSEAR assessment is the impact upon safety of dangerous substance. The
potential outcome on the ignition of any loss of containment event should be considered (Figure 3).
To do this the intermediate consequence and the consequence determinant should be identified. In
addition, the scale of any impact, will to a certain extent, be determined by the quantity of material
involved. This should always be considered as this also informs the extent of harm.
3.3.2.7

Identification of Control

3.3.2.7.1

General

The identification of control is fundamental to the risk assessment process. The regulation requires
that the effect of measures which have been or will be taken pursuant to these Regulations should
be considered. This requires that the measures for explosion protection to be identified and their
effectiveness assessed. Measures can be both technical and organisational.
3.3.2.7.2

Measures for Explosion Protection

During the risk assessment process the measures established for fire and explosion protection
should be formally identified and their effectiveness assessed.
Measures can be considered to:

Prevent the formation of an explosion atmosphere.

Avoid the ignition of an explosive atmosphere.
Mitigate the consequences of an explosive atmosphere.

Within this framework, organisational measures are typically taken where technical measures are
insufficient or where technical measures cannot alone ensure or maintain protection. It is essential
that the assessment considers both. To do this effectively it is useful to address these separately.
Hazardous area classification can be considered as a protection measure within this context and
this is discussed further.
3.3.2.7.3

Hazardous Area Classification

Hazardous area classification is an explicit requirement of DSEAR. Workplaces, where an

explosive atmosphere may occur should be classified into hazardous (zones) or non hazardous
places on the basis of the frequency and duration of the occurrence of an explosive atmosphere
Table 2.

Page 10 of 22

Table 2

Definitions of zones

GAS, VAPOURS, MIST

Zone
0
Place in which an explosive atmosphere
consisting of a mixture with air of
flammable substances in the form of
gas, vapour or mist is present
continuously or for long periods or
frequently.
1
Place in which an explosive atmosphere
consisting of a mixture with air of
flammable substances in the form of
gas, vapour or mist is likely to occur in
normal operation occasionally.
2
Place in which an explosive atmosphere
consisting of a mixture with air of
flammable substances in the form of
gas, vapour or mist is not likely to occur
in normal operation but, if it does occur,
will persist for a short period only.

DUST
Zone
20
A place in which an explosive
atmosphere in the form of a cloud of
combustible dust in air is present
continuously, or for long periods or
frequently.
21

22

A place in which an explosive

atmosphere in the form of a cloud of
combustible dust in air is likely to
occur
in
normal
operation
occasionally.
A place in which an explosive
atmosphere in the form of a cloud of
combustible dust in air is not likely to
occur in normal operation but, if it
does occur, will persist for a short
period only.

There are exiting European Norm standards (British Standards Institute, 2003a & 2000) for
completing these studies and these may be supported by industry codes of practice. For example
the institute of petroleum and the Institution of Gas Engineers have both issued codes of practice
in support of hazardous area classification:

Area Classification Code for Installations Handling Flammable Fluids Part 15 of the Institute of
Petroleum model Code of Safe Practice in the Petroleum Industry (Institute of Petroleum,
2002).
Recommendation IGE/SR/25, Hazardous Area Classification of Natural Gas Installations
(Institution of Gas Engineers, 2000).

Industry codes of practices may be used where they are more applicable to the materials under
consideration (British Standards Institute, 2003a).
The Approved Code of Practice issued in support of DSEAR (Health and Safety Executive, 2003)
suggests that hazardous area classification should be completed as an integral part of risk
assessment. This enables control over ignition sources to be formally assessed. Furthermore
integration of risk assessment enables:

The quantity of material to be assessed which may negate the requirement for hazardous area
classification.
The criticality of ventilation to be formally assessed.

3.3.2.7.4

Concepts of Protection

There are standards to ensure that ignition sources cannot arise. Common concepts of protection,
associated standards and brief descriptions are detailed in Appendix B. The equipment is
assessed against general requirements in addition to the concept of protection specific
requirements. Essential Health and Safety Requirements need to be satisfied for ATEX
certification and compliance with concepts of protection aids this process. Alternatively equipment
is designed and assessed against the Essential Health and Safety Requirements (EHSR) without
applying concepts of protection.

Page 11 of 22

The standards detailed are currently in use but there is a possibility that all the European
references with soon follow the 60079 numbering system as used for Hazardous Area
Classification EN 60079-10.
In addition to the standards presented in Appendix B there are further methods of protection
specifically for combustible dust based on several methods of protection used for gases and
vapours, as detailed in Table 3.
Table 3
Ex tD
Ex iD
Ex pD
Ex mD

Further Concepts of Protection

Protection by enclosure.
Intrinsic safety.
Pressurised.
Encapsulation.

The standards for concepts of protection are continually being updated and revised, therefore
continuous reviews are required.
3.3.3

Risk Evaluation

The risk evaluation stage uses the outcome of the risk analysis to determine whether the tolerable
risk has been achieved. The depth of this study will depend upon the nature of the hazard.
Once a frequency and consequence have been determined to each event it is then necessary to
determine whether these risks are tolerable.
The HSE offer guidelines on numerical values that can be used to describe the tolerability limits for
a fatality. The guidelines suggest the upper limit of the Tolerable if ALARP region is 1x10-3 and the
lower limit is 1x10-6, (Health and Safety Executive, 2001). This suggests that a quantitative or
semi-qualitative approach should be used.
For example the risk matrix is a well-used tool to present risks in relation to the HSEs tolerability
criteria. However, in order to be able to do this the matrix may need to be calibrated against the
HSE criteria.
It should also be recognised that this criterion applies to all of the risks that a person may be
exposed to at work, not just the risks from flammable & explosive hazards.
However, this approach may not be appropriate to the hazards under assessment. A purely
qualitative approach may be considered, but once again the criteria for decision making should be
established and recorded.
Risk evaluation provides the basis for determining whether additional control or mitigation is
necessary. Control is discussed in Section 3.2.2.7 and at this point further measures for explosion
protection need to be considered. These may be either technical or organisation preventative or
mitigation measures. Options for improvement should be considered within the context of the
existing risk assessment. Certain options will reduced the frequency of harm others will mitigate
the consequences. Within in any framework developed it is useful that the following hierarchy is
considered:

Eliminate hazard.
Substitute hazard.
Control risk.
Mitigate the detrimental effects.

Page 12 of 22

3.4

Inspection and Testing of Mechanical Equipment

3.4.1

Electrical Equipment

3.4.1.1

Inspection

Inspection of electrical equipment is detailed in an European Standard, EN 60079-17 (British

Standards Institute, 2003b). This standard is intended to be applied by users, and covers factors
directly related to the inspection and maintenance of electrical installations within hazardous areas
only. It does not include conventional requirements for electrical installations, nor the testing and
certification of electrical apparatus. When conducting an inspection of electrical equipment in
hazardous areas, the following up-to-date documentation is required:
a) the classification of hazardous areas (reference EN 60079-10).
b) apparatus group and temperature class.
c) records sufficient to enable the explosion-protected equipment to be maintained in
accordance with its type of protection (e.g. equipment type, spares, technical information,
manufacturers instructions, etc).
The inspection and maintenance of equipment installations should be carried out by competent
personnel. The competent inspection and maintenance team should conduct an initial inspection
before plant or equipment is brought into service. To ensure installations remain in a satisfactory
condition for continued use within the associated hazardous areas either:
a)
b)
c)

Regular periodic inspections, or

Continuous supervision by skilled personnel, and,
Maintenance.

should be carried out by the inspection and maintenance team. In addition, where replacement,
repair, modification or adjustment is applicable further inspection is necessary to ensure the
installation remains suitable for the environment.
There are different types and grades of inspection. The interrelationships are detailed in Table 4.

Page 13 of 22

Table 4

Inspection Type and Grade

INSPECTION TYPE
Type
Description
Initial
Conducted to ensure
installation is correct.
This inspection can be done
by the manufacturer.
This inspection should also
consider the period between
future inspections
Periodic
Conducted periodically to
evaluate the status of
equipment.
Periodically evaluated on a
regular basis.
o Fixed equipment maximum 3 year interval
o Mobile equipment maximum 1 year interval
Detailed inspection
conducted if internal damage
is suspected.
Sample

Continuous
supervision

Periodic inspection may be

done on a sample basis for
numerous similar items (e.g.
JBs & luminaires).
This is used at the discretion
of the inspection team.
Used to monitor if
environment is problematic.
This is used on a regular
basis in the normal course of
work.
Prevents designated
inspection.
Issues relating to personnel
integrity.

INSPECTION GRADE
Grade
Description
Detailed An inspection which
encompasses those aspects
covered by CLOSE
INSPECTION and in addition
identifies those defects, which
will only be apparent by
opening-up the equipment.
Close
An inspection which
encompasses those aspects
covered by VISUAL
INSPECTION and in addition,
identifies those defects which
will be apparent only by the use
of access equipment (e.g.
ladders and tools).
Visual
An inspection which identifies,
without the use of access
equipment or tools, those
defects which will be apparent
to the naked eye.
Detailed As detailed previously.
Close

As detailed previously.

Visual

As detailed previously.

Close

As detailed previously.

Visual

As detailed previously.

The results of all initial, periodic, sample and continuous supervision inspections shouldl be
recorded. Methods of recording vary but generally the information gathered will be fairly standard.
EN 60079-17 provides check lists for common types of protection concepts (i.e. Flameproof,
intrinsic safety, increased safety, etc) and most recording systems are based around these tables.
Information required for an effective inspection includes:

Details of installation.
Evidence of Hazardous Area Classification review.
Apparatus group and temperature classification.
Equipment certificates (especially when special conditions are indicated).
Inspection date.
Inspector.
Type and grade of inspection.
Inspection schedule (Reference check lists detailed in EN 60079-17).
Additional information.

Page 14 of 22

The requirements for continuous supervision by skilled personnel are not as rigorous. Generally
the records of inspection shall include:

A history of maintenance activities with the reason for such activities.

Verification of the effectiveness of the continuous supervision approach.
Information on defects found and remedial action taken.

The records are usually part of normal maintenance documentation. However, the interrogation
arrangements for the system must then be suitable to achieve the concepts detailed above.
3.4.1.2

Maintenance

The general condition of all equipment shall be noted when conducting an inspection and
appropriate remedial measures shall be taken where necessary (e.g. replacement of missing
bolts). Care shall be taken, however, to maintain the integrity of the type of protection provided for
the equipment; this may require consultation with the manufacturer (e.g. replacement bolts for a
flameproof enclosure might require a specific grade). The advent of ATEX equipment ensures that
equipment is supplied with instructions; these instructions will highlight maintenance requirements
for the item of equipment. Replacement parts, if required, will be detailed in the instructions (or on
the certificate) and shall be replaced in accordance with the safety documentation. For example, if
a luminaire lamp is replaced with a higher wattage lamp this could effect the temperature
classification of the equipment and could lead to ignition of an explosive atmosphere.
Alterations to apparatus shall not be carried out without appropriate authorization where they
adversely affect the safety of the apparatus as stated in the safety documentation (e.g. certificate
or instructions).
EN 60079-17 does not provide generic information for types of equipment maintenance as this
information should be provided by the manufacturer. This information will be available for
equipment post ATEX but it might be harder to find pre ATEX. Some of the main areas to be
considered for general maintenance will relate to the environmental conditions in which the
equipment is located. Some of the key elements to consider are corrosion, ambient temperature,
ultraviolet radiation, ingress of water, accumulation of dust or sand, mechanical effects and
chemical attack.
Equipment maintenance shall always consider the type of protection. For example, flameproof
equipment relies heavily on the mechanical strength and construction of the enclosure/flamepaths,
therefore maintenance such as skimming a corroded flamepath could invalidate the type of
protection if not conducted under the requirements of the certification. In these situations advice
should be sort from the manufacturer or experts.
3.4.1.3

Mechanical Equipment

Mechanical equipment standards are unavailable at present for inspection and maintenance but
ATEX certified equipment should be supplied with instructions as required for electrical equipment.
Therefore, until standards and /or guidance is provided mechanical equipment should be inspected
and maintained following the same principles laid down for electrical equipment. EN 60079-17
only covers the main concepts of protection and relies on the inspection/maintenance team
adapting the principles used for other electrical equipment, thus this approach should be taken for
mechanical equipment.
The check lists detailed in EN 60079-17 are based on generic questioning and the design
requirements of the concepts of protection. Published and draft mechanical equipment design
standards are available, and hence inspection schedules can be produced. In addition, input from
manufacturers and users of the equipment should be considered where appropriate.

Page 15 of 22

3.4.1.4

Inspection and Maintenance Team / Individual Training

Skilled personnel conducting inspection and maintenance within a hazardous area shall be
provided with sufficient training to enable familiarity with the installation which they attend. This
training shall include any plant, equipment, operational or environment conditions which relate to
their understanding of the needs of the explosion protection of equipment.
Where any alterations or changes to the process or installation are effected, this information shall
be provided to the skilled personnel in a manner which supports their function as part of the
continuous supervision process. Where necessary, training in the concepts of continuous
supervision shall be provided together with refresher or reinforcement seminars.
The knowledge requirements of the technical person with executive function shall include a full
understanding of the provisions of EN 60079-10 (hazardous area classification) and EN 60079-14
(equipment selection and installation). Personnel competence is extremely important and should
not be overlooked when training personnel to conduct the inspection and maintenance functions
required by EN 60079-17. This has a direct link to human factors assessments which are
becoming more prominent in hazardous environments.
3.5

Emergency Arrangements

The requirement to establish emergency arrangements has been a longstanding requirement of

UK legislation. The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 (Health and
Safety Executive, 2003) require that procedures for serious and imminent danger and for danger
areas are established.
It is therefore expected that the majority of sites will have systems in place to address
emergencies. It may be that within any compliance programme there is an action to review these
arrangements following the completion of the assessment of risk.
There are additional requirements within DSEAR that the emergency arrangements should
address. There is a requirement to coordinate fire and explosion safety where more than one
employer occupies a site. This duty does apply to emergency arrangements. The risk assessment
therefore needs to consider this type of situation and within these assessments determine whether
other employers can be affected.
In addition, there is also a requirement for verification of explosion safety following modification of
existing plant and for new plant. The effectiveness of emergency arrangements do need to be
assessed at this stage. It is therefore useful in any design project to consider this requirement as
the project progresses.
3.6

Information, Training and Instruction

The Health and Safety Executive (2003) stipulate the information that needs to be provided to
employees. This includes:

The identity of the dangerous substances which could be present.

The type and extent of the risks.
Significant findings of risk assessment.
The control and mitigation measures adopted.
Procedures for dealing with accidents / emergencies.

It is evident from the above that much of this information is generated during a compliance
programme. It is therefore possible to generate this as the programme progresses.
It is also important to note, that where risks can affect other employees from other employers that
this is identified and appropriate information instruction / training is provided at induction.
Finally, information / training / instruction may be an important organisation measure to prevent
and / or mitigate risk. Where this is the case the risk assessment should refer to this explicitly.

Page 16 of 22

4.0

Discussion

Section 3 introduced the key elements of DSEAR compliance. The information present in Section
3.3.2 (Risk Assessment) can be considered as key to any compliance programme. Risk
assessment is the principal demonstration required by the regulation.
Furthermore, it is this risk assessment process which informs other key elements of the
compliance programme. Without an effective assessment of risk, emergency planning
arrangements cannot be developed, employees cannot be trained and critical mechanical /
electrical equipment cannot be inspected.
DSEAR can be considered as establishing a layer of defence (LOD) for each of the elements of the
risk assessment. For DSEAR to apply there must first be a source of hazard within the workplace.
The first layer of protection can therefore be considered to be design procedures, inspection /
maintenance system or perhaps even the principals of inherent SHE.
Following the release of a material, an explosive atmosphere must be able to form and ignite.
Once again there will be a layer of defence to prevent this. This LOD may include the inspection of
electrical and mechanical equipment against an appropriate standard of the results of the risk
assessment. Finally following ignition someone needs to be present to be harmed. A final layer,
principally of mitigation measures but also prevention measures can be established.
The risk assessment process described in Section 3 gives guidance for each of these stages and
can be used to identify existing systems and inform improvement. This concept has been
summarised in Figure 6.
Figure 6

Summary of Compliance Requirements

PRESENCE OF AN
EXPLOSIVE
ATMOSPHERE

LOD 2

LOD 1

SOURCE OF HAZARD

WORKPLACE

IGNITION OF AN
EXPLOSIVE
ATMOSPHERE

LOD 3

PRESENCE OF AN
IGNITION SOURCE
(ACTIVE AND
EFFECTIVE)

HARM

PRESENCE OF
SOMEONE WHO
COULD BE HARMED

Design procedures - inherent

SHE
Risk assessment techniques
Management of change

Technical prevention
measures for release and
ignition
Organizational prevention
measures for release

Technical mitigation
measures
Organizational prevention
measures
Organizational mitigation
measures.

Hazardous Area
Classification

6.0

Conclusion

The paper has discussed a potential route to compliance and has introduced tools to achieve this.
A compliance programme and hence the tools used will be dependant upon the nature and extent
of the hazard and risk and ultimately what the organisation decides is suitable and sufficient.
The Health and Safety Executive has suggested that DSEAR complements the general duty to
manage risks under the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999. However,
despite this DSEAR may still present a challenge to some organisations. Others organisations may
determine that compliance can be demonstrated within their existing systems. DSEAR, in common
with recent health and safety legislation is focussed upon demonstrating that measures are in
place to guarantee the safety of employees and other who may be affected, and this may not be in
place. It is also possible that organisations have yet to assess the hazard presented by mechanical
equipment located with a defined hazardous area. A potential method is presented to assist
organisations achieve this.

Page 17 of 22

7.0

References

British Standards Institute; 2003a, BS EN 60079-10:2003 Electrical Apparatus for Explosive Gas
Atmospheres Part 10: Classification of hazardous areas; BS EN 60079-10:2003.
British Standards Institute, 2003b, Electrical apparatus for explosive gas atmospheres Part 17:
Inspection and maintenance of electrical installations in hazardous areas (other than mines), BS
EN 60079-17.
British Standards Institute, 2002, BS EN 50281-3:2001, Equipment for the use in the presence of
combustible dust Part 3: Classification of areas where combustible dusts are or may be present,
British Standards Institute, BS EN 50281-3:2001.
British Standards Institute, 1998, BS EN 1127-1:1998 Explosive atmospheres Explosion
prevention and protection Part 1: Basic concepts and methodology, British Standards Institute, BS
EN 1127-1:1998.
CEN, 2004, Methodology for Risk Assessment of Protective Systems for Intended Use in
Potentially Explosive Atmospheres, TC 305 WI 00305082.
Health and Safety Executive, 2004, The Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmospheres
Regulations 2002 (DSEAR), Implementing the Chemical Agents Directive 98/24/EC (CAD) and the
Explosive Atmospheres Directive 99/92/EC (ATEX 137).
Available from: http://www.hse.gov.uk/spd/dsear.htm [Accessed 18 November 2004.
Health and Safety Executive; 2003, L138, The Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmospheres
Regulations 2002, Approved Code of Practice and Guidance, L138.
Health and Safety Executive, 2001, Reducing Risk, Protecting People.
Institute of Petroleum, 2002, Area Classification Code for Installations Handling Flammable Fluids
Part 15 of the Institute of Petroleum model Code of Safe Practice in the Petroleum Industry, 2nd
Edition.
Institution of Gas Engineers, 2000, Safety Recommendation IGE/SR/25, Hazardous Area
Classification of Natural Gas Installation, IGE/SR/25.
Official Journal of the European Communities; 2000, Directive 1999/92/EC of the European
parliament and the Council of 16 December 1999 on minimum requirements for improving the
safety and health of workers potentially at risk from explosive atmospheres.
Official Journal of the European Communities, 1994, Directive 1994/9/EC of 23 March 1994 on the
approximation of the laws of the member states concerning equipment and protective systems
intended for use in potentially explosive atmospheres.

Word count excluding Appendices - 6869

Page 18 of 22

Appendix A Ignitions Sources

Ignition Source

Mechanism

Hot surfaces.

Hot or heated surfaces generated by mechanical or machinery processes.

All moving parts (bearing, shaft passages, glands), tight housing of moving parts etc.
Inherent hot or heated surfaces such as radiators, drying cabinets, heating coils.
Hot surfaces generated by exothermic chemical reactions.
Equipment, protective systems or components that convert mechanical energy into heat, e.g. friction clutches, mechanically operating
brakes.
A layer of dust or combustible solid in contact with a hot surface and ignited by the hot surface can also act as an ignition source.
As a result of friction, impact or abrasion particles become separated from solid materials and become hot. If these particles consist of
oxidisable materials (e.g. iron, steel), they can burn thus reaching higher temperatures.
Deposited dust in contact with sparks can smoulder and thus be a secondary ignition source.
The ingress of foreign materials into equipment can cause sparking.
Rubbing friction between ferrous metals and between ceramics can generate hot spots and sparks.
Impacts between rust and light metals (e.g. aluminium, magnesium), and their alloys can initiate thermite reactions.
Light metals such as Titanium and Zirconium can generate sparks upon impact or friction with any hard material in the absence of rust.
Flames are associated with combustion reactions at temperatures of more than 1000C.
Hot gases include the products of reaction or heated gases. Glowing solid particles can also be produced in dusty or sooty flames.
Welding beads (which occur when welding or cutting) are sparks with a very large surface and hence the most effective source of
ignition.
Electrical sparks and hot surfaces can occur as sources of ignition.
Electrical sparks can be generated:
When electrical circuits are opened and closed.
By loose connections.
By stray currents.
Stray currents can flow in electrically conductive systems or parts of systems:
As a result of short circuit or a short circuit to earth owing to faults in electrical installations.
As a result of magnetic induction (near electrical installations with high current or radio frequency).
As a result of lightning.
If parts of a system able to carry current are disconnected, connected or bridged (even in the case of a slight potential difference)
and explosive atmosphere can be ignited as a result of an electric spark and / or arcs. In addition, ignition can occur due to heating
up of these current paths.
With cathodic corrosion protection the above ignition risks are present. However, if sacrificial anodes are used ignition risk due to
electrical sparks are unlikely (unless anodes are Al or Mg).
The discharge of charged, insulated conductive parts can lead to incendive sparks. Non conductive materials will include most plastics.
Brush discharges, cone discharges from bulk material and cloud discharges are also possible.
Brush discharges can ignite almost all explosive gas and vapour atmospheres. In addition ignition of explosive dust / air atmospheres

Mechanically
generated sparks /
Thermite reactions.

Naked flames and

hot gases / liquids
(including hot
particles).
Electrical apparatus.

Stray electrical
currents, cathodic
corrosion protection.

Static electricity.

Page 19 of 22

Ignition Source
Lightning.

Radio frequency
electromagnetic
waves (104 3x1012
Hz)..
Electromagnetic
waves from 3x1011
3x1015 Hz.

Ionizing radiation.

Utrasonics.
Adiabatic
compression and
shock waves.
Exothermic reaction
including self ignition
of dusts.

Mechanism
by brush discharges cannot be discounted. Whilst all discharges can ignite all types of explosive atmosphere this is dependant upon
their discharge energy.
If lightning strikes an explosive atmosphere ignition will always occur. There is also a possibility of ignition due to the high temperatures
reached by lightning conductors.
Large currents flow from lightning strikes and these can produce sparks in the vicinity of the point of impact.
In the absence of lightning strikes thunderstorms can cause high induced voltages in equipment, protective systems and components.
EM waves are emitted by all systems that generate or use radio frequency electrical energy e.g. radio transmitters, industrial / medical
RF generators for heating, drying, hardening, welding, cutting.
All conductive parts located in the radiation field function as receiving aerials. If the field is powerful enough and if the receiving aerial is
sufficiently large these conductive parts can cause an ignition in an explosive atmosphere the received radio-frequency
Focussed energy in this spectral range can become a source of ignition through absorption by the explosive atmosphere or solid
surface.
Under certain circumstances this radiation of intense light is so intense that following absorption by dust particles these become a
source of ignition in an explosive atmosphere.
Examples include sunlight, lasers.
It is also worth noting that equipment that generates intense lights sources (e.g. lamps, lasers, electric arcs) can themselves be sources
of ignition).
Ionizing radiation generated by X-ray tubes and radioactive substances can ignite explosive atmospheres (especially those with dust
particles).
In addition, the radioactive source itself can heat up to such an extent that the minimum ignition energy of the explosive atmosphere is
exceeded.
Ionizing radiation can cause chemical decomposition or other reactions, which can lead to the generation of highly reactive radicals or
unstable compounds, and this can cause ignition (Note: these reactions can also create explosive atmospheres, e.g. radiolysis of water
generating hydrogen and oxygen).
In the use of ultrasonic sound waves solid or liquid substances absorb a large portion of the emitted energy. As a result substances
exposed to ultrasonics can warm up so in extreme cases, ignition may be induced.
The high temperatures generated during adiabatic compression in shock waves can ignite explosive atmospheres (and deposited
dusts). The temperature increase depends upon the pressure ratio and not the pressure difference.
Shock waves are generated during the sudden relief of high pressure gases into pipelines.
Exothermic reactions can act as an ignition source when the rate of heat exceeds the rate of heat loss to the surroundings.
Reactions include; Pyrophoric substances with air, Alkali metals with water, Self ignition of combustible dusts, Self heating of feedstuffs
induced by biological processes, Decomposition of organic peroxides, Polymerisation, Those induced by catalysts, Copper with
acetylene, Hydrogen peroxide with heavy metals, Aluminium / rust exposed to impact or friction, Sugar / chlorate exposed to impact or
friction.

Page 20 of 22

Appendix B Concepts of Protection

Ex o

Concept
Oil immersion

Standard
EN 50015

Cat
2

Ex p

Pressurised

EN 50016

Ex q

Powder filling

EN 50017

Ex d

Flameproof
Enclosure

EN 50018

Ex e

Increased
safety

EN 50019

Ex i

Intrinsic safety

EN 50020

1 (ia)
2 (ib)

Ex n

Type
of EN 50021
protection n

Brief description
Type of protection in which the electrical
apparatus or parts of the electrical
apparatus are immersed in a protective
liquid in such a way that an explosive
atmosphere which may be above the
liquid or outside the enclosure cannot be
ignited.
Technique of applying protection as to an
enclosure in order to prevent the
formation of an explosive atmosphere
inside the enclosure by maintaining an
overpressure against the surrounding
atmosphere, and where necessary by
using dilution.
Type of protection in which the parts
capable of igniting an explosive
atmosphere are fixed in position and
completely surrounded by filling material
to prevent the ignition of an external
explosive atmosphere.
Type of protection in which the parts
which can ignite an explosive atmosphere
are placed in an enclosure which can
withstand the pressure developed during
an internal explosion of an explosive
mixture and which prevents the
transmission of the explosion to the
explosive atmosphere surrounding the
enclosure.
Type of protection in which additional
measures are applied so as to give
increased security against the possibility
of excessive temperatures and of the
occurrence of arcs and sparks inside and
on external parts of electrical apparatus
which does not produce arcs or sparks in
normal service.
Type of protection where circuits in which
any spark or any thermal effect produced
in the conditions specified in EN 50020,
which include normal operation and
specified fault conditions, is not capable
of causing ignition of a given explosive
gas atmosphere.
Type of protection applied to electrical
apparatus such that, in normal operation
and in certain abnormal conditions
specified by EN 50021, it is not capable of
igniting
a
surrounding
explosive
Page 21 of 22

Concept

Ex m

Ex fr

Ex d
Ex g
Ex c

Ex b

Ex p
Ex k

Standard

Cat

Brief description
atmosphere.
This type of protection is broken into the
following types:
nA non-sparking.
nC enclosed break.
nR restricted breathing.
nL energy limited.
nP simplified pressurisation.
Encapsulation EN 50028
Type of protection applied to electrical
apparatus
such
that
surrounding
explosive atmospheres are excluded from
ignition sources by a compound.
EN 13463- 1, 2 or Risk assessment and application of
Basic
3
supporting standards as listed below
methods and 1
where necessary.
requirements
prEN
Type of protection relies on tight seals of
Flow
13463-2
the enclosure to restrict the breathing of
restricted
the enclosure
enclosure
Flameproof
prEN
Type of protection as detailed for
enclosure
13463-3
electrical apparatus Ex d.
Inherent
prEN
Type of protection relies on low potential
safety
13463-4
energy.
Constructional EN 13463- Type of protection in which constructional
safety
5
measures are applied so as to protect
against the possibility of ignition from hot
surfaces,
sparks
and
adiabatic
compression generated by moving parts.
Type of protection that relies on a device
Control
of prEN
13463-6
to control all ignition sources, e.g. thermal
ignition
sensors and shutdown devices.
sources
Pressurisation prEN
Type of protection as detailed for
13463-7
electrical apparatus Ex p.
Liquid
EN 13463- Type of protection in which potential
immersion
8
ignition sources are made ineffective or
separated from the explosive atmosphere
by either totally immersing them in a
protective liquid, or by partially immersing
and continuously coating their active
surfaces with a protective liquid in such a
way that an explosive atmosphere which
may be above the liquid, or outside the
equipment enclosure cannot be ignited.

Page 22 of 22