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Platos Logic
Charles M. Young
Department of Philosophy
Claremont Graduate University
Logic (following Quine 1986) is the systematic study of logical truth (or,
equivalently, valid argument). A logical truth is a sentence true in virtue of its logical
form. Logical form is relative to a set of grammatical categories. Logical systems may be
classified in terms of the categories they take to matter for logical form. Since Frege 1879,
the set of categories that matter begins with sentence and sentential operator, definitive of
sentential logic, and goes on to include term, predicate, and quantifying expression,
definitive of predicate or quantificational logic. From there one may go on, in various
ways, to develop temporal, modal, conditional, relevantist, and intuitionist systems. (See
Burgess 2009 for a helpful survey and sharp assessment of such developments.)
Plato has the ideas of logical form and logical truth. Republic 436b9, for example,
affirms:
Exclusion: It is not possible for the same thing to do or to suffer contraries in
the same respect, in relation to the same thing, or at the same time.
This is a kissing cousin of our:
Non-Contradiction: It is not possible for both a sentence and its negation to be
true.
Regarding things that are such as to be of something, those that are of certain sorts are of
something of a certain sort, and those that are just themselves are of something that is just
itself, a principle that appeals to the grammatical category of relative term to support the
thought that thirst as such is for drink as such, and not for good drink, even though all
desire is for the good. The translation in Shorey But I need hardly remind you (of the
particles alla mentoi with which Socrates introduces the principle) anticipates the
incomprehension that Glaucon immediately expresses. The principle requires over forty
lines for its elucidation.
Whether Platos various scattered remarks on contrariety, predication, and
relation can be brought under control and organized into a coherent system of ideas
remains to be seen. Some worthwhile work has been done e.g., Robinson 1966, Smith
1973, Johnson 1977, Lloyd 1992, and, most recently and systematically, Dancy 2007. But
there is still much to do.
Bibliography
Burgess, J. P., 2009. Philosophical Logic, Princeton.
Cooper, L., 1974. Plato on the Trial and Death of Socrates. Ithaca.
Dancy, R. M., 2007. Plato's Introduction of Forms 1st ed., Cambridge.
Frege, G., 1879. Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des
reinen Denkens. Halle.
Johnson, T. M., 1977. Forms Reasons, and Predications in Platos Phaedo, unpublished
PhD dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, Claremont, CA.
Kraut, R., 1992. The Cambridge Companion to Plato. Cambridge.
Lloyd, G. E. R., 1992. Polarity and Analogy: Two Types of Argumentation in Early Greek
Thought. Bristol.
Fowler, H. N. (trans.), 1999. Plato: Euthyphro. Apology. Crito. Phaedo. Phaedrus., Loeb
Classical Library.
Grube, G. M. A. (trans.), 2002. Plato: Five Dialogues. 2nd ed. Indianapolis.
Quine, W.V. O., 1986. Philosophy of Logic. 2nd ed. Cambridge.
Robinson, R., 1966. Plato's Earlier Dialectic. 2nd ed. Oxford.
Shorey, P. (trans). 1930. Plato: The Republic. Cambridge.
Smith, R., 1973. Plato's Dialectic from the Standpoint of Aristotle's First Logic, unpublished
PhD dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, Claremont, CA.
Sprague, R. K. 1962. Platos Use of Fallacy. London.