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research-article2014

JOS0010.1177/1440783314522186Journal of SociologyPakulski and Markowski

Editorial

Globalisation, immigration
and multiculturalism the
European and Australian
experiences

Journal of Sociology
2014, Vol. 50(1) 39
The Author(s) 2014
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DOI: 10.1177/1440783314522186
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Jan Pakulski

University of Tasmania, Australia

Stefan Markowski

Tischner European University, Poland


University of Warsaw, Poland

Migration and multiculturalism the latter defined generically as a strategy for managing ethnic diversity (see Pakulski in this volume)1 are closely related. Mass migrations
inevitably raise issues of social and political management of ethno-cultural relations,
and this very management becomes problematic when mass migrations intensify and/
or significantly alter the established ethnic composition (as well as the socio-cultural
status quo that accompanies it). Sudden surges of migration have regularly occurred in
Europe and Australia throughout the last two centuries. The latest such wave started in
the 1990s, triggering a destabilising backlash in Europe; Australia was left largely
immune to the shock of immigration, except for the intensified debate about boat people. This is just one reason among many to devote this Special Issue to a comparison of
the Australian and European experiences of recent mass migrations and the increasingly
strained strategies for managing them.
In the most general sense, the recent intensification of mass migrations (estimated
globally at 210250 million people, with 45 million refugees alone) is an integral part of
globalisation the increasing cross-border flows of information, internationally portable capital, globally tradeable goods and services, values and norms, and, most importantly, ever more mobile people (Livi-Bacci, 2012). This last dimension of globalisation
the increased mobility of people has proven the most problematic and difficult to
manage on the European continent. There are six interrelated reasons for these difficulties
Corresponding author:
Jan Pakulski, University of Tasmania, Hobart, Tasmania, Australia.
Email: Jan.Pakulski@utas.edu.au

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Journal of Sociology 50(1)

(and the accompanying anti-immigration backlash), all explored in the articles contributed to this volume:
the recent waves of mass migration have been sudden, powerful, and less controllable by the receiving states than past waves. In Europe, they involve not only
intra-EU migrations which produce only moderate strain but also much more
socially problematic and politically traumatic extra-EU movements of economic
and political refugees (e.g. crisis migrations from Africa and the Middle East),
often from regions ravaged by conflicts and natural disasters (see Lesinska in this
volume);
these waves involve, often for the first time, large numbers of people who are very
different from the host populations, not just in their languages, cultures and identities, but also in their religious beliefs, outlooks, lifestyles and everyday practices.
Absorption of such immigrants, especially Muslims from the destabilised regions
of Africa, Asia and the Middle East, has proven more difficult than the absorption
and integration of more similar immigrants in the past (see Gozdecka et al. in
this volume);
Europes immigration regime bifurcates. The eastern neighborhood of the
European Union (EU), which comprises a distinct group of former Soviet Union
countries (the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia
and Azerbaijan), is an area of competing influence between Russia, which hopes
to retain and consolidate its regional hegemony, and the EU, which has forged
cooperative relations with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and
Ukraine, mainly on the basis of Partnership and Cooperation Agreements. The
competition also involves quite distinct strategies of management of mass migrations and immigrant integration (as pointed out by Markowski et al. in this volume), thus creating a competing migration system within Europe;
many external (extra-European) immigrants have limited knowledge and experience of their European host societies, and therefore less integration capacity than
intra-European migrants. This is often exacerbated by the traumatic experiences
of migration, thus producing a tendency for ethno-religious communalism, sometimes even defensive particularisms, which, in turn, provoke a hostile backlash
from host populations;
mass immigration in the 1990s and 2000s has coincided with waves of terrorism
and the national security scares which accompany them, especially those related
to Islamist terrorism. They also coincide with backlash terrorism (as illustrated
by Breiviks mass murders in Norway). Consequently, others especially
Muslim immigrants are suspected of disloyalty, anti-western sentiments and,
generally, of reluctance to integrate with their host societies. Radical declarations
by religious zealots, themselves leaders of backlash movements, further increase
such suspicions;
the Great Recession, hitting the Mediterranean belt of the EU, which also
receives the largest number of non-EU immigrants, exacerbates tensions. These
immigrants face high unemployment and hostility from local workers forced to
compete for scarce jobs.

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Pakulski and Markowski

Reactions to these new circumstances seem to have been similar throughout Europe:
a backlash against mass immigration and tolerance of ethno-cultural diversity, the latter often identified with multiculturalism (Berezin, 2009). Outside the EUs eastern
borders, especially in Russia, mass migrations, especially from Central Asia, cause serious ethno-religious and ethno-racial tensions. As Markowski et al. (in this volume) point
out, these migrations also exacerbate the social and political tensions between Russia and
the EU, especially over competing patterns of economic association. In the EUs eastern
regions, ethnic minorities have attracted the hostile attention of an increasingly vocal
extreme right. In western Europe, there has been a shift in leaders and the publics attitudes away from tolerant multicultural acceptance of cultural diversity towards suspicious assimilationism (see Lesinska in this volume). Some even diagnose a more
radical shift towards post-multiculturalism that salvages some liberal elements, such as
civic nationalism, but sacrifices others, such as ethno-religious tolerance (see Gozdecka
in this volume).
Even in Australia, which has not experienced significant ethno-religious strain and
terrorism on its soil, and has been largely immune to the economic crisis and connected
anti-immigrant backlash, public attitudes to immigration have started to change, and the
issues of border control and asylum seekers have divided the formerly immigrationfriendly elites (see Markus in this volume). While Australian multiculturalism integrative, reciprocal and respectful of majority has remained the officially approved strategy
for the management of ethnic diversity, it also attracts criticism, often based on misconceptions about its strategic goals and underlying philosophy (see Pakulski in this
volume).
However, these general statements, as almost all contributors have stressed, require
some clarifications and qualifications. For a start, the European backlash seems to be
directed mainly towards uncontrolled crisis migration, especially the inflow of economic refugees from outside Europe. Illegals are suspected of abusing the system and
resisting integration. While the leading role in spreading these suspicions has been
played by right-wing movements and parties, anti-immigrant attitudes have gradually
percolated to mainstream political parties and leaders. In France, the anti-immigrant and
pro-assimilationist National Front leads in opinion polls; in October 2013 over 24 per
cent of polled French voters intended to support it, compared with 22 per cent supporting
the conservative UMP and less than 19 per cent declaring support for the ruling Socialists.
As recently as 2009, the National Front was still a marginal party attracting only 6 per
cent of the popular vote in European Parliament elections. The anti-immigrant Freedom
Party in Holland proposes a pan-European alliance before the 2014 EU parliamentary
elections aimed at restricting immigration and asserting cultural assimilation. In crisisravaged Greece, the extremist, neo-Nazi New Dawn organises attacks on immigrants and
threatens forced expulsion of refugees. The Eurosceptic Five Star Movement in Italy
proposes drone surveillance of the Italian coast and strict control of the inflow of African
refugees. The Bulgarian government is constructing a razor-wire wall on its border with
Turkey to stem the inflow of illegal immigrants; this is in response to a wave of refugees
from war-torn Syria. Britains xenophobic UKIP, supported by the popular press, has
started a campaign against illegal immigrants and their alleged (without evidence) abuses
of the British welfare system. In response to this campaign, the ruling Conservative

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Journal of Sociology 50(1)

government of David Cameron has restricted legal immigration (especially student and
family visas), extended public monitoring of immigrants through banking and medical
services, limited welfare payments to immigrants and ended immigration through nongenuine marriages.
The backlash has resulted in tighter control of crisis migration and further restrictions in assistance to refugees. The legitimate labour market migrations within the
EU, by contrast, create less controversy; they are largely accepted as a part of the integration process. The accompanying policy shift may not be as comparatively illiberal as
some critics suggest. This is partly because all European countries have always embraced
assimilationist policies less tolerant of cultural diversity than Australian multiculturalism and partly because the radical backlash is kept under control by liberal elites. Also
public attitudes, policies and elite strategies in Europe are diverging. The most crisisafflicted societies, like Greece, Italy, Spain and, increasingly, also France, have experienced the strongest political backlash, with anti-immigration and anti-immigrant parties
gathering strength. The less affected societies, like Germany, Poland and most of the
Scandinavian countries, control the backlash by distinguishing between legitimate (legal
and intra-EU) and illegitimate immigrants, with the latter facing stronger controls and
restrictions. Finally, the non-EU countries, like Russia, seem to be embracing quite distinct strategies of immigrant selection and adaptation.
Thus, the backlash has resulted in some shifts and restrictions, but also in some differentiation between the strategies of European governments. One interesting outcome is
an emerging stratified treatment of immigrants. The regular (legal and controlled)
movements of workers across EU borders are reluctantly accepted as a part of the process of EU integration, while increasing suspicion-cum-hostility is directed at extra-EU
economic refugees, especially those who arrive illegally and form visible and welfare-dependent minorities.
Similarly, the backlash against multiculturalism often misconstrued as an uncritical cult of ethno-cultural diversity (Multikulti) takes different forms. It is illiberal
mainly at the political fringe. The critics belonging to the political mainstream, however,
remain liberal; they point to the social pathologies that often accompany poorly managed
mass migrations. Their attitude towards ethnic diversity is more cautious, perhaps more
circumspect and conditional, than the attitudes of the extremists. Thus very few observers realise that Angela Merkels criticism was directed at Multikulti and not multiculturalism. Multikulti a superficial and uncritical celebration of cultural diversity, with
little concern for social integration is a caricature of multiculturalism as understood and
practised in Australia. The problem is that the finer points escape public (and media)
attention, and that the public denunciations of Multikulti by a powerful and popular EU
leader have been widely interpreted as being directed at mainstream liberal strategies.
This has caused collateral damage to the reputation of integrative multiculturalism.
Australia seems to have been less affected by political backlash and anti-liberal policy
shifts. As noted by Markus, public attitudes to immigration and multiculturalism in
Australia remain largely approving, though there are signs of a growing apprehension
towards uncontrolled immigration and unassimilable minorities (especially Muslim
refugees, who are often seen as resisting integration). This apprehension, though, has
not altered the traditional approval of mass, controlled immigration and Australian

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Pakulski and Markowski

integrative multiculturalism, both still widely regarded as success stories by governments and the general public. This lasting approval reflects not only the generally successful integration of immigrants, but also the failure of anti-Asian and anti-immigrant
mobilisations in the 1990s, such as Pauline Hansons One Nation movement and party.
This Australian immunity to radical backlashes may also reflect, as argued by Pakulski
(in this volume), a specific character of Australian multiculturalism: its integrative,
reciprocal and respectful nature. Australians remain supportive of mass migration, but
less and less tolerant of uncontrolled crisis migrations, especially by boat people, who
are seen as illegitimate queue jumpers, though they also attract sympathy when thought
of as the hapless victims of people smugglers. Similarly, in spite of occasional criticisms
of multiculturalism, and in spite of the collateral damage the concept has suffered at the
hands of some European politicians, there are no signs of multiculturalism being abandoned. Australias official adaptation strategies towards immigrants and ethnic minorities remain tolerant and bi-partisan, though the integrative nature of multiculturalism is
also emphasised more explicitly.
Thus the differences in immigration and management of diversity strategies have
widened within Europe, as well as between Europe and Australia. The eastern non-EU
parts of Europe are moving towards a distinct kind of migration regime aimed at strictly
controlling immigrants from Central Asia. The EU countries are adopting distinct tactical responses reflective of their vulnerability to crisis and political backlash, while they
also discuss a coordinated strategy involving (1) EU-wide operational procedures (by
member states) that respect human rights; (2) more integrative-cum-assimilationist strategies towards immigrants and minorities; and (3) different treatment of different categories of immigrant, with more restrictions placed on uncontrolled and semi-controlled
flows of crisis-migrants. At the same time, political rhetoric in Europe has shifted in a
post-multicultural direction.
What is the future of Australias immigration policies and multiculturalism? Four
observations seem most relevant to answering this question. First, immigration is likely to
remain high in volume and selective in mode. The (relatively) vibrant Australian economy, as well as a strong elite consensus about the value of mass immigration, are strong
predictors of such an outcome. Second, while multiculturalism continues to mean different things to different people, its original Australian version integrative, reciprocal and
respectful of the majority remains widely accepted by Australian elites, including political leaders, and the general public. Third, this integrative multiculturalism looks quite
successful as a method of management of diversity and as a nation-building strategy. In
spite of a continuous mass intake of ethnically and religiously diverse immigrants,
Australian society remains relatively free of the pathologies of immigrant mal-integration
(while facing a challenge in relation to its Aboriginal minorities). Ethno-religious and
ethno-communal conflicts and tensions are mild and rare. Levels of ethnic concentration
often used as an indicator of mal-integration (ethnic ghettoisation) are also low.
Ethnic minority and immigrant labour force participation is high, which also indicates a
high level of occupational integration, even though, like everywhere else, new immigrants
to Australia face a greater likelihood of unemployment and longer job-seeking periods
than more established immigrants. Similarly, the level of political engagement of immigrants and ethnic minorities in Australia is high all major parties have a strong

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Journal of Sociology 50(1)

contingent of ethnic politicians (Jupp and Clyne, 2011; Jupp et al., 2007; Marcus et al.,
2009). While one has to be careful about attributing all these outcomes to the integrative
impact of multiculturalism alone, the social-historical record of multicultural strategies
remains strong. Fourth, the symptoms of migrant mal-integration are diagnosed much
more frequently and in a more severe form in countries that have shunned multiculturalism. As Pakulski and Gozdecka et al. (in this volume) remind us, the most publicised
cases of ethno-religious mal-integration come not from Australia or Canada, but from the
UK, France and Germany the countries that have never embraced the policy of integrative multiculturalism. Mal-integration pathologies, it seems, are correlated with the assimilationist strategies embraced by governments in continental Europe, and with the tolerant
and benign neglect of immigrants embraced by British authorities.
Even if one concludes, cautiously, that Australias integrative multiculturalism seems
viable (or at least it works better than the rival strategies embraced by European elites),
there is no assurance of its bright future. This is not because multiculturalism faces widespread albeit often confused criticism, but because Australia is facing some new
challenges of the third immigration revolution. The first such immigration revolution
occurred in the late 1940s and early 1950s as a result of a mass inflow of non-British
immigrants and it spawned the original incarnation of Australias integrative multiculturalism. The second revolution started in the late 1970s, and it accompanied a mass of
post-Vietnam War immigrants from South East Asia. It also caused a shift in the emphases of multicultural strategies in an adaptive-integrative direction. Now Australia faces
a third revolution in the form of a mass inflow of immigrants and refugees coming not
only from crisis-ravaged parts of Europe, but also and increasingly from East and
South Asia (including Afghanistan), from the war-ravaged Middle East, and from the
destabilised parts of Africa. Like many recent non-European migrants to Europe, these
new New Australians face a much more difficult adaptation, partly because of their
relatively low social resources (skills, knowledge, networks), partly because of wider
religious differences and cultural distance from the host society, partly because of rising competition for jobs, and partly because of mounting security concerns and the negative stereotyping of illegal immigrants. Whether Australias relatively open immigration
policies and tolerant multiculturalism will survive the test of this third immigration
revolution is an open question.
Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or
not-for-profit sectors.

Note
1. All undated references are papers contributed to this volume.

References
Berezin, M. (2009) Illiberal Politics in Neo-liberal Times. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Jupp, J. and M. Clyne (eds) (2011) Multiculturalism and Integration: A Harmonious Relationship.
Canberra: ANU E-Press.

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Pakulski and Markowski

Jupp, J., J. Nieuwenhuysen and E. Dawson (eds) (2007) Social Cohesion in Australia. Sydney:
Allen and Unwin.
Livi-Bacci, M. (2012) A Short History of Migration. Cambridge: Polity.
Marcus, A., J. Jupp and P. McDonald (2009) Australias Immigration Revolution. Sydney: Allen
and Unwin.

Author biographies
Jan Pakulski is Professor of Sociology at the University of Tasmania and Fellow of the Academy of
the Social Sciences in Australia He is (co-)author of Postmodernization (1992), The Death of Class
(1996), Postcommunist Elites and Democracy in Eastern Europe (co-edited 1998), Globalizing
Inequalities (2004) and Toward Leader Democracy (2012).
Stefan Markowski is a Professor of Management at the Tischner European University, Krakow,
Poland; Visiting Professor at the Centre of Migration Research (CMR), University of Warsaw,
Warsaw, Poland; and Visiting Fellow at the ANU Centre for European Studies, Canberra,
Australia. He researches social, economic and demographic changes east of European Union
(CARIM-East project).

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