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Dialogues in social psychology - Or, how new are new ideas?

Paula Castro
Social and Organizational Psychology Department
ISCTE
Lisboa

e-mail: paula.castro iscte.pt

Se la riflessione sui grandi orientamenti di una disciplina dovesse


progredire in funzione delle critiche che le sono indirizzate, la
psicologia, e in particolare la psicologia sociale, dovrebbe essere
una delle disciplini i cui orientamenti generali sono i pi meditati.
E chissa, forse chos.
W. Doise, 1999, pg. 225

1. Dialogues in social psychology


W. Doise wonders whether social psychology can be considered a discipline
whose fundaments have been highly meditated, and he decides that the right answer is
probably Maybe. I would tend to agree with him. I am, however, prepared to defend
that some of the more interesting and recent meditations about the discipline can be
found in the written dialogue between Social Representations Theory and Discursive
Psychology. And so, my first aim in this paper will be to discuss communalities and
differences between these approaches through an analysis of their written dialogue.
More specifically, I will examine some of the written exchanges that occurred during
the 80s and the 90s between Moscovici and the group of Social Psychology, paying
special attention to those from this group defending discursive approaches.
Before analysing this dialogue I will, however, need to briefly sketch its historical
and conceptual context, in order to give an idea of the constraints within which it
developed.
Allow me, thus, to put forward the idea that the conceptual space of social
psychology (an expression borrowed from Harr, 1989) can be roughly defined with
two axes and the resulting four quadrants. The first axis is related to the importance
accorded to mental representation some approaches take mental representation as
the object of study, others argue for its dispensability. The second is related to the
different assumptions about the origins of meaning social or individual.

Figure 1
The conceptual space of social psychology
individual construction
of meaning

Social
Cognition

Behaviourism

mental representation
should be studied

mental representation
should not be studied

Social
Representations
Theory

Discursive
Psychology
Social construction
of meaning

Drawing the conceptual space of social psychology with these two axes allows
for different traditions to be positioned into the four quadrants defined.
Proceeding counter-clockwise on this space, and starting from the oldest
tradition, we find behaviourism dispensing the study of mental representation and
assuming individual experience as the source of meaningful behaviour. Although we
are proceeding counter-clockwise, we are in line with chronology, since the next
quadrant takes us to social cognition. Coming after behaviourism, this tradition
assumes individual experience as the source of mental representations and elects these
as the object of study. Approximately at the same time that social cognition was
initiating its ascending influence over the discipline (McGuire, 1986), was Moscovici
forging the concept of social representation assuming at the time the importance of
studying mental representations, and the idea that meaning is socially constructed.
Finally, in the last quadrant is positioned a newer approach - discursive psychology ,

that dispenses the study of mental representations and assumes the social construction
of meaning.
This conceptual space organized in four quadrants has, of course, to taken as a
large scale map. That is, it has to be taken as a simplified version of a complex
territory. Detail, alternative roads, hills and valleys are absent from most large scale
maps. But these can, nevertheless, be useful guides to prepare our travels.
And so, using this space as a map to read the relationship between Social
Representations Theory and Discursive psychology I will now try to give a brief
overview of the dialogue between them during the last two decades.
Since I will be analysing a dialogue, I will be analysing communication. And
for the analysis of communication, Moscovici (1976) has forged some concepts that I
will be using. I will try to characterise the different voices in this dialogue by drawing
on his ideas about communicative modalities propagation, propaganda and diffusion
much in the manner of Doise (1987; 1993).
I will be arguing that in a first phase of the development of SRT Moscovici
was talking to the group of social psychology as a whole and favouring propagation.
This first phase was a very long one. Moscovicis thesis was first published in
1961. By 1976 a (modified) reprint appeared. During the fifteen years that elapsed
between the genesis of the concept and the re-print of 76, Moscovici had also been
busy with texts about attitudes (1963), group polarization (Moscovici & Zavalloni,
1969) and minority influence (Moscovici & Faucheux, 1972).
He had been busy let me risk an interpretation with finding a place within
the social psychology of the seventies. In the seventies in Europe the idea of a distinct
European social psychology was kept alive in Bristol and some hoped in Paris. In
North-America the official credo of an experimental social psychology had already

simultaneously substituted behaviour variables for cognitive ones and given rise to
first critics (Gergen, 1973). Finding a place within the social psychology of the
seventies meant that one had to take into account both European and American
interlocutors, or (at least) both French and English speaking interlocutors. Well, in
1979 a meeting was held in Paris that tried to take all of these into account. Quoting
Farr and Moscovici (1984), the aim of this meeting was: "to facilitate the diffusion of
a knowledge of this tradition of research throughout the English-speaking world" (pg.
x).
Also in the same spirit was published the volume edited by Forgas (1981),
where Moscovici states: "we are firmly convinced that the view we have adopted is
on the whole well founded and represents a uniquely European approach to the study
of social cognition, different from and complementary to, recent North American
research" (pg. 181-182, emphasis added). So, it is absolutely clear SRT is speaking
both for those who do not speak French and for those who live in North America, and
for both reasons these texts are published in English. It is also clear that at this
moment Moscovici envisages SRT as being compatible with social cognition, and
aims at a conciliation of the theory with research developments from the latter. He
therefore highlights the axis that SRT shares with social cognition the importance
accorded to mental representation. The 1981 text bears testimony to this project,
namely in his analysis of anchoring.
But those who live in North America never really answered back to this
propagation effort (Duveen, 2000) 1. Some of those who speak English, on the other
hand, did answer back throughout the 80s. From the direction of discursive

At least, not the effort connected with SRT. The efforts made in the area of social influence are
obviously acknowledged in the fact that Moscovici is the author of the chapter on Social Influence of
the 1985 Handbook of Social Psychology.

approaches, Harr responded in 1984. Next came Litton & Potter (1985), Potter &
Litton (1985), Parker (1987), Potter & Wheterell (1987) and Billig (1988).
Texts by Harr (1984), Parker (1987), and Billig (1988) seem to concentrate
on the axis of agreement. They question SRT in order to ensure that its social
dimension is not lost but deepened, and thus question some of the fundaments of the
theory and some of the research directions it took.
Harr (1984) discusses how social we can consider a social representation
when we study taxonomic groups, instead of structured groups.
Parker (1987) warns against taking certain directions of research, along whose
lines the social dimension can be lost. Following Farr, he considers that there is a
strong and a weak version of the theory. The strong version is patent in the
importance Moscovici accords to the study of content, and Jodelets contributions.
The weak form of the theory appears in Moscovicis defence of cognitive social
psychology (Parker, 1987, pg. 462) and Abrics proposals. Parker is writing after the
propagation project of Moscovici has apparently met with some success. And it seems
to be precisely against the conciliation of the theory with social cognition that he is
writing: I want to direct attention to the dangers that accrue when a new theoretical
position (in this case social representations) is appropriated by, and rehabilitated
within traditional social psychology (pg. 447).
Billig (1988) argues that STR should analyse not only homogeneity, but also
the co-existence of contradictory themes in common sense, and so should analyse
representations not just as the product of dialogue, but also of argumentation and
negation (pg. 74).
On the other hand, Potter & Litton (1985) and Potter & Wheterell (1987),
consider mainly the axis of disagreement cognitive representation -, and discuss the

Theory in order to dismiss it, and to substitute it by the study of interpretative


repertoires. They try to spell out the advantages of this analytic notion compared
with social representations (1987, pg. 155, emphasis added). They acknowledge that
to cast a coherently social, social psychology is exactly one of the espoused goals of
social representations theory. However it is discourse analysis which offers a
systematically non-cognitive social psychology as an alternative to the increasingly
pervasive cognitive variety (pg. 157).
In sum, some of these communications assume the characteristics of
propagation some aspects of the SRT can be kept, others ameliorated, and others
dismissed. And other voices in this dialogue are speaking more in a spirit of
propaganda SRT should be altogether substituted by discourse analysis, and the
concept of interpretative repertoires.
Moscovici did not answer all these communications directly and in writing.
Harr, he answers (Moscovici, 1984b) stating that he thoroughly agrees that he
studied taxonomic groups. But he adds that he also studied structured groups, when he
analysed the French press. And he argues for the need to study both types of groups.
The others, he does not answer until the 90s.
But as the 80s approach the end, Moscovici will publicly make very clear that
the time of aiming at conciliating SRT with social cognition has come to an end. In
1988 and 1989 Moscovici publishes two texts in the European Journal of Social
Psychology. Both are very critical of American social psychology. The fragmentary
character of social cognition research and the subsidarization of social psychology to
general psychology are focused. The two texts are also simultaneously very clear
about Moscovicis commitment to the assumption of the social construction of
meaning and about his defence of social psychology as a social science.

These two texts seem to mark an inflexion point in Moscovicis


communication with the group of social psychology. From this moment onwards,
social cognition will no longer be the object of a propagation-type communication,
aiming at conciliating ideas from SRT with some of its ideas.
During the 90s Moscovici will try to deepen the communicative aspects of his
original theory. He emphasized the social construction component, and tried to pursue
new ways to make the study of representations more social (Moscovici, 1994;
Moscovici & Vignaux, 1994; Moscovici & Markova, 1998; Moscovici, 1998;
Moscovici, 1999). And towards the very end of the 90s Moscovici will also resume
the dialogue with discursive psychology (1998; 1999), in a propagation-like style. He
will make a distinction between static and dynamic social representations, and about
the latter he will state that they are formed with the double aim of acting and
evaluating, and do not presuppose that knowledge and action are two separated
domains (1998, pg. 245). And he will also state that: "I have the idea that the
majority of the research on discourse by Billig, Potter & Litton, does not contradict
the theory of social representations. On the contrary, they complement it, deepen this
aspect of it (the social construction of reality aspect). To ask then, whether language
or representations is the better model can have no more psychological meaning then
asking the question does a man walk with the help of his left leg or his right leg?"
(1998, pg. 246).
Let us now hear other voices intervening in this dialogue in the 90s. In 1993,
a volume was published that aimed at giving an overview of the empirical approaches
to social representations. Before that, however, a number of theoretical meditations
about the Theory are offered, and among these are texts from Billig (1993) and
McKinlay et al. (1993). Also in the same volume, Doise comments these as follows:

"Billig adopts a strategy of propagation in Moscovici's terms: he tried to convince us


that social representations theory should be adapted to his rhetorical approach" (pg.
163). For their part, (McKinlay et al.) enter the debate on social representations
rather in a spirit of propaganda. Apparently, they try to introduce an antagonism
between the social representations approach and their conception of discourse
analysis" (pg. 167). A position also apparent in a later text: "Although social
representations theory has stimulated this important refocusing of psychological
interest (in content and meaning), it is not free from the reductionism of social
cognition" (Potter & Wetherell, 1998, pg. 140).
Harr takes a different position, when he defines himself as a fellow traveller
with Farr and Moscovici and their allies (1998b, pg. 136), in a text where he draws a
distinction between transcendent and immanent social representations. A distinction
that does not seem to be very far from the one Moscovici presents in the same year,
and that differentiates static from dynamic representations.
Again in the 90s, Parker (1998) joins this dialogue, and he is also clear about
possible conciliations: "the social psychological theory of social representations was
part of a sustained attempt by the discipline to develop fully social explanations of
identity and shared knowledge. It is in many ways compatible with the framework
used in this book" (pg. 40).

3.
In sum, divergence between the approaches concerns the importance that should be
accorded to mental representation in order to devise a coherent program for the study
of social psychology. Discursive psychology argues that we should only direct our
questions to what happens between people, not inside them. Moscovici seems to be

arguing for an analysis of communication and language that cannot dispense


representation altogether, even if it is not only on representations that are in the head
that we should concentrate, but also on representations that are in the world (Farr,
1999).
As Billig has repeatedly stated, there are for every issue with social
significance contradictory injunctions that co-exist in the great reservoir of common
sense. New ideas are constantly thrown in the stream of common sense, new terms are
coined and appropriated by the thinking society and this appropriation constantly
defines and re-defines the meaning of these new terms, as well as the meaning of the
old ones to which they connect. This process does not only happen in the society
that is outside scientific disciplines. It happens whenever people think and
argument, so it happens with social psychologists as well. New ideas are also
constantly thrown into social psychologys heritage for thinking. There was a time
when the idea of studying cognitive representations seemed a new idea, since
behaviourism had dismissed it. From the seventies onwards it became an old idea, and
the idea of studying language appeared as the new idea. The concrete features that
these ideas took when employed by people in the dialogues that took place over these
years helped shape their meanings. Some actualisations of the meaning of social
representations that is, some texts from the social psychological literature - present
these as incompatible with discursive psychology. Other texts present them as
compatible, even if only with restrictions. Some texts argue that only new ideas
should be kept, others that new and old ideas can be conciliated. Others do not bother
entering this dialogue, and still others argue for keeping only old ideas (Jahoda,
1988).

This can be considered another example of what Moscovici described when he


was describing the different modalities of communicating about psychoanalysis in the
French press. He was, in that somehow neglected part of the theory, describing
different places from where to think and talk. These places have different
characteristics that can be seen as offering pre-formatted platforms from where to
think and argue about many socially relevant issues. At the same time, these platforms
still allow for many creative transformations when individuals talk.
Recently Moscovici suggested that he had always considered the possibility of
extending his ideas about communicative modalities to the interpersonal level: My
hypothesis in La Psychanalyse was that there are different systems of communication
and conversation at the interpersonal levels, just as there is diffusion, propagation and
propaganda at the 'mass level'; and that their rules or logic shape these social
representations in specific ways" (Moscovici & Markova, 1998, pg. 402).
If we try to develop this idea, we can take the characteristics he identified for
propaganda, propagation and diffusion as a map with which to attempt a first
cartography of discourses. These characteristics can help us identify the complex
ways in which old and new ideas are assembled together, included or excluded, in
different discourses. They can help in the identification of different inter-group
positions.
Furthermore, the different places for arguing that each modality offers also
carry different implications for how social consensus is discursively constructed.
From the theory (and also Vala, 2000) it is directly possible to deduce that those
advocating new ideas in a propaganda-like style will present new ideas as lacking
general consensus. And those arguing for conciliation, as well as those favouring
older ideas, will present the same new ideas as comparatively more consensual.

4.
I will now try to illustrate some of these aspects with data from a project we
conducted on how people talk about the environment and nature (Castro & Lima,
1999; Castro, 2000; Castro & Lima, 2001).
Since we wanted to see how new and old ideas are differently inter-related,
this theme was particularly adequate to our aims, because ecological ideas, in the
form they have nowadays, are frequently presented as new ideas. One of the more
influential traditions in the study of public positions about the human-nature
relationship even defends that new ecological ideas are thoroughly and rapidly
substituting old anthropocentric ideas all over the world (Dunlap, 1993; Dunlap &
Mertig, 1995; Furman, 1997). Instead of assuming that this substitution is thus
smoothly taking place, we decided to take seriously the assumptions that: (1) old and
new ideas tend to co-exist and to interact; (2) this interaction assumes different
formats, opening up different places from where to think and argue.
We started this project with a questionnaire that included the classical scale
used to analyse the ecological beliefs of the public the NEP scale (Dunlap et al.,
1992). But instead of assuming that each individual had to answer either in the
ecological or in the anthropocentric direction, considering these as mutually
exclusive, we assumed that all four combinations were possible people could
position themselves as espousing only the new ecological ideas, only the old
anthropocentric ideas, both of them, or neither of them.
And the four positions were found (Castro & Lima, 2001). So afterwards we
hypothesized that these four positions would also be apparent in the discourses of the
same persons, when participating in focus groups. That is, we were also expecting
four different discourses. These would present the characteristics of communicative

modalities, as Moscovici synthesises them: la diffusion tend a favoriser leclosion


dopinions sur des problemes specifiques, la propagation difie des attitudes
susceptibles de marquer aussi bien les representations que les conduites (pg. 401). (...)
la propagande est plus concrete, elle ne se contente pas de renouveler la signification
dun comportement, elle tend le crr ou le renforcer. (1976, pg. 402).
One discourse would present the characteristics of discourses that argue only
for new ideas, rejecting old ones dichotomization, focus on behaviour and minority
status attributed to the self. That is, the characteristics of Propaganda. Another would
present the characteristics of propagation conciliation of new and old ideas and
focus on attitudes. The other two would focus on the level of beliefs, highlighting
uncertainty in the area of environmental problems, and would present the
characteristics of diffusion.
Furthermore, the discourse most clearly connected with the defence of old
ideas would also depict ecological ideas as majority ideas. That is, ideas that
everybody espouses and therefore have no differentiating identity value.
In the material obtained with the groups, we identified four different
discourses the Action, the Conciliation, the Resistance and the Human Species
discourses. Lack of space prevents me from presenting the lively descriptions of the
environment and nature that were characteristic of each. I would only like to highlight
two ideas.
The first concerns the way each discourse depicts the characteristics of
communicative modalities. The Action discourse focuses on behaviour vigilance and
behaviour modification, in order to deal with environmental problems, presented as a
catastrophic certainty. It presents ecological ideas as new ideas that should not be
conciliated with old anthropocentric ideas. The Conciliation discourse presents

environmental problems as serious, but as solvable through education and


information, attitude change, and through the conciliation of ecological and economic
interests. The catastrophic potential of environmental problems is, for both the
Resistance and the Human Species discourses, still a controversial matter, a matter of
opinion.
We could, thus, say that the Action discourse presents Propaganda
characteristics, the Conciliation discourse presents Propagation characteristics and
both the Resistance and Human Species discourses present some features of
Diffusion.
However, it should be noted that the Resistance discourse also depicts
ecological ideas and behaviours as only another instance of education and respect, and
as already so consensual that one already feels like resisting them, in the name of
human values.
And it is here that we reach the second idea I would like to highlight. It has to
do with how social consensus about the environment is differently presented in the
two discourses of Action and Resistance.
Here are two examples of how the Resistance discourse presents social
consensus:
CF2 (When my friends and I are discussing the environment) I think, we all, we all
agree, and the positions are so, are so clear, and so, so, similar, in what regards the
environment that it is a matter of respect
M - You all agree about the environment, is that it?
CF2 - Yes ... and, and ... experiences are so similar ... so similar that it is difficult to
start an argument, we say, thats it, thats it And, well, end of conversation,
everybody says thats it, everybody thinks the same. (pg. 36)
CF1 It is obvious... if we think about debating it with people, actually, it probably
isnt it is not very debated, because it appears as evident.
M What do you mean, evident?
CF1 It is, it is..., because it is a pacific theme. We can discuss (the Portuguese primeminister) .... and, indeed, because it is a polemic theme, and there are always... we can
discuss abortion and there are big arguments, when actually, well, if we talk about the

Amazonian forest burning, we all go, Oh, What a shame, how incredible that it is
burning! Isnt it? (pg. 37)

And now here are some examples of how the Action discourse presents social
consensus:
CP4 And so, someone isolated, two or three people in a street are worried with the
environment, compared with a thousand or two thousand, it is almost nothing The
results of what one sees they demonstrate that we are a minority, isnt it? (pg. 38)
CP2 we are very few, this is not enough, a lot more were needed (pg. 37)
MP2 I think we have a small amount that, yes, yes sir, would agree with what we are
saying, and the great majority, I think this is indifferent to them (pg. 25)

The same pattern is apparent when, with a questionnaire, people are asked to
estimate the percentage of the Portuguese population that would answer as they do.

Table 1
Mean of the percentages estimated for the Portuguese population, by the direction of the
beliefs expressed, for those that answer affirmatively
Beliefs

Estimated percentage
of the Portuguese population that:

Uses recycled paper


Is in favour of making the
environment a priority
Agrees that the balance of Nature
is fragile and easily upset

Predominance of
orientation to the
new ecological
ideas

Predominance of
orientation to the old
anthropocentric ideas

27.6

35.8

t(88) =-2.28, p<.03

49.0

57.6

t(138)=-2.0, p<.05

53,5

61,9

t(155)=-2.1, p<.04

5. Conclusion
Both daily informal exchanges and institutional practices have opened for us a
number of possibilities for thinking and arguing about controversial and relevant
social issues. We can argue in a manner that rejects old ideas, in a manner that rejects
new ideas, in a manner that conciliates both of them or in a manner that is suspicious
of both. These can be seen as pre-formatted places from where to align our arguments
in different ranks. And it seems to be possible to identify these places if we take the

characteristics of communicative modalities as a map for a first approach of the


territory.
But these are also places that are not totally pre-given. They allow for
creativity, and respond to the Zeitgeist in particular manners.
Discursive work done around the question of social consensus could be
envisaged as one of the manners of responding to the Zeitgeist, or, more specifically,
to those dimensions that the Zeitgeist defines as non-(directly)opposable. Ecological
ideas nowadays seem to be ideas that no one wishes to clearly reject. A blatantly nonecological discourse is difficult to sustain in many forums. And so, arguing for nonecological courses of action, or ideas, implies having to circumnavigate these in
complex ways. Presenting ecological ideas as absolutely consensual, even hegemonic,
and actually not as new as all that, since they are simply another instance of respect
and education, can be taken as an example of such a circumnavigation effort. An
effort that clearly resonates with Billigs analysis of how defining an issue as totally
non-controversial is a way of making it a non-issue for what is there to be discussed
about something that has already achieved total consensus and is no more than an old
idea in a new guise?
For their part, those who speak from a revolutionary, or propaganda, position
are not prepared to concede that these ecological ideas are old, much less that they are
consensual. They are, on the contrary, polemic, calling for action and able to
differentiate the self from others.
A parallel with what happens in the dialogues amongst social psychologists
can also be drawn from these circumnavigation efforts. That social psychology ought
to be social is an idea that is inscribed in the genetic code of the discipline. Who will
wish to say that his/her social psychology is not social? However, the definitions of

what is social in social psychology may, and do, vary. For social cognition it is
evident that the social dimension is present in the discipline, that is a noncontroversial or consensual issue, since its object is the social mind (Markus &
Zajonc, 1985). From this position, it is possible to argue that what SRT presents as a
new idea of social, is nothing more than an old idea in a different guise, and not a
very good one (Jahoda, 1988). But from another position we can say that the idea of
social in social representations theory is still not new enough, because it is not
compatible with what is really a new idea that the mind should not be our object of
study (Potter & Wheterell, 1987; 1998). And still from another position, we can say
that the idea of social in SRT has to be deepened in order to better accommodate new
ideas about the importance of focusing also on language and its interactive use (Billig,
1988; 1993; Harr, 1998).
All of these can of course be called subtleties, but can we really say that our
social life does not unravel around many such subtleties? And can we really disagree
with Moscovici when he states that: When one looks at the variety of representations
in existence, one is struck by two things: mans obstinate rediscovery and reiteration
of the same themes and his extraordinary prolificness in inventing ideas, urged on by
a poetic instinct (1984, pg. 967). Or, perhaps, would we wish to object only to the
last six words?

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