Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 88324 July 6, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANGELO ARCEO y MALI, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Godofredo C. de Guzman for accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J.:
This appeal seeks to overturn the judgment of conviction rendered in Criminal Case No. 86-45584 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila on February 17, 1989, 1 with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the two (2) accused, ANGELO ARCEO Y MALI and RAMIL CECILIO
Y MARIANO, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide; and
hereby sentences them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory
penalties provided for by law, less preventive period of their imprisonment; and adjudging
them to pay jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased. Delfin Manalese, the amount of
P30,000.00 for his death, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and with
costs against them.
SO ORDERED.
Accused-appellant Angelo Arceo, together with his co-accused Ramil Cecilio, were charged before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XI, with the crime of robbery with homicide, in an information which
reads as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of May, 1986, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and by means of force,
violence and intimidation to wit: by suddenly grabbing and forcibly snatching from the wrist
of one Delfin Manalese y Astor, take, steal and carry away one (1) wrist watch valued at
P1,500.00 belonging to said Delfin Manalese y Astor against his will, to the damage and
prejudice of said owner in the aforesaid sum of P1,500.00, Philippine Currency; that by
reason of and on the occasion of the commission of the said crime of robbery, the said
accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, attack,
assault and use personal violence upon the person of said Delfin Manalese y Astor, by then
and there stabbing him on the chest with a bladed weapon, thereby inflicting upon the latter
mortal wound which was the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, both accused, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
After trial on the meats, the court a quo rendered the aforesaid judgment finding both accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide. Only accused Angelo Arceo appealed from
the judgment of conviction.
The trial court synthesized the evidence for the prosecution in this wise:
1. ROLANDO CALADIAO, testified that he was a market porter and a resident of 346 P. Rada
Street, Tondo, Manila; that on May 22, 1986, at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening he was on
his way to the market in order to report for work at the corner of Padre Rada and Camba
Extension, Manila; while he was at the comer of Padre Rada Street and Camba Extension; he
saw Delfin Manalese standing as if he is resting, two (2) persons approached Delfin. After
approaching, the smaller one placed his arm on the shoulder of Delfin, who turned out to be
Angelo Arceo. Thereafter, the two (2) persons forced (sic) to get the watch of Delfin. Delfin
tried to free himself from the hold of the two persons in order to run away. Angelo at that
time had a companion who turned out to be Ramil Cecilio. Angelo stabbed Delfin with a
"balisong" while Ramil was holding him (t.s.n., pp. 3, 4, 6, 7 & 8, hearing, October 23, 1986).
Continuing, he declared that Angelo was able to get the watch of Delfin when Angelo

stabbed (Delfin (t.s.n., pp. 8-9, hearing, Oct. 23, 1986).itc-asl At the time the accused
approached the victim, he was then three (3) armlenght (sic). He brought the lifeless victim
to Mary Johnston Hospital.
Likewise, he asseverated that he recognized both accused Angelo and Ramil as he used to
see them loitering at Maria Payo Street whenever he visited his friend Rodrigo Capwa who
lived at P. Herrera Street. At the time of the incident he observed that Ramil and Angelo were
under the influence of drugs as they were loitering in their place and that they were
"pasuray-suray" from side to side (t.s.n., p. 10, hearing, Nov. 26, 1986).
2. MARCIAL CENIDO, testified that he was a medico-legal-officer of Western Police District;
that he examined the cadaver of Delfin and the cause of his death. He recounted that on
May 23, 1986 he autopsied the body of Delfin and conducted postmortem examination, his
findings of which are reflected in Exh. "E";
3. PFC. AMADOR REGALADO of the Homicide Section of WPD declared that on May 22, 1986,
a stabbing incident was reported to their office. Upon receiving that report, he inquired as to
the identities of the alleged suspects and was told of the aliases of the two (2) suspects.
Thereafter, he went to the house of the alleged suspects and invited them to the police
headquarters to shed light on the reported stabbing incident. Likewise, persons who
allegedly witnessed the incident were also invited for investigation.
He testified that he was present at the time both the accused gave their statements before
Pat. Trinidad;
4. REYNALDO LIMPIN testified that in the evening of May 22, 1986, at around 8:00 o'clock he
heard people shouting "magnanakaw". At this juncture, he moved towards the direction
where the shouting came from and noticed two persons running in a hurry, one of them was
holding a bladed weapon with traces of blood. He confronted them and asked them "Ano
iyong sumisigaw na magnanakaw?" and to which they answered "Hindi sila" (t.s.n. p. 9,
hearing of April 9, 1987).
Testifying further, he identified his sworn statement (Exh. "C") as part of his testimony. In
addition, he asseverated that he was five (5) armlenght (sic) away from the victim. After the
testimonies of the aforementioned witnesses, the prosecution offered Exhibits "A" to "E-1"
and rested its case. 3
The evidence for the defense was summarized as follows:
1. ANGELO ARCEO Y MALI testified in his behalf and declared that he was a resident of 21
Marikina Maypajo, Caloocan City and asseverated that on May 22, 1986 at around 7:00
o'clock in the evening he was at Maypajo, he was then with his friends, Chito, Joseph,
Robert, Pogi and Aling Felisa, singing. They started singing at 9:00 p.m. and finished at
10:00 o'clock in the evening. He further added that from 7:00 o'clock to 9:00 o'clock p.m. he
was in Maypajo, conversing with his friend (t.s.n. p. 4, Hearing of Oct. 13, 1987).itc-asl
On cross-examination, Angelo testified that it would take him ten (10) minutes if he rides a
jeep to reach Padre Rada, Manila, from Caloocan. He admitted that if he will take a taxi it will
take the same number of minutes from Padre Rada, Manila. If he walks from Padre Rada,
Manila to Caloocan, it will take him 1/2 hour to reach Caloocan (t.s.n. p. 5, hearing, Dec. 15,
1987).
2. FELISA HERRERA, testified that she is 64 years old and residing at 21 Marikina, Maypajo,
Caloocan City; that Angelo is her neighbor for three (3) years. On May 22, 1986, at around
6:00 o'clock in the evening, she was in their house together with Angelo, Bong, Chito,
Joseph, Mando and Pogi, who were then singing.
3 FORTUNATO ARCEO, likewise testified that in the evening of May 22, 1986 between 11:00
to 12:00 midnight, Pat. Regalado and his co-policemen went to his house and inquired about
the whereabouts of Ramil as the latter was implicated in a killing incident. He told them that
he has no son by the name of Ramil.
The following morning, the policemen arrived and arrested his son, Fortunate Arceo, Jr. He
admitted that he knew Ramil Cecilio who was living in the 6th house from their house.
4. RAMIL CECILIO testified likewise in his behalf and declared that he is 28 years old, jobless
and a resident of 415 Zabala Street, corner Balagtas, Tondo, Manila. He admitted that a
certain policeman picked him up in his wife's house located at Sandico, corner P. Soriano,
Tondo, Manila, on May 22, 1986 at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening (t.s.n. pp. 3 & 4,
hearing, January 14, 1988).

On cross-examination he testified that Sandico Street is eight (8) meters away from Camba
Extension and to Padre Rada, if one is to walk from Sandico to Camba and Padre Rada
streets, it will take ten (10) minutes to reach the place (t.s.n., p. 7, hearing, January 14,
1988).
5. ANGELINA BUENSUCESO, testified that at about 7:30 in I the evening of May 22, 1986,
Ramil went to her house located at 1164 Asuncion Extension, Tondo, Manila, to attend to her
mother's birthday. She further admitted that Ramil slept in their house and left at 12:00
o'clock noon the following day. After the testimony of Angelina Buensuceso, the defense
rested its case without any documentary evidence. 4
On rebuttal, the prosecution presented Danilo Manalese, brother of the victim. He recounted that on May
22, 1986, at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening while he was in his house at 989 Camba Extension, Tondo,
Manila, he heard the victim shout twice "Nay, sinaksak po ako." He proceeded to the place where his
brother was and the latter pointed to both accused as the ones responsible for the stabbing. He recognized
both accused as the place was well lighted. 5
The main thrust of the appeal is centered on credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution, appellant
faulting them as follows:
1. Caladiao allegedly neither helped the victim nor could he have identified the perpetrators since he was
in a state of shock; that because the place was crowded it was impossible to identify appellant as one of
the perpetrators; that Caladiao was a neighbor of the victim; and that Caladiao, instead of using the fastest
means of transportation, used a pushcart to bring the patient to the hospital.
2. Limpin supposedly contradicted Caladiao because the latter never testified that shouts of
"magnanakaw" were heard; that he could not have inquired from appellant on what was happening since
Limpin was not a person in authority or an agent thereof, and that Limpin was implicated in another
stabbing incident thereby casting doubt on his credibility.
3. Pfc. Regalado, appellant claims, was likewise inconsistent in his testimony that he investigated the
appellant in the morning and also in the afternoon.
4. Lastly, Delfin Manalese's testimony was allegedly inconsistent with that of Caladiao. Delfin Manalese
stated that he heard his brother cry "Nay sinaksak po ako" twice, while Caladiao testified that he heard the
victim cry the same words once. Appellant further argues that Delfin could not have possibly heard his
brother since his house was thirty meters away from the corner of Padre Rada St. 6
It is an elementary rule that inconsistencies and contradictions referring to minor details do not destroy the
credibility of witnesses. 7 Inconsistencies in the principal eyewitness' testimony which are details that do
not impair the identification of the accused are not fatal. Witnesses who are in a state of surprise and fright
cannot be expected to recall with accuracy or uniformity matters connected with the main overt act.
Rather than discredit the testimony of the witnesses, such discrepancies or minor details serve to add
credence and veracity to their categorical, straightforward and spontaneous testimony. 8
From an analysis of the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution, it becomes readily apparent that
the supposed errors involve minor matters which have no material bearing on the commission of the
criminal act itself. Variances can be attributed to the fact that different persons have diverse impressions
and perceptions of a startling event. On the other hand, the testimonies of two or more witnesses would be
under a serious cloud of doubt if their declarations tallied in their minutest details, for then, that would not
be natural. That would indicate that the testimonies were rehearsed. 9
Furthermore, the trial court categorically observed that "(t)he testimony of subject witness is clear direct,
spontaneous and therefore deserves credence. The witnesses testified in a straight-forward manner,
sincere and candid in answering questions propounded during the direct examination as well as in
the cross-examination. They have no motive to testify falsely against the accused." 10
We, therefore, find no reason to depart from the cardinal principle that the findings of the trial court on the
matter of credibility should not be disturbed on appeal due to its superior advantage in observing the
conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying, unless some facts or circumstances may have
been overlooked that may affect the result of the case. 11 The findings of the trial court carry great weight
because they have the privilege of examining the deportment and demeanor of witnesses, and, therefore,
can discern if such witnesses are telling the truth or not. 12
Furthermore, we are convicted beyond reasonable doubt, on the basis alone of the testimony of
eyewitness Rolando Caladiao, that both accused actually committed the crime charged. Caladiao's lone
but credible testimony is, to our mind, sufficient to support a conviction. Hence, even in the absence of
corroborating testimony, the accused can validly be convicted on the basis of the positive identification by
Caladiao.

Appellant tries to impeach Limpin by adverting to the latter's being one of the respondents in a case for
frustrated murder in I.S. No. 85-13602 of the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila. It should be noted,
however, that in order to affect the credibility of a witness by the mere fact that he was charged with an
offense, previous conviction by final judgment is required, 13 and the existence of a pending information
may not be shown to impeach the witness. 14 With more reason, therefore, should Limpin not be
discredited merely on the basis of a complaint filed with the city fiscal, there being no showing that an
information has been filed in court and that judgment has been rendered convicting him of the offense.
The defense of appellant hinges primarily on alibi which, as we have repeatedly declared, is one of the
weakest defenses that may be invoked by an accused. We rule once again that for this defense to prosper,
it is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere when the crime was committed but that he
must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime. It
cannot prevail over the positive identification of the prosecution witnesses. It is an issue of fact that hinges
on the credibility of the witnesses who seek to establish it. 15 It has been held that no physical impossibility
exists where the distance between the scene of the crime and the place where the accused allegedly was
at that time would take only fifteen to twenty minutes to negotiate by jeep, 16 or where it can be traversed
by walking in one and a half hours, 17 or where the places involved are only two hundred meters apart. 18
That it could not have been physically impossible for accused Arceo to be at the scene of the crime is
evident from his own testimony to the effect that it would take him ten minutes if he rides a jeep to reach
Padre Rada, Manila, from Caloocan; that it would take him the same number of minutes if he takes a taxi;
and that if he walks from Padre Rada, it would take him half an hour to reach Caloocan.
Alibi, we have consistently held, cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused. Even if,
admittedly, the eyewitness had seen the malefactors for the first time at the time of the killing, it does not
necessarily follow that he could not have recognized their faces. Persons observing a startling occurrence
would strive to know the ones involved, especially in a case where the victim is known to the eyewitness.
19
Perforce, there is no merit in the allegation of appellant that he could not have been identified by
Caladiao who, at that time, was supposedly in a state of shock.
There is no reason to doubt the testimony of Caladiao who has positively identified the perpetrators of the
crime, it appearing that the place of the incident was well lighted and the witness was at a distance of
about three arm's length. These facts are sufficient to exclude any doubt in the identification of the
accused. Furthermore, the witness actually saw appellant stab the victim on the chest. That the victim
sustained a stab wound on the chest was confirmed by the medico-legal officer, Dr. Marcial Cenido, who
conducted an autopsy on the body of the victim. It was also shown that this single stab wound was fatal,
thereby causing the immediate death of the victim.
The proven circumstances attendant to the crime indubitably establish that accused Arceo and Cecilio
conspired to commit the crime as shown by their coordinated acts directed to ensure the accomplishment
of their evil designs. The act of one accused in holding the victim from behind when the latter was stabbed
by his co-accused is a positive act towards the realization of a common criminal intent, although the intent
can be classified as instantaneous. It can be safely assumed that had not the first accused held both arms
of the victim from behind, the latter could have parried the thrust or even run away from his assailant. By
immobilizing the two hands of the victim from behind, and although there was no anterior conspiracy, the
two accused showed unity of criminal purpose and intent immediately before the actual stabbing. 20
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68969 January 22, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
USMAN HASSAN y AYUN, respondent.

SARMIENTO, J.:
This is a pauper's appeal of the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Ninth Judicial
Region Branch XIII, dated January 25, 1984, which "finds the accused USMAN HASSAN y AYUN guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the Crime of MURDER, and there being neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance attending the commission of the crime, and pursuant to Paragraph No. 1 of Article
64 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby imposes upon the said accused the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA
and all its accessory penalties; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim Ramon Pichel, Jr. y Uro the
amount of P12,000.00 and to pay the costs." 2
Usman Hassan was accused of murder for stabbing to death Ramon Pichel, Jr. y Uro, 24, single, and a
resident of Zamboanga City. 3 At the time of his death on July 23,1981, the deceased was employed as
manager of the sand and gravel business of his father. On the other hand, Hassan was an illiterate, 15year-old pushcart cargador. 4
The quality of justice and the majesty of the law shine ever brightest when they are applied with more
jealousy to the poor, the marginalized, and the disadvantaged. Usman Hassan, the herein accusedappellant, belongs to this class. At the time of the alleged commission of the crime, he was poor,
marginalized, and disadvantaged. He was a flotsam in a sea of violence, following the odyssey of his
widowed mother from one poverty-stricken area to another in order to escape the ravages of internicine
war and rebellion in Zamboanga del Sur. In the 15 years of Hassan's existence, he and his family had to
evacuate to other places for fear of their lives, six times. His existence in this world has not even been
officially recorded; his birth has not been registered in the Registry of Births because the Samal tribe, to
which he belongs, does not see the importance of registering births and deaths.
Usman was convicted on the bases of the testimony of a lone eyewitness for the prosecution and the
sloppiness of the investigation conducted by the police investigator, Police Corporal Rogelio Carpio of the
Homicide and Arson Section of the Zamboanga City Police Station, who also testified for the prosecution.
We rule that Usman Hassan's guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt and that Usman Hassan must,
therefore, be set free.

The lone eyewitness for the prosecution is Jose Samson, 24 years old when he testified, married, and a
resident of Zamboanga City. On the day of the killing, he was employed at the sand and gravel business of
the father of the deceased but was jobless at the time of his examination-in-chief on February 3, 1982.
He testified that he was with Ramon Pichel, Jr. at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of July 23, 1981; that he
was a backrider in the motorcycle of Ramon when they went to buy mangoes at Fruit Paradise near the
Barter Trade Zone in Zamboanga City that while he was selecting mangoes, he saw a person stab Ramon
who was seated at his red Honda motorcycle which was parked about two or three meters from the fruit
stand where he Samson) was selecting mangoes; that he saw the assailant stab Ramon "only once" and
that after the stabbing, the assailant ran towards the PNB Building. When asked at the cross-examination if
he knew the assailant, Samson said, "I know him by face but I do not know his name." 5
This sole eyewitness recounted the stabbing thus: "While Ramoncito Pichel, Jr. was holding the motorcycle
with both of his hands, the assailant come from behind, held his left hand and stabbed him from behind on
his chest while the victim was sitting on the motorcycle." He claimed that he was able to see the assailant
because it was very bright there that Ramon was facing the light of a petromax lamp, and that all these
happened in front of the fruit stand a distance of about 6 to 7 meters from the side of the road.
Samson described the assailant as wearing a white, short-sleeved t-shirt and maong pants, but "he did not
see if the aggressor was wearing shoes," that the assailant stabbed Ramon with a knife but "he did not
exactly see what kind of knife it was, and he did not see how long the knife was He said he brought the
wounded Ramon to the Zamboanga City General Hospital in a tricycle.
On cross-examination, Samson testified:
xxx xxx xxx
Q When you rushed Ramon Pichel, Jr. to the hospital you came to know that he
was already dead, is that correct?
A Yes, sir, I learned that he was already dead.
Q In the hospital, were you investigated by the police?
A They just asked the description of that person as to his attire and his
appearance.
Q And it was while in the hospital that you told them the description of the
one who stabbed Ramon Pichel, Jr.?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And the body of Ramon Pichel, Jr., was brought to the Funeraria La Merced?
A Yes, sir,
Q Can you recall what time was that?
A I do not know what time was that.
Q And it was all La Merced Funeraria that the police brought to you the accused?
A...
Q For Identification?
A Yes, sir.
Q And he was alone when you Identified him?
A Yes he was alone.
Q Aside from working with the Pichel family in their sand and gravel business, do you have
any blood relationship with them?
A Yes. sir.

(Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

What comes as a surprise is that Samson's statement 7 which was taken only on July 25, 1981, two days
after the stabbing, and sworn to only on July 27, 1981, also two days after it was taken, or four days after
the killing, was never presented or mentioned by the prosecution at all. The information was practically
forced out of Police Corporal Rogelio P. Carpio, a witness for the People, during his cross-examination. 8 The
sworn statement contained the following questions and answers:
xxx xxx xxx
Q-14. What and please narrate it to me briefly in your own words, the incident
you are referring?
A-14. While I was busy selecting some mangoes, I saw unidentified person
whom I can recognize by face if seen again embraced my companion Ramon
Pitcher Jr. while the latter was aboard his motorcycle parked within the area.
That this person without much ado, and armed with a knife suddenly stabbed
him (Ramon). That by coincidence to this incident, our eye met each other
and immediately thereafter, he fled the area toward the Philippine National
Bank (PNB). That this unidentified person was sporting a semi-long hair,
dressed in White Polo-Shirt (Short sleeve), maong pants height to more or less
5'5, Dark Complexion. That as this unidentified person fled the area I
immediately came to aid my companion, Ramon Pitcher, Jr., and rushed him to
Zamboanga General Hospital, on board a Tricycle. That may companion
(Ramon) did not whispered (sic) any words to me for he was in serious
condition and few minutes later, he expired.
Q-15. Was tills unidentified person was with companion when he attack (sic)
Ramon Pitcher Jr.?
A-15. He was alone Sir.
Q-16. Can you really Identified (sic) this person who attacked and stabbed
your companion, Ramon Pitcher, Jr., that evening in question?
A-16. Yes, Sir,
Q-17. Do you still remember that confrontation we made at the Office of La
Merced Funeral Homes, wherein you were confronted with one Usman Hassan,
whom this Officer brought along?
A-17. Yes, Sir.
Q-18. Was he the very person, who attacked and stabbed your companion,
Ramon Pitcher, Jr.?
A-18. Yes, Sir, he was the very person who attacked and stabbed my
companion, Ramon Pitcher, Jr., that evening in question.
Q-19. Why?
A-19. Because his face and other physical appearance were fully noted by me
and this I cannot forget for the rest of my life.
Q-20. Before this incident, was there any altercation that had ensued while in
the process of buying some mangoes in that area?
A-20. None Sir.
Q-21. Were you able to note what kind of knife used by said Usman Hassan in
stabbing your companion, Ramon Pitcher Jr.?
A-21: None Sir,
Q-22. Well, I have nothing more to ask of you, do you have anything more to
say, add or alter in this statement?
A-22. No more Sir.

Q-23. Are you willing to give a supplemental statement if needed in the

future?
A-23. Yes, Sir.

(Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
The version of the sole eyewitness appearing in his statement 10 is substantially the same as that
embodied in the "Case Report," Exhibit it "C", by Police Corporal Carpio, also admitted a s Exhibit "2." This
exhibit for the prosecution confirms the sworn statement of witness Samson that an unidentified person,
whom he recognized only by face, appeared and without any provocation, the latter embraced the victim
and stabbed the same allegedly with a knife." The rest of the Case Report: is also significant in that it
confirms the confrontation between the accused and Jose Samson in the funeral parlor arranged by the
police Investigator and prosecution witness, Corporal Carpio.
xxx xxx xxx
From this end, a follow-up was made within the premises of the Old Barter Trade, wherein
the person of USMAN HASSAN Y AYUN, of Paso Bolong, this City, was arrested in connection
with the above stated incident. That this Officer and companions arrested this person Usman
due to his physical appearance, which was fully described by victim's companion. Jose
Samson. During his arrest, a knife, measuring to more or less seven (7) inches in blade was
confiscated in his possession. The person of Usman Hassan was brought along at the La
Merced Funeral Homes for a confrontation with victims companion, Jose Samson and in this
confrontation, Jose Samson positively Identified said Usman Hassan as the very person who
stabbed the victim.
Usman Hassan, on the other hand, denied the charges levelled against hub and admitted
ownership of said knife; claiming among other things that he used said knife for slicing
mangoes. 11
xxx xxx xxx
We hold that the evidence for the prosecution in its entirety does not satisfy the quantum of proof
beyond reasonable doubt required by the Constitution, the law, and applicable jurisprudence to convict
an accused person. The said evidence denies us the moral certainty which would allow us to pronounce,
without uneasiness of conscience. Usman Hassan y Ayun guilty of the killing of the deceased Ramon Pichel,
Jr. y Uro, and condemn him to life imprisonment and in effect turning him into a flotsam again in a sea of
convicted felons in which he would be a very young stranger.
In evaluating the worth of the testimony of the lone eyewitness for the prosecution against the denial and
alibi of the accused, value judgment must not be separated from the constitutionally guaranteed
presumption of innocence.
When the evidence for the prosecution and the evidence for the accused are weighed, the
scales must be tipped in favor of the latter. This is because of the constitutional presumtion
of innocence the accused enjoys as a counter-foil to the awesome authority of the State that
is prosecuting him.
The element of doubt, if reasonable in this case, must operate against the inference of guilt
the prosecution would draw from its evidence. That evidence, as it happens, consists only of
the uncorroborated statement of the two policemen which, as previously observed, is flawed
and therefore suspect. 12
The testimony of Jose Samson, the lone eyewitness, is weak and unconvincing. And so with the evidence
sought to be introduced by Police Corporal Carpio. We discover, for example, that the expert testimony of
the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, Dr. Valentin Bernalez, presented by the
prosecution, contradicted, on material points, the testimony of the one eyewitness, Jose Samson. While
Samson averred on the witness stand that he saw the assailant stab the deceased "from behind on his
chest" 13 only once, the NBI medico-legal officer Identified two stab wounds, one at the front portion of the
chest at the level and third rib, (sic) and another stab wound located at the left arm posterior aspect." 14
The same medical expert also concluded from the nature and location of the chest wound, which was the
cause of death, that the same was inflicted on the victim while the alleged accused was in front of him." 15
The investigation of this case by the Homicide/Arson Section of the Zamboanga Southern Police Sector, 16
at Zamboanga City, particularly by Police Corporal Rogelio P. Carpio, leaves much to be desired. For one,
we are not satisfied with the procedure adopted by the police investigators in the Identification of the
accused as the assailant. We have no doubt that Usman Hassan was "presented" alone 17 to Jose Samson
by the police investigator and prosecution witness, Police Corporal Carpio, and his police companions, at

the office of the La Merced Funeral Homes in Zamboanga City. As correctly termed by the very evidence 18
of the prosecution, the procedure adopted by the police investigators was a confrontation" between Jose
Samson, Jr. and Usman. Earlier, on direct examination, Corporal Carpio testified that Usman was alone
when he was brought to Samson for confrontation in the funeral parlor. However, on cross-examination,
Carpio made a turnabout by saying that the accused was Identified by Samson in a "police line-up;" this
tergiversation we dare say, was an afterthought, more the result of an over or careless cross-examination,
augmented by the leading questions 19 of the trial judge rather than a fastidiousness if not sincerity, on the
part of the police investigator, to honestly correct erroneous statements in his examination-in-chief. The
fact remains that both Samson and the accused testified clearly and unequivocably that Usman was alone
when presented to Samson by Carpio. There was no such police line-up as the police investigator, to
honestly correct erreoneous statements in his examination-in-chief. The fact remains that both Samson
and the accused testified clearly and unequivocably that Usman was alone when presented to Samson by
Carpio. There was no such police investigator claimed on second thought.
The manner by which Jose Samson, Jr. was made to confront and Identify the accused alone at the funeral
parlor, without being placed in the police line-up, was "pointedly suggsestive, generated confidence where
there was none, activated visual imagination, and, all told, subserted his reliability as eyewitness. This
unusual, coarse, and highly singular method of Identification, which revolts against the accepted principles
of scientific crime detection, alienates the esteem of every just man, and commands neither our respect
nor acceptance." 20
Moreover, the confrontation arranged by the police investigator between the self-proclaimed eyewitness
and the accused did violence to the right of the latter to counsel in all stages of the investigation into the
commission of a crime especially at its most crucial stage the Identification of the accused.
As it turned out, the method of Identification became just a confrontation. At that critical and decisive
moment, the scales of justice tipped unevenly against the young, poor, and disadvantaged accused. The
police procedure adopted in this case in which only the accused was presented to witness Samson, in the
funeral parlor, and in the presence of the grieving relatives of the victim, is as tainted as an uncounselled
confession and thus falls within the same ambit of the constitutionally entrenched protection. For this
infringement alone, the accused-appellant should be acquitted.
Moreover, aside from this slipshod Identification procedure, the rest of the investigation of the crime and
the preparation of the evidence for prosecution were done haphazardly, perfunctorily, and superficially.
Samson was not investigated thoroughly and immediately after the incident. As previously mentioned, his
statement was taken by the investigator only two days after the murder of Ramon Pichel, Jr. and sworn
only two days after it had been taken. Similarly, there is nothing in the record to show that the fruit vendor
from whom Samson and the deceased were buying mangoes that fateful evening and who certainly must
have witnessed the fatal stabbingwas investigated, or why he was not investigated. Nor is any
explanation given as to why the companion 21 of the accused at the time Corporal Carpio arrested him
(accused) 'sitting on a pushcart " 22 at about 8:00 P.M. (around 7:00 P.M., according to Usman) of that same
evening near the scene of the crime, was not also investigated when he could have been a material
witness of the killing or of the innocence of the accused. In addition, the knife and its scabbard, 23
Confiscated by Carpio from Usman (tucked on the right side of his waist") at the time of his arrest, were
not even subjected to any testing at all to determine the presence of human blood which could be typed
and compared with the blood type of the deceased. A crime laboratory test had Carpio or the
prosecuting fiscal, or even the trial judge, insisted on it would have revealed whether or not the knife in
question (confiscated from the accused by Carpio one hour after the alleged commission of the crime) had
indeed been the weapon used to kill Ramon. The police investigator instead nonchalantly dismissed this
sin of omission by saying that the knife could have been cleaned or the bloodstain could have been taken
away. 24 This presumption of the deadly weapon's having been "cleaned" of bloodstains is tantamount to
pronouncing the accused of being guilty.
Our doubt about the guilt of the accused is further deepened by a resolution, 25 in a separate case, 26 of
Assistant City Fiscal of Zamboanga City and deputized Tanod bayan Prosecutor Pablo Murillo, which clearly
reveals that on July 24, 1981, a day after the killing of Ramon Pichel, Jr., a similar stabbing took place at
Plaza Pershing near the place of the earlier incident, with the suspect in that frustrated homicide case
being a certain Benhar Isa, 'a notorious and a deadly police character" in Zamboanga City, with a long
record of arrests. In that resolution, Fiscal Murillo said the same Benhar Isa was tagged as 'also a suspect
in the stabbing of Ramon Pichel, Jr. to death and the stabbing of Pastor Henry Villagracia at the Fruit
Paradise, this City." The said resolution further states that "with regards to this incident or witnesses ever
testified for fear of possible reprisals." 27
The trial of Usman Hassan began on October 27, 1981. Benhar Isa himself was killed by a policeman on
August 28, 1981, while he (Isa) "was apparently under the influence of liquor armed with a knife (was)
molesting and extorting money from innocent civilians' and "making trouble." 28 The records of the case at
bar do not show any attempt on the part of Corporal Carpio, or any other police officer, to investigate or
question Benhar Isa in connection with the killing of Pichel, Jr. Was it fear of the notorious police character
that made the police officers disregard the possible connection between the slaying of Ramon and that of
the person (Harun Acan y Arang of the Ministry of National Defense) 29 who was allegedly stabbed by
Benhar Isa a day after the killing of Ramon Jr.? And yet questioning Isa might have provided that vital link
to the resolution of Usman's guilt or innocence. But why should the police officers investigate Isa when

Usman Hassan was already in custody and could be an available fall guy? Usman Hassan, instead, became
a victim of a grave injustice. Indeed, Usman Hassan is too poor to wage a legal fight to prove his
innocence. And he is so marginalized as to claim and deserve an honest-to-goodness, thorough, and fair
police investigation with all angles and leads pursued to their logical, if not scientific, conclusions. Sadly
circumstanced as he is, the authority of the State was too awesome for him to counteract.
The appealed decision made much ado of the admission by Usman "that he was arrested at the former
barter trade, which is a place just across the place of the stabbing at the Fruit Paradise." 30 The trial judge
found it "therefore strange that on the very evening of the stabbing incident he was still at the barter trade
area by 8:00 o'clock in the evening when he usually comes to the city proper at about 6:00 o'clock in the
morning and goes home at past 5:00 o'clock and sometimes 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon." 31 Usman's
explanation that, at around 7:00 o'clock P.M., he was waiting for transportation to take him home was
found by the trial court as 'flimsy and weak since he did not explain why he had to go home late that
evening." 32 But the whole trouble is nobody asked him. The trial judge did not propound any single
question to the accused, and only three to his mother on innocuous matters, by way of clarification, if only
to put on record what the mother and son could articulate with clarity. Taking into account their poverty
and illiteracy, the mother and son needed as much, if not more, help, than the trial judge extended to the
prosecution witnesses during their examination by asking them clarificatory and mostly leading questions.
In that sense and to that extent, the accused was disadvantaged.
A fact that looms large, though mutely to testify on the innocence of the accused but the importance of
which was brushed away by the trial judge was the presence of the accused near the scene (about 100 to
150 meters away) soon after the stabbing (he testified at around 7:00 P.M. although Police Corporal Carpio
stated it was 8:00 P.M.) where he was found sitting on his pushcart with a companion. If he were the
assailant, he would have fled. But the trial court instead indulged in conjecture, foisting the probability that
the accused 'was lulled by a false sense of security in returning to the place (of the stabbing), when no
police officers immediately responded and appeared at the scene of the crime," adding 'there are
numerous cases in the past where criminals return to the scene of their crimes, for reasons only
psychologist can explain." 33 It must have escaped the trial court's attention that Usman has no criminal
record, and, therefore, he could not be generally classed with criminals. In the second place, the trial
court's rationalization ignores the biblical truism recognized by human nature and endorsed with approval
by this Court that "(T)he wicked flee when no man pursueth but the righteous are as bold as a lion." 34
And now as a penultimate observation, we could not help but note the total absence of motive ascribed to
Usman for stabbing Ramon, a complete stranger to him. While, as a general rule, motive is not essential in
order to arrive at a conviction, because, after all, motive is a state of mind, 35 procedurally, however, for
purposes of complying with the requirement that a judgment of guilty must stem from proof beyond
reasonable doubt, the lack of motive on the part of the accused plays a pivotal role towards his acquittal.
This is especially true where there is doubt as to the Identity of the culprit 36 as when 'the Identification is
extremely tenuous," 37 as in this case.
We can not end this travail without adverting to the cavalier manner in which the trial court disregarded
the claimed young age of Usman Hassan.
The defense claims that the accused Usman Hassan is a minor, basing such claim on the
testimony of Lahunay Hassan, the mother of said accused, who declared that her son Usman
Hassan, who is one of her four (4) children, was born in the year 1967. She testified that she
was just told by a person coming from their place about the year of the birth of her son
Usman. However on cross-examination, Lahunay Hassan cannot even remember the date or
year of birth of her other children. The failure of Lahunay Hassan to remember the date or
year of birth of her children is of course understandable, considering that she is unschooled
and she belongs to a tribe that does not register births, deaths or marriages, however, it is
strange that she only took pains to find out the year of birth of her son Usman. For this
reason, the Court granted a motion of the defense on September 13, 1982, to have the
herein accused examined by a competent dentist to determine his age. However, the
findings of the dentist of Zamboanga General Hospital which is marked as Exhibit "5" shows
the following: "age cannot be determined accurately under present mouth conditions.
Approximately, he can be from 14 to 21 years of age." This simply means that the herein
accused could either be 14 years of age or 21 years of age, or any age in between those
aforestated years. From the observation of this court, the accused Usman Hassan was about
18 years of age at the time he committed this crime and this observation is based on his
personal appearance, his size and facial features and other personal characteristics, hence
he can not be classified as a youthful offender under Article. 189 of Presendential Decree No.
603, as ammended by Presedential Decree No. 1179. In the case of U.S. vs. Mallari, 29 Phil.
13 and People vs. Reyes and Panganiban, CA 48 O.G. 1022, cited in the Edition, Page 680, it
was ruled by the Supreme Court that "In cases where the age of the culprit is at issue as a
basis for claiming an exempting mitigating circumstance, it is incumbent upon the accused
to establish that circumstance ad any other elements of defense. 38
Considering that the age of the accused could exempt him from punishment or cause the suspension of his
sentence under Articles 12 and 80, respectively of the Revised Penal Code, if found guilty, more
meticulousness and care should have been demanded of medical or scientific sources, and less reliance on

the observation of the judge as had happened in this case. The preliminary findings of the dentist that the
accused could be anywhere between fourteen to twenty one years, despite the difficulty of arriving at an
accurate determination due to Hassan's mouth condition, would have placed the trial judge on notice that
there is the probability that the accused might be exempted from criminal liability due to his young age. All
the foregoing indicates that the accused had not been granted the concern and compassion with which the
poor, marginalized, and disadvantaged so critically deserve. It is when judicial and police processes and
procedures are thoughtlessly and haphazardly observed that cries of the law and justice being denied the
poor are heard. In any event, all this would not be of any moment now, considering the acquittal of the
accused herein ordered.
WHEREFORE, the decision is hereby REVERSED, and the accused Usman Hassan y Ayun is ACQUITTED of
the crime charged. His release from confinement is hereby Ordered, unless he is held for another legal
cause. With costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 148560

November 19, 2001

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury of his pen in defense of the rights of the
individual from the vast powers of the State and the inroads of societal pressure. But even as he draws a
sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on individuality beyond which the State cannot tread - asserting
that "individual spontaneity" must be allowed to flourish with very little regard to social interference - he
veritably acknowledges that the exercise of rights and liberties is imbued with a civic obligation, which
society is justified in enforcing at all cost, against those who would endeavor to withhold fulfillment. Thus
he says The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of
action of any of their number, is self-protection. The only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to self-preservation. With the end
of maintaining the integrity and cohesiveness of the body politic, it behooves the State to formulate a
system of laws that would compel obeisance to its collective wisdom and inflict punishment for nonobservance.
The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism wrought changes in the social
order, carrying with it a new formulation of fundamental rights and duties more attuned to the imperatives
of contemporary socio-political ideologies. In the process, the web of rights and State impositions became
tangled and obscured, enmeshed in threads of multiple shades and colors, the skein irregular and broken.
Antagonism, often outright collision, between the law as the expression of the will of the State, and the
zealous attempts by its members to preserve their individuality and dignity, inevitably followed. It is when
individual rights are pitted against State authority that judicial conscience is put to its severest test.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act
Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder),1 as amended by RA 7659,2 wishes to impress upon us that
the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid
from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder
Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of
vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it
abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of
which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have transgressed constitutional
boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 which are reproduced hereunder:
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business, enterprise or material
possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or
indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any
combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the
public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any
other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government
contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public office concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any
other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business
enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or
implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or

(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to

unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the
Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate
amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder
and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public
officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for
such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating
and extenuating circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be considered by the court.
The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets
including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in
favor of the State (underscoring supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to
prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish
beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy (underscoring supplied).
On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate
Informations, docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b)
Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3,
par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c) Crim. Case No. 26563, for
violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees); (d) Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim.
Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085).
On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the Ombudsman for
preliminary investigation with respect to specification "d" of the charges in the Information in Crim. Case
No. 26558; and, for reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to
give the accused an opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents necessary to prove lack of
probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds raised were only lack of preliminary investigation,
reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The purported
ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law under which they are charged were never raised in
that Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.
On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding
that "a probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest
of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the
Sandiganbayan.
On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on the ground that
the facts alleged therein did not constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was
unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one (1)
offense. On 21 June 2001 the Government filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash, and five (5) days
later or on 26 June 2001 petitioner submitted his Reply to the Opposition. On 9 July 2001 the
Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.
As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18 September 2001, the issues for
resolution in the instant petition for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague;
(b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore
violates the rights of the accused to due process; and, (c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a
malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it.
Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is predicated on the
basic principle that a legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the Constitution. 3 Courts
invariably train their sights on this fundamental rule whenever a legislative act is under a constitutional
attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional adjudication. This strong predilection for constitutionality
takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the government to encroach upon the
duties and powers of another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is based on the deference the
judicial branch accords to its coordinate branch - the legislature.
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must assume that
the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and has passed the law
with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare
of the majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental
law, courts should proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance. Every intendment
of the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last

resort. In construing therefore the provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether an
interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep the question of constitutionality.
In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon 4 we held that as long as there is some basis for the decision
of the court, the constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched and the case will be decided on
other available grounds. Yet the force of the presumption is not sufficient to catapult a fundamentally
deficient law into the safe environs of constitutionality. Of course, where the law clearly and palpably
transgresses the hallowed domain of the organic law, it must be struck down on sight lest the positive
commands of the fundamental law be unduly eroded.
Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party challenging the validity
of the statute. He must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there is indeed an infringement of the
constitution, for absent such a showing, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if
well-founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain."5 And
petitioner has miserably failed in the instant case to discharge his burden and overcome the presumption
of constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which
would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its
description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the
crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus 1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his
family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;
2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of
the following overt or criminal acts: (a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or
malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or indirectly,
any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any
person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the
office or position of the public officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of
assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by
obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form
of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise
or undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other
combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons
or special interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection
or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and
prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and,
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or
acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.
As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it
what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently
guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and more
importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood
with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or
accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts
enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law.
In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating with reasonable
certainty the various elements of the offense which petitioner is alleged to have committed:
"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby
accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a.
'ASIONG SALONGA' and a.k.a. 'JOSE VELARDE,' together with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang,
Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan
or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and
penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE
MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES,
SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL
POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, illgotten wealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION
EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR

THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts,
OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE
AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00),
MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE,
KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connection with
co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio,
AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF
ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion of the
TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (P200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated for the
province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself and/or in connivance with co-accused
Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a.
Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE DOES; (italic supplied).
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF
STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF
STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS
ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,102,965,607.50) AND MORE OR LESS
SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR
HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P744,612,450.00), RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR
LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY
EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,847,578,057.50); AND
BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN
CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY
REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P189,700,000.00) MORE OR
LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE
EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;'
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES,
KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES
AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE
MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS (P3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME
'JOSE VELARDE' AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK."
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is obviously none - that will
confuse petitioner in his defense. Although subject to proof, these factual assertions clearly show that the
elements of the crime are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the
prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is completely informed of the accusations
against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms
"combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in
Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to petitioner,
render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his
fundamental right to due process.
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely
because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them; 6
much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory
command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is not
restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute
will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or
at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in
their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, 7 unless it is evident that the legislature
intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words. 8 The intention of the lawmakers - who are,
ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is
always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted
definition of the words "combination" and "series:"

Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To combine is to bring
into such close relationship as to obscure individual characters.
Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and temporal
succession.
That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in their popular meanings
is pristinely evident from the legislative deliberations on the bill which eventually became RA 7080 or the
Plunder Law:
DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, 7 May 1991
REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say THROUGH A COMBINATION OR
SERIES OF OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF. Now when we say
combination, we actually mean to say, if there are two or more means, we mean to say that number one
and two or number one and something else are included, how about a series of the same act? For
example, through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will these be included also?
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.
REP. ISIDRO: Series.
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series.
REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that REP. GARCIA: Two.
REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not twice of one
enumeration.
REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.
REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?
REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but combination, two acts.
REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, thats it. When we say combination, we mean, two different acts. It cannot
be a repetition of the same act.
REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.
REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.
REP. GARCIA: A series.
REP. ISIDRO: Thats not series. Its a combination. Because when we say combination or series, we seem to
say that two or more, di ba?
REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very good
suggestion because if it is only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have here a combination
or series of overt or criminal acts. So x x x x
REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di....
SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term "series?"
REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.
REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two misappropriations....
REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be combination. Series.
REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?

REP. GARCIA: Yes.

REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
SEN. TANADA: Two different.
REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.
REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...
REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...
DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989
SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that sometimes "one" or maybe even "two" acts may
already result in such a big amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider deleting the words "a series of
overt or," to read, therefore: "or conspiracy COMMITTED by criminal acts such as." Remove the idea of
necessitating "a series." Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural.
SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned in this.
THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be....
SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because "a series" implies several or many; two or more.
SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x
THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular crime. But when we
say "acts of plunder" there should be, at least, two or more.
SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr. President.
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling under
different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1,
par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government under
Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under
the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation, malversation and raids
on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature
intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would have taken greater
pains in specifically providing for it in the law.
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan 9 that this term is sufficiently
defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law,
the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the
public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an
'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As commonly understood, the term
'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which the principal accused and
public officer and others conniving with him follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the
alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple accused
vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of
what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness"
doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly
stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient
definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the
statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that
which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the
statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law

enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.10 But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in
imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that
are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by
proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed against
such activities.11 With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and
free from ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys
a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and
practice.12 It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable
degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as
petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the
metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it
might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the
nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes.
Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza during the
deliberations of the Court that the allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do not justify a
facial review of its validity The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act
in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application, violates the first essential of due process of law." 13 The overbreadth doctrine, on the other
hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." 14
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of
possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe
speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a
single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed
to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack
demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." 15 The
possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the
possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester
because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting
from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be
prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot
take chances as in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They
are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the
First Amendment."16 In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,17 the Court ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth have
been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words"
and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against
ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held
that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the
challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." 18 As for
the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all
its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot
complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others." 19
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for
testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First
Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With
respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional
will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to
other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional." 20 As has been pointed
out, "vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce
facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only]
'as applied' to a particular defendant."21 Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim that this
Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they
might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. 22 It
constitutes a departure from the case and controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits
decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts. 23 But, as the U.S.
Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris24

[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these
deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The
combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the
relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of
detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding
constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong
medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort," 25 and is generally disfavored.26 In
determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been
violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged. 27
In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so
tenaciously claimed and argued at length by petitioner, is more imagined than real. Ambiguity, where none
exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts and words in the statute to furnish support to critics who cavil
at the want of scientific precision in the law. Every provision of the law should be construed in relation and
with reference to every other part. To be sure, it will take more than nitpicking to overturn the wellentrenched presumption of constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot
feign ignorance of what the Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who voted for its passage,
petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its appropriate
committees by reason of which he even registered his affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal
implications and sound constitutional anchorage.
The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan28 must be mentioned if only to illustrate and emphasize the
point that courts are loathed to declare a statute void for uncertainty unless the law itself is so imperfect
and deficient in its details, and is susceptible of no reasonable construction that will support and give it
effect. In that case, petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e), of
The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for being vague. Petitioners posited, among others, that the term
"unwarranted" is highly imprecise and elastic with no common law meaning or settled definition by prior
judicial or administrative precedents; that, for its vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e), violates due process in that it
does not give fair warning or sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Petitioners further argued that
the Information charged them with three (3) distinct offenses, to wit: (a) giving of "unwarranted" benefits
through manifest partiality; (b) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through evident bad faith; and, (c) giving
of "unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable negligence while in the discharge of their official
function and that their right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them was
violated because they were left to guess which of the three (3) offenses, if not all, they were being charged
and prosecuted.
In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
does not suffer from the constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad
faith," and "gross and inexcusable negligence" merely describe the different modes by which the offense
penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of the statute may be committed, and the use of all these phrases in the same
Information does not mean that the indictment charges three (3) distinct offenses.
The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or official support; unjustified;
unauthorized (Webster, Third International Dictionary, p. 2514); or without justification or adequate reason
(Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. US Dept. of Justice, C.D. Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and
Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 43-A 1978, Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, p. 19).
The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act consider a corrupt practice and make
unlawful the act of the public officer in:
x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence, x x x (Section 3 [e], Rep. Act 3019, as amended).
It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal provisions penalize is the act of a
public officer, in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions, in giving any private party
benefits, advantage or preference which is unjustified, unauthorized or without justification or adequate
reason, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or ambiguous in the use of the term
"unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which was understood in its
primary and general acceptation. Consequently, in that case, petitioners' objection thereto was held
inadequate to declare the section unconstitutional.
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law
circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate
acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts
showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy -

SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to
prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a
pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for
plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond
reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. 29 The use of the "reasonable
doubt" standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in the
application of criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of criminal law be not diluted by a standard of
proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our
free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his government
cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with
utmost certainty. This "reasonable doubt" standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of
constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction
except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he
is charged.30 The following exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep. Pablo Garcia on this score
during the deliberations in the floor of the House of Representatives are elucidating DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080, 9 October 1990
MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal law that what is alleged in the
information must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. If we will prove only one act and find him guilty of
the other acts enumerated in the information, does that not work against the right of the accused
especially so if the amount committed, say, by falsification is less than P100 million, but the totality of the
crime committed is P100 million since there is malversation, bribery, falsification of public document,
coercion, theft?
MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable
doubt. What is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime charged. For
example, Mr. Speaker, there is an enumeration of the things taken by the robber in the information three
pairs of pants, pieces of jewelry. These need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but these will not
prevent the conviction of a crime for which he was charged just because, say, instead of 3 pairs of
diamond earrings the prosecution proved two. Now, what is required to be proved beyond reasonable
doubt is the element of the offense.
MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the crime of plunder the totality of
the amount is very important, I feel that such a series of overt criminal acts has to be taken singly. For
instance, in the act of bribery, he was able to accumulate only P50,000 and in the crime of extortion, he
was only able to accumulate P1 million. Now, when we add the totality of the other acts as required under
this bill through the interpretation on the rule of evidence, it is just one single act, so how can we now
convict him?
MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an essential element of the crime,
there is a need to prove that element beyond reasonable doubt. For example, one essential element of the
crime is that the amount involved is P100 million. Now, in a series of defalcations and other acts of
corruption in the enumeration the total amount would be P110 or P120 million, but there are certain acts
that could not be proved, so, we will sum up the amounts involved in those transactions which were
proved. Now, if the amount involved in these transactions, proved beyond reasonable doubt, is P100
million, then there is a crime of plunder (underscoring supplied).
It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any manner refashion the standard
quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. The burden still remains with the prosecution to prove beyond
any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to constitute the crime.
The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime suffers from a
dismal misconception of the import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond
reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute
a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every
other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing
that the accused is charged in an Information for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on the
public treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by
pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they amounted to at least
P50,000,000.00.31
A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion that "pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the very acts of
accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth. Stated otherwise, such pattern arises where the
prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par. (d).

Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the predicate acts. This conclusion is consistent with reason
and common sense. There would be no other explanation for a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill gotten wealth." The prosecution is therefore not required to make a deliberate
and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily follows with the establishment of a series or
combination of the predicate acts.
Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that "pattern" is "a
very important element of the crime of plunder;" and that Sec. 4 is "two pronged, (as) it contains a rule of
evidence and a substantive element of the crime," such that without it the accused cannot be convicted of
plunder JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be convicted under the Plunder Law without
applying Section 4 on the Rule of Evidence if there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of
the acts complained of?
ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes enumerated in the Revised Penal
Code, but not plunder.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the crime are proved beyond reasonable doubt
without applying Section 4, can you not have a conviction under the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4 in convicting an accused charged for
violation of the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays down a substantive element of the law x x
xx
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of Section 4 when there is proof beyond
reasonable doubt on the acts charged constituting plunder?
ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, it contains a rule of evidence and it
contains a substantive element of the crime of plunder. So, there is no way by which we can avoid Section
4.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt insofar as the predicate crimes charged
are concerned that you do not have to go that far by applying Section 4?
ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a very important element of the crime of
plunder and that cannot be avoided by the prosecution. 32
We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and
understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not one of them.
Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal:
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder x x x x
It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for
plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in
favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is only a means to an end, an aid to
substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a conviction for plunder may be had, for what is
crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by
the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for
the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may
simply be severed from the rest of the provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of the law;
after all, the existing rules on evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080
provides for a separability clause Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to any person or
circumstance is held invalid, the remaining provisions of this Act and the application of such provisions to
other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from being declared invalid as a result of the
nullity of some of its provisions, assuming that to be the case although it is not really so, all the provisions
thereof should accordingly be treated independently of each other, especially if by doing so, the objectives
of the statute can best be achieved.

As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which
requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a
prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder
was committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of
petitioner.
In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is the reason
he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Taada made during the
deliberation on S.B. No. 733:
SENATOR TAADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to convict him would not be evidence for
each and every individual criminal act but only evidence sufficient to establish the conspiracy or scheme to
commit this crime of plunder. 33
However, Senator Taada was discussing 4 as shown by the succeeding portion of the transcript quoted
by petitioner:
SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained in Section 4, Rule of
Evidence, which, in the Gentleman's view, would provide for a speedier and faster process of attending to
this kind of cases?
SENATOR TAADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .34
Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution
need not prove each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it
proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or ciminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of
the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.
Indeed, 2 provides that Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the
crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of
participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised
Penal Code, shall be considered by the court.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions
under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree
of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent. It is true that 2 refers to "any person
who participates with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of
plunder." There is no reason to believe, however, that it does not apply as well to the public officer as
principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal
laws with what they omit, but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying
what they obviously mean."35
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been
resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Other heinous crimes are punished with death as a straight
penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to these groups of heinous crimes, this Court held in People v.
Echegaray:36
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable,
either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as
to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human being . . . . Seen in this light, the
capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or
the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death; and
drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as
murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention, where the victim is detained
for more than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were
made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and
carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are
penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject
criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself
to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of
corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and impoverished the population, the Philippine
Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and
syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the

populace. [With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its
people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat
to the very existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in
this context, no less heinous are the effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive
arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving government officials, employees or officers, that their
perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in
se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se37 and it
does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the
predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as
though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an
ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.
To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080, on
constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is now too late in the day for him to resurrect this
long dead issue, the same having been eternally consigned by People v. Echegaray38 to the archives of
jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as
a declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an
integral part of it.
Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in high places
which have shaken its very foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has become more elaborate in
the corridors of time as unscrupulous people relentlessly contrive more and more ingenious ways to bilk
the coffers of the government. Drastic and radical measures are imperative to fight the increasingly
sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and economically catastrophic looting of the national treasury.
Such is the Plunder Law, especially designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption
which, if left unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral and
institutional fiber of our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will of the legislature
to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure society against the avarice and other venalities in
public office.
These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few issues of national
importance can equal the amount of interest and passion generated by petitioner's ignominious fall from
the highest office, and his eventual prosecution and trial under a virginal statute. This continuing saga has
driven a wedge of dissension among our people that may linger for a long time. Only by responding to the
clarion call for patriotism, to rise above factionalism and prejudices, shall we emerge triumphant in the
midst of ferment.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as
amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional
is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5272

March 19, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.
Gibb & Gale, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the testimony of the
accused himself, because from the very nature of these facts and from the circumstances surrounding the
incident upon which these proceedings rest, no other evidence as to these facts was available either to the
prosecution or to the defense. We think, however, that, giving the accused the benefit of the doubt as to
the weight of the evidence touching those details of the incident as to which there can be said to be any
doubt, the following statement of the material facts disclose by the record may be taken to be
substantially correct:
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal
Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a house boy or muchacho.
"Officers' quarters No. 27" as a detached house situates some 40 meters from the nearest building, and in
August, 19087, was occupied solely as an officers' mess or club. No one slept in the house except the two
servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the door of which opened upon
a narrow porch running along the side of the building, by which communication was had with the other
part of the house. This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height. The
door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of
security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing
this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair. In the room there was
but one small window, which, like the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door and window, there
were no other openings of any kind in the room.
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received for the night, was
suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out
twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being
pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. Due to the heavy growth of vines along
the front of the porch, the room was very dark, and the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber
or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was
struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which had been placed against the door. In the
darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted by the person who had
forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable
that the chair was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden opening of the door against which it
rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at
the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and
fell down on the steps in a desperately wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who immediately
recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers who slept
in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.

There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just described,
one of which took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook; and as defendant
alleges, it was because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal
protection.
The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on friendly and amicable
terms prior to the fatal incident, had an understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock
at the door and acquiant his companion with his identity. Pascual had left the house early in the evening
and gone for a walk with his friends, Celestino Quiambao and Mariano Ibaez, servants employed at
officers' quarters No. 28, the nearest house to the mess hall. The three returned from their walk at about
10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano stopped at their room at No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No.
27. A few moments after the party separated, Celestino and Mariano heard cries for assistance and upon
returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the back steps fatally wounded in the stomach, whereupon one
of them ran back to No. 28 and called Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who immediately went to the aid of
the wounded man.
The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it under
the impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of their sleeping room,
despite defendant's warnings.
No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals suggests itself, unless it be
that the boy in a spirit of mischief was playing a trick on his Chinese roommate, and sought to frightened
him by forcing his way into the room, refusing to give his name or say who he was, in order to make Ah
Chong believe that he was being attacked by a robber.
Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military hospital, where he
died from the effects of the wound on the following day.
The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial court of
simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one day presidio mayor,
the minimum penalty prescribed by law.
At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual Gualberto, but
insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful
right of self-defense.
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that
The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:
xxx

xxx

xxx

4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following attendant
circumstances:
(1) Illegal aggression.
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle to complete
exception from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open
the door of his room had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the defendant believed him to be.
No one, under such circumstances, would doubt the right of the defendant to resist and repel such an
intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning
to desist, and his threat that he would kill the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be
questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a small room, with no means of escape, with the thief
advancing upon him despite his warnings defendant would have been wholly justified in using any
available weapon to defend himself from such an assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting for the
thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver the first blow.
But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That neither the
defendant nor his property nor any of the property under his charge was in real danger at the time when
he struck the fatal blow. That there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or "ladron" as
defendant believed he was repelling and resisting, and that there was no real "necessity" for the use of the
knife to defend his person or his property or the property under his charge.
The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally
responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from

criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of
homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed
the act. To this question we think there can be but one answer, and we hold that under such circumstances
there is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to
negligence or bad faith.
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative
a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny,
animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an
acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions
touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one
voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by
him, even though it be different from that which he intended to commit. (Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87
and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240;
Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596; Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509; Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213;
Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)
The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only question worthy of
consideration is whether malice or criminal intent is an essential element or ingredient of the crimes of
homicide and assassination as defined and penalized in the Penal Code. It has been said that since the
definitions there given of these as well as most other crimes and offense therein defined, do not
specifically and expressly declare that the acts constituting the crime or offense must be committed with
malice or with criminal intent in order that the actor may be held criminally liable, the commission of the
acts set out in the various definitions subjects the actor to the penalties described therein, unless it
appears that he is exempted from liability under one or other of the express provisions of article 8 of the
code, which treats of exemption. But while it is true that contrary to the general rule of legislative
enactment in the United States, the definitions of crimes and offenses as set out in the Penal Code rarely
contain provisions expressly declaring that malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient of the crime,
nevertheless, the general provisions of article 1 of the code clearly indicate that malice, or criminal intent
in some form, is an essential requisite of all crimes and offense therein defined, in the absence of express
provisions modifying the general rule, such as are those touching liability resulting from acts negligently or
imprudently committed, and acts done by one voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the
act committed is different from that which he intended to commit. And it is to be observed that even these
exceptions are more apparent than real, for "There is little distinction, except in degree, between a will to
do a wrongful thing and indifference whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal, and
within limits supplies the place of the affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s.
313); and, again, "There is so little difference between a disposition to do a great harm and a disposition to
do harm that one of them may very well be looked upon as the measure of the other. Since, therefore, the
guilt of a crime consists in the disposition to do harm, which the criminal shows by committing it, and since
this disposition is greater or less in proportion to the harm which is done by the crime, the consequence is
that the guilt of the crime follows the same proportion; it is greater or less according as the crime in its
own nature does greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been otherwise stated, the
thing done, having proceeded from a corrupt mid, is to be viewed the same whether the corruption was of
one particular form or another.
Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the contrary shall
appear.
An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even though
the wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to commit.
The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word "voluntary" as used in this
article, say that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act, and roundly asserts that without
intention (intention to do wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime; and that the word "voluntary"
implies and includes the words "con malicia," which were expressly set out in the definition of the word
"crime" in the code of 1822, but omitted from the code of 1870, because, as Pacheco insists, their use in
the former code was redundant, being implied and included in the word "voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo
Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)
Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be said to exempt from
criminal responsibility when the act which was actually intended to be done was in itself a lawful one, and
in the absence of negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits and recognizes in his discussion of the
provisions of this article of the code that in general without intention there can be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1,
p. 16.) And, as we have shown above, the exceptions insisted upon by Viada are more apparent than real.
Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:

In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that where there is no intention
there is no crime . . . in order to affirm, without fear of mistake, that under our code there can be no
crime if there is no act, an act which must fall within the sphere of ethics if there is no moral injury.
(Vol. 2, the Criminal Law, folio 169.)
And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for example in its sentence
of May 31, 1882, in which it made use of the following language:
It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the malice which is supposed
from the operation of the will and an intent to cause the injury which may be the object of the
crime.
And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering that, whatever may be the
civil effects of the inscription of his three sons, made by the appellant in the civil registry and in the
parochial church, there can be no crime because of the lack of the necessary element or criminal intention,
which characterizes every action or ommission punished by law; nor is he guilty of criminal negligence."
And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the following language:
. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice or their absence in the
commission of an act defined and punished by law as criminal, is not a necessary question of fact
submitted to the exclusive judgment and decision of the trial court.
That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential element of the
various crimes and misdemeanors therein defined becomes clear also from an examination of the
provisions of article 568, which are as follows:
He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice, would constitute
a grave crime, shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum degree, to
prision correccional in its minimum degrees if it shall constitute a less grave crime.
He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple imprudence or
negligence shall incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum degrees.
In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their discretion, without
being subject to the rules prescribed in article 81.
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed for the crime is equal
to or less than those contained in the first paragraph thereof, in which case the courts shall apply
the next one thereto in the degree which they may consider proper.
The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words "criminal intent," and
the direct inference from its provisions is that the commission of the acts contemplated therein, in the
absence of malice (criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any criminal liability on
the actor.
The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to approximate in meaning the
word "willful" as used in English and American statute to designate a form of criminal intent. It has been
said that while the word "willful" sometimes means little more than intentionally or designedly, yet it is
more frequently understood to extent a little further and approximate the idea of the milder kind of legal
malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent without justifiable excuse. In one case it was said to mean, as
employed in a statute in contemplation, "wantonly" or "causelessly;" in another, "without reasonable
grounds to believe the thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that ordinarily in a statute it means "not
merely `voluntarily' but with a bad purpose; in other words, corruptly." In English and the American
statutes defining crimes "malice," "malicious," "maliciously," and "malice aforethought" are words
indicating intent, more purely technical than "willful" or willfully," but "the difference between them is not
great;" the word "malice" not often being understood to require general malevolence toward a particular
individual, and signifying rather the intent from our legal justification. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1,
secs. 428 and 429, and cases cited.)
But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the definition of a crime
that it be committed "voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously" "with malice aforethought," or in one of the
various modes generally construed to imply a criminal intent, we think that reasoning from general
principles it will always be found that with the rare exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a crime
evil intent must combine with an act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his position with numerous citations from
the decided cases, thus forcely present this doctrine:
In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the rule as to the intent. In
controversies between private parties the quo animo with which a thing was done is sometimes
important, not always; but crime proceeds only from a criminal mind. So that

There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, punishment is the
sentence of wickedness, without which it can not be. And neither in philosophical speculation nor in
religious or mortal sentiment would any people in any age allow that a man should be deemed
guilty unless his mind was so. It is therefore a principle of our legal system, as probably it is of
every other, that the essence of an offense is the wrongful intent, without which it can not exists.
We find this doctrine confirmed by
Legal maxims. The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is distinct on this
subject. It consequently has supplied to us such maxims as Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea,
"the act itself does not make man guilty unless his intention were so;" Actus me incito factus non
est meus actus, "an act done by me against my will is not my act;" and others of the like sort. In
this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence differs from civil. So also
Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to the intention, we
inculpate or exculpate others or ourselves without any respect to the happiness or misery actually
produced. Let the result of an action be what it may, we hold a man guilty simply on the ground of
intention; or, on the dame ground, we hold him innocent." The calm judgment of mankind keeps
this doctrine among its jewels. In times of excitement, when vengeance takes the place of justice,
every guard around the innocent is cast down. But with the return of reason comes the public voice
that where the mind is pure, he who differs in act from his neighbors does not offend. And
In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to man, no one deems
another to deserve punishment for what he did from an upright mind, destitute of every form of
evil. And whenever a person is made to suffer a punishment which the community deems not his
due, so far from its placing an evil mark upon him, it elevates him to the seat of the martyr. Even
infancy itself spontaneously pleads the want of bad intent in justification of what has the
appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence that the plea, if its truth is credited, will be
accepted as good. Now these facts are only the voice of nature uttering one of her immutable
truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law, superior to all other doctrines, because first in nature from
which the law itself proceeds, that no man is to be punished as a criminal unless his intent is wrong.
(Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 286 to 290.)
Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from this doctrine of
abstract justice result from the adoption of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non excusat ("Ignorance
of the law excuses no man"), without which justice could not be administered in our tribunals; and
compelled also by the same doctrine of necessity, the courts have recognized the power of the legislature
to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the doing of certain acts, and to make their commission criminal
without regard to the intent of the doer. Without discussing these exceptional cases at length, it is
sufficient here to say that the courts have always held that unless the intention of the lawmaker to make
the commission of certain acts criminal without regard to the intent of the doer is clear and beyond
question the statute will not be so construed (cases cited in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes 76 and 77); and the
rule that ignorance of the law excuses no man has been said not to be a real departure from the law's
fundamental principle that crime exists only where the mind is at fault, because "the evil purpose need not
be to break the law, and if suffices if it is simply to do the thing which the law in fact forbids." (Bishop's
New Criminal Law, sec. 300, and cases cited.)
But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity therefore, requiring mistake
in fact to be dealt with otherwise that in strict accord with the principles of abstract justice. On the
contrary, the maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases
of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the
act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from
criminal liability provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; and as laid down by Baron
Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him." (Reg. vs.
Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387; P. vs. Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509;
Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625; Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S.,
28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to say, the question as to whether he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or
negligence fell into the mistake is to be determined by the circumstances as they appeared to him at the
time when the mistake was made, and the effect which the surrounding circumstances might reasonably
be expected to have on his mind, in forming the intent, criminal or other wise, upon which he acted.
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of
facts which will justify a killing or, in terms more nicely in accord with the principles on which the
rule is founded, if without fault or carelessness he does believe them he is legally guiltless of the
homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an innocent person is unfortunately
extinguished. In other words, and with reference to the right of self-defense and the not quite
harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of reason and sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that
notwithstanding some decisions apparently adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he
is justified in acting on the facts as they appear to him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is misled
concerning them, and defends himself correctly according to what he thus supposes the facts to be

the law will not punish him though they are in truth otherwise, and he was really no occassion for
the extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 305, and large array of cases there cited.)
The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application of this rule is the case
where a man, masked and disguised as a footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds up" his friends in a
spirit of mischief, and with leveled pistol demands his money or his life, but is killed by his friend under the
mistaken belief that the attack is a real one, that the pistol leveled at his head is loaded, and that his life
and property are in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. No one will doubt that if the facts were
such as the slayer believed them to be he would be innocent of the commission of any crime and wholly
exempt from criminal liability, although if he knew the real state of the facts when he took the life of his
friend he would undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of homicide or assassination. Under such
circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of the facts overcomes the presumption of malice or criminal
intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is a necessary ingredient of the "act punished by law" in cases
of homicide or assassination) overcomes at the same time the presumption established in article 1 of the
code, that the "act punished by law" was committed "voluntarily."
Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:
If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain had a felonious design
against him, and under that supposition killed him, although it should afterwards appear that there
was no such design, it will not be murder, but it will be either manslaughter or excusable homicide,
according to the degree of caution used and the probable grounds of such belief. (Charge to the
grand jury in Selfridge's case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's report of the case, p.7.)
In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:
A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him, with an outstretched
arms and a pistol in his hand, and using violent menaces against his life as he advances. Having
approached near enough in the same attitude, A, who has a club in his hand, strikes B over the
head before or at the instant the pistol is discharged; and of the wound B dies. It turns out the pistol
was loaded with powder only, and that the real design of B was only to terrify A. Will any reasonable
man say that A is more criminal that he would have been if there had been a bullet in the pistol?
Those who hold such doctrine must require that a man so attacked must, before he strikes the
assailant, stop and ascertain how the pistol is loaded a doctrine which would entirely take away
the essential right of self-defense. And when it is considered that the jury who try the cause, and
not the party killing, are to judge of the reasonable grounds of his apprehension, no danger can be
supposed to flow from this principle. (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)
To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by Viada, a few of which are
here set out in full because the facts are somewhat analogous to those in the case at bar.
QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth, at night, in company only
of his wife, without other light than reflected from the fire, and that the man with his back to the
door was attending to the fire, there suddenly entered a person whom he did not see or know, who
struck him one or two blows, producing a contusion on the shoulder, because of which he turned,
seized the person and took from his the stick with which he had undoubtedly been struck, and gave
the unknown person a blow, knocking him to the floor, and afterwards striking him another blow on
the head, leaving the unknown lying on the floor, and left the house. It turned out the unknown
person was his father-in-law, to whom he rendered assistance as soon as he learned his identity,
and who died in about six days in consequence of cerebral congestion resulting from the blow. The
accused, who confessed the facts, had always sustained pleasant relations with his father-in-law,
whom he visited during his sickness, demonstrating great grief over the occurrence. Shall he be
considered free from criminal responsibility, as having acted in self-defense, with all the
circumstances related in paragraph 4, article 8, of the Penal Code? The criminal branch of the
Audiencia of Valladolid found that he was an illegal aggressor, without sufficient provocation, and
that there did not exists rational necessity for the employment of the force used, and in accordance
with articles 419 and 87 of the Penal Code condemned him to twenty months of imprisonment, with
accessory penalty and costs. Upon appeal by the accused, he was acquitted by the supreme court,
under the following sentence: "Considering, from the facts found by the sentence to have been
proven, that the accused was surprised from behind, at night, in his house beside his wife who was
nursing her child, was attacked, struck, and beaten, without being able to distinguish with which
they might have executed their criminal intent, because of the there was no other than fire light in
the room, and considering that in such a situation and when the acts executed demonstrated that
they might endanger his existence, and possibly that of his wife and child, more especially because
his assailant was unknown, he should have defended himself, and in doing so with the same stick
with which he was attacked, he did not exceed the limits of self-defense, nor did he use means
which were not rationally necessary, particularly because the instrument with which he killed was
the one which he took from his assailant, and was capable of producing death, and in the darkness
of the house and the consteration which naturally resulted from such strong aggression, it was not
given him to known or distinguish whether there was one or more assailants, nor the arms which
they might bear, not that which they might accomplish, and considering that the lower court did not
find from the accepted facts that there existed rational necessity for the means employed, and that

it did not apply paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of supreme court
of Spain, February 28, 1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) .
QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was situated in a retired part of the
city, upon arriving at a point where there was no light, heard the voice of a man, at a distance of
some 8 paces, saying: "Face down, hand over you money!" because of which, and almost at the
same money, he fired two shots from his pistol, distinguishing immediately the voice of one of his
friends (who had before simulated a different voice) saying, "Oh! they have killed me," and
hastening to his assistance, finding the body lying upon the ground, he cried, "Miguel, Miguel,
speak, for God's sake, or I am ruined," realizing that he had been the victim of a joke, and not
receiving a reply, and observing that his friend was a corpse, he retired from the place. Shall he be
declared exempt in toto from responsibility as the author of this homicide, as having acted in just
self-defense under the circumstances defined in paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code? The criminal
branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not so find, but only found in favor of the accused two of the
requisites of said article, but not that of the reasonableness of the means employed to repel the
attack, and, therefore, condemned the accused to eight years and one day of prison mayor, etc.
The supreme court acquitted the accused on his appeal from this sentence, holding that the
accused was acting under a justifiable and excusable mistake of fact as to the identity of the person
calling to him, and that under the circumstances, the darkness and remoteness, etc., the means
employed were rational and the shooting justifiable. (Sentence supreme court, March 17, 1885.)
(Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.)
QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, at night, by a large stone
thrown against his window at this, he puts his head out of the window and inquires what is
wanted, and is answered "the delivery of all of his money, otherwise his house would be burned"
because of which, and observing in an alley adjacent to the mill four individuals, one of whom
addressed him with blasphemy, he fired his pistol at one the men, who, on the next morning was
found dead on the same spot. Shall this man be declared exempt from criminal responsibility as
having acted in just self-defense with all of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the
requisites of law? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Zaragoza finds that there existed in favor
of the accused a majority of the requisites to exempt him from criminal responsibility, but not that
of reasonable necessity for the means, employed, and condemned the accused to twelve months of
prision correctional for the homicide committed. Upon appeal, the supreme court acquitted the
condemned, finding that the accused, in firing at the malefactors, who attack his mill at night in a
remote spot by threatening robbery and incendiarism, was acting in just self-defense of his person,
property, and family. (Sentence of May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)
A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the defendant
Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced
open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his
life and of his property and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances,
as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without
malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of
self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from
criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or
recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by
him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his property
and the property under his charge.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and the
defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the costs of
both instance de oficio. So ordered.
Johnson Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.
Arellano, C.J., and Mapa, J., dissent.

Separate Opinions
TORRES, J., dissenting:
The writer, with due respect to the opinion of the majority of the court, believes that, according to the
merits of the case, the crime of homicide by reckless negligence, defined and punishes in article 568 of the
Penal Code, was committed, inasmuch as the victim was wilfully (voluntariomente) killed, and while the act
was done without malice or criminal intent it was, however, executed with real negligence, for the acts
committed by the deceased could not warrant the aggression by the defendant under the erroneous belief
on the part of the accused that the person who assaulted him was a malefactor; the defendant therefore
incurred responsibility in attacking with a knife the person who was accustomed to enter said room,
without any justifiable motive.

By reason of the nature of the crime committed, in the opinion of the undersigned the accused should be
sentenced to the penalty of one year and one month of prision correctional, to suffer the accessory
penalties provided in article 61, and to pay an indemnify of P1,000 to the heirs of the deceased, with the
costs of both instances, thereby reversing the judgment appealed from.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-47722

July 27, 1943

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendants-appellants.
Antonio Z. Oanis in his own behalf.
Maximo L. Valenzuela for appellant Galanta.
Acting Solicitor-General Ibaez and Assistant Attorney Torres for appellee.
MORAN, J.:
Charged with the crime of murder of one Serapio Tecson, the accused Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto
Galanta, chief of police of Cabanatuan and corporal of the Philippine Constabulary, respectively, were,
after due trial, found guilty by the lower court of homicide through reckless imprudence and were
sentenced each to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and six months to two years and two months
of prison correccional and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased in the amount of
P1,000. Defendants appealed separately from this judgment.
In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information
received escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive."
Captain Monsod accordingly called for his first sergeant and asked that he be given four men. Defendant
corporal Alberto Galanta, and privates Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio Serna and D. Fernandez, upon order of
their sergeant, reported at the office of the Provincial Inspector where they were shown a copy of the
above-quoted telegram and a newspaper clipping containing a picture of Balagtas. They were instructed to
arrest Balagtas and, if overpowered, to follow the instruction contained in the telegram. The same
instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise called by the Provincial Inspector. When
the chief of police was asked whether he knew one Irene, a bailarina, he answered that he knew one of
loose morals of the same name. Upon request of the Provincial Inspector, the chief of police tried to locate
some of his men to guide the constabulary soldiers in ascertaining Balagtas' whereabouts, and failing to
see anyone of them he volunteered to go with the party. The Provincial Inspector divided the party into two
groups with defendants Oanis and Galanta, and private Fernandez taking the route to Rizal street leading
to the house where Irene was supposedly living. When this group arrived at Irene's house, Oanis
approached one Brigida Mallare, who was then stripping banana stalks, and asked her where Irene's room
was. Brigida indicated the place and upon further inquiry also said that Irene was sleeping with her
paramour. Brigida trembling, immediately returned to her own room which was very near that occupied by
Irene and her paramour. Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a
man sleeping with his back towards the door where they were, simultaneously or successively fired at him
with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already
wounded, and looking at the door where the shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at him.
Shocked by the entire scene. Irene fainted; it turned out later that the person shot and killed was not the
notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's
paramour. The Provincial Inspector, informed of the killing, repaired to the scene and when he asked as to
who killed the deceased. Galanta, referring to himself and to Oanis, answered: "We two, sir." The corpse
was thereafter brought to the provincial hospital and upon autopsy by Dr. Ricardo de Castro, multiple
gunshot wounds inflicted by a .32 and a .45 caliber revolvers were found on Tecson's body which caused
his death.
These are the facts as found by the trial court and fully supported by the evidence, particularly by the
testimony of Irene Requinea. Appellants gave, however, a different version of the tragedy. According to
Appellant Galanta, when he and chief of police Oanis arrived at the house, the latter asked Brigida where
Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place, and upon further inquiry as to the whereabouts of Anselmo
Balagtas, she said that he too was sleeping in the same room. Oanis went to the room thus indicated and
upon opening the curtain covering the door, he said: "If you are Balagtas, stand up." Tecson, the supposed
Balagtas, and Irene woke up and as the former was about to sit up in bed. Oanis fired at him. Wounded,
Tecson leaned towards the door, and Oanis receded and shouted: "That is Balagtas." Galanta then fired at
Tecson.
On the other hand, Oanis testified that after he had opened the curtain covering the door and after having
said, "if you are Balagtas stand up." Galanta at once fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, while the
latter was still lying on bed, and continued firing until he had exhausted his bullets: that it was only
thereafter that he, Oanis, entered the door and upon seeing the supposed Balagtas, who was then
apparently watching and picking up something from the floor, he fired at him.
The trial court refused to believe the appellants. Their testimonies are certainly incredible not only because
they are vitiated by a natural urge to exculpate themselves of the crime, but also because they are
materially contradictory. Oasis averred that be fired at Tecson when the latter was apparently watching
somebody in an attitudes of picking up something from the floor; on the other hand, Galanta testified that
Oasis shot Tecson while the latter was about to sit up in bed immediately after he was awakened by a

noise. Galanta testified that he fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, when the latter was rushing at him.
But Oanis assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still lying on bed. It is apparent from
these contradictions that when each of the appellants tries to exculpate himself of the crime charged, he is
at once belied by the other; but their mutual incriminating averments dovetail with and corroborate
substantially, the testimony of Irene Requinea. It should be recalled that, according to Requinea, Tecson
was still sleeping in bed when he was shot to death by appellants. And this, to a certain extent, is
confirmed by both appellants themselves in their mutual recriminations. According, to Galanta, Oanis shot
Tecson when the latter was still in bed about to sit up just after he was awakened by a noise. And Oanis
assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still lying in bed. Thus corroborated, and considering
that the trial court had the opportunity to observe her demeanor on the stand, we believe and so hold that
no error was committed in accepting her testimony and in rejecting the exculpatory pretensions of the two
appellants. Furthermore, a careful examination of Irene's testimony will show not only that her version of
the tragedy is not concocted but that it contains all indicia of veracity. In her cross-examination, even
misleading questions had been put which were unsuccessful, the witness having stuck to the truth in every
detail of the occurrence. Under these circumstances, we do not feel ourselves justified in disturbing the
findings of fact made by the trial court.
The true fact, therefore, of the case is that, while Tecson was sleeping in his room with his back towards
the door, Oanis and Galanta, on sight, fired at him simultaneously or successively, believing him to be
Anselmo Balagtas but without having made previously any reasonable inquiry as to his identity. And the
question is whether or not they may, upon such fact, be held responsible for the death thus caused to
Tecson. It is contended that, as appellants acted in innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of
their official duties, both of them believing that Tecson was Balagtas, they incur no criminal liability.
Sustaining this theory in part, the lower court held and so declared them guilty of the crime of homicide
through reckless imprudence. We are of the opinion, however, that, under the circumstances of the case,
the crime committed by appellants is murder through specially mitigated by circumstances to be
mentioned below.
In support of the theory of non-liability by reasons of honest mistake of fact, appellants rely on the case of
U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488. The maxim is ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the
mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. In the Ah Chong case, defendant therein after having
gone to bed was awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called out twice, "who is there," but
received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed and called out again.,
"If you enter the room I will kill you." But at that precise moment, he was struck by a chair which had been
placed against the door and believing that he was then being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and
struck and fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be his room-mate. A common illustration of
innocent mistake of fact is the case of a man who was marked as a footpad at night and in a lonely road
held up a friend in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled, pistol demanded his money or life. He was killed
by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack was real, that the pistol leveled at his head was
loaded and that his life and property were in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. In these
instances, there is an innocent mistake of fact committed without any fault or carelessness because the
accused, having no time or opportunity to make a further inquiry, and being pressed by circumstances to
act immediately, had no alternative but to take the facts as they then appeared to him, and such facts
justified his act of killing. In the instant case, appellants, unlike the accused in the instances cited, found
no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate action. The person in the room being
then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to
themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been made,
as the victim was unarmed, according to Irene Requinea. This, indeed, is the only legitimate course of
action for appellants to follow even if the victim was really Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill
Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive only if resistance or aggression is offered
by him.
Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to
secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes,
and protect himself from bodily harm (People vs. Delima, 46 Phil, 738), yet he is never justified in using
unnecessary force or in treating him with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when the
arrest could be effected otherwise (6 C.J.S., par. 13, p. 612). The doctrine is restated in the new Rules of
Court thus: "No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person
arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention." (Rule 109, sec. 2,
par. 2). And a peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force or
violence in making an arrest (5 C.J., p. 753; U.S. vs. Mendoza, 2 Phil., 109). It may be true that Anselmo
Balagtas was a notorious criminal, a life-termer, a fugitive from justice and a menace to the peace of the
community, but these facts alone constitute no justification for killing him when in effecting his arrest, he
offers no resistance or in fact no resistance can be offered, as when he is asleep. This, in effect, is the
principle laid down, although upon different facts, in U.S. vs. Donoso (3 Phil., 234, 242).
It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal "must be taken by storm" without regard to his right to
life which he has by such notoriety already forfeited. We may approve of this standard of official conduct
where the criminal offers resistance or does something which places his captors in danger of imminent
attack. Otherwise we cannot see how, as in the present case, the mere fact of notoriety can make the life
of a criminal a mere trifle in the hands of the officers of the law. Notoriety rightly supplies a basis for
redoubled official alertness and vigilance; it never can justify precipitate action at the cost of human life.
Where, as here, the precipitate action of the appellants has cost an innocent life and there exist no

circumstances whatsoever to warrant action of such character in the mind of a reasonably prudent man,
condemnation not condonation should be the rule; otherwise we should offer a premium to crime in
the shelter of official actuation.
The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not
accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the
incident of another act performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939). In the words of Viada,
"para que se celifique un hecho de imprudencia es preciso que no haya mediado en el malicia ni intencion
alguna de daar; existiendo esa intencion, debera calificarse el hecho del delito que ha producido, por mas
que no haya sido la intencion del agente el causar un mal de tanta gravedad como el que se produjo."
(Tomo 7, Viada Codigo Penal Comentado, 5.a ed. pag. 7). And, as once held by this Court, a deliberate
intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence (People vs.
Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232; People vs. Bindor, 56 Phil., 16), and where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a
mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence (People vs.
Gona, 54 Phil., 605) to support a plea of mitigated liability.
As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with the qualifying circumstance
of alevosia. There is, however, a mitigating circumstance of weight consisting in the incomplete justifying
circumstance defined in article 11, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code. According to such legal provision, a
person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a
right or office. There are two requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one: (a)
that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the
injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the
lawful exercise of such right or office. In the instance case, only the first requisite is present appellants
have acted in the performance of a duty. The second requisite is wanting for the crime by them committed
is not the necessary consequence of a due performance of their duty. Their duty was to arrest Balagtas or
to get him dead or alive if resistance is offered by him and they are overpowered. But through impatience
or over-anxiety or in their desire to take no chances, they have exceeded in the fulfillment of such duty by
killing the person whom they believed to be Balagtas without any resistance from him and without making
any previous inquiry as to his identity. According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower
by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall, in such case, be imposed.
For all the foregoing, the judgment is modified and appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with
the mitigating circumstance above mentioned, and accordingly sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
from five (5) years of prision correctional to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of
the law, and to pay the heirs of the deceased Serapio Tecson jointly and severally an indemnity of P2,000,
with costs.
Yulo, C.J., Bocobo, Generoso and Lopez Vito, A., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 148560

November 19, 2001

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury of his pen in defense of the rights of the
individual from the vast powers of the State and the inroads of societal pressure. But even as he draws a
sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on individuality beyond which the State cannot tread - asserting
that "individual spontaneity" must be allowed to flourish with very little regard to social interference - he
veritably acknowledges that the exercise of rights and liberties is imbued with a civic obligation, which
society is justified in enforcing at all cost, against those who would endeavor to withhold fulfillment. Thus
he says The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of
action of any of their number, is self-protection. The only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to self-preservation. With the end
of maintaining the integrity and cohesiveness of the body politic, it behooves the State to formulate a
system of laws that would compel obeisance to its collective wisdom and inflict punishment for nonobservance.
The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism wrought changes in the social
order, carrying with it a new formulation of fundamental rights and duties more attuned to the imperatives
of contemporary socio-political ideologies. In the process, the web of rights and State impositions became
tangled and obscured, enmeshed in threads of multiple shades and colors, the skein irregular and broken.
Antagonism, often outright collision, between the law as the expression of the will of the State, and the
zealous attempts by its members to preserve their individuality and dignity, inevitably followed. It is when
individual rights are pitted against State authority that judicial conscience is put to its severest test.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act
Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder),1 as amended by RA 7659,2 wishes to impress upon us that
the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid
from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder
Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of
vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it
abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of
which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have transgressed constitutional
boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 which are reproduced hereunder:

Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business, enterprise or material
possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or
indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any
combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the
public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any
other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government
contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public office concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any
other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business
enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or
implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to
unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the
Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate
amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder
and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public
officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for
such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating
and extenuating circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be considered by the court.
The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets
including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in
favor of the State (underscoring supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to
prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish
beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy (underscoring supplied).
On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate
Informations, docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b)
Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3,
par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c) Crim. Case No. 26563, for
violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees); (d) Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim.
Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085).
On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the Ombudsman for
preliminary investigation with respect to specification "d" of the charges in the Information in Crim. Case
No. 26558; and, for reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to
give the accused an opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents necessary to prove lack of
probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds raised were only lack of preliminary investigation,
reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The purported
ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law under which they are charged were never raised in
that Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.
On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding
that "a probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest
of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the
Sandiganbayan.
On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on the ground that
the facts alleged therein did not constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was
unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one (1)

offense. On 21 June 2001 the Government filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash, and five (5) days
later or on 26 June 2001 petitioner submitted his Reply to the Opposition. On 9 July 2001 the
Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.
As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18 September 2001, the issues for
resolution in the instant petition for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague;
(b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore
violates the rights of the accused to due process; and, (c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a
malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it.
Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is predicated on the
basic principle that a legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the Constitution. 3 Courts
invariably train their sights on this fundamental rule whenever a legislative act is under a constitutional
attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional adjudication. This strong predilection for constitutionality
takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the government to encroach upon the
duties and powers of another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is based on the deference the
judicial branch accords to its coordinate branch - the legislature.
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must assume that
the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and has passed the law
with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare
of the majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental
law, courts should proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance. Every intendment
of the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last
resort. In construing therefore the provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether an
interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep the question of constitutionality.
In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon 4 we held that as long as there is some basis for the decision
of the court, the constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched and the case will be decided on
other available grounds. Yet the force of the presumption is not sufficient to catapult a fundamentally
deficient law into the safe environs of constitutionality. Of course, where the law clearly and palpably
transgresses the hallowed domain of the organic law, it must be struck down on sight lest the positive
commands of the fundamental law be unduly eroded.
Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party challenging the validity
of the statute. He must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there is indeed an infringement of the
constitution, for absent such a showing, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if
well-founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain."5 And
petitioner has miserably failed in the instant case to discharge his burden and overcome the presumption
of constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which
would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its
description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the
crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus 1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his
family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;
2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of
the following overt or criminal acts: (a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or
malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or indirectly,
any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any
person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the
office or position of the public officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of
assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by
obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form
of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise
or undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other
combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons
or special interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection
or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and
prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and,
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or
acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.
As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it
what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently
guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and more
importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood

with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or
accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts
enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law.
In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating with reasonable
certainty the various elements of the offense which petitioner is alleged to have committed:
"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby
accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a.
'ASIONG SALONGA' and a.k.a. 'JOSE VELARDE,' together with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang,
Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan
or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and
penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE
MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES,
SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL
POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, illgotten wealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION
EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR
THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts,
OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE
AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00),
MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE,
KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connection with
co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio,
AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF
ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion of the
TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (P200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated for the
province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself and/or in connivance with co-accused
Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a.
Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE DOES; (italic supplied).
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF
STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF
STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS
ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,102,965,607.50) AND MORE OR LESS
SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR
HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P744,612,450.00), RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR
LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY
EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,847,578,057.50); AND
BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN
CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY
REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P189,700,000.00) MORE OR
LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE
EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;'
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES,
KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES
AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE
MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS (P3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME
'JOSE VELARDE' AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK."
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is obviously none - that will
confuse petitioner in his defense. Although subject to proof, these factual assertions clearly show that the
elements of the crime are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the

prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is completely informed of the accusations
against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms
"combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in
Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to petitioner,
render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his
fundamental right to due process.
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely
because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them; 6
much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory
command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is not
restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute
will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or
at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in
their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, 7 unless it is evident that the legislature
intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words. 8 The intention of the lawmakers - who are,
ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is
always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted
definition of the words "combination" and "series:"
Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To combine is to bring
into such close relationship as to obscure individual characters.
Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and temporal
succession.
That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in their popular meanings
is pristinely evident from the legislative deliberations on the bill which eventually became RA 7080 or the
Plunder Law:
DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, 7 May 1991
REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say THROUGH A COMBINATION OR
SERIES OF OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF. Now when we say
combination, we actually mean to say, if there are two or more means, we mean to say that number one
and two or number one and something else are included, how about a series of the same act? For
example, through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will these be included also?
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.
REP. ISIDRO: Series.
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series.
REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that REP. GARCIA: Two.
REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not twice of one
enumeration.
REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.
REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?
REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but combination, two acts.
REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, thats it. When we say combination, we mean, two different acts. It cannot
be a repetition of the same act.

REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.

REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.
REP. GARCIA: A series.
REP. ISIDRO: Thats not series. Its a combination. Because when we say combination or series, we seem to
say that two or more, di ba?
REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very good
suggestion because if it is only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have here a combination
or series of overt or criminal acts. So x x x x
REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di....
SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term "series?"
REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.
REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two misappropriations....
REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be combination. Series.
REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
SEN. TANADA: Two different.
REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.
REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...
REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...
DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989
SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that sometimes "one" or maybe even "two" acts may
already result in such a big amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider deleting the words "a series of
overt or," to read, therefore: "or conspiracy COMMITTED by criminal acts such as." Remove the idea of
necessitating "a series." Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural.
SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned in this.
THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be....
SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because "a series" implies several or many; two or more.
SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x
THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular crime. But when we
say "acts of plunder" there should be, at least, two or more.
SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr. President.
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling under
different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1,
par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government under
Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under
the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation, malversation and raids
on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature

intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would have taken greater
pains in specifically providing for it in the law.
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan 9 that this term is sufficiently
defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law,
the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the
public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an
'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As commonly understood, the term
'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which the principal accused and
public officer and others conniving with him follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the
alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple accused
vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of
what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness"
doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly
stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient
definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the
statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that
which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the
statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.10 But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in
imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that
are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by
proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed against
such activities.11 With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and
free from ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys
a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and
practice.12 It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable
degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as
petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the
metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it
might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the
nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes.
Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza during the
deliberations of the Court that the allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do not justify a
facial review of its validity The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act
in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application, violates the first essential of due process of law." 13 The overbreadth doctrine, on the other
hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." 14
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of
possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe
speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a
single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed
to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack
demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." 15 The
possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the
possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester
because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting
from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be
prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot
take chances as in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They
are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief

Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the
First Amendment."16 In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,17 the Court ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth have
been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words"
and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against
ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held
that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the
challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." 18 As for
the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all
its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot
complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others." 19
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for
testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First
Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With
respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional
will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to
other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional." 20 As has been pointed
out, "vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce
facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only]
'as applied' to a particular defendant."21 Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim that this
Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they
might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. 22 It
constitutes a departure from the case and controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits
decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts. 23 But, as the U.S.
Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris24
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these
deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The
combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the
relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of
detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding
constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong
medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort," 25 and is generally disfavored.26 In
determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been
violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged. 27
In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so
tenaciously claimed and argued at length by petitioner, is more imagined than real. Ambiguity, where none
exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts and words in the statute to furnish support to critics who cavil
at the want of scientific precision in the law. Every provision of the law should be construed in relation and
with reference to every other part. To be sure, it will take more than nitpicking to overturn the wellentrenched presumption of constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot
feign ignorance of what the Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who voted for its passage,
petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its appropriate
committees by reason of which he even registered his affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal
implications and sound constitutional anchorage.
The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan28 must be mentioned if only to illustrate and emphasize the
point that courts are loathed to declare a statute void for uncertainty unless the law itself is so imperfect
and deficient in its details, and is susceptible of no reasonable construction that will support and give it
effect. In that case, petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e), of
The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for being vague. Petitioners posited, among others, that the term
"unwarranted" is highly imprecise and elastic with no common law meaning or settled definition by prior
judicial or administrative precedents; that, for its vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e), violates due process in that it
does not give fair warning or sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Petitioners further argued that
the Information charged them with three (3) distinct offenses, to wit: (a) giving of "unwarranted" benefits
through manifest partiality; (b) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through evident bad faith; and, (c) giving
of "unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable negligence while in the discharge of their official
function and that their right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them was
violated because they were left to guess which of the three (3) offenses, if not all, they were being charged
and prosecuted.
In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
does not suffer from the constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad
faith," and "gross and inexcusable negligence" merely describe the different modes by which the offense
penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of the statute may be committed, and the use of all these phrases in the same
Information does not mean that the indictment charges three (3) distinct offenses.

The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or official support; unjustified;
unauthorized (Webster, Third International Dictionary, p. 2514); or without justification or adequate reason
(Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. US Dept. of Justice, C.D. Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and
Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 43-A 1978, Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, p. 19).
The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act consider a corrupt practice and make
unlawful the act of the public officer in:
x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence, x x x (Section 3 [e], Rep. Act 3019, as amended).
It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal provisions penalize is the act of a
public officer, in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions, in giving any private party
benefits, advantage or preference which is unjustified, unauthorized or without justification or adequate
reason, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or ambiguous in the use of the term
"unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which was understood in its
primary and general acceptation. Consequently, in that case, petitioners' objection thereto was held
inadequate to declare the section unconstitutional.
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law
circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate
acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts
showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to
prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a
pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for
plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond
reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. 29 The use of the "reasonable
doubt" standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in the
application of criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of criminal law be not diluted by a standard of
proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our
free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his government
cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with
utmost certainty. This "reasonable doubt" standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of
constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction
except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he
is charged.30 The following exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep. Pablo Garcia on this score
during the deliberations in the floor of the House of Representatives are elucidating DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080, 9 October 1990
MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal law that what is alleged in the
information must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. If we will prove only one act and find him guilty of
the other acts enumerated in the information, does that not work against the right of the accused
especially so if the amount committed, say, by falsification is less than P100 million, but the totality of the
crime committed is P100 million since there is malversation, bribery, falsification of public document,
coercion, theft?
MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable
doubt. What is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime charged. For
example, Mr. Speaker, there is an enumeration of the things taken by the robber in the information three
pairs of pants, pieces of jewelry. These need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but these will not
prevent the conviction of a crime for which he was charged just because, say, instead of 3 pairs of
diamond earrings the prosecution proved two. Now, what is required to be proved beyond reasonable
doubt is the element of the offense.
MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the crime of plunder the totality of
the amount is very important, I feel that such a series of overt criminal acts has to be taken singly. For
instance, in the act of bribery, he was able to accumulate only P50,000 and in the crime of extortion, he
was only able to accumulate P1 million. Now, when we add the totality of the other acts as required under
this bill through the interpretation on the rule of evidence, it is just one single act, so how can we now
convict him?

MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an essential element of the crime,
there is a need to prove that element beyond reasonable doubt. For example, one essential element of the
crime is that the amount involved is P100 million. Now, in a series of defalcations and other acts of
corruption in the enumeration the total amount would be P110 or P120 million, but there are certain acts
that could not be proved, so, we will sum up the amounts involved in those transactions which were
proved. Now, if the amount involved in these transactions, proved beyond reasonable doubt, is P100
million, then there is a crime of plunder (underscoring supplied).
It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any manner refashion the standard
quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. The burden still remains with the prosecution to prove beyond
any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to constitute the crime.
The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime suffers from a
dismal misconception of the import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond
reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute
a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every
other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing
that the accused is charged in an Information for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on the
public treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by
pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they amounted to at least
P50,000,000.00.31
A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion that "pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the very acts of
accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth. Stated otherwise, such pattern arises where the
prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par. (d).
Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the predicate acts. This conclusion is consistent with reason
and common sense. There would be no other explanation for a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill gotten wealth." The prosecution is therefore not required to make a deliberate
and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily follows with the establishment of a series or
combination of the predicate acts.
Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that "pattern" is "a
very important element of the crime of plunder;" and that Sec. 4 is "two pronged, (as) it contains a rule of
evidence and a substantive element of the crime," such that without it the accused cannot be convicted of
plunder JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be convicted under the Plunder Law without
applying Section 4 on the Rule of Evidence if there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of
the acts complained of?
ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes enumerated in the Revised Penal
Code, but not plunder.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the crime are proved beyond reasonable doubt
without applying Section 4, can you not have a conviction under the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4 in convicting an accused charged for
violation of the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays down a substantive element of the law x x
xx
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of Section 4 when there is proof beyond
reasonable doubt on the acts charged constituting plunder?
ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, it contains a rule of evidence and it
contains a substantive element of the crime of plunder. So, there is no way by which we can avoid Section
4.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt insofar as the predicate crimes charged
are concerned that you do not have to go that far by applying Section 4?
ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a very important element of the crime of
plunder and that cannot be avoided by the prosecution. 32

We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and
understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not one of them.
Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal:
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder x x x x
It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for
plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in
favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is only a means to an end, an aid to
substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a conviction for plunder may be had, for what is
crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by
the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for
the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may
simply be severed from the rest of the provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of the law;
after all, the existing rules on evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080
provides for a separability clause Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to any person or
circumstance is held invalid, the remaining provisions of this Act and the application of such provisions to
other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from being declared invalid as a result of the
nullity of some of its provisions, assuming that to be the case although it is not really so, all the provisions
thereof should accordingly be treated independently of each other, especially if by doing so, the objectives
of the statute can best be achieved.
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which
requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a
prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder
was committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of
petitioner.
In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is the reason
he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Taada made during the
deliberation on S.B. No. 733:
SENATOR TAADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to convict him would not be evidence for
each and every individual criminal act but only evidence sufficient to establish the conspiracy or scheme to
commit this crime of plunder. 33
However, Senator Taada was discussing 4 as shown by the succeeding portion of the transcript quoted
by petitioner:
SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained in Section 4, Rule of
Evidence, which, in the Gentleman's view, would provide for a speedier and faster process of attending to
this kind of cases?
SENATOR TAADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .34
Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution
need not prove each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it
proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or ciminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of
the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.
Indeed, 2 provides that Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the
crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of
participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised
Penal Code, shall be considered by the court.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions
under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree
of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent. It is true that 2 refers to "any person
who participates with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of
plunder." There is no reason to believe, however, that it does not apply as well to the public officer as
principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal

laws with what they omit, but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying
what they obviously mean."35
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been
resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Other heinous crimes are punished with death as a straight
penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to these groups of heinous crimes, this Court held in People v.
Echegaray:36
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable,
either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as
to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human being . . . . Seen in this light, the
capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or
the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death; and
drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as
murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention, where the victim is detained
for more than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were
made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and
carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are
penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject
criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself
to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of
corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and impoverished the population, the Philippine
Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and
syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the
populace. [With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its
people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat
to the very existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in
this context, no less heinous are the effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive
arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving government officials, employees or officers, that their
perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in
se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se37 and it
does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the
predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as
though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an
ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.
To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080, on
constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is now too late in the day for him to resurrect this
long dead issue, the same having been eternally consigned by People v. Echegaray38 to the archives of
jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as
a declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an
integral part of it.
Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in high places
which have shaken its very foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has become more elaborate in
the corridors of time as unscrupulous people relentlessly contrive more and more ingenious ways to bilk
the coffers of the government. Drastic and radical measures are imperative to fight the increasingly
sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and economically catastrophic looting of the national treasury.
Such is the Plunder Law, especially designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption
which, if left unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral and
institutional fiber of our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will of the legislature
to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure society against the avarice and other venalities in
public office.
These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few issues of national
importance can equal the amount of interest and passion generated by petitioner's ignominious fall from
the highest office, and his eventual prosecution and trial under a virginal statute. This continuing saga has
driven a wedge of dissension among our people that may linger for a long time. Only by responding to the
clarion call for patriotism, to rise above factionalism and prejudices, shall we emerge triumphant in the
midst of ferment.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as
amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional
is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.