G.R. No.

131482

July 3, 2002

REGALADO P. SAMARTINO, petitioner,

vs.
LEONOR B. RAON, AGUSTIN G. CRISOSTOMO, THE
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF NOVELETA, CAVITE,
HON. MANUEL A. MAYO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 16, CAVITE CITY, HON. ROLANDO D. DIAZ,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 17, CAVITE CITY,
SHERIFF DANILO G. LAPUZ, CAVITE CITY and THE
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

2. For the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of

P5,000.00 monthly from January, 1992 up to the time he
surrenders the premises considered as damages for the
use of the subject land.
3. For the defendant to pay the plaintiffs P 10,000.00 as
and for attorneys fees with an additional P800.00 as
appearance fees.
4. To pay the plaintiffs P 100.00 as filing fee.
SO ORDERED.4

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Respondents Leonor Bernardo-Raon and Agustin G.
Crisostomo are the surviving sister and spouse,
respectively, of the late Filomena Bernardo-Crisostomo,
who passed away on May 17, 1994. Among the properties
left by the deceased was her one-half share in a parcel of
land in Noveleta, Cavite, registered under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T- 131898 in the name of co-owners
Lido Beach Corporation and Filomena Bernardo.
On January 25, 1996, respondents instituted against
petitioner Regalado P. Samartino a complaint for
ejectment, docketed as Civil Case No. 744 of the
Municipal Trial Court of Noveleta, Cavite.1 They alleged
that during the lifetime of Filomena Bernardo, she leased
her share in the property to petitioner for a period of five
years counted from 1986; that the said lease expired and
was not extended thereafter; and that petitioner refused to
vacate the property despite demands therefor.
Summons was served on Roberto Samartino, brother of
petitioner.2 At the time of service of summons at
petitioners house, he was not at home as he was then
confined at the National Bureau of Investigation Treatment
and Rehabilitation Center (NBI-TRC), Tagaytay City since
January 19, 1996, where he was undergoing treatment
and rehabilitation for drug dependency. Thus, on February
2, 1996, a liaison officer of the NBI-TRC appeared before
the trial court with a certification that petitioner will be
unable to comply with the directive to answer the
complaint within the reglementary period, inasmuch as it
will take six months for him to complete the rehabilitation
program and before he can be recommended for
discharge by the Rehabilitation Committee.3
The trial court, despite the written certification from NBITRC, granted respondents motion to declare petitioner in
default and ordered them to present evidence ex-parte.
On March 21, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment in
favor of respondents as follows:
FROM THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment
is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendant ordering the latter and other person/s claiming
rights under him:
1. To vacate immediately the land in question after the
finality of the decision.

After learning of the adverse decision against him,

petitioners counsel filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Cavite City, Branch 16, a motion to set aside judgment.
The motion was treated as an appeal and docketed as
Civil Case No. N-6281. On July 18, 1996, the RTC
affirmed the decision of the MTC.5
The aforesaid decision became final. Accordingly, the
court of origin issued on September 17, 1996 a writ of
execution.6 Petitioner was given a grace period of one
month within which to vacate the premises. His real
property situated in Noveleta, Cavite, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-283572, was levied and sold at
public auction to respondents in full satisfaction of the
monetary award.7
On November 25, 1996, petitioner filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Cavite City, a petition for relief from
judgment, docketed as Civil Case No. N-6393.8 In support
thereof, petitioner submitted an affidavit of merit,9 alleging
in fine that the parcel of land from which he was being
evicted had been sold to him by Filomena BernardoCrisostomo, as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated December 13, 1988.10
The following day, November 26, 1996, the RTC issued an
Order dismissing the petition for relief from judgment.11
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied on
December 12, 1996. A second Motion for Reconsideration
was likewise denied on January 14, 1997.12 On the same
day, a writ of demolition was issued commanding the
sheriff to remove the building and improvements made by
petitioner on the subject premises and to deliver the
possession thereof to respondents.13
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 432O2.14 On
August 29, 1997, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition.15 Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was
denied on November 14, 1997.16 Hence this petition for
review.
The petition is impressed with merit.
In actions in personam, summons on the defendant must
be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in
person, or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him.
If efforts to serve the summons personally to defendant is
impossible, service may be effected by leaving copies of

the summons at the defendants dwelling house or

residence with some person of suitable age and discretion
residing therein, or by leaving the copies at the
defendants office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof. Otherwise stated,
service of summons upon the defendant shall be by
personal service first and only when the defendant cannot
be promptly served in person will substituted service be
availed of.17
Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly
provides:
Sec. 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever
practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a
copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to
receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
Sec. 7. Substituted service. - If, for justifiable causes, the
defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as
provided in the preceding section, service may be effected
(a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion
then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at
defendants office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof.
We have long held that the impossibility of personal
service justifying availment of substituted service should
be explained in the proof of service; why efforts exerted
towards personal service failed. The pertinent facts and
circumstances attendant to the service of summons must
be stated in the proof of service or Officers Return;
otherwise, the substituted service cannot be upheld. It is
only under exceptional terms that the circumstances
warranting substituted service of summons may be proved
by evidence aliunde. It bears stressing that since service
of summons, especially for actions in personam, is
essential for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant, the resort to a substituted service must
be duly justified. Failure to do so would invalidate all
subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds.18
In this connection, Supreme Court Administrative Circular
No. 59 was issued on November 19, 1989 to stress the
importance of strict compliance with the requisites for a
valid substituted service, to wit:
Delays in court proceedings have been caused by faulty
and erroneous implementation of Section 8, Rule 14,
Rules of Court on Substituted Service of Summons.
The Trial Judges of all lower courts, as well as the Clerks
of Court in their capacity as Ex-Officio Sheriffs together
with the Deputy Sheriffs are reminded of the provision of
Section 8, Rule 14, Rules of Court on substituted service
as follows:
xxx

xxx

xxx

The manner of effecting substituted service as prescribed

in Venturanza vs. Court of Appeals, 156 SCRA 305, must
be strictly complied with, thus:
"The substituted service should be availed only when the
defendant cannot be served promptly in person.
Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating
the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the
failure of such efforts. The statement should be made in
the proof of service. This is necessary because substituted
service is in derogation of the usual method of service.
Substituted service is a method extraordinary in character,
and hence may be used only as prescribed in the
circumstances authorized by statute. Thus, the statutory
requirements of substituted service must be followed
strictly, faithfully and any substituted service other than
authorized by the statute is considered ineffective."
For immediate compliance.
In the case at bar, the sheriffs Return of Summons simply
states:
This is to certify that on this date: 26th day of January I
have caused the service of summons, together with the
attached complaint and its annexes issued in the above
entitled case upon defendant REGALADO SAMARTINO
thru ROBERTO SAMARTINO, Brother of the defendant
acknowledge receipt of said court processes by affixing
his signature at the lower left portion of the original
summons hereto attached.
WHEREFORE, the attached original summons is hereby
respectfully returned to the court of origin duly served for
information and record purposes.
Noveleta, Cavite, February 9, 1996.19
Clearly, the above return failed to show the reason why
personal service could not be made. It failed to state that
prompt and personal service on the defendant was
rendered impossible. It was not shown that efforts were
made to find the defendant personally and that said efforts
failed; hence the resort to substituted service. As stated
above, these requirements are indispensable because
substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of
service. It is an extraordinary method since it seeks to bind
the defendant to the consequences of a suit even though
notice of such action is served not upon him but upon
another whom law could only presume would notify him of
the pending proceedings. For this reason, failure to
faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the requirements of
substituted service renders said service ineffective.20
Furthermore, nowhere in the return of summons or in the
records of this case is it shown that petitioners brother, on
whom substituted service of summons was effected, was
a person of suitable age and discretion residing at
petitioners residence.

There being no valid substituted service of summons, the

trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner. It should be emphasized that the service of
summons is not only required to give the court jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant, but also to afford the
latter an opportunity to be heard on the claim made
against him. Thus, compliance with the rules regarding the
service of summons is as much an issue of due process
as of jurisdiction. The essence of due process is to be
found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and
submit any evidence one may have in support of his
defense. It is elementary that before a person can be
deprived of his property, he should first be informed of the
claim against him and the theory on which such claim is
premised.21
By reason of the ineffective service of summons, petitioner
was not duly apprised of the action against him.
Consequently, he was prevented from answering the
claims against him. He was not given a chance to be
heard on his defenses. What made matters worse was
that the trial court had actual knowledge that petitioner
was then indisposed and unable to file his answer to the
complaint, as he was then confined at the NBI-TRC. The
trial courts failure to give petitioner a reasonable
opportunity to file his answer violated his right to due
process. Perforce, the judgment rendered against
petitioner is nugatory and without effect.
The trial court should not have been too rash in declaring
petitioner in default, considering it had actual notice of
valid reasons that prevented him from answering. Wellsettled is the rule that courts should be liberal in setting
aside orders of default for default judgments are frowned
upon, unless in cases where it clearly appears that the
reopening of the case is intended for delay. The issuance
of orders of default should be the exception rather than the
rule, to be allowed only in clear cases of obstinate refusal
by the defendant to comply with the orders of the trial
court.22
Suits should as much as possible be decided on the
merits and not on technicalities. In this regard, we have
often admonished courts to be liberal in setting aside
orders of default as default judgments are frowned upon
and not looked upon with favor for they may amount to a
positive and considerable injustice to the defendant and
the possibility of such serious consequences necessitates
a careful examination of the grounds upon which the
defendant asks that it be set aside. Since rules of
procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice, it is well recognized that this Court is
empowered to suspend its operation, or except a
particular case from its operation, when the rigid
application thereof tends to frustrate rather than promote
the ends of justice. We are not unmindful of the fact that
during the pendency of the instant petition, the trial court
has rendered judgment against petitioners. However,
being the court of last resort, we deem it in the best
interest that liberality and relaxation of the Rules be
extended to petitioners by setting aside the order of
default issued by the trial court and the consequent default

judgment; otherwise, great injustice would result if

petitioners are not afforded an opportunity to prove their
claims.23
In addition, the Regional Trial Court committed reversible
error in dismissing the petition for relief from judgment for
having been filed out of time. According to the Regional
Trial Court, the petition for relief, filed on November 25,
1996, was late because petitioner had actual knowledge of
the judgment in the ejectment case since March 1996. The
period within which to file a petition for relief should have
been reckoned from the date petitioner learned of the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court. It should not have
been counted from the date of the Municipal Trial Courts
decision because, precisely, petitioner appealed the same.
It was the Regional Trial Courts decision that became final
and, hence, was the proper subject of the petition for relief
from judgment. It is axiomatic that a petition for relief is
only available against a final and executory judgment.24
Section 3, Rule 38, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that a verified petition for relief must be filed
within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the
judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside
and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or
final order has been entered or such proceeding has been
taken. It must be accompanied with affidavits showing the
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied
upon, and the facts constituting petitioners good and
substantial cause of action or defense.25
It is not clear from the records of the case at bar when
petitioner learned of the decision of the Regional Trial
Court affirming the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court.
What appears is that the said decision became final only
on August 15, 1996, and must have been entered
sometime thereafter. Hence, the petition for relief filed on
November 25, 1996 was well within the six-month period
prescribed by the Rules.
Finally, the records show that petitioner raised a
meritorious defense in his affidavit of merit. He alleged
therein that the property from which he was being ejected
had been sold to him by its registered owner. Ownership is
a valid defense in unlawful detainer cases. While
possession is the main issue in ejectment, it is also one of
the essential attributes of ownership. It follows that an
owner of real property is entitled to possession of the
same. Petitioner can, therefore, properly plead his right of
possession to defeat that of respondents. Indeed, an
owner who cannot exercise the seven "juses" or attributes
of ownership - the right to possess, to use and enjoy, to
abuse or consume, to accessories, to dispose or alienate,
to recover or vindicate and to the fruits - is a crippled
owner.26
All told, the Municipal Trial Court of Noveleta and the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite City did not have jurisdiction
over the person of petitioner. Hence, all proceedings had
as regards petitioner were null and void. Necessarily, the
enforcement of the writ of execution as well as the sale at

public auction of petitioners real property to satisfy the

void judgment must also be declared of no legal effect.
There is a real need to resolve the issue of ownership over
the premises in order to determine who, as between
petitioner and respondents, has a better right to possess
the property in dispute. This can only be done in the
proper proceeding before the trial court wherein petitioner
will be afforded every right to present evidence in his
behalf.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 43202 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. This
case is REMANDED to the Municipal Trial Court of
Noveleta, Cavite, which is directed to continue
proceedings in Civil Case No. 744 by affording petitioner
Regalado P. Samartino a chance to file his answer and
present evidence in his defense, and thereafter to hear
and decide the case. The Writ of Execution dated
September 17, 1996, the Writ of Demolition dated January
14, 1997, and the certificate of sale over Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-283572, as well as all acts and
deeds incidental to the judgment in Civil Case No. 744,
are declared NULL AND VOID.

G.R. No. 160025

April 23, 2014

G.R. No. 172216

SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD NG BAGUIO CITY,

Petitioner,
vs.
JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION,
Respondent.
x-----------------------x

JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION,

Petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE FERNANDO VIL PAMINTUAN, PRESIDING
JUDGE, BRANCH 03 REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
BAGUIO CITY, Respondent.

G.R. No. 163052

x-----------------------x

JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION,

Petitioner,
vs.
MAYOR BERNARDO M. VERGARA, CITY MAYOR OF
BAGUIO, VICE MAYOR BETTY LOURDES F. TABANDA,
VICE MAYOR OF BAGUIO, COUNCILOR BRAULIO D.
YARANON,
COUNCILOR
ELMER
O.
DATUIN,
COUNCILOR ANTONIO R. TABORA, JR., COUNCILOR
GALO D. WEYGAN, COUNCILOR EDILBERTO B.
TENEFRANCIA, COUNCILOR FEDERICO J. MANDAPAT,
JR., COUNCILOR RICHARD A. CARINO, COUNCILOR
FAUSTINO A. OLOWAN, COUNCILOR DELFIN V.
BALAJADIA, COUNCILOR RUFINO M. PANAGAN, CITY
SECRETARY RONALDO B. PEREZ, SANGGUNIANG
PANLUNGSOD NG BAGUIO, Respondents.

G.R. No. 173043

JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
vs.
CITY MAYOR BRAULIO D. YARANON, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 174879

x-----------------------x

JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION,

Petitioner,
vs.
ACTING CITY MAYOR AND FORMERLY VICE MAYOR
AND PRESIDING OFFICER OF THE SANGGUNIANG
PANLUNGSOD NG BAGUIO, REINALDO A. BAUTISTA,
JR.,
MEMBERS
OF
THE
SANGGUNIANG
PANLUNGSOD NG BAGUIO, LEONARDO B. YANGOT,
JR., ROCKY THOMAS A. BALISONG, EDILBERTO B.
TENEFRANCIA, FAUSTINO A. OLOWAN, GALO P.
WEYGAN, FEDERICO J. MANDAP AT, PERLITA L.
CHAN-RONDEZ, ANTONIO R. TABORA, JOSE M.
MOLINTAS AND RUFINO M. PANAGAN AND CITY
LEGAL OFFICER MELCHOR CARLOS R. RABANES,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 165564

x-----------------------x

JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION,

Petitioner,
vs.
CITY MAYOR BRAULIO D. YARANON, Respondent.

G.R. No. 181488

x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 164107
JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
vs.
CITY MAYOR BRAULIO D. YARANON, Respondent.

x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 172215
JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE FERNANDO VIL PAMINTUAN, PRESIDING
JUDGE OF BRANCH 3 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF BAGUIO CITY, BENEDICTO BALAJADIA,
PATERNO AQUINO, RICHARD LABERINTO, ROLANDO
ABELLERA, FERNANDO SANGALANG, ALLAN ATOS,
ANGELINO SANGALANG, CITY OF BAGUIO, AND CITY
MAYOR BRAULIO D. YARANON, Respondents.
x-----------------------x

CITY MAYOR BRAULIO D. YARANON, Petitioner,

vs.
JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION, HON.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA,
ACTING BY AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT, AND
HON. RONALDO V. PUNO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
Before this Court are nine (9) Petitions involving
essentially the same parties - officials of the City
Government of Baguio and Jadewell Parking Systems
Corporation (Jadewell). The only party here that is neither
an official of the City Government of Baguio nor an officer
of Jadewell is former Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan.

The two principal parties executed a Memorandum of

Agreement (MOA) on 26 June 2000, whereby the City of
Baguio authorized Jadewell to regulate and collect parking
fees for on-street parking in the city, as well as to
implement the installation of modern parking meters.
The legal disputes embodied in the nine Petitions began
when the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Baguio City
(Sanggunian) revoked the MOA through City Resolution
No. 037, Series of 2002 (Resolution 37), alleging
substantial breach of the MOA on the part of Jadewell.
Then Mayor Alfredo Vergara vetoed the Resolution. The
Sanggunian Panlungsod overrode the veto through an
unnumbered Resolution dated 17 April 2002. These twin
Resolutions constitute what we call here as the first act of
Rescission1 of the MOA by the city officials of Baguio.
Jadewell denied the breach and commenced an action
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio,2
questioning the validity of the MOAs revocation and the
Sanggunians capacity to pass a resolution revoking the
MOA.
There was a second act of rescission that the city officials
of Baguio performed in 2006, the circumstances of which
will be narrated later on.
While the main case was under litigation, and then under
appeal, the parties filed contempt charges against each
other. Six of these cases are part of the consolidated
Petitions before us.
These nine highly-voluminous cases, however, all boil
down essentially to just these five sets of legal questions
requiring resolution:
(a) The validity or invalidity and legal efficacy of
Saggunians two distinct acts of rescission of the MOA;
(b) The duty of a trial judge to dismiss a case assailing the
validity of the MOA and the city resolution approving it in
view of the pendency of the various petitions before this
Court;
(c) the liability of : (i) respondent city officials of Baguio, for
various counts of indirect contempt of this court, (ii) some
respondents, who are lawyers at the same time, for acts
that require the disciplinary action of disbarment, (iii)
respondent Judge Pamintuan, for taking cognizance of a
civil case allegedly in defiance of this Courts authority;
(d) the validity of the administrative suspension of one of
the respondents herein, former Mayor Braulio Yaranon, by
the Office of the President in relation to his acts of nonrecognition of the MOA; and
(e) the nullification of certain acts of officials of Baguio City
directed against Jadewell pursuant to their belief that the
latter had no authority to continue implementing the terms
of the MOA.
THE ANTECEDENT FACTS

On 1 March 1999, Jadewell proposed the privatization3 of

the administration of on-street parking in Baguio City using
Schlumbergers DG4S Pay and Display Parking Meter
(hereinafter "DG4S P&D"), which it touted as
"technologically advanced, up to the level of more
progressive countries and which would make the city as
the first and only city in the Philippines, if not in Asia, to
have metered parking as an important part of its traffic and
parking system."4
Respondent Sanggunian acted favorably on the
proposal.5 On 31 May 2000, it passed Resolution No. 159,
Series of 1999, authorizing the City Mayor of Baguio to
negotiate and enter into a Memorandum of Agreement
with Jadewell for the installation of its proposed DG4S
parking technology.6
On 16 July 1999, the City Mayor of Baguio wrote to
Jadewell, transmitting to it the finalized draft of the MOA,
with amendments emanating from his office. The City
Mayor informed Jadewell that the finalization of the MOA
would be subject to the appropriate action of the
Sanggunian and the passage of an enabling ordinance.7
On 27 March 2000, respondent Sanggunian enacted City
Ordinance No. 003, Series of 2000 (Ordinance No. 0032000) amending Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1983,
outlining the rules and policy on the privatization of the
administration of on-street parking in the city streets of
Baguio.8 For this purpose, the City of Baguio authorized
the intervention of a private operator for the regulation,
charging and collection of parking fees and the installation
of modern parking meters, among others.
On 10 April 2000, the City Legal Officer of Baguio City
advised the City Mayor that the project for the regulation of
on-street parking and installation of parking meters was
not an infrastructure. Hence, the project was not covered
by the Build-Operate-Transfer Law9 and did not require
publication of a notice for its validity.10
Nevertheless, for the sake of transparency, the City Legal
Officer recommended the publication of the appropriate
notice on the project and an invitation to bid. An invitation
to bid for the proposed regulation of on-street parking and
installation of parking meters on Baguio Citys streets was
published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on 8, 9 and 10
May 2000. Four interested bidders submitted their
proposals, but three were disqualified. The bid of Jadewell
was the only one not disqualified; hence, it was awarded
the project.11
On 26 June 2000, the MOA was finally executed between
Jadewell and the City of Baguio through its then City
Mayor, Mauricio G. Domogan for the installation,
management and operation of the DG4S P&D parking
meters.12
On 17 July 2000, the Sanggunian confirmed the MOA
through its Resolution No. 205-2000.13

On 31 August 2000, the parties executed a supplemental

MOA to include the Ganza/Burnham parking space,
owned by the Philippine Tourism Authority and managed
by the City of Baguio, in the project.14 This supplemental
agreement was neither confirmed nor ratified by the
Sanggunian.
In September of 2000, Jadewell began to mobilize and
take over the parking facilities at the Ganza/Burnham Park
area.15 Around this time, questions arose regarding the
compliance by Jadewell with the provisions of the MOA,
notably on matters such as obtaining the recommendation
from the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH) for the installation of the parking meters and the
legality of the collection of parking fees being done by its
parking attendants prior to the installation of the parking
meters at Burnham Park.16
On 20 December 2000, Jadewell wrote then Vice-Mayor
Daniel T. Farias to inform him of the progress of the
deputization by the Department of Transportation and
CommunicationsLand Transportation Office (DOTC-LTO)
of parking attendants required for the implementation of
the MOA. Jadewell explained that they were still working
on the required deputization of Jadewells parking
attendants. Nevertheless, it claimed that its parking
attendants were authorized to collect parking fees pending
the actual installation of the parking meters. It also claimed
that the parking meters had not yet been installed because
the necessary civil works were yet to be completed.17
Shortly thereafter, a case was filed by Edgar M. Avila, et
al. with the RTC-Baguio City (Branch 61), assailing
Ordinance No. 003-2000 as unconstitutional and seeking
to restrain the City Government of Baguio from
implementing the provisions of the MOA. It further alleged
that the City Government could not delegate the
designation of pay parking zones to Jadewell, that the
parking attendants deployed by Jadewell were not
deputized, and that the questioned ordinance creates
class legislation as the designated taxi and jeepney stands
were discriminatorily removed. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 4892-R.18 This was dismissed on motion
by Jadewell joined by the City Government of Baguio. The
lower court declared that Ordinance No. 003-2000 is
constitutional and that all acts emanating from it are
deemed "reasonable and non-discriminatory...having been
enacted in accordance with the powers granted to Baguio
City by law."19 Complainants Motion for Reconsideration
(MR) was denied.
On 24 August 2001, Edgar Avila, et al., filed a Rule 65
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with the
Supreme Court assailing the RTCs dismissal of their
Complaint. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 149642.
On 10 October 2001, this Court issued a Resolution
dismissing the petition of Avila, et al. for failure to state in
their petition the material dates when they received the
appealed resolution and order, and to append the original
or certified true copies of the questioned resolution and
order subject of their petition.20 There was no resolution

on the merits. The Resolution became final and executory

on 2 April 2002.21
A case was also filed by Nelia G. Cid against then Mayor
Bernardo Vergara, et al. when her vehicle was clamped,
towed away, and impounded by Jadewell after the latter
found her car to be illegally parked. She refused to pay the
corresponding fees to Jadewell and as a result, the latter
refused to release her vehicle.22 Cid filed a case for
replevin and questioned the validity of Ordinance No. 0032000 and the MOA, as well as the authority of Jadewell to
clamp down/tow away vehicles whose owners refuse to
pay parking fees. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. 5165-R and was assigned to Branch 7 of RTC-Baguio.
On 24 May 2002, an Omnibus Order was issued by this
RTC that addressed several pending incidents related to
the authority of Jadewell to clamp down/tow away
vehicles. The Omnibus Order upheld Jadewells authority
to retain the vehicle of petitioner Nelia G. Cid pending her
payment of the parking and towage fees to Jadewell, and
held that the authority of Jadewell was lawfully provided in
Ordinance No. 003-2000 and the MOA. Also, the RTCBaguio took cognizance of the ruling by this Court in G.R.
No. 149642 which, in its mistaken view, upheld the validity
of the questioned ordinance and the MOA.23
Ultimately, Jadewell was able to install no more than 14
parking meters in three (3) areas of Baguio City: six (6) on
Session Road, five (5) on Harrison Road and three (3) on
Lake Drive.24 At the time that these meters were installed,
there were already verbal complaints being raised against
Jadewell by the Sanggunian for the following alleged
violations:
a. Failure to install parking meters for each parking space
as specified in Section 3-F of Ordinance No. 003-2000;25
b. Failure to install a convenient and technologically
advanced parking device that is solar-powered and can
measure the time a vehicle stays in a parking slot;26
c. Failure to give the City of Baguio the latter's share of the
collected parking fee;27
d. Failure to post a performance bond in the amount of P1
million after its previous bond expired.28
The Sanggunian passed Resolution No. 395, Series of
2000, directing Jadewell to comply with its obligations
under the MOA for the installation of the necessary
number of parking meters.29
On 15 March 2001, Jadewell wrote to the City Mayor in
response to the mentioned Resolution, informing the said
office that the former had started operation of the off-street
parking on 2 December 2000 and of the on-street parking
on 15 December 2000.30 On 27 January 2001, Jadewell
also wrote the City Treasurer that the former had
completed installation of the parking meters.31
In response to the letter of Jadewell, the City Treasurer
demanded the remittance of Baguios share of the parking

fees collected by Jadewell since it started operations.

Jadewell responded by saying that it had complied with
this obligation.32
On 19 February 2002, the Sanggunian passed Resolution
37,33 expressing its intent to rescind the MOA with
Jadewell. The said Resolution enumerated in the
"Whereas" clauses the alleged violations of Jadewell
prompting it to rescind the MOA. It reads:
xxxx
WHEREAS, it now appears from verified facts that:
1. contrary to its commitment to install a technologically
based P & D parking system, at no cost to the City,
including "such equipment and paraphernalia to meter the
length of usage of the affected parking spaces for
purposes of payment of the parking fees", Jadewell has
installed only fourteen (14) parking meters (only 12 of
which are working) in only three (3) streets, and Jadewell
does not intend to install anymore [sic]; instead it has
resorted as a rule to an exceptional circumstance of
manual collection of parking fees by parking attendants
who, despite express provisions of the Ordinance, are not
duly deputized by the DOTC-LTO. Despite assurances to
the Honorable City Mayor that Jadewell would stop
collection of parking fees until the parking meters have
been duly installed, Jadewell continues to collect parking
fees manually by using undeputized parking attendants to
do the collection;
2. contrary to its commitment to install a technologically
based P & D parking system, at no cost to the City,
Jadewell has charged the cost of such and similar
equipment as direct costs, thus substantially eroding the
share of the City in the parking fees;
3. contrary to its obligation to post a performance bond,
Jadewell has not fully complied, and when required to
update its performance bond Jadewell refused to do so
rationalizing its non-compliance by the assertion that they
are already performing and therefore are no longer
obligated to post a performance bond;
4. contrary to its obligation to remit the share of the City
within the first ten (10) days of the following month,
Jadewell had initially resisted making payments to the City
on the pretext that the profits cannot be determined until
after the end of the fiscal year and initially failed to have
their tickets pre-numbered and registered with the Office
of the City Treasurer;
5. contrary to its promise that the City would derive
substantial revenue from the on-street pay parking
system, Jadewell has not paid a single centavo of the City
share in on-street parking operation; whatever Jadewell
has remitted to the City are properly chargeable against
the share of the City in the MOA on off-street parking (the
Burnham Parking Area near Ganza), and it appears less
than what the City is entitled thereto; and

6. contrary to its representations that the P & D System

which it proposed would eliminate fraud in the collection of
parking fees, Jadewell has perpetrated fraud on the City
by, according to the affidavit of its former bookkeeper, Mr.
Adonis Cabungan, doctoring the financial statements
before the same are submitted to City authorities.34
WHEREAS, there has been no substantial improvement of
the traffic situation in the City even with the introduction of
the P & D Parking System and thus it increasingly appears
that the system introduced by Jadewell is more for
revenue raising than for regulatory purposes. As a
consequence the legal principle applies that the collection
of taxes cannot be let to any person. In other words,
government cannot allow private persons to collect public
funds for themselves with the agreement that part thereof
or as it turned out in this case no part thereof is shared
with the City;
WHEREAS, in its financial reports to the City showing
substantial loses [sic] and in its statement to other persons
that it is losing money on the project, the kindest thing that
the City can do for Jadewell is to prevent Jadewell from
incurring anymore [sic] loses.
NOW THEREFORE, on motion of Hon. Bautista, and Hon.
Cario, seconded by Hon. Yaranon, Hon. Weygan and
Hon. Tabora, be it RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, to
rescind the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) executed
between the City of Baguio and Jadewell Parking System
Corporation dated 26 June 2000 on the basis of the
foregoing premises and exercising its rights under Section
12 of the MOA on the subject of On-Street Parking
executed between the City of Baguio and Jadewell
Parking Systems Corporation dated 26 June 2000 and,
more importantly, performing its duty to protect and
promote the general welfare of the people of Baguio City.
RESOLVED FURTHER, to direct the City Legal Officer to
cause the proper notice of rescission to Jadewell Parking
Systems Corporation forthwith and to take all appropriate
steps to implement and enforce the intent of this
Resolution.
RESOLVED FURTHERMORE, to inform all City officials
and employees and all other persons concerned to be
guided accordingly.35
On 1 March 2002, the then City Mayor of Baguio,
Bernardo M. Vergara, vetoed Resolution 37, through a
letter dated 1 March 2002 addressed to the Vice-Mayor,
as Presiding Officer of the Sanggunian, and its members.
Mayor Vergara reasoned that it was premature for the
Sangguniang Panlungsod to rescind the MOA, because
the latter provides for a minimum period of five years
before the right of rescission can be exercised; and, that
the right of Jadewell to due process was violated due to
the lack of opportunity to hear the latters side. The City
Mayor proposed a re-negotiation of the MOA with Jadewell
as a solution to the problem.36

Meanwhile, on 13 March 2002, the DOTCCordillera

Autonomous Region (DOTC-CAR) issued a cease and
desist order to Jadewell prohibiting it from clamping down
and/or towing away vehicles in Baguio City for violation of
traffic rules and regulations.37
On 17 April 2002, the Sanggunian resolved through a
Resolution of the same date, to override the veto of the
City Mayor, worded thus:
NOW THEREFORE, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (City
Council) in Regular Session assembled, by twelve
affirmative votes constituting more that [sic] a two-thirds
vote of all its Members, has resolved to override, as it
hereby overrides, the veto of His Honor, Mayor Bernardo
M. Vergara, of City Resolution Numbered 037, Series of
2002, entitled "Rescinding the Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) Executed Between the City of Baguio and Jadewell
Parking Systems Corporation Dated 26 June 2000."38
Also at this time, Braulio D. Yaranon, who was then a
member of the Sanggunian, requested a special audit
from the Commission on AuditCordillera Autonomous
Region (COA-CAR) on the operations of Jadewell as
regards the pay parking project embodied in the MOA.
On 27 May 2002, Jadewell filed with the RTC of Baguio
City a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, assailing the validity of Resolution
No. 037-2002, which rescinded the MOA between the
Sangguniang Panlungsod and Jadewell.39 The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 5285-R and was raffled off to
RTC-Baguio (Branch 61).
On 8 October 2002, the RTC Br. 61 promulgated its
Decision40 finding the Sanggunians rescission of the
MOA unlawful. The Sanggunian then filed an appeal
assailing the RTCs decision with the Court of Appeals; the
case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74756.
Meanwhile, pending resolution of CA-G.R. SP No. 74756
before the CA, the Sanggunian passed Resolution No.
089, Series of 2003. The resolution sought the assistance
of the DOTC-CAR specifically, for it to take immediate
action against the officers and personnel of Jadewell for
defying the 13 March 2002 cease-and-desist Order it
issued prohibiting the latter from clamping down and/or
towing away vehicles.41 On 27 May 2003, City Mayor
Vergara approved and signed Resolution No. 089-2003. In
response, Jadewell filed a Petition for Indirect Contempt
with the CA against Mayor Vergara, the Sanggunian and
other local government officers. The case was docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 77341. The original petition was
followed by three (3) supplemental petitions filed by
Jadewell in the same case.
On 7 July 2003, the CA rendered a Decision42 in CA G.R.
SP No. 74756, affirming the assailed Decision of the trial
court which declared as invalid the Sanggunians
rescission of the MOA. The Sanggunian filed a Motion For
Reconsideration, but this was denied by the CA through a

Resolution dated 4 September 2003.43 Aggrieved by the

denial of their appeal, the Sanggunian filed a Rule 45
Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, seeking to
reverse and set aside the 7 July 2003 Decision and its
Resolution dated 04 September 2003 of the CA. The
petition was docketed as G.R. No. 160025, the first of the
consolidated petitions herein.44
In CA-G.R. SP No. 77341, the CA dismissed in a
Decision45 promulgated on 28 July 2004 the contempt
petitions filed by Jadewell for lack of merit. The latters
Motion For Reconsideration was likewise denied by the
CA.46 Jadewell elevated the dismissal of its contempt
petitions to this Court on 8 December 2004 by filing a Rule
45 Petition for Review on Certiorari. The case was
docketed as G.R. No. 166094. This is not among the
consolidated petitions herein.
On 13 July 2003, the COA-CAR promulgated the
requested Report.47 The Reports objective was to
ascertain compliance by the contracting parties the City
of Baguio and Jadewell with Ordinance No. 003-2000
and the MOA. The COA-CAR Report has 12 findings,
essentially as follows:
1) The provisions of the MOA and its Supplement as
regards the sharing of the fees are contradicting, hence
the share of the City Government cannot be
determined;48
2) There was no proper segregation by area of the parking
fees collected, hence the proper share of Baguio City
cannot be determined;49
3) The City Government did not strictly implement the
collection of penalties arising from the late remittances of
Jadewell, hence additional revenues were not collected;50
4) The City Treasurer did not conduct an audit of the
books and accounts of Jadewell, thus the City
Governments share from parking fees cannot be
ascertained;51
5) The use of the P&D parking meters were [sic] not
maximized due to Jadewells non-compliance with
Ordinance No. 003-2000 and the MOA, resulting in the
collection of meager income from its use;52
6) The MOA does not specify the guidelines for
determining the economic viability of installing the parking
meters and the period within which to install it [sic];53
7) The Supplemental MOA was not confirmed by the City
Council of Baguio in violation of R.A. No. 7160 (the Local
Government Code);54
8) The coverage of the parking operations contained in
Annex "A" of the MOA was not confirmed by the City
Council in violation of R.A. No. 7160;55
9) The City Government failed to ensure proper
compliance by Jadewell with the MOA provisions;56

10) The pay parking project was awarded to a bidder who

did not have all the qualifications as stated in the
"Invitation to Bid" in violation of R.A. No. 7160 and Audit
Circular No. 92-386;57
11) The provisions on deputization in Ordinance No. 0032000 and the MOA are contrary to R.A. No. 4136 (the
Land Transportation and Traffic Code), thus rendering it
invalid;58
12) The monthly minimum amount to be remitted to the
City Government is doubtful due to the discrepancy in the
amounts collected and expenses for the year 1999
provided by the City Government to Jadewell as against
the amount certified by the Office of the City Architect and
Parks Superintendent-Burnham Parks Office for the City
Government overseeing the Ganza-Burnham parking
spaces.59
On 11 February 2004, after G.R. No. 160025 was filed and
pending resolution by this Court, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod adopted Resolution No. 056, Series of 2004.
The said Resolution informs the general public that
Jadewell had neither the authority nor the police power to
clamp, tow, or impound vehicles at any place in the City of
Baguio.60 Also, on the same date, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod passed Resolution No. 059, Series of 2004, in
which it made a formal demand upon Jadewell to restore
to it possession of the Ganza Parking Area.61
With these developments, Jadewell filed directly with this
Court its first indirect contempt case against Bernardo M.
Vergara (then City Mayor of Baguio), its Vice-Mayor, and
the entire City Council for enacting Resolution Nos. 056 &
059, Series of 2004 pending resolution by this Court of
G.R. 160025. The case was docketed as G.R. No.
163052.
On 23 June 2004, this Court through its First Division,
ordered G.R. No. 163052 consolidated with G.R. No.
160025.62
On 1 July 2004, then Baguio City Mayor Braulio D.
Yaranon issued Executive Order No. 001-04,63 the
decretal portion of which reads:
NOW, THEREFORE, the undersigned City Mayor,
pursuant to his authority to enforce all laws and
ordinances relative to the governance of the City, and to
issue executive orders for the faithful and appropriate
enforcement and execution of such laws and ordinances
(Sec. 455 (b) (2) and (iii), R.A. 7160) hereby affirms and
gives protection to the right of the citizenry, particularly
affected motor vehicle owners, operators, and drivers, to
refuse to submit to the enforcement of Ordinance 0032000, by the Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation, and
further to refuse to pay public revenue in the form of fees,
charges, impositions, fines, and penalties provided for in
the said ordinance, to the said entity, such acts being
patently illegal and prohibited by law; this Executive Order
shall be in force and effect until the City Council, as the

legislative arm of the City of Baguio, shall have adopted

appropriate remedial or corrective measures on the
matters and concerns specified hereinabove.
On 8 July 2004, Mayor Yaranon issued a Memorandum64
to the City Director of the Baguio City Police Department,
directing the department to stop and prevent Jadewell
from clamping, towing, and impounding vehicles; to arrest
and file criminal charges against Jadewell personnel who
would execute the proscribed acts specified in the said
Memorandum; and to confiscate the equipment used by
Jadewell to clamp, tow, or impound vehicles under the
authority of the rescinded MOA.
On 12 July 2004, Jadewell filed its second Petition for
indirect contempt again with this Court, this time against
Mayor Yaranon for having issued the above-cited Order
also for the same reasons given in its first contempt
petition with this Court. The Petition was docketed as G.R.
No. 164107.
Furthermore, on 15 July 2004, Jadewell filed an
administrative case against Mayor Yaranon before the
Office of the President (OP). Docketed as Case No. OP
04-G-294, it sought the mayors suspension and removal
from office. The case against Mayor Yaranon was for his
issuance of the following: (1) Executive Order No. 001-04
dated 1 July 2004; (2) the Memorandum dated 7 July 2004
limiting the pay parking business of Jadewell to certain
parts of Baguio City;; and (3) Memorandum dated 8 July
2004 directing the Baguio City Police Department to
prevent Jadewell from apprehending, towing and
impounding vehicles. A supplemental petition filed by
Jadewell on 19 January 2005, complaining of Executive
Order No. 005-2004, which was issued on 15 October
2004, was also included in administrative case OP 04-G294.
On the following day, 16 July 2004, Jadewell filed a
Supplemental Petition with Motion for Leave of this
Court65 in the second contempt petition before this Court,
G.R. No. 164107, alleging as a supplemental fact, Mayor
Yaranons Memorandum of 08 July 2004.
On 15 October 2004, Mayor Yaranon issued Executive
Order No. 005-2004.66 This was a cease and desist order
against Jadewell to prevent it from performing the
following acts: (1) charging and collecting from motorists,
parking fees without their consent;67 (2) seizing and
detaining vehicles of motorists who refuse to pay parking
fees to Jadewell;68 and (3) using yellow-colored heavy
wreckers or tow trucks bearing the name "City of
Baguio".69
In addition to Executive Order No. 005-2004, Mayor
Yaranon issued Executive Order No. 005-2004-A, which is
essentially a rehash of Executive Order No. 005-2004.70
On 25 October 2004, Jadewell filed a third Petition with
this Court, praying that Mayor Yaranon be cited for
contempt and that Executive Order No. 005-2004 be
nullified.71 This case was docketed as G.R. No. 165564.

On 16 November 2004, Jadewell filed a Supplemental

Petition to this Petition alleging as a supplemental ground
the issuance of Executive Order No. 005-2004-A.72

the streets and/or premises operated and/or occupied by

the respondent and to let them remain open, until further
orders of this Court; and

On 20 December 2004, Mayor Yaranon issued

Administrative Order No. 622, Series of 2004, which
declared that Jadewell exceeded its area of operations for
the administration of on-street parking and was thus
required to show lawful cause why its business permit
should not be revoked. In response to this Order, Jadewell
filed a Second Supplemental Petition for contempt against
Mayor Yaranon in G.R. No. 165564 on 25 January 2005.

(b) to require petitioner to POST a CASH BOND or a

SURETY BOND from a reputable bonding company of
indubitable solvency in the amount of ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00), with terms and
conditions to be approved by the Court, within five (5)
days from notice, otherwise, the writ of preliminary
mandatory
injunction
herein
issued
shall
AUTOMATICALLY be lifted.

On 10 January 2005, this Court through a Resolution73

ordered the consolidation of G.R. No. 160025 with G.R.
Nos. 163052, 164107, and 165564.

NOW THEREFORE, You, [City Mayor Braulio D. Yaranon],

your agents, representatives and/or any person or persons
acting upon your orders or in your place or stead, are
hereby DIRECTED to IMMEDIATELY REOPEN the streets
and/or premises operated and/or occupied by the
respondents and to let the said streets and premises
remain OPEN, until further orders from this Court.

On 17 January 2005, this Court denied Jadewells petition

in G.R. No. 166094 for failure to show any reversible error
on the part of the CA in dismissing its petition for contempt
in CA-G.R. SP No. 77341.74 Its Motion For
Reconsideration was likewise denied with finality.75
In the beginning of the year 2005, Jadewell attempted to
renew its business permit from the City of Baguio and
tendered the fees required. However, the Office of the City
Mayor refused to renew the business permit and returned
the amount tendered.76 Because of these actions of
Mayor Yaranon, Jadewell filed on 15 April 2005 its Third
Supplemental Petition in G.R. No. 164107, which had
been consolidated with G.R. Nos. 160025, 163052, and
165564. Aside from its main prayer to cite the mayor for
contempt, Jadewell also prayed that Mayor Yaranon, a
lawyer, be disbarred.77 On 25 April 2005, this Court,
through its Third Division, admitted the Third Supplemental
Petition of Jadewell.78
On 9 February 2005, this Court, in G.R. No. 160025,
issued a Writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering
Mayor Yaranon to immediately reopen the streets and
premises occupied and/or operated by Jadewell. The
Court also required Jadewell to post a cash or surety bond
in the amount of P100,000 within five days from receipt of
the order.79
The order, in part, reads:

On 8 April 2005, Mayor Yaranon issued a Memorandum80

directing Col. Isagani Nerez, Director of the Baguio City
Police District, to create a special task force to stop
Jadewell from clamping, towing, and impounding vehicles
in violation of parking rules in Baguio City; to impound the
wrecker/tow trucks used by Jadewell.
On 20 April 2005, this Court promulgated a Resolution in
G.R. No. 160025, finding Mayor Yaranon guilty of direct
and indirect contempt. He was cited for direct contempt
when it was proven that he had submitted pleadings
before this Court containing falsehoods. Mayor Yaranon
had stated in his Compliance that the streets were opened
for Jadewell to resume operations, but upon inspection
these were found to be closed.81 He was also cited for
indirect contempt, for having continuously refused to carry
out the writ issued by this Court to reopen the streets so
Jadewell could resume operations.82 This Court likewise
fined Mayor Yaranon the amount of P10,000, which he
paid. The Court further ordered the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to immediately arrest and detain Mayor
Yaranon pending his compliance with the 9 February 2005
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by this
Court, which ordered the reopening of some streets so
Jadewell could continue its operations.83

Acting on the urgent motion dated January 26, 2005 of

respondent Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation for the
issuance of a temporary mandatory/preventive order
and/or for writ of preliminary mandatory/prohibitory
injunction pending appeal in G.R. No. 160025, alleging
that the effects of the acts of City Mayor Yaranon, unless
stayed, would also make effective what the petitioner
Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Baguio failed to obtain in
the instant case, the net effect of which would not only be
grave damage and injury to the respondent but also to the
City of Baguio, the Court further Resolved:

On 10 August 2005, Benedicto Balajadia, et al. filed Civil

Case No. 6089-R against Jadewell before the RTC
Baguio City. The case was subsequently raffled to Branch
3 of the RTC presided by Judge Fernando Vil
Pamintuan.84 Balajadia, et al. sought to nullify the MOA
between Jadewell and the City Government of Baguio and
its enabling ordinance, Ordinance No. 003-2000. The
complainants also prayed for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and for a writ of preliminary
injunction against Jadewell.

(a) to ISSUE, the WRIT OF PRELIMINARY MANDATORY

INJUNCTION
prayed
for,
effective
immediately,
commanding City Mayor Yaranon to immediately reopen

On 19 April 2006, Judge Pamintuan issued an Order in

Civil Case No. 6089-R granting the prayer of complainants
Balajadia et al. for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary

Prohibitory Injunction. The injunction was meant to restrain

Jadewell from proceeding with the supervision and
collection of parking, towing, and impounding fees on the
streets of Baguio City. Further, Judge Pamintuan ordered
the holding in abeyance of the implementation of City
Ordinance No. 003-2000 and the MOA.85
On 27 April 2006, Jadewell filed with this Court a Rule 65
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus against
Judge Pamintuan86 for refusing to dismiss Civil Case No.
6089-R. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 172215. On
the same day, Jadewell filed a Petition asking this Court to
cite Judge Pamintuan for contempt. This fourth contempt
case, albeit primarily against a member of the judiciary,
was docketed as G.R. No. 172216.
On 19 June 2006, G.R. No. 172215 was ordered
consolidated with G.R. Nos. 160025, 163052, 164107, and
165564.87
On 23 June 2006, Mayor Yaranon wrote Jadewell a letter
demanding that it desist from operating the pay parking
system in Baguio City. Simultaneously, he wrote the
Sanggunian, requesting it to cancel Ordinance No. 0032000, the enabling ordinance for the MOA.
On 26 June 2006, Jadewell filed a Supplemental
Petition88 in G.R. No. 172215 complaining of Judge
Pamintuans issuance of the following Orders in Civil Case
No. 6089-R: (a) Order dated 24 April 200689 directing the
parties to file a pre-trial brief and setting the pre-trial of the
case; (b) Order dated 01 June 200690 informing Jadewell
that public respondent was not suspending the
proceedings, because he believed he was not covered by
the writ issued by this Court; (c) Order dated 14 June
200691 upholding the writ he issued in the civil case
despite his receipt of a copy of the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by this Court; and (d) Order dated 16
June 200692 directing Jadewell to comply with the writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction under pain of direct
contempt.
On the same day, 26 June 2006, the Office of the
President (OP) rendered a Decision in OP 04-G-294, the
administrative case Jadewell had filed against Mayor
Yaranon, finding him guilty of grave misconduct, abuse of
authority, and oppression. Mayor Yaranon was meted out
a penalty totalling 12 months suspension from office.93
This suspension was implemented by the Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG). Aggrieved by his
suspension, Mayor Yaranon filed his Motion For
Reconsideration, which was denied on 22 August 2006 by
the OP.
On 29 June 2006, in response to Mayor Yaranons letters
of 23 June 2006, Jadewell filed before this Court yet
another case for contempt its fifth contempt case, and
the third one specifically against Mayor Yaranon. In
addition to its prayer to cite the mayor for contempt,
Jadewell also prayed that Mayor Yaranon, a lawyer, be
disbarred.94 The case was docketed as G.R. No. 173043.

On 31 July 2006, G.R. No. 173043 was ordered

consolidated with G.R. Nos. 160025, 163052, 164107,
165564, and 172215.95 On 27 September 2006, G.R. No.
172216 was consolidated with G.R. Nos. 160025, 163052,
164107, 165564.96
On 23 August 2006, while the consolidated cases were
pending resolution before this Court, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 204, Series of 2006.
The Resolution directed the City Legal Officer to notify
Jadewell of the Baguio City Governments intention to
rescind the MOA, and to inform Jadewell to stop its
operations under the MOA 60 days after receipt of the
Notice.97
On 28 August 2006, the legal counsel for Jadewell wrote
to Baguio City Vice-Mayor Bautista, Jr., informing him that
the OP had denied the Motion for Reconsideration of
Mayor Yaranon assailing the OP resolution ordering the
latters suspension as City Mayor of Baguio City.98 The
counsel for Jadewell likewise stated in his letter that they
were aware that the Sanggunian was planning to issue a
resolution to repeal Ordinance No. 003-2000 and rescind
the MOA. The letter requested the Vice-Mayor to veto the
measure in light of the pending petitions with the Supreme
Court.99 The said counsel likewise sent a similar letter to
the Sanggunian, urging it to desist from implementing the
repeal of Ordinance No. 003-2000 and the rescission of
the MOA pending the resolution of the cases with the
Supreme Court.100
On 13 September 2006, Mayor Yaranon appealed to the
CA, in a case docketed as CA G.R. CV SP No. 96116,
praying for the lifting of the penalty of suspension meted
him in OP 04-G-294, but this appeal was denied. Mayor
Yaranon moved for reconsideration.101
On 22 September 2006, City Legal Officer Rabanes wrote
a letter to Jadewell, through its President, Mr. Rogelio Tan,
informing Jadewell of Resolution No. 204, Series of 2006,
which rescinded the MOA, and ordering it to stop
operations within 60 days from notice.102 This letter was
received on the same day it was issued;103 hence, the
60-day period lapsed on 22 November 2006. This notice,
together with the resolution, constitute the second act of
rescission of the MOA by the city officials of Baguio.
On 19 October 2006, Jadewell filed the sixth contempt
case with this Court against the acting City Mayor of
Baguio, Reinaldo A. Bautista, Jr., and the members of the
Sanggunian, including City Legal Officer Melchor Carlos
R. Rabanes, for the second act of rescission of the
MOA.104 The case was docketed as G.R. No. 174879.
On 9 October 2007, the CA dismissed Mayor Yaranons
Petition in CA G.R. CV SP No. 96116 on the ground that it
had become moot and academic due to Mayor Yaranons
failure to be re-elected in the 17 May 2007 elections.
Mayor Yaranon filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 07
November 2007, but this was also denied by the CA on 24
January 2008. Thus, on 17 March 2008, Mayor Yaranon
filed a Rule 45 Petition before this Court seeking to

reverse and set aside the CA Decision and Resolution. It

was docketed as G.R. No. 181488.
On 12 November 2008, G.R. No. 181488 was ordered
consolidated with the cases already mentioned.105
THE ISSUES
1. On G.R. No. 160025 and on the
claim in G.R. No. 174879 that the second
act of rescission was a valid act of
rescission.
Whilst the issues are spread out among the nine cases,
we have grouped these according to what are common to
the specific cases.
In our effort to simplify the issues and provide forms of
relief to the parties that are not purely academic, it is
necessary to examine the operative effects that may result
from any resolution of this Court. Such examination may
also help guide the parties in their future actions, and
perhaps the overly-litigated matters brought before us in
the consolidated petitions may finally be put to rest.
We note at the outset that on 22 November 2006, 60 days
had lapsed from receipt of the letter dated 22 September
2006, informing Jadewell of the decision of the City of
Baguio to rescind the MOA under Section 12 thereof. It
may be recalled that Section 12 requires that notice of the
intention to rescind be given 60 days prior to the effectivity
of the rescission. Jadewell has not questioned the legal
efficacy of this notice. It has brought this matter of a
second rescission to the Courts attention only as a matter
of contumacious behavior on the part of the respondents
in G.R. No. 174879, in the same way that it brought
various actions of the public respondents before the Court
in its other contempt petitions. Since the legal efficacy of
the rescission in 2006 has not been contested by Jadewell
in any of the petitions before us, we thus consider this
notice of rescission to have taken legal effect and
therefore, at the latest, the MOA between the City of
Baguio and Jadewell has ceased to legally exist as of 22
November 2006.
Parenthetically, we note that while the validity of the
second act of rescission described in G.R. No. 174879 is
not principally determinative of the respondents liability for
indirect contempt therein, a conclusion that the second act
of rescission was undertaken competently and
appropriately will to a certain degree impact our
appreciation of such possible liability. We will discuss this
issue in our subsequent discussion on the charges of
contempt.
Inasmuch as there is no longer any existing MOA, no
order of this Court can have the effect of directing the City
of Baguio to enforce any of the terms of the MOA, which
brings us to the matter of G.R. No. 160025. In whatever
direction we rule on the question of the validity of the first
act of rescission, such ruling will only have the effect of
either providing Jadewell a basis to seek damages from

the City of Baguio for the wrongful termination of the MOA,

should we find wrongful termination to have taken place,
or, deny Jadewell that right. The possible susceptibility of
the City of Baguio and its officials to an action for
damages on a finding of wrongful termination is why we do
not consider G.R. No. 160025 as having been rendered
moot by the lawful rescission of the MOA on 22 November
2006. Thus, we will proceed to rule on the issues in G.R.
No. 160025.
The fallo of the RTC Decision upheld by the CA, which
affirmance is the lis mota in G.R. No. 160025, reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered declaring both
Sangguniang Panlungsod Resolution No. 037, Series of
2002 and the April 17, 2002 Resolution overriding the
Mayors veto as NULL and VOID. The Writ of Preliminary
Injunction earlier issued by this Court is made
PERMANENT, with costs against respondents.106
The RTC did not order the respondents therein to comply
with the MOA. An order to perform a contract is not
necessarily subsumed in an order not to terminate the
same.
Contrast this legal point with the fact that the prayer of
Jadewell in its original petition asked the RTC, in relevant
part:
...that the writ of preliminary injunction be made
permanent and the writs applied for be issued against the
respondents nullifying and voiding Resolution No. 037,
series of 2002 and the resolution over-riding the veto
and instead, directing them to perform what the
memorandum of agreement requires them to do.
(Emphasis supplied)107
This latter part, which is effectively a prayer for a
permanent mandatory injunction against respondents
therein to perform the terms of the MOA, are not in the
fallo of the RTC decision. We consider therefore that the
RTC deliberately withheld granting the specific prayer to
order Baguio City to perform the MOA. No motion to
correct or clarify the said fallo having been filed by
Jadewell, the prayer to order the city officials of Baguio to
perform the MOA is hereby deemed abandoned.
We further note three things:
1. Jadewell has not questioned - in its Petition, Reply to
Comment, and Memorandum before this Court - the
implication of the RTC and CA Decisions to the effect that
the Sanggunian had the authority to perform acts of
contractual rescission on behalf of the City of Baguio when
both these courts ignored the issue raised by Jadewell in
its Petition before the RTC, and we therefore do not
consider this to be a genuine issue in this Petition before
us;
2. While the Sangguniang Panlungsod has insinuated that
there was fraud and excess of authority on the part of the

mayor in the execution108 of the MOA - because the latter

provided for a smaller sharing of "20 % from the gross
profit of the operation or 50% of the net profit whichever is
higher" instead of the intended "20% of gross
receipts,"109- petitioners in G.R. No. 160025 conceded
even at the RTC level that they are not assailing the MOA
for being defective but for having been breached in the
performance. We thus disregard all arguments in G.R. No.
160025 regarding the validity of the execution of the MOA,
for being a non-issue in this case;110
3. We also immediately set aside claims of Jadewell in its
Petition before the RTC that an alternative relief should be
provided by the courts in the form of compensation for
terminated Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) contracts under
the BOT Law (Republic Act No. 6957) as there is not the
slightest basis on record that the administration of onstreet parking can be classified as an infrastructure
contract, a basic element that must be present for any
contract to come within the terms of the BOT Law.
Having preliminarily screened out the non-issues in this
case, we proceed to examine the rulings of the courts a
quo in G.R. 160025.
The CA affirmed the RTC Decision in toto, along the
following points:
1. On the sole procedural issue. - The RTC was correct in
treating the Petition as one for permanent injunction with a
prayer for a preliminary injunction, instead of treating it by
its formal title: "Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus with a Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction." It was correct in holding that if the Petition had
been treated by its formal denomination, then it would
have been dismissed for failing to satisfy the requirement
that the act sought to be nullified was rendered in a judicial
or quasi-judicial capacity by the respondents, but then this
formal denomination could be disregarded and the nature
of the Petition should be determined by its allegations and
prayers. Since there was a prayer to permanently enjoin
respondents from enforcing the questioned resolutions,
the RTC was correct in treating it as one for permanent
injunction.
2. On the substantive issues:
a. On the lack of due process afforded Jadewell. The
RTC was correct in ruling that Jadewell was denied the
right to be heard before the Sanggunian rescinded the
MOA. There is no evidence on record that the Sanggunian
afforded Jadewell an opportunity to present its side or
refute the charges of the latters violation committed under
the MOA.111
b. On the authority of the RTC to consider the effect of
Section 9 of the MOA112 when Jadewell never raised the
matter of Section 9 in any of its pleadings. The RTC
correctly considered Jadewells letter dated 24 November
2001, addressed to the Sanggunian and offered during the
trial, which introduced the subject matter of the five (5)
year guarantee against rescission provided in Section 9 of

the MOA. The CA regarded the RTCs consideration of

said letter as judicious and added that even without it, the
MOA, and its provisions, form part of the case records.113
c. On the failure to observe the 60-day notice requirement.
The RTC correctly found that the Sanggunian cannot
validly and unilaterally rescind the MOA without observing
the provisions in Section 12 of the MOA requiring that a
60-day notice be given before rescission can take place.
To allow the Sanggunian to unilaterally rescind the MOA
without giving Jadewell an opportunity to present its side is
to render the right to rescission provided in the MOA
legally vulnerable.114
d. On the lack of substantiveness of the alleged breach of
performance of the MOA by Jadewell. The CA reviewed
the records of the case and upheld the findings of the RTC
that the violations of Jadewell were not substantial to merit
the consequence of rescission under the MOA.115
We elucidate on the arguments of the parties, the RTC,
and the CA.
In its Petition before the RTC, Jadewell argues that the
rescission of the MOA was not valid, on due process
grounds, and also because there was no substantial
breach on its part to justify a rescission of the MOA.116 It
also asserts that the Sanggunian had no authority to
rescind the MOA, because the latter was not a party
thereto.117
Jadewell sought a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent
the implementation of the questioned Resolution, and
prayed that after hearing, the preliminary injunction be
made permanent. It further prayed for the issuance of a
writ of certiorari to nullify the assailed Resolution; and for a
mandatory injunction to compel the City Government to
perform the latters obligations under the MOA.118
Jadewell alternatively invoked the provisions of Section 18
of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the
BOT Law,119 in the event the RTC would uphold the
validity of the questioned Resolution.
The trial court ruled that the rescission violated the due
process clause of the Constitution and failed to meet the
requirements for rescission under the Civil Code and the
MOA itself. In the Sanggunians Memorandum, on appeal
before the CA, the Sanggunian assigned three errors to
the Decision of the trial court: (1) the RTC ignored the
evidence on record and the requirements of Rule 65 when
it declared the subject Resolution void; (2) Jadewell was
not denied due process when the MOA was rescinded;
and (3) by ruling that the Sangguniang Panlungsod had no
right of rescission for the first 5 years of the MOA an
issue not raised in the pleadings the trial court
improperly took up the cudgels for Jadewell in the
case.120
As earlier stated, the CA upheld the RTCs Decision in
toto.

The Sanggunian filed its Motion for Reconsideration

arguing that the CA had erred as follows: (1) treating
Jadewells petition as an original action for injunction;121
(2) ruling that Jadewell was deprived of due process122
when it rescinded the MOA; and (3) finding that the MOA
stipulated for a five-year minimum guarantee against
rescission.123 This was denied, and this denial and the
CA Decision are the subjects of G. R. 160025.
2. G.R. No. 172215 Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus, filed by
Jadewell against Judge Pamintuan
for not dismissing Civil Case No. 6089-R
Jadewell directly filed the instant Rule 65 Petition for
Certiorari before this Court to nullify the denial by the trial
court of its Motion to Dismiss and its Motion for
Reconsideration of the same order,124 and for ordering
Jadewell to cease collecting parking fees, and from towing
and impounding vehicles on the streets of Baguio City. It
also seeks to nullify the proceedings in Civil Case No.
6089-R, invoking both res judicata and litis pendentia.125
It contends that, since the issue on the validity of the
questioned city ordinance and the MOA was favorably
ruled upon previously by RTC Branches 7 and 61 of
Baguio City in separate cases, Branch 3 of the same RTC
presided by Judge Pamintuan is bound by the rulings of
the other branches.126 Litis pendentia is being invoked in
relation to the petitions already before this Court.

enacting Resolution Nos. 056 & 059, Series of 2004. To

recall, Resolution No. 056, Series of 2004 informs the
general public that Jadewell had neither the authority nor
the police power to clamp, tow or impound vehicles at any
place in the City of Baguio.128 In Resolution No. 059,
Series of 2004, the City of Baguio made a formal demand
upon Jadewell to surrender the Ganza and Burnham Park
Parking Areas within thirty days. In the same Resolution,
the City of Baguio also directed the City Legal Officer to
file the appropriate legal actions necessary to recover the
said parking areas and to ask for damages against
Jadewell.129
The core issue to be resolved in this case is whether the
Sanggunian Panlungsod is guilty of indirect contempt for
enacting the above resolutions, pending resolution of G.R.
No. 160025.
b. G.R. No. 164107 This contempt petition was filed
directly with this Court against then Baguio City Mayor
Braulio D. Yaranon after he issued Executive Order No.
001-04 announcing that, as City Mayor, he would give
protection to motor vehicle owners, operators, and drivers
who would refuse to submit to the enforcement of traffic
rules by Jadewell such as by refusing to pay the parking
fees or fines the latter imposes.

Mayor Yaranon is impleaded in this case on the basis of

the order of Judge Pamintuan to the city mayor to perform
his duty to supervise the roads, streets and park of Baguio
City, in coordination with the police and the LTO during the
validity of the Writ of Injunction that Judge Pamintuan
issued.127

Yaranon also issued a Memorandum dated 8 July 2004,

ordering the arrest and filing of criminal charges against
Jadewell personnel who would clamp, tow, or impound
motor vehicles in defiance of Executive Order No. 001-04.
This was followed by a Memorandum on 8 April 2005
directing the Baguio City Police District to create a special
task force to prevent Jadewell from clamping, towing, and
impounding vehicles found to be in violation of the parking
rules in Baguio City.

The main issue to be resolved in Jadewells Petition for

certiorari is whether Judge Pamintuans rulings in Civil
Case No. 6089-R violated the res judicata/litis pendentia
doctrines.

The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether Mayor

Yaranon could be cited for contempt for the above,
pending resolution of the issue of the validity of the
rescission of the MOA in G.R. Nos. 160025 and 163052.

3. G.R. No. 181488 The

Certiorari petition filed by Yaranon
seeking to reverse Resolutions dated
9 October 2008 and 24 January 2008
in CA-G.R. SP No. 96116 which
upheld the validity of his suspension
as City Mayor of Baguio.

c. G.R. No. 165564 Jadewell filed this third contempt

petition against Mayor Yaranon for issuing Executive
Order No. 005-2004 dated 15 October 2004. The order
directs Jadewell to cease and desist from: (a) charging
and collecting parking fees on the streets of Baguio City
without the consent of the City Government;130 (b)
seizing and detaining vehicles of motorists who refuse to
pay the parking fees to Jadewell131 and (c) using yellowcolored tow trucks bearing the name "City of Baguio".132
Jadewells petition also seeks to nullify Executive Order
No. 005-2004.

Mayor Yaranons instant Petition before this Court raises

the following issues: (1) that his failed re-election bid was
not a supervening event in the final determination by the
CA of whether he was guilty of grave misconduct, abuse of
authority, and oppression; and (2) that the CA should rule
on the substantive validity of his suspension.
4. The Petitions for Contempt
a. G.R. No. 163052 This is the first contempt petition
filed by Jadewell directly with this Court against City Mayor
Vergara, the Vice Mayor, and the entire Sanggunian, for

On 16 November 2004, Jadewell filed a Supplemental

Petition. The act complained of this time was the issuance
of Executive Order No. 005-2004-A which is a mere
rehash of Executive Order No. 005-2004.133 On 25
January 2005, Jadewell filed a Second Supplemental
Petition in connection with Mayor Yaranons issuance of
Administrative Order No. 622, Series of 2004. The said
administrative order declared that Jadewell exceeded its

area of operations for the administration of on-street

parking and it required to show lawful cause why its
business permit should not be revoked.
Like in the earlier contempt petitions, Jadewell alleges that
these issuances by Mayor Yaranon are contumacious
because they were made while the main petition, G.R. No.
160025 questioning the rescission of the MOA by the
Sanggunian, is still pending resolution with this Court.
d. G.R. No. 172216 On 27 April 2006, Jadewell filed a
petition for contempt against Judge Fernando Vil
Pamintuan, Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 3 of Baguio
City, in relation to Civil Case No. 6089-R pending before
his sala.134 In the said civil case, Judge Pamintuan
issued an Order directing Jadewell to desist from the
collection of parking fees, from towing and impounding
vehicles on the streets of Baguio City and to hold in
abeyance the implementation of City Ordinance 003-2000
and the MOA. The validity of the Order of Judge
Pamintuan is the subject of a Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition, and Mandamus instituted by Jadewell in G.R.
No. 172215.
The main issue to be resolved in this case is whether
Judge Pamintuan should be cited for indirect contempt by
this Court for issuing the assailed Orders.
e. G.R. No. 173043 On 29 June 2006, Jadewell filed yet
another contempt case against Mayor Yaranon. In addition
to its prayer to cite him for contempt, Jadewell also prays
that Mayor Yaranon, as a lawyer, be disbarred.135
Jadewell instituted this fifth contempt case after it received
a letter from Mayor Yaranon demanding that it stop its
business operations in Baguio City, at the same time
directing the Sangguniang Panlungsod to cancel
Ordinance 003-2000.
The issue to be resolved in this case is whether Mayor
Yaranon was guilty of indirect contempt and professional
misconduct for the above acts pending resolution of G.R.
Nos. 160025, 163052,164107, 165564 and 172215.136
f. G.R. No. 174879 - On 19 October 2006, Jadewell filed a
contempt case against the acting City Mayor of Baguio,
Reinaldo A. Bautista, Jr., and the members of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod, including City Legal Officer
Melchor Carlos R. Rabanes, in connection with the second
act of rescission.137 Jadewell also asks that the
respondents who are lawyers, namely: Rocky Thomas A.
Balisong, Edilberto B. Tenefrancia, Faustino A. Olowan,
Federico J. Mandapat, Perlita L. Chan-Rondez, and Jose
M. Molintas, be disbarred.
These acts, in Jadewells view, are contumacious in light
of the pending G.R. No. 160025 before this Court.
OUR RULINGS
1. On G.R. No. 160025
a. On the Treatment of

Jadewells Petition as one for

Permanent Injunction.
The CA sustained the position of the Sanggunian that
certiorari could not prosper because when the latter
enacted Resolution 37, the Sanggunian was exercising its
legislative function and not its judicial or quasi-judicial
function. The writ of certiorari under Rule 65 requires: (a)
that it is directed against a tribunal, a board or an officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) that such
tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) that
there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.138
The CA nevertheless proceeded to treat the Petition as an
original action for injunction, ruling in this wise:
xxxx
Although in the trial court, Jadewell filed said petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65, it is
essentially one for Injunction under Rule 58. Said petitions
form and substance satisfied all the requirements of a civil
action for Injunction, which is the proper remedy under the
attendant circumstances.
The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very
rigid technical sense, rules of procedure are used only to
help secure, not override substantial justice. If a technical
and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim would
be defeated.
Considering the clear and patent denial of due process
committed by the Sanggunian in precipitately rescinding
the MOA and in the interest of substantial justice, WE
deem it more prudent to treat the petition filed below as an
action for Injunction under Rule 58, which is well within the
jurisdiction of the trial court. Consequently, the present
appeal shall be considered as an appeal from the
permanent injunction ordered by the trial court, which is
properly appealable to this Court, as held in Casilan vs.
Ybaez.139
xxxx
We sustain the ruling of the appellate court treating
Jadewells original action for certiorari as one for injunction
based on the allegations in the latters pleadings.
In Ramon Jimenez, Jr. v. Juan Jose Jordana,140 the issue
to be resolved was whether the nature of the action was
one for specific performance or for recovery of real
property. In determining that the case was one for the
recovery of real property, the Court characterized the suit
on the basis of the allegations in the Complaint. We
restated the rule that the nature of an action is determined
by the material averments in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought. In the recent case of Reyes
v. Alsons Development and Investment Corporation,141
we likewise ruled that the nature of an action is
determined by the allegations in the pleadings.

In Lee, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,142 the controversy to be

resolved was whether the appeal filed by the petitioner
was one under Rule 65 or Rule 42. The determination of
the issue was crucial, because the appellate court had
dismissed the appeal of the petitioner, saying that the
wrong mode of appeal had been used. The CA had ruled
that petitioner should have filed a certiorari petition under
Rule 65 instead of a petition under Rule 42 to appeal
the assailed decision rendered by the RTC in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction.
We held:
Our perusal of the petition filed before the Court of
Appeals clearly shows that it is a petition for review under
Rule 42, and not a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65. We note that in the Court of Appeals petition,
under the heading "Nature of the Petition," petitioner
stated that it was a "petition for review on certiorari to set
aside, invalidate and reverse the Decision dated
December 14, 2001 of public respondent Judge Victor T.
Llamas, Jr." Also, the reversal sought was premised on the
ground that the decision was issued in gross error. The
statement under the heading "Nature of the Petition" that
the trial courts decisions were issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and even the
caption impleading the lower courts, would not
automatically bring the petition within the coverage of Rule
65. It is hornbook doctrine that it is not the caption of the
pleading but the allegations therein that determine the
nature of the action. (Emphasis supplied)

preliminary distinction in order to find out whether the SEC

had the jurisdiction to prevent, on a permanent basis, the
commission of certain acts by the respondents. Thus, the
necessity to make the distinction between injunction as a
provisional remedy and injunction as a main case. It found
guidance from Garayblas v. Atienza, Jr.,145 and quoting
from the latter:
Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby
a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act.
It may be the main action or merely a provisional remedy
for and as an incident in the main action. The Court has
distinguished the main action for injunction from the
provisional or ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction,
thus:
The main action for injunction is distinct from the
provisional or ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction
which cannot exist except only as part or an incident of an
independent action or proceeding. As a matter of course,
in an action for injunction, the auxiliary remedy of
preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory,
may issue. Under the law, the main action for injunction
seeks a judgment embodying a final injunction which is
distinct from, and should not be confused with, the
provisional remedy of preliminary injunction, the sole
object of which is to preserve the status quo until the
merits can be heard. A preliminary injunction is granted at
any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment
or final order. It persists until it is dissolved or until the
termination of the action without the court issuing a final
injunction.

In the original action filed by Jadewell before the RTC of

Baguio City, although the action was clearly denominated
as a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
against the Sangguniang Panlungsod, the allegations
actually supported an action for injunction under Rule 58
of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure. As can be
gleaned from its allegations and especially in its prayers,
Jadewell filed the case with the trial court with the ultimate
end of restraining the implementation of Resolution No.
037, Series of 2002.

We, therefore, rule that the CA did not commit any error in
treating Jadewells Petition for Certiorari as an original
action for injunction.

We agree with the CA when it ruled that Jadewell sought

permanent injunction aside from the auxiliary remedy of
preliminary injunction, thus:

In the instant case, evidence on record does not show that

before the Sanggunian passed the disputed Resolution it
gave Jadewell an opportunity to present its side. Neither
did the Sanggunian convene an investigatory body to
inquire into Jadewells alleged violations nor at least invite
Jadewell to a conference to discuss the alleged violations,
if only to give Jadewell the chance to refute any evidence
gathered by it against the latter. As it is, the Sanggunian
arrogated upon itself the role of a prosecutor, judge and
executioner in rescinding the MOA, all in clear violation of
Jadewells constitutionally embedded right to due
process.146

An action for injunction is a recognized remedy in this

jurisdiction. It is a suit for the purpose of enjoining the
defendant, perpetually or for a particular time, from
committing or continuing to commit a specific act, or
compelling the defendant to continue performing a
particular act. It has an independent existence. The action
for injunction is distinct from the ancillary remedy of
preliminary injunction, which cannot exist except only as
part or an incident of an independent action or
proceeding.143 xxxx...
In Garcia v. Adeva,144 this Court had the opportunity to
clarify that while injunction can be a provisional remedy, it
can also be a main case. The Court had to make this

b. On the denial of due process.

The second issue in this Petition is the correctness of the
CAs ruling that Jadewell was deprived of due process
when the Sangguniang Panlungsod rescinded the MOA.
The findings of the CA are as follows:

x x x.
Both courts held that Jadewell was denied due process.
When the denial of due process argument is raised, it is
directed primarily against the exercise of governmental

authority that "deprives life, liberty and property" without

observance what is, in the circumstances, the applicable
standards of "due process." It is not an argument that is
relevant in situations of contractual breach between two
purely private entities, nor is it available against the
government when the latter is not discharging a
governmental function, but merely pursuing a purely
commercial activity in a proprietary capacity. In order to
consider the due process argument, this Court must first
determine whether the MOA was entered into by the City
of Baguio in a governmental capacity, or in a purely
proprietary capacity.
The regulation of on-street and off-street parking is a
governmental function that can be exercised by local
governments. It is important to understand the objective of
the Baguio City Government in: (1) privatizing the
administration of on-street and off-street parking; and (2)
its execution of a MOA with Jadewell. This can be gleaned
from the Explanatory Note and other provisions of the
agreement, to wit:
The City of Baguio has earned the reputation of the
CLEANEST AND GREENEST HIGHLY URBANIZED CITY
for the previous years. This has become possible due to
the collective effort of both the Citizens of Baguio and the
City Government. However, the increase in population,
volume of vehicles and the absence of a regulatory
measure to address this concern gradually tainted what
used to be a reputation we were proud of.
The ever increasing problems, specifically those relevant
to the Traffic situation is at this point the biggest
contributor to environmental degradation. Other Salient
points we must consider relevant to this matter are the
problems on OBSTRUCTION AND DOUBLE PARKING
which are very rampant. We further add to these the
problems on DISORGANIZED PARKING, LACK OF
DEPUTIZED AGENTS to monitor, supervise and enforce
traffic rules and regulations.
At this point in time, we feel the immediate need of
focusing on these problems. There is an urgent need to
adopt measures that would alleviate these matters. This
we recommend that PARKING SPACES should be
REGULATED in such a manner that it would bring
advantage both to the City Government and the Citizens
of Baguio. We further propose the collection of
REGULATORY FEES that would be used in maintaining
our roads and to hire people that would de deputized to
help ease the problems as stated above.
Finally, we believe that our roads are beyond the
Commerce of Man. To convert our roads into PAY
PARKING SPACES, would be violative of this principle.
However to REGULATE its use and its eventual effect
would redound to the GENERAL WELFARE will be an
appreciated gesture to help preserve our image as the
CLEANEST AND GREENEST HIGHLY URBANIZED
CITY.
xxxx

SECTION 4. Parking spaces. A parking place may be

divided into parking spaces and for the purposes of this
Ordinance, each space or for a number of spaces as
determined by the private parking operator in consultation
with the concerned Official of the City of Baguio.
xxxx
SECTION 5. Prohibitions against parking outside the
parking spaces. No spaces shall park any motor vehicle
on the sidewalk or cause or permit any motor vehicle to
wait to any road or length of road on which in any place in
which or adjacent to or in close proximity to which there is
a parking place.
xxxx
SECTION 7. Payment of Prescribed Charges. (1) No
person shall park any motor vehicle in a parking place or
parking space during the times specified in this Ordinance
without paying the prescribed charge for the required
parking period; (2) The prescribed charge payable in
respect to the parking of a motor vehicle in a parking
space shall be paid by the insertion into the parking meter
provided for that parking space a coin/coins of Philippine
Currency or by using cards in order to obtain the payment
ticket to evidence the payment of the prescribed charge;
(3) The payment ticket shall be displayed at a conspicuous
part of a motor vehicle in a parking place or parking space;
(4) The payment ticket shall be valid to be used on any
parking space within the authorized period indicated in the
payment ticket.
xxxx
SECTION 22. Rules. The Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) to be entered into by the City Mayor shall be
governed by this Ordinance.
From the above, the following are clear: (1) that the City of
Baguio decided on the privatization of the administration of
parking for environmental and peace and safety reasons,
both of which are within its powers under Section 458(A)
(5)(v) and (vi) of the Local Government Code; and (2) that
the terms of agreement between the City of Baguio and
Jadewell involve the delegation of governmental functions
in terms of regulating the designation and use of parking
spaces as well as the collection of fees for such use.
These are indicators that any privatization contract
pursuant to the above Resolution takes the essential
character of a franchise because what is being privatized
is a government-monopolized function.
It would thus be relevant to ask if there is a provision in the
applicable laws or the franchise (MOA) that grants the City
of Baguio the right to revoke the latter either at will, or
upon the satisfaction of certain conditions, such that
ordinary due process protection can be considered to
have been waived by the franchisee. We must caution that
when we refer to revocation at will here, we are referring

to the revocation
obligations.147

of

resolutory,

not

suspensive,

We have looked closely at Resolution No. 003-2000 and

the MOA and have additionally reflected on the applicable
provision under the Civil Code. We have come to the
conclusion that:
(a) There is only one provision that allows for unilateral
revocation of the MOA, which can be found in Section 9
thereof:
9. Minimum Guaranty The FIRST PARTY guaranties
(sic) a minimum period of five (5) years against rescission;
provided that after such period, the parties may agree to
increase to a reasonable rate the parking fees and the
share of the city from the parking fees collected as
provided for in the guidelines, (Annex "B");
(b) This Section 9 requires that five years must have
lapsed presumably from the date of execution of the
MOA before the unilateral right to revoke the MOA can
be exercised;
(c) Therefore, before the five year period has lapsed, the
right to revoke the MOA arises only under Article 1191 of
the Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in
reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not
comply with what is incumbent upon him.
The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and
the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of
damages in either case. He may also seek rescission,
even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should
become impossible.
The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless
there be just cause authorizing the fixing of a period.
This is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of
third persons who have acquired the thing, in accordance
with Articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law.
From the above, it appears that in order to effect a valid
revocation of the MOA prior to the lapse of the 5-year
period provided for in Section 9, the City of Baguio had to
approach the problem from one or both of two
perspectives: one, negotiate the termination of the MOA
with Jadewell, or two, exercise its option under Article
1191 of the Civil Code.
The first option, a negotiated pretermination of the
contract, is an inherent right of every party in a contract.
This can be inferred from the freedom of the parties to
contract and modify their previous covenants provided it
would not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy.148 Despite the provision on the
minimum warranty against rescission stipulated in the
MOA, the parties were not constrained to mutually modify
such restriction. The Sanggunian could have proposed to

Jadewell the possibility of lifting the warranty against

rescission subject to the condition that the latter will
comply with its obligations under the MOA.
This scenario could have impressed upon Jadewell that its
contractual relations with the city government of Baguio
were less than ideal. The suggested approach for the
Sanggunian could have been legally sound and practical.
Obviously, this was not done in this case; thus, Jadewells
Complaint before the RTC of Baguio City.
The second option is the exercise of the unilateral right to
rescind a bilateral contract on the part of a party who
believes that it has been injured by a breach substantial
enough to warrant revocation. Where one party allegedly
failed to comply with his obligations under a contract, the
injured party may rescind the obligation if the other does
not perform or is not ready and willing to perform.149 We
will examine the acts of Baguio City in relation to what is
allowed under Article 1191.
Rescission under Article 1191 takes place through either
of two modes: (1) through an extrajudicial declaration of
rescission; or (2) upon the grant of a judicial decree of
rescission.
Extrajudicial declaration of rescission is recognized as a
power which does not require judicial intervention.150 If
the rescission is not opposed, extrajudicial declaration of
rescission produces legal effect151 such that the injured
party is already relieved from performing the
undertaking.152
However, the power of declaring extrajudicial rescission
conferred upon the injured party is regulated by the Civil
Code. If the extrajudicial rescission is impugned by the
other party, it shall be subject to a judicial
determination153 where court action must be taken, and
the function of the court is to declare the rescission as
having been properly or improperly made, or to give a
period within which the debtor must perform the obligation
alleged to be breached.154 A unilateral cancellation of a
contract may be questioned in courts by the affected party
to determine whether or not cancellation is warranted.155
Thus, in an extrajudicial decree of rescission, revocation
cannot be completely exercised solely on a partys own
judgment that the other has committed a breach of the
obligation156 but always subject to the right of the other
party to judicially impugn such decision.
It is important to contextualize that the agreement entered
into by the City of Baguio with Jadewell is the embodiment
of a grant of franchise imbued with public interest and is
not merely an agreement between two private parties.
It is our view that the first act of rescission by the City of
Baguio may be valid even if there is a stipulation against it
within the first five years of the MOAs existence. Article
1191 of the New Civil Code provides a party the right to
rescind the agreement and clearly overrides any
stipulation to the contrary. However, the grounds that

would serve as basis to the application of the said article

must be clearly established.
In the exercise of this option under Article 1191, was it
necessary for the City of Baguio to provide Jadewell an
opportunity to air its side on the matter before the former
implemented the rescission of the MOA? In the instant
case, was Jadewell deprived of procedural due process?
We answer in the negative. We disagree with the rulings of
the RTC and the CA that Jadewell was deprived of due
process. In Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila v. The
Board of Transportation,157 we confronted the issue of
whether the petitioners were denied procedural due
process when the respondent Board of Transportation
issued a circular ordering the phasing out of old vehicles
to be used as taxicabs. In the said case, the phase-out
was embodied in a circular that was promulgated without
holding a public hearing or at least requiring those affected
to submit their position papers on the policy to be
implemented. We held for the respondent Board, and
ruled in this wise:
Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of
the Circulars is neither violative of procedural due process.
As held in Central Bank vs. Hon. Cloribel and Banco
Filipino, 44 SCRA 307 (1972):
Previous notice and hearing as elements of due process,
are constitutionally required for the protection of life or
vested property rights, as well as of liberty, when its
limitation or loss takes place in consequence of a judicial
or quasi-judicial proceeding, generally dependent upon a
past act or event which has to be established or
ascertained. It is not essential to the validity of general
rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct
of a class or persons or enterprises, unless the law
provides otherwise.
In the instant case, the assailed act by the Sanggunian
Panlungsod in rescinding the MOA be it first or second
act of rescission was clearly in the exercise of its
legislative or administrative functions and was not an
exercise of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. The
Sanggunian Panlungsod does not possess any judicial or
quasi-judicial functions. The preamble of the MOA lends
support to this view. Evidently, the foremost reason why
the agreement was entered into by the parties was to
provide order, given Baguio Citys parking problems in
identified areas, as well as to generate income.
The objectives of the Sanggunian Panlungsod, as well as
its intention to rescind the MOA; because it deems to no
longer serve the interest of the City of Baguio, are clearly
an exercise of its legislative or administrative function.
However, it is another matter as to whether the City of
Baguio was able to clearly establish the grounds as basis
for the exercise of its right to rescind.
c. On the allegation of Jadewells
substantial breach of the MOA.

The Baguio City government has repeatedly mentioned

that Jadewell had so far installed only 14 parking meters,
with only 12 functioning. The COA-CAR Report dated 13
July 2003 enumerated 12 findings,158 a majority of which
indicates that Jadewell was remiss in the fulfilment of its
obligations under the MOA. While Finding Nos. (1), (2),
(3), (4), (5), (8) and (12) of the COA-CAR Report state that
Jadewell collected parking fees, Jadewell failed to properly
remit the same. Finding No. (11) of the COA-CAR Report
states that Jadewell failed to have its parking attendants
deputized,159 a condition under the MOA that is also
important to the overall objective of the endeavor.
The MOA does not specifically provide for the exact
number of parking meters to be installed by Jadewell
pursuant to the parties objective in regulating parking in
the city. Nevertheless, 100 parking spaces were allotted
as mentioned in Annex A of the MOA.160 The agreement
also obligates Jadewell to have its parking attendants
deputized by the DOTC-LTO so that they shall have the
authority to enforce traffic rules and regulations in the
regulated areas.161 To the Courts mind, these are two of
the most important obligations that Jadewell had to comply
with, considering the nature and objective of the
agreement it had entered into.
Despite the enumeration of the above-mentioned faults of
Jadewell, we do not make a categorical finding that there
was substantial breach committed by Jadewell to justify a
unilateral rescission of the MOA. We find, however, that
the RTC had not properly received evidence that would
allow it to determine the extent of the claimed violations of
the MOA. Had these violations by Jadewell been proven in
a proper hearing, the finding of a substantial breach of the
MOA would have been a distinct probability.
Unfortunately, neither the RTC nor the CA provided a clear
basis for their rulings on the extent of the breach of the
MOA by Jadewell. Save from reiterating the Sanggunians
litany of violations said to be committed by Jadewell, there
was no testimony on record to prove such facts and no
indication as to whether the RTC or CA dismissed them or
took them at face value.
Whatever the extent of breach of contract that Jadewell
may have committed and the enumeration of Jadewells
alleged faults in Resolution 37 is quite extensive the City
of Baguio was still duty-bound to establish the alleged
breach.
Matters became complicated when the RTC and the CA
lumped the issues on the due process violation of Baguio
City with Jadewells alleged substantial breaches under
the MOA, instead of making a clear finding on the
existence and extent of such breach. The facts and legal
issues were thus muddled.
We find fault in the lower and appellate courts lapse in
examining the issue on Jadewells alleged substantial
breach. Evidence-taking had to be undertaken by these
courts before they could arrive at a judicial conclusion on
the presence of substantial breach.

We thus DENY the Petition of the Sanggunian Panlungsod

in G.R. No. 160025 and AFFIRM the questioned CA
Decision. However, we reject the ruling made by the
appellate court that the violations of Jadewell under the
MOA were not substantial. We hold that there is no
sufficient evidence on record to make such determination.
While Jadewell prays for damages against the public
respondent, and while ordinarily we could grant the same,
the context of this case prevents us from giving any form
of recompense to Jadewell even if the rescission of the
MOA did not follow the required legal procedure. This is
because it would be appalling to grant Jadewell any award
of damages, considering (1) it installed only 14 out of the
apparently 100 contemplated parking meters; (2) its
employees, private citizens who did not possess any
authority from the LTO, were manually collecting parking
fees from the public, and (3) it did not, apparently properly
remit any significant amount of money to the City of
Baguio. These three facts are uncontested, these
omissions are offensive to the concept of public service
that the residents of Baguio were promised through
Jadewell. From its ambiguous responses extant in the
records, it is clear that Jadewell does not appear to be an
investor who has lost in its investments in the Baguio City
project. Thus, we do not award any damages to Jadewell.
2. On G.R. Nos. 163052, 164107,
165564, 172216, 173043 and 174879
(The Contempt Petitions)
Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure enumerates the acts constituting indirect
contempt, thus:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance
of his official duties or in his official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process,
order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person
who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real
property by the judgment or process of any court of
competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces
another to enter into or upon such real property, for the
purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or
in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person
adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the
processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct
contempt under Section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and
acting as such without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or

property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or
process of a court held by him.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to
prevent the court from issuing process to bring the
respondent into court, or from holding him in custody
pending such proceedings.
The rule alerts us to three possible situations, wherein, in
the context of the facts of these petitions, contumacious
behaviour could have been committed by public
respondents. First, disobedience or resistance to a lawful
order of this Court under paragraph (b). Second, unlawful
interference with the proceedings of this Court under
paragraph (c). Third, improper conduct tending, directly or
indirectly, to impeded, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice by this Court under paragraph (d).
Jadewell, in G.R. Nos. 163052, 164107, 165564, 172216,
173043, and 174879, bases its charges of indirect
contempt against public respondents on a claim that any
action that tends to stop the implementation of the MOA is
contumacious. Such actions include desistance orders to
desist against Jadewell itself, the second act of unilateral
rescission of the MOA; orders to other public officers to
prevent Jadewell from exercising its authority under the
MOA; and the official encouragement for motorists to
resist attempts of Jadewell to collect parking fees or
clamp/tow vehicles that do not observe the parking
regulations.
We find scant jurisprudence to guide us on this matter.
The closest situation is that presented in Southern
Broadcasting Network v. Davao Light and Power,162
penned by Justice Felix Makasiar. In that case, petitioners
representative, Carmen Pacquing, wrote a letter to
President Marcos asking for his intervention so that her
Motion for Reconsideration (MR) of the resolution of this
Court denying her Petition could be favorably granted.
Respondent Davao Light asked that petitioner Pacquing
be cited for contempt, arguing that her act in writing to the
President asking him to intervene in the case showed
disrespect to and disregard for the authority of this Court
as the final arbiter of all cases. We found petitioner
Pacquing guilty of contempt, thus:
x x x. WE hold that such actuation of herein petitioners
representative only bespeaks more of her contumacious
attempt to trifle with the orderly administration of justice
because if she know that this Court will ultimately decide
the case "regardless of the Presidents intervention," then
she should have desisted from writing to the President.
In the light of the foregoing, there is no doubt that Mrs.
Pacquing committed an "improper conduct tending,
directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice" (Section 3, par. [d] Rule 71,
Rules of Court) and impair the respect due to the courts of
justice in general, and the Supreme Court, in particular.

In the above case, respondent Carmen Pacquing was

clearly asking the President to commit an improper act
to influence the Supreme Court that obstructs the orderly
administration of justice, as the Court is constitutionally
required to act independently free from the promptings of
the President. Pacquing clearly violated both Sections (c)
and (d) of Section 3, Rule 71.
No such similar situation occurred here. Public
respondents never asked anyone to employ pressure or
influence on this Court for the formers benefit.
Instead, the acts that have been allegedly committed by
public respondents are acts done pursuant to their belief
that: (a) the MOA has been validly voided, and more
importantly, (b) that Jadewells personnel do not have the
legal authority to perform the governmental function of
administering the regulation of on-street and off-street
parking, of towing or clamping vehicles that violate such
regulation, and of collecting parking fees from motorists.
It is important to note that the Court never gave a
mandatory injunction that is couched in a way that
requires public respondents to fully comply with the terms
of the MOA. The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
(WPMI) issued on 9 February 2005 is directed to Mayor
Yaranon only, and it directs him to perform only one
specific act: to reopen, and maintain open, the street and
premises then being occupied and operated by Jadewell.
Mayor Yaranon did not immediately comply with this
WPMI. Thus, this Court fined him P10,000 on 20 April
2005, and ordered the NBI to arrest him if he further failed
to comply with the WPMI. Subsequently, Mayor Yaranon
paid the fine, and there is nothing on record to show that
he has, since April of 2005, further defied this Court on
that score.
The Court did not issue a WPMI specifically ordering the
parties to observe the terms of the MOA. Thus, public
respondents were not expressly prohibited to act on their
beliefs regarding the validity or invalidity of the MOA, or,
the authority or lack of authority of Jadewell personnel to
perform governmental functions in the streets of Baguio.
This is an important result, because to hold otherwise is to
effectively grant one of the parties a mandatory injunction
even without an express resolution to this effect from the
Court. Without an express order, the pendency of a suit
before the Supreme Court is not a prima facie entitlement
of provisional relief to either party.
Public respondents therefore were, at liberty to question
and inform the public of their belief regarding the lack of
authority of Jadewell and its personnel to regulate public
parking in Baguio. They were certainly free to formally
write Jadewell on their beliefs and pass the corresponding
resolutions to this effect. The mayor was also not under
legal compulsion to renew Jadewells business permit in
view of his opinion that Jadewell was exceeding its
allowable area of operation, which Jadewell was not able
to fully disprove. This is especially true for two important

reasons: (1) there is an uncontested cease and desist

order that was issued by the DOTC-CAR on 13 March
2002 which Jadewell defied well into 2005, and (2) public
respondents are city officials of Baguio who have the legal
duty to ensure the laws are being followed, including laws
that define who may enforce regulations on public parking.
That Jadewell personnel do not have the legal authority to
enforce regulations on public parking is categorical from
the Letter dated 1 February 2001 by the Regional Director
of the DOTC-CAR denying the request of Jadewell for the
deputation of its personnel.163
We therefore do not find any of the public respondents
who were then officials of the City of Baguio, liable for
indirect contempt, and thereby dismiss G.R. Nos. 163052,
164107, 165564, 173043 and 174879. In G.R. 174879, we
have already pronounced that the Sanggunian was within
its full right to perform the second act of rescission, and
thus, it is even with more reason, that its members and the
City Legal Officer cannot be held in contempt therefor. We
deny the prayer in the petitions to disbar the respondents
therein who are lawyers.
We also do not find Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan liable
for contempt in G.R. No. 172216.
Jadewell wants this Court to cite Judge Pamintuan for
contempt for issuing a writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction ordering Jadewell to stop collecting parking
fees; to refrain from supervising the parking in Baguio City;
as well as to hold in abeyance the implementation of the
MOA and its enabling ordinance.164
It was only on 5 June 2006 that this Court, in G.R. No.
172215, issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)165
directing the trial court to discontinue the proceedings in
Civil Case No. 6089-R. Upon receipt by Judge Pamintuan
of the TRO, he immediately ordered the cancellation of the
29 June 2006 hearing.166
We do not consider the promulgation of the assailed writ
of preliminary prohibitory injunction against Jadewell as a
defiance of our writ issued on 9 February 2005,
considering, it was directed against Mayor Yaranon only.
We have held in Leonidas v. Supnet that "a party cannot
be held in indirect contempt for disobeying a court order
which is not addressed to him."167 We note that Judge
Pamintuan observed deference to the Orders of this Court
when he immediately suspended the proceedings in Civil
Case No. 6089-R upon receipt of the TRO.
G.R. No. 172215
In this Petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, Jadewell
assails the Orders of RTC-Branch 3 (Baguio City) denying
its motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration in
Civil Case No. 6089-R.
We deny the petition of Jadewell in this case.

In Manuel Camacho v. Atty. Jovito Coresis, Jr.,168 we

described the nature of special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65, as follows:

The procedural policy in the cited cases was again

referred to in Bernas v. Sovereign Ventures, Inc.,172
highlighting the following:

A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the

Rules of Court is an extraordinary remedy for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction. To invoke the Courts
power of judicial review under this Rule, it must first be
shown that respondent tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi- judicial functions has indeed acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, and that there
is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. Conversely, absent a showing
of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the
acts of the respondents may not be subjected to our
review under Rule 65.

Let it be stressed at this point the basic rule that when a

motion to dismiss is denied by the trial court, the remedy is
not to file a petition for certiorari, but to appeal after a
decision has been rendered. (Emphasis supplied)

In Indiana Aerospace University v. Commission on Higher

Education,169 this Court ruled thus:
An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory, and
so the proper remedy in such a case is to appeal after a
decision has been rendered. A writ of certiorari is not
intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling;
it is resorted to only to correct a grave abuse of discretion
or a whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. Its function is limited to keeping an inferior
court within its jurisdiction and to relieve persons from
arbitrary acts -- acts which courts or judges have no power
or authority in law to perform. It is not designed to correct
erroneous findings and conclusions made by the court.
In East Asia Traders, Inc. v. Republic of the Philippines, et
al.,170 we decreed:
The petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner
with the Court of Appeals is not the proper remedy to
assail the denial by the RTC of the motion to dismiss. The
Order of the RTC denying the motion to dismiss is merely
interlocutory. An interlocutory order does not terminate nor
finally dispose of the case, but leaves something to be
done by the court before the case is finally decided on the
merits. It is always under the control of the court and may
be modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds shown at
any time before final judgment. This proceeds from the
courts inherent power to control its process and orders so
as to make them conformable to law and justice. The only
limitation is that the judge cannot act with grave abuse of
discretion, or that no injustice results thereby.
East Asia Trader also reiterated our ruling in Indiana
Aerospace.
Further,
in
Bonifacio
Construction
Management Corporation v. Hon. Perlas Bernabe,171 we
reiterated our rulings in East Asia Traders and Indiana
Aerospace. We had ruled in these earlier cases that an
order of the trial court denying a motion to dismiss is an
interlocutory order, and to use a writ of certiorari to assail it
is improper.

G.R. No. 181488

The question of law raised by petitioner Yaranon in this
Petition for Review on Certiorari is whether the CA
correctly dismissed his appeal questioning the validity of
his suspension from office as City Mayor, on the ground
that his suit had become moot and academic due to his
non-re-election to office. The CA cited Crespo v. Provincial
Board of Nueva Ecija173 as basis for the dismissal.
For his part, Mayor Yaranon contends that the appellate
court should have ruled on the validity of his suspension
from office despite his failure to get re-elected as City
Mayor. He argues that he has the right to know whether
his suspension was valid or not and, in the event his
suspension is declared invalid, Mayor Yaranon believes he
is entitled to the salaries and benefits accruing during the
period he was suspended.
We deny the Petition of Mayor Yaranon.
The appeal of Mayor Yaranon has been rendered moot
and academic. We hold that the resolution of the issue
raised herein would serve no practical purpose.
In Miriam College v. Court of Appeals,174 we ruled that a
case becomes moot and academic when there is no more
actual controversy between the parties, or when no useful
purpose can be served in passing upon the merits.
Further, courts will not determine a moot question in which
no practical relief can be granted.175
Mayor Yaranon has already served his suspension. We
find no practical value in remanding his case to the
appellate court for the determination of the factual basis
and legal issues of his appeal pertaining to the validity of
his suspension as then City Mayor of Baguio City.
We have held in Nicart, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan (Third
Division),176 that an issue becomes moot when a
petitioner is not entitled to substantial relief:
x x x [T]he propriety of the preventive suspension of
petitioner effected through the assailed Resolution of
February 15, 2001 has become a moot issue, it appearing
that he has already served his suspension. An issue
becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a
justifiable controversy so that a determination thereof
would be of no practical use and value. In such cases,
there is no actual substantial relief to which petitioner
would be entitled to and which would be negated by the
dismissal of the petition.

We cannot sustain Mayor Yaranons argument that his

appeal should not have been dismissed because, in the
event that the finding of the Office of the President to
suspend him is reversed, he is still entitled to the salaries
accruing during the period he was suspended. We take
note of the cases cited by Mayor Yaranon such as Crespo
v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija,177 Baquerfo v.
Sanchez178 and Reyes v. Cristi,179 among others. These
cases involve substantial issues such as denial of due
process and procedural irregularities other than a mere
claim for entitlement to salaries. The factual background
and the legal issues for resolution in the cases mentioned
are not similar to the case at bar.
In Triste v. Leyte State College Board of Trustees180 the
Court elucidated on the nature of the salary of a public
official:
Mechem states that "(l)ike the requirement of an oath, the
fact of the payment of a salary and/or fees may aid in
determining the nature of a position, but it is not
conclusive, for while a salary or fees are usually annexed
to the office, it is not necessarily so. As in the case of the
oath, the salary or fees are mere incidents and form no
part of the office. Where a salary or fees are annexed, the
office is often said to be coupled with an interest; where
neither is provided for it is a naked or honorary office, and
is supposed to be accepted merely for the public good."
(Emphasis supplied)
Given the circumstances of this case, we find that Mayor
Yaranons claim for unpaid salaries, in case of
exoneration, does not constitute such substantial relief
that would justify the revival of his appeal. Even if we did
sustain his Petition, we nevertheless find that it has been
mooted by our resolution in the main petition.
WHEREFORE, we hereby rule as follows:
a.) In G.R. No. 160025, the Petition of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Baguio City is DENIED. The CA Decision
dated 7 July 2003 in CA G.R. SP No. 74756 is hereby
AFFIRMED with modification. There is not enough
evidence on record to conclude that Jadewells violations
were sufficient to justify the unilateral cancellation of the
MOA by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Baguio City; at
the same time, neither the RTC nor the CA provided a
clear finding whether the breach of the MOA by Jadewell
was substantial. We affirm the CA as to the rest of its
dispositions in its assailed Decision. Nevertheless, no
award of damages is hereby made in favour of Jadewell
and neither is there any pronouncement as to costs.
b.) G.R. Nos. 163052, 164107, 165564, 172216, 173043
and 174879, the Petitions of Jadewell to cite Mayor
Braulio D. Yaranon, Mayor Bernardo M. Vergara, Acting
City Mayor Reinaldo A. Bautista, Vice Mayor Betty
Lourdes F. Tabanda, the members of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Baguio City namely: Elmer O. Datuin,
Antonio R. Tabora, Edilberto B. Tenefrancia, Federico J.
Mandapat, Jr., Richard A. Carino, Faustino A. Olowan,
Rufino M. Panagan, Leonardo B. Yangot, Jr., Rocky

Thomas A. Balisong, Galo P. Weygan, Perlita L. ChanRondez, Jose M. Molintas, and Judge Fernando Vil
Pamintuan for indirect contempt and to disbar
Sangguniang Panlungsod members Rocky Thomas A.
Balisong, Edilberto B. Tenefrancia, Faustino A. Olowan,
Federico J. Mandapat, Perlita L. Chan-Rondez, Jose M.
Molintas, Melchor Carlos B. Rabanes and Mayor Braulio
D. Yaranon are all hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
c.) We DENY the Petition of Jadewell for lack of merit in
G.R. No. 172215. We likewise DENY its prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction for being moot and academic. No
pronouncement as to costs.
d.) We DENY the Petition of Mayor Braulio D. Yaranon in
G.R. No. 181488, for lack of merit and AFFIRM the CA
Decision CA-G.R. SP No. 96116. No pronouncement as to
costs.

RODOLFO S. BELTRAN, doing G.R. No. 133640

business under the name and style, OUR LADY OF
FATIMA BLOOD BANK, FELY G. MOSALE, doing
business under the name and style, MOTHER SEATON
BLOOD BANK; PEOPLES BLOOD BANK, INC.; MARIA
VICTORIA T. VITO, M.D., doing business under the name
and style, AVENUE BLOOD BANK; JESUS M. GARCIA,
M.D., doing business under the name and style, HOLY
REDEEMER BLOOD BANK, ALBERT L. LAPITAN, doing
business under the name and style, BLUE CROSS
BLOOD TRANSFUSION SERVICES; EDGARDO R.
RODAS, M.D., doing business under the name and style,
RECORD BLOOD BANK, in their individual capacities and
for and in behalf of PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF
BLOOD BANKS,
Petitioners,

versus

THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH,

Respondent.
x ------------------------------------------------ x
DOCTORS BLOOD CENTER, G.R. No. 133661
Petitioner,
- versus
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH.
Respondent.
x --------------------------------------------- x
RODOLFO S. BELTRAN, doing G.R. No. 139147
business under the name and style, OUR LADY OF
FATIMA BLOOD
BANK, FELY G. MOSALE, doing Present:
business under the name and style,
MOTHER SEATON BLOOD BANK; DAVIDE, JR., C.J.,
PEOPLES BLOOD BANK, INC.; PUNO,
MARIA VICTORIA T. VITO, M.D., PANGANIBAN,
doing business under the name and QUISUMBING,
style, AVENUE BLOOD BANK; YNARES-SANTIAGO,
JESUS M. GARCIA, M.D., doing SANDOVALGUTIERREZ,
business under the name and style, CARPIO,
HOLY REDEEMER BLOOD BANK, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
ALBERT L. LAPITAN, doing CORONA,
business under the name and style, CARPIO-MORALES,
BLUE CROSS BLOOD CALLEJO, SR.,
TRANSFUSION SERVICES; AZCUNA,
EDGARDO R. RODAS, M.D., doing TINGA,
business under the name and style, CHIZO-NAZARIO,*
and
RECORD BLOOD BANK, in their GARCIA, JJ.
Individual capacities and for
and in behalf of PHILIPPINE Promulgated:

ASSOCIATION OF BLOOD BANKS,

Petitioners, November 25, 2005
versus
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH,
Respondent.
x
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:

Before this Court are petitions assailing primarily the

constitutionality of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719,
otherwise known as the National Blood Services Act of
1994, and the validity of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9,
series of 1995 or the Rules and Regulations Implementing
Republic Act No. 7719.
G.R. No. 133640,[1] entitled Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing
business under the name and style, Our Lady of Fatima
Blood Bank, et al., vs. The Secretary of Health and G.R.
No. 133661,[2] entitled Doctors Blood Bank Center vs.
Department of Health are petitions for certiorari and
mandamus, respectively, seeking the annulment of the
following: (1) Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719; and, (2)
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9, series of 1995. Both
petitions likewise pray for the issuance of a writ of
prohibitory injunction enjoining the Secretary of Health
from implementing and enforcing the aforementioned law
and its Implementing Rules and Regulations; and, for a
mandatory injunction ordering and commanding the
Secretary of Health to grant, issue or renew petitioners
license to operate free standing blood banks (FSBB).
The above cases were consolidated in a resolution of the
Court En Banc dated June 2, 1998.[3]
G.R. No. 139147,[4] entitled Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing
business under the name and style, Our Lady of Fatima
Blood Bank, et al., vs. The Secretary of Health, on the
other hand, is a petition to show cause why respondent
Secretary of Health should not be held in contempt of
court.
This case was originally assigned to the Third Division of
this Court and later consolidated with G.R. Nos. 133640
and 133661 in a resolution dated August 4, 1999.[5]
Petitioners comprise the majority of the Board of Directors
of the Philippine Association of Blood Banks, a duly
registered non-stock and non-profit association composed
of free standing blood banks.
Public respondent Secretary of Health is being sued in his
capacity as the public official directly involved and charged
with the enforcement and implementation of the law in
question.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act
of 1994 was enacted into law on April 2, 1994. The Act
seeks to provide
an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary
blood donation and by regulating blood banks in the
country. It was approved by then President Fidel V. Ramos
on May 15, 1994 and was subsequently published in the
Official Gazette on August 18, 1994. The law took effect
on August 23, 1994.
On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of
1995, constituting the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of said law was promulgated by respondent
Secretary of the Department of Health (DOH).[6]
Section 7 of R.A. 7719 [7] provides:
Section 7. Phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks - All
commercial blood banks shall be phased-out over a period
of two (2) years after the effectivity of this Act, extendable
to a maximum period of two (2) years by the Secretary.

Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides:

Section 23. Process of Phasing Out. -- The Department
shall effect the phasing-out of all commercial blood banks
over a period of two (2) years, extendible for a maximum
period of two (2) years after the effectivity of R.A. 7719.
The decision to extend shall be based on the result of a
careful study and review of the blood supply and demand
and public safety.[8]

Blood banking and blood transfusion services in the

country have been arranged in four (4) categories: blood
centers run by the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC),
government-run blood services, private hospital blood
banks, and commercial blood services.
Years prior to the passage of the National Blood Services
Act of 1994, petitioners have already been operating
commercial blood banks under Republic Act No. 1517,
entitled An Act Regulating the Collection, Processing and
Sale of Human Blood, and the Establishment and
Operation of Blood Banks and Blood Processing
Laboratories. The law, which was enacted on June 16,
1956, allowed the establishment and operation by licensed
physicians of blood banks and blood processing
laboratories. The Bureau of Research and Laboratories
(BRL) was created in 1958 and was given the power to
regulate clinical laboratories in 1966 under Republic Act
No. 4688. In 1971, the Licensure Section was created
within the BRL. It was given the duty to enforce the
licensure requirements for blood banks as well as clinical
laboratories. Due to this development, Administrative

Order No. 156, Series of 1971, was issued. The new rules
and regulations triggered a stricter enforcement of the
Blood Banking Law, which was characterized by frequent
spot checks, immediate suspension and communication of
such suspensions to hospitals, a more systematic recordkeeping and frequent communication with blood banks
through monthly information bulletins. Unfortunately, by
the 1980s, financial difficulties constrained the BRL to
reduce the frequency of its supervisory visits to the blood
banks.[9]
Meanwhile, in the international scene, concern for the
safety of blood and blood products intensified when the
dreaded disease Acute Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS) was first described in 1979. In 1980, the
International Society of Blood Transfusion (ISBT)
formulated the Code of Ethics for Blood Donation and
Transfusion. In 1982, the first case of transfusionassociated AIDS was described in an infant. Hence, the
ISBT drafted in 1984, a model for a national blood policy
outlining certain principles that should be taken into
consideration. By 1985, the ISBT had disseminated
guidelines requiring AIDS testing of blood and blood
products for transfusion.[10]
In 1989, another revision of the Blood Banking Guidelines
was made. The DOH issued Administrative Order No. 57,
Series of 1989, which classified banks into primary,
secondary and tertiary depending on the services they
provided. The standards were adjusted according to this
classification. For instance, floor area requirements varied
according to classification level. The new guidelines
likewise required Hepatitis B and HIV testing, and that the
blood bank be headed by a pathologist or a hematologist.
[11]
In 1992, the DOH issued Administrative Order No. 118-A
institutionalizing the National Blood Services Program
(NBSP). The BRL was designated as the central office
primarily responsible for the NBSP. The program paved
the way for the creation of a committee that will implement
the policies of the program and the formation of the
Regional Blood Councils.
In August 1992, Senate Bill No. 1011, entitled An Act
Promoting Voluntary Blood Donation, Providing for an
Adequate Supply of Safe Blood, Regulating Blood Banks
and Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof, and for
other Purposes was introduced in the Senate.[12]
Meanwhile, in the House of Representatives, House Bills
No. 384, 546, 780 and 1978 were being deliberated to
address the issue of safety of the Philippine blood bank
system. Subsequently, the Senate and House Bills were
referred to the appropriate committees and subsequently
consolidated.[13]
In January of 1994, the New Tropical Medicine
Foundation, with the assistance of the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) released its final
report of a study on the Philippine blood banking system
entitled Project to Evaluate the Safety of the Philippine
Blood Banking System. It was revealed that of the blood

units collected in 1992, 64.4 % were supplied by

commercial blood banks, 14.5% by the PNRC, 13.7% by
government hospital-based blood banks, and 7.4% by
private hospital-based blood banks. During the time the
study was made, there were only twenty-four (24)
registered or licensed free-standing or commercial blood
banks in the country. Hence, with these numbers in mind,
the study deduced that each commercial blood bank
produces five times more blood than the Red Cross and
fifteen times more than the government-run blood banks.
The study, therefore, showed that the Philippines heavily
relied on commercial sources of blood. The study likewise
revealed that 99.6% of the donors of commercial blood
banks and 77.0% of the donors of private-hospital based
blood banks are paid donors. Paid donors are those who
receive remuneration for donating their blood. Blood
donors of the PNRC and government-run hospitals, on the
other hand, are mostly voluntary.[14]
It was further found, among other things, that blood sold
by persons to blood commercial banks are three times
more likely to have any of the four (4) tested infections or
blood transfusion transmissible diseases, namely, malaria,
syphilis, Hepatitis B and Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) than those donated to PNRC.[15]
Commercial blood banks give paid donors varying rates
around P50 to P150, and because of this arrangement,
many of these donors are poor, and often they are
students, who need cash immediately. Since they need
the money, these donors are not usually honest about
their medical or social history. Thus, blood from healthy,
voluntary donors who give their true medical and social
history are about three times much safer than blood from
paid donors.[16]
What the study also found alarming is that many Filipino
doctors are not yet fully trained on the specific indications
for blood component transfusion. They are not aware of
the lack of blood supply and do not feel the need to adjust
their practices and use of blood and blood products. It also
does not matter to them where the blood comes from.[17]
On August 23, 1994, the National Blood Services Act
providing for the phase out of commercial blood banks
took effect. On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9,
Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of said law was promulgated by DOH.
The phase-out period was extended for two years by the
DOH pursuant to Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719 and
Section 23 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
Pursuant to said Act, all commercial blood banks should
have been phased out by May 28, 1998. Hence,
petitioners were granted by the Secretary of Health their
licenses to open and operate a blood bank only until May
27, 1998.
On May 20, 1998, prior to the expiration of the licenses
granted to petitioners, they filed a petition for certiorari with
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court assailing the constitutionality and

validity of the aforementioned Act and its Implementing

Rules and Regulations. The case was entitled Rodolfo S.
Beltran, doing business under the name and style, Our
Lady of Fatima Blood Bank, docketed as G.R. No.
133640.
On June 1, 1998, petitioners filed an Amended Petition for
Certiorari with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order, writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
and/or status quo ante order.[18]
In the aforementioned petition, petitioners assail the
constitutionality of the questioned legal provisions, namely,
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719 and Section 23 of
Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, on the
following grounds: [19]
1.
The questioned legal provisions of the National
Blood Services Act and its Implementing Rules violate the
equal protection clause for irrationally discriminating
against free standing blood banks in a manner which is
not germane to the purpose of the law;
2.
The questioned provisions of the National
Blood Services Act and its Implementing Rules represent
undue delegation if not outright abdication of the police
power of the state; and,
3.
The questioned provisions of the National
Blood Services Act and its Implementing Rules are
unwarranted deprivation of personal liberty.

On May 22, 1998, the Doctors Blood Center filed a similar

petition for mandamus with a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order, preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction before this Court entitled Doctors
Blood Center vs. Department of Health, docketed as G.R.
No. 133661. [20] This was consolidated with G.R. No.
133640.[21]
Similarly, the petition attacked the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 7719 and its implementing rules and
regulations, thus, praying for the issuance of a license to
operate commercial blood banks beyond May 27, 1998.
Specifically, with regard to Republic Act No. 7719, the
petition submitted the following questions[22] for
resolution:
1.
Was it passed in the exercise
of police power, and was it a valid exercise of such power?
2.
Does it not amount to
deprivation of property without due process?
3.
the obligation of contracts?

Does it not unlawfully impair

4. With the commercial blood banks being abolished and

with no ready machinery to deliver the same supply and
services, does R.A. 7719 truly serve the public welfare?

On June 2, 1998, this Court issued a Resolution directing

respondent DOH to file a consolidated comment. In the
same Resolution, the Court issued a temporary restraining
order (TRO) for respondent to cease and desist from
implementing and enforcing Section 7 of Republic Act No.
7719 and its implementing rules and regulations until
further orders from the Court.[23]
On August 26, 1998, respondent Secretary of Health filed
a Consolidated Comment on the petitions for certiorari and
mandamus in G.R. Nos. 133640 and 133661, with
opposition to the issuance of a temporary restraining
order.[24]
In the Consolidated Comment, respondent Secretary of
Health submitted that blood from commercial blood banks
is unsafe and therefore the State, in the exercise of its
police power, can close down commercial blood banks to
protect the public. He cited the record of deliberations on
Senate Bill No. 1101 which later became Republic Act No.
7719, and the sponsorship speech of Senator Orlando
Mercado.
The rationale for the closure of these commercial blood
banks can be found in the deliberations of Senate Bill No.
1011, excerpts of which are quoted below:
Senator Mercado: I am providing over a period of two
years to phase out all commercial blood banks. So that in
the end, the new section would have a provision that
states:
ALL COMMERCIAL BLOOD BANKS SHALL BE PHASED
OUT OVER A PERIOD OF TWO YEARS AFTER THE
EFFECTIVITY OF THIS ACT. BLOOD SHALL BE
COLLECTED FROM VOLUNTARY DONORS ONLY AND
THE SERVICE FEE TO BE CHARGED FOR EVERY
BLOOD PRODUCT ISSUED SHALL BE LIMITED TO THE
NECESSARY EXPENSES ENTAILED IN COLLECTING
AND PROCESSING OF BLOOD. THE SERVICE FEE
SHALL BE MADE UNIFORM THROUGH GUIDELINES
TO BE SET BY THE DEPARTMENTOF HEALTH.
I am supporting Mr. President, the finding of a study called
Project to Evaluate the Safety of the Philippine Blood
Banking System. This has been taken note of. This is a
study done with the assistance of the USAID by doctors
under the New Tropical Medicine Foundation in Alabang.
Part of the long-term measures proposed by this particular
study is to improve laws, outlaw buying and selling of
blood and legally define good manufacturing processes for
blood. This goes to the very heart of my amendment which
seeks to put into law the principle that blood should not be
subject of commerce of man.
The Presiding Officer [Senator Aquino]: What does the
sponsor say?
Senator Webb: Mr. President, just for clarity, I would like to
find out how the Gentleman defines a commercial blood
bank. I am at a loss at times what a commercial blood
bank really is.

Senator Mercado: We have a definition, I believe, in the

measure, Mr. President.
The Presiding Officer [Senator Aquino]: It is a business
where profit is considered.
Senator Mercado: If the Chairman of the Committee would
accept it, we can put a provision on Section 3, a definition
of a commercial blood bank, which, as defined in this law,
exists for profit and engages in the buying and selling of
blood or its components.
Senator Webb: That is a good description, Mr. President.
Senator Mercado: I refer, Mr. President, to a letter written
by Dr. Jaime Galvez-Tan, the Chief of Staff,
Undersecretary of Health, to the good Chairperson of the
Committee on Health.
In recommendation No. 4, he says:
The need to phase out all commercial blood banks within
a two-year period will give the Department of Health
enough time to build up governments capability to provide
an adequate supply of blood for the needs of the
nation...the use of blood for transfusion is a medical
service and not a sale of commodity.
Taking into consideration the experience of the National
Kidney Institute, which has succeeded in making the
hospital 100 percent dependent on voluntary blood
donation, here is a success story of a hospital that does
not buy blood. All those who are operated on and need
blood have to convince their relatives or have to get
volunteers who would donate blood
If we give the responsibility of the testing of blood to those
commercial blood banks, they will cut corners because it
will protect their profit.
In the first place, the people who sell their blood are the
people who are normally in the high-risk category. So we
should stop the system of selling and buying blood so that
we can go into a national voluntary blood program.
It has been said here in this report, and I quote:
Why is buying and selling of blood not safe? This is not
safe because a donor who expects payment for his blood
will not tell the truth about his illnesses and will deny any
risky social behavior such as sexual promiscuity which
increases the risk of having syphilis or AIDS or abuse of
intravenous addictive drugs. Laboratory tests are of limited
value and will not detect early infections. Laboratory tests
are required only for four diseases in the Philippines.
There are other blood transmissible diseases we do not
yet screen for and there could be others where there are
no tests available yet.
A blood bank owner expecting to gain profit from selling
blood will also try his best to limit his expenses. Usually he
tries to increase his profit by buying cheaper reagents or
test kits, hiring cheaper manpower or skipping some tests
altogether. He may also try to sell blood even though
these have infections in them. Because there is no
existing system of counterchecking these, the blood bank
owner can usually get away with many unethical practices.
The experience of Germany, Mr. President is illustrative of
this issue. The reason why contaminated blood was sold
was that there were corners cut by commercial blood

banks in the testing process. They were protecting their

profits.[25]
The sponsorship speech of Senator Mercado further
elucidated his stand on the issue:

Senator Mercado: Today, across the country, hundreds of

poverty-stricken, sickly and weak Filipinos, who,
unemployed, without hope and without money to buy the
next meal, will walk into a commercial blood bank, extend
their arms and plead that their blood be bought. They will
lie about their age, their medical history. They will lie about
when they last sold their blood. For doing this, they will
receive close to a hundred pesos. This may tide them over
for the next few days. Of course, until the next
bloodletting.
This same blood will travel to the posh city hospitals and
urbane medical centers. This same blood will now be
bought by the rich at a price over 500% of the value for
which it was sold. Between this buying and selling,
obviously, someone has made a very fast buck.
Every doctor has handled at least one transfusion-related
disease in an otherwise normal patient. Patients come in
for minor surgery of the hand or whatever and they leave
with hepatitis B. A patient comes in for an appendectomy
and he leaves with malaria. The worst nightmare: A patient
comes in for a Caesarian section and leaves with AIDS.
We do not expect good blood from donors who sell their
blood because of poverty. The humane dimension of blood
transfusion is not in the act of receiving blood, but in the
act of giving it
For years, our people have been at the mercy of
commercial blood banks that lobby their interests among
medical technologists, hospital administrators and
sometimes even physicians so that a proactive system for
collection of blood from healthy donors becomes difficult,
tedious and unrewarding.
The Department of Health has never institutionalized a
comprehensive national program for safe blood and for
voluntary blood donation even if this is a serious public
health concern and has fallen for the linen of commercial
blood bankers, hook, line and sinker because it is more
convenient to tell the patient to buy blood.
Commercial blood banks hold us hostage to their threat
that if we are to close them down, there will be no blood
supply. This is true if the Government does not step in to
ensure that safe supply of blood. We cannot allow
commercial interest groups to dictate policy on what is and
what should be a humanitarian effort. This cannot and will
never work because their interest in blood donation is
merely monetary. We cannot expect commercial blood
banks to take the lead in voluntary blood donation. Only

the Government can do it, and the Government must do it.

[26]
On May 5, 1999, petitioners filed a Motion for Issuance of
Expanded Temporary Restraining Order for the Court to
order respondent Secretary of Health to cease and desist
from announcing the closure of commercial blood banks,
compelling the public to source the needed blood from
voluntary donors only, and committing similar acts that will
ultimately cause the shutdown of petitioners blood banks.
[27]
On July 8, 1999, respondent Secretary filed his Comment
and/or Opposition to the above motion stating that he has
not ordered the closure of commercial blood banks on
account of the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) issued
on June 2, 1998 by the Court. In compliance with the
TRO, DOH had likewise ceased to distribute the health
advisory leaflets, posters and flyers to the public which
state that blood banks are closed or will be closed.
According to respondent Secretary, the same were printed
and circulated in anticipation of the closure of the
commercial blood banks in accordance with R.A. No.
7719, and were printed and circulated prior to the
issuance of the TRO.[28]
On July 15, 1999, petitioners in G.R. No. 133640 filed a
Petition to Show Cause Why Public Respondent Should
Not be Held in Contempt of Court, docketed as G.R. No.
139147, citing public respondents willful disobedience of
or resistance to the restraining order issued by the Court
in the said case. Petitioners alleged that respondents act
constitutes circumvention of the temporary restraining
order and a mockery of the authority of the Court and the
orderly administration of justice.[29] Petitioners added that
despite the issuance of the temporary restraining order in
G.R. No. 133640, respondent, in his effort to strike down
the existence of commercial blood banks, disseminated
misleading information under the guise of health
advisories, press releases, leaflets, brochures and flyers
stating, among others, that this year [1998] all commercial
blood banks will be closed by 27 May. Those who need
blood will have to rely on government blood banks.[30]
Petitioners further claimed that respondent Secretary of
Health announced in a press conference during the Blood
Donors Week that commercial blood banks are illegal and
dangerous and that they are at the moment protected by a
restraining order on the basis that their commercial
interest is more important than the lives of the people.
These were all posted in bulletin boards and other
conspicuous places in all government hospitals as well as
other medical and health centers.[31]
In respondent Secretarys Comment to the Petition to
Show Cause Why Public Respondent Should Not Be Held
in Contempt of Court, dated January 3, 2000, it was
explained that nothing was issued by the department
ordering the closure of commercial blood banks. The
subject health advisory leaflets pertaining to said closure
pursuant to Republic Act No. 7719 were printed and
circulated prior to the Courts issuance of a temporary
restraining order on June 21, 1998.[32]
Public respondent further claimed that the primary
purpose of the information campaign was to promote the

importance and safety of voluntary blood donation and to

educate the public about the hazards of patronizing blood
supplies from commercial blood banks.[33] In doing so, he
was merely performing his regular functions and duties as
the Secretary of Health to protect the health and welfare of
the public. Moreover, the DOH is the main proponent of
the voluntary blood donation program espoused by
Republic Act No. 7719, particularly Section 4 thereof which
provides that, in order to ensure the adequate supply of
human blood, voluntary blood donation shall be promoted
through public education, promotion in schools,
professional education, establishment of blood services
network, and walking blood donors.
Hence, by authority of the law, respondent Secretary
contends that he has the duty to promote the program of
voluntary blood donation. Certainly, his act of encouraging
the public to donate blood voluntarily and educating the
people on the risks associated with blood coming from a
paid donor promotes general health and welfare and
which should be given more importance than the
commercial businesses of petitioners.[34]

WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719

CONSTITUTES UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE
POWER;

On July 29, 1999, interposing personal and substantial

interest in the case as taxpayers and citizens, a Petitionin-Intervention was filed interjecting the same arguments
and issues as laid down by petitioners in G.R. No. 133640
and 133661, namely, the unconstitutionality of the Acts,
and, the issuance of a writ of prohibitory injunction. The
intervenors are the immediate relatives of individuals who
had died allegedly because of shortage of blood supply at
a critical time.[35]
The intervenors contended that Republic Act No. 7719
constitutes undue delegation of legislative powers and
unwarranted deprivation of personal liberty.[36]
In a resolution, dated September 7, 1999, and without
giving due course to the aforementioned petition, the
Court granted the Motion for Intervention that was filed by
the above intervenors on August 9, 1999.

V
WHETHER OR NOT R.A. 7719 IS A VALID EXERCISE
OF POLICE POWER; and,

In his Comment to the petition-in-intervention, respondent

Secretary of Health stated that the sale of blood is
contrary to the spirit and letter of the Act that blood
donation is a humanitarian act and blood transfusion is a
professional medical service and not a sale of commodity
(Section 2[a] and [b] of Republic Act No. 7719). The act of
selling blood or charging fees other than those allowed by
law is even penalized under Section 12.[37]
Thus, in view of these, the Court is now tasked to pass
upon the constitutionality of Section 7 of Republic Act No.
7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations.
In resolving the controversy, this Court deems it necessary
to address the issues and/or questions raised by
petitioners concerning the constitutionality of the aforesaid
Act in G.R. No. 133640 and 133661 as summarized
hereunder:
I

II
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS
IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS VIOLATE
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE;
III
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS
IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS VIOLATE
THE NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE;

IV
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS
IMPLEMENTING
RULES
AND
REGULATIONS
CONSTITUTE DEPRIVATION OF PERSONAL LIBERTY
AND PROPERTY;

VI
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS
IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS TRULY
SERVE PUBLIC WELFARE.
As to the first ground upon which the constitutionality of
the Act is being challenged, it is the contention of
petitioners that the phase out of commercial or free
standing blood banks is unconstitutional because it is an
improper and unwarranted delegation of legislative power.
According to petitioners, the Act was incomplete when it
was passed by the Legislature, and the latter failed to fix a
standard to which the Secretary of Health must conform in
the performance of his functions. Petitioners also contend
that the two-year extension period that may be granted by
the Secretary of Health for the phasing out of commercial
blood banks pursuant to Section 7 of the Act constrained
the Secretary to legislate, thus constituting undue
delegation of legislative power.
In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire
whether the statute was complete in all its terms and
provisions when it left the hands of the Legislature so that
nothing was left to the judgment of the administrative body
or any other appointee or delegate of the Legislature.[38]
Except as to matters of detail that may be left to be filled in
by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by
executive officers and administrative boards, an act of the
Legislature, as a general rule, is incomplete and hence
invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard
by which the administrative board may be guided in the
exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it.[39]
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act
of 1994 is complete in itself. It is clear from the provisions
of the Act that the Legislature intended primarily to
safeguard the health of the people and has mandated

several measures to attain this objective. One of these is

the phase out of commercial blood banks in the country.
The law has sufficiently provided a definite standard for
the guidance of the Secretary of Health in carrying out its
provisions, that is, the promotion of public health by
providing a safe and adequate supply of blood through
voluntary blood donation. By its provisions, it has
conferred the power and authority to the Secretary of
Health as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law.
Congress may validly delegate to administrative agencies
the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to
implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies.
[40] The Secretary of Health has been given, under
Republic Act No. 7719, broad powers to execute the
provisions of said Act. Section 11 of the Act states:
SEC. 11. Rules and Regulations. The implementation of
the provisions of the Act shall be in accordance with the
rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Secretary,
within sixty (60) days from the approval hereof
This is what respondent Secretary exactly did when DOH,
by virtue of the administrative bodys authority and
expertise in the matter, came out with Administrative Order
No.9, series of 1995 or the Rules and Regulations
Implementing Republic Act No. 7719. Administrative
Order. No. 9 effectively filled in the details of the law for its
proper implementation.
Specifically, Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9
provides that the phase-out period for commercial blood
banks shall be extended for another two years until May
28, 1998 based on the result of a careful study and review
of the blood supply and demand and public safety. This
power to ascertain the existence of facts and conditions
upon which the Secretary may effect a period of extension
for said phase-out can be delegated by Congress. The
true distinction between the power to make laws and
discretion as to its execution is illustrated by the fact that
the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and
conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to
be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first
cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be
made.[41]

b)
to lay down the legal principle that the
provision of blood for transfusion is a medical service and
not a sale of commodity;
c)
to provide for adequate, safe, affordable and
equitable distribution of blood supply and blood products;
d)
to inform the public of the need for voluntary
blood donation to curb the hazards caused by the
commercial sale of blood;
e)
to teach the benefits and rationale of
voluntary blood donation in the existing health subjects of
the formal education system in all public and private
schools as well as the non-formal system;
f)
to mobilize all sectors of the community to
participate in mechanisms for voluntary and non-profit
collection of blood;
g)
to mandate the Department of Health to
establish and organize a National Blood Transfusion
Service Network in order to rationalize and improve the
provision of adequate and safe supply of blood;
h)
to provide for adequate assistance to
institutions promoting voluntary blood donation and
providing non-profit blood services, either through a
system of reimbursement for costs from patients who can
afford to pay, or donations from governmental and nongovernmental entities;
i)
to require all blood collection units and blood
banks/centers to operate on a non-profit basis;
j)
to establish scientific and professional
standards for the operation of blood collection units and
blood banks/centers in the Philippines;
k)
to regulate and ensure the safety of all
activities related to the collection, storage and banking of
blood; and,
l)
to require upgrading of blood banks/centers
to include preventive services and education to control
spread of blood transfusion transmissible diseases.

In this regard, the Secretary did not go beyond the powers

granted to him by the Act when said phase-out period was
extended in accordance with the Act as laid out in Section
2 thereof:
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy In order to promote
public health, it is hereby declared the policy of the state:

Petitioners also assert that the law and its implementing

rules and regulations violate the equal protection clause
enshrined in the Constitution because it unduly
discriminates against commercial or free standing blood
banks in a manner that is not germane to the purpose of
the law.[42]

a)
to promote and encourage voluntary blood
donation by the citizenry and to instill public
consciousness of the principle that blood donation is a
humanitarian act;

What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection

of the laws is a question not always easily determined. No
rule that will cover every case can be formulated. Class
legislation, discriminating against some and favoring
others is prohibited but classification on a reasonable
basis and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted.
The classification, however, to be reasonable: (a) must be

based on substantial distinctions which make real

differences; (b) must be germane to the purpose of the
law; (c) must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and, (d) must apply equally to each member of the class.
[43]
Republic Act No. 7719 or The National Blood Services Act
of 1994, was enacted for the promotion of public health
and welfare. In the aforementioned study conducted by
the New Tropical Medicine Foundation, it was revealed
that the Philippine blood banking system is disturbingly
primitive and unsafe, and with its current condition, the
spread of infectious diseases such as malaria, AIDS,
Hepatitis B and syphilis chiefly from blood transfusion is
unavoidable. The situation becomes more distressing as
the study showed that almost 70% of the blood supply in
the country is sourced from paid blood donors who are
three times riskier than voluntary blood donors because
they are unlikely to disclose their medical or social history
during the blood screening.[44]
The above study led to the passage of Republic Act No.
7719, to instill public consciousness of the importance and
benefits of voluntary blood donation, safe blood supply
and proper blood collection from healthy donors. To do
this, the Legislature decided to order the phase out of
commercial blood banks to improve the Philippine blood
banking system, to regulate the supply and proper
collection of safe blood, and so as not to derail the
implementation of the voluntary blood donation program of
the government. In lieu of commercial blood banks, nonprofit blood banks or blood centers, in strict adherence to
professional and scientific standards to be established by
the DOH, shall be set in place.[45]
Based on the foregoing, the Legislature never intended for
the law to create a situation in which unjustifiable
discrimination and inequality shall be allowed. To
effectuate its policy, a classification was made between
nonprofit blood banks/centers and commercial blood
banks.
We deem the classification to be valid and reasonable for
the following reasons:
One, it was based on substantial distinctions. The former
operates for purely humanitarian reasons and as a
medical service while the latter is motivated by profit. Also,
while the former wholly encourages voluntary blood
donation, the latter treats blood as a sale of commodity.
Two, the classification, and the consequent phase out of
commercial blood banks is germane to the purpose of the
law, that is, to provide the nation with an adequate supply
of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and
treating blood transfusion as a humanitarian or medical
service rather than a commodity. This necessarily involves
the phase out of commercial blood banks based on the
fact that they operate as a business enterprise, and they
source their blood supply from paid blood donors who are
considered unsafe compared to voluntary blood donors as
shown by the USAID-sponsored study on the Philippine
blood banking system.
Three, the Legislature intended for the general application
of the law. Its enactment was not solely to address the
peculiar circumstances of the situation nor was it intended
to apply only to the existing conditions.

Lastly, the law applies equally to all commercial blood

banks without exception.
Having said that, this Court comes to the inquiry as to
whether or not Republic Act No. 7719 constitutes a valid
exercise of police power.
The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation
of the State. The health of the people is a primordial
governmental concern. Basically, the National Blood
Services Act was enacted in the exercise of the States
police power in order to promote and preserve public
health and safety.
Police power of the state is validly exercised if (a) the
interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those
of a particular class, requires the interference of the State;
and, (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to
the attainment of the objective sought to be accomplished
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.[46]
In the earlier discussion, the Court has mentioned of the
avowed policy of the law for the protection of public health
by ensuring an adequate supply of safe blood in the
country through voluntary blood donation. Attaining this
objective requires the interference of the State given the
disturbing condition of the Philippine blood banking
system.
In serving the interest of the public, and to give meaning to
the purpose of the law, the Legislature deemed it
necessary to phase out commercial blood banks. This
action may seriously affect the owners and operators, as
well as the employees, of commercial blood banks but
their interests must give way to serve a higher end for the
interest of the public.
The Court finds that the National Blood Services Act is a
valid exercise of the States police power. Therefore, the
Legislature, under the circumstances, adopted a course of
action that is both necessary and reasonable for the
common good. Police power is the State authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare.[47]
It is in this regard that the Court finds the related grounds
and/or issues raised by petitioners, namely, deprivation of
personal liberty and property, and violation of the nonimpairment clause, to be unmeritorious.
Petitioners are of the opinion that the Act is
unconstitutional and void because it infringes on the
freedom of choice of an individual in connection to what he
wants to do with his blood which should be outside the
domain of State intervention. Additionally, and in relation to
the issue of classification, petitioners asseverate that,
indeed, under the Civil Code, the human body and its
organs like the heart, the kidney and the liver are outside
the commerce of man but this cannot be made to apply to
human blood because the latter can be replenished by the
body. To treat human blood equally as the human organs
would constitute invalid classification. [48]
Petitioners likewise claim that the phase out of the
commercial blood banks will be disadvantageous to them
as it will affect their businesses and existing contracts with
hospitals and other health institutions, hence Section 7 of
the Act should be struck down because it violates the nonimpairment clause provided by the Constitution.

As stated above, the State, in order to promote the

general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with
property, and with business and occupations. Thus,
persons may be subjected to certain kinds of restraints
and burdens in order to secure the general welfare of the
State and to this fundamental aim of government, the
rights of the individual may be subordinated.[49]
Moreover, in the case of Philippine Association of Service
Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon,[50] settled is the rule that the
non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to
the loftier purposes targeted by the government. The right
granted by this provision must submit to the demands and
necessities of the States power of regulation. While the
Court understands the grave implications of Section 7 of
the law in question, the concern of the Government in this
case, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of
business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is
profits that suffer as a result of government regulation.
Furthermore, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all
contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of
the State and not only may regulations which affect them
be established by the State, but all such regulations must
be subject to change from time to time, as the general
well-being of the community may require, or as the
circumstances may change, or as experience may
demonstrate the necessity.[51] This doctrine was
reiterated in the case of Vda. de Genuino v. Court of
Agrarian Relations[52] where the Court held that individual
rights to contract and to property have to give way to
police power exercised for public welfare.
As for determining whether or not the shutdown of
commercial blood banks will truly serve the general public
considering the shortage of blood supply in the country as
proffered by petitioners, we maintain that the wisdom of
the Legislature in the lawful exercise of its power to enact
laws cannot be inquired into by the Court. Doing so would
be in derogation of the principle of separation of powers.
[53]
That, under the circumstances, proper regulation of all
blood banks without distinction in order to achieve the
objective of the law as contended by petitioners is, of
course, possible; but, this would be arguing on what the
law may be or should be and not what the law is. Between
is and ought there is a far cry. The wisdom and propriety of
legislation is not for this Court to pass upon.[54]
Finally, with regard to the petition for contempt in G.R. No.
139147, on the other hand, the Court finds respondent
Secretary of Healths explanation satisfactory. The
statements in the flyers and posters were not aimed at
influencing or threatening the Court in deciding in favor of
the constitutionality of the law.
Contempt of court presupposes a contumacious attitude, a
flouting or arrogant belligerence in defiance of the court.
[55] There is nothing contemptuous about the statements
and information contained in the health advisory that were
distributed by DOH before the TRO was issued by this

Court ordering the former to cease and desist from

distributing the same.
In sum, the Court has been unable to find any
constitutional infirmity in the questioned provisions of the
National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations.
The fundamental criterion is that all reasonable doubts
should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a
statute. Every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must be shown
that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and
beyond reasonable doubt.[56] Those who petition this
Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional
must clearly establish the basis therefor. Otherwise, the
petition must fail.
Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge
the constitutionality of the National Blood Services Act of
1994 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the
Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the
presumption of constitutionality of the law. As to whether
the Act constitutes a wise legislation, considering the
issues being raised by petitioners, is for Congress to
determine.[57]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders
judgment as follows:
1.
In G.R. Nos. 133640 and
133661, the Court UPHOLDS THE VALIDITY of Section 7
of Republic Act No. 7719, otherwise known as the National
Blood Services Act of 1994, and Administrative Order No.
9, Series of 1995 or the Rules and Regulations
Implementing Republic Act No. 7719. The petitions are
DISMISSED. Consequently, the Temporary Restraining
Order issued by this Court on June 2, 1998, is LIFTED.
2.
In G.R. No. 139147, the
petition seeking to cite the Secretary of Health in contempt
of court is DENIED for lack of merit.

account the unremitted amounts and the acquisition cost

of the Honda City, Alfredo pilfered a total amount of
P1,046,000.00 to its prejudice and damage.5
In his counter-affidavit, Alfredo raised, among others, Juno
Cars supposed failure to prove ownership over the five (5)
cars or its right to possess them with the purported
unremitted payments. Hence, it could not have suffered
damage.6
On March 4, 2008, Provincial Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado
issued a Resolution7 finding probable cause and
recommending the filing of an information against Alfredo
for qualified theft and estafa.
Alfredo moved for reconsideration, but the motion was
denied.8 He then filed a petition for review with the
Department of Justice on May 16, 2008.9
G.R. No. 197293

April 21, 2014

ALFREDO C. MENDOZA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND JUNO CARS, INC.,
Respondents.
DECISION

While Alfredos motion for reconsideration was still

pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Mandaluyong, two informations for qualified theft10 and
estafa11 were filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
212, Mandaluyong City. On March 31, 2008, Alfredo filed a
motion for determination of probable cause12 before the
trial court. On April 28, 2008, he also filed a motion to
defer arraignment.

LEONEN, J.:
While the determination of probable cause to charge a
person of a crime is the sole function of the. prosecutor,
the trial court may, in the protection of one's fundamental
right to liberty, dismiss the case if, upon a personal
assessment of the evidence, it finds that the evidence
does not establish probable cause.
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the
Court of Appeals' decision2 dated January 14, 2011, which
reversed the Regional Trial Court's dismissal of the
complaint against petitioner Alfredo C. Mendoza for
qualified theft and estafa.
This case stems from a complaint-affidavit filed by Juno
Cars, Inc. through its representative, Raul C. Evangelista,
on January 8, 2008 for qualified theft and estafa against
Alfredo.3
In the complaint-affidavit, Juno Cars alleged that on June
2, 2007, it hired Alfredo as Trade-In/Used Car Supervisor.
On November 19, 2007, its Dealer/Operator, Rolando
Garcia, conducted a partial audit of the used cars and
discovered that five (5) cars had been sold and released
by Alfredo without Rolandos or the finance managers
permission.4
The partial audit showed that the buyers of the five cars
made payments, but Alfredo failed to remit the payments
totalling P886,000.00. It was further alleged that while
there were 20 cars under Alfredos custody, only 18 were
accounted for. Further investigation revealed that Alfredo
failed to turn over the files of a 2001 Hyundai Starex and a
Honda City 1.5 LXI. Juno Cars alleged that taking into

Several clarificatory hearings were scheduled but were not

conducted.13 On February 4, 2009, the parties agreed to
submit all pending incidents, including the clarificatory
hearing, for resolution.14
On March 3, 2009, the trial court, through Presiding Judge
Rizalina Capco-Umali, issued an order15 dismissing the
complaint, stating that:
After conducting an independent assessment of the
evidence on record which includes the assailed Resolution
dated 04 March 2008, the court holds that the evidence
adduced does not support a finding of probable cause for
the offenses of qualified theft and estafa. x x x.16
Juno Cars filed a motion for reconsideration, which the
trial court denied on July 3, 2009.17
Juno Cars then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals, arguing that the trial court acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion
when it dismissed the complaint. It argued that "the
determination of probable cause and the decision whether
or not to file a criminal case in court, rightfully belongs to
the public prosecutor."18
On January 14, 2011, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision,19 reversed the trial court, and reinstated the
case. In its decision, the appellate court ruled that the trial
court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction "in
supplanting the public prosecutors findings of probable
cause with her own findings of insufficiency of evidence
and lack of probable cause."20

Aggrieved, Alfredo filed a petition for review under Rule 45

before this court. In essence, he argued that the trial court
was correct in finding that there was no probable cause as
shown by the evidence on record. He argued that "judicial
determination of probable cause is broader than [the]
executive determination of probable cause"21 and that "[i]t
is not correct to say that the determination of probable
cause is exclusively vested on the prosecutor x x x."22
In its comment,23 Juno Cars argued that Alfredo
presented questions, issues, and arguments that were a
mere rehash of those already considered and passed
upon by the appellate court.
The Office of the Solicitor General, arguing for public
respondent, stated in its comment24 that the appellate
court correctly sustained the public prosecutor in his
findings of probable cause against Alfredo. Since there
was no showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado, the trial court should respect
his determination of probable cause.
In his reply,25 Alfredo reiterated that "judicial
determination of probable cause[,] while not a superior
faculty[,] covers a broader encompassing perspective in
the disposition of the issue on the existence of probable
cause."26 He argued that the findings of the trial court
should be accorded greater weight than the appellate
courts. It merely reviewed the findings of the trial court.
The primordial issue is whether the trial court may dismiss
an information filed by the prosecutor on the basis of its
own independent finding of lack of probable cause.
Time and again, this court has been confronted with the
issue of the difference between the determination of
probable cause by the prosecutor on one hand and the
determination of probable cause by the judge on the other.
We examine these two concepts again.
Juno Cars filed a complaint against Alfredo for qualified
theft27 and estafa under Article 315, fourth paragraph, no.
3(c)28 of the Revised Penal Code. Since qualified theft is
punishable by reclusion perpetua, a preliminary
investigation must first be conducted "to determine
whether there is sufficient ground to engender a wellfounded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held
for trial," in accordance with Rule 112, Section 1 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure.
At this stage, the conduct of the preliminary investigation
and the subsequent determination of the existence of
probable cause lie solely within the discretion of the public
prosecutor.29 If upon evaluation of the evidence, the
prosecutor finds sufficient basis to find probable cause, he
or she shall then cause the filing of the information with
the court.
Once the information has been filed, the judge shall then
"personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and
its supporting evidence"30 to determine whether there is

probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest. At this stage,

a judicial determination of probable cause exists.
In People v. Castillo and Mejia,31 this court has stated:
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause:
executive and judicial. The executive determination of
probable cause is one made during preliminary
investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the
public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to
determine whether probable cause exists and to charge
those whom he believes to have committed the crime as
defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise
stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to
determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in
court. Whether or not that function has been correctly
discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he
has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of
probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court
itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other
hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a
warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused.
The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence
submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused
under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be
forced to issue the arrest warrant.32
The difference is clear: The executive determination of
probable cause concerns itself with whether there is
enough evidence to support an Information being filed.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other
hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be
issued. In People v. Inting:33
x x x Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the
preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary
investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender
should be held for trial or released. Even if the two
inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same
proceeding, there should be no confusion about the
objectives. The determination of probable cause for the
warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary
investigation properwhether or not there is reasonable
ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense
charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be
subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of
trialis the function of the Prosecutor.34 (Emphasis
supplied)
While it is within the trial courts discretion to make an
independent assessment of the evidence on hand, it is
only for the purpose of determining whether a warrant of
arrest should be issued. The judge does not act as an
appellate court of the prosecutor and has no capacity to
review the prosecutors determination of probable cause;
rather, the judge makes a determination of probable cause
independent of the prosecutors finding.

People v. Court of Appeals and Jonathan Cerbo35

discussed the rationale. In that case, Jonathan Cerbo
allegedly shot Rosalinda Dy in the presence of his father,
Billy Cerbo. An information for murder was filed against
Jonathan Cerbo. The daughter of Rosalinda Dy, as private
complainant, executed a complaint-affidavit charging Billy
Cerbo with conspiracy. The prosecutor then filed a motion
to amend the information, which was granted by the court.
The information was then amended to include Billy Cerbo
as one of the accused, and a warrant of arrest was issued
against him.
Billy Cerbo filed a motion to quash the warrant arguing
that it was issued without probable cause. The trial court
granted this motion, recalled the warrant, and dismissed
the case against him. The Court of Appeals affirmed this
dismissal. This court, however, reversed the Court of
Appeals and ordered the reinstatement of the amended
information against Billy Cerbo, stating that:
In granting this petition, we are not prejudging the criminal
case or the guilt or innocence of Private Respondent Billy
Cerbo. We are simply saying that, as a general rule, if the
information is valid on its face and there is no showing of
manifest error, grave abuse of discretion or prejudice on
the part of the public prosecutor, courts should not dismiss
it for want of evidence, because evidentiary matters
should be presented and heard during the trial. The
functions and duties of both the trial court and the public
prosecutor in "the proper scheme of things" in our criminal
justice system should be clearly understood.
The rights of the people from what could sometimes be an
"oppressive" exercise of government prosecutorial powers
do need to be protected when circumstances so require.
But just as we recognize this need, we also acknowledge
that the State must likewise be accorded due process.
Thus, when there is no showing of nefarious irregularity or
manifest error in the performance of a public prosecutors
duties, courts ought to refrain from interfering with such
lawfully and judicially mandated duties.
In any case, if there was palpable error or grave abuse of
discretion in the public prosecutors finding of probable
cause, the accused can appeal such finding to the justice
secretary and move for the deferment or suspension of the
proceedings until such appeal is resolved.36 (Emphasis
supplied)

Jurisdiction over an accused is acquired when the warrant

of arrest is served. Absent this, the court cannot hold the
accused for arraignment and trial.
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
The Constitution prohibits the issuance of search warrants
or warrants of arrest where the judge has not personally
determined the existence of probable cause. The phrase
"upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce" allows a
determination of probable cause by the judge ex parte.
For this reason, Section 6, paragraph (a) of Rule 112 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure mandates the judge to
"immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record
fails to establish probable cause." Section 6, paragraph (a)
of Rule 112 reads:
Section 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. (a) By the
Regional Trial Court. Within ten (10) days from the filing
of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally
evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its
supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the
case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue
a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused
has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by
the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or
when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to
section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of
probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to
present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice
and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty
(30) days from the filing of the complaint of information.
In People v. Hon. Yadao:38

In this case, the resolution dated March 4, 2008 of

Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado found that the facts and
evidence were "sufficient to warrant the indictment of
[petitioner] x x x."37 There was nothing in his resolution
which showed that he issued it beyond the discretion
granted to him by law and jurisprudence.
While the information filed by Prosecutor Delgado was
valid, Judge Capco-Umali still had the discretion to make
her own finding of whether probable cause existed to
order the arrest of the accused and proceed with trial.

Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial

court three options upon the filing of the criminal
information: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record
clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) issue a
warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (3) order
the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five
days from notice in case of doubt as to the existence of
probable cause.
But the option to order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence is not mandatory.1wphi1 The courts first option
under the above is for it to "immediately dismiss the case if

the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable

cause." That is the situation here: the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause against the
respondents.39 (Emphasis supplied)
It is also settled that "once a complaint or information is
filed in court, any disposition of the case, whether as to its
dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the accused,
rests in the sound discretion of the court."40
In this case, Judge Capco-Umali made an independent
assessment of the evidence on record and concluded that
"the evidence adduced does not support a finding of
probable cause for the offenses of qualified theft and
estafa."41 Specifically, she found that Juno Cars "failed to
prove by competent evidence"42 that the vehicles alleged
to have been pilfered by Alfredo were lawfully possessed
or owned by them, or that these vehicles were received by
Alfredo, to be able to substantiate the charge of qualified
theft. She also found that the complaint "[did] not state
with particularity the exact value of the alleged office files
or their valuation purportedly have been removed,
concealed or destroyed by the accused,"43 which she
found crucial to the prosecution of the crime of estafa
under Article 315, fourth paragraph, no. 3(c) of the
Revised Penal Code. She also noted that:
x x x As a matter of fact, this court had even ordered that
this case be set for clarificatory hearing to clear out
essential matters pertinent to the offense charged and
even directed the private complainant to bring documents
relative to the same/payment as well as affidavit of
witnesses/buyers with the end view of satisfying itself that
indeed probable cause exists to commit the present case
which private complainant failed to do.44
Accordingly, with the present laws and jurisprudence on
the matter, Judge Capco-Umali correctly dismissed the
case against Alfredo.
Although jurisprudence and procedural rules allow it, a
judge must always proceed with caution in dismissing
cases due to lack of probable cause, considering the
preliminary nature of the evidence before it. It is only when
he or she finds that the evidence on hand absolutely fails
to support a finding of probable cause that he or she can
dismiss the case. On the other hand, if a judge finds
probable cause, he or she must not hesitate to proceed
with arraignment and trial in order that justice may be
served.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision
dated January 14, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP. No. 110774 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Criminal Case Nos. MC08-11604-05 against Alfredo C.
Mendoza are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

According to the prosecution, at about 6:00 a.m. of

November 25, 2005, Police Senior Inspector Sofronio
Bayan (PSI Bayan) of the San Gabriel Police Station in
San Gabriel, La Union, received a text message from an
unidentified civilian informer2 that one Marvin Buya (also
known as Marvin Bugat) [would] be transporting
marijuana3 from Barangay Lun-Oy, San Gabriel, La
Union to the Poblacion of San Gabriel, La
Union.4cralawred
PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order to intercept the
suspect.5 PSI Bayan ordered SPO1 Jaime Taracatac, Jr.
(SPO1 Taracatac), a member of the San Gabriel Police, to
set up a checkpoint in the waiting area of passengers from
San Gabriel bound for San Fernando City.6cralawred
G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RespondentAppellee, v. VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA, AccusedAppellant.
DECISION

A passenger jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at

SPO1 Taracatacs checkpoint.7
The jeepney driver
disembarked and signalled to SPO1 Taracatac indicating
the two male passengers who were carrying marijuana.8
SPO1 Taracatac approached the two male passengers
who were later identified as Victor Romana Cogaed and
Santiago Sacpa Dayao.9 Cogaed was carrying a blue bag
and a sack while Dayao was holding a yellow
bag.10cralawred

LEONEN, J.:
The mantle of protection upon ones person and ones
effects through Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution is
essential to allow citizens to evolve their autonomy and,
hence, to avail themselves of their right to privacy. The
alleged compromise with the battle against dangerous
drugs is more apparent than real. Often, the compromise
is there because law enforcers neglect to perform what
could have been done to uphold the Constitution as they
pursue those who traffic this scourge of society.
Squarely raised in this appeal1 is the admissibility of the
evidence seized as a result of a warrantless arrest. The
police officers identified the alleged perpetrator through
facts that were not based on their personal knowledge.
The information as to the accuseds whereabouts was
sent through a text message. The accused who never
acted suspicious was identified by a driver. The bag that
allegedly contained the contraband was required to be
opened under intimidating circumstances and without the
accused having been fully apprised of his rights.
This was not a reasonable search within the meaning of
the Constitution. There was no reasonable suspicion that
would allow a legitimate stop and frisk action. The
alleged waiver of rights by the accused was not done
intelligently, knowingly, and without improper pressure or
coercion.
The evidence, therefore, used against the accused should
be excluded consistent with Article III, Section 3 (2) of the
Constitution.
There being no possible admissible
evidence, the accused should be acquitted.
I

SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the

contents of their bags.11 Cogaed and Dayao told SPO1
Taracatac that they did not know since they were
transporting the bags as a favor for their barriomate
named Marvin.12 After this exchange, Cogaed opened
the blue bag, revealing three bricks of what looked like
marijuana.13 Cogaed then muttered, nagloko daytoy nga
Marvinen, kastoy met gayam ti nagyanna, which
translates to Marvin is a fool, this is what [is] contained in
the bag.14 SPO1 Taracatac arrested [Cogaed] and . . .
Dayao and brought them to the police station.15 Cogaed
and Dayao were still carrying their respective bags16
inside the station.17cralawred
While at the police station, the Chief of Police and
Investigator PO3 Stanley Campit (PO3 Campit) requested
Cogaed and Dayao to empty their bags.18
Inside
Cogaeds sack was four (4) rolled pieces of suspected
marijuana fruiting tops,19 and inside Dayaos yellow bag
was a brick of suspected marijuana.20cralawred
PO3 Campit prepared the suspected marijuana for
laboratory testing.21 PSI Bayan personally delivered the
suspected marijuana to the PNP Crime Laboratory.22
Forensic Chemical Officer Police Inspector Valeriano
Panem Laya II performed the tests and found that the
objects obtained were indeed marijuana.23
The
marijuana collected from Cogaeds blue bag had a total
weight of 8,091.5 grams.24 The marijuana from Cogaeds
sack weighed 4,246.1 grams.25 The marijuana collected
from Dayaos bag weighed 5,092 grams.26 A total of
17,429.6 grams were collected from Cogaeds and
Dayaos bags.27cralawred
According to Cogaeds testimony during trial, he was at
Balbalayan, La Union, waiting for a jeepney to take

him28 to the Poblacion of San Gabriel so he could buy

pesticide.29 He boarded a jeepney and recognized
Dayao, his younger brothers friend.30 Upon arrival at the
Poblacion of San Gabriel, Dayao and Cogaed alighted
from the jeepney.31
Dayao allegedly asked for
[Cogaeds] help in carrying his things, which included a
travelling bag and a sack.32 Cogaed agreed because
they were both going to the market.33 This was when
SPO1 Taracatac approached them, and when SPO1
Taracatac asked Cogaed what was inside the bags,
Cogaed replied that he did not know.34 SPO1 Taracatac
then talked to Dayao, however, Cogaed was not privy to
their conversation.35
Thereafter, SPO1 Taracatac
arrested Dayao and Cogaed and brought them to the
police station.36 These facts were corroborated by an
eyewitness, Teodoro Nalpu-ot, who was standing across
the
parking
lot
where
Cogaed
was
apprehended.37cralawred
At the police station, Cogaed said that SPO1 Taracatac
hit [him] on the head.38 The bags were also opened, but
Cogaed never knew what was inside.39cralawred
It was only later when Cogaed learned that it was
marijuana when he and Dayao were charged with illegal
possession of dangerous drugs under Republic Act No.
9165.40
The
information
against
them
states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

2002) and sentences him to suffer life imprisonment, and

to pay a fine of one million pesos (Php
1,000,000.00).46chanrobleslaw
The trial court judge initially found Cogaeds arrest illegal
considering that Cogaed at that time was not, at the
moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was shown
that he was about to do so or that had just done so. He
just alighted from the passenger jeepney and there was no
outward indication that called for his arrest.47 Since the
arrest was illegal, the warrantless search should also be
considered illegal.48 However, the trial court stated that
notwithstanding the illegality of the arrest, Cogaed waived
his right to object to such irregularity 49 when he did not
protest when SPO1 Taracatac, after identifying himself,
asked him to open his bag.50cralawred
Cogaed appealed51 the trial courts decision. However,
the Court of Appeals denied his appeal and affirmed the
trial courts decision.52 The Court of Appeals found that
Cogaed waived his right against warrantless searches
when [w]ithout any prompting from SPO1 Taracatac, [he]
voluntarily opened his bag.53 Hence, this appeal was
filed.
The following errors were assigned by Cogaed in his
appellants brief:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I

That on or about the 25th day of November, 2005, in the

Municipality of San Gabriel, Province of La Union, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA and
SANTIAGO DAYAO Y SACPA (who acted with
discernment) and JOHN DOE, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, did then there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly, without being
authorized by law, have in their control, custody and
possession dried marijuana, a dangerous drug, with a total
weight of seventeen thousand, four hundred twenty-nine
and six-tenths (17, 429.6) grams.
CONTRARY TO Section 11 (Possession of Dangerous
Drugs), Article II, of Republic Act No. 9165 (otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002).41
The case was raffled to Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of
San Fernando City, La Union.42 Cogaed and Dayao
pleaded not guilty.43 The case was dismissed against
Dayao because he was only 14 years old at that time and
was exempt from criminal liability under the Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 or Republic Act No.
9344.44 Trial against Cogaed ensued. In a decision45
dated May 21, 2008, the Regional Trial Court found
Cogaed guilty. The dispositive portion of the decision
states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Victor Cogaed y
Romana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING

THE SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS AS EVIDENCE
AGAINST THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE BEING
THE RESULT OF AN UNLAWFUL WARRANTLESS
SEARCH AND SEIZURE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING
THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT
DESPITE
THE
ARRESTING OFFICERS NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROPER CUSTODY OF
SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 9165.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING
THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT
DESPITE
THE
ARRESTING OFFICERS FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE
INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE SEIZED
DANGEROUS DRUGS.54
For our consideration are the following issues: (1) whether
there was a valid search and seizure of marijuana as
against the appellant; (2) whether the evidence obtained
through the search should be admitted; and (3) whether
there was enough evidence to sustain the conviction of the
accused.

In view of the disposition of this case, we deem that a

discussion with respect to the requirements on the chain
of custody of dangerous drugs unnecessary.55cralawred

thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion

amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed
a criminal activity;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

We find for the accused.

Consented warrantless search;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

II

Customs search;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The right to privacy is a fundamental right enshrined by

implication in our Constitution. It has many dimensions.
One of its dimensions is its protection through the
prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures in
Article
III,
Section
2
of
the
Constitution:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Stop and frisk; andChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

One of these jurisprudential exceptions to search warrants

is stop and frisk. Stop and frisk searches are often
confused with searches incidental to lawful arrests under
the Rules of Court.63 Searches incidental to a lawful
arrest require that a crime be committed in flagrante
delicto, and the search conducted within the vicinity and
within reach by the person arrested is done to ensure that
there are no weapons, as well as to preserve the
evidence.64cralawred

This provision requires that the court examine with care

and diligence whether searches and seizures are
reasonable. As a general rule, searches conducted with
a warrant that meets all the requirements of this provision
are reasonable. This warrant requires the existence of
probable cause that can only be determined by a judge.56
The existence of probable cause must be established by
the judge after asking searching questions and
answers.57 Probable cause at this stage can only exist if
there is an offense alleged to be committed. Also, the
warrant frames the searches done by the law enforcers.
There must be a particular description of the place and the
things to be searched.58cralawred
However, there are instances when searches are
reasonable even when warrantless.59 In the Rules of
Court, searches incidental to lawful arrests are allowed
even without a separate warrant.60 This court has taken
into account the uniqueness of circumstances involved
including the purpose of the search or seizure, the
presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in
which the search and seizure was made, the place or
thing searched, and the character of the articles
procured.61 The known jurisprudential instances of
reasonable
warrantless
searches
and
seizures
are:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest . . .
;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Seizure of evidence in
;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

plain

view,

Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the

government, the vehicles inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public

Exigent and
omitted)

emergency circumstances.62

(Citations

III

On the other hand, stop and frisk searches are

conducted to prevent the occurrence of a crime. For
instance, the search in Posadas v. Court of Appeals65
was similar to a stop and frisk situation whose object is
either to determine the identity of a suspicious individual or
to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police
officer seeks to obtain more information.66 This court
stated that the stop and frisk search should be used
[w]hen dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially
criminal situation in the city streets where unarguably
there is no time to secure . . . a search
warrant.67cralawred
The search involved in this case was initially a stop and
frisk search, but it did not comply with all the
requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution.
Stop and frisk searches (sometimes referred to as Terry
searches68) are necessary for law enforcement. That is,
law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent
the commission of offenses. However, this should be
balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in
accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
The balance lies in the concept of suspiciousness
present in the situation where the police officer finds
himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on
the experience of the police officer. Experienced police
officers have personal experience dealing with criminals
and criminal behavior. Hence, they should have the ability
to discern based on facts that they themselves observe
whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner.
Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the police officer,
with his or her personal knowledge, must observe the
facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.

In Manalili v. Court of Appeals,69 the police officers were

initially informed about a place frequented by people
abusing drugs.70 When they arrived, one of the police
officers saw a man with reddish eyes and [who was]
walking in a swaying manner.71 The suspicion increased
when the man avoided the police officers.72 These
observations led the police officers to conclude that the
man was high on drugs.73 These were sufficient facts
observed by the police officers to stop [the] petitioner
[and] investigate.74cralawred

It is the police officer who should observe facts that would

lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion of a person. The
police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by
another person. This is necessary to justify that the
person suspected be stopped and reasonably
searched.85
Anything less than this would be an
infringement upon ones basic right to security of ones
person and effects.

In People v. Solayao,75 police officers noticed a man who

appeared drunk.76 This man was also wearing a
camouflage uniform or a jungle suit.77 Upon seeing the
police, the man fled.78
His flight added to the
suspicion.79 After stopping him, the police officers found
an unlicensed homemade firearm80 in his possession.81
This court ruled that [u]nder the circumstances, the
government agents could not possibly have procured a
search warrant first.82 This was also a valid search.

Normally, stop and frisk searches do not give the law

enforcer an opportunity to confer with a judge to determine
probable cause. In Posadas v. Court of Appeals,86 one of
the earliest cases adopting the stop and frisk doctrine in
Philippine jurisprudence, this court approximated the
suspicious
circumstances
as
probable
cause:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In these cases, the police officers using their senses

observed facts that led to the suspicion. Seeing a man
with reddish eyes and walking in a swaying manner, based
on their experience, is indicative of a person who uses
dangerous and illicit drugs. A drunk civilian in guerrilla
wear is probably hiding something as well.
The case of Cogaed was different. He was simply a
passenger carrying a bag and traveling aboard a jeepney.
There was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal, about
riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. The assessment of
suspicion was not made by the police officer but by the
jeepney driver. It was the driver who signalled to the
police that Cogaed was suspicious.
This is supported by the testimony of SPO1 Taracatac
himself:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
COURT:
Q
So you dont know what was the content while it was still
being carried by him in the passenger jeep?
WITNESS:
A
Not yet, Your Honor.83
SPO1
Taracatac
stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

likewise

COURT:
Q
If the driver did not make a gesture pointing to the
accused, did you have reason to believe that the accused
were carrying marijuana?
WITNESS:
A
No, Your Honor.84
The jeepney driver had to point to Cogaed. He would not
have been identified by the police officers otherwise.

IV

The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted

suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there
was a probable cause that he was concealing something
illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police
officers
to
inspect
the
same.87
(Emphasis
supplied)chanrobleslaw
For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as
a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant
a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty
of the offense with which he is charged.88cralawred
Malacat v. Court of Appeals89 clarifies the requirement
further. It does not have to be probable cause, but it
cannot be mere suspicion.90 It has to be a genuine
reason91to serve the purposes of the stop and frisk
exception:92cralawred
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause
is not required to conduct a stop and frisk, it nevertheless
holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a
stop and frisk. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the
police officers experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons
concealed about him.93 (Emphasis supplied, footnotes
omitted)
In his dissent for Esquillo v. People,94 Justice Bersamin
reminds us that police officers must not rely on a single
suspicious circumstance.95 There should be presence of
more than one seemingly innocent activity, which, taken
together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal
activity.96
The Constitution prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures.97 Certainly, reliance on only one
suspicious circumstance or none at all will not result in a
reasonable search.98cralawred
There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this
case, and there was no approximation for the probable
cause requirement for warrantless arrest. The person
searched was not even the person mentioned by the
informant. The informant gave the name of Marvin Buya,

and the person searched was Victor Cogaed. Even if it

was true that Cogaed responded by saying that he was
transporting the bag to Marvin Buya, this still remained
only as one circumstance. This should not have been
enough reason to search Cogaed and his belongings
without a valid search warrant.
V
Police officers cannot justify unbridled searches and be
shielded by this exception, unless there is compliance with
the genuine reason requirement and that the search
serves the purpose of protecting the public. As stated in
Malacat:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[A] stop-and-frisk serves a two-fold interest: (1) the
general interest of effective crime prevention and
detection, which underlies the recognition that a police
officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of
investigating possible criminal behavior even without
probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of
safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer
to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom
he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police
officer.99 (Emphasis supplied)
The stop and frisk search was originally limited to outer
clothing and for the purpose of detecting dangerous
weapons.100 As in Manalili,101 jurisprudence also allows
stop and frisk for cases involving dangerous drugs.
The circumstances of this case are analogous to People v.
Aruta.102 In that case, an informant told the police that a
certain Aling Rosa would be bringing in drugs from
Baguio City by bus.103 At the bus terminal, the police
officers prepared themselves.104 The informant pointed
at a woman crossing the street105 and identified her as
Aling Rosa.106 The police apprehended Aling Rosa,
and they alleged that she allowed them to look inside her
bag.107
The
bag
contained
marijuana
leaves.108cralawred
In Aruta, this court found that the search and seizure
conducted was illegal.109 There were no suspicious
circumstances that preceded Arutas arrest and the
subsequent search and seizure.110 It was only the
informant that prompted the police to apprehend her.111
The evidence obtained was not admissible because of the
illegal
search.112
Consequently,
Aruta
was
acquitted.113cralawred
Aruta is almost identical to this case, except that it was the
jeepney driver, not the polices informant, who informed
the police that Cogaed was suspicious.
The facts in Aruta are also similar to the facts in People v.
Aminnudin.114 Here, the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) acted upon a tip, naming Aminnudin as somebody
possessing drugs.115 The NBI waited for the vessel to
arrive and accosted Aminnudin while he was disembarking

from a boat.116 Like in the case at bar, the NBI inspected

Aminnudins bag and found bundles of what turned out to
be marijuana leaves.117 The court declared that the
search and seizure was illegal.118
Aminnudin was
acquitted.119cralawred
People v. Chua120 also presents almost the same
circumstances. In this case, the police had been receiving
information that the accused was distributing drugs in
different karaoke bars in Angeles City.121 One night, the
police received information that this drug dealer would be
dealing drugs at the Thunder Inn Hotel so they conducted
a stakeout.122 A car arrived and parked123 at the
hotel.124 The informant told the police that the man
parked at the hotel was dealing drugs.125 The man
alighted from his car.126 He was carrying a juice box.127
The police immediately apprehended him and discovered
live ammunition and drugs in his person and in the juice
box he was holding.128cralawred
Like in Aruta, this court did not find anything unusual or
suspicious about Chuas situation when the police
apprehended him and ruled that [t]here was no valid
stop-and-frisk.129cralawred
VI
None of the other exceptions to warrantless searches exist
to allow the evidence to be admissible. The facts of this
case do not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful
arrest.
Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for
searches incidental to a lawful arrest. For there to be a
lawful arrest, there should be either a warrant of arrest or
a lawful warrantless arrest as enumerated in Rule 113,
Section
5
of
the
Rules
of
Court:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a)
When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b)
When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c)
When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
The apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a
warrant of arrest. None of the instances enumerated in
Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were present
when the arrest was made.

At the time of his apprehension, Cogaed has not

committed, was not committing, or was about to commit a
crime. As in People v. Chua, for a warrantless arrest of in
flagrante delicto to be affected, two elements must
concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2)
such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of
the arresting officer.130 Both elements were missing
when Cogaed was arrested.131 There were no overt acts
within plain view of the police officers that suggested that
Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that time.

None, maam.
Q
Now, Mr. witness when you went near them and asked
them what were the contents of the bag, you have not
seen any signs of hesitation or fright from them, is it not?
A
It seems they were frightened, maam.
Q
But you actually [claimed] that there was not any
hesitation from them in opening the bags, is it not?
A
Yes, maam but when I went near them it seems that they
were surprised.133 (Emphasis supplied)

Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time;

hence, he could not have qualified for the last allowable
warrantless arrest.

The state of mind of Cogaed was further clarified with

SPO1 Taracatacs responses to Judge Florendos
questions:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

VII

COURT:
....
Q
Did you have eye contact with Cogaed?
A
When I [sic] was alighting from the jeepney, Your Honor I
observed that he was somewhat frightened. He was a little
apprehensive and when he was already stepping down
and he put down the bag I asked him, whats that, and
he answered, I dont know because Marvin only asked
me to carry.134

There can be no valid waiver of Cogaeds constitutional

rights even if we assume that he did not object when the
police asked him to open his bags. As this court
previously stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Appellants silence should not be lightly taken as consent
to such search. The implied acquiescence to the search, if
there was any, could not have been more than mere
passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all
within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.132
(Citations omitted)chanrobleslaw
Cogaeds silence or lack of aggressive objection was a
natural reaction to a coercive environment brought about
by the police officers excessive intrusion into his private
space. The prosecution and the police carry the burden of
showing that the waiver of a constitutional right is one
which is knowing, intelligent, and free from any coercion.
In all cases, such waivers are not to be presumed.
The coercive atmosphere created by the presence of the
police officer can be discerned again from the testimony of
SPO1
Taracatac
during
crossexamination:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ATTY. BINWAG:
Q
Now, Mr. witness, you claimed that you only asked them
what are the contents of their bags, is it not?
WITNESS:
A
Yes, maam.
Q
And then without hesitation and voluntarily they just
opened their bags, is it not?
A
Yes, maam.
Q
So that there was not any order from you for them to open
the bags?
A

For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her

constitutional right, it is not sufficient that the police officer
introduce himself or herself, or be known as a police
officer. The police officer must also inform the person to
be searched that any inaction on his or her part will
amount to a waiver of any of his or her objections that the
circumstances do not amount to a reasonable search.
The police officer must communicate this clearly and in a
language known to the person who is about to waive his or
her constitutional rights. There must be an assurance
given to the police officer that the accused fully
understands his or her rights. The fundamental nature of
a persons constitutional right to privacy requires no less.
VIII
The Constitution provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Any evidence obtained in violation of [the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures] shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.135
Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of
the poisonous tree doctrine, this constitutional provision
originated from Stonehill v. Diokno.136 This rule prohibits
the issuance of general warrants that encourage law
enforcers to go on fishing expeditions. Evidence obtained
through unlawful seizures should be excluded as evidence
because it is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches
and seizures.137 It ensures that the fundamental rights

to ones person, houses, papers, and effects are not lightly

infringed upon and are upheld.
Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed
were founded on the search of his bags, a pronouncement
of the illegality of that search means that there is no
evidence left to convict Cogaed.
Drugs and its illegal traffic are a scourge to our society. In
the fight to eradicate this menace, law enforcers should be
equipped with the resources to be able to perform their
duties better.
However, we cannot, in any way,
compromise our societys fundamental values enshrined in
our Constitution. Otherwise, we will be seen as slowly
dismantling the very foundations of the society that we
seek to protect.
WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 28, San Fernando City, La Union and of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03394 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accusedappellant VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA is hereby
ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement
unless he is being held for some other legal grounds. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Villarama, Jr.,* and
Mendoza, JJ., concur.

O R D E R O F R E LE AS E
TO: The Director
Bureau of Corrections
1770 Muntinlupa City
G R E E T I N G S:
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court on July 30, 2014
promulgated a Decision in the above-entitled case, the
dispositive
portion
of
which
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 28, San Fernando City, La Union and of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03394 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accusedappellant VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA is hereby
ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement
unless he is held for some other legal ground. No costs.
SO ORDERED."

At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45

of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the February
10, 2009 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), which
affirmed with modification the August 29, 2006 decision[2]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 5, Kalibo, Aklan,
finding petitioner guilty of violating Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1866, as amended.

The facts:
Petitioner, Elenita Fajardo, and one Zaldy Valerio (Valerio)
were charged with violation of P.D. No. 1866, as amended,
before the RTC, Branch 5, Kalibo, Aklan, committed as
follows:
ELENITA C. FAJARDO,
Petitioner,

- versus -

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.
G.R. No. 190889
Present:
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:
January 10, 2011
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

That on or about the 28th day of August, 2002, in the

morning, in Barangay Andagao, Municipality of Kalibo,
Province of Aklan, Republic of the Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, without authority of law, permit or license, did
then and there, knowingly, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in their possession, custody and control
two (2) receivers of caliber .45 pistol, [M]odel [No.]
M1911A1 US with SN 763025 and Model [No.] M1911A1
US with defaced serial number, two (2) pieces short
magazine of M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35) pieces live
M16 ammunition 5.56 caliber and fourteen (14) pieces live
caliber .45 ammunition, which items were confiscated and
recovered from their possession during a search
conducted by members of the Provincial Intelligence
Special Operation Group, Aklan Police Provincial Office,
Kalibo, Aklan, by virtue of Search Warrant No. 01 (9) 03
issued by OIC Executive Judge Dean Telan of the
Regional Trial Court of Aklan.[3]
When arraigned on March 25, 2004, both pleaded not
guilty to the offense charged.[4] During pre-trial, they
agreed to the following stipulation of facts:
1.

2.
Accused Elenita Fajardo is the same person subject
of the search warrant in this case who is a resident of
Sampaguita Road, Park Homes, Andagao, Kalibo, Aklan;
3.
Accused Zaldy Valerio was in the house of Elenita
Fajardo in the evening of August 27, 2002 but does not
live therein;
4.

DECISION
NACHURA, J.:

The search warrant subject of this case exists;

Both accused were not duly licensed firearm holders;

5.
The search warrant was served in the house of
accused Elenita Fajardo in the morning of August 28,
2002; and
6.
The accused Elenita Fajardo and Valerio were not
arrested immediately upon the arrival of the military
personnel despite the fact that the latter allegedly saw

them in possession of a firearm in the evening of August

27, 2002.[5]
As culled from the similar factual findings of the RTC and
the CA,[6] these are the chain of events that led to the
filing of the information:
In the evening of August 27, 2002, members of the
Provincial Intelligence Special Operations Group (PISOG)
were
instructed
by
Provincial
Director
Police
Superintendent Edgardo Mendoza (P/Supt. Mendoza) to
respond to the complaint of concerned citizens residing on
Ilang-Ilang and Sampaguita Roads, Park Homes III
Subdivision, Barangay Andagao, Kalibo, Aklan, that armed
men drinking liquor at the residence of petitioner were
indiscriminately firing guns.
Along with the members of the Aklan Police Provincial
Office, the elements of the PISOG proceeded to the area.
Upon arrival thereat, they noticed that several persons
scampered and ran in different directions. The responding
team saw Valerio holding two .45 caliber pistols. He fired
shots at the policemen before entering the house of
petitioner.
Petitioner was seen tucking a .45 caliber handgun
between her waist and the waistband of her shorts, after
which, she entered the house and locked the main door.
To prevent any violent commotion, the policemen desisted
from entering petitioners house but, in order to deter
Valerio from evading apprehension, they cordoned the
perimeter of the house as they waited for further
instructions from P/Supt. Mendoza. A few minutes later,
petitioner went out of the house and negotiated for the
pull-out of the police troops. No agreement materialized.
At around 2:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. of August 28, 2002,
Senior Police Officer 2 Clemencio Nava (SPO2 Nava),
who was posted at the back portion of the house, saw
Valerio emerge twice on top of the house and throw
something. The discarded objects landed near the wall of
petitioners house and inside the compound of a
neighboring residence. SPO2 Nava, together with SPO1
Teodoro Neron and Jerome T. Vega (Vega), radio
announcer/reporter of RMN DYKR, as witness, recovered
the discarded objects, which turned out to be two (2)
receivers of .45 caliber pistol, model no. M1911A1 US,
with serial number (SN) 763025, and model no. M1911A1
US, with a defaced serial number. The recovered items
were then surrendered to SPO1 Nathaniel A. Tan (SPO1
Tan), Group Investigator, who utilized them in applying for
and obtaining a search warrant.
The warrant was served on petitioner at 9:30 a.m.
Together with a barangay captain, barangay kagawad, and
members of the media, as witnesses, the police team
proceeded to search petitioners house. The team found
and was able to confiscate the following:

1.
Two (2) pieces of Short Magazine of M16 Armalite
Rifle;
2.
Thirty five (35) pieces of live M16 ammos 5.56
Caliber; and
3.
Fourteen (14) pieces of live ammos of Caliber 45
pistol.
Since petitioner and Valerio failed to present any
documents showing their authority to possess the
confiscated firearms and the two recovered receivers, a
criminal information for violation of P.D. No. 1866, as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294, was filed
against them.
For their exoneration, petitioner and Valerio argued that
the issuance of the search warrant was defective because
the allegation contained in the application filed and signed
by SPO1 Tan was not based on his personal knowledge.
They quoted this pertinent portion of the application:
That this application was founded on confidential
information received by the Provincial Director, Police
Supt. Edgardo Mendoza.[7]
They further asserted that the execution of the search
warrant was infirm since petitioner, who was inside the
house at the time of the search, was not asked to
accompany the policemen as they explored the place, but
was instead ordered to remain in the living room (sala).
Petitioner disowned the confiscated items. She refused to
sign the inventory/receipt prepared by the raiding team,
because the items allegedly belonged to her brother,
Benito Fajardo, a staff sergeant of the Philippine Army.
Petitioner denied that she had a .45 caliber pistol tucked in
her waistband when the raiding team arrived. She averred
that such situation was implausible because she was
wearing garterized shorts and a spaghetti-strapped
hanging blouse.[8]

Ruling of the RTC

The RTC rejected the defenses advanced by accused,
holding that the same were already denied in the Orders
dated December 31, 2002 and April 20, 2005, respectively
denying the Motion to Quash Search Warrant and
Demurrer to Evidence. The said Orders were not appealed
and have thus attained finality. The RTC also ruled that
petitioner and Valerio were estopped from assailing the
legality of their arrest since they participated in the trial by
presenting evidence for their defense. Likewise, by
applying for bail, they have effectively waived such
irregularities and defects.
In finding the accused liable for illegal possession of
firearms, the RTC explained:
Zaldy Valerio, the bodyguard of Elenita Fajardo, is a
former soldier, having served with the Philippine Army
prior to his separation from his service for going on

absence without leave (AWOL). With his military

background, it is safe to conclude that Zaldy Valerio is
familiar with and knowledgeable about different types of
firearms and ammunitions. As a former soldier,
undoubtedly, he can assemble and disassemble firearms.
It must not be de-emphasize[d] that the residence of
Elenita Fajardo is definitely not an armory or arsenal which
are the usual depositories for firearms, explosives and
ammunition. Granting arguendo that those firearms and
ammunition were left behind by Benito Fajardo, a member
of the Philippine army, the fact remains that it is a
government property. If it is so, the residence of Elenita
Fajardo is not the proper place to store those items. The
logical explanation is that those items are stolen property.

xxxx
The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. What the
law requires is merely possession which includes not only
actual physical possession but also constructive
possession or the subjection of the thing to ones control
and management. This has to be so if the manifest intent
of the law is to be effective. The same evils, the same
perils to public security, which the law penalizes exist
whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be
its owner or a borrower. To accomplish the object of this
law[,] the proprietary concept of the possession can have
no bearing whatsoever.

M16 ammunition, 5.56 caliber and fourteen (14) pieces

live caliber .45 ammunition confiscated and recovered
from their possession during the search conducted by
members of the PISOG, Aklan Police Provincial Office by
virtue of Search Warrant No. 01 (9) 03 fall under Section 4
of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court.[9]
Consequently, petitioner and Valerio were convicted of
illegal possession of firearms and explosives, punishable
under paragraph 2, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as
amended by R.A. No. 8294, which provides:
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a
fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) shall be
imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered
firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter
than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .
44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered
powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire
magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full
automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however,
That no other crime was committed by the person
arrested.
Both were sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of
prision mayor, and to pay a fine of P30,000.00.

xxxx

On September 1, 2006, only petitioner filed a Motion for

Reconsideration, which was denied in an Order dated
October 25, 2006. Petitioner then filed a Notice of Appeal
with the CA.

x x x. [I]n order that one may be found guilty of a violation

of the decree, it is sufficient that the accused had no
authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he
intended to possess the same, even if such possession
was made in good faith and without criminal intent.

Ruling of the CA
The CA concurred with the factual findings of the RTC, but
disagreed with its conclusions of law, and held that the
search warrant was void based on the following
observations:

xxxx

[A]t the time of applying for a search warrant, SPO1

Nathaniel A. Tan did not have personal knowledge of the
fact that appellants had no license to possess firearms as
required by law. For one, he failed to make a categorical
statement on that point during the application. Also, he
failed to attach to the application a certification to that
effect from the Firearms and Explosives Office of the
Philippine National Police. x x x, this certification is the
best evidence obtainable to prove that appellant indeed
has no license or permit to possess a firearm. There was
also no explanation given why said certification was not
presented, or even deemed no longer necessary, during
the application for the warrant. Such vital evidence was
simply ignored.[10]

To convict an accused for illegal possession of firearms

and explosive under P.D. 1866, as amended, two (2)
essential elements must be indubitably established, viz.:
(a) the existence of the subject firearm ammunition or
explosive which may be proved by the presentation of the
subject firearm or explosive or by the testimony of
witnesses who saw accused in possession of the same,
and (b) the negative fact that the accused has no license
or permit to own or possess the firearm, ammunition or
explosive which fact may be established by the testimony
or certification of a representative of the PNP Firearms
and Explosives Unit that the accused has no license or
permit to possess the subject firearm or explosive (Exhibit
G).
The judicial admission of the accused that they do not
have permit or license on the two (2) receivers of caliber .
45 pistol, model M1911A1 US with SN 763025 and model
M1911A1 of M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35) pieces live

Resultantly, all firearms and explosives seized inside

petitioners residence were declared inadmissible in
evidence. However, the 2 receivers recovered by the
policemen outside the house of petitioner before the
warrant was served were admitted as evidence, pursuant
to the plain view doctrine.

Accordingly, petitioner and Valerio were convicted of illegal

possession of a part of a firearm, punishable under
paragraph 1, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended.
They were sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of three
(3) years, six (6) months, and twenty-one (21) days to five
(5) years, four (4) months, and twenty (20) days of prision
correccional, and ordered to pay a P20,000.00 fine.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration,[11] but the motion
was denied in the CA Resolution dated December 3, 2009.
[12] Hence, the present recourse.
At the onset, it must be emphasized that the information
filed against petitioner and Valerio charged duplicitous
offenses contrary to Section 13 of Rule 110 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, viz.:
Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. A complaint or information
must charge but one offense, except only in those cases
in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for
various offenses.
A reading of the information clearly shows that possession
of the enumerated articles confiscated from Valerio and
petitioner are punishable under separate provisions of
Section 1, P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294.
[13] Illegal possession of two (2) pieces of short magazine
of M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35) pieces of live M16
ammunition 5.56 caliber, and fourteen (14) pieces of live
caliber .45 ammunition is punishable under paragraph 2 of
the said section, viz.:
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a
fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) shall be
imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered
firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter
than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, 41, .
44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered
powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire
magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full
automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however,
That no other crime was committed by the person
arrested.[14]
On the other hand, illegal possession of the two (2)
receivers of a .45 caliber pistol, model no. M1911A1 US,
with SN 763025, and Model M1911A1 US, with a defaced
serial number, is penalized under paragraph 1, which
states:
Sec. 1. Unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition,
disposition or possession of firearms or ammunition or
instruments used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of firearms or ammunition. The penalty of
prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of
not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) shall
be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low
powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and

other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm,

ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or
intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was
committed.[15]

This is the necessary consequence of the amendment

introduced by R.A. No. 8294, which categorized the kinds
of firearms proscribed from being possessed without a
license, according to their firing power and caliber. R.A.
No. 8294 likewise mandated different penalties for illegal
possession of firearm according to the above
classification, unlike in the old P.D. No. 1866 which set a
standard penalty for the illegal possession of any kind of
firearm. Section 1 of the old law reads:
Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition,
Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or
Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the
Manufacture of Firearms of Ammunition. The penalty of
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall
unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire dispose, or
possess any firearms, part of firearm, ammunition, or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used
in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
(Emphasis ours.)
By virtue of such changes, an information for illegal
possession of firearm should now particularly refer to the
paragraph of Section 1 under which the seized firearm is
classified, and should there be numerous guns
confiscated, each must be sorted and then grouped
according to the categories stated in Section 1 of R.A. No.
8294, amending P.D. No. 1866. It will no longer suffice to
lump all of the seized firearms in one information, and
state Section 1, P.D. No. 1866 as the violated provision, as
in the instant case,[16] because different penalties are
imposed by the law, depending on the caliber of the
weapon. To do so would result in duplicitous charges.
Ordinarily, an information that charges multiple offenses
merits a quashal, but petitioner and Valerio failed to raise
this issue during arraignment. Their failure constitutes a
waiver, and they could be convicted of as many offenses
as there were charged in the information.[17] This accords
propriety to the diverse convictions handed down by the
courts a quo.
Further, the charge of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition under paragraph 2, Section 1 of P.D. No.
1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, including the validity
of the search warrant that led to their confiscation, is now
beyond the province of our review since, by virtue of the
CAs Decision, petitioner and Valerio have been effectively
acquitted from the said charges. The present review is
consequently only with regard to the conviction for illegal
possession of a part of a firearm.
The Issues

Petitioner insists on an acquittal and avers that the

discovery of the two (2) receivers does not come within
the purview of the plain view doctrine. She argues that no
valid intrusion was attendant and that no evidence was
adduced to prove that she was with Valerio when he threw
the receivers. Likewise absent is a positive showing that
any of the two receivers recovered by the policemen
matched the .45 caliber pistol allegedly seen tucked in the
waistband of her shorts when the police elements arrived.
Neither is there any proof that petitioner had knowledge of
or consented to the alleged throwing of the receivers.
Our Ruling
We find merit in the petition.
First, we rule on the admissibility of the receivers. We hold
that the receivers were seized in plain view, hence,
admissible.
No less than our Constitution recognizes the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. This
right is encapsulated in Article III, Section 2, of the
Constitution, which states:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons,
houses, papers, and
effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.

is in a position from which he can view a particular area;

(b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is
inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the
officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a
crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. The
law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial
intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can
particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful
intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be
open to eye and hand, and its discovery inadvertent.[20]
Tested against these standards, we find that the seizure of
the two receivers of the .45 caliber pistol outside
petitioners house falls within the purview of the plain view
doctrine.
First, the presence of SPO2 Nava at the back of the house
and of the other law enforcers around the premises was
justified by the fact that petitioner and Valerio were earlier
seen respectively holding .45 caliber pistols before they
ran inside the structure and sought refuge. The attendant
circumstances and the evasive actions of petitioner and
Valerio when the law enforcers arrived engendered a
reasonable ground for the latter to believe that a crime
was being committed. There was thus sufficient probable
cause for the policemen to cordon off the house as they
waited for daybreak to apply for a search warrant.
Secondly, from where he was situated, SPO2 Nava clearly
saw, on two different instances, Valerio emerge on top of
the subject dwelling and throw suspicious objects. Lastly,
considering the earlier sighting of Valerio holding a pistol,
SPO2 Nava had reasonable ground to believe that the
things thrown might be contraband items, or evidence of
the offense they were then suspected of committing.
Indeed, when subsequently recovered, they turned out to
be two (2) receivers of .45 caliber pistol.

Complementing this provision is the exclusionary rule

embodied in Section 3(2) of the same article

The pertinent portions of SPO2 Navas testimony are

elucidating:

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the

preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.

Q When you arrived in that place, you saw policemen?

A Yes, sir.

There are, however, several well-recognized exceptions to

the foregoing rule. Thus, evidence obtained through a
warrantless search and seizure may be admissible under
any of the following circumstances: (1) search incident to a
lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3)
search in violation of custom laws; (4) seizure of evidence
in plain view; and (5) when the accused himself waives his
right against unreasonable searches and seizures.[18]
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain
view of an officer, who has a right to be in the position to
have that view, are subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence.[19] It applies when the following
requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search
of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or

Q What were they doing?

A They were cordoning the house.
Q You said that you asked your assistant team leader
Deluso about that incident. What did he tell you?
A Deluso told me that a person ran inside the house
carrying with him a gun.
Q And this house you are referring to is the house which
you mentioned is the police officers were surrounding?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, how long did you stay in that place, Mr. Witness?
A I stayed there when I arrived at past 10:00 oclock up to
12:00 oclock the following day.

Q At about 2:00 oclock in the early morning of August 28,

2002, can you recall where were you?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where were you?
A I was at the back of the house that is being cordoned by
the police.
Q While you were at the back of this house, do you recall
any unusual incident?
A Yes, sir.
Q Can you tell the Honorable Court what was that
incident?
A Yes, sir. A person went out at the top of the house and
threw something.
Q And did you see the person who threw something out of
this house?
A Yes, sir.

Q Mr. Witness, at around 4:00 oclock that early morning of

August 28, 2002, do you recall another unusual incident?
A Yes, sir.
Q And can you tell us what was that incident?
A I saw a person throwing something there and the one
that was thrown fell on top of the roof of another house.
Q And you saw that person who again threw something
from the rooftop of the house?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you recognize him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who was that person?
A Zaldy Valerio again.
xxxx

xxxx

Q Where were you when you saw this Zaldy Valerio

thr[o]w something out of the house?
A I was on the road in front of the house.

Q Can you tell the Honorable Court who was that person
who threw that something outside the house?
A It was Zaldy Valerio.

Q Where was Zaldy Valerio when you saw him thr[o]w

something out of the house?
A He was on top of the house.

COURT: (to witness)

Q Before the incident, you know this person Zaldy Valerio?
A Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q Why do you know him?

A Because we were formerly members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines.

Q Later on, were you able to know what was that

something thrown out?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that?
A Another lower receiver of a cal. 45.

xxxx
PROS. PERALTA:
Q When you saw something thrown out at the top of the
house, did you do something if any?
A I shouted to seek cover.

xxxx
Q And what did he tell you?
A It [was] on the wall of another house and it [could] be
seen right away.
xxxx

xxxx
Q What did you do if any?
A We waited for the owner of the house to wake up.
Q So, what else did you do if any after you shouted, take
cover?
A I took hold of a flashlight after five minutes and focused
the beam of the flashlight on the place where something
was thrown.
Q What did you see if any?
A I saw there the lower [part] of the receiver of cal. 45.

xxxx
Q Who opened the fence for you?
A It was a lady who is the owner of the house.
Q When you entered the premises of the house of the
lady, what did you find?
A We saw the lower receiver of this .45 cal. (sic)[21]

xxxx
The ensuing recovery of the receivers may have been
deliberate; nonetheless, their initial discovery was

indubitably inadvertent. It is not crucial that at initial

sighting the seized contraband be identified and known to
be so. The law merely requires that the law enforcer
observes that the seized item may be evidence of a crime,
contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.
Hence, as correctly declared by the CA, the two receivers
were admissible as evidence. The liability for their
possession, however, should fall only on Valerio and not
on petitioner.
The foregoing disquisition notwithstanding, we find that
petitioner is not liable for illegal possession of part of a
firearm.
In dissecting how and when liability for illegal possession
of firearms attaches, the following disquisitions in People
v. De Gracia[22] are instructive:
The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. What the
law requires is merely possession which includes not only
actual physical possession but also constructive
possession or the subjection of the thing to one's control
and management. This has to be so if the manifest intent
of the law is to be effective. The same evils, the same
perils to public security, which the law penalizes exist
whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be
its owner or a borrower. To accomplish the object of this
law the proprietary concept of the possession can have no
bearing whatsoever.
But is the mere fact of physical or constructive possession
sufficient to convict a person for unlawful possession of
firearms or must there be an intent to possess to
constitute a violation of the law? This query assumes
significance since the offense of illegal possession of
firearms is a malum prohibitum punished by a special law,
in which case good faith and absence of criminal intent are
not valid defenses.
When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule,
intent to commit the crime is not necessary. It is sufficient
that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act
prohibited by the special law. Intent to commit the crime
and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A
person may not have consciously intended to commit a
crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is,
by the very nature of things, the crime itself. In the first
(intent to commit the crime), there must be criminal intent;
in the second (intent to perpetrate the act) it is enough that
the prohibited act is done freely and consciously.
In the present case, a distinction should be made between
criminal intent and intent to possess. While mere
possession, without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict
a person for illegal possession of a firearm, it must still be
shown that there was animus possidendi or an intent to
possess on the part of the accused. Such intent to
possess is, however, without regard to any other criminal
or felonious intent which the accused may have harbored
in possessing the firearm. Criminal intent here refers to the
intention of the accused to commit an offense with the use
of an unlicensed firearm. This is not important in
convicting a person under Presidential Decree No. 1866.

Hence, in order that one may be found guilty of a violation

of the decree, it is sufficient that the accused had no
authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he
intended to possess the same, even if such possession
was made in good faith and without criminal intent.
Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual, or
harmless possession or control of a firearm cannot be
considered a violation of a statute prohibiting the
possession of this kind of weapon, such as Presidential
Decree No. 1866. Thus, although there is physical or
constructive possession, for as long as the animus
possidendi is absent, there is no offense committed.[23]
Certainly, illegal possession of firearms, or, in this case,
part of a firearm, is committed when the holder thereof:

(1)
possesses a firearm or a part thereof
(2)
lacks the authority or license to possess the
firearm.[24]
We find that petitioner was neither in physical nor
constructive possession of the subject receivers. The
testimony of SPO2 Nava clearly bared that he only saw
Valerio on top of the house when the receivers were
thrown. None of the witnesses saw petitioner holding the
receivers, before or during their disposal.
At the very least, petitioners possession of the receivers
was merely incidental because Valerio, the one in actual
physical possession, was seen at the rooftop of petitioners
house. Absent any evidence pointing to petitioners
participation, knowledge or consent in Valerios actions,
she cannot be held liable for illegal possession of the
receivers.
Petitioners apparent liability for illegal possession of part
of a firearm can only proceed from the assumption that
one of the thrown receivers matches the gun seen tucked
in the waistband of her shorts earlier that night.
Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to convert such
assumption into concrete evidence.
Mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for
proof required to establish the guilt of an accused beyond
reasonable doubt. The rule is the same whether the
offenses are punishable under the Revised Penal Code,
which are mala in se, or in crimes, which are malum
prohibitum by virtue of special law.[25] The quantum of
proof required by law was not adequately met in this case
in so far as petitioner is concerned.
The gun allegedly seen tucked in petitioners waistband
was not identified with sufficient particularity; as such, it is
impossible to match the same with any of the seized
receivers. Moreover, SPO1 Tan categorically stated that
he saw Valerio holding two guns when he and the rest of
the PISOG arrived in petitioners house. It is not unlikely
then that the receivers later on discarded were
components of the two (2) pistols seen with Valerio.

These findings also debunk the allegation in the

information that petitioner conspired with Valerio in
committing illegal possession of part of a firearm. There is
no evidence indubitably proving that petitioner participated
in the decision to commit the criminal act committed by
Valerio.
Hence, this Court is constrained to acquit petitioner on the
ground of reasonable doubt. The constitutional
presumption of innocence in her favor was not adequately
overcome by the evidence adduced by the prosecution.
The CA correctly convicted Valerio with illegal possession
of part of a firearm.
In illegal possession of a firearm, two (2) things must be
shown to exist: (a) the existence of the subject firearm;
and (b) the fact that the accused who possessed the same
does not have the corresponding license for it.[26]
By analogy then, a successful conviction for illegal
possession of part of a firearm must yield these requisites:
(a)
the existence of the part of the firearm; and
(b)
the accused who possessed the same does not
have the license for the firearm to which the seized
part/component corresponds.
In the instant case, the prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt the
elements of the crime. The subject receivers - one with the
markings United States Property and the other bearing
Serial No. 763025 - were duly presented to the court as
Exhibits E and E-1, respectively. They were also identified
by SPO2 Nava as the firearm parts he retrieved af ter
Valerio discarded them.[27] His testimony was
corroborated by DYKR radio announcer Vega, who
witnessed the recovery of the receivers.[28]
Anent the lack of authority, SPO1 Tan testified that, upon
verification, it was ascertained that Valerio is not a duly
licensed/registered firearm holder of any type, kind, or
caliber of firearms.[29] To substantiate his statement, he
submitted a certification[30] to that effect and identified the
same in court.[31] The testimony of SPO1 Tan, or the
certification, would suffice to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the second element.[32]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 10,
2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED with respect to petitioner Elenita Fajardo y
Castro, who is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground that her
guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.

YARIA, JR., MICHAEL M. SANDOVAL, and ROLDAN A.

GAVINO,
Respondents.
x-------------------------------------------x

ELISEO F. SORIANO,
Petitioner,
- versus MOVIE
AND
TELEVISION
REVIEW
AND
CLASSIFICATION BOARD, ZOSIMO G. ALEGRE,
JACKIE AQUINO-GAVINO, NOEL R. DEL PRADO,
EMMANUEL BORLAZA, JOSE E. ROMERO IV, and
FLORIMONDO C. ROUS, in their capacity as members of
the Hearing and Adjudication Committee of the MTRCB,
JESSIE L. GALAPON, ANABEL M. DELA CRUZ,
MANUEL M. HERNANDEZ, JOSE L. LOPEZ, CRISANTO
SORIANO, BERNABE S. YARIA, JR., MICHAEL M.
SANDOVAL, and ROLDAN A. GAVINO, in their capacity
as complainants before
the MTRCB,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 164785
Present:
Present:

ELISEO F. SORIANO,
Petitioner,
- versus MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA, in her capacity as
Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board, MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW
AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD, JESSIE L. GALAPON,
ANABEL M. DELA CRUZ, MANUEL M. HERNANDEZ,
JOSE L. LOPEZ, CRISANTO SORIANO, BERNABE S.

PUNO, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
G.R. No. 165636

American, holding it together. They have been considered,

sufficiently discussed in some detail, and found to be
without merit in our Decision. It would, thus, make little
sense to embark on another lengthy discussion of the
same issues and arguments.
Suffice it to reiterate that the sanction imposed on the TV
program in question does not, under the factual milieu of
the case, constitute prior restraint, but partakes of the
nature of subsequent punishment for past violation
committed by petitioner in the course of the broadcast of
the program on August 10, 2004. To be sure, petitioner
has not contested the fact of his having made statements
on the air that were contextually violative of the programs
G rating. To merit a G rating, the program must be suitable
for all ages, which, in turn, means that the material for
television [does not], in the judgment of the [MTRCB], x x
x contain anything unsuitable for children and minors, and
may be viewed without adult guidance or supervision.[3]
As previously discussed by the Court, the vulgar language
petitioner used on prime-time television can in no way be
characterized as suitable for all ages, and is wholly
inappropriate for children.
Promulgated:
March 15, 2010
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
VELASCO, JR., J.:

Before us is this motion of petitioner Eliseo F. Soriano for

reconsideration of the Decision of the Court dated April 29,
2009, modifying that of the Movie and Television Review
and Classification Board (MTRCB) by imposing the
penalty of three-month suspension on the television show
Ang Dating Daan, instead of on petitioner Soriano, as host
of that program.
Petitioner seeks reconsideration on the following grounds
or issues: (1) the suspension thus meted out to the
program constitutes prior restraint; (2) the Court erred in
ruling that his utterances[1] did not constitute exercise of
religion; (3) the Court erred in finding the language used
as offensive and obscene; (4) the Court should have
applied its policy of non-interference in cases of conflict
between religious groups; and (5) the Court erred in
penalizing the television program for the acts of petitioner.
The motion has no merit.
Petitioners threshold posture that the suspension thus
imposed constitutes prior restraint and an abridgement of
his exercise of religion and freedom of expression is a
mere rehash of the position he articulated in the
underlying petitions for certiorari and expounded in his
memorandum.[2] So are the supportive arguments and
some of the citations of decisional law, Philippine and

Petitioner next harps on the primacy of his freedoms,

referring particularly to the exercise of his religious beliefs
and profession, as presiding minister of his flock, over the
right and duty of the state as parens patriae. Petitioners
position may be accorded some cogency, but for the fact
that it fails to consider that the medium he used to make
his statements was a television broadcast, which is
accessible to children of virtually all ages. As already laid
down in the Decision subject of this recourse, the interest
of the government in protecting children who may be
subjected to petitioners invectives must take precedence
over his desire to air publicly his dirty laundry. The public
soapbox that is television must be guarded by the state,
which purpose the MTRCB serves, and has served, in
suspending Ang Dating Daan for petitioners statements.
As emphasized in Gonzalez v. Kalaw Katigbak,[4] the
freedom of broadcast media is, in terms of degree of
protection it deserves, lesser in scope, especially as
regards television, which reaches every home where there
is a set, and where children will likely be among the avid
viewers of the programs shown. The same case also laid
the basis for the classification system of the MTRCB when
it stated, It cannot be denied though that the State as
parens patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of
caring for the welfare of the young.[5]
The penalty of suspension imposed on petitioner has
driven him to liken the Court to a blind man who was
asked to describe an elephant, and by his description he
stubbornly believed that an elephant is just the same as a
Meralco post after touching one if its legs.[6] Petitioner
makes this comparison with the view that the factual
backdrop against which his statements were made was
purportedly not considered by the Court. As he presently
argues:

The Honorable Court should have rendered its decision in

light of the surrounding circumstances why and what
prompted herein petitioner to utter those words. Clearly,
he was provoked because of the malicious and blatant
splicing by the INC ministers of his recorded voice. Verily,
Petitioner submits that the choice of words he used has
been harsh but strongly maintains that the same was
consistent with his constitutional right of freedom of
speech and religion.
Contrary to petitioners impression, the Court has, in fact,
considered the factual antecedents of and his motive in
making his utterances, and has found those
circumstances wanting as defense for violating the
programs G rating. Consider the following excerpts from
the Courts Decision:
There is nothing in petitioners statements subject of the
complaints expressing any particular religious belief,
nothing furthering his avowed evangelical mission. The
fact that he came out with his statements in a televised
bible exposition program does not automatically accord
them the character of a religious discourse. Plain and
simple insults directed at another person cannot be
elevated to the status of religious speech. Even petitioners
attempts to place his words in context show that he was
moved by anger and the need to seek retribution, not by
any religious conviction. His claim, assuming its veracity,
that some INC ministers distorted his statements
respecting amounts Ang Dating Daan owed to a TV station
does not convert the foul language used in retaliation as
religious speech. We cannot accept that petitioner made
his statements in defense of his reputation and religion, as
they constitute no intelligible defense or refutation of the
alleged lies being spread by a rival religious group. They
simply illustrate that petitioner had descended to the level
of name-calling and foul-language discourse. Petitioner
could have chosen to contradict and disprove his
detractors, but opted for the low road.

And just to set things straight, the penalty imposed is on

the program, not on petitioner.
Petitioner would next have the Court adopt a hands-off
approach to the conflict between him and the Iglesia Ni
Cristo. In support of his urging, he cites Iglesia ni Cristo v.
Court of Appeals.[7]
Petitioners invocation of Iglesia ni Cristo to support his
hands-off thesis is erroneous. Obviously, he fails to
appreciate what the Court stated in that particular case
when it rejected the argument that a religious program is
beyond MTRCBs review and regulatory authority. We
reproduce what the Court pertinently wrote in Iglesia ni
Cristo:

We thus reject petitioners postulate that its religious

program is per se beyond review by the respondent

[MTRCB]. Its public broadcast on TV of its religious

program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief.
Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and
ears of children. The Court iterates the rule that the
exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the
State when it will bring about the clear and present danger
of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to
prevent, i.e. serious detriment to the more overriding
interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare. A
laissez faire policy on the exercise of religion can be
seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels the Court
against its blind adoption as religion is and continues to be
a volatile area of concern in our country today. Across the
sea and in our shore, the bloodiest and bitterest wars
fought by men were caused by irreconcilable religious
differences. Our country is still not safe from the
recurrence of this stultifying strife considering our warring
religious beliefs and the fanaticism with which some of us
cling and claw to these beliefs. x x x For when religion
divides and its exercise destroys, the State should not
stand still.[8] (Emphasis added.)

Lastly, petitioner claims that there was violation of due

process of law, alleging that the registered producer of the
program is not a party to the proceedings. Hence, the
program cannot, so petitioner asserts, be penalized.
We will let the records speak for themselves to refute that
argument.
As per petitioners admission in his petition for certiorari
filed with the Court, he is the Executive Producer of Ang
Dating Daan, a televised bible exposition program
produced by the Philippine-based religious organization,
Church of God International.[9] It is unclear, then, which
producer the movant is referring to in claiming that there
was no representation before the MTRCB. He was and is
the representative of Ang Dating Daan, and the claim that
there was no due process of law is simply bereft of merit.
Even as the foregoing disquisitions would suffice to write
finis to the instant motion, certain relevant issues have
been raised by some members of the Court that ought to
be addressed if only to put things in their proper
perspective. We refer to the matter of obscenity.
As stressed at every possible turn in the challenged
Courts Decision, the defining standards to be employed in
judging the harmful effects of the statements petitioner
used would be those for the average child, not those for
the average adult. We note that the ratings and regulation
of television broadcasts take into account the protection of
the child, and it is from the childs narrow viewpoint that the
utterances must be considered, if not measured. The
ratings G, PG (parental guidance), PG-13, and R
(restricted or for adults only) suggest as much. The
concern was then, as now, that the program petitioner
hosted and produced would reach an unintended
audience, the average child, and so it is how this audience
would view his words that matters. The average child
would not be concerned with colorful speech, but, instead,

focus on the literal, everyday meaning of words used. It

was this literal approach that rendered petitioners
utterances obscene.
The Court has taken stock of Action for Childrens
Television v. FCC,[10] but finds this U.S. case not to be of
governing application to this jurisdiction under the present
state of things. The so-called safe harbor of 10:00 p.m. to
6:00 a.m., adverted to in Action for Childrens Television as
the time wherein broadcast of indecent material may be
permitted, is believed inapplicable here. As it were, there
is no legislative enactment or executive issuance setting a
similar period in the Philippines wherein indecent material
may be broadcast. Rather than fix a period for allowing
indecent programming, what is used in this jurisdiction is
the system of classification of television programs, which
the petitioner violated. His program was rated G,
purported to be suitable for all ages. We cannot lose sight
of the violation of his programs classification that carried
with it the producers implied assurance that the program
did not contain anything unsuitable for children and
minors. The hour at which it was broadcasted was of little
moment in light of the guarantee that the program was
safe for childrens viewing.
The suspension of the program has not been arrived at
lightly. Taking into account all the factors involved and the

arguments pressed on the Court, the suspension of the

program is a sufficiently limited disciplinary action, both to
address the violation and to serve as an object lesson for
the future. The likelihood is great that any disciplinary
action imposed on petitioner would be met with an equally
energetic defense as has been put up here. The simple
but stubborn fact is that there has been a violation of
government regulations that have been put in place with a
laudable purpose, and this violation must accordingly be
dealt with. We are not unmindful of the concerns on the
restriction of freedoms that may occur in imposing
sanctions upon erring individuals and institutions, but it
cannot be over-emphasized that the freedoms encased in
the Bill of Rights are far from absolute. Each has its own
limits, responsibilities, and obligations. Everyone is
expected to bear the burden implicit in the exercise of
these freedoms. So it must be here.
WHEREFORE, petitioners motion for reconsideration is
hereby DENIED.
No further pleadings shall be entertained in this case. Let
entry of judgment be made in due course.
SO ORDERED.