Brandon Tate-Brown's Federal Lawsuit

CIVIL COVER SHEET
JS 44 (Rev. 12/12)
The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as
provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the
purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON NEXT PAGE OF THIS FORM.)
I. (a) PLAINTIFFS
DEFENDANTS
Tanya Brown-Dickerson, Administratrix of the Estate of Brandon TateBrown, deceased obo the Estate and all others similarly situated
City of Philadelphia
Nicholas Carrelli
Heng Dang
Philadelphia
(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff
Philadelphia
County of Residence of First Listed Defendant
(EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES)

NOTE:
(c) Attorneys (Firm Name, Address, and Telephone Number)
(IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY)

IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF
THE TRACT OF LAND INVOLVED.
Attorneys (If Known)
Brian R. Mildenberg, Esq.

215-545-4870
Mildenberg Law Firm, PC
1735 Market Street, Ste. 3750, Phila., PA 19103
Craig Straw, Esq. / John Coyle, Esq.

City of Philadelphia Law Department, 1515 Arch St, 14th Fl.
Philadelphia, PA 19102
II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an X in One Box Only)

1
U.S. Government
Plaintiff
Federal Question
(U.S. Government Not a Party)
U.S. Government
Defendant
Diversity
(Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III)
III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES (Place an X in One Box for Plaintiff

(For Diversity Cases Only)
PTF
Citizen of This State
1
DEF
1
and One Box for Defendant)

PTF
DEF
Incorporated or Principal Place
4
4
of Business In This State
Citizen of Another State
Incorporated and Principal Place

of Business In Another State
Citizen or Subject of a
Foreign Country
Foreign Nation
IV. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an X in One Box Only)

CONTRACT
TORTS
110 Insurance
120 Marine
130 Miller Act
140 Negotiable Instrument
150 Recovery of Overpayment
& Enforcement of Judgment
151 Medicare Act
152 Recovery of Defaulted
Student Loans
(Excludes Veterans)
153 Recovery of Overpayment
of Veterans Benefits
160 Stockholders Suits
190 Other Contract
195 Contract Product Liability
196 Franchise
REAL PROPERTY
210 Land Condemnation
220 Foreclosure
230 Rent Lease & Ejectment
240 Torts to Land
245 Tort Product Liability
290 All Other Real Property
PERSONAL INJURY
310 Airplane
315 Airplane Product
Liability
320 Assault, Libel &
Slander
330 Federal Employers
Liability
340 Marine
345 Marine Product
Liability
350 Motor Vehicle
355 Motor Vehicle
Product Liability
360 Other Personal
Injury
362 Personal Injury Medical Malpractice
CIVIL RIGHTS
440 Other Civil Rights
441 Voting
442 Employment
443 Housing/
Accommodations
445 Amer. w/Disabilities Employment
446 Amer. w/Disabilities Other
448 Education
FORFEITURE/PENALTY
PERSONAL INJURY
365 Personal Injury Product Liability
367 Health Care/
Pharmaceutical
Personal Injury
Product Liability
368 Asbestos Personal
Injury Product
Liability
PERSONAL PROPERTY
370 Other Fraud
371 Truth in Lending
380 Other Personal
Property Damage
385 Property Damage
Product Liability
PRISONER PETITIONS
Habeas Corpus:
463 Alien Detainee
510 Motions to Vacate
Sentence
530 General
535 Death Penalty
Other:
540 Mandamus & Other
550 Civil Rights
555 Prison Condition
560 Civil Detainee Conditions of
Confinement
625 Drug Related Seizure

of Property 21 USC 881
690 Other
BANKRUPTCY
OTHER STATUTES
422 Appeal 28 USC 158

423 Withdrawal
28 USC 157
PROPERTY RIGHTS
820 Copyrights
830 Patent
840 Trademark
LABOR
710 Fair Labor Standards
Act
720 Labor/Management
Relations
740 Railway Labor Act
751 Family and Medical
Leave Act
790 Other Labor Litigation
791 Employee Retirement
Income Security Act
SOCIAL SECURITY
861 HIA (1395ff)
862 Black Lung (923)
863 DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
864 SSID Title XVI
865 RSI (405(g))
FEDERAL TAX SUITS

870 Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff
or Defendant)
871 IRSThird Party
26 USC 7609
375 False Claims Act

400 State Reapportionment
410 Antitrust
430 Banks and Banking
450 Commerce
460 Deportation
470 Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations
480 Consumer Credit
490 Cable/Sat TV
850 Securities/Commodities/
Exchange
890 Other Statutory Actions
891 Agricultural Acts
893 Environmental Matters
895 Freedom of Information
Act
896 Arbitration
899 Administrative Procedure
Act/Review or Appeal of
Agency Decision
950 Constitutionality of
State Statutes
IMMIGRATION
462 Naturalization Application
465 Other Immigration
Actions
V. ORIGIN (Place an X in One Box Only)

1 Original
Proceeding
2 Removed from
State Court
Remanded from
Appellate Court
4 Reinstated or
Reopened
5 Transferred from
Another District
(specify)
6 Multidistrict
Litigation
Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity):
42 USC sec. 1983
VI. CAUSE OF ACTION Brief description of cause:
Action for wrongful death/excessive force/municipal liability and reforms
DEMAND $
CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION
VII. REQUESTED IN
UNDER RULE 23, F.R.Cv.P.
COMPLAINT:
VIII. RELATED CASE(S)
(See instructions):
Hon. Stewart Dalzell
IF ANY
JUDGE
DATE
CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint:

Yes
No
JURY DEMAND:
DOCKET NUMBER
10-5952
SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD
9/2/15
FOR OFFICE USE ONLY
RECEIPT #
AMOUNT
APPLYING IFP
JUDGE
MAG. JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA DESIGNATION FORM to be used by counsel to indicate the category of the case for the purpose of
assignment to appropriate calendar.
see attached listing

see attached listing
Address of Defendant:
Philadelphia, PA
Place of Accident, Incident or Transaction:
Address of Plaintiff:
(Use Reverse Side For Additional Space)
Does this civil action involve a nongovernmental corporate party with any parent corporation and any publicly held corporation owning 10% or more of its stock?
(Attach two copies of the Disclosure Statement Form in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 7.1(a))
Does this case involve multidistrict litigation possibilities?
RELATED CASE, IF ANY:
Case Number: 10-5952
Judge
Hon. S. Dalzell
Date Terminated:
Yes9
No9
Yes9
No9
active
Civil cases are deemed related when yes is answered to any of the following questions:
1. Is this case related to property included in an earlier numbered suit pending or within one year previously terminated action in this court?
Yes9
No9
2. Does this case involve the same issue of fact or grow out of the same transaction as a prior suit pending or within one year previously terminated
action in this court?
Yes9
No9
3. Does this case involve the validity or infringement of a patent already in suit or any earlier numbered case pending or within one year previously
Yes9
terminated action in this court?
No9
4. Is this case a second or successive habeas corpus, social security appeal, or pro se civil rights case filed by the same individual?
Yes9
CIVIL: (Place
No9
U in ONE CATEGORY ONLY)
A. Federal Question Cases:
B. Diversity Jurisdiction Cases:
1. 9 Indemnity Contract, Marine Contract, and All Other Contracts
1. 9 Insurance Contract and Other Contracts
2. 9 FELA
2. 9 Airplane Personal Injury
3. 9 Jones Act-Personal Injury
3. 9 Assault, Defamation
4. 9 Antitrust
4. 9 Marine Personal Injury
5. 9 Patent
5. 9 Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
6. 9 Labor-Management Relations
6. 9 Other Personal Injury (Please specify)
7. 9 Civil Rights
7. 9 Products Liability
8. 9 Habeas Corpus
8. 9 Products Liability Asbestos
9. 9 Securities Act(s) Cases
9. 9 All other Diversity Cases
10. 9 Social Security Review Cases
(Please specify)
11. 9 All other Federal Question Cases

(Please specify)
ARBITRATION CERTIFICATION
I,
(Check Appropriate Category)

Brian R Mildenberg
, counsel of record do hereby certify:
x9 Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 53.2, Section 3(c)(2), that to the best of my knowledge and belief, the damages recoverable in this civil action case exceed the sum of
$150,000.00 exclusive of interest and costs;

9 Relief other than monetary damages is sought.
DATE:
Attorney-at-Law
Attorney I.D.#
NOTE: A trial de novo will be a trial by jury only if there has been compliance with F.R.C.P. 38.
I certify that, to my knowledge, the within case is not related to any case now pending or within one year previously terminated action in this court
except as noted above.
DATE:
Attorney-at-Law
CIV. 609 (5/2012)
Attorney I.D.#
LIST OF NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF PARTIES:

TANYA BROWN-DICKERSON,
Administratrix of the Estate of
BRANDON-TATE BROWN, deceased,
on behalf of the Estate as Administratrix
and a class of all others similarly situated,
ADDRESS:
5238 Horrocks Street
Philadelphia, PA 19124,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA
1500 Arch Street, 14th Floor
NICHOLAS CARRELLI,
HENG DANG,
Defendants.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CASE MANAGEMENT TRACK DESIGNATION FORM
TANYA BROWN-DICKERSON et al.
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA et al.,
Defendants.
In accordance with the Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan of this court,
counsel for plaintiff shall complete a Case Management Track Designation Form in all
civil cases at the time of filing the complaint and serve a copy on all defendants. (See
1:03 of the plan set forth on the reverse side of this form.) In the event that a defendant
does not agree with the plaintiff regarding said designation, that defendant shall, with its
first appearance, submit to the clerk of court and serve on the plaintiff and all other
parties, a Case Management Track Designation Form specifying the track to which that
defendant believes the case should be assigned.
SELECT ONE OF THE FOLLOWING CASE MANAGEMENT TRACKS:
(a) Habeas Corpus Cases brought under 28 U.S.C. 2241 through 2255.
(b) Social Security Cases requesting review of a decision of the Secretary of Health
and Human Services denying plaintiff Social Security Benefits.
(c) Arbitration Cases required to be designated for arbitration under Local Civil
Rule 53.2.
(d) Asbestos Cases involving claims for personal injury or property damage from
exposure to asbestos.
XXXXXX (e) Special Management Cases that do not fall into tracks (a) through
(d) that are commonly referred to as complex and that need special or intense
management by the court. (See reverse side of this form for a detailed explanation
of special management cases.)
(f) Standard Management Cases that do not fall into any one of the other tracks.
MILDENBERG LAW FIRM, P.C.
/s/ Brian R. Mildenberg
By: BRIAN R. MILDENBERG, ESQUIRE
Identification No.: 84861
1735 Market Street, Suite 3750
brian@mildenberglaw.com
(215) 545-4870
Counsel for Plaintiff
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(215) 545-4870
____________________________________
:
TANYA BROWN-DICKERSON,
:
Administratrix of the Estate of
:
BRANDON-TATE BROWN, deceased, :
on behalf of the Estate as Administratrix :
and a class of all others similarly situated, :
5238 Horrocks Street
:
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA,
:
th
1500 Arch Street, 14 Floor
:
:
:
NICHOLAS CARRELLI,
:
:
:
:
HENG DANG,
:
:
:
:
Defendants,
:
____________________________________:
CLASS ACTION FOR

CIVIL RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS; and,
COMPLAINT FOR
WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
MILDENBERG LAW FIRM, PC

1735 MARKET STREET, SUITE 3750
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103
(215) 545-4870 | WWW.MILDENBERGLAW.COM
COMPLAINT
COMES NOW Plaintiff, requesting this Honorable Court to enter judgment in her
favor, and against Defendants, and for her Complaint, alleges, upon information and belief, as
follows:
PARTIES
1.
Plaintiff is Tanya Brown-Dickerson, an adult individual and citizen of
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, residing therein at the address listed on the caption of this
Complaint.
2.
Plaintiff is the natural mother of Brandon Tate-Brown, deceased. Brandon
Tate-Brown died on December 15, 2014, when he was shot one time in the back of his head
by Philadelphia Police Officer, Defendant Nicholas Carrelli, while his person was unarmed,
during a traffic stop.
3.
Plaintiff has qualified and been duly appointed Administratrix of the Estate of
Brandon Tate-Brown, and was granted Letters of Administration by the Register of Wills of
Philadelphia County on January 8, 2015, File # A0090-2015.
4.
Plaintiff brings this action as Administratrix of the Estate of Brandon Tate-
Brown. With respect to state law claims for wrongful death and survival, persons listed
pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 2204 are decedents intestate heirs, Plaintiff and decedents natural
father, Terrell T. Skinner (last known residence address: 293 South Jones Street, Lock Haven,
PA 17745). This action is brought on their behalf, and they are being served with Notice
pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 2205.
5.
Plaintiff also brings this action on behalf of all other persons similarly situated,
and seeks class certification of the injunctive relief claims against the Philadelphia Police
Department for violations of Plaintiffs federal civil rights and rights under the Pennsylvania
Constitution.
6.
Defendant, the City of Philadelphia, is a municipality and City of the First
Class, duly existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
7.
Defendant, Nicholas Carrelli, is, upon information and belief, an adult
individual and citizen of Philadelphia, who is employed by Defendant the City of Philadelphia
as a Police Officer. Upon information and belief, Defendant Carrelli is the Police Officer who
discharged his weapon and shot Brandon Tate-Brown one time in the back of the head on
December 15, 2015, killing Brandon Tate-Brown. Upon information and belief, the City of
Philadelphia Police Department refused to publically identify the name of Carrelli until June,
2015. Further, upon information and belief, until June, 2015, the City of Philadelphia falsely
claimed that Brandon Tate-Brown was reaching for a gun into his front side passenger door
when shot, requiring Carrelli to kill him. The City has now admitted that story to be false.
8.
Defendant, Heng Dang, is, upon information and belief, an adult individual and
citizen of Philadelphia, who is employed by Defendant the City of Philadelphia as a Police

Officer.
Upon information and belief, Officer Dang was Officer Carrellis partner on
December 15, 2015, and, upon information and belief, Dang was the driver of the police car
that puled over Brandon Tate-Brown for the aforesaid traffic stop, while Carrelli sat in the
passenger seat of said police vehicle. Upon information and belief, the City of Philadelphia
Police Department refused to publically identify the name of Dang until June, 2015.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
9.
The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein by reference.
10.
This action is properly maintained as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(a) &
(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

11.
With respect to the claims herein for equitable relief from the City of
Philadelphias long term pattern and practice of conduct that violates Plaintiffs federal civil
rights and rights under the Pennsylvania Constitution as regards training for, procedures
concerning, performance of, and investigation of officer involved physical altercations, use of
force, and discharge of firearms, the Class is defined as: (a) all persons in the City of
Philadelphia who have been or may in the future be injured or injured or killed, or who come
into contact with Philadelphia Police Officers during arrest where physicality, use of force, or
discharge of firearms is involved; and (b) all minorities who have or may in the future come
into contact with Philadelphia Police Officers where the aforesaid factors are involved and/or
where a police conduct during the interaction results from or is affected by failure to train or a
racially discriminatory application of policy (including but not limited to disparate impact and
intentional discrimination).
12.
The claims for equitable relief sought against the Philadelphia Police
Department may proceed as a class action because:

a. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members in impracticable;
b. There are questions of law or fact common to the class, including but not
limited to whether the involved customs, polices and procedures of the
Philadelphia Police Department violate federal civil rights laws and the
Pennsylvania Constitution.
c. Plaintiffs claims are common to and typical of the class members with respect
to the injunctive relief requested.
d. The harms suffered by Plaintiff are typical of the harms suffered by the class
and a final judgment ordering the relief requested is appropriate relief in this
action.
e. Plaintiff and undersigned counsel will fairly and adequately represent the rights
of the class.
f. Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the
Plaintiff Class, making declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the
Plaintiff Class as a whole appropriate and necessary.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
13.
14.
This Honorable Court has jurisdiction and venue is appropriate in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania because the actions complained of herein all occurred in this District.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
A.
THE KILLING OF BRANDON TATE-BROWN
15.
16.
On or about December 15, 2014, in the early morning, pre-dawn hours,
decedent, Brandon Tate-Brown, a 26-year-old black male, was lawfully driving a 2014 White
Dodge Charger with Florida license plates.
17.
On or about such date, Defendants Officer Carrelli and Officer Dang were
working in the 15th Police District, in full uniform, in a marked police cruiser, allegedly
patrolling the district.
18.
On such date, at or near the 6000 block of Frankford Avenue, according to
police reports, said Defendants claim they observed Brandon Tate-Brown, an African
American male, driving the said late model Dodge Charger, a luxury vehicle, in the middle of
the night.
19.
At or about said time, according to said Defendants, upon observing Brandon
Tate-Brown driving the said vehicle, and believing that Brandons daytime running lights
were on (as opposed to full headlights) the said Defendant police officers engaged their police
lights and pursued Brandon Tate-Brown, signaling for him to pull over.
20.
In compliance with the police officers, Brandon Tate-Brown engaged his turn
signal and pulled over on the 6700 block of Frankford Avenue, in front of several shops and
directly adjacent to a gun dealership.
21.
According to surveillance video viewed by Plaintiff, Brandon Tate-Brown
complied with the officers when pulling him over. According to the video, Plaintiff believes
that Brandon Tate-Browns headlights were on while he was driving and at the time he was
pulled over.
22.
The video shows a long interaction between the two Defendant officers and
Brandon Tate-Brown prior to Brandon Tate-Brown being asked to step out of his vehicle.
23.
Plaintiff believes the video shows that for a period of time prior to Brandon
Tate-Brown being asked to step out of his vehicle, Carrelli, the discharging officer, appeared
to have his gun pointed at Brandon Tate-Brown for the duration of Brandons time inside of
his vehicle.
24.
According to official police reports, the police officer Defendants claim to
have pulled Brandon Tate-Brown over for driving without headlights.

25.
The police documents also claim that they were just pulling him over to check
on him, make sure he was ok, have him turn on the lights, and then go on his way.
26.
The fact that on video, the officers appeared to act aggressively and/or have
their guns drawn during the interaction with Brandon Tate-Brown while he was still in his
vehicle is not in accordance with standard police procedure, or in accordance with the
statement that they were just checking on the safety of a motorist.
27.
The police officers and the police department have made several inconsistent
and seemingly dishonest claims and statements concerning the decision to pull over Brandon
Tate-Brown. Upon information and belief, one eyewitness who is also a Philadelphia Parking
Authority Officer, and who was assisting Philadelphia Police Officers at the scene, during the
event, observed police state that they thought Brandon was matched the description of a
suspect from an earlier robbery. There was no mention of headlights as an issue.
28.
The police department advised the Medical Examiner on the date in question
that Brandon Tate-Brown was pulled over for a routine traffic stop, and made no mention of
headlights.
29.
After pulling Brandon Tate-Brown over, Plaintiff believes and therefore avers
that at least one of the officers became aggressive with Brandon Tate-Brown for no reason,
pulling a gun on Brandon Tate-Brown and pointing the gun at him while still in his vehicle,
while he was cooperating with police.
30.
During this time period, Plaintiff believes and avers that, instead of just
checking on the safety of a motorist driving without full headlights (their stated reason for
pulling him over) the police officers began an aggressive interaction with Brandon with the
intent of harassing Brandon Tate-Brown, instigating a struggle, assaulting him, arresting him,
and charging him with a crime. When Brandon Tate-Brown resisted, and tried to run from the
aggressive and assaultive officers, Carrelli shot Brandon Tate-Brown once in the back of the
head from close range.
31.
During the initial approach, and, Plaintiff believes, while pointing a gun at
Brandon, the officers aggressively questioned Brandon about his vehicle.

32.
Brandon explained, truthfully, that he worked at a car rental agency, and that
he was using the car by permission of his manager, and identified the agency as Hertz,
producing appropriate paperwork at the request of the officers, and providing the phone
number and contact information for his manager.
33.
Pursuant to the police side of the story, the officers were just checking on
Brandons safety, since his headlights were out, and then intending to let him go. Instead of
doing that, however, they needlessly became aggressive, pulled a gun, inquired into
ownership of the vehicle, called in the plates, and learned that the vehicle was allegedly
registered to Dollar Rental Car (a 100% owned subsidiary of Hertz), and not Hertz. Upon
learning this, the officers again approached Brandons vehicle and this time ordered him to
step out of the vehicle.
34.
This order constituted an unlawful arrest of Brandon Tate-Brown.
35.
Hertz owns Dollar Rental Car, which is a fully owned subsidiary of Hertz and
has been since 2012.

36.
A reasonable police officers knows or should know that not every rental car is
registered in the name of the rental dealer, because of the overlapping ownership in the
industry or because many times the dealers are franchises, subsidiaries or agents of a related
company. When dealing with rental cars, officers know or should know that these facts do
not create reasonable suspicion of crime or probable cause to arrest a driver.
37.
The rental car being registered to Dollar, Hertzs subsidiary, was not a basis to
request Brandon to step out of the vehicle.

38.
This, combined with a lack of full headlights, was no basis to arrest the driver
of the vehicle or to continue the traffic investigation.

39.
Police reports state that it is due to this alleged inconsistency that the
decision was made to ask Brandon Tate-Brown to leave the vehicle and to place him under
arrest.
40.
There was no inconsistency and even if there was, there was no evidence that
any crime was being committed, nor any probable cause or reasonable suspicion as to same.
Rather, a simple question about the rental car would have answered any valid concern, and if
the intention of the police were, as officially stated, to just check on safety, have Brandon turn
on the lights, and then send him on his way, this rental car issue would not have caused the
officers to decide to arrest Brandon by directing him out of his vehicle.
41.
Once Brandon was asked to exit the vehicle, Carrelli claims he then spotted a
gun in Brandons vehicle lodged between the center console and the passenger seat, and
claims to have called out Gun, to his partner.
42.
Brandon complied with the request to exit the vehicle.
43.
Once he exited the vehicle, he continued to comply with Hangs instructions.
During this time, according to an eyewitness statement, Hang pointed a gun at Brandons
back, demanding to know where the gun was.
44.
Upon information and belief, Brandon denied having a gun.
45.
After the overly aggressive pullover, and after Carrelli was pointing a gun at
Brandon while he was still in the car and pulled over (and before any allegation that Brandon
had a gun in the car), Brandon Tate-Brown now had Hang pointing a gun at his back.
46.
From Brandon Tate-Browns perspective, his life was in danger due to these
two overly aggressive and inappropriate police officers pointing guns at him from the start of
their interaction.
47.
Upon information and belief, along with the aggressiveness in pulling their
guns, the defendant rookie police officers also acted aggressively and in a threatening manner
towards Brandon Tate-Brown, such that Brandon Tate Brown reasonably feared they were
going to shoot him or harm him physically.
48.
Although Carrelli claims to have seen a gun, he did not obtain the alleged gun
from the car, secure the gun, or take any action to document the existence of the alleged gun.
Rather, at or about the time that Hang was pointing a gun directly at Brandons back,
according to the eyewitness, a struggle broke out between Hang and Brandon Tate-Brown.
49.
Plaintiff believes and therefore avers that the struggle began because Hang was
pointing a gun to Brandons back, a threat to shoot him, and, along with his overly aggressive
partner, Carrelli, who had his gun pointed at Brandon during the earlier phase of the stop,
before Brandon was asked to step out of the vehicle, he was acting aggressively towards
Brandon. Brandon Tate-Brown reasonably feared for his life and safety at this moment.
50.
In the alternative, Brandon Tate-Brown resisted Hang because Hang began to
physically beat, hit or harm Brandon Tate-Brown.

51.
As Brandon resisted Hang, who was pointing a gun at Brandons back,
Carrelli, upon information and belief, decided to become physically violent with Brandon, and
engaged in a struggle with Brandon wherein Brandon was beaten and subjected to unlawful
and excessive force.
52.
Instead of securing the alleged gun that was allegedly in the car, Carrelli claims
that he went around the vehicle to help Hang fight Brandon Tate-Brown.
53.
Brandon Tate-Brown was now being beaten by two overly aggressive police
officers who were rookies, and neither of which had been on the police force for more than a
year. He struggled with them to protect himself, and several times, broke free from their
grips, and ran away from them. The struggle took place in the middle of Frankford Avenue.
54.
Brandon Tate-Brown was unarmed for the entire duration of the struggle.
55.
In subsequent police interviews, the officers confirm hat Brandon Tate-Brown
never threw a punch at them or hit them in any way during the struggle when he was trying to
escape their violence.

56.
At no time during the struggle, even according to police accounts, was
Brandon Tate-Brown armed or holding a weapon.

57.
Brandon Tate-Brown was carrying a cellphone for the duration of the struggle,
which was ringing during and after the struggle, according to EMT records.
58.
During the struggle, near the end of the struggle, Brandon again broke free
from the officers. According to the video, he ran across Frankford Avenue, in the direction of
his vehicle, across the rear of his vehicle. Carrelli chased Brandon, and as Brandon, in a
running motion, reached the rear right brake light of his vehicle, running across the back from
left to right, Carrelli discharged his firearm one time, shooting Brandon in the back of his
head, killing him. At the time Brandon was shot, he was near the rear of his vehicle, not near
or reaching into the passenger side front door where the gun was alleged to have been located.
59.
Hours after the shooting, a police evidence team finally recovered an alleged
gun in Brandons vehicle. Months later, the police claimed that that the weapon allegedly
found was reported stolen in 2012, and that a mixture of DNA on the weapon likely
contained Brandons DNA.
60.
The official police department position from the date of the incident in
December, 2014, as released to the public, was that Carrelli was justified in shooting Brandon
Tate-Brown because, at the time of the shooting, Brandon Tate-Brown was reaching for the
alleged gun into the front passenger seat of the vehicle.
61.
However, the surveillance video shows, as stated, that Brandon Tate-Brown
was shot near the rear of his vehicle, by the right rear brake light, not near the passenger door
or reaching into the passenger door.

62.
The claim that Brandon Tate-Brown was reaching into the vehicle for a gun at
the time he was shot is a complete fabrication on the part of the Defendant officers and the
police department.
63.
Moreover, Plaintiff never believed the police story that Brandon Tate-Brown
had a gun in his vehicle. Rather, due to the inconsistencies and false statements uncovered,
including the false claim by the police officers that Brandon Tate-Brown was shot because he
was reaching into the passenger side door for his gun, Plaintiff believes that these police
officers have no credibility.
64.
In June, 2015, Philadelphia Police Commissioner Ramsey admitted that there
was never any evidence that Brandon Tate-Brown was reaching for a gun when he was shot,
and, in a complete turnaround from the original story, blamed the original false police
narrative publics and the news medias thirst for details.
65.
Plaintiff, however, believes and avers that the false released narrative fed to the
public for six months, that Brandon Tate-Brown had to be shot because he was reaching into
the passenger door for a gun, was always an intentional lie.
66.
The alleged gun was not recovered from the vehicle for several hours after the
shooting.
67.
During this time, it would have been possible for Defendant police officers to
plant a drop gun in the vehicle. A drop gun is a gun planted by a police officer to falsely
implicate a suspect in the possession of a gun. Brandons blood, bodily fluids and DNA were
all over the street and sidewalk after the shooting. It would have been possible for police
officers to wipe some of Brandons DNA onto a drop gun.
68.
Almost immediately after the shooting, business owners, including the owners
of the aforesaid gun dealership, were called by police to the scene prior to opening of business
in order to obtain any video surveillance evidence from their places of business.
69.
For this purpose, upon information and belief, police entered the aforesaid
places of business, including the aforesaid gun dealership, to review and seize video
surveillance equipment.
70.
Plaintiff believes and therefore avers, based upon the false claim by police that
Brandon Tate-Brown was reaching for a gun when he was shot, that in fact, this claim is a lie,
and that to bolster this lie, and protect themselves from discipline or prosecution, a drop gun
was obtained and used, and placed in the vehicle, where it remained for several hours before
the evidence team removed it.
71.
In addition, on video captured by news cameras, the evidence team is seen
placing the alleged gun against the car hood, where Brandons DNA could have been located
as a result of the shooting near the rear of the vehicle, contaminating the evidence.
Importantly, of several swabs of DNA taken from the alleged gun, Brandons DNA appears
nowhere except for the swab from the butt of the gun. This is the area where the evidence
team is seen to have contaminated the gun by placing the butt of the gun on the vehicle next to
which Brandon had just been shot in the head and around and upon which was his blood and
DNA.

72.
This improper handling of the crime scene invalidates any claim that
Brandons DNA was on the alleged gun.

73.
Brandons fingerprints were not on the gun.
74.
In order to believe that Brandon had a gun in the vehicle, a fact finder must
find the police officers testimony to be credible. However, as stated, the police made several
contradictory and dishonest statements and claims concerning the events in question. Upon
information and belief, a fact finder could decide that the officers, due to these inconsistent
statements, are not credible, and refuse to believe that any gun was seen during the traffic
stop.
75.
In addition, an unauthorized photograph taken at the scene, from behind police
lines, and then posted online, by an unknown person, shows that Brandons body, or the car,
was moved after Brandon was killed to position Brandon near the passenger side of the door.
Supporting this assertion, the Medical Examiner noted in his report that the scene was
disturbed. Moving Brandons body closer to the passenger side, or moving the car so that the
body would be near the passenger door, was, upon information and belief, an action taken to
support the false assertion that Brandon was reaching into the passenger side door before he
was shot.
Responding officers also confirmed that the body was rolled over.
Upon
information and belief, this moving of the body constituted tampering with the scene, another
dishonest practice.
76.
Upon information and belief, the force used against Brandon Tate-Brown was
excessive from the start. From the decision to pull him over for no reason, or because he,
being a black male, allegedly matched a prior robbery, to the decision to ask him to step out of
the vehicle and arrest him because his car rental paperwork said Hertz but the car was
registered to Dollar, a subsidiary of Hertz, to pointing a gun at him while he was still in the
vehicle (before any alleged claim that Brandon had a gun in the vehicle), to pointing a gun at
Brandons back after he complied and stepped out of the vehicle, to becoming physical and
starting a struggle with Brandon, to chasing him and beating him, and then, finally, to
shooting him while he was unarmed, in the back of the head, near the rear of his vehicle, the
actions of the Defendant police officers constituted excessive and unlawful force, unlawful
seizure and arrest.
77.
In addition, for at least part of the time, the Police Officers mistook Brandons
cell phone for a gun or other weapon. Plaintiff believes that if Carrelli saw anything, it was a
cell phone, and not a gun, and does not believe as not credible, any of the officers claims
regarding the alleged gun that was allegedly recovered from the vehicle.
78.
The lack of fingerprints, a DNA mixture appearing only on the contaminated
butt of the gun (but not on any other swabs from the gun), Brandons DNA all over the street
and sidewalk, and a gun that was stolen in 2012 from an unknown party do not lead to a
conclusion that Brandon Tate-Brown ever possessed this gun. A fact finder could decline to
believe that the police story regarding the gun is credible, and instead, could believe that the
gun was a drop gun. The police department has regularly contented with known cases of
police officers planting evidence on suspects.
79.
Additional lies told by the police immediately after the shooting included
telling the first EMT on the scene that Brandon was shot because he was shooting his gun at
police and telling persons on the scene that Brandon was shot because he was reaching into
his vehicle for a gun.

80.
Later that morning, at Internal Affairs, Carrelli repeated that false story to his
Sgt. and dishonestly stated that Brandon was shot while reaching for the gun.
81.
As stated, Commissioner Ramsey has now admitted that there was never any
evidence Brandon was reaching for a gun, and that same was a false story.
82.
Despite the false story, Carrelli has not been disciplined, and continues to hold
his badge and gun as a police officer.

83.
Major deficiencies in PPD training contributed to and were a substantial factor
in the unlawful pullover, arrest, seizure, beating, and killing of Brandon Tate-Brown. As
explained below, these deficiencies have also been identified by the United States Department
of Justice (DOJ) as requiring substantial reform and correction.
84.
The actions of the foregoing Defendant police officers were negligent,
reckless, and/or, in the alternative, malicious and intentional, and tinged with racial bias.
85.
The PPD was negligent and recklessly indifferent in the hiring and training of
the aforesaid Defendant Police Officers.

86.
The aforesaid Defendant Police Officers, rookies in their first year of
employment, were provided with the very same deficient training and procedures noted as
lacking and deficient by the DOJ.
87.
The police investigation into the shooting was deficient, less than forthcoming,
non-transparent, and lacks even any scintilla of credibility.

88.
The police department, as a result of the investigation and false statements by
the officers involved, for a period of six months, falsely maintained that Brandon was
reaching into the car for his gun, in the passenger door. The entire time, the Department had a
video that showed the truth: Brandon was killed at the rear of his vehicle. This incredible and
arrogant deception is more than mere error; Plaintiff believes that the police have intentionally
lied and continue to do so concerning the facts of Brandons death. The powers that be did
not want another Ferguson in Philadelphia, and came out strong, from the morning of the
shooting and for a period of six months after, in an effort to taint Brandons name, and paint
him as the aggressor reaching for a gun, when none of that was ever true. These officers
should have their badges and guns taken from them, at the very least. But the Department has
not disciplined them in any way for their conduct. And that Department has not been
disciplined. No heads have rolled, no resignations have been demanded; business continues
as usual. This Honorable Court has the hold the Department accountable for the illegal and
dishonest actions of the Philadelphia Police Department concerning killing of Brandon TateBrown.
89.
The investigation lacks all hallmarks of accuracy and integrity. Police officer
and witness statements were not were not videotaped. Police officers were questioned only
after the witnesses signed statements that were composed by police investigators. This is
contrary to the practices of proper investigation in officer use of force, and adds to the lack of
credulity of the police departments findings in the investigation. The police changed their
story several time during events. The statements and findings of investigation appear to have
been intentionally embellished to lead to a conclusion that the shooting was justified.
90.
The police refused, for six months, to release evidence, or the video
surveillance of the shooting, to the public. At all times, during this refusal, the police
maintained Brandon was shot because he was reaching for a gun into the front passenger seat.
At all times, the video, which they continued to hide, showed otherwise.
91.
The police department has acted with a lack of transparency, further leading to
questions as to what they are hiding.

92.
The police department first released minor, selected portions of statements and
evidence, but failed to release any evidence that could be used to support Plaintiffs claims.
93.
The police department has engaged in a failed attempt to pull the wool over the
eyes of the public, by refusing to release the video and claiming that Brandon Tate-Brown
was reaching into the passenger side door when he was shot, a fabrication.
94.
After six months of public pressure and legal actions, in June, 2015, the police
department finally released the video to the public and admitted that their claim that Brandon
Tate-Brown was reaching for a gun was false. Still, the investigation has not been reopened
and the officers remain on the street.
95.
Based upon the police department fabrications involved, Plaintiff believes and
avers that the police evidence cannot be trusted in this case, and seeks a formal finding that
the police department has lied during the investigation, and that the jury be instructed as to
such lies, and that the jury be instructed that if it believes the police lied or tampered with
evidence, that they may find in favor of the Plaintiff.
96.
Further, upon a showing that police lied or tampered with any evidence, or
made any false statements or official reports, Plaintiff requests that this Honorable Court enter
judgment in her favor, as a sanction for spoliation of evidence.

97.
As a direct and proximate result of the deficiencies in training, policies,
operations, and investigations, Brandon Tate-Brown sustained injuries and damages including
death.
B.
THE PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENTS
USE OF FORCE TRAINING, POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND INVESTIGATIONS
ARE DEFICIENT AND VIOLATE PLAINTIFFS FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS THE
PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION
1.
98.
The 2015 DOJ Report
At all times relevant hereto, the Philadelphia Police Department has knowingly
continued and maintained practices and policies that violate Plaintiffs federal civil rights and
the Pennsylvania Constitution.
99.
In or around 2013, amidst a drop in violent crimes and assaults against the
police, the number of Philadelphia Police Department (PPD) officer involved shootings
(OIS) was on the rise, as was the number of fatal OISs, which was uncovered and reported
by the Philadelphia Inquirer. An Assessment of Deadly Force in the Philadelphia Police
Department, US Department of Justice, March 23, 2015 (hereafter DOJ Report) at 1.
100.
In recognition of the problems in the PPD relating to use of force, the United
States Justice Department began an investigation related to officer use of force, deadly use of
force, and officer involved shootings. Id.
101.
The investigation by the Department of Justice was conducted by an
interdisciplinary team of researchers, analysts, and subject matter experts over a 12-month
period. Id.
102.
As a result of the investigation, the Department of Justice issued the DOJ

Report on or about March 23, 2015.

103.
In the Report, the DOJ made the following findings and/or recommendations,
inter alia:
a. Finding: PPD officers do not receive regular, consistent training on the
departments deadly force policy. Recommendation: The PPD should develop
a standard training module on [use of deadly force] and require all sworn
personnel to complete the training on an annual basis.
b. Finding: The PPD requires officers to complete crisis intervention training
(CIT) in order to obtain an electronic control weapon (ECW) [taser]. This
requirement conflates the two tactical approaches and limits the distribution of
less-lethal tools throughout the department. Recommendation: ECWs should
be standard-issue weapons for all PPD officers assigned to uniformed
enforcement units; All PPD officers in uniformed enforcement units should be
required to carry ECWs on their duty belts at all times.
c. Finding: PPD recruit training is not conducted in a systemic and modular
fashion. As a result, some recruit classes receive firearms training close to the
end of the academy, whereas others receive it early on. Recommendation: The
PPD should revise the sequencing of its academy curriculum so that recruits
are continually building on previously learned skills; Skills that require
continual training and refinement, such as firearms, defensive tactics,
communications, and driving, should be staggered throughout the length of the
academy.
d. Finding: For some PPD recruits, de-escalation training has been little more
than lecture and observations. Focus group participants generally agreed that
more de-escalation training was needed at the academy; Recommendation: The
PPD should revamp its academy de-escalation training, ensuring that recruits
receive more hours of scenario training, which allows each recruit to exercise
and be evaluated on verbal de-escalation skills; PPD de-escalation training
should be expanded to include a discussion of tactical de-escalation.
e. Finding: Incidents involving discourtesy, use of force, and allegations of bias
by PPD officers leave segments of the community feeling disenfranchised and
distrustful of the police department. Recommendation: PPDs academy should
significantly increase the scope and duration of its training on core and
advanced community oriented policing.
f. Finding: The PPD lacks a field-training program to help transition academy
graduates into full-time work as officers. Recommendation: The PPD should
develop a field-training program.
g. Finding: The PPDs annual in-service training requirements tend to be limited
to municipal police officer education and training commission standards. As a
result, officers do not regularly receive in-service training on threat perception,
decision making, and de-escalation. Recommendation: The PPD should add at
least one additional day of reality-based training to its annual requirements.
Recommendation: The PPD should include training in procedural justice
during the next offering of mandatory in-service program courses.
Recommendation: The PPD should include training in fair and impartial
policing during the next offering of mandatory in-service program courses.
h. Finding: The PPD requires that officers qualify with their firearms just once
per calendar year. Recommendation: The PPD should require that officers
qualify with their weapons at least twice per year.
i. Finding: PPD officers do not receive in-service defensive tactics training.
Recommendation: The PPD should provide periodic defensive tactics training.
j. Finding: OIS investigations generally lack consistency. Recommendation: The
PPD should establish a single investigative unit devoted to criminal
investigations of all deadly force incidents. Recommendation: PPD deadly
force investigation team (DFIT) members should have the experience and
training necessary to conduct thorough and objective OIS investigations.
Recommendation: The PPD should develop a manual for conducting OIS
investigations from a criminal standpoint.
k. Finding: The PPDs current practice for recording interviews of witnesses and
discharging officers is through typed notes. Recommendation: The PPD should
establish a policy that interviews of all critical witnesses and suspects in the
course of an OIS investigation will be video and audio recorded.
l. Finding: The IAD shooting team waits for the district attorneys office
(DAO) to decline charges against an officer before it interviews discharging
officers and closes its investigation. As a result, most officers involved in
shootings are not interviewed until three or more months after the incident
occurred. Recommendation: The PPD should revise its policy and practice so
that the criminal investigative unit assigned to each OIS is the primary point of
contact with the DAO. The IAD should be extricated from this role.
Recommendation: The shooting team should conduct interviews with all

discharging officer(s) as soon as practical, but not later than 72 hours after the
incident. Recommendation: The IAD should set a goal to close administrative
investigations within 30 days of the DAOs declination. Recommendation: All
interviews of discharging officers should be video recorded.
m. Finding: The scope of shooting team investigations focuses solely on policy,
while largely neglecting officer tactics and decision making. Recommendation:
The shooting team should significantly enhance their investigative scope to
include officer tactics and decision making. Recommendation: Shooting team
investigative reports should highlight findings and any inconsistencies in
policy, procedure, and training for the use of force review board to evaluate in
their decision. Recommendation: The shooting team should develop an
operations manual, delineating all of their investigative activities, reporting,
and role in the review process.
n. Finding: The UFRB and PBI are duplicative processes that at times have
conflicting outcomes. This sends a mixed message to members of the
department and causes unnecessary internal strife. Recommendation: The PPD
should dismantle the two-board system for OISs and combine the functions of
the UFRB and PBI into one integrated board. Recommendation: The newly
established board should conduct a comprehensive review of each incident.
Recommendation: Voting board members should include command staff, a
sworn officer one rank higher than the involved officer, a peer officer, and at
least one citizen representative. Recommendation: Shooting team investigators
should make a formal presentation of the facts to the board, highlighting any
potential conflicts and key points for deliberation amongst the board.
Recommendation: Board members should have the opportunity to call
witnesses and ask questions related to the incident. Recommendation: After
board proceedings are complete, voting members should deliberate the case
and issue a finding by majority vote.
o. Finding: The PPD has begun posting a significant amount of data and case
information on its website. Still, more transparency is needed for properly
keeping the community informed. Recommendation: The PPD should, at a
minimum, publish directive 10, directive 22, and the yet-to-be-written directive
of the UFRB on the OIS webpage. Recommendation: The PPD should update
its website as case files are closed and available for public dissemination.
Recommendation: The PPD website should be updated to include more
detailed accounts of the OIS and DAO review of the incident.
Recommendation: The PPD should publish a detailed report on use of force,
including deadly force, on an annual basis. The report should be released to the
public.
p. Finding: The PPD does not fully accommodate the [Police Advisory
Commission (PAC)] in its role to provide independent civilian oversight of
police operations in Philadelphia. Recommendation: The PPD should work
with the PAC and accommodate requests for important documentation,
investigative files, and data related to all uses of force, including OISs.
q. Finding: Distrust in the ability of the PPD to investigate itself pervades
segments of the community. Scandals of the past and present, high profile OIS
incidents, and a lack of transparency in investigative outcomes help cement
this distrust. Recommendation: The PPD should establish a policy stating that
the police commissioner or designee will hold a press conference on an OIS
incident within 72 hours of the incident. Recommendation: The PPD should
enter into an agreement with the police advisory commission allowing a PAC
observer access to all pertinent documentation related to an OIS investigation.
Recommendation: The police commissioner should enter into a memorandum
of understanding with an external, independent investigative agency, through
which the investigation of all OISs involving an unarmed person will be
submitted for review.
r. Finding: The PPD lacks a field training program to help transition academy
graduates into full-time work as officers. Recommendation: The PPD should
develop a field training program.
s. Finding: PPD officers do not receive in-service defensive tactics training.
Recommendation: The PPD should provide periodic defensive tactics training.
t. Finding: The PPDs current practice for recording interviews of witnesses and
discharging officers is thought typed notes.
Recommendation:
The PPD
should establish a policy that interviews of all critical witnesses and suspects in
the course of an OIS investigation will be video and audio recorded.
u. Finding: The PPD lacks official training requirements for IAD shooting team
members. Recommendation: Current and future members of the shooting
team should be required to receive specialized training in OIS investigations.
104.
All of the finding and recommendations in the DOJ Report are incorporated
herein by reference.
105.
As to racial bias in use of deadly force matters, the DOJ Report found as
follows:
a. The racial composition of suspects in OISs was 80% Black, 10% Hispanic, 9%
White, and 1% Asian.
b. White suspects were unarmed in 8 of 32 OISs (25%). Black suspects were
unarmed in 45 of 285 OISs (15.8%). Hispanic suspects were unarmed 4 of 340
OISs (14.7%). Asian suspects were unarmed in 1 of 5 OISs (20%).
c. Black suspects in OISs were the most likely to be the subject of a threat
perception failure by police (i.e., believing the suspect was armed when he was
not).
106.
In summary, the DOJ Report stated as follows: The department has much
work to do in the months and years ahead. Our assessment uncovered policy, training, and
operational deficiencies in addition to an undercurrent of significant strife between the
community and department. It yielded 48 findings and 91 recommendations for the
department to reform its deadly force practices. Id. at 9.
107.
The foregoing policy, training, and operational deficiencies create a risk of
imminent harm to persons interacting with police in arrest, use of force or possible use of
force situations. As a result of these deficiencies, lack of training, and lack of appropriate and
modern police investigation techniques, persons being arrested or pulled over by police, or
coming into contact with police in use of force situations are in imminent danger of harm.
108.
The foregoing deficiencies have contributed to wrongful deaths and injuries to
suspects and other members of the public dealing with police in use of force or potential use
of force situations, have contributed to a pattern of conduct in police shootings that fail to
meet the minimum standards required under federal law and the Pennsylvania Constitution,
and have denied those interacting with police in these situations of their basic rights to life,
liberty, equal protection, substantive and procedural due process of law, and nondiscrimination, all in violation of the federal Civil Rights Act and the Pennsylvania
Constitution.
2.
Prior Reports, Litigation, Policy, Practice, and Custom
109.
110.
As noted in the Complaint in the related class action Bailey et al. v. City of
Philadelphia, E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 10-5952, the PPD has a history of conducting stops, frisks,
detentions and searches without probable cause or reasonable suspicious and of intentionally
subjecting persons to these measures, at times accompanied by the unreasonable use of force,
based on their race or ethnicity. Id. at paragraph 80.
111.
Paragraphs 80 through 98 in the aforesaid Bailey action are incorporated by
reference herein, and are re-alleged as though restated herein in full.

112.
The foregoing action was resolved by way of Consent Decree, which upon
information and belief, is still in effect.

113.
By and through their actions as aforesaid, the Defendants have continued to
violate the rights of Plaintiff and the class members to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures, made without reasonable suspicion or probable cause.
114.
By and through their actions aforesaid, the Defendants have denied Plaintiff
and the class members equal protection of the laws when searches, seizures, stops, and frisks
are conducted on the basis of race or ethnic origin, either intentionally, or by disparate impact
or treatment.
115.
In addition to the relief provided by the Court in the aforesaid Consent Decree,
Plaintiff seeks court supervision of implementation of all recommendations of the DOJ in the
DOJ Report.
CAUSES OF ACTION
COUNT I
WRONGFUL DEATH
PLANTIFF v. DEFENDANTS
116.
117.
The foregoing actions of Defendants were the direct and proximate cause of
the wrongful death of Brandon Tate-Brown.

118.
The forgoing actions of Defendants constitute wrongful acts, neglect, unlawful
violence, negligence, and/or recklessness and/or malicious and intentional misconduct.

119.
By virtue of the Pennsylvania Wrongful Death Act, Plaintiff is entitled on
behalf of the beneficiaries of the Estate to recover compensatory and punitive damages, and
damages for any hospital, nursing, medical, funeral, and estate administration expenses
necessitated by reason of injuries causing death.
COUNT II
FALSE ARREST
PLAINTIFF v. DEFENDANTS
120.
121.
This claim is brought pursuant to Pennsylvanias survival statute.
122.
The Defendants pulled Brandon Tate-Brown over for no valid reason
123.
The Defendants arrested Brandon Tate-Brown when they directed him to step
out of his vehicle and restricted his movements and freedom; he was not free to leave.
124.
The Defendants arrested Brandon Tate-Brown without probable cause, and
stopped him without reasonable suspicion.

125.
The Defendants were not authorized to arrest Brandon Tate-Brown.
126.
As a direct and proximate result of the aforesaid, Brandon Tate-Brown was
harmed, for which harm compensatory and punitive damages may be recovered.
COUNT III
ASSAULT
127.
128.
By virtue of their wrongful conduct, as aforesaid, prior to his death, Defendants
engaged in acts that were meant to cause a reasonable apprehension of imminent and harmful
contact.
129.
130.

COUNT IV
BATTERY
131.
By virtue of their wrongful conduct, as aforesaid, Defendants, prior to the
death of Brandon Tate-Brown, made harmful and offensive contact with him, and caused him
to suffer serious injuries including but not limited to blunt force trauma wounds, and pain and
suffering.
132.
COUNT V
PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATION
42 Pa.C.S. 8309 ET SEQ.
133.
134.
By virtue of their wrongful conduct as aforesaid, Defendants subjected
Brandon Tate-Brown to injury to his person.

135.
Upon information and belief, Brandon Tate-Browns race (African American),
was a substantial factor in the decision to pull Brandon Tate-Brown over, and to assault and
mistreat him, in that he allegedly matched the description of an African American male
involved in a prior robbery on the date in question. In addition, the discriminatory policies
and practices of the police department raise an inference of racial motivation.
136.
Thereafter, the Defendants acted aggressively towards Brandon Tate-Brown,
and subjected him to actions constituting the crimes of simple and aggravated assault, and
recklessly endangering another person.
137.
At all times relevant hereto, Defendants acted with malicious intention towards
the race or color of Brandon Tate-Brown.

138.
As a result, Defendants are liable for general and special damages, including
damages for emotional distress, punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees and costs, and
injunctive and other equitable relief.
COUNT VI
VIOLATION OF PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION
Request for Declaratory and Equitable Relief
Plaintiff, on behalf of the Estate and a class of all others similarly situated
v. all Defendants
139.
The Pennsylvania constitution provides, inter alia, as follows:
Section 1.
All men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent and
indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty,
of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their
own happiness.
Section 8.
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to seize any
person or things shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed by the affiant.
Section 9.
[T]he accused cannot be deprived of his life, liberty or property unless by the
judgment of his peers of the law of the land.
Section 26.
Neither the Commonwealth nor any political subdivision thereof shall deny to any
person the enjoyment of any civil right, nor discriminate against any person in the
exercise of any civil right.
140.
The forgoing deficiencies identified by the DOJ and prior reports and litigation
findings constitute a policy, practice or custom of the Philadelphia Police Department that
violates the Pennsylvania Constitution provisions previously cited.
141.
As a result of the foregoing deficiencies, Plaintiff suffered harm, injury, and
death.

142.
As a result of the foregoing deficiencies, and as long as they still exist, other
citizens of Philadelphia are at imminent risk of harm, injury and police misconduct in the use
of force, should they come into contact with, be arrested by, or be subjected to use of force by
police.
143.
So long as these violations of the Pennsylvania Constitution persist, the Police
Department is operating in a manner that violates the rights of persons of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, as aforesaid.
144.
Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks on behalf of the Estate and a class of similarly
situated individuals, the following declaratory and injunctive relief:

a.
A declaratory judgment that Defendant the City of Philadelphia, through the
PPD, violated the rights of Brandon Tate-Brown under the Pennsylvania Constitution;
b.
A declaratory judgment that the class is in imminent harm based upon the
aforesaid violations;
c.
A permanent injunction ordering the City of Philadelphia to complete all of the
91 recommendations of the DOJ Report, in order to come into compliance with

standards required under the Pennsylvania Constitution, on pain of contempt of court
for failure to comply;
d.
An order appointing a Master, Trustee, Receiver, or Monitor over the reform
efforts of the Philadelphia Police Department in implementing the said reforms, who
will report to the court as to progress or lack thereof, and who will be empowered to
take actions needed to ensure such reforms are completed;
e.
An order that this courts jurisdiction over the Police Departments reform
efforts shall continue until complete; and,

f.
An award of counsel fees and costs of suit, and any other form of relief that is
appropriate in the interests of justice.

COUNT VII
FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATION
42 USC SEC. 1983
VIOLATIONS OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
v. all Defendants
145.
146.
The foregoing actions of Defendants constitute a policy, practice, or custom in
violation of the rights of Plaintiff and the Class under the Fourth Amendment to the United
States constitution in the use of force and deadly force.
147.
As a direct and proximate cause of said policies and customs, and lack of
training and supervision, Plaintiff was injured and killed.

148.
The force used against decedent was excessive, unreasonable and unlawful.
149.
The arrest of decedent was unreasonable and unlawful.
150.
The violations of the rights of Plaintiff and the class were undertaken
knowingly, or with deliberate indifference to the rights of Plaintiff and the class.
151.
The Fourth Amendment is applicable to Defendants through the Fourteenth
Amendment and may be enforced herein through 42 USC 1983.

COUNT VII
42 USC SEC. 1983
VIOLATIONS OF EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
v. all Defendants
152.
153.
The foregoing actions of Defendants constitute a policy, practice, or custom
racial discrimination in violation of the rights of Plaintiff and the Class under the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
154.

155.
knowingly, or with deliberate indifference to the rights of Plaintiff and the class. Defendants
have actively targeted African Americans and minorities for unlawful treatment.
156.
The Fourteenth Amendment may be enforced herein through 42 USC 1983.

COUNT VII
42 USC SEC. 2000(d) et seq.
DISCRIMINATION IN FEDERALLY FUNDED PROGRAM
v. all Defendants
157.

158.
The foregoing actions of Defendants constitute a policy, practice, or custom
racial discrimination in violation of the rights of Plaintiff and the Class under the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
159.
The enforcement activities of the police department subject to the instant
Complaint are funded, in part, with federal funds.

160.

161.
knowingly, or with deliberate indifference to the rights of Plaintiff and the class. Defendants
have actively targeted African Americans and minorities for unlawful treatment.
162.
The actions of Defendants violate 42 USC Sec. 2000(d), et seq., which
proscribes discrimination based upon race or ethnicity in federally funded programs.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests this Honorable Court to enter judgment
in favor of Plaintiff and the class, and against Defendants, and to order the following relief:
a. A declaratory judgment that Defendant the City of Philadelphia, through
the PPD, violated the federal civil rights of Brandon Tate-Brown and his
rights under the Pennsylvania Constitution;
b. A declaratory judgment that the class is in imminent harm based upon the
aforesaid violations;
c. A permanent injunction ordering the City of Philadelphia to complete all of
the 91 recommendations of the DOJ Report, in order to come into
compliance with standards required under the US Constitution, the
Pennsylvania Constitution, and federal civil rights statutes, on pain of

contempt of court for failure to comply;
d. An order appointing a Master, Trustee, Receiver, or Monitor over the
reform efforts of the Philadelphia Police Department in implementing the
said reforms, who will report to the court as to progress or lack thereof, and
who will be empowered to take actions needed to ensure such reforms are
completed;
e. An order that this courts jurisdiction over the Police Departments reform
efforts shall continue until complete; and,
f. An award of counsel fees and costs of suit, and any other form of relief that
is appropriate in the interests of justice.
g. With respect to Plaintiffs individual claims, an award of compensatory,
punitive, special, wrongful death, and general damages, in an amount to be
determined at trial;
h. With respect to Plaintiffs individual claims, an award of counsel fees and
costs of suit; and
i. Such additional relief as may be appropriate or required in the interests of
justice.

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Brian R. Mildenberg
(215) 545-4870
Dated: 9/1/2015


Brandon Tate-Brown&#39;s Federal Lawsuit

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CIVIL COVER SHEET

(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff

County of Residence of First Listed Defendant

(EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES)

(c) Attorneys (Firm Name, Address, and Telephone Number)

(IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY)

Attorneys (If Known)

Brian R. Mildenberg, Esq.

Craig Straw, Esq. / John Coyle, Esq.

II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an X in One Box Only)

III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES (Place an X in One Box for Plaintiff

and One Box for Defendant)

Citizen of Another State

Incorporated and Principal Place

IV. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an X in One Box Only)

625 Drug Related Seizure

422 Appeal 28 USC 158

FEDERAL TAX SUITS

375 False Claims Act

V. ORIGIN (Place an X in One Box Only)

42 USC sec. 1983

VI. CAUSE OF ACTION Brief description of cause:

Action for wrongful death/excessive force/municipal liability and reforms

CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint:

SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

see attached listing

(Use Reverse Side For Additional Space)

terminated action in this court?

U in ONE CATEGORY ONLY)

A. Federal Question Cases:

B. Diversity Jurisdiction Cases:

1. 9 Indemnity Contract, Marine Contract, and All Other Contracts

1. 9 Insurance Contract and Other Contracts

2. 9 Airplane Personal Injury

3. 9 Jones Act-Personal Injury

4. 9 Marine Personal Injury

5. 9 Motor Vehicle Personal Injury

6. 9 Other Personal Injury (Please specify)

8. 9 Products Liability Asbestos

9. 9 Securities Act(s) Cases

9. 9 All other Diversity Cases

10. 9 Social Security Review Cases

11. 9 All other Federal Question Cases

(Check Appropriate Category)

$150,000.00 exclusive of interest and costs;

LIST OF NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF PARTIES:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Counsel for Plaintiff

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Counsel for Plaintiff

CLASS ACTION FOR

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

MILDENBERG LAW FIRM, PC

Plaintiff is Tanya Brown-Dickerson, an adult individual and citizen of

Plaintiff is the natural mother of Brandon Tate-Brown, deceased. Brandon

Plaintiff brings this action as Administratrix of the Estate of Brandon Tate-

Defendant, the City of Philadelphia, is a municipality and City of the First

Defendant, Nicholas Carrelli, is, upon information and belief, an adult

citizen of Philadelphia, who is employed by Defendant the City of Philadelphia as a Police

The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein by reference.

(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Department may proceed as a class action because:

The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein by reference.

Brandon Tate-Brown's Federal Lawsuit

Brandon Tate-Brown's Federal Lawsuit